Reconciliation: Role of British Foreign, Defence and International Development Policy

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 14th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I warmly congratulate the most reverend Primate on the third of his excellent speeches which I have heard over the past weeks—first, in the Abbey on the plight of Christians in the Middle East; then at the start of our Brexit debate; and now on the good Christian theme of reconciliation. The Epistles talk of ambassadors for Christ with the gospel of reconciliation, and Christ himself spoke of peacemakers as blessed, so I gladly give a few random reflections on his theme.

First, it is absolutely right that he mentions the interlocking and complementary roles of the three departments—Foreign Office, Defence and International Development—in pursuit of reconciliation. Attempts by us to solve conflicts often require a combination of these three and others.

A good example is the western Balkans during and after the bloody wars of the 1990s. Think of the horror of the massacre of 7,000 or 8,000 Muslim men at Srebrenica. The three departments had been involved in seeking solutions to these conflicts, mostly in coalition with the European Union and, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has said, with the United Nations. Now the FCO and the Ministry of Defence, with their substantial reduction in resources, must view with envy the fixed financial commitment available to DfID. There is surely a need for a debate on rebalancing and redefining the role of the three departments. For example, our military was used, properly, to combat the Ebola outbreak, a development crisis.

Often, early military intervention can save lives. I cite the Rwanda genocide in 1994 when, over three months, 800,000 people were killed. A simulation exercise by West Point concluded that 500 or so military at the outset might have prevented the carnage. I had the honour of chairing two reconciliation meetings of Hutu and Tutsi representatives at the Christian Centre at Ashburnham, near Battle in Sussex, at the time, and learned at first hand of the horrors.

Surely there is no lasting development without peace and stability. Well-judged military intervention and skilful diplomacy can lead to peace, as we saw with the excellent military intervention of our forces in Sierra Leone. We should also not forget the role of arbitration mentioned by the most reverend Primate—for example, the arbitration by the Pope over the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile.

We should be encouraged by recent progress on conflicts which earlier appeared incapable of solution. I look forward to the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and listened with appreciation to the excellent speech of the noble Lord, Lord Trimble. After Sharpeville and Soweto, the South African problem appeared intractable, as did the problem in Northern Ireland, but Churches, the private sector and the civics—the community groups—played a key role in bridge-building at the time.

This raises the question of the role of Governments as against individuals and communities. Governments cannot forgive injustices—only the victims can. Governments can, however, provide encouragement and facilities for individuals and groups to promote reconciliation. Governments can also learn lessons from the past—lessons for good and for ill. Contrast post-war Germany and Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. In Germany after 1945, yes, the leaders of the Nazis were disposed of at Nuremberg, but the great majority of people, such as Konrad Adenauer, who played such a key role in democracy-building, were given the opportunity to build the structures of the very democratic Federal Republic of Germany. By contrast in Iraq, after 2004 the neocons in Washington overruled the State Department and Colin Powell and demobilised the Iraqi army, unpaid and keeping their arms, and destroyed the structures of the state, which led to the chaos that followed.

There are limits to the possibility of reconciliation, often not recognised by Church leaders. However worthy the cause, however strenuous the effort, some world problems may indeed be without solution and our best efforts must be directed at preventing the worst—or, in despair, redrawing national boundaries, as happened, for example, between Ethiopia and Eritrea and is now in prospect between Serbia and Kosovo.

Perhaps also the Arab-Israeli conflict may fall into this category. Much valuable work has been done at a micro level and I applaud the work of the noble Lord, Lord Stone, and bodies such as Tracks of Peace. The best efforts of President Clinton—and what US President has made as much effort on a particular foreign problem as he—and the shuttle diplomacy of Secretary of State Kerry failed even though there is, among most people of good will, a broad consensus over the outlines of a solution. Bottom up, yes, and top down. Solomon would no doubt have found a solution but, even if the effort is worth while, alas, our diplomats cannot find one.

Similarly in Cyprus—on which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, played a significant and excellent role—the broad lines of an agreement are clear in the Annan plan, but this is the Mediterranean, with all the passions of the Mediterranean, and even moderates such as President Anastasiades of the republic and Mr Akinci in the north, with strong personal chemistry, have failed to reach an agreement.

Further, it may be misplaced to seek reconciliation with some leaders. It would be impossible to seek reconciliation with a Hitler or a Pol Pot, however good one’s intentions. Think of the frozen conflicts around Europe, mostly the result of Russian adventurism in Georgia, Crimea, Transnistria or Nagorno-Karabakh, which defy the best international efforts at reconciliation.

