European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill and Extension Letter

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay]

I can tell the House what has been ditched—the right hon. Gentleman’s manifesto, with him moving from the commitment he gave to respect the referendum result to one that is now characterised by dither and delay. The Leader of the Opposition questions the letter from the Prime Minister. What the Prime Minister made clear was that we would abide by the law, and Lord Pannick, among many others, has confirmed that the Prime Minister has done so, so there is no question as to the commitment from him. Of course, the Leader of the Opposition disagrees with the action, but the position of the Prime Minister and his commitment to leaving on 31 October will not surprise any Members either of this House or of the European Council.

The Leader of the Opposition talks about collusion. In this House, we want to collude with the British public to respect the referendum result and to get Brexit done. When he talks about delay, he should answer this question: he wants a second referendum, as we know the shadow Brexit Secretary does, but how long is that going to take? How long will the primary legislation take? How long will the Electoral Commission requirements take? How long will he leave the House in purgatory? He gave a commitment that if we went past 31 October, there would be a general election, and yet on the “Andrew Marr” programme on Sunday, the shadow Brexit Secretary said that he wanted a further delay to have a second referendum. When will the Leader of the Opposition accept the Prime Minister’s challenge? When will he have a general election? Or are we to have, as the shadow Brexit Secretary said, more dither, more delay and more shirking of his responsibilities?

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Ind)]

Will my right hon. Friend try to ensure that the Government stop giving this sacred quality to the date of 31 October, which is a really rather silly point that has intruded into the extremely complicated arguments we are having? I would be quite happy if we concluded a withdrawal agreement along the lines the Prime Minister is proposing by 31 October, if we could do it properly, but the date was not selected by the British public or the British Government; it was a compromise in the EU between President Macron and the rest and was plucked out of the air. Will he agree that what matters is that we get the right withdrawal agreement, carried with the tenuous majority the Government may have, through Second Reading and Third Reading so that its form can be settled, and that we then proceed in a way that future generations, if we get it right—or even if we get it wrong—will regard as much more important than whether we made it by a particular day in October 2019?

European Union (Withdrawal) Acts

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Saturday 19th October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Ind)]

I hoped I would never be driven, in these long debates on Brexit, finally to deciding what my opinion is on the choice between a no deal and a bad deal. I regret to say that when my right hon. Friend the previous Prime Minister put forward the proposition before, I had considerable doubts about her belief that no deal was better than a bad deal. Those doubts have increased, because what we have before us now is undoubtedly a bad deal. I think it is a very bad deal. It is wholly inferior to the deal that was negotiated by my right hon. Friend the former Prime Minister, for which I, too, voted three times, like the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle). We cannot be accused of taking part in this debate seeking to block Brexit and repudiate the wishes of the British public, and all the rubbish that the more fanatic Brexiteers and their followers frequently hail at us. But now the choice is very real.

This is a very bad deal, for reasons that I will not dilate on, but others have. I actually have considerable sympathy with the Members from Northern Ireland: the independent Unionist, with whom I almost always agree, and the Democratic Unionists. This is a most peculiar constitutional position that they are being put in as members of the United Kingdom. I would very much rather that we did not have this situation of a border down the Irish sea, because there is absolutely no doubt that there is quite a clear customs and regulatory border being envisaged down the Irish sea.

It has to be said that the effect is to save the all-Irish economy from the near calamity that a total no deal would have resulted in. I have no idea how anybody would have operated a no-deal situation across the border, and I thought these weird propositions of a customs border somewhere in Northern Ireland but not on the border had little or no chance of working. Although the Irish at least have the economic consolation that they will sail on through the transition period as they are now, I am extremely worried that the purpose of going to negotiate this convoluted arrangement over Ireland was so that the economy of Britain could be taken out of the customs union and the single market straightaway. If that holds after the transition period, I think it will have the most damaging effects on our economic future, for all the reasons that other people have given in the earlier and lengthy speeches we have heard.

Therefore, it is all to be played for in the transition period. I actually do not believe that a good free trade agreement, a good agreement on security and fighting international crime, and agreements on the licensing of medicines and the possible arrangements with the European Medicines Agency—all the things spelled out—are likely to be achieved by the end of next year. The Canada deal, which a lot of Brexiteers like to hold up as a model, took about nine years to put in place, and I wish that we were prepared to contemplate a more realistic timescale.

Meanwhile, the votes today, and the process of the next week or two, must get us through the necessary steps to put in place a withdrawal agreement, so that we have a transition period in which to hold full negotiations about our ultimate destination. All my votes in this House have been to ensure that the calamity of leaving with no deal on 31 October, or whenever, was never allowed to happen. For that reason, we should support this deal, but I cannot understand the Government’s resistance to saying that we should legislate before we abandon the protection of the Benn Act and decide that we do not need an extension.

The Government say that we can take for granted the details and getting the votes, but none of us are sure whether there is a majority for this Government and the present deal at all. If the Government can maintain a majority throughout all the legislation I shall be very reassured, but I would like to wait to see that they can—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. We are extraordinarily grateful, more grateful than ever before, to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. The five-minute limit still applies, but the right hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) will be the last Member to benefit from it.

European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 4th September 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Kinnock]

I can confirm that we are saying in the amendments that the vote should reflect the outcome of the cross-party talks, but clearly this is not about setting that in stone. The current Prime Minister is welcome—good luck to him—to go to Brussels and try to get a deal. I am sure that hon. Members will forgive me if I am sceptical about whether serious attempts are being made to do that, but if he is able to secure changes that he feels he can bring back, clearly they would still have to be based on that 585-page document, which is the basic building block for a deal. It will not be torn up by the EU.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Ind)]

As the hon. Gentleman says, the House has never voted on the proposal that so nearly came forward. I think I would have supported it had it got that far. Does he agree that had the whole House realised then what form subsequent events would take to lead us to today and what would happen to public opinion in the ever increasingly wild debate that followed—if the vote could have been taken with that foresight—it would have been carried by a large majority in this House, that the withdrawal deal, as amended, would now be in place, and that we would now be able to have civilised and sensible debates about the long-term arrangements to be agreed during the transition period?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Father of the House. Like many Members, I wish that crystal balls had been handed out when we first came to this place. Unfortunately, that was not the case. It goes back to what he said earlier—Parliament and the debate have been captured by the extremes, and we have to move on from that. We have to break the deadlock and find a sustainable way of preventing no deal, and the way to do that is to leave with a deal.

