(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI must begin by apologising for not being present at the outset of the debate. The business of the House accelerated beyond my expectation and I am not as fleet of foot, perhaps, as I once was.
In the felicitous event that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I had been sitting together in judgment, I would have contented myself by simply saying “I concur”, because there was nothing in what he said with which I would want to take issue. Indeed, there was a great deal in what the mover of the amendment, the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), said with which I would agree. It is not necessary for me to delay the House over-long. It seems quite clear that the issue is whether the commencement of the sort of proceedings that regulated return would involve should be a matter of Executive responsibility or whether there should be judicial oversight.
I suspect that those who believe in judicial oversight do so as a matter of instinct, and perhaps not necessarily of logic, whereas, on the other side of the argument, people will think that an Executive decision is sufficient. As I explained on Second Reading, I have come down on one side of the argument against the background of reservations that I had, and still have, about the legitimacy even of managed return. A matter of this kind essentially enervates; it goes beyond TPIMs. It is a fundamental thing to say to someone who is a British citizen, “You may not return to this country.” That being so, we should incline towards the whole notion of judicial oversight.
That is a question of principle, but there is a pragmatism about it as well, because it would mean that every case would be considered on its own merits and that the Home Secretary of the time would have the protection of the court in proceeding in this direction. If the matter is left as one of judicial review, as it almost inevitably would be, there would be a period of uncertainty. In the course of a judicial review, the standard is not to satisfy oneself that there is a justification for the order but to satisfy oneself as to whether the execution of a discretion has been reasonable. It is sometimes described as having to demonstrate that a decision made as part of a ministerial discretion is arbitrary, perverse or capricious. That is a much more limited and very different approach from that proposed in the amendments. There should be a proper warrant for something that has an enervating effect on the rights of the individual. If one takes the view that rights depend only on loyalty to the principles under which those rights are exercised, then that opens up a very substantial door into areas where, for example, anyone who took a life would inevitably not be allowed the protection of life imprisonment but would be regarded as someone who, having taken a life, should sacrifice his or her own life. Our law has moved very firmly in the direction of judicial oversight.
I will vote for these amendments if they are pressed—indeed, I have told the Liberal Democrat Chief Whip that I intend to do so—because I think that this is a matter of principle. I will do my best to persuade reasonable men and women of the Liberal Democrats here present that they should do so also.
Having heard the debate so far, and having heard what was said on Second Reading and in Committee, I hope that the Minister may feel that this is an opportunity to try to produce a solution that reflects the view of the vast majority of the House rather than one that divides the House. In matters of this kind, it is always vital that if one possibly can, one should accept the will, if not of the whole House, then of the vast majority of the House. These are inevitably controversial issues, not least, as I said, because they have an enervating effect on fundamental rights. I shall wait with interest to hear what the Minister says. I hope that he will take account, if not of what I have said, then of the very eloquent and measured contribution of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield.
I seek clarification from my right hon. and learned Friend, based on his considerable knowledge and experience, on what question the court would address if it is not the judicial review question as to whether the Home Secretary acted reasonably in the determination that he or she has made. What question would the court address under the proceeding that he would like us to have?
The question is one of the Home Secretary having to persuade the court that he or she was entitled to make the order that was sought. In doing so, consideration would have to be given to all the individual circumstances that lay around that application. When one has gone a step further to judicial review, the question is not whether the decision was right or wrong but whether it was reasonable. That is a wholly different element of judicial oversight from the one that the amendments seek to achieve.
The Minister is a sensible individual, and he will, I am sure, understand the extent of the unease—that is perhaps the best way to put it—about this matter across the Floor of the House. He has within his power the opportunity to remove that unease by being sympathetic towards the points that have been made in the speeches we have heard so far.
I am not going to answer that question, because it is not central to my point. When my hon. Friend and I meet elsewhere—perhaps in some shadow Attorney-Generals’ afterlife—we can have a long and fascinating conversation about the matter he has just raised, but if he does not mind, I want to make a few brief points.
Temporary is not two years; to my mind, it is something far shorter. I have no objection to the Home Secretary making a temporary exclusion order, but I prefer the expression used by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) on Second Reading when he talked about “managed return”. That is a much more accurate description.
Would the hon. and learned Gentleman be happier, as I would be, if, by the time the Bill returned from the Lords, it was a Bill about managed return, not exclusion, and if exclusion were the back-up to enforcing managed return?
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the right hon. Gentleman for the interest he has taken in this subject and the way he has pursued it.
Finally, the Bill will close a gap in our current legislation in relation to terrorism. Clause 72 extends the reach of the UK courts so that those who prepare or train for terrorism abroad can be prosecuted should they return to this country. As the House is aware, a significant number of UK nationals or residents have travelled to Syria and Iraq to take part in the conflicts in those countries. We face the very serious threat that those fighters may seek to return to the UK and carry out attacks or radicalise people here. Extending extra-territorial jurisdiction for the offences in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006 will bolster our law enforcement agencies’ ability to protect the public—but we will need to do more. Later this week, the House will have the opportunity again to debate the wider provisions of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which is designed to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to fight and to counter the underlying ideology that feeds and supports terrorism. Given the immediacy of this threat, we will bring forward amendments in Committee to provide for the provisions in clause 72 of this Bill to come into force on Royal Assent.
Before I conclude, I want to advise the House of one further amendment that we will bring forward in Committee. The use of unauthorised mobile phones in prison poses a significant threat to prison security, as well as affording prisoners the opportunity to continue engaging in serious and organised crime while serving their sentence. While significant effort is put into tackling this problem within prisons, physically detecting handsets, let alone SIM cards, is clearly challenging given the ease with which they can be hidden. We need to find a more cost-effective way of denying prisoners the use of mobile phones. Our amendment will therefore confer a power on the civil courts to require mobile network operators to disconnect unauthorised mobile phones in use in prison.
The Home Secretary has not found time in her speech to mention the provision on the possession of knives in prison, which ensures that that can be dealt with by the courts. Alongside the Attorney-General’s willingness to prosecute when prison officers are threatened with knives, that is very welcome.
My right hon. Friend highlights another important aspect of the Bill. When this was first brought to my attention, it seemed strange to me that the use of knives in prisons could not be dealt with in the same manner as the use of knives in other scenarios in public places. As he says, we have done the right thing in bringing that into the Bill.
The Bill contains a range of measures to protect the public from those who would do them harm. It will give law enforcement agencies and the courts greater powers to strip criminals of their ill-gotten gains and to prosecute those who support and benefit from organised crime, and ensure that no one is beyond the reach of the law. It will enhance the protection of vulnerable women and children who face violence and abuse at the hands of the very people who should care for them most. It will close a gap in our current terrorism legislation. Together, these measures will help law enforcement agencies to keep the public safe and secure. There can be no greater aspiration than that, and I believe it is an objective that all right hon. and hon. Members can support. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons Chamber
Frank Dobson
I understand my hon. Friend’s point. The whole proposition of exclusion orders seems to be predicated on the idea, first, that these people are totally rational; and secondly, that their greatest desire is to come back to Britain. Neither of those things will necessarily be the case, because some very odd people are going to be involved.
The right hon. Gentleman seems to be in danger of attacking the idea that was originally presented rather than that contained in the Bill, which is much closer to being a process of determining that, if somebody who is thought to be dangerous comes back to this country, we can control, monitor and supervise them. Surely that is a more sensible objective, which the original, apparent objective of making people stateless would not have been.
Frank Dobson
I agree that the Government have modified their position since the first daft statements were made—things have been made more rational—but I do not think they have come up with the best proposition. The proposal for notification and managed return orders may not be perfect by any means, but it is a better proposition than that suggested by the Government.
The peculiarity of the functions of British consular services when a person is suspected is extraordinary. The consular services will serve people with an order and then, if somebody else nicks them and puts them in prison or starts torturing them, the same consular services will turn around and start looking after their interests. That seems to me to be at the odd end of the functions of a consular service.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIf the hon. Gentleman will be little patient, I shall move on to that subject in a few moments.
As I was saying, the Opposition accept that this extra category of data will be a vital tool for law enforcement—not just in protecting national security, but in combating a whole range of online crimes, including online child abuse, on which I shall speak in greater detail when we come on to new clause 2. The provisions for this extra category of data were first proposed in the Government’s ill-fated draft Communications Data Bill—I think that might help the hon. Gentleman in respect of his intervention. Although initially reluctant to provide any public evidence for why these extra data were needed, the Government did then provide the evidence that convinced the Joint Committee on the draft Bill of the necessity of this extra retention. The draft Communications Data Bill has been subject to much coalition grandstanding over the past few years, with the Home Secretary proposing a Bill of unprecedented, and in our view unnecessary, scope, while the Deputy Prime Minister refuses to accept the need for any legislation at all. Of course there was room for compromise and the Opposition have always supported this compromise. Some additional data retention is required, but not on the scale the Home Secretary proposed.