There are, however, some signs of hope in the gloom, making a search for solutions worth while. I was co-founder and senior vice-president of a body called AWEPAA, the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid, in which the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, of the Liberal Democrats, and my good and noble friend Lord Boateng played a significant part. For over a decade from 1984 I visited South Africa regularly, mostly under Church auspices. I recall in 1984 that whites were avidly reading Alistair Horne’s excellent work, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-62, and fearing the worst. Horne had described how, after a number of terrorist outrages, the middle ground between the Muslim majority and the French minority collapsed, which led to a mass exodus to metropolitan France of the Pieds-Noirs as the infrastructure of Algeria was destroyed.

The whites in South Africa feared that this might also be their fate but, of course, as the white tribe, most of them had no homeland to return to. North of the Limpopo in Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s policies of retribution led to economic collapse and political chaos, but in South Africa, south of the Limpopo, the middle ground largely stood firm. Christians such as Archbishop Tutu, Bishop Hurley, the South African Council of Churches and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference built bridges between black and white. Christians in this country such as Viscount Brentford of the Newick Park Initiative brought communities together.

Civic community organisations flourished, as my noble friend Lord Boateng knows very well personally. Individuals can make a difference for good or ill: a Mandela—Madiba—or a Mugabe. We should also remember that reconciliation can be dangerous. I recall the fate of the Afrikaner leader, Johan Heyns, the moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church. He invited Nelson Mandela to speak to the congress of his Church and for his pains was assassinated shortly after. I think of the poisoning of Frank Chikane, the head of the South African Council of Churches, and other Christians such as Dean Farisani. I criticised government policy at the time. It was labelled as constructive engagement, but it was a very one-sided engagement that often protected the apartheid state from international pressure. Eventually the release of Nelson Mandela avoided the temptation of retribution by the black majority.

I will make two brief final comments. We in the UK are not Norway or Canada, essentially soft-power exponents. We have at our disposal many instruments across the range in the form of first-rate military and intelligence skills, an experienced Diplomatic Service and a major aid programme. Let us also not forget the diaspora communities in our own country, which in my judgment are not used sufficiently. We have Tamils in terms of Sri Lanka and we have Kurds in terms of Iraq and Kurdistan.

Of course, as colleagues have said, we should not overlook the work of the British Council in the Middle East and over many years in South Africa, educating under apartheid. I was invited by the trade unions of the British Council to debate with Father Huddleston of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. He was a great man, but he was an absolutist. He had closed the Church schools in 1954 and he wanted to withdraw the British Council from South Africa as if he expected new black leaders to arise like Chinese terracotta soldiers after liberation. Happily, the unions of the British Council decided against him. We won the debate and the British Council stayed on to play a significant role.

I recall the words of the Prophet Micah in chapter eight: yes, we should walk humbly with our God, but what does the Lord also require of us but to seek justice and love mercy? Let us think of Archbishop Tutu’s justice and reconciliation committees. By all means let our government departments across the board seek reconciliation, but we should recognise the limits. More importantly for us is that our Government should search for justice to underpin that reconciliation. Finally, I would submit that without justice, efforts at reconciliation will be built on sand.

Royal Navy: Staffing

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 5th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the depreciation of the pound is certainly an issue that we are wrestling with. To a certain extent, the Ministry of Defence hedges against currency devaluation but we cannot do that indefinitely into the future. We are protected to a large degree at the moment. But it is one of the reasons why we need an NSCR exercise such as the one going on at the moment, which is about not only investing in capability wisely but doing it in a cost-informed way.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, there has recently been good news about co-operation with the French on naval capability. Does the Minister anticipate any further developments of this sort, where we co-operate with our close allies?

UK Defence Forces

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 23rd November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I join others in congratulating my noble friend on his initiative and on a Motion which begs many questions. For example, have we adjusted sufficiently to our important but diminishing role in the world? Can we afford to be, or indeed not to be, a global UK punching above our weight in defence matters? What is the state of our defence readiness?

Sir Richard Barrons, the former commander of Joint Forces Command, told the Commons Defence Committee on 14 November—the transcript of that debate is well worth reading—that currently we have,

“a Navy that is structurally underfunded, an Air Force that is holding together a bunch of very good equipment but is really at the edge of its engineering and support capacity, and an Army that is now broadly speaking 20 years out of date”.

