Ellison Review

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I recognise the role that the hon. Gentleman has played in relation to this matter, the concern that he has expressed over the years, and the efforts that he has made, as he has just evidenced to us, to ensure that the truth will be found in relation to the murder of Stephen Lawrence.

On the public inquiry, as I indicated earlier, we will be looking at the terms of reference once it is clearer that Mark Ellison has been able to do his work in relation to the question of the SDS in general and miscarriages of justice. It is specifically in respect of the SDS and the Peter Francis allegations that Mark Ellison identifies that a public inquiry might be better placed to make definitive findings, and that is the background against which we will look at the inquiry’s terms of reference. In relation to some of the other aspects that he investigated, he has not highlighted the potential for a public inquiry to find further evidence and get to the truth behind certain allegations. As I said, the inquiry will look at undercover policing and the SDS, in particular, but we will set the terms of reference in due course when Mark Ellison has had an opportunity to conduct the further review that has been proposed in his report and that I have accepted as a recommendation.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I welcome the thoroughness of the Ellison inquiry and my right hon. Friend’s resolute response to it. Does she agree that undercover operations, although sometimes necessary, were wholly inappropriate and had no valid purpose when used against the Lawrence family and Duwayne Brooks, and that that underlines the need not only for effective accountability for such operations but an ethical framework within which they are conducted? Will she say any more about how she hopes to protect whistleblowers, whose lives and careers are often shattered when they serve the public and the vast majority of honest police officers by bringing corruption to public notice?

[Mrs May]

I thank my right hon. Friend. In fact, “wholly inappropriate” is precisely the wording that Mark Ellison uses in relation to the use of an undercover officer during the Macpherson inquiry. I think that many people will be absolutely shocked by the fact that there was an individual who was, in Mark Ellison’s words—I used the quote as did the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—

“an MPS spy in the Lawrence family camp”

at a time when the family were in opposition to the MPS in judicial proceedings. I am sure that everybody recognises that that was wholly inappropriate and that this is not the behaviour that we expect from the police.

On the question on whistleblowing, my right hon. Friend makes a very valid and important point. It is crucial. The issue of whistleblowing in various aspects of the public sector has been raised in recent times. It is very important that police officers feel that they are able to raise matters of concern and that those matters of concern will be properly considered and properly dealt with. I have not quite finalised my proposals in this area, so I ask my right hon. Friend to have some patience. I will inform the House in due course of how we intend to improve the ability of police officers to be whistleblowers and to feel that they are able to do that and what they feel is absolutely right and of benefit to the vast majority of offers, who operate with integrity.

Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

That is absolutely correct. The proposal for the creation of a European public prosecutor was framed specifically in those terms, and it would therefore require the endorsement of the public. I think that that is because, owing to the significant impact that it would have on the criminal justice system, the change would be so significant and fundamental—for reasons that I shall explain shortly—that it would require the backing not just not of Parliament but of the public.

The flaws in the EPPO proposal frame the context in which we must also consider the Eurojust proposal. The reforms proposed to Eurojust would involve deep connections with the EPPO, because the legal base for the EPPO requires it to be created “from Eurojust”. The Commission has sought to reflect that by creating operational, management and administrative links between the two bodies. That includes the exchange of data, including personal data; automatic cross-checking of data held on each body’s IT system; and Eurojust’s treating any request for support from the EPPO as if it had been received from a national competent authority.

At a time when we do not know what the EPPO will look like—given that the Commission must now review its proposal following the yellow card—let alone how the relationship between it and Eurojust might ultimately be defined in either text, it would be irresponsible in the extreme for us to risk binding ourselves to the European public prosecutor through our participation in the new Eurojust proposal. That would be a needless risk, given that we can review our place in Eurojust on its adoption.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Does the Minister not think it particularly unfortunate that when the functions performed by Eurojust are so necessary and so valuable, our ability to co-operate in that mechanism should be impaired by its becoming interlocked with a proposal with which we disagree?

[James Brokenshire]

That is an important point. As my right hon. Friend will know, the Government believe that the existing structure for Eurojust works well, and provides for effective practical co-operation in dealing with cross-border criminality. I shall develop that point further during my speech.

We also need to consider what the coalition programme says about preserving the integrity of our criminal justice system when deciding whether to opt into a new justice and home affairs proposal. The new Eurojust proposal would create mandatory powers for national members—powers that would allow it to require coercive measures at a national level. This House will already be aware that we have expressed concerns about any such powers being granted to Europol, the EU police agency, and our concerns hold true in this regard too. The proposed text goes further in explicitly requiring that those based in The Hague would be able to insist that national authorities take investigative measures in certain circumstances. That could, for example, include requiring them to issue a search warrant in the UK. That would cut across the division of responsibilities and separation of powers between police and prosecutors in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. It also fails to take into account the role of the independent judiciary in ensuring that certain coercive measures are granted to police in appropriate circumstances. Moreover, the proposals would conflict with the role of the Lord Advocate in Scotland, who has the sole, ultimate responsibility for determining investigative action in Scotland. That would be undermined by the proposed powers.