How can the hon. Lady say that my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister did not see the need for any legislation at all when we are sitting here in this Committee this afternoon considering the legislation which we think properly balances the privacy issues with the need for public safety?
The right hon. Gentleman has made his point, and we will obviously disagree on what I have just said.
Our view, agreed with by most of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, is that the data required to link an IP address to a device is one such category of data that is required and therefore we welcome what in principle clause 17 seeks to achieve. I say “in principle” because we do have some concerns about the drafting of clause 17, which is why we have tabled amendment 5.
The hon. Lady has produced a formidable list of questions, but I only have one for her, on amendment 5. It seems to me that the process we are describing does not enable people to discover who the user of an instrument was; it locates or identifies only the instrument from which the communication was made. Therefore, amendment 5 would be inoperative, because it could never be demonstrated that it was being used to establish who the user was as it cannot be guaranteed to do that.
I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s observations on amendment 5. As with the previous grouping, the amendment was tabled to give us the opportunity to look at the specifics of clause 17 and to understand fully the thinking behind the Minister’s approach. I take on board what the right hon. Gentleman has said, which may be correct, but the amendment allows us to debate what would be disclosed and what information would be available.
I have just bombarded the Minister with a whole range of questions and I know that, as usual, he will be very thorough and go through each in turn. However, I want to turn briefly to new clause 2, which seeks to move on from the retention of data to a review of whether the form of storing the data is allowing the key authorities to access it in a timely manner. I will say, so everyone understands where I am coming from, that this proposal aims to probe the Minister’s argument, and to look at the clause to see what more can be done and whether we need to be aware of any issues for companies.
My concern arises from the police’s apparent problems in pursuing the majority of suspected paedophiles identified through Operation Notarise. My understanding is that Operation Notarise identified between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals whom the communications data suggested were taking part in online abuse. From that, only 700 people have been named, investigated and arrested, so well in excess of 20,000 IP addresses have been identified, but that information has not been translated into named users. At this point, I am not even talking about arrests, but about identifying the users to enable effective safeguarding interventions.
Once a user is identified, even if it is just an address, the police can make several key checks: first, against the police national computer to see if there is a known sex offender living at the address; secondly, against the Disclosure and Barring Service database to identify anyone who might be working with or have access to children; and thirdly, against the Department for Work and Pensions database to see if a child is registered at the property for the purpose of claiming child benefit.
At the moment, the police do not know how many of the people they have identified are known sex offenders working with children or living with children. Most people would see that as unacceptable and would believe there should be a response. This could start with a review of the degree to which the difficulty of linking IP addresses to users is behind the police’s problems with moving this forward.
Finally, I turn to the amendments and new clauses tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), and by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), on the degree to which RIPA is being used to access the records of certain professionals, including journalists. They address a real concern that Members and the general public have about the use of RIPA to access the records particularly of journalists and those in the media.
As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), has said, this issue has to be addressed. Indeed, a key concession secured by the Opposition during the passage of the DRIP Bill was that a review of RIPA would be conducted by David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and that it would include the use of RIPA to look at the records of journalists. It is because we have confidence in that review that we do not feel amendment 11 is necessary.
However, that is also why the Opposition have a great deal of sympathy with the aims of new clause 1, which would require a court order before relevant authorities could access communications data that could be covered by a professional duty of confidentiality. The clause does not state whether the role of the court would be simply to ensure that due process is followed, or to apply some test of proportionality or necessity. However, the clause provides for the right of appeal for the individual. That means that an individual would have prior knowledge that their communications data were to be disclosed to law enforcement agencies. It is also important to note that the clause would apply not just to journalists but to doctors, lawyers and others, including Members of Parliament, when a professional duty of confidentiality could be construed.
I have the disadvantage of speaking first on this group of amendments, and obviously, this is not my amendment, so I am very much looking forward to hearing what the proposers feel would happen. However, the hon. Gentleman raises an important point, because we are not only talking about a limited group of people who describe themselves as journalists and who, in the past, we would have been able to identify clearly. Perhaps the proposers of the amendment would be able to address that when they speak to it.
I want to make a further point about the broad definition of professional duty that concerns me, especially when combined with the right of appeal. As I have said, a large number of professionals have some form of duty of confidentiality, and in many cases it is not clear, particularly when discussing communications data, how that potential duty of confidentiality would be separated from other investigations about which we would not allow the individual to have prior knowledge. There is a clear case for preventing a journalist from being targeted for their sources unless there is an overwhelming need to do so. However, the case is less clear in respect of other professions, particularly as we may be investigating issues involving criminal misconduct. Let me give an example for the Committee to consider: the case of Myles Bradbury, the doctor recently convicted of a string of horrendous sexual assaults of boys in his care. As a doctor, he would potentially have been covered by the new clause, especially in respect of some of his communications, and the Committee would be concerned about that. If he had been alerted to the fact that the police were investigating him, he would have had some time to delete much of the evidence which was then used to lead to his prosecution. I just give that as an example of the care we have to take in considering these matters.
I hope the Minister will respond in detail—I am sure he will—to the issues I have raised on this group, particularly the need for the drafting of clause 17 to be made much clearer so that the general public can be reassured about exactly what it is attempting to do.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) is right to seek clarification to satisfy herself and her colleagues that clause 17 achieves its intended purpose and no more. Its intended purpose is reasonable: to keep up with the technological changes that lead evildoers to move from one technology to another, and become more difficult to track as they do so.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that this provision does not keep up with the technology, and that much more has to happen and will happen? Will he clarify his party’s position on the changes that will have to come?
The hon. Gentleman has a strange desire, which he has expressed during a previous speech, to extend the debate beyond the bounds of clause 17 and the amendments to it. I do not think we should be drawn into that at the moment, except to make the general point that all processes involving intrusion into people’s private communications should have high levels of justification before they are used at all, and protections should be provided by various safeguards and authorisations. Finding the right balance for different levels of communication is a difficult task, and I expect a great deal of work will need to be done. Most of us in this House, and certainly most in my party, do not want, either by design or accidental discovery, a great deal of personal information about people to get in the hands of the state and its employees without any reasonable justification. On a matter that will be raised when the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) speaks, nor do we want the processes of investigation by journalists to be impaired by a fear that sources will be compromised from the beginning. There are very good reasons for extreme caution in this area, but I believe the Government have exercised that caution and sought to devise a process to deal with a particular and recognisable difficulty.
Mark Field
The right hon. Gentleman is making a perfectly valid point. In the midst of the more hyperbolic phrases that get used, such as “snooper’s charter”, does he recognise that legislation such as this—and further legislation, which will inevitably be required whoever is in government in the years to come—should also be designed to protect the individual? It is not just about the state getting more powers; it is about codifying the rules and protections for the individual. It is very important that we have that in mind when looking at any new legislation that comes into play.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s observation, which points to part of the purpose of the process, of which this is only a part. The clauses we are talking about in RIPA—or DRIPA, as it has become known—are the subject of a sunset provision, because significant further review is to take place and new legislation will be required on the outcome of that review. So those who think that detailed discussion of matters that often feel technically beyond us is just an occasional thing in this House will have to recognise that we are going to be coming back to this issue. That does not apply to me, because I do not anticipate being a Member in the next Parliament, having announced that I am going to retire, but Members in the next Parliament will certainly be engaging with these issues.
I simply wished to place on the record that my view—and, I hope, that of my right hon. and hon. Friends—is that the Government have striven hard to find a sensible way to identify the instrument or apparatus that has been the point of communication. In many cases, that will enable them to identify the individual, but I stress that it does not guarantee that, any more than knowing a telephone number guarantees that the person who used the telephone—that instrument from that number—is the person who engaged in the criminal activity. It is more complicated than that, but this provision is a necessary aid to investigations ranging from the activities of paedophiles through to the serious threats we now face.
Everyone else who has spoken so far seems to have explained my amendments, and I am grateful to them. I tabled new clause 1 and amendment 11 because there is now a sense of urgency about dealing with this matter. I speak as the secretary of the National Union of Journalists group in Parliament—a group of MPs drawn from various political parties in the House. Throughout proceedings on RIPA and DRIPA and now this Bill, we have been discussing this issue. To put it simply, this House has always recognised in legislation the need to protect journalists, because we see journalism as one of the bulwarks of democracy in this country. Although we may not be enamoured of journalists or individual newspapers at times, we believe they play a vital democratic role in exposing what happens, particularly in regard to the behaviour of public authorities, Governments, corporations and others. That is why over the years we have written into legislation protection for journalists, as well as for other professions where there are issues of confidentiality, and the House has accepted that in all the debates so far.