Leaving the EU: Business of the House

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Wednesday 12th June 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Barclay]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. What we hear repeatedly from Opposition Members is what they are opposed to, not what they are for. That is reflected in the fact that the European Union—[Interruption.] The shadow International Trade Secretary chunters. The European Union has been consistent in stating its view that the withdrawal agreement is the only offer on the table, but Labour Members voted against the withdrawal agreement, just as they voted against the deal each time. Their manifesto said that they would respect the result, yet many Labour Members want a second referendum, which is clearly at odds with their manifesto.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

I entirely understand and appreciate my right hon. Friend’s tactics in trying to address procedural and textual points in the motion, rather than addressing the main point, which is rather difficult for the Government. I do not think those procedural and textual points would be raised if, by any sad chance, we were sitting on the Opposition Benches and telling a Government we opposed that the House as a whole wanted a debate and legislation on a particular issue.

Will my right hon. Friend move to the main point? Is he actually prepared to defend a situation where a new Prime Minister wishes to pursue a policy for which he or she knows there is no majority in the House of Commons? Does he believe it should be possible for that Prime Minister to prorogue and send away Parliament until he or she has exercised dictatorial powers to put the policy in place? That, I think, is plainly totally contrary to our constitution, and I do not see how any parliamentarian could possibly defend such a possibility.

[Stephen Barclay]

I and, I think, the majority of Members absolutely share the belief of the Father of the House that anything that brings Her Majesty into the politics of the House is to be avoided. I have consistently stated that position. However, may I pick up on the specifics? I always listen very closely to the Father of the House, and he said to concentrate not on the procedural and textual points but on the substance, yet the shadow Brexit Secretary said the exact opposite. He said that he did not want to get on to the substance because that is not in the text. Members who support the motion are saying, on the one hand, that we should look at the specifics put forward by the Opposition—[Interruption.] I do not support bringing Her Majesty into it; I have answered that question. But it is incoherent for Members who support the motion to say, on the one hand, “Don’t look at the substance,” and, on the other hand, that the House should consider the substance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Grant]

If we asked a lot of business leaders just now what their ideal option would be if they had a completely free choice, I think most would say, “Don’t leave.” Those who were pushing for us to accept the Prime Minister’s deal previously made it perfectly clear that that was because they thought it was either the Prime Minister’s deal or no deal. If they were presented with a choice of the Prime Minister’s Brexit or no Brexit, they might give a very different decision.

The people had the chance to vote for no deal and chose not to. We can no longer say that pursuing or being willing to allow a no-deal Brexit is the will of the people. The people spoke on 23 May just as firmly and decisively as they did in June 2016. Those who, for the last three years, have been telling us that we have to listen to what people said in June 2016 better start listening to what people said in May 2019, because it was not just about the failure of the no-deal Brexit parties to get anything like a majority of support. The parties who were unambiguous in saying that they were standing on a manifesto of “Stop Brexit”, without exception, had record-breaking successes. The SNP had our best ever European election result, as a result of which, I am proud to say, my good friend Alyn Smith is president of the European Free Alliance and is likely to become the vice-president of a group that has almost 50% more MEPs than the one that Mr Farage wants to lead. Plaid Cymru had its best ever European elections, as did the Liberal Democrats and the Alliance party in Northern Ireland. The Greens managed only their second best ever, but it is 30 years since they were anywhere near the vote that they got this time. Meanwhile in Scotland, the Tories went into these elections telling people in Scotland to send a message to Nicola Sturgeon; I can confidently say that Nicola Sturgeon has got the message.

The purpose of today’s motion is to force the Government to do what any rational, sane and democracy-respecting Government would already have done. We are trying to force the Government to give Parliament a choice and give direction to a Government who are leaderless, rudderless, drifting and utterly lost. The motion is designed to give Parliament a chance to stop a no-deal Brexit, and to stop what would in effect be the non-military coup against Parliament that some would-be Prime Ministers are already openly advocating.

In January, in March and in April 2019, this Parliament voted to take no deal off the table. On 23 May, the people made it clear that they want no deal taken off the table. This morning, some of our most important industries pleaded with us to take no deal off the table. Our duty could not be clearer: whatever our individual views on the European Union might be, it is time to get no deal off the table, and we can start that process by supporting the motion today.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

rose—

[Mr Speaker]

Oh! I had not anticipated the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I call Mr Kenneth Clarke. May I just say that, notwithstanding the immense celebrity of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, I am hoping for very brief speeches, if possible?

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

Mr Speaker, I am sorry that I surprised you. I am not sure that I wrote in beforehand, but I shall endeavour to be brief. I intend to be brief because there are not many complicated issues here.

The first issue to which I want to respond is the procedural point that the Secretary of State wisely tried to retreat into, citing a few constitutional experts saying how outrageous it is for the House of Commons to try to take control of the Order Paper. Indeed, that very rarely happens but, with great respect to much more distinguished experts than me, such as Vernon Bogdanor, we have already demonstrated once that procedures already exist, which can be used—as they were by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—in very exceptional circumstances, for the House as a whole to take command of a day’s business. Of course, the reason it did not happen for many years is that most Governments have had a comfortable majority on every conceivable subject, so there was not the faintest prospect of their losing control of the Order Paper and nobody challenged them. However, we are in exceptional times and the precedent we have already created is a perfectly valuable one.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

I will when I have finished my first point.

This cannot bring down the Government. Of course, if the Government are defeated, it will be open to someone to bring a motion of confidence tomorrow. However, at present, the Government would carry a motion of confidence, so all we are doing—the majority of the House, if we do—is insisting that we want to bring some clarity to the present debate, and I would say some sanity. We want to give some reassurance to people in business up and down the country who are very worried and take the opportunity again to rule out the idea of leaving with no deal. We certainly want to rule out the idea of proroguing Parliament indefinitely, so that the Prime Minister of the day can run a semi-presidential system for a bit and put in place what he or she wants, without any parliamentary majority.

This is not a great threat to the constitutional foundations of the country. This does not actually threaten the future stability of Governments. and I am sure that, if we were in opposition, we would be supporting it without the slightest demur.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I will give way, but I am about to finish the procedural point.

In fact, when we were in opposition, David Cameron asked me to chair a committee to advise him on a lot of constitutional issues—with Sir George Young and Andrew Tyrie, who have now moved on to the upper House, and others—and to make recommendations. We actually advocated, and David Cameron in opposition accepted, that we should give the House more control over the business of the House. We started, eventually, this business of the Backbench Business Committee determining the business of the House for a day.