These are not matters of mere technicality. They are about fundamental aspects of our systems of law and would require wholesale and unjustified changes in order to be implemented. They would also conflict with the principle that operational decisions are best made as close to the operational level as possible, and would disrupt the operational independence of our law enforcement officials and prosecutors.

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[James Brokenshire]

Consultation has taken place with the Scottish Government and with the devolved Administration in Northern Ireland to keep them apprised of the examination of this measure and to highlight the significant issues at stake. From the outset, this Government have made clear their opposition to a European public prosecutor’s office, for the reasons I have enunciated this evening. I do not think that there is any surprise about the steps that have been taken or, because of the fundamental nature of the objections that I have highlighted, any fundamental objection to the proposals I am setting out and to our seeking the House’s authorisation in the manner we are tonight.

The only rationale for the Eurojust proposal seems to be that in order for an EPPO proposal to be brought forward the Commission had to take into account the treaty requirement for it to be established “from Eurojust”. Our law enforcement agencies and prosecutors already work closely with Eurojust as it currently operates; this House will be aware that we are part of the current agency. They value the support it provides, but they must retain discretion to make decisions at a national level. Indeed, the Government value the current Eurojust arrangements, which support judicial co-operation arrangements, helping to co-ordinate serious cross-border crime investigations and prosecutions. The case of the murders in Annecy in France in early September 2012 demonstrates the value of the current Eurojust arrangements. The UK and French national desks at Eurojust were instrumental in co-ordinating activity that led to a joint investigation team, and in clarifying the legal and procedural options in each country. That is why we are seeking to rejoin those arrangements as part of the 2014 opt-out decision.

We also take seriously our commitment to tackling fraud against the EU’s budget, but we believe that the most effective approach is prevention, not the creation of a new EU prosecutor. The UK has a zero-tolerance approach to all fraud, with robust management controls and payment systems in place that seek to prevent incidences of EU fraud. We have welcomed recently agreed changes to EU payment procedures and the reform of OLAF, the EU’s anti-fraud office, to improve the reporting systems and investigations. Once they are fully in place, they will support existing and future UK investigations and prosecutions.

The Commission’s approach with the proposals under consideration today is, therefore, unnecessary and, as I have set out, the content raises substantial concerns. That leads us to conclude that we should not participate in the new Eurojust proposal at the start of negotiations. We will instead undertake to play an active role in negotiations on both Eurojust and the EPPO, seeking amendments to the Eurojust regulation to meet our needs while engaging in discussions on the EPPO to protect against any attempt to bypass our non-participation through the back door of Eurojust. At the end of negotiations, we will thoroughly review the Eurojust final text and actively consider opting in—in consultation with Parliament—on the basis of that final assessment.

If the final text remained unacceptable and we were not able to participate in it, there would obviously be risks for our longer-term participation in Eurojust. Depending on what was finally agreed, an assessment would need to be made on whether we could remain within the old arrangements, subject to the outcome of the separate work on the 2014 decision, or whether the institutions would seek to eject us from Eurojust and we would need to seek alternate co-operation arrangements. Given that we do not expect to have sight of the final text much before the middle of 2015, it is hard to speculate on the final outcome, particularly in the light of the recent developments of the yellow card having been issued in relation to the measure for the EPPO. What I can reiterate is that we will work to get the text into a place where it is able to meet our significant concerns.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Over the considerable period in which the subject can be discussed, can we not seek allies among our fellow member states from those who recognise that different legal systems with different distributions of powers within them must be recognised by any EU-wide arrangement and that the text should therefore be changed?

[James Brokenshire]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his contribution and I know that he was consistent on that point during our debate on subsidiarity last week. That view has been expressed by a large number of national Parliaments across the EU and it is now for the Commission to reflect on that message in the context of subsidiarity and on whether there are more appropriate ways, as we would argue, to deal with the issue of combating fraud in the EU.

As I have already said, Ireland has announced its intention not to exercise its opt-in to the new Eurojust proposal at the start of negotiations and, of course, Denmark cannot participate in post-Lisbon justice and home affairs measures such as this. All member states have a shared interest in ensuring that the final proposals work with all member states’ criminal justice systems, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) has said, rather than adopting the Commission’s unworkable one-size-fits-all approach.

Let me conclude by making clear our commitment to the current Eurojust arrangements and our intention to negotiate to protect those arrangements, and our view that as the proposal stands it poses too high a risk to our criminal justice systems to opt in at this stage. Today’s motion is in the national interest and I urge the House to support it.

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[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I agree with the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) on one point and disagree with her on another. I agree that there should be a debate on the Floor of the House when the three Select Committees publish their reports. They will provide important guidance to the Government in their negotiations. Where I disagree with her is that it is not sufficient for her to say, “Even if it were true, I would not have started from here.” The question still has to be asked whether the Labour party would, if it had had the opportunity, have opted in to the Eurojust proposal or not. She conspicuously failed to answer that question, except in a way that suggested that she had been given a narrow mandate by somebody in authority in the Labour party.