It might be better expressed as “protection for sources”, because the primary concern is not to give a special elevated status to the journalist, but to avoid a situation in which the questions are asked, “Who told him and how can we get him?”
Exactly. I was not arguing for preferential status for journalists—God forbid that I do that here. I was coming on to that point: this is about the ability to make sure a source is protected—as we all know, sources are often whistleblowers, blowing the whistle on abuses by public authorities and others—but it is also relevant to the protection of journalists themselves. We have seen across the world how, when the confidentiality of journalists’ sources is undermined, journalists become just as much a target as their sources, and in recent years large numbers of journalists in various countries have died as a result of persecution. What I am trying to say is that it is critical that we protect the role journalists play and enable them to undertake their work.
We have legislated in accordance with that principle—in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, for example. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) that it is always difficult to find the mechanism, but the mechanism under PACE was the ability of the court to determine whether a production order should be made. We gave it over to the courts to determine that. What was important about that is that the journalist was notified of the application and could contest it before the court, and a decision would then be made that commanded the confidence of all those involved. The classic case since then is when the police failed to get an order under PACE and then used RIPA to obtain an order against a journalist to get information relating to articles that were being written, including the sources of that information. I think it was generally felt in the House that that was not what we intended when we passed PACE and was not in the spirit of RIPA. We have for some time consistently tried to get Government and this House—the responsibility falls on the shoulders of us all—to do exactly as my right hon. Friend said and to find an appropriate mechanism.
I tabled new clause 1 because I cannot find an effective mechanism other than the use of the courts at some stage. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) asked whether it is a mechanism to enable the court to determine whether due process has been followed or the merits of a case. I have left that open for now because I welcome the discussion, but in my view, it is both.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley says that my local parish priest rather optimistically describes me as a lapsed Catholic. The secrets of the confessional need to be included; otherwise, there might be an excommunication.
The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) makes a good point about journalism. I would like the definition to be membership of the NUJ, but there you are. These days, I would have the widest interpretation, but if it is to be contested, I would like to see a court make the decision on the basis of the evidence before it.
It is important that we distinguish what we are talking about here—the protection of the conversations that take place between lawyers and their clients and between doctors and their patients, discovered by entirely different processes. We are looking at the identification of the person who tipped someone off or provided some information. There may be good criminal law reasons for finding out who that person is, but I agree that some kind of measure is needed to ensure that those who warn a journalist or perhaps a Member of Parliament that something serious is going wrong have protection.
Let me give one example of where RIPA was used. The case of Kirsty Green was in the evidence presented to the Home Affairs Committee by Michelle Stanistreet, the general secretary of the NUJ. Kirsty was a former regional newspaper journalist. Derby council spied on her meeting with local authority staff in 2009. Two Derby city council employees watched her when, as Derby Telegraph’s local government correspondent, she met four current and former council employees in a Starbucks coffee shop. The local authority said that RIPA was used to get surveillance authority for officials because they were protecting the council’s interests. The consequences for those individuals was a risk to their job in the local authority.
It is important that communication is protected, but names and sources also have to be protected, especially for whistleblowers, as we have seen when social workers have come forward in child abuse cases. The right hon. Gentleman makes the point well, but to me it emphasises even further the need for some judicial process in the oversight of access to the data and the way in which the legislation has been proposed.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI just want to place on record the fact that the Select Committee on Justice, although it was severely critical of the Government’s handling of the matter from the beginning, has supported the five measures that the Government wish to opt into. I am pleased that my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Government have been firm in their determination to opt in.
That is the bizarre thing about this whole situation. We had the opportunity to demonstrate the House’s support for these measures to everyone, particularly the courts—we know that Eurosceptics have made challenges in the courts to any aspect of legislation that they can challenge. Why do we allow them to do that without having a vote that shows the House’s strong support for the measures? The right hon. Gentleman is right that Select Committees have supported them, and the debate in the other place also showed support. Many Lords who strongly objected to the process that had been followed, even in that House, said that they supported the measures and wanted the opportunity to signal that support. We need to send that important signal, whether on football banning orders, the European arrest warrant or the other co-operation measures, and we now have the opportunity to do that.
We need co-operation to stop international crimes such as human trafficking and online child pornography, and to protect people and get justice for victims. So last week, I told the Home Secretary that I would support her motion. Today, I am glad she has said that she will support mine. These are unusual circumstances, and there were many other issues that we would have been keen to debate this afternoon, from the bedroom tax to the national health service. However, we thought it was right to ensure that the House had the opportunity to meet the Prime Minister’s promises and demonstrate its support for these crucial international crime-fighting measures. We need to demonstrate the strong support throughout the House for co-operation with Europe. We have the opportunity today to have a straightforward vote on the European arrest warrant and European co-operation measures, and to do what it says on the tin, even though the word “Europe” is in the title. I hope that the whole House will support the motion.
Let me say to my hon. Friend, as I did to a previous intervention, that I fully accept the concerns that a number of right hon. and hon. Members have about the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, but this is not an issue confined to the measures we are considering today. As part of the opt-out/opt-in decisions we take for measures brought forward in the justice and home affairs area post-the Lisbon treaty, we look at the question of jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the ECJ applies to those measures as well. We have opted in to a number of measures on the basis that a balanced judgment of the importance of those measures and the benefits they bring outweighs the concerns that my hon. Friend has raised. He uses the term “in perpetuity”, but as I said, if we have a Conservative Government after May 2015, we will have the opportunity to renegotiate a relationship with the European Union and a number of issues can be dealt with within that. Both the Prime Minister and I have indicated that we think free movement should be included within it, and I believe that our relationship with the European Court of Justice is another candidate for consideration in those negotiations.
I want to point out that the Government were right not to opt in to a series of standards measures where we are already well above the standards precisely, because it unnecessarily imported European Court of Justice jurisdiction into our own system.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe have just had an hour-and-a-half debate in which Members have been talking about the importance of parliamentary process. We have a parliamentary process called Committee stage at which amendments to the Bill will be properly considered, and that debate will take place then. I have indicated to the House that I understand the desire of some Members to ensure that the review of the capability and powers that are needed and the regulatory framework is on the statute book to ensure that that does, indeed, take place. David Anderson, the reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, has indicated that he will lead that review and there is widespread support for that given the excellent job he does in his current role. However, I want to make sure that, in looking to ensure we undertake that review, the Bill is drafted in a way that delivers what we all want to be delivered. I would have thought that that was entirely reasonable. That debate will take place at the Committee stage, when the hon. Gentleman will be free to wax lyrical about the nature of the amendment.
May I bring the Home Secretary back to what she was talking about before, which is what is loosely described as blanket retention? It is not possible for the police to identify, before a crime has been committed, the range of telephone calls made and received about which it would be helpful for them to have communications data in order to pursue that crime. Therefore, the retention of data for a period is the only way the system can work.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. People often argue, “Actually, all you need to do is retain data from the point when you’ve identified a suspect or that a crime has taken place,” but when somebody has been murdered, for example, it may be necessary to go back and identify calls between the victim and a number of people. That is why it is important to be able to retain data from the past, but that is for a limited period. Previously, under the regulations that were agreed by this House, 12 months was the set period for retention. One issue that the European Court of Justice raised was that there should not just be one period of retention for all types of data. We are addressing that by making it a maximum period of retention, so it would be possible in any notice to a communications service provider to say that a particular type of data is required to be retained for a period of less than 12 months. We are, therefore, introducing the flexibility that the ECJ required.
Alan Johnson (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). I am not sure whether he and I are the best people to support the Home Secretary. It seems to be de rigueur in some quarters to believe that members of the Intelligence and Security Committee and former Home Secretaries lose any sense of the need to support the noble causes of protection of privacy and promoting civil liberties as soon as they come into office. We are supposed to have all that sucked out of us as we walk down Marsham street.
Sometimes, as a non-tweeter, I am lectured about the importance of privacy by people who send a tweet every time they brush their teeth. Leaving that aside, I suppose that, just as it is impossible to imagine a new Foreign Secretary arguing for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, it is impossible to imagine a Home Secretary being caught up with the more fundamentalist wing of the civil liberties group. That does not mean that we do not care about civil liberties.
Leaving aside Home Secretaries and distinguished Chairs of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the people who work in the security services and the police and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre are equally concerned about issues of privacy. The one thing that sometimes irritates me about this debate is the idea that we could direct them. In this country, with all our values, which we sometimes seem to believe exist only within this Chamber or within Members of Parliament and Ministers, that is a ludicrous suggestion.
For me, there is one test for the Bill—the Ronseal test: does it do what it says on the tin? Let me assure Opposition Members that the Home Secretary prior to 2010, who was me, operated entirely on the basis of this Bill. I have sprinkled rosewater on it, I have held it up to the light, I have closely examined all six clauses. Apart from the ambiguity, which others have referred to, we always believed that we had protection in respect of CSPs based overseas and that they were subject to the law on communications in the UK. We always operated in that way, and it is as well to make that clear. Would it not be ludicrous if it worked any other way?