In office, we took a slightly different perspective. I am afraid that was then reduced to the Backbench Business Committee producing harmless motions and the Government never voting on them, with only one-line Whips. In my opinion, one day, there might be a Government and a Parliament so adventurous as to contemplate giving more control to the House as a whole over its own business. However, this Parliament seems to prefer to get steadily weaker, rather than stronger, and I do not think that day has yet dawned. At this stage, as that is all I am going to say on the procedural point, I will give way.

[Sir William Cash]

On that procedural point, the reality is that Standing Order No. 14 gives precedence to Government business for very good reasons. It is in accordance with our constitutional conventions and the Standing Orders that the Government have a majority and that, in those circumstances—[Interruption.] They do. With the confidence and supply agreement with the DUP, we have a Government and that is the point. We have a Prime Minister. This motion does no more than open the door to the possibility that, by some permutation or other, there may be some argument about a Prorogation or, indeed, about no deal. But that is not what this motion is about; it is an open-door policy—nothing more or less.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

Governments pursue policies for which they have a parliamentary majority. I am going to be brief, so I shall not widen what I think is the very important broader constitutional procedural field.

It is now argued by many people that this Parliament has no powers, really, except when it is passing legislation, and I think that that is what is contemplated here. Unless a statute is passed to change the law, the Government can regard motions in Parliament as a mere expression of opinion. I regard that as nonsense; I regard it as dangerous nonsense; and the sooner it is shot down the better. It has emerged in the last two or three years precisely because Parliament is fragmented: both parties are shattered on several policies, so people are trying again to get round the problems.

Parties form a Government when they can command a majority in a vote of confidence. They can then only pursue policies for which they have a majority in the House of Commons, and continue to have a majority in the House of Commons. It is preposterous to start reinterpreting our unwritten constitution on the basis that no one ever intended that the Government should have to abandon a policy on which it is defeated in the House of Commons. That is complete nonsense. The worst thing to do—because one of the candidates at least fears that she would be defeated if she pursued her policy—is to send Parliament away and have no Parliament at all. I think that I have already made clear, in an intervention, my views on the Prorogation point. I think that the sooner the House makes this clear, takes a day to make it clear and to make it illegal to contemplate doing that—and gives Parliament a role to stop it—the better.

Leaving with no deal has, as I recall, been ruled out with increasing majorities on the three occasions on which we have voted on it. With this mad debate going on in the country at the moment, it is obviously high time Parliament reasserted the fundamental basis of what is going on—that there is no majority in the House for no deal. Apart from those who defend the desirability of leaving with no deal, which no one has done in today’s debate so far, I cannot see why people are going to such lengths to resist that.

The Government’s policy, for which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State speaks, is to oppose leaving with no deal. I agree with him that we can say to the Opposition, “Well, we had a deal and you would not let it go through.” I supported the Prime Minister’s latest attempt to surround that deal with suggestions that I think should have been supported by Opposition Members who agree with my hon. Friends and me on a soft Brexit. I have an eccentric view that they would have been supported.

We have all constantly been attending plotting meetings. I have attended meetings at which Labour Members were agreeing to vote for the Second Reading of that Bill. What we were plotting was what amendments we would pass to put in improvements and safeguards. That could have prospered, but I am afraid that the Prime Minister preferred to do all her dealings, all the way through, with the members of the European Research Group. She always made concessions to them and eventually they told her that she had to go, so she said she was resigning. So we are now in this position.

I personally believe—it may be an eccentric belief—that the Prime Minister could have secured a majority for the deal as she had finally modified it, in an attempt to get cross-party support. It is obvious that the deal that we all need will only be achieved by any Prime Minister when we face up to the need for cross-party support to get around the party divisions. Both parties must accept that a minority will rebel against any deal that comes forward, but we could probably get a majority of the House to vote down the Labour left and the Tory right and actually pass something that is in the national interest. That, I think, is the main objective that really lies behind today’s debate. To listen to all these arguments about why, for pedantic procedural and textual reasons, we should reject it is, I am afraid, to take—not for the first time—a rather bizarre perspective on the huge and historic events in which we are involved. The House really has to take some control.

My final point is this. It might even improve the quality of the leadership debate that is going on in my party—and it needs to be improved—if we forced some reality into the exchanges between the extremely distinguished candidates who are vying for the privilege of being the next Prime Minister.

European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 3rd April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Chuka Umunna]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. This is so important and we have been brought to this point because our democracy is deadlocked. We are faced with a perfect storm created by a clash of mandates: we are trying to work our way through dealing with a clash of mandates between views expressed by a majority of people who participated in a referendum in 2016 and views expressed in a general election which has led to a hung Parliament and the chaos in this House of Commons.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is correct in saying that we would have to produce a reason for wanting an extension, but does he agree that the reason that would command wide support here is so that we could clarify the political declaration and develop the ideas of some sort of customs arrangement and some sort of regulatory alignment mapping out our future relationship? Does he agree that most of the European nations would welcome that development, and probably a very long extension to the end of 2021 would be quite readily available?

[Chuka Umunna]

I do not disagree at all with the Father of the House. I think a long extension would be preferable. I do not think there is anything for us to fear in terms of European elections. After all that is called democracy and at least it means more of our constituents can get involved in this process. In terms of the different elements of this Bill and the duties we are seeking to impose on the Government, it has been said that to find a way forward through all of this requires compromise. As I have said, I believe there should be a duty in this Bill for the Government to seek an extension in order to provide for a people’s vote. Why do those of us who argue for a people’s vote want a people’s vote? We do so because we want to give the British people the ability to take a different course, and in so doing there is compromise. The easy thing to do if we wanted to stop Brexit from happening would be to simply ignore the 2016 result.