I start from the proposition that Eurojust is essential and that the European public prosecutor most certainly is not. For the one to get in the way of the other is harmful. Anyone who looked at the documentation for this debate and the excellent work of the European Scrutiny Committee would readily concede that there are many complexities to this matter. However, at its heart, there is a simple issue, which is that whereas cross-border crime requires an effective apparatus that takes advantage of our being in the European Union—we want to maintain those arrangements and it would be greatly contrary to Britain’s interests not to be part of them—the creation of the European public prosecutor is neither necessary nor, in the opinion of many of us, even desirable. That it should stand in the way of British participation and the participation of other countries in Eurojust is seriously harmful.

There are two ways in which the situation that we are confronted with creates difficulties for any British Government, of whatever party political composition. The first is that the proposals on the European public prosecutor and on Eurojust are interlocking. The draft directive on Eurojust incorporates the European public prosecutor so extensively that it makes the position of a state that wants one and not the other very difficult.

The second is that the mandatory powers that are given to national members of Eurojust fly in the face of arrangements in the United Kingdom. Of course, the arrangements throughout the United Kingdom are not uniform. The arrangements in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are quite different from those in Scotland. In Scotland, the Lord Advocate and the procurator fiscal can direct investigations. There is a clear separation between investigation and prosecution in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Those differences need to be respected. If we can respect those differences in the United Kingdom, surely the European Union can respect the fact that the same objectives can be achieved by different legal systems.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman share the concern of many in this House, including the Minister, over the data that are collected by the Commission, which show that the conviction rate in the UK is 23%, when in reality it is about 75%? The data that the Commission collects centrally go against what we are trying to do.

[Sir Alan Beith]

There are many dangers in playing with those statistics. Not least, the objective of a 100% conviction rate seems to undervalue the ability of the court to determine that evidence is not sufficient to support conviction and punishment. We expect our courts to throw out cases that do not have a sound evidential basis. The whole statistical exercise is potentially dangerous and misleading.

I speak for the Liberal Democrats, rather than for the Justice Committee, because, oddly enough, this is a home affairs power rather than a justice power, and there is no doubt that we want to be in Eurojust. We do not want Eurojust to be complicated by the wholly different proposal for a European public prosecutor, and we do not want Britain’s participation to be impaired in any way.

The motion is carefully worded. It asserts that

“the UK should not opt in to the draft Regulation on the Eurojust at this time and should conduct a thorough review of the final agreed text to inform active consideration of opting into the Eurojust Regulation, post adoption”.

That wording is most ingeniously crafted. What I want it to mean is that we will make substantial efforts to ensure that we get a Eurojust regulation that meets our needs and those of a number of other member states that share our concerns and that can be allies in putting this matter right, so that there can be no doubt about our future co-operation in these arrangements, which greatly assist us in dealing with cross-border crime and catching up with fleeing criminals who dodge around the nations of Europe. That is of immense importance to us. I look forward to the Government’s active involvement in trying to get the Eurojust proposal right so that we can opt in to it in due course.

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[Chris Heaton-Harris (Daventry) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate and to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab). His arguments were well put and I completely agree with them. I will try not to copy him too much, but he nailed the point that this measure is completely tied to the European public prosecutor’s office. It is a building block of it, and a morphing of what Eurojust was originally set up to do, taking it much further than any of us in this House would like.

In last week’s debate, we did not get to the issue of what exactly the European public prosecutor’s office is, probably because the Minister asked us not to stray into that territory. According to the European Union, the European public prosecutor’s office will be a

“prosecution office of the European Union with exclusive competence for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment crimes against the EU budget.”

Those last few words are the most important.

For the best part of two decades, the European Commission’s budget has not received a positive statement of assurance from the European Court of Auditors. A lot of money is wasted in maladministration, but a large sum also disappears through fraud, which has caused consternation in some circles for some time. People have, in the past, blown the whistle on areas where money has been filtered away illegally. The problem goes back to before 1999. Those of us who were involved in European affairs back then will remember that the Jacques Santer Commission fell in 1999 because of a scandal involving a failure to chase down fraud, and the ignoring of whistleblowers and internal fraud. When the Commission fell, there was marked panic in European circles and a committee of independent experts was set up. That reported in March 1999 and again in September 1999 after the European elections of that year.

Before 1999, there was an anti-fraud organisation in the European Commission called UCLAF, which after 1999 morphed into a similar anti-fraud organisation called OLAF. Its job was to chase down fraud, both internal and external, and to protect the financial interests of communities in and across the European Union. It was a simple transfer of powers from UCLAF to OLAF—alas, several members of staff also made the transfer—but OLAF did not really succeed in doing its job of chasing fraud for some time. Indeed, it tended to chase whistleblowers before it actually chased fraudsters who chose to defraud the European Union.

All the time, the fraud figures for the European Union kept climbing. Some say it was as high as €500 million, although some would say it was even more. The question for this debate is why the big leap from having an anti-fraud office, which already has the powers to do the job within the context of the existing treaties, to something that would take a huge amount of powers away from member states. Why the huge powergrab?