For example, today’s Times reports that HMS “Diamond”, our Type 45 destroyer, is aborting its mission to the Gulf for engineering reasons, when its five sister ships are in Portsmouth for maintenance, shortage of staff and engine failure.

Have our people recognised the scale of the changes since the Second World War in our potential world role? Nostalgia and myths clearly played a role in the referendum debate. It is perhaps relevant that the Chancellor did not mention defence in yesterday’s Budget.

It is relevant also that the Government have just replaced a Defence Secretary who knew his job and was highly respected by the military with a man who has apparently shown little or no interest in defence and security matters and whose expertise lies in party management. The pressures on the Chancellor were shown in yesterday’s Budget, with the financial context, including the cost of equipment, worsened by the dollar/euro/sterling exchange rate post Brexit, and hard choices on whether to buy more cheaply off the shelf from the US or develop national capabilities.

As a number of noble Lords have mentioned, key questions include deciding how vital to our core interests amphibiosity is in general, the future of the Royal Marines and the potential loss of HMS “Albion” and HMS “Bulwark” in a trade-off with the Navy. Technical developments, such as artificial intelligence, have changed the debate, and of course the nature of the debate is changing so rapidly that the 2015 SDSR already needs a review.

Last week I had the opportunity to discuss the current problems with a group of Welsh Guards. They all agreed that they were being asked to do too much with too little. Are our military being asked to do too much? They spoke of too many peripheral tasks, such as training others countries’ forces, and questioned whether our 20 current active overseas missions are justified.

Does our military have too little? That depends on the role that we assign to it. A key question is: should our military be expected to have excellent capabilities across the full spectrum? Where do we seek to link with our allies, particularly with France, after Lancaster House and St Malo? What about our EU and NATO alliances? NATO is challenged by Trump’s ambivalence on the Article 5 commitment and by Turkey’s pivot to Russia, as evidenced, for example, by its purchase from Russia of an air defence system which is non-NATO compatible. Our EU critics may question the added value but, in response to the US President and Brexit, on 13 November 23 of the 28 EU states began a process of permanent structured co-operation in the defence field, which could include the development of a new combat aircraft to replace Eurofighter and Rafale. Where does all this leave us? Should we just remain on the sidelines, or do we become more reliant on the US?

As a final reflection—this was said by my noble friend Lord McConnell—clearly hard power will not defeat terrorism. We need also to rely on our excellent soft-power facilities, but we also need to constantly evaluate the relevance of all our current commitments and not ask our military to do too much with too little.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 22nd June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I adopt many of the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, and indeed of his mentor, Bill George. As always, Shakespeare had the right words for it. In “Macbeth”, Macduff admirably sums up the state of our nation:

“Confusion now hath made his masterpiece”—

or “turmoil”, as the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, has said.

The Queen’s Speech comes in the wake of two failed government gambles: first, the EU referendum and, secondly, the recent and unnecessary general election. The Government proposed; the people disposed. As we start the EU negotiations, we now have what Mr Osborne, the former Chancellor, described as “a dead woman walking”, yet further weakened by the insensitive response to the tragedy at Grenfell Tower. I understand that there will be a Statement on that later. That tragedy is a further sad illustration of the state of our nation: a widening social divide and government complacency. The Government have sacked the chief executive of the local authority, but, despite accepting mistakes, all their Ministers remain in office.

I have lived in Swansea all my life, but I have also been a resident of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea for almost 60 years. I was a councillor in the neighbouring, adjoining ward of Golborne, which also suffers from multi-deprivation. I was a member of the first neighbourhood law council in the country there and of the first urban parish council. No borough has such extremes of wealth between north and south as Kensington. There is a difference of 13 years in life expectancy between the north and the south. There has been Conservative rule from time immemorial in the town hall. They are decent people but unaware of the realities of the north of the borough. The council has amassed huge and increased surpluses. It has kept council tax levels the same for years, and I and other council tax payers received a rebate of £100 in 2014. Last year, the council received a quarter more in local authority rent income than it spent on council housing. Faced with such glaring inequalities, is there anything in the Queens’s Speech, I ask rhetorically, which might reduce them? Brexit, which is obviously the main theme —the leitmotif—of the Queen’s Speech, will certainly mean higher food prices as a result of the depreciation of sterling. We know that the poorest people spend a higher proportion of their budget on food.