EU: Withdrawal and Future Relationship (Motions)

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Monday 1st April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

I beg to move motion (C),

That this House instructs the Government to:

(1) ensure that any Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration negotiated with the EU must include, as a minimum, a commitment to negotiate a permanent and comprehensive UK-wide customs union with the EU;

(2) enshrine this objective in primary legislation.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following motions:

Motion (D)—Common Market 2.0—

That this House –

(1) directs Her Majesty’s Government to –

(i) renegotiate the framework for the future relationship laid before the House on Monday 11 March 2019 with the title ‘Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom’ to provide that, on the conclusion of the Implementation Period and no later than 31 December 2020, the United Kingdom shall –

(a) accede to the European Free Trade Association (Efta) having negotiated a derogation from Article 56(3) of the Efta Agreement to allow UK participation in a comprehensive customs arrangement with the European Union,

(b) enter the Efta Pillar of the European Economic Area (EEA) and thereby render operational the United Kingdom’s continuing status as a party to the EEA Agreement and continuing participation in the Single Market,

(c) agree relevant protocols relating to frictionless agri-food trade across the UK/EU border,

(d) enter a comprehensive customs arrangement including a common external tariff, alignment with the Union Customs Code and an agreement on commercial policy, and which includes a UK say on future EU trade deals, at least until alternative arrangements that maintain frictionless trade with the European Union and no hard border on the island of Ireland have been agreed with the European Union,

(ii) negotiate with the EU a legally binding Joint Instrument that confirms that, in accordance with Article 2 of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland of the Withdrawal Agreement, the implementation of all the provisions of paragraph 1 (i) of this motion would cause the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to be superseded in full;

(2) resolves to make support for the forthcoming European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill conditional upon the inclusion of provisions for a Political Declaration revised in accordance with the provisions of this motion to be the legally binding negotiating mandate for Her Majesty’s Government in the forthcoming negotiation of the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Motion (E)—Confirmatory public vote—

That this House will not allow in this Parliament the implementation and ratification of any withdrawal agreement and any framework for the future relationship unless and until they have been approved by the people of the United Kingdom in a confirmatory public vote.

Motion (G)—Parliamentary Supremacy—

That—

(1) If, at midday on the second last Day before exit day, the condition specified in section 13(1)(d) of the Act (the passing of legislation approving a withdrawal agreement) is not satisfied, Her Majesty’s Government must immediately seek the agreement of the European Council under Article 50(3) of the Treaty to extend the date upon which the Treaties shall cease to apply to the United Kingdom;

(2) If, at midday on the last Day before exit day, no agreement has been reached (pursuant to (1) above) to extend the date upon which the Treaties shall cease to apply to the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Government must immediately put a motion to the House of Commons asking it to approve ‘No Deal’;

(3) If the House does not approve the motion at (2) above, Her Majesty’s Government must immediately ensure that the notice given to the European Council under Article 50 of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union is revoked in accordance with United Kingdom and European law;

(4) If the United Kingdom’s notice under Article 50 is revoked pursuant to (3) above a Minister of Her Majesty’s Government shall cause an inquiry to be held under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the question whether a model of a future relationship with the European Union likely to be acceptable to the European Union is likely to have majority support in the United Kingdom;

(5) If there is a referendum it shall be held on the question whether to trigger Article 50 and renegotiate that model;

(6) The Inquiry under paragraph (4) shall start within three months of the revocation; and

(7) References in this Motion to “Days” are to House of Commons sitting days; references to “exit day” are references to exit day as defined in the Act; references to the Act are to The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; and references to the Treaty are to the Treaty on European Union.

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[Mr Clarke]

May I first of all say that I hope, for the reputation of this House and the reputation of the political institutions of this country, that we will achieve a majority for at least a couple of these motions this afternoon in order to reassure the public that we do know what we are doing, or we are beginning to know what we are doing, and that we are capable of delivering responsible government and looking after the national interest in the present crisis? I think most right hon. and hon. Members must have appreciated at the weekend how little respect the public as a whole have for their political institutions at the moment, and how very low is the regard in which they hold what is going on in this House.

The House has blocked the Government’s policy. It will not vote for the withdrawal agreement, and last week in a rather curious mixture of votes it voted against the propositions before it. If we are to avoid ludicrous deadlock, today is the day when the House has to indicate that there is a majority and a consensus in favour of something positive that will give some guidance on where we are going.

[Mr Nigel Evans (Ribble Valley) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I might do so when I have got going, but the filibustering on the business motion means that we have very little time for debate, so I am going to make an effort to keep my speech short. With respect to my hon. Friend, who is an old friend, I will not give way.

What happened last week was understandable. People plumped for what they wanted, and we spread so widely over eight motions that nothing actually got a majority. Today, I trust that people will vote for more than one motion if they can live with more than one, because if we just keep plumping for our one and only solution, we will find that we are broken up. That is what my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) had in mind when he introduced this process.

I voted for, I think, five of the motions last week, and, as I shall argue, I do not think that they are incompatible with each other. Some are larger than others, and they swallow one within the other. Some are on separate subsets of the problem. What we are all asking ourselves, in this deadlock, is, what compromise would each and every Member be prepared to accept in the national interest?

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

With apologies to my hon. Friend the Member for Ribble Valley (Mr Evans), I will give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset once, because this is his process.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am enormously grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, and I agree with every word he has spoken. Does he agree that the reason why we are holding this debate and following this unusual process is not that we are interested in some zany constitutional theory, but that our country faces the prospect, on Thursday week, of leaving without a deal if this House does not come together and find some way forward?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

My right hon. Friend and I are in complete agreement. As he quite rightly says, we must avoid no deal occurring by default in a fortnight’s time simply because the House of Commons could not agree on anything. In fact, 400 Members of the House of Commons have voted against no deal, and it would be calamitous just to collapse into it because we cannot reach any compromise among ourselves about what we actually wish to put forward.

I am trying to illustrate that my motion, which is for a permanent customs union, is perfectly compatible with a wider look at the subject but sets a basic agenda. I think it will help to minimise what I regard as the damaging consequences of leaving the European Union, and enable us to reassure the business and other interests in this country—some of them are absolutely panic-stricken—who view the great unknown and the end of the common market with great concern. I hope that the public, who are as polarised as this House in their opinions, will begin to be reassured. I hope that people will be reconciled to a compromise of leaving the political European Union but staying in the common market, to use the language of Eurosceptics over the years.

[Greg Hands]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

No, I will not give way. As I have said, we have just had two hours of filibustering, and I do not want my speech to be spun out.

Let me illustrate why I think motion (C) does not conflict with the body of opinion in most of the political parties in this House, starting with the Conservative party. My motion does not conflict with the Prime Minister’s withdrawal agreement. Indeed, it slightly complements it, and it deals with a different subject. Motion (C) deals with the political arrangements—the non-binding political declaration and the nature of the later negotiations that will have to take place to determine our long-term future.