Alongside the proposal for a European public prosecutor’s office, the Commission has also published a communication on its ideas for OLAF in the future. It plans to table legislative proposals to alter the OLAF regulation in due course. As it happens, the Council and the European Parliament have only just agreed a revision to the 1999 OLAF regulation, which has been more than 10 years in the making. A key aim of that is to strengthen OLAF, the anti-fraud office of the European Union, and its investigative capabilities, and also to provide greater safeguards for those being investigated. The Commission’s proposals for the European public prosecutor’s office, however, would entail OLAF losing the powers to conduct investigations into fraud against the EU budget and being limited to investigations on other irregularities involving EU funds and misconduct or crimes committed by EU personnel that do not have a financial impact. It is gutting powers, which the European public prosecutor would use, from an existing body, because it wants an EPPO with more powers. It is the precursor to this area of criminal justice that my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton talked about. The European Scrutiny Committee, of which I am a member, noted the proposal to amend OLAF regulation and concluded:

“We are disappointed to see that so soon after reform of OLAF’s regulatory framework has been agreed, the Commission, without waiting to see the impact of that reform, is suggesting further legislation including the creation of an EPPO. The Commission refers to this pre-emptive approach to policy-making and legislative reform somewhat euphemistically as ‘step-by-step’ when it seems more like leaps and bounds.”

This is a case of leaps and bounds. We would have to change a number of things that we hold dear in our common law system. We have no arrest without evidence. The European public prosecutor will operate under a system of corpus juris, so that one can be arrested without evidence. We do not hold suspects for more than a fixed and limited time unless charges are presented in open court. Under corpus juris, a person can be held indefinitely. In our system, we believe we have the right to face one’s accuser and see evidence. Under corpus juris, the accuser may be anonymous and no right for the accused to see the evidence exists. We like to be tried by lay magistrates in most cases, have the right to trial of a jury of one’s peers and have an adversarial model. That is not the case under corpus juris, where a person is tried by professional judges, there is no right to trial by jury and there is an inquisitorial model. We like an open court. It is a closed court under corpus juris. We like the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

[Sir Alan Beith]

The phrase corpus juris is rather misleading—all it means is “body of law”. The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that our system is different and provides safeguards in a different way, but it would be foolish if we were to look at the rest of Europe and say that they do not have any rights because their system of enshrining them is different from ours.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I fully accept that fact. I am just trying to outline what this big change would mean when, according to the European Commission’s figures, it is just—it is a big sum—meant to protect €500 million-worth of fraud against the EU budget. Is this a proportionate change that we would like to see? I would argue that it is not.

Various people have come forward with individual cases regarding the difference between how the system operates now and how it would operate under a European public prosecutor. In one case, OLAF transferred information to the German and Bulgarian authorities relating to German and Bulgarian nationals who allegedly worked to defraud an EU agricultural and rural development fund scheme. Whereas the German proceedings led to a conviction, the proceedings in Bulgaria ended in acquittal—the current system led to different results in a cross-border case. The argument for a European public prosecutor is that it would have made a difference by ensuring consistency of investigation and prosecution in those countries, changing the nature of prosecution within a member state.

Another example relates to cigarette smuggling from the Czech Republic into Germany. The German criminal court used telephone tapping records obtained by the Czech police as evidence to convict the suspect. Although that evidence was obtained lawfully according to Czech law, the defence lawyer argued that without a court order authorising the telephone tapping, the evidence was inadmissible in the German court. It comes to a certain point when one wonders whether a supranational body such as the European public prosecutor could ask for the phone tapping of a British national on a matter that might not be deemed worthy of phone tapping in the UK.

This is a big step forward and we should note that it is all about a power grab from the European Commission, or a power grab from Viviane Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice. We should be very wary of where she goes from here. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) asked what discussions could be had, but having discussions with Viviane Reding can be very difficult, because she is completely focused on delivering an area of criminal justice for the EU. It is a ridiculous idea that cannot work, but were it to work, it would mean a complete change in how we do law in this country, and one that most of us in this place would fight to the death.

European Public Prosecutor’s Office

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd October 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Brokenshire)]

I beg to move,

That this House considers that the Draft Regulation on the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) (European Union Document No. 12558/13 and Addenda 1 and 2) does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, for the reasons set out in the annex to Chapter One of the Fifteenth Report of the European Scrutiny Committee (HC 83-xv); and, in accordance with Article 6 of Protocol (No. 2) annexed to the EU Treaties on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, instructs the Clerk of the House to forward this reasoned opinion to the Presidents of the European Institutions.

It is a pleasure, Madam Deputy Speaker, to see you in your place for this debate and to serve under your chairmanship this evening.

In July the European Commission published a proposal for the establishment of a European public prosecutor’s office—an EPPO. It is the Commission’s answer to a problem known as

“fraud against the Union’s financial interests”.

The EPPO proposal was published alongside a parallel legislative measure to reform the existing EU agency, Eurojust. These two proposals, the EPPO and Eurojust, will together be the subject of a separate debate in a week’s time as part of the so-called Lidington arrangements. I look forward to it, following my letters to the Chairs of the relevant Committees yesterday with the Government’s recommendation that the UK should not opt in to the new Eurojust proposal at the outset of negotiations, but should actively consider its position following a thorough review of the final agreed text.