Mention is made of improvements in our housebuilding, yet in Kensington and Chelsea property prices rocket. Young people have no hope of starting on the ownership ladder but can only rent, often from foreign buyers who buy off plan. I commend the Government for their initiative in instituting a register of beneficial ownership of property for UK buyers and committing to a similar scheme for foreign buyers, in part to counter money laundering of the oligarchs and others. Often, the properties are simply investments and remain empty. Here, as everywhere, sunlight is the best disinfectant. Obviously, these inequalities did not start with this Government and are replicated nationally and internationally.

At least the Government have a good record on overseas aid. I join my noble friend Lord Collins in commending the continuation of the 0.7% of GNI. Like him, I question the possible danger of vacating the high ground: the Government are now seeking the agreement of OECD member states to revise the definition of aid so that certain military expenditure is included. I recognise that there is some merit in this—without security there would be no development. It is an arguable case. However, others fear that this will be the thin end of the wedge. What has been done? What has been the response from OECD members? What are the prospects of evolving a new definition?

The effects of the “confusion”, in Shakespeare’s terms, are apparent also in the Government’s approach to Brexit. The Government started on the wrong foot. Their objectives are not clear save, as in the first line of the Queen’s Speech,

“to secure the best possible deal”.—[Official Report, 21/6/17; col. 5.]

Is that Mr Hammond’s deal or Dr Fox’s deal? There is certainly no consensus in the government party. Should the priority be on jobs or immigration? The Prime Minister herself lacks credibility. Before the referendum, when she emerged from her fugitive and cloistered corner, she argued for remain, clearly seeing it then as being in the UK interest. Now she espouses Brexit with the zeal of the convert, treating our partners as though they were enemies.

On foreign affairs generally, we retain many advantages from the post-Second World War settlement. We remain members of the P5 of the Security Council and of NATO, which is ever more important, and we have excellent Armed Forces and intelligence communities. Yet let us be brutally realistic: whatever form Brexit takes, it will mean a much diminished international status. We will be weakened by ceasing to be part of the EU team at the UN, in international trade negotiations and by leaving the directoire of France, Germany and ourselves. We will be forced to move, inexorably, more into the orbit of the United States. We clearly must retain the best possible relationship with the United States, preparing for an eventual post-Trump US. We will be less relevant in the Middle East, Ukraine and Iran. Any lingering illusions about our role as a bridge between the EU and the US will be undermined by our withdrawal. No doubt the Daily Mail will trumpet that, at last, we have an independent foreign policy. That concept ended with our glorious retaking of the Falklands some 35 years ago. Now we increasingly need alliances. Even an associate status with the EU is not the same as being a full team member.

How do we best work closely with the EU and wider Europe? Perhaps the nearest parallel was almost 60 years ago. I was in the Foreign Office when the door to the Common Market seemed to shut. To avoid isolation, we hastily searched around for institutions that brought us together with the six. Coupled with the cul-de-sac of EFTA, we looked at the Western European Union, which was looking for a role. We used it in ways well beyond its original concept. The Commonwealth is only marginally relevant in this context. We have a similar dilemma today. Is there any equivalent to the Western European Union? EFTA may assume a new importance. Of course, an additional benefit for the Government is that the EFTA Court will allow them to escape from their undertaking to their right wing not to be subject to the European Court of Justice. Frankly, that is no more than a conjuring trick because the EFTA Court has broadly the same jurisdiction as the European Court of Justice. Let us look at the 47 members of the Council of Europe—obviously a weaker institution. It is puzzling that the Government flirted with the idea of withdrawing from the European Court of Human Rights, which would effectively mean leaving the Council of Europe as a whole.

Finally, the only case that at the moment proves difficult for us in relation to the European Court of Human Rights is the Hirst judgment on prisoners’ voting rights. I urge the Government to look again at this. There may now be a majority in the House of Commons that would allow the Government to follow what has been our excellent record so far in implementing judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and to accept one of the possible, pragmatic options in complying with the Hirst judgment.

Register of Hereditary Peers

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Monday 9th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

I agree with both parts of the noble Lord’s proposition.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Earl has said that my noble friend Lord Grocott’s proposal is best advanced through a change in Standing Orders—presumably not through legislation. What are the implications of that? Will the noble Earl and the Government give my noble friend an opportunity to test the opinion of the House?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it is open to any noble Lord to approach the Procedure Committee or indeed the Lord Speaker with a proposal for consideration. If a proposition then comes before the House, we will of course look at it on its merits.