As I said last week, the motion answers the concerns of the Labour party, which has supported it. The Labour party says that it will not vote for the withdrawal agreement, not because of its contents, but because it represents a blind Brexit in which we have absolutely no idea what the Government are going to do. To approve the withdrawal agreement would be to give the Government a blank sheet of paper and allow them to carry on arguing inside the Cabinet about what objectives to seek in the negotiations that would follow. What this motion suggests is that the House mandates the Government—whatever shape they take and whatever the Government—to make a permanent customs union one of their foundations in the negotiations. I will come back to the only reason that they have ever given for being against the customs union, which is the only basis for voting against it.

[Greg Hands]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

No, I am not going to give way. It would be unfair to other Members who have had this whole debate crammed into three hours. In 1972, we used to have all-night sittings on much smaller issues than this. I do not recommend going back to that, but I object to listening to my colleagues having to speak on three-minute time limits because chaps want to get to dinner and will not sit after 7 o’clock in the evening in the middle of the week, which is where this rather pathetic Parliament has got itself recently. That is my last digression from my theme. [Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order.

[Mr Clarke]

As I have said, the motion does not conflict with the Government’s withdrawal agreement. If the motion is passed or if it is subsumed by common market 2.0, which I will also vote for—that motion would subsume this one if it is carried—the easiest way of proceeding is for the Government to proceed with their withdrawal agreement tomorrow and for the Labour party to abstain because it is no longer such a blind Brexit, and then we can get on to the serious negotiations, which this country has not even started yet, with its 27 partner nations.

Motion (C) does not conflict with the case that is being made by many Members for a further referendum—either a confirmatory referendum or a people’s vote. It is not on the same subject. The referendum is about whether the public have changed their mind and whether we are firmly committed to the EU now that we know what is happening. That is a process—a very important one—that we are arguing about. I have been abstaining on that; I am not very fond of referendums, but there we are.

Motion (C) is concerned with a quite different subject: the substance of the negotiations if we get beyond 12 April. It begins to set out what the Government have a majority for and what they are being given a mandate for when they start those negotiations. The separate issue of whether, at any relevant stage, a referendum is called for can be debated and voted on quite separately. Advocates of a people’s vote are not serving any particular interest if they vote for a people’s vote and somehow vote against this motion to make sure that that somehow gets a bigger majority. Both can be accommodated.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I shall be accused of bias if I give way to my right hon. and learned Friend.

I urge the Liberals to proceed on that basis, and similarly, the Scottish nationalists. I agree with them—I would much prefer to stay in the European Union—but I am afraid that in trying to give this country good and stable governance by giving steers to the House of Commons, I have compromised on that, because a huge majority seems to me to have condemned us to leaving the European Union. I have tabled motions with the Scottish nationalists and have voted with them to revoke article 50 if the dread problem of no deal seems to be looming towards us by accident, and I will again. I cannot understand why the Scottish nationalists will not at least contemplate, if they cannot get their way and stay in the European Union, voting for a permanent customs union, which will benefit business and the economy in Scotland just as much as here and is not remotely incompatible with pursuing their wider aims.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

As I have mentioned the Scottish nationalists, I will of course give the hon. and learned Lady the right to reply.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am very grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. The reason that the Scottish National party cannot support his motion today is that freedom of movement is vital for the Scottish economy and we do not get freedom of movement without the single market—that is the reason we cannot support his motion.

[Mr Clarke]

I will vote for the single market, if it is presented in a proper way, and I would have voted for the motion in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr Fysh) last week, had he not at the end added a gratuitous sentence ruling out a customs union. If we can get a majority for the single market, I will vote for it again.

I accept that if we pass a motion for the single market, or the motion for common market 2.0, which no doubt my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles) will move later, my motion will be subsumed, but I am not confident we will pass a motion for the single market, because although the Scot nats are attracted by freedom of movement, many of my right hon. and hon. Friends are provoked into voting against it for that very reason. Similarly, common market 2.0, which I would settle for, is probably too ambitious. Mine, then, is the fall-back position.

I hope that my hon. Friend votes for my motion, but I cannot understand the Scottish nationalists. Voting for my motion is no threat to their position; indeed, it is an insurance policy—this goes back to how I started—to make sure that we move forward and that the House of Commons gives the Government a mandate that we can then ensure they have to follow in mapping out this nation’s future. In the long negotiations over the next two or three years, questions of regulatory alignment and freedom of movement will start coming into the negotiations again; that we have committed ourselves to a permanent customs union will not compromise any of those discussions.

I have not the faintest idea why Members of the Democratic Unionist party are not supporting motion (C). If we pass motion (C), it will mean we have no tariffs or certificates of origin and that the Irish border question is pretty well solved—we will be 90-odd% of the way to maintaining the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. It would be of huge benefit to the Irish economy and Irish security and mean that the DUP’s objection to the Irish backstop—that Northern Ireland is being treated differently from the rest of the UK—vanished Pass motion (C) and it applies to the entire United Kingdom.

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

As I am referring to the DUP, I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman, but I am a Unionist. He thinks the Irish backstop is not a Unionist proposition. Motion (C) is a Unionist proposition and does no harm to the DUP’s position.

[Sammy Wilson]

I am glad to hear that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is a Unionist, though in supporting the withdrawal agreement three times he has shown that he does not respect the views of the people of Northern Ireland who believe it puts the Union in jeopardy.

The customs union alone does not resolve the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic in the terms in which the EU has expressed it. The single market rules are equally important in its argument that there would need to be regulatory checks—though of course we know, from its no-deal preparations, that it does not matter whether we are in a customs union or a single market, or neither, because it does not intend to put checks on the border anyway.

[Mr Clarke]

I agree that to have an open border—unless we invent these magic X-ray cameras whose discovery some of my hon. Friends think is imminent—we will need to be in a customs union and have some degree of regulatory alignment. In the case of the Irish border—and, I think, of Dover—a customs union gets us 90% of the way. As I say, it is not the customs union that is inconsistent with the right hon. Gentleman’s aim and mine, which is a totally free-moving, frictionless—to use the Prime Minister’s phrase—border at the channel in England and in Ireland, with the same arrangements applying to both. He cites the fact that unfortunately the withdrawal agreement has the Irish backstop in it. Motion (C) makes the Irish backstop irrelevant and superfluous. It will never feature if we pass my motion (C).