It would not only be ludicrous; it would be an invitation to companies to re-site themselves outside the United Kingdom, for fear of placing themselves at a competitive disadvantage.
Alan Johnson
Of course. The right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) made a very important point earlier about the need for a blanket provision. We need to keep blanket information. How will we resolve the cases that the shadow Home Secretary set out so effectively without that provision?
I admit before this House that I believe these laws ought to go further. I have made that clear before. I agreed with the Home Secretary in the foreword to the draft Bill a couple of years ago, which says that we cannot allow continuing and new technologies to remove this capability, but I accept that this is not the place to argue for that. Indeed, I believe that the new provisions set up under David Anderson, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and the examination that David Anderson will carry out, make it more probable that we will have an informed debate when the matter comes before Parliament.
The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who is not in his place, spoke about telecommunications, but before telecommunications, there was the Post Office. It has always been the case that we have used these kinds of powers to protect this country against our enemies. When I joined the Post Office as a postman in 1968—I know that is a long time ago—there was a whole unit in St Martin’s le Grand occupied by MI5, or the service, as it was called, where technicians wore rubber gloves and sat with very strong lights and large kettles, steaming open letters. I add, incidentally, that I was not one of those people. I know that by reading “The Defence of the Realm”, the splendid history of MI5 written by Christopher Andrew.
Christopher Andrew also tells us that in 1969, 221,000 postal items were opened in this way. There had been an increase of 135,000 on 1961. The interception of communications commissioner’s report in 2013 shows the total number of interception warrants authorised by the Home Secretary. Bear in mind that 221,000 letters were opened in 1969. The number of warrants authorised in 2013 was 2,670. That shows that, although there is a more complex problem, although the challenges are more complex and, I would say, the threats to this country are more severe—that our citizens are in a more perilous position than they were in the 1960s is arguable, but that is what I believe—it is incredible that we have a much greater grip on the issue now. We have far more surveillance and far more oversight of these matters than we had, and that is very healthy.
In my view, we are today defending what is there already. If there was an addition to those powers—I was pleased to hear the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee say that the Committee had looked at this—I would not support the Bill and I would not have supported the programme motion earlier. Members in all parts of the House see this as important. Let us not lose the capabilities that we have before we debate whether those capabilities need to be added to.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIn respect of clause 1, we are also stating that a retention notice may relate to particular operators, and there is a whole set of subsections and paragraphs dealing with the basis on which a retention notice can be provided. It also goes on to say, in subsection (3), that the Secretary of State can
“by regulations make further provision about the retention of relevant communications data.”
Subsection (4) deals with certain provisions relating to
“requirements before giving a retention notice”,
and a code of practice and a range of other matters regarding
“the integrity, security or protection of, access to, or the disclosure or destruction of, data retained by virtue of this section”.
I entirely accept your point, of course, Sir Roger, that this is a debate on this clause, but this clause contains the essential powers that are being proposed under this piece of domestic legislation, and I am certain—this is not an assertion—that this has to be compliant with European law and it has to be compliant with the charter.
All I am saying is simply that there is an opportunity to make sure this law is effective—that clause 1 is effective. If Parliament wants clause 1 to be effective, it will want to be sure that it is bomb-proof against any challenges that may be made in respect of powers being conferred by clause 1, and in order to do that we have to get around the problem of the European Court, which has already issued an objection to the original proposals—the original regulations and the original retention directive on which the regulations are based, and, indeed, on which any subsequent regulations will be based, because I have not heard anyone yet say that the retention directive, which is the subject of clause 1, is going to be repealed by the European Union. There was some talk from the Home Secretary that she was looking at it, and there was talk about consultation, but I have not heard anybody suggest that the retention directive is going to be repealed in whole or in part. It may be that that will happen, but we are considering this Bill as it is now, and as we speak clause 1 is derived from European law and the charter of fundamental rights.
In a nutshell, this is what I am saying: section 2 of the 1972 Act requires the implementation of the requirements prescribed by the European directives and European law, and the Bill falls within the scope of European law, and the charter and the general principle of EU law will continue to apply. I will respond to the shadow Minister and the Minister in one simple statement, and it is this. If they want the legislation in clause 1 to be effective, it is imperative to make certain that arrangements are made in the primary legislation that the House is now discussing to ensure that sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 do not apply in this context, because that is the only way—by primary legislation—to ensure that the powers in clause 1 will not be vitiated by a further Court challenge in future. This is a fundamental question that pertains to the supremacy of Parliament. We want the legislation to pass—or many Members of the House do, judging by the majority that we have just witnessed—but if that is the case, why not insert the formula
“notwithstanding sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972”
to ensure that clause 1 will survive? Otherwise, I fear that it is at risk.
The Home Secretary talked about wanting to remove the risk of uncertainty. All I would say is that what we are doing on the Floor of this House is compounding and creating the very uncertainty that she said she wanted to avoid. The uncertainty will come simply and solely because of the ideological obsession with not making provision in an Act—which otherwise would make it a good enactment—to include the words
“notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972”,
and then legislating on our own terms. If we do not do that, this clause and all that follows from it will be at risk, and there will indeed be uncertainty arising from it.
If I may make this final point, Sir Roger. When the charter of fundamental rights was going through, I tabled an amendment to include the words “notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972”. The charter applies to this clause, and as I said to the Prime Minister the other day—and it is understood—the only thing we can do is either to accept that the charter is applicable in the United Kingdom or to displace it. By including in the Bill the words “notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972”, the charter will not apply. I tabled such an amendment to the Lisbon treaty legislation. That amendment was declined and the result is that we now have a series of European Court judgments saying that the charter does apply to the United Kingdom. If my amendment had been accepted—back in 2008, I think it was—we would not be having to face the fact that the charter is now applicable.
The charter arises in relation to this provision, and all I am asking is for the Minister and those on the Opposition Benches to listen and to act to ensure that we are not trumped by a challenge by the European Court, guided through the legislation and case law, to override legislation that is passed in this House of Parliament. It is very simple.
This clause is about retention; it is not about access. That distinction is an important one, not least to anybody reading these debates or drawing conclusions from them. It is also something that might profitably have been considered at greater length by the European Court when it reached its judgment.
There is a big difference in the impact on somebody’s human rights between the retention of data and having access to those data, which we will deal with in subsequent clauses. Of course, companies retain data for their own commercial purposes, such as billing and a variety of other reasons. They are constrained by the Data Protection Act—they have to have a legitimate purpose for doing so—but they have many purposes that can enable them to keep data. It is important to recognise that the problem from a human rights and privacy point of view arises when access is made—when a Government body can go into that mine of data and discover a lot of things about somebody’s life. It might have a number of good reasons to do that—to identify whether that person is involved in a serious crime—but those reasons have to be justified by some kind of procedure. We can consider that aspect later, but we must recognise that this part of the Bill is confined to the power of retention.
The Government’s answer to the argument advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is that, in framing the retention provisions, they will not be obliged to make the same provision for every kind and every aspect of data. That should satisfy the European Court provision. If ever this comes to a legal challenge, I hope that there will be some attempt to make the Court think a little more carefully about the fact that retention and access are not the same thing.
My right hon. Friend has been in this House for many years. Does he recall that a situation similar to the kind that I have been describing arose in relation to the Factortame case? The European Court, through our own courts, ended up by striking down the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 because the Government did not get the legislation right, which they could do this time round.
I have only remembered the case because my hon. Friend made the same point on a previous occasion. He has not been slow to point that case out. It is worth remembering—this may not be an approved thing to say—that the European Court is not always entirely consistent from one judgment to the next in the way that it applies its principles. It is important that we make it absolutely clear that we have a set of rules to ensure that the Government only require the retention of data when they have good purpose for doing so, and they only retain those kinds of data for which there is good purpose. Access to that data should be the subject of stringent conditions. In essence, that was what the European Court judgment was about, and the Government are meeting those conditions in the way that they have framed this legislation. That is not to say that they could not be open to challenge; perhaps they will be at some point. If that challenge is made, we should make it quite clear how important the distinction is between retention and access to data.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) makes his point well. He talks about the retention of data, the security and assurance that is provided and the separate regime that relates to access to data and how that is reflected in the Bill’s provisions. Those provisions relate to the retaining of data, the safeguards that exist and some of the steps that we propose to take in relation to the Information Commissioner and the powers that he has to ensure that the data are retained securely. Then there is the separate regime that relates to the rights of different agencies, as set out in legislation, to gain access to that data. My right hon. Friend understands that concept and expressed it well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) has highlighted the point about seeking to put beyond doubt that any legal challenge to this Bill should be considered by this Parliament and by the courts of the United Kingdom. Given the backdrop to this legislation—the data protection directive—and the approach that the European Court of Justice has taken in striking down the directive, I suppose I can understand why he is motivated to raise these issues in the Committee this evening. His comments raise broader points about the European Communities Act 1972. Our membership of the EU is wider than this Bill, and I respect the consistent way in which he has advanced those issues in the House.
