National Security (State Threats) Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and John Hayes

2nd reading
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I think we agree about the threat we face and about its scale. We do not need to spend the four hours allocated for this debate sharing that agreement, as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis) rightly said. Our job is to scrutinise the Government’s proposed response to the threat, and that is what I want to do with my time. It is especially important to do that when the timescale for consideration of the legislation is compressed, as it is today.

I have huge sympathy with those who have spoken about the IRGC, but I would counsel against using this legislation to make the final decision about its proscription or designation. I do not want to steal the Minister’s lines, but I suspect that she will say to us, rightly, that it is important that we do not set a precedent, under this new system, of making designations in primary legislation, rather than by ministerial decision. There is an important procedural point there, which it will be necessary to maintain if we want to defend the flexibility that I think the Government are seeking in this legislation.

However, it is right to reflect on the problem that the Government are seeking to solve. The problem is clearly the gaps that they, and many of us, perceive in the proscription regime under the Terrorism Act, which does not enable them to deal with damaging behaviour by entities, including state entities, that are not captured by the proscription regime. That is the problem that Jonathan Hall identified in his report, and the problem that the Government are seeking to remedy through this legislation. They have made it clear that their objective is to present a regime that is broadly equivalent—the Government have used the word “equivalent” in their publications relating to this Bill—to the proscription regime. I want to explore that a little, to understand exactly how the Bill is going to deliver on its objectives.

I will start, as the Bill does, with the grounds for designation. The Bill is clear that in order to designate a body under this legislation, the Secretary of State must reasonably believe that it is, or has been, involved in what is described as “foreign power threat activity”, and then must consider that

“designating the body is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

It is important to understand what foreign power threat activity is. It is defined in section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 as

“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts or threats”,

which are set out in subsection (3), and include obtaining or disclosing protected information or trade secrets, assisting a foreign intelligence service, entering a prohibited place, sabotage, general foreign interference and obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service. Section 33 goes on to specify other acts:

“serious violence against another person…endanger the life of another person, or…create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.”

I set that out in detail because it is important to understand that for designation to be attached to a relevant body, it must have been involved in that sort of serious harmful activity. That is what would justify designation in the mind of the relevant Secretary of State: the body’s activities must be considered to be different from those of a normal state or other body engaged in its normal business.

In the explanatory notes, the Government give examples of things that might result in designation, such as, in paragraph 21,

“a foreign intelligence service obtaining protected information and inspecting sensitive defence or intelligence sites in the UK…a mercenary group carrying out acts of serious violence on behalf of a foreign power”,

or,

“a network preparing to carry out sabotage or threatening to commit acts that create a serious risk to the health and safety of the public”.

I set all that out because the Bill creates an offence of supporting a designated body, but in the construction of that offence, it is clear that the Government do not believe that all acts or expressions of support for a designated body are sufficient for that criminal liability. I want to understand why not.

[Sir John Hayes]

I hesitate to interrupt the flow of my right hon. and learned Friend, but the key point is legitimacy, as he and I have discussed. A state can be conducting legitimate activity by definition, whereas the bodies that have been proscribed previously are never legitimate implicitly. It is a difficult tightrope for Governments to walk, and that is why historically they have tended not to defer to a place where they chose to proscribed state bodies, because the implication is for the state as a whole. Where states take a “whole-state approach”—China being a good example—it is hard to walk that tightrope.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. Friend and Committee colleague is right in what he says, and I will come back to how and why we distinguish what the Bill proposes from the proscription regime.

On what is required to prove at least one of the criminal offences set out in this Bill, clause 2 introduces a new offence under a proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023. The offence involves support for a designated body, but only if such support is given for “a prohibited purpose”, which proposed new section 17A(4) sets out is

“a purpose that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

That is an additional element that the prosecution must prove. That will undoubtedly make this offence more difficult to obtain convictions under, and there may be good reason for that, but if there is, I want to understand what it is.

I make two observations on the Government’s chosen approach in relation to that specific proposed new offence. The first is that this is not equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. I use that expression because that is the wording the Government have used in setting out their aspirations with the Bill. Although the Government intend designation to be similar to proscription in many respects—I accept it cannot be in all respects—proscription does not require an additional motive for someone who supports a proscribed organisation, but merely that they support the proscribed organisation and know that that is what they are doing. No additional motive, demonstrating some kind of animus against the welfare of the United Kingdom, is needed, and that is an important distinction.

The Government may say that the reason for that difference is to protect those who are engaging with a legitimate entity in a way that, just as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) says, can never be possible with a proscribed terrorist organisation. In that case, however, I am struggling a little with the purpose and effect of designation itself. Surely the point of designation in the Bill is to move an organisation from the acceptable column into the unacceptable column. Surely the list of reasons why someone might be designated, which I read out earlier, is there to show us that those organisations, when they are doing those things, should not be worthy of support of any kind; but that is not, I think, where this legislation leaves us.

Lord Mandelson: Response to Humble Address

Debate between Jeremy Wright and John Hayes

Wednesday 3rd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Hayes]

Indeed, you will chastise me if I do not stick to my chronology precisely, Madam Deputy Speaker.

As the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) said, there is some confusion about the character of mitigation. We certainly know that nothing has been provided in respect of mitigation or about the reaction to the flags about Mandelson’s associations with senior figures in foreign states or his personal circumstances, yet Sir Oliver Robbins gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in April—its Chair has made this clear—in which he said that clearance could be approved if

“risks identified as of highest concern…could be managed and/or mitigated.”