The purpose of the debate is specifically for the House to decide whether the Commission’s EPPO proposal breaches the principle of subsidiarity, and that is what we should focus on tonight. I recognise that I am in an unusual position tonight in moving a motion on a course of action to be taken by the House, not the Government. I am aware, too, that the issue of who should move a motion in a subsidiarity debate such as this is a matter that the Procedure Committee has examined and on which the Government have responded. Although there may be differences of view over the procedure, I hope we can agree on the substance of the debate.

It is the shared view of both the European Scrutiny Committee and the Government that the EPPO proposal does indeed breach the principle of subsidiarity. If the whole House agrees, it can, under the EU treaties, send a democratic and political signal to the presidents of the European Commission, Council and Parliament in the form of a reasoned opinion to that effect. Moreover, in this case, if one quarter of the votes allocated to national Parliaments are cast, the so-called yellow card would be triggered meaning that the Commission would be obliged to review its proposal.

To update the House on how matters stand, both chambers of the Dutch Parliament, the Hungarian National Assembly and the Czech Senate have already taken this step, and others are actively considering it. This is a real opportunity for all national Parliaments to exercise, as democratic representatives, their views on what the Commission has proposed.

Before I say more about the reasoned opinion process, let me summarise the Government’s view on the EPPO proposal. The House will be aware of our long-standing position in the coalition agreement not to participate in the establishment of any EPPO, and the details of the proposal serve only to reinforce that position. While of course fraud must be tackled at all levels, including when it involves funds that form part of the EU budget, we do not agree that the establishment of a European public prosecutor’s office is the right approach.

The Commission’s proposal would establish a new supranational EU body with responsibility for criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union, as well as so-called ancillary offences within participating member states. The EPPO would exercise the function of a prosecutor within the courts of the participating member states for these offences and instruct their national authorities over the conduct of investigations.

This proposal is unnecessary, unsubstantiated and unwelcome. In the Government’s view, the best way to tackle EU fraud is through prevention. The UK has a zero-tolerance approach to fraud, with robust management controls and payment systems in place that seek to prevent incidences of EU fraud. Additionally we should continue efforts already happening to strengthen the current system.

For example, reforms to the European Anti-Fraud Office—OLAF—are currently being introduced to improve information exchange between OLAF and national authorities, and to improve OLAF’s own internal quality control. Indeed, a new regulation governing the work of OLAF entered into force only on 1 October 2013. These changes need time to be implemented fully before any further action is contemplated. Against that background, one of the many criticisms we have of the EPPO proposal is that the subsidiarity principle has not been met.

Without getting into too much technicality and legalese, the principle of subsidiarity means that decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the citizens whom they affect, and that the European Union should act only when outcomes can be better achieved at European Union level. It is important to note that subsidiarity is different from the principle of proportionality, under which any action taken by the European Union should not exceed what is necessary to achieve the stated objectives.

Under the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the treaties, the Commission must demonstrate that the objectives of the proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved at member state level—the first limb of the test—and then, that the objectives of the proposal can be better achieved at EU-level by reason of their scale and effects, which is the second limb and so-called EU added-value test. There is a requirement for the Commission to include a detailed statement in all legislative proposals on compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and some assessment of its financial impact. This detailed statement should be

“substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators”.

In the Government’s view, the Commission has not presented a convincing case, and we do not believe that the principle of subsidiarity has been met. The Commission has not allowed time for current reforms to take effect, nor has it adequately considered options to strengthen the current system. For example, it has not considered enhanced incentives or other options for reform at regional or national level in any detail or in a rigorous manner, and it has not demonstrated what value an EPPO would add. We should recall that the relevant legal base in the treaties—article 86 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union—says that an EPPO “may” be established. The treaties do not say it “shall” be created. The Commission has not, in our view, provided robust evidence to justify the creation of a supranational body with extensive and harmonised powers.

As I have said, under the treaties national Parliaments have the opportunity to put forward a reasoned opinion when they do not consider that a proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

As the Minister has just made a point about harmonised powers, may I remind him that one of the consequences of giving the EPPO the power to direct investigations would be to create a power for prosecutors that does not currently exist in England and Wales, although it does in Scotland? That perhaps illustrates the level of change that would be required to satisfy the idea of having a public prosecutor at European level.

[James Brokenshire]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice, for highlighting the seriousness and significance of the European Commission’s proposal and why, in our view, it is not appropriate for the United Kingdom to opt in to the measure. As I have indicated, we made that abundantly clear in the coalition agreement in advance of the proposals being published. I am sure that we will examine in detail the impact of the Commission’s published measure in our debate next week on the in-principle decision as to whether the UK should opt in. That is the right avenue for exploring the detailed issues, whereas today is about subsidiarity. However, I take his points seriously.

Although there have been a number of reasoned opinions since the opportunity to provide them came into effect, there has only been one occasion on which the yellow card threshold has been reached. That was on a Commission proposal about the posting of workers and the right to take collective action, also known as Monti II. In that case, the Commission withdrew the proposal fully, even though it maintained that the principle of subsidiarity had been met. It conceded on the grounds that it was clear that there was no political will among member states and national Parliaments to take the proposal forward.