We have considered carefully the existing law and legislation, and we have reflected on the European Court of Justice judgment in seeing what further measures can be put into effect to reduce the risk of challenge. That risk of challenge is most likely to heard within the UK courts than the European courts, as that is where challenge to the legislation might be flagged up in the first instance. Legislation is challenged in our courts from time to time. We believe that we have considered carefully the compliance of the Bill with the necessary regulatory requirements and remain confident that it meets those requirements.
The right hon. Gentleman serves on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and I used to serve on it. When I did, I was a little concerned that the definition of “economic well-being” was extremely broad and could refer to things that might generally promote Britain’s economic interest, rather than matters related to national security, as the Bill helpfully defines economic well-being, or things that should be dealt with under other categories such as serious crime. There are serious threats, and the right hon. Gentleman is right to identify them. They are what this should be about.
That intervention was helpful. I said at the outset that the wording of clause 3 took us slightly further. It relates economic well-being explicitly to national security, whereas previously it was related implicitly. The right hon. Gentleman is right to say that that is the conditional element of it all. I do not think that I am drawing the definition too broadly; the interpretation could be even broader. My purpose is to find out what other factors fall under that broad heading of economic well-being. I do not for one minute think that I have included all the considerations in the short amendment that I have put together; it is merely a vehicle to allow us to discuss matters more fully.
It was interesting when we discussed the timetable for the Bill—you may rule this comment out of order, Sir Roger—that everyone said that there would not be enough time to discuss it. As far as I am aware, nobody else is due to speak on my amendment, and I do not think any other speeches are intended on clause 3, so perhaps we do have enough time.
It is always difficult for Ministers—not just me; this has been the case with successive Governments—to comment on security and interception matters. Perhaps it will help the hon. Lady if I explain that what we are doing tonight is strengthening the position by underlining that the purpose has to be connected to national security, so it is not simply a question of economic well-being. The fact that we are putting that into legislation is an important development, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) has said.
I am sympathetic to the amendment in principle, as it seeks to provide clarity on the meaning of economic well-being in law. In many ways, I think it seeks to address some of the points raised by the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark). David Anderson may wish to reflect on it in his review of existing legislation and new legislation capabilities. Indeed, the privacy and civil liberties oversight board may also wish to address the issue of clarity. My simple point is that it needs to be done with care, given the other legislation I have flagged up and the broader context of the European convention on human rights.
Ought we and the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) not to be celebrating the fact that for the first time in statute we are narrowing and specifying the circumstances in which economic well-being can be used as a justification? In other words, there has to be a national security element to it, not just a general feeling that some piece of information would be helpful for our economic well-being.
The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. We are putting this provision front and centre in primary legislation. I hope that that is helpful in giving an assurance. National security is clearly a pretty high bar to reach, so framing the economic well-being argument in those terms should give an assurance that this is not something that would be relied upon lightly.
I am genuinely surprised that the hon. Lady has made her point in that way, because the Bill is about strengthening governance and oversight. Sitting alongside the Bill in relation to the retention of communications data, there will, in addition, be a statutory code of practice, while the Information Commissioner has the right to look at further audit and oversight of data retention, and the interception of communications commissioner can consider the use of the powers. That should give independent assurance to not just the hon. Lady but others who, reasonably and legitimately, want to know that such powers are not abused or expanded.
Our governance and oversight of communications data and interception have been strengthened and enhanced over the years, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) said on Second Reading. Equally, in relation to wanting to know that the tests are adhered to in relation to a Secretary of State effectively authorising a warrant for interception, the oversight of the interception of communications commissioner should provide a great deal of assurance.
I have always recognised that people should be able to uphold their industrial rights, including the right to form a trade union. I certainly do not in any way intend this debate to get into such an issue. Indeed, from his speech, the right hon. Member for Knowsley understands that the Bill’s provisions will tighten important rights in existing law. The point concerns whether there is a need for any further clarification. The comments of the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran on the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment highlighted the tricky nature of trying to frame the Bill correctly and the potential for unintended consequences in that context.
May I just hammer the point home? Economic well-being would not be mentioned in the Bill were we not providing a greater safeguard than has ever existed before or under RIPA to ensure that the power is used only in relation to national security.
Absolutely. My right hon. Friend makes a very good comment for me to conclude on. Clause 3, which will provide such strengthening, has given us the opportunity to have a constructive and helpful debate.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberFirst, Madam Deputy Speaker, may I apologise for missing the start of the Home Secretary’s speech because of a meeting with a Minister which had been arranged before today’s timings were affected by the earlier statement? I am very glad to follow my colleague the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz). We have worked together, along with the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, to try to improve the way Parliament is able to address these matters. It has been a struggle, and the outcome in terms of the process is still far from satisfactory, but we have reached this point and we are having this debate. There will be a debate and a vote or votes at a later stage—we are still unclear as to what that procedure will be. This has at times been like getting blood out of a stone, and I do not think that is particularly in the Government’s interests. I appreciate some of the problems that they face, but in order to obtain parliamentary support they need to give Parliament the opportunities to feel confident that it has been able to examine things properly. I am therefore glad that we now have the Command Paper, which includes all the impact assessments. It would have been very helpful to have had those much earlier, and of course we still do not have the impact assessments on those measures the Government do not propose to enter—perhaps those would have helped to illuminate the Government’s reasons for the decisions they made.
There are no changes in the opt-ins in the Ministry of Justice field; the changes are in the much larger number of measures that come within the Home Office’s sphere. The Justice Committee has therefore already examined and reached conclusions on the measures, and it is unlikely to do a great deal more on the issue between now and the later stages of consideration. We published a report, and the Government are still pursuing a view with which we broadly agree, and I will explain why.
The measures include six mutual recognition measures, including one on financial penalties that originated with the United Kingdom and Sweden. There are measures on previous convictions, prisoner transfers, judgments in absentia and European supervision orders. The Government propose to rejoin all those measures with one exception, which is the probation measures framework decision, to which I will return. The Committee agrees that the Government were right, in the national interest and in the interest of effective cross-border co-operation, to seek to rejoin five of the measures.
The Committee of course strongly supports the UK’s participation in the prisoner transfer framework decision because it is a priority to reduce the number of foreign nationals held in UK prisons. That decision is also an important part of the overall package for reforming the European arrest warrant. The Committee is particularly conscious of the problems presented by the large number of foreign nationals in UK prisons. Those are nationals from many countries in UK prisons, and the Government must continue their efforts in relation to those countries. With European countries, however, there is a much better prospect of achieving a prisoner’s return to their native country because we are not dealing with countries in which human rights considerations, on the face of it, would appear to prevent a return.
One of the five measures, the European supervision order, enables a defendant or suspect on non-custodial pre-trial bail or other supervision to return to their home member state to await trial there under supervision, and we support and welcome that measure. The probation measures framework decision provides the basis for mutual recognition and supervision of suspended sentences, post-custodial licences and community sentences, and the Committee noted the Government’s concerns about the measure’s operation:
“In view of the potential value of the Framework Decision we consider that the Government should pursue the matter in their negotiations on the opt-in list to see whether these concerns can be dealt with. We would not wish to rule out participation in the measure if concerns about its drafting can be overcome”.
We discovered from another source that a solution to that problem is alleged to have been found. The source was a press release issued by the General Affairs Council on 24 June, from which it appears that the Government have undertaken to consider opting back in to two Prüm decisions and the probation measures framework decision at a later stage.
In evidence to our Committee on 9 July, the Lord Chancellor admitted that he had been pressed by the Commission to rejoin the probation measures framework decision, arguing that it was closely linked to the prisoner transfer agreement. He repeated the objections that he had previously expressed to the Committee, particularly that we do not have much experience of the measure’s operation in other countries and the legal problems that it might cause. He said that the solution reached in the negotiations was that the UK would look at the matter again in the next Parliament to see whether rejoining would be in the national interest. It would have been preferable if the Government had volunteered information on that, either in correspondence or in a Command Paper, instead of leaving it to Committees to glean information from Council press releases and media reports.