Such mitigations were meant to have been noted in an email from Ian Collard, the Foreign Office head of security, noting the decision to grant Mandelson’s clearance. According to Sir Oliver Robbins, that email recorded

“the ways in which we would manage”

Mandelson’s clearance and “the mitigations”. Sir Oliver Robbins’s claim was supported by the top official in charge of gathering the Humble Address material, Cat Little. She told MPs that she had seen an email that

“sets out the decision to grant DV and some mitigations.”

There was certainly a stated need to manage the risks associated with Peter Mandelson’s appointment and an acknowledgment that that might be done through some process of mitigation, but we have heard no more. It may be that no detailed mitigation plan was drawn up. It is perfectly possible that that might have happened, for the very reason that these risks were so great that they could not have been mitigated. However, even if that were the case, surely there would have been box notes or communications in emails making all that clear between the Foreign Office and the Cabinet Office, between UKSV and the Cabinet Office, and between Ministers and officials, yet we have seen nothing.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, in addition to the concern he has expressed that there is no evidence of mitigations being put in place, there is a concern that there was not much time to do those mitigations between the point at which UKSV recommendations were received and the decision by the Foreign Office to grant vetting? There really was not much time for mitigations, as well as very little evidence that they were provided.

[Sir John Hayes]

That is true. Indeed, that might have been reflected in some of the messages that I have suggested to the Department that it might, even at this late stage, make available to our Committee—perhaps that is the most sensible thing given the terms of the Humble Address—and subsequently, in a redacted form, more widely. Even if it were true that because of the pace of the appointment, a full plan could not be drawn up, I find it inconceivable and—I would go as far as to say—unbelievable that there were no communications of any kind associated with the measures referred to by Sir Olly Robbins and Ian Collard.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and John Hayes

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I give way to my fellow Committee member.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am extremely grateful to the former Attorney General for giving way. He is right to say that the matter could have been—and still could be, as I think he will also want to confirm—brought to our Committee. If, even at this late juncture, an overture were made to our Committee—clearly, it would have to be discussed at Committee—it would be perfectly possible for the Government to set out in those terms the advice they received that legitimises the position that they have taken.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. Although all our hearings are held within closed doors, he is right that until that happens, our door is open. There is an opportunity for the Minister, if he wishes to take it, to make that proposal.

Let me come back to the point that the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) made. His rejoinder and the rejoinders of his colleagues and Ministers have always been the same throughout this debate. They say, “The last Government began negotiations on this, so clearly the last Government accept the same logic that we accept.” That simply will not do. As Ministers and the Back Benchers behind them have been very keen to point out, the last Government had 11 rounds of negotiation on this question. If they had chosen to do the deal that this Government have done, they had ample opportunity to do it, but they did not. That can only be because they did not believe it was the right deal to do.

This Government are undoubtedly enthusiastic about getting swift resolution of disputes—it seems that they apply the same principles to labour disputes—but settling a negotiation fast is really very easy if we give the person with whom we are negotiating everything they want. What Mauritius wanted out of this negotiation was sovereignty over the entire Chagos archipelago, and that is what this Government have given them. I am afraid that we really cannot award any points for the fact that this Government have managed to resolve this issue more swiftly. The fact that the Government of which some of us Conservative Members were part did not resolve it that quickly is perhaps because they were not prepared to give ground on that particular issue.

We need an explanation of why the Government feel it is necessary to do this deal. We need an explanation on what precisely the legal jeopardy they face is and what its origin is, and we need to know what the binding legal judgment they fear is. Frankly, without those explanations, this House should not be asked to agree to this Bill or this treaty.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Jeremy Wright and John Hayes

Friday 16th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the hon. Lady’s point and I have seen her amendments on the subject, which are very sensible. We need to think about the way in which the panel process will actually unfold. If we believe that this is an important safeguard, as, I think, is a common view, we need to do everything we can to make sure that it is an effective one. Like the hon. Lady’s amendments, my amendment 47 seeks to remedy the problem by ensuring that the assisted dying commissioner notifies anyone they think may have relevant evidence to give so that they can give it. That evidence may, of course, not change the panel’s decision, but in some of the most troubling cases it will, and the opportunity for the panel to consider that evidence, when the stakes are so high, must surely be provided for.

I accept that what I am proposing is an infringement of the privacy of the person wishing to die—it is a fetter on their ability to choose to die without informing their family or friends as they may wish—but the Bill is all about balancing the rights of a person to die as they wish with, on the other hand, our duty to protect the vulnerable from abuse. That is exactly why the stages through which a person must go in order to be assisted to die are in this Bill, including obtaining the grant of a certificate from a panel. To be of value, as I say, that must surely add new protections to the other stages.

[Sir John Hayes]

We were assured that one of the key safeguards in the Bill’s original incarnation was a legal test. That process—had it been retained, of course—would have enabled the collection of evidence in the very way that my right hon. and learned Friend is describing. It is partly because the safeguards have been weakened that we have the dilemma that his amendments seek to deal with.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s point, but I am not sure I entirely agree with him. I think some of the procedural problems I am describing would have existed even with the previous iteration of the Bill, but certainly they are there in its current iteration. At this Report stage, I am seeking to fix the problem that arises from the difficulty for the three qualified individuals who will constitute these panels to express a considered judgment. If we are to have added value in the panel stage of this process, we surely have to enable the panel to make good judgments. Good judgments come from the capacity to assess all the relevant evidence. The Bill, as it stands, makes it very hard for the panel to have access to all that evidence in every case, but perhaps especially in those cases where the additional safeguard is most needed.