The Monti II case highlights the fact that the continuing use of the reasoned opinion procedure and resulting yellow cards represents a powerful political signal and an important way for national Parliaments to intervene directly in the EU’s functioning. Even when the yellow card threshold has not been met, the views of national Parliaments have been influential on a wide range of issues, as member states have used reasoned opinions to support their negotiating positions. They have often secured amendments on the salient issues on the back of them.

Achieving the threshold requires a great deal of co-ordination between national Parliaments. I am sure the European Scrutiny Committee and other interested parties in Parliament, in both this House and the other place, are making best use of their contacts with other national Parliaments in that regard. I look forward to hearing the debate and urge the House to support this important motion.

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[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I would like to join the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) in giving credit where credit is due. This debate is taking place on the basis of the report and reasoned opinion of the European Scrutiny Committee. The Government agree with that reasoned opinion, but it is very much that of the Committee. In my capacity as Chairman of the Liaison Committee and the Justice Committee, I think that the European Scrutiny Committee is entitled to the credit. If there is something wrong with our procedure, it is that it does not fully recognise that process. However, the outcome is a happy one because pretty well everybody agrees that the reasoned opinion is correct, and it accords with the Government’s view.

The proposal for a European public prosecutor offends against the subsidiarity principle. One of its primary objectives is to strengthen the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. That is a perfectly reasonable objective to pursue, but it does not have to be achieved through the creation of a European public prosecutor. Indeed, it would not necessarily be best achieved in that way. The other limb of the general argument in favour of the European public prosecutor is that it is a further development of the area of justice. That provides the hint that subsidiarity is in danger of going out the window.

There are many ways in which the European Union could improve the way in which it deals with fraud. If national Governments fail to take the actions that they should take, they should be shamed into doing so. We also have to be a little careful about using percentage figures on the success of prosecutions. There is considerable danger if anybody thinks that the target of a justice system is to have 100% success in prosecutions. Courts will sometimes find people not guilty because the evidence has not been brought forward or sustained. The 100% target is a rather dangerous principle to import into this debate.

It is often pointed out that the European Union could do a lot more to resist fraud if it designed its schemes and its disbursement of money in ways that lent themselves to fraud a great deal less. Nothing is fraud-proof, but schemes can be designed that are less susceptible to fraud than many of those that have been developed over the years by European institutions.

Many elements of the proposal offend against subsidiarity. The European public prosecutor would have investigative powers, search and seizure powers, and interception and surveillance powers. To have those powers in operation at a supranational level would be a pretty significant change.

The proposal would take away the role of the Director of Public Prosecutions in prosecuting decisions in matters relating to EU fraud. It would have a similar effect on the roles of the procurator fiscal and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. The proposal would ignore the deliberate separation of decisions on investigation from decisions to prosecute in England and Wales, which is a long-standing element of our system. We can argue about whether that barrier should be retained, but we should have that argument in the context of our legal system and not allow it to be forced on us by the introduction of the European public prosecutor.

I am convinced that in the minds of some people, the creation of a European public prosecutor is a route to a prosecution role that goes wider than EU finances. I am not always tempted by slippery slope or Trojan horse arguments, but some of the same people have advanced the case for a prosecutor to deal with EU finances and a wider role for such an office.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

The right hon. Gentleman must accept that there has been constitution creep for decades in the European Union. Surely that is what we are trying to stop.

[Sir Alan Beith]

There have also been many advances in the way in which European nations use the European Union to achieve highly desirable objectives, such as through co-operating to deal with international crime. An intrinsic problem with the way in which the European Union was constructed, which is quite understandable given the way in which it was constructed, is that there is a belief in the Commission that the way forward is always to create further powers and jurisdictions. We have created a system that has that element within it. However, those who worry about Britain’s membership of the European Union have a tendency to underestimate the benefits and the value that have been achieved through many of its processes.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) pointed out that there is a close relationship between this proposal and the issue of Eurojust. Unhelpfully, it would compromise the acceptability of Eurojust to many people if the European public prosecutor was located within Eurojust. There are other aspects of interrelationship between the two issues. I regard Eurojust as an extremely valuable institution that has many processes that are of great advantage to British citizens. It has an important role in the prevention and detection of crime against British citizens and British interests. But again, even within the Eurojust proposals that we will be looking at again shortly, the role of the national members of Eurojust in the Commission’s proposal to order investigative measures changes the relationship between law enforcement and prosecution that is so firmly a part of our system.

There is, of course, another feature of the proposals that I am glad has not attracted the attendance of some of my hon. Friends on the Conservative Benches: if we went ahead with it, it would trigger a referendum. That might make it attractive to them to vote against the motion tonight, or whenever we have a deferred Division. I should not really tell them this, because it might inflame them in a way that I do not want. Basically, I think we all agree that establishing a European public prosecutor’s office is not the direction in which we ought to go and that it offends the principle of subsidiarity, as is extremely cogently argued in detail by the European Scrutiny Committee.

2014 JHA Opt-out Decision

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 15th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

We are going to ensure, as the motion suggests, that the Scrutiny Committee and the two Select Committees have the opportunity properly to scrutinise the set of measures, and there will be two votes in the House. We have always been clear that Parliament and its Committees should have adequate time to scrutinise the set of measures. That work does not need to be done before today’s vote, because today’s vote is about the decision to exercise the opt-out.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

rose—

[Pete Wishart]

rose—

[Mrs May]

I give way to the Chairman of the Select Committee.