Brexit: Armed Forces and Diplomatic Service

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 8th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, we have had a sterling opening speech and a well-reasoned maiden speech. My starting point is this. On 23 June, the people spoke. It is uncertain what they said but the Prime Minister has given the helpful steer that “Brexit means Brexit”. At least in the fields of domestic policy, the economy and border control there was quite a substantial pre-referendum debate and areas of concern were revealed.

However, foreign affairs and defence figured much less. I recall, for example, Mr Farage saying that he was a “Commonwealth man”, although all the Commonwealth countries were against leaving, and indeed the only Commonwealth country with a vote—Gibraltar—voted very much to remain. Miss Mordaunt, who is still a government Minister, told us that Turkey, with a teeming population, was about to join the EU. That was not true then and is still less true today. I therefore conclude from this lack of pre-referendum debate that in the areas covered today the Government have a much freer hand in making deals which are clearly in our national interest, and similarly in seeking co-operation in fields such as migration and counterterrorism—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown.

I make the following reflections. First, for over 40 years we have worked with the EU at every level—from the European Council to constant co-ordination at post level. This has led to harmonisation of policy, which has not prevented divergence, such as we saw at the UN General Assembly in respect of recognition of Palestine, with the EU splitting three ways. This habit of working together has given us more clout—for example, on Iran—and the question is whether we now face the danger of being excluded from a lead position on such issues. With our departure and the likely policies of the Trump Administration, will we not see an increasing fraying, for example—even abandonment—of the sanctions against Russia because of its occupation of Crimea?

My second reflection is that Brexit should give an enhanced role to our embassies in EU countries and perhaps even to institutions such as the Council of Europe. There will be staff implications. I note that the total FCO budget is only twice the sum of our development aid to Ethiopia, where there is an alarming deterioration in human rights. Presumably our secondees to the EEAS will return. Do we accept any obligations to our other UK nationals in the service?

My third observation is that the FCO is, of course, only a part of our representation overseas. On cultural diplomacy, the British Council has shown its concern. Will Erasmus be continued for the UK? On DfID, the 2016 statistics show that we paid 30% of our multilateral ODA to the Commission’s development budget and the European Development Fund. Will these contributions come to an end or be reduced? What new mechanisms will be devised for co-ordination with the European Union, even if we are almost certainly outside the room when priorities are decided?

Fourthly, there is the security aspect. In the Times of 11 June Sir John Scarlett wrote, concerning Brexit, that,

“we risk losing automatic access to counter-terrorist data”,

and,

“exchanges of information becoming less expertly targeted”.

How will the Government prevent this?

But have no fear: Boris Johnson told Chatham House on 2 December that the referendum was a country “taking back control”, a country “galvanised by new possibilities”. History will show whether this is again pure Johnson bluster. His claim of a greater global reach begs the question: what are the constraints now that prevent us, with our allies, having a global reach?

Similar considerations arise on the defence side. There will be calls, of course, for a new European defence organisation, most stridently from those European countries that make the least credible contribution to defence, such as Belgium, at 0.9% of GDP, and Luxembourg, at 0.4%. What are the prospects for our joining future CSDP operations such as Sophia and Atalante? How will we influence their mandate from outside? Will we continue our relationship with the European Defence Agency? How will Berlin Plus be affected by the change?

My conclusion is simple. We travel in hope. If there is good will on all sides, and given our flexibility in this field, we may be able to preserve much of the present co-operation—unless the hard-line Brexiteers prevail. What assurances can the Minister give us on these points?

Royal Yacht

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend underestimates his pulling power. If private enterprise, however defined, believed that there was a business case for a new royal yacht, we would of course look at it, but we would still be left with the question of who would pay for the vessel. Given that no government department has a need for a royal yacht, it is hard to see how any public funding could be justified.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, a number of Conservative Members in the other place have made the interesting suggestion that the costs of a new royal yacht should come out of the aid budget. Will the Minister reject that immediately?

[Earl Howe]

Yes, my Lords. No government funding has been proposed by any government department.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, at last—at long, long last—Chilcot has reported, and it makes bleak reading. I had a ringside seat at the events described, but was never in the position of taking decisions. I am comforted by the fact that neither were members of the inquiry. Although I accept that their conclusions are broadly justified, their judgments are not infallible, and need rigorous questioning.