More generally, the Justice Committee supports the Government’s choice of measures to rejoin in the national interest and in the interest of fighting crime. We reached some agreement with the Government on minimum standards measures that set standards already met by the United Kingdom. We said that
“the arguments for opting into the…minimum standards measures are primarily symbolic, and our view is that those arguments do not outweigh the disadvantages of bringing wide areas of criminal justice in the UK unnecessarily into the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
Many traditions in our judicial systems in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland are different from those that prevail in continental practice, and it therefore makes sense not to become involved in matters in the European Court of Justice when doing so does not serve the national interest. There is value in signing up to minimum standards measures if it has a persuasive effect in other countries, but the Committee’s view is that that is outweighed by the disadvantages of creating case law in the European Court of Justice on matters that do not need to be treated in that way.
The changes to the list of 35 measures do not appear to affect the overall balance of the package. Some of the changes are the consequence of measures ceasing to be subject to the block opt-out, and others, such as the additional measures on Europol and the Schengen information system, are ancillary to the Government’s decision to participate in Europol and the Schengen information system and may be regarded as necessary on the grounds of coherence and practical operability. It is interesting that the Government have achieved the conjuring trick of changing the list of measures while retaining the same total number. I suspect that has something to do with internal party management within the Conservative party, but the outcome for the balance of the measures will continue to be supported by the Committee. The measures that the Government have agreed to opt into will materially assist in the fight against serious crime and in the safeguarding of the freedom of our citizens. The Government have my support.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that this is a growing problem, and I think that that is recognised at senior levels of the judiciary. We should listen with as much vim and vigour to what the judges have to say as we do to what the Association of Chief Police Officers says.
On the internet search engine ruling, it is important to say that there is a cultural and values issue at stake. It is not just some legal constitutional issue. A right to be forgotten may suit French privacy laws that gag the publication of the peccadilloes and crimes of the rich and powerful, but it directly cuts against our tradition of media freedom, transparency and free speech.
Having seen the effect of ECJ judicial activism on this area of crime and policing, do we really want to allow the ECJ to determine the powers and responsibilities of British police forces, the British criminal process and even foreign forces, through joint operations, operating on British soil? That is a huge risk for us, and I fear that we risk the Luxembourg Court doing for British policing what the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has done for UK border controls.
One reason why I refuse uncritically to defer to ACPO on these issues is that it is ill-equipped to gauge the long-term threat to operations and ultimately public safety of these developments. These are constitutional developments, so it is not just a question of consulting on the administrative arrangements that we have in place now. If anyone in favour of opting back into these measures had listened to this debate, they would have thought that ACPO had been wholeheartedly in favour of opting into more measures than we are doing. If we look at the evidence it gave to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, we see that it recommended opting into only 13 measures, which is substantially fewer than the number that we are planning to opt into.
The second issue that I wish to address is the European arrest warrant. Many Members will have their own constituency horror stories, and I am afraid that I am no different. In fact, my constituency seems to attract problematic cases. The one that sticks in my mind and, frankly, in my throat is the case of Colin Dines, a former judge of impeccable character who was falsely accused of involvement in a major mafia-related Italian telecoms fraud. The story would be almost amusing if it were not so tragic. Without any evidence presented or any opportunity for him to explain his innocence to the Italian authorities, which he was confident that he could do, he was the subject of a European arrest warrant, which was nodded through by our courts, as they must be. He faced the prospect of incarceration or, at best, house arrest for months on end until his trial. Tragically, the only thing that temporarily saved him from being carted off was that he had a stroke from the stress of it, which meant that he was temporarily deemed not fit to travel. The case remains hanging over him like the sword of Damocles, which is totally unacceptable. It is also unacceptable for me as a law maker in this House to see the fate of citizens across this country.
That case is not an isolated injustice. If Members want to grasp the scale of the justice gap under the EU law and the European arrest warrant, they should listen again to our senior judiciary, such as our top extradition judge who gave evidence to the independent inquiry into extradition carried out by Sir Scott Baker. Lord Justice Thomas said that the European arrest warrant system is “a huge problem”—his words. He did not say that it was a small problem, or that there were isolated incidences, but that it was a huge problem that had become “unworkable”.
I pay tribute to the Home Secretary, who has looked very carefully at what can be done within the EU framework decision. Additional safeguards were introduced by the Government in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and they are positive steps in the right direction, and the Government deserve great credit for looking at the matter so carefully. In my opinion, the safeguards do not go far enough. That is also the opinion of Fair Trials International. In particular, the bar on extraditing suspects when the case is not trial-ready could be made tighter. I fear that the new leave to appeal requirement undercuts all the safeguards introduced. Above all, it is a shame that we were not allowed any time on the Floor of the House to debate those clauses, important and positive as they were, because they were introduced late in Committee.
I understand from Ministers that there is no appetite in Brussels to revise the EU framework decision itself, a point that I make to my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon. That is a sad reality that we have to accept. The question is what we do next. I believe the preferable option would be to opt out of the European arrest warrant and renegotiate a bilateral extradition treaty with a limited number of extra safeguards—the few modest additions that we need to make it safe for our citizens. We would still have fast-track extradition, but we would stop the justice system in effect selling our citizens out, which is what it does at present.
Does the hon. Gentleman envisage bilateral extradition treaties with each individual member state?
I shall address that point squarely in a moment. I need to move on fairly swiftly.
In the meantime, between the renegotiation and the opt-outs, we could temporarily continue the EAW arrangements for, say, a year to allow the conclusion of the negotiation. In the worst-case scenario, if partner states in Brussels refused, we would have to fall back on the Council of Europe conventions that predated the European arrest warrant. It has rather breathlessly been suggested that without the EAW, we would risk letting people such as Jeremy Forrest or terrorists such as Osman Hussein go scot-free. That is irresponsible nonsense, and it must be addressed head on. Ideally, we would negotiate a bespoke extradition treaty, as I have suggested. We want something between the old cumbersome conventions and the current automaticity, but even under the Council of Europe treaties the main temporary effect would be to delay extradition proceedings from weeks to months. That would not mean any fugitive or suspect going free or any increased risk to the British public.
I have asked a range of parliamentary questions and written to Ministers on this, and I am grateful for the replies that I have received. The evidence is clear. There certainly are gaps under the Council of Europe conventions. They do not apply to some tax offences, but that is not the same as dangerous criminals threatening public safety. Even then, fewer than 0.4% of prosecutions for tax offences last year were facilitated by a European arrest warrant. The second gap is that Council of Europe conventions would require us to respect the statute of limitations on crimes in other EU jurisdictions. Again, that is hardly the kind of loophole that would stop the hot pursuit of dangerous fugitives. The third gap relates to EU countries that limit extradition of their own nationals, except under an EAW. That would affect extradition requests to Latvia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Belgium and Germany.
It is a very odd argument that we must accept the injustice of the European arrest warrant for British nationals because a few other countries have stronger safeguards protecting their citizens in their normal extradition arrangements. In any case, it will have become clear to the House that none of these temporary gaps under the Council of Europe conventions would apply to people such as Jeremy Forrest and Osman Hussein. It is irresponsible scaremongering to suggest that they would. Opting out of the European arrest warrant, on the Government’s own evidence to me, might for a relatively short period delay EU extradition proceedings while we conclude a better arrangement, but the risk of dangerous fugitives going free is negligible. Public safety is a perfectly respectable, reasonable and legitimate argument to weigh against the threat to individual liberty. We do it in the House all the time. Administrative convenience is not.
The third issue I wish to address is that the Government are considering opting into Prüm measures on data sharing, which would cover fingerprints, DNA, car registration details and so on. There are serious reservations about the impact of this on British citizens, and serious risks. The UK DNA database is far bigger than any other EU database, and innocent British citizens are far more likely to find their samples caught up in a foreign criminal investigation. EU authorities are more likely to assume that the availability of UK DNA samples is a strong indicator of previous criminal behaviour. We know that the EU standard for matching DNA samples is 40% less accurate than the UK standard, which accentuates the risks. Taken together, the Prüm data sharing, the European investigation order and the European arrest warrant make up a rather dangerous cocktail for an unprecedented number of future miscarriages of justice. The House should have no illusions about that.
My final point is about the alternative to opt-ins. The EU has legal personality in the JHA field, so, to answer the point made by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), if we were to refrain from opting back into any of these measures we could negotiate with one party and not 27. So that we understand that it is a practical right and not a theoretical one, let me explain that the EU has already done that with 24 other non-EU countries in JHA, so there is no reason in principle or practice why Britain cannot do the same. I ask Ministers whether that question has been raised in Brussels and what precisely the objections were. If the Government do not feel that that is feasible, has a marker at least been laid down in Brussels about future British renegotiation, making it clear that we will want to return to the whole area of JHA in the round, given what has been said?