[Sir Alan Beith]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady. I can confirm that I was consulted about the voting arrangements, but that was only last week and it took place by telephone because I was out of the country. That consultation took place only a week ago. What happened to the commitment that, by February this year, the Committees would be given explanatory memorandums on which to base their work on the opt-ins?

[Mrs May]

I have already said to the right hon. Gentleman and to others who have raised the issue of the explanatory memorandums that I am sorry that it was not possible to produce them at an earlier date. We have looked at the time available for scrutiny by the Select Committees and the Scrutiny Committee, and for the second vote on the potential measures that we might choose to opt back into. The explanatory memorandums were made available last week, and they are available to the Committees in their consideration of any measures that the Government should opt into or seek to rejoin. That information has now been made available and I hope that it will be able to inform the Committees’ considerations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

The Command Paper sets out, very late in the day, various lists, proposals, explanatory memorandums and the rest of it, effectively bouncing the Committees and shunting straight past the scrutiny process, in defiance of the promises and undertakings given months ago. The Chairs are deeply concerned about this attempt to push the scrutiny process to one side. The European Scrutiny Committee, which I Chair, has a specific job to do under Standing Orders that cannot be brushed aside by the Government or anybody else. Those are the Standing Orders of the House. The other two Committees will want to look at policy questions, but we consider proposals more on a document-by-document basis, and there are 130-odd of them, so the matter has to be dealt with within the framework of Standing Orders.

I look to the Justice Secretary, who is sitting on the Front Bench, knowing in my heart that he wants to ensure that the scrutiny process works effectively, and I invite him, in consultation with the Home Secretary, to accept our amendment and put in place that proper scrutiny process. There is no great hurry. What puzzles many Members is why an attempt has been made to bounce the House, as it were; we are puzzled about why this had to be rushed, and we have had no explanation. We simply do not understand the reasons. We do not see why there has to be a vote either. Many people think there should not be one.

In January, the European Scrutiny Committee requested that the relevant Committees should have sight of the Government’s impact assessments on the various measures under consideration. Will the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary supply us with this information as soon as possible? It is all part of the scrutiny process. If the Government really want transparent and democratic systems that work in the interests of those whom we have the honour to represent, it is essential that we do this properly.

[Sir Alan Beith]

rose—

[Mr Cash]

I give way to the Chairman of the Liaison and Justice Committees because he also has matters to raise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

Did the three of us—the three Committee Chairs—not warn the Government repeatedly against allowing this situation to arise by asking them to produce the memorandums in the early part of the year?

[Mr Cash]

This is driven not by hostility, but by basic common sense: it helps the democratic process and the working between the Government and the Select Committee system, whose role has been enhanced recently, to work with the grain. That is the point: this has been working against the grain. I know that my right hon. Friends the Justice Secretary and the Home Secretary, not to mention the Prime Minister, are conscious of these questions. If mistakes were made in trying to rush and not give scrutiny the opportunities that are needed in the interests of those whom we serve, it is essential to get this right. I urge them strongly to accept the amendment in the name of the Chairmen of those Committees, and on which the Chairmen of other Committees have expressed an interest too.

The Opposition’s amendment is a rather curious state of affairs, something to which I referred when I intervened on the shadow Home Secretary. I simply put it on the record like this: the full sequence would be that the United Kingdom would have to notify its block opt-out decision six months before it could notify which measures it would seek to opt back into. The specific order is clearly set out—I was not trying to bounce the right hon. Lady—in article 10 of protocol 36, and has been confirmed by the Commission in response to a question from the European Parliament. We know what the sequence should be, so it would not be possible for the Government to notify the European institutions of their intention to exercise the block opt-out once, to use the wording of the amendment, those institutions

“have committed to the UK’s ongoing participation”

in the measures concerned. There is something wrong with the wording of the Opposition’s amendment, because it does not fit with article 10 of protocol 36. Anyone can make a pedantic point, but this goes to the heart of article 10 of protocol 36.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Grayling]

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. It might be helpful to the House to say—as I was intending to in my winding-up speech, but this will stop everybody making the point all the way through the debate—that we will accept the amendment standing in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) and the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz).

[Sir Alan Beith]

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Can I claim a reward for getting my amendment accepted before I have actually moved it?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Sir Alan, you were just fractionally ahead of me. I seem to recollect that Mr Speaker said that the amendments would be formally moved at the end of the debate. Perhaps this is an indication that we should have the Government opening and closing a debate before we actually have that debate, so that we know where we stand. Mr Bryant, thank you very much for your point of order—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I rise on behalf of the Liaison Committee and the Justice Committee, both of which I chair, to speak to amendment (b), which I can do very much more briefly now that the Justice Secretary has indicated that it will be accepted, although I need to explain why we tabled it. It takes something, as the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) said, to bring together on matters European the right hon. Gentleman and myself, whose views are not so different on these issues, and the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash). That arose from the way in which the Government have gone about this process, which is not the way that they said they would go about it. However, in two moves—in a two-step—over the past five days, the Government have sought to respond to our concerns, and I very much welcome that.