[Mr Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

No, I am sorry; I will go back to being strict, though when I refer to parties or people, I feel it is courteous to let them respond.

Let me now deal, finally and very briefly, with the only substantial argument that has been raised in the House against the customs union from the beginning to the end of our debates. That argument is that it will stop us having our own customs arrangements with third party countries, and it is repeated by Ministers over and over again.

[Greg Hands]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

No, I will not, in the interests of other Members who wish to speak.

First, that argument is not actually accurate. It is true that trade agreements with other countries would mean that we would not be able to make changes in external tariffs. Of course, we would have the benefit of no tariffs at all: totally tariff-free entry into the rest of the EU. What we would be able to have trade agreements on is the service economy, service industries, which constitute the vast majority of this country’s GDP.

I have been involved in trade negotiations quite a lot over the years. It is not vanity, but simply my longevity, which leads me to say that I have probably had more experience of trade arrangements and dealings than any other Member. In every Department that I have occupied, I have led trade delegations to somewhere or other. During my spell at the Department of Trade and Industry and my spell at the Treasury, I became heavily involved in trade deals, particularly with the Americans, China, and large parts of Latin America. I led for the last Government—the coalition Government—on the EU-US TTIP negotiations. Although the Commission conducts the negotiations on a mandate that it has been given by the 28 member states, certain of the bigger ones—such as Britain—remain a constant presence, and go backwards and forwards to try to ensure that the process is going smoothly. So I have been involved in many attempts to secure trade deals, some successful and some not. Opening up the Chinese market is a very slow business: I could have told President Trump that.

Some of my right hon. and hon. Friends ascribe great weight to an American deal. TTIP failed. It was given that strange title—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—because Obama’s officials said that it would not be possible to get anything called a free trade agreement past America, which is quite a protectionist country. Certainly Congress is protectionist, and that was under Obama. The problem with the Americans was, first of all, that we wanted to open up access to services. Tariffs do not matter much in European-American trade. They are vestigial. All the Europeans, including the British, are quite content to abandon tariffs in both directions, because they are fairly small. The auto industry, on both sides of the Atlantic, did not really want tariffs. It is regulatory differences, and getting regulatory equivalence, or convergence, that stand in the way.

We wanted the Americans to open up public procurement, which they would not do—and, anyway, it is a state-by-state process, which makes it more difficult—and to open up the service sector, particularly financial services. The lobbies in Congress are too strong for that to make much progress. The present President has given no indication that he would open up any market to us. The approach that he has taken to trade negotiations, when he talks about a trade agreement and takes on the Mexicans, the Canadians and the Chinese, is that he wants America to export more to them and wants them to export less to America. We have a large trade surplus with America, and that is what he has in mind. It is perfectly plain. His obsession is with food and agricultural products, and that means giving up our standards of animal welfare and food quality—which, owing to British lobbying, are very high in Europe—and accepting America’s lower standards involving hormone-treated beef and chicken.

If any Members think we can influence that—if they think that with such a trade agreement we can somehow start tightening up American food standards and animal welfare—I can only tell them that the agriculture lobby in Congress is extremely powerful, and would not take the slightest notice of British interests in such matters. The Australians would probably agree to a deal, but we would have to face the problem of hormone-treated beef, because that is what they want to export to us. The New Zealanders would want a deal as long as the quotas were lifted from their tariff-free exports of lamb. I am sure that they would be happy if we could think of anything that we wished to sell to New Zealand that we do not sell at the moment. But those negotiations will not compensate for the loss of our European markets if we stay outside the customs union and the single market and erect great barriers in our way.

I have made a modest case—it is modest compared with my own views; nobody in this House is a greater supporter of the European project than I am and nobody in this House wants Britain to remain in the EU more than I do, if that were in the realm of the possible. To reject motion (C) again would run the risk of the adverse reaction outside that we got when—as I think we all anticipated—there were minorities for every motion last week. Now is the time for hon. Members to get behind motion (C). If they wish to get behind common market 2.0, they should feel free to do so, and those who want to reinforce the revocation argument if otherwise we would crash out with no deal should vote for that.

So far, the process has been a shambles. The public hold their political parties and politicians and the institutions of Government almost in contempt. Today, we must start to bring that to an end. All I propose is a modest step compared with most others on the Order Paper. It is perfectly compatible with the wider ambitions of a large majority of this House. It is fitting that I should open the debate because my motion is the basic, obvious beginning. If the House wishes to add more, I shall probably vote with it.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands (Chelsea and Fulham) (Con)]

I will begin by answering my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), who said that he had not heard a single argument against a customs union. I credit him for staying for the whole debate, because I am going to give him plenty. He also said that I had been involved in a filibuster, but my contribution to the business of the House motion lasted for one minute and 13 seconds. That must be the shortest filibuster that there has ever been. I did once speak for one hour and 43 minutes on beer duty, but I do not think that one minute and 13 seconds really counts.

Why is a customs union a very bad idea? Broadly speaking, it would mean a huge loss of control over our economic policy, a decline in our foreign policy influence and a huge democratic deficit. Trade policy is not just about trade deals. It is about much more, which we would be handing over to the European Union without a seat at the table. There are tariffs, remedies and preferences as well as trade agreements, and these would all be given over. The House of Commons would abrogate its responsibility in relation to the UK’s trade policy. This is not Andorra or San Marino, which are currently in customs unions with the European Union. This is the world’s fifth largest economy.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe and I were on the same side in the referendum in 2016, so I am approaching this debate not as some kind of Brexiteer, but from the position of what makes sense for the UK’s trade policy. It makes no sense in our democracy for the House of Commons to vote tonight to hand over control of UK trade policy to Brussels. It would mean that a Maltese Commissioner, a Latvian MEP, a Portuguese Commissioner and a Slovene MEP would all have more say over UK trade policy than any elected politician, including the UK Prime Minister. That is not democratically sustainable, nor is it sustainable for our foreign policy.

My right hon. and learned Friend and I served in the Government together. At that time, I went into various rooms in foreign countries to speak to foreign Governments, so I know that trade is one of the aspects of leverage that we have. As a member of the European Union, the UK has influence on EU trade policy. That will obviously be gone when we are no longer a member, but under a customs union we would also have no influence over our own trade policy. We would be unable to have those conversations with the Government of the United States when we can say, “Well, if we can do this on some other area, we will have a word in Brussels on this particular trade issue.” All of that would be gone.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way because I did not have time to give way to him in the end. I think he would acknowledge that it is a slight exaggeration to say that the British Government would have as little influence over deals being negotiated by the EU as a Latvian MEP if we moved into a customs union. As the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) just said, a big economy such as ours would add to the attractions of the EU market for a negotiating partner, so surely we should put in place a structure giving us far more consultation and involvement in the negotiations than my right hon. Friend is describing—not as good as now, but perfectly adequate.