I suggest that at the very least the Government, or perhaps even the Prime Minister, should make the context behind the decisions clear by letter to the new Presidents of the Commission and of the Council. If not, I fear that this, our best opportunity to demonstrate that we can deliver renegotiation in Europe, runs the risk of being perceived both at home and across the EU as a signal that when push comes to shove our deeds do not match our words.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the right hon. Lady. She raises two issues. First, she is absolutely right that there have been questions about the extraterritoriality of the current provisions in RIPA. We have asserted, as I believe the previous Government did, that the extraterritorial jurisdiction was there, but we have chosen to make it absolutely clear in the Bill that it is possible to exercise a warrant extraterritorially. That is part of the purpose of that part of the legislation. Secondly, we have already had discussions with the United States on the mutual legal assistance arrangements, and it is precisely that sort of issue that I think the senior former diplomat will be able to address in discussions with other Governments, particularly the American Government, because the right hon. Lady is absolutely right that currently the processes are very slow and do not address the issue as we need them to.
Since it is not surprising that this is a difficult issue on which to achieve coalition consensus, I welcome the fact that the Home Secretary has agreed with my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister on a whole series of safeguards that are absent from previous legislation. I suggest that as part of the fundamental review that now needs to take place of this essential but temporary legislation we should consider whether some authority beyond that of Ministers, perhaps of a judicial kind, might be needed, certainly for the highest level of intrusion into privacy.
I note my right hon. Friend’s point. Of course, the question of whether some form of legal or judicial authority—a magistrates court, perhaps—should look at access to communications data was considered by the Joint Scrutiny Committee. It looked at the processes that are in place today and accepted that they were absolutely appropriate and suited the requirements.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf we opt into any of these measures and they are justiciable by the European Court of Justice, we are, through that act itself, ceding sovereignty to the European Union, because it is part of building up a single state.
What does a state have that makes it a state? What is the essence of a state? At least one important part is the ability to control law and order. We are opting back into the things that are most clearly creating the powers of a federal state of the united states of Europe—a single state that is the European Union. That will mean that we are no longer a member of an international organisation like any other, such as the United Nations or NATO, from which it would be easy to withdraw, should we wish, although I am not suggesting for a moment that we do so.
Of the 35 areas that we are asking to opt back into, three illustrate the fundamental importance of the sovereignty issue. The first of those is the European arrest warrant. The decision over who can arrest a nation state’s citizens must be an essential right of that nation state in determining this exceptional power that it gives to its police officers. In our case, the power that constables who hold the Queen’s warrant have to restrict somebody’s freedom comes directly from the Crown as part of the expression of the power of the state. To decide that an arrest can be determined abroad without any of the necessary British legal procedures involved is a move very firmly towards a federal state. Crucially, the question of who is or is not arrested will no longer be determined by a British court but by the European Court of Justice, over which we have no absolute control. We may have one justice there, but it is not a court to which we send ambassadors; it is a court that is independent in its exercise of European law as opposed to British law.
The hon. Gentleman has fallen into uncharacteristically misleading language. Over what court does he think we do have control? We send to the European Court of Justice judges just like those we have in our own courts, and we do not purport to control them from this House.
My right hon. Friend is fully aware that Parliament can overrule any court in this country by an Act of Parliament. That is how our constitution works; it is the absolute essence of our constitution and our democracy. He, of all people, must know that. We have in this House, and together with the House of Lords, the ability to change the law if there has been a judgment that is alien to our understanding of how the law should be enforced. That is simply not the case as regards the European Court of Justice. It is a court that is outside the control not of Parliament but of the people of the United Kingdom, whose rights are being given up. The arrest warrant would be handed over as part of the creation of a state.
Tied in with this is Europol. Europol, in its current form, is limited, but once we have signed up to this measure, its development will be subject to the qualified majority vote. Europol exists to provide support and assistance to member states in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking. What are we doing in this regard? Are we setting up the very beginnings of a federal bureau of investigation? Are we starting to say that we will have a police force in Europe with a power that goes across national borders? Are we therefore saying that British subjects may be subject to a law that this country has not agreed to—indeed, we may even vote against it—and that has emanated from a judicial system that is not controlled by the democratic will of the British people?
That ties in with Eurojust, which is about creating mutual legal assistance to aid investigations and prosecutions and how judicial action in a cross-border case should take place. What is happening? We are creating an arrest warrant, the beginnings of a European police force and Eurojust, which will allow co-operation in a judicial and prosecutorial capacity. That is not a million miles away from creating a European public prosecutor, which for some reason is singled out as the one thing that is a bridge too far and that we must never have without a referendum, but everything that is being put in place makes that the next logical step. If we do this, it would be no surprise if a future Government said, “We have the arrest warrant, Europol and Eurojust, so surely we don’t need a referendum to have a public prosecutor, because that is the next thing we should do.” This is further evidence of the creation of a European federal state.
The argument in favour of this measure is that it will help ensure that criminals get caught. Everyone is in favour of that: of course we want criminals to be brought to justice. Is there not, however, an ancient view of British justice that it is better for 100 guilty men to go free—I say “men” deliberately, because women very rarely commit crimes that get them sent to prison, much less so than men, and I do not want to upset any hon. Ladies—than for one innocent man to go to prison? That seems to be at the essence of our understanding of justice. This is about risking our belief in justice for the convenience of the Administration.
Is it not that the worst argument of all that their noble lordships have produced a report saying that public officials are too idle to do their jobs properly for us to have a system of bilateral negotiations? I know that our public officials are among the greatest and hardest working people in the land. When one sees them arrayed in front of us, one knows that they would be willing to burn the midnight oil and act in the nation’s interest to ensure that we have those bilateral agreements. Although it has not yet been done, there is nothing in European law to prevent a member state from having an agreement with the body of the European Union. The European Commission does not want that to happen, but that is a very different question from whether or not it is legal. It could easily be done by a relatively simple treaty change, if it is not provided for in the current treaties.
I must first explain to the House that I had to leave during the middle of this debate, after the opening speeches, to speak in a discussion upstairs about a statutory instrument that directly affects my constituency.
I have the pleasure of following the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). It is a pleasure because of his eloquence, but eloquence and judgment do not always walk together, and on some matters he is simply wrong, including about the European arrest warrant. My belief is that if 100 criminals go free in the absence of the European arrest warrant, that would be an extremely bad state of affairs for our constituents. That is entirely separate from the question of ensuring that no innocent person is convicted in our courts. Long may we strive to achieve that second objective.
Mark Reckless
In response to the right hon. Gentleman’s first point, how many of our own citizens—who had done nothing wrong and been convicted of no crime—is he prepared to see detained in foreign prisons in return for those 100 people going free?
One measure that we are opting into ensures that people do not have to be detained in foreign prisons, but can be returned to the United Kingdom to serve under bail conditions in the United Kingdom. That is another reason why I think that we should look at the measures individually and decide which are in the national interest and beneficial to our citizens because they afford some protection to our citizens abroad or because they help to protect our citizens in this country from criminals who flee elsewhere having done terrible harm.
I want to make a little progress.
I want primarily to speak about the Justice Committee’s work on this matter, but I cannot forbear to mention that the Government have handled their relationship with Parliament very badly in this regard. This debate is a somewhat belated and limited response to the view of the three Committees that there should have been an early opportunity to debate and vote on the measures so that the Government knew the House’s views, with that being supported by impact assessments at an early stage—we still have not had any—and a much earlier indication of the Government’s intentions.
There have indeed been intensive discussions. The hon. Member for North East Somerset implied that they took place at a table with all the Conservatives on one side and all the Liberal Democrats on the other. I know that it was more complicated than that on several issues, as I am sure the Justice Secretary is well aware.
I want to turn to the measures for which the Ministry of Justice is responsible, and on which the Justice Committee reported. Of the total of 16 such measures, the Government propose that the UK should rejoin seven. Our report examines the case for and against rejoining all 16 measures, and we concluded in broad support of the Government’s approach. There are six mutual recognition measures—on financial penalties, previous convictions, prisoner transfer, probation measures, judgments in absentia and the European supervision order, to which I referred a moment ago—and the Government propose to rejoin them all, except for the probation measures framework decision.
We agreed that the Government was right, in the national interest and in the interests of effective cross-border co-operation in criminal justice, to seek to rejoin five of the measures. The Government support particularly strongly the UK’s participation in the prisoner transfer framework decision, stating that a top priority is to reduce the number of foreign nationals in UK prisons, while the decision is also an important part of the overall reform package of the European arrest warrant. My support for the European arrest warrant is accompanied by the belief that it was right to take active steps in various areas to try to reform it and make it better serve its purpose.
One of the five measures, the European supervision order, enables a defendant or suspect under non-custodial pre-trial bail or other supervision to be returned to their home member state to await trial there. It would not of course apply to people granted unconditional bail, who would be free to return to their home member state in any case. We urged the Government to implement the measure without further delay, and their response stated that they intended to do so as soon as practicable.