From 1997 to 2005 I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee. Once or twice a year over that period we visited Washington and New York, where we met many of the key players in the White House, the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA, and, of course, our excellent then ambassador in New York, Sir Jeremy Greenstock. In London, after I had argued for containment, the Prime Minister invited me to meet him one to one at No. 10, and thereafter arranged for me to meet Sir John Scarlett, who had briefed him, in both September 2002 and February 2003.

I shall now make some reflections, matching my own experiences with the conclusions of the report. Yes, in 2003 I voted for the war. Would I have done so now, in the light of current knowledge? No. Would I have voted yes, knowing only what I did in 2003? Yes. Why? Hindsight is a wonderful thing. It gives 20:20 vision. Of course, Chilcot had access to contemporaneous documents, but the memories of participants have been coloured by the consequences, and the confident tone of many of the report’s conclusions was matched only by the vaulting confidence of the Prime Minister and his senior advisers, cheered on by the Daily Mail, the Sun and the Daily Express.

We now know that the consequences were overwhelmingly negative. But what would have happened if we had not intervened? Almost certainly Saddam Hussein, or one of his nasty sons, would be ruling Iraq and threatening the region. As the ISG reported in the following year, he might have had to be tackled later, as he would have had the intent and then the capability of acquiring WMD. Increased oil resources would have allowed him to buy kit from AQ Khan, or from North Korea, the arch-proliferator.

Questions remain. Is there sufficient contextual analysis in the report? Did its authors seek to put themselves in the shoes of policymakers at the time? Remember that there was enormous frustration at the dissembling and obstruction by Saddam Hussein. Remember, too, that there was a realisation that sanctions were fraying fast and containment increasingly less credible. Remember also the post-9/11 atmosphere of the terrorist threat.

The Prime Minister made a strategic judgment to stand alongside the US to influence it—a judgment that was only partially realised, but which was at least honest. When briefed by the Prime Minister, I was surprised by an almost starry-eyed admiration for President Bush. When I was briefed by Sir John Scarlett he told me, essentially, what was relayed in the much-criticised dossier of September 2002, drafted by the JIC.

Thus the Prime Minister accepted the advice of our intelligence chiefs. They were wrong, but he honestly conveyed their advice—intelligence that was also accepted by France and Germany, and by our own military. I believe—if my memory is correct—that our soldiers were offered anti-CW kit at the time. Even Saddam Hussein may have believed that he still had WMD. It is difficult for politicians to disregard the advice of intelligence experts, but there should have been more rigorous and sceptical questioning. The establishment of the new security adviser to the Prime Minister should help.

There was a lack of HUMINT, and our sources—such as the Iraqi exile in the US, Chalabi, other exiles, and the BW fraudster—were certainly very suspect and had their own agendas. The report might have covered the position in Washington more thoroughly. I met Richard Perle, the grey eminence of the neocons, on several occasions. He spoke enthusiastically of the likely welcome of liberating forces in Baghdad and the promised democratic renaissance in the Middle East—unaware of the sort of complexities that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has mentioned. Colin Powell was angered by the briefing behind his speech to the UN. Richard Armitage, his No. 2, spoke to us of the military expertise at the top of the State Department compared with the comparative weakness at the top of the DOD, led by the management experts Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.

The inquiry concluded that the post-conflict plan was “wholly insufficient”, but probably failed adequately to reflect the fact that it was not us but the Department of Defense that was in the driving seat—overriding the advice and the plans of the State Department. In retrospect, perhaps, the failure of the Prime Minister was not to make his support more conditional. In Baghdad, visiting the CPA, I saw that the operatives under Bremer were overwhelmingly American. I also visited our rather isolated outpost in Basra. We had little or no influence over the twin disastrous decisions on de-Baathification and the disbandment of the army. Colin Powell—perhaps after visiting a supermarket—said, “If you break it, you own it”, and liberation soon morphed into occupation and intolerant Shia domination under al-Maliki.