[Greg Hands]

I think that is wishful thinking. The European Union is highly likely to prioritise the interests of its members versus the interests of non-members. That has always been the case. There are also serious arguments as to whether European Union rules would even allow a non-member to have an influence on EU trade policy. I am afraid that that is just a fact.

Entering into a customs union would be democratically unsustainable. Tariffs would be set by people who are not accountable to this House or to our constituents. That could be damaging for goods coming into the country, if those people were to set high tariffs on goods that our consumers would quite like access to. It could also happen the other way around with things such as trade remedies, as has been briefly mentioned. All these incredibly important aspects, including trade defences, would be handed over to Brussels. Now, Brussels might look after our trade remedies, but it would not give them priority. It would give the defence of its own industries—the fee-paying members of the European Union—priority over countries such as ours. This would mean that those all-important WTO investigations into, say, the ceramics industry, would be relegated below investigations to protect, for example, the German or Dutch steel industries.

On trade deals, the Turkey trap has been mentioned; this is about the asymmetry. The EU would offer access to our 65 million consumers without necessarily being able to achieve anything in return. I can guarantee that the UK asks would be the ones that would be dropped first, and that the UK items of defence would be the ones that the EU would concede first. It is inevitable because we would not be a fee-paying member of the European Union, so we would not be a priority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sammy Wilson]

For those reasons, the solutions before us do not deal with the backstop.

Some people would say, “Well, of course, there is no solution, other than staying in the EU, that deals with the backstop”. I do not accept that, first, because of current practice, and secondly, because of what the EU has itself said about what would happen in the case of a no deal: it has argued that it would not need barriers along the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I agree that in addition to a customs union we would probably need some modest regulatory alignment to ensure an open border in Ireland and at Dover, but the regulatory alignment would be the same for the whole of the United Kingdom. I thought the DUP’s objection to the backstop was that it would put in place different arrangements for Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK and therefore place a barrier down the Irish sea. Motion (C) avoids that.

[Sammy Wilson]

I said there were two criteria: first, would it deal with the issue of difference between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, and, secondly, would it deliver what people voted for when they voted to leave the EU? Of course, if we stayed in the customs union, or a customs union arrangement, with the degree of regulatory alignment required, that would not deliver what people voted for.

On the motion for a confirmatory public vote, the option emerging today is for the people to be given a choice between a deal based on whatever compromise solution comes from this remain Parliament and remaining, but that is not a choice as far as the vast majority of people who voted to leave the EU are concerned: remain or half remain. People voted the first time to leave, and the idea that we give people such a choice is not acceptable. On the SNP motion, its Members have made no secret of where they stand. They want to stay in the EU and to provide for that situation. For those reasons, we would not vote for the SNP motion either. We will not support any of these arrangements tonight because they would not safeguard the Union and they would not deliver Brexit.

EU: Withdrawal and Future Relationship (Votes)

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Monday 1st April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Thank you.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. With the help of the people who work with me, I have got a damn sight nearer to a majority in this House than anybody else has so far, apart from the rather curious and now historic Malthouse compromise, which I fear is dead. Three votes is quite near.

We cannot go on with everybody voting against every proposition. The difficulty is that there are people who want a people’s vote who would not vote for my motion because they thought they were going to get a people’s vote. There were people—the Scottish nationalists—who wanted common market 2.0, so would not vote for my motion. All of them had nothing against mine. If they continue to carry on like that, they will fail. I say to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) that if we added the people’s vote to a motion such as mine, we would lose votes from all over the place, and from the Labour party. We would lose more than we would gain. Those Members should accept that they do not have a majority yet for the people’s vote and vote for something that they have no objection to as a fall-back position. That is politics. I sometimes think that this particular Parliament in which I find myself sitting is not very political at the moment, and it is confounding the general public.

[Mr Speaker]

Thank you.

EU: Withdrawal and Future Relationship (Motions)

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Wednesday 27th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

I join those who have congratulated my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) on giving us this opportunity. At last we are seeing, as we go along, that the House is moving into a mood where it is going to be possible to end the catastrophic shambles of the last six months. We are beginning to talk about actually being able to take decisions founded on some sort of cross-party consensus and some search for a majority that can be sustained through the difficult and long negotiations that will be required to reach agreement on our final relations with the European Union. It seems to me that it is up to the House to respond to that properly and deal with this procedure, with a willingness to compromise with one another and move towards some eventual binding recommendation to the Government about the way in which things should be conducted in future. I shall certainly approach this in that way.

My right hon. Friend has also helped the Government, although they are bitterly resistant to what he has done, raising absurd constitutional arguments, which are complete fiction and which they could have remedied easily if they had put down their own proposals for having indicative votes, as they told us that they were going to two days ago. This hair-splitting thing about it being the Government who should table business motions, and not Back Benchers, is a completely piffling irrelevance. He has actually helped them considerably: I have never seen the right-wing members of the European Research Group more apparently panicked by the way the House as a whole is moving. They are demonstrably in a minority, their dreams of a no-deal departure are fading, and despite their frequent meetings with the Prime Minister and their gliding into Chequers at the weekend, they are beginning to peel off one by one, having first rebuffed it.

I congratulate those who put this process together and those Ministers who resigned to get this pressure going and bring us nearer to reality, and I will turn now to the substance of how I am going to vote. As I have said, I will vote not for my first preference—I will when it occurs—but for that which I can live with. Unfortunately, I think we are doomed to leave the European Union within the next two or three years. My duty now is to exercise my own judgment as to what is in the national interest, will minimise the damaging consequences and will perhaps save some of the better features for future generations.

As I have said before, the obvious compromise is, unfortunately, to give up the political European Union and leave the political institution and remain in the common market, as the public still call it—the customs union and the single market—thereby avoiding problems at the borders and for business, ensuring the smooth running of trade, and so on.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

I am sorry, but I cannot give way. I would like to—I have been collaborating with the hon. Gentleman—but I must take notice of time.