On the probation measures framework decision, which provides a basis for mutual recognition and supervision of suspended sentences, post-custodial licences and community sentences, we noted the Government’s concerns about its practical operability, but we stated:
“In view of the potential value of the Framework Decision we consider that the Government should pursue the matter in their negotiations on the opt-in list to see whether these concerns can be dealt with. We would not wish to rule out participation in the measure if concerns about its drafting can be overcome as part of the forthcoming negotiation process or at a later stage.”
In their response, the Government spelled out in more detail their objections to the measure, including that it falls within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, while saying that they support the measure in principle. I still hope that they will make some effort to deal with some of the practical difficulties, because the measure may be of real benefit.
There are six minimum standards measures, which set out EU-wide minimum penalties and sanctions for corruption involving officials, counterfeiting of the euro, fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, and corruption in the private sector. Two of the measures will be replaced by a new directive, covering counterfeiting of the euro, which the UK has decided not to opt into. The Government do not propose to rejoin any of the remaining four measures. They pointed out that we already at least meet the minimum standards, and rejected the arguments that were put to us in evidence that leaving the measures could cause reputational damage. We stated that
“the arguments for opting into the…minimum standards measures are primarily symbolic, and our view is that those arguments do not outweigh the disadvantages of bringing wide areas of criminal justice in the UK unnecessarily into the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”
The remaining four measures under the aegis of the Ministry of Justice comprise one on data protection in police and judicial co-operation, one on a data protection secretariat, a Schengen agreement on road traffic offences and a measure on conflicts of jurisdiction. The Government propose to rejoin the first two, but not the last two. We broadly agreed with the Government’s line, although we stated that the arguments were finely balanced as to whether the UK should rejoin the framework decision on settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction, because it provides a framework of guidance for member states to put in place to protect against parallel legal proceedings on the same matters being taken in different member states. The Government’s position, which they maintained in their response, was that it had no additional practical value because best practice arrangements are already in place.
Our broad conclusion was to support the Government’s choice of opt-ins on Ministry of Justice measures. The Government closely coincide with our views. Those views are on the record for the consideration of the House to which we report, and it remains a matter of regret to me that we were not able to register our views in the House earlier and in a more concrete way. However, this debate has been a useful means of reminding the Government about where it has support, where there are differences of view and, in particular, where the Select Committees charged with such responsibilities have looked carefully at the measures and given their advice.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith). We have not reached the same conclusion, but I pay tribute to the work of his Select Committee, and indeed to the work of all the Select Committees that have provided the reports that have invaluably informed this debate. I agree with the point that has been consistently made on the critical role of parliamentary scrutiny in all of this. Whatever our view on the measures and the direction that Britain should take, the measures are clearly substantive and important.
I welcome the Government’s exercise of the block opt-out, which is critical. I am surprised by the great lengths that Opposition Members, so few of whom remain in their place, have taken to trash the opt-out that they negotiated and to highlight all its flaws. Time and again, rather than setting out their position on the substance, they are at pains to point out their failure to negotiate, and to rubbish the product of their negotiations before the previous election.
It is important that we scrutinise the substance of this area of UK-EU relations, both because of its effect on policy and because the public care about it. For all the slavish pro-EU noises that we have heard from Labour and Liberal Democrat colleagues, their argument is clearly not taking effect with the British public. A ComRes poll for Open Europe towards the end of last year found that crime and policing is the fourth most important area that the British public want renegotiated with Europe. The top area is immigration, so two of the top four measures for renegotiation, according to the British public, who we know overwhelmingly back renegotiation, are justice and home affairs measures. If Conservative Members are just a bunch of crazies and are missing something, other Members must struggle to explain why they have failed to win over public opinion. Why do the public so strongly think that justice and home affairs is an area that needs to be reconsidered? It is important that we look at the package as a whole and at individual measures through the cold, hard lens of the British national interest.
My opening point is that the lack of proper empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of many JHA measures has been an endemic problem across successive Administrations, but particularly under the previous Government. In comparison with the way in which UK policy and legislation works, whether we are for or against the measures, we do not have a proper understanding of how the measures operate in practice. The right hon. Gentleman referred in a rather cavalier way to hundreds of criminals going free if we do not sign up to the European arrest warrant. I will take an intervention if he can explain where that figure comes from, because I do not think it is based on concrete evidence.
I was referring to the remarks of the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), who used the rather tired saying that it is better for 100 individuals to go free than for one innocent man to be convicted. My argument is that it would not be acceptable for 100 people to go free because we do not have the European arrest warrant, but we should also ensure that innocent people are not convicted.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He is the Chair of the Justice Committee, which has investigated the measure, but I am still not clear on the public protection shortfall, in empirical terms, if we do not sign up to the European arrest warrant and instead look for alternative arrangements, which I know would be slower. The Home Secretary referred to a case relating to the German constitution, but what is the empirical evaluation of the quantitative size of the public protection shortfall for which the European arrest warrant caters? I am none the wiser. I appreciate that the police would love to have fast-track extradition, but I will not nod police powers through the House that have been requested by the Association of Chief Police Officers, or by anyone else for that matter. In the same way, I would happily join forces with Liberal Democrat colleagues to face down police requests for things such as ID cards or extended powers of pre-charge detention. We need to consider the merits of each proposal.
ACPO’s evidence to the House of Lords European Union Committee has been regularly cited, and that evidence recommends that it is vital to opt back in to only 13 of 135 EU crime and policing measures. I do not suggest that we should take that at face value, but it is extraordinary that only 13 measures are regarded as being of any tangible law enforcement value. That highlights the unthinking way in which the previous Government signed up to EU measures, and they are now saying that the current Government are proposing only to opt out of trivial measures. The real question is why the previous Government signed us up to stuff that is trivial, redundant and irrelevant, not least because the trajectory of EU justice and home affairs is, sooner or later, going to encompass the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, which we know can turn seemingly irrelevant or peripheral measures into something damaging for national democracies. At the other end of the scale, it shows how much pointless legislation comes out of the EU if the police, who are regarded as the most zealous advocates of EU crime and policing, are advocating that we opt back in only to such a small proportion of the measures covered by the Lisbon treaty opt-in.
I pay tribute to the 21st report of the European Scrutiny Committee. I agree with all the points on the risk of giving jurisdiction to the European Court of Justice, because we would end up doing for crime and policing what the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has done for deportation powers and prisoner voting and is looking to do for whole-life tariffs. We should be very cautious about that.
The Home Affairs Committee’s ninth report contains some important analysis of the European arrest warrant, which it describes as “fundamentally flawed.” It is worth noting that that backs up the evidence from Britain’s most senior High Court extradition judge, Lord Justice Thomas, to the independent Baker review of extradition. Lord Justice Thomas said that the European arrest warrant has become “unworkable.” I will read out in full some quotes from Britain’s most senior extradition judge, because this is not a right-wing excursion or some rabid anti-European ideology; it is from someone who considers such cases week in, week out. In his evidence to the Baker review, Lord Justice Thomas said:
“Looking at the 27—I’ve said this to many people—this system becomes unworkable in the end… politically there is a huge problem. There is quite a lot of strong judicial feeling on this subject”—
the European arrest warrant—
“in northern Europe that both the judges and politicians in other countries need to put the resources into their systems to bring them up to standard… We’re all agreed there’s an undoubted problem, as the cases sent in by Fair Trials International illustrate. If you talk to anyone, there’s obviously a problem… One of the problems with the way in which a lot of European criminal justice legislation has emerged is that it presupposes a kind of mutual confidence and common standards that actually don’t exist.”
That is Britain’s most senior extradition judge.
Previous speakers, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), spoke about considering not only a snapshot of current co-operation but the future vision of where EU justice and home affairs co-operation is heading. I entirely agree with that analysis. We need to think of the long term, not just the short term. I know that many hon. Members are rightly fixated on the time lag and the time gap, whether we have enough time to do anything else and whether we will find ourselves, having opted out, not opting back in to measures, but at this juncture we ought to look to a long-term settlement of Britain’s relationship with Europe in the important area of crime and policing.
I fear the creeping supranationalism that is undoubtedly coming. We cannot read the text of the regulations, whether on Europol or Eurojust, not to mention the wider remit of the European Court of Justice, without seeing that that is happening. We would have to be blind not to accept that. There is a new draft regulation that would strengthen Europol’s power to demand that national police forces initiate investigations by whittling away the national right to say no. There is similar strengthening of powers to demand data from national Governments with less ability for those Governments to say no. There is increasing supranational management of the running of Europol. Of course, if we opt back in, all of that is subject to the overriding jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, rather than the British Supreme Court. I always find it fascinating that Opposition Members, including the shadow Justice Secretary, who set up the British Supreme Court, are now so willing and eager to give away its right to have the last word not only on matters affecting law enforcement and public safety but on matters affecting British citizens.