My conclusion is this. I confess I have changed my mind following the publication of the report. I had assumed that the delay, and the likely pulling of punches in the report, would lead to great anger among the families of the victims and that, 13 years after the events described, it was likely to be viewed as a historical document, mainly of interest to academic researchers into the processes of British government. It is not holy writ; its own judgments need to be questioned, yet overall it is a massive contribution to our understanding of the events leading to the Iraq war and, of course, the processes of government, and a salutary highlighting of what went wrong and the lessons to be learned. If interventions are contemplated, they should take place only according to just war principles and if the objectives are clear, and after thorough preparation, risk analysis and the provision of sufficient resources. All were lacking in the case of Iraq. Perhaps the Prime Minister—any Prime Minister—should not have on his desk the phrase, “The buck stops here”, but rather the Cromwellian words, “Think, ye may be mistaken”.

Syria

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we have noted with deep concern and condemnation the actions to which the noble Lord refers. We have also noted the resolution that he mentioned. As he knows, however, it has been the consistent position of the Government, and that of Governments before us, that any resolution declaring genocide is a matter for the judicial system rather than the Government. But that does not alter the facts on the ground, which are truly dire. We are very concerned that these matters should be given the due weight and prominence that they undoubtedly deserve in the negotiations.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, it is early days yet, but what is the Government’s best analysis of the fact that there was no consultation, which hardly suggests that the Russians are prepared to play the team game in respect of the peace process? Is there not a danger that the Russians’ withdrawal, and possibly political differences with the Assad regime, might embolden ISIL and push back Assad’s forces?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is quite right that there are a number of possible explanations for the Russians’ decision. We cannot yet read the correct one. All we can do at the moment is to say publicly, as we have, that if President Putin means what he says and Russia truly puts its weight behind holding the Assad regime and its allies to the terms of the cessation of hostilities, and to participating in the peace negotiations in good faith, then we hope that rapid progress towards a peaceful resolution can be achieved. I am afraid that it is too early for us to diagnose the precise trigger for the Russian actions; we can only monitor.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the four maiden speakers and wish to make three brief reflections.

First, there is a consensus that this SDSR is valuable and welcome. It is certainly an improvement on its 2010 cost-cutting-exercise predecessor. However, I question whether the pace of change has been fully taken into account. There must be concern about the timeframe given the many uncertainties—the play of the “contingent and the unforeseen”, the “unknown unknowns”, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, 9/11, the Arab spring and mass migration to Europe—all of which stand as a corrective to long-term planning.

There is a need, of course, for flexibility and agility in doctrine and procurement, where the lead times—such as for the maritime patrol capability and the new strike brigades—are long. Again, the Vanguard replacement seems to have been stretched incredibly from 2024 to 2028, and now to the early 2030s. Surely the case for adaptable platforms capable of modification as the nature of the threat changes has been made.

The history of the Upholder class submarine is instructive—planned in the early 1980s, abandoned in the early 1990s and eventually sold cheaply to Canada. I concede that part of the reason was cost-cutting, but the key consideration was that its role as a barrier to Soviet incursions into the North Sea had become redundant. Thus, even five-year projections can be swiftly undermined by events. For example, had Scotland become independent with an anti-Trident Government, we would need a massive rethink of strategy and bases.

We need to learn from overseas examples. From his previous knowledge of the health brief, I ask the noble Earl whether he is confident that there is, for example, sufficient spare capacity in our London hospitals to cope with a major terror attack as the Paris hospitals appear to have coped. Is the planning for this contingency adequate?

My second reflection is that the SDSR has a welcome emphasis on inter-departmentalism at home and co-operation with our alliances abroad—certainly compared with its predecessor—but are the boundaries between the MoD, DfID and the FCO still too stark, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said? Should the departments not be seen as three legs of a tripod? Yet two of the three legs have a guaranteed budget, so the FCO has to take the strain. Is the balance correct? Are the boundaries of these budgets sufficiently flexible? For example, our military contribution to tackling Ebola was properly charged to the defence budget.

I come to my third and final reflection. The Oracle at Delphi advised those who sought its wisdom to “know yourself”. Yes, we are pre-eminent in soft power, but have we reached a true understanding of our role in the world? Did I detect a certain bravado in the tone of the review? The Prime Minister said exultantly, “Britain is back”. Have we made a root-and-branch examination of our role and capabilities? The Falklands, the last of our unilateral campaigns, could not now be repeated. The review should be read in parallel with the LSE review already cited. Thus, have we fully adjusted to our proper role in the alliances with increased specialisation in procurement and in regional market share? Is there now a case for a new St Malo treaty to add Germany to the Franco-UK alliance? Must we in the UK continue to have the full spectrum of capability? I am not confident that these and other questions have been adequately answered in the review.