Under such a compromise, we would continue to enjoy the economic advantages of being in the biggest and most prosperous international free trade area in the world and begin to reconcile the 52% with the 48%. Most sensible members of the public, however passionate their views, be they remain or leave, could see the sense in coming together around such a compromise. It was the main Eurosceptic demand 20 years ago: leave the EU but not the common market. If we solved that, we could begin to repair the dreadful political mood in the country.

I will vote for revoke whenever it appears, because that is my personal preference, but that is self-indulgence, and I will support—[Laughter.] If we get a majority, I will be delighted.

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

I will not give way to my fellow collaborator on revoking.

I will support common market 2.0 and anything that resembles it, though I will not dwell on it further, as I have already dealt with it. I come then to my motion (J). As I have already indicated, it is not my first preference—the two I have already named are my preferences—but it is tabled to maximise support in the House so that we can move on Monday towards our really taking control and actually putting the Government, though they do not accept it, in a much stronger position than they are today when it comes to the future negotiations.

Motion (J) advocates a customs union only—a permanent customs union, I point out to the hon. Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall), who intervened earlier on this point—and would keep the minimum needed for frictionless trade and an open border in Ireland. We would also need some understanding or moves on regulatory convergence, but that does not need to be dealt with at this stage. If we started with the premise that we will be permanently in a customs union, it would bring greater clarity to the next stage—the really important stage—of the negotiations. I think that every other EU member state would be ready to accede to that, and it would improve the climate of the negotiations.

The motion is designed to appeal in particular to Labour Members who are demanding it and to my more cautious right hon. and hon. Friends in the Conservative party. Those who have hang-ups about rule making and use medieval language about vassal states and all the rest of it are talking about the single market. Motion (J) does not include the single market. The customs union guarantees a reasonably frictionless relationship and the possibility of completely open trade in the future, and leaves all the other things to be decided in the negotiations.

[Greg Hands]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

No, I will not.

That is the basis on which I tabled motion (J), and I commend it to the House. Members may prefer a different motion; I shall vote for several. I think that we should all vote for as many of the motions as we can, and then we will see which is the strongest. We will not be dismissed by the more fervent members of the Government saying that they have all been defeated, and none of them secured an individual majority. On Monday, we could move on to how we sift them out.

Above all, for Labour Members this will, I hope, pave the way for allowing the withdrawal agreement to go through, because their main argument is not about the contents of the withdrawal agreement but about the “blind Brexit” that worries them so much. Even in motion (J)—if we cannot get a stronger one—there is not a blind Brexit any more. Labour Members could at least abstain, so that we could secure the withdrawal agreement and then move on to what really matters—the serious long-term negotiations on the big issues, which we shall have to handle much better than we are doing now.

My last word is this. If we fail, and if we are faced in a fortnight’s time with no deal, I think the feeling in the House is so strongly against that outcome that we must all vote to revoke at that stage. A great many members of the public will probably think that we have got ourselves into such a mess that it might have been sensible to do that anyway. We should stop now, sort out what we are doing, and perhaps start again if the House is still enthusiastic about leaving. However, I hope we can avoid that conclusion by demonstrating that Parliament is capable of orderly debate, reasonable conclusions, and contributing to the better governance of this country as part of this process—including, I hope, my motion (J).

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Article 50 Extension

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Wednesday 20th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Geraint Davies]

rose—

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

rose—

[Stephen Barclay]

I have given way to the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) once and I think the Father of the House wants to intervene, so I will obviously let my right hon. and learned Friend intervene in a moment. However, even the question for a second referendum, as well as the length of time it would take, is unclear, and the hon. Gentleman cannot persuade Labour Front Benchers of his policy.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

We are sadly wandering around the point of how long and why we are having an extension, with Front Benchers on both sides, with respect, not being altogether clear. Are there not various basic facts? First, if the withdrawal agreement is defeated again, that cannot be the agenda for any further extension. Secondly, useful negotiations in Brussels will be very limited for the next few months because a new Parliament is being elected and a new Commission is being appointed, so we will not be able to get under way till some time in the summer. If we use that time for the British generally—Parliament and Government—to reach some conclusions about what we are pursuing, some time after that will still be needed. I would have thought that until the end of the year is the very minimum time that is needed to sort out this crisis sensibly and constructively from now on. We have not been doing that thus far.

[Stephen Barclay]

The Father of the House makes a very reasonable and well-made point. Indeed, it is a point I have made to some of my colleagues who voted leave in the referendum—if they continue to fail to support a meaningful vote then the House may opt for a softer form of Brexit. That is a risk that many who campaigned to leave need to be mindful of. The equivalent risk, for those who may cling to that life raft as a preferable option, is that it remains unclear whether the House would then ratify that, given the way the withdrawal agreement Bill would need to be passed. It is a major piece of proposed legislation and the sustainability of that coalition would come under question with the subsequent risk of a no-deal outcome.

EU Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Changes

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Walker]

The right hon. Gentleman talks about further delay. I have confirmed to him that there will be a meaningful vote in the House tomorrow. I have explained that negotiations are ongoing, and the Government are seeking legally binding changes that will address the concerns that have been raised in the House.

The right hon. Gentleman speaks of chaos. We all remember his advice to the Government, on day one after the referendum, to trigger article 50 immediately. I think that we can be very clear that this process would be no safer in his hands. He talks about investment. He and his party will have the opportunity to vote to secure and unlock investment tomorrow by backing the deal, and they will do so fully informed by the Government’s legal analysis. He asked about the timetable for the publication of the Attorney General’s advice, and I can confirm that that advice will be published before the House sits tomorrow.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

My hon. Friend firmly confirmed that the vote on the deal would come tomorrow. He did not actually mention the event, if it is defeated, of the vote on Wednesday on whether or not we leave with no deal, and, further to that, the vote on Thursday about delaying article 50 if, indeed, the House rejects no deal. I hope that that was a mere oversight and that my hon. Friend is not going back on last week’s undertakings.

[Mr Walker]

I am happy to confirm that the exact words of the Prime Minister in giving that undertaking, which we absolutely stand by, were

“First, we will hold a…meaningful vote”

on 12 March. If the Government did not win a meaningful vote, they would

“table a…motion…to be voted on by Wednesday 13 March…asking this House if it supports leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement… Thirdly”,

if the House rejected both those options,

“the Government will, on 14 March, bring forward a motion on whether Parliament wants to seek a short, limited extension to article 50.”—[Official Report, 27 February 2019; Vol. 655, c. 377.]