The original change that was made last week was specifically to endorse the role of Select Committees in considering the Government’s proposals as to which measures we should opt back into. The reason that we were not happy with the wording which then emerged, which was a considerable improvement on the Government’s first motion, was that it appeared to us that the words would restrict the Committees’ ability to argue for the inclusion of measures not on the list or the exclusion of measures that were on the list. Our understanding had been that specific confirmation of the list was a matter for the second debate and vote, after the Committees had considered the issues raised by the Government’s statement of what they were minded to do on the various opt-in possibilities.

[Chris Bryant]

As I understand it, in that meeting the Home Secretary asserted that it was absolutely essential—legally necessary—that there be a vote today to allow the opt-out to happen. Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that really to be the case?

[Sir Alan Beith]

There has been argument about that from two Members who devote a great deal of time to the issue and I am reluctant to become the arbiter of this argument. All we sought to secure in our capacity as Committee Chairs was that the Committees’ ability to do the job was not inhibited and could not be restricted by someone pointing to the wording and saying, “You can’t discuss that possibility. It’s outwith your reach.” What the Government had made clear all along and made clear again to me in a telephone call last week while I was away with the Justice Committee was that there is to be a second-stage process as originally envisaged, and at that stage there will be confirmation of what is at present clear Government policy as to what the list is, following consideration of the representations and views that may be put forward by any of the relevant Committees.

I do not believe that in seeking to meet the Committees’ wishes and excluding those words, the Government are seeking to change their policy. They are simply making it clear that the procedure is an open one in which Committees can put forward their representations, whether they support the list or seek variations in it.

[The Minister for Immigration (Mr Mark Harper)]

I confirm that that is the case, but let me be clear that what the Home Secretary said about the need for this House to take a view was that it is not a legal but a political issue. The European Commission has made it clear that it will not engage in a discussion or a negotiation until we make clear the view of the Government and this Parliament. That is what the Home Secretary said in her speech and that remains the Government’s position.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

We would have been in a happier and more comfortable position had the Government carried out their original intention to deliver memorandums to the Committees by February of this year, followed as soon as possible by more detailed impact assessments. That was not done. The Committees had been led to believe that it would be done so they waited and waited for those things to appear, so that they could start their consideration on the basis of clear information about what the Government had been advised and which way their thinking was going.

[Bob Stewart]

Does that mean that we now have a set time by which all the Committees are to complete their consideration? For example, is the end of consideration period to be completed by the end of the year?

[Sir Alan Beith]

We have an end of consideration date at the end of October, which is clear in the motion and emerged from discussions between Committee Chairs and the Government. It was not our ideal timetable, which would have started back in February, but that is where we are now.

What we have to consider now is how best the Select Committees can do their job in drawing the attention of the House and the Government to any concerns they might have about opt-ins that are on the list and opt-outs—or not-opt-ins, if that is the right phrase—that they might wish to consider. It is for the Committees, as Ministers have confirmed, to decide how they will go about this task, but a timetable has been set.

There is still more information which can usefully be given to Committees in the form of a more detailed impact assessment than is contained, for example, in the Command Paper. We are entitled to continue to seek that, and if we do not get it, awkward questions will be asked of Ministers when they come before the Committee, in order to elicit the information that we need. Our purpose, which will be fulfilled by the exclusion of these words, was to give the Committees of the House the scope to which they are entitled, which the Government from the beginning said they would have, in order to consider these matters before the final decision is made.

[Chris Bryant]

May I ask the Select Committee Chairman a question about how the three Committees will divvy up responsibilities? The Government have submitted not one memorandum but five—three from one Minister and one from each of the others. There might be confusion for the House if there were three reports that did not coincide.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Committees are well accustomed to dealing with overlap of responsibility. The Liaison Committee is also well accustomed to assisting in sorting out any problems that overlap may generate. There are issues that fall within Home Affairs which are of interest to the Justice Committee, such as Eurojust. We will find ways of dealing with that, even in a compressed time scale. I welcome the Government’s acceptance that in the letter as well as the spirit they should recognise that Select Committees of this House have a right and a duty to advise the House on the basis of open consideration without undue restriction.

Family Migration Rules

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Virendra Sharma (Ealing, Southall) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Owen, to serve under your chairmanship. I am grateful for this welcome opportunity to discuss this important matter in this timely debate. Last week, the all-party parliamentary group on migration launched its report on the impact of the income requirement for those sponsoring a partner or spouse from outside the European economic area, and the new rules on adult dependants, almost a year after the new family migration rules were introduced. The media coverage of the rules and the numerous e-mails and phone calls received in my office over the past week suggest that there is great public interest in the matter, which makes this debate even more important.

I thank the APPG on migration and its secretariat, the Migrants Rights Network, for the dedicated and professional support provided to the inquiry and to the group’s members. Thanks are also due to the 280 or so individuals and organisations that took the time to submit evidence to the APPG inquiry. Submissions were received from more than 175 families, who reported that they had directly experienced difficulties as a result of the new family migration rules, and I keep receiving more every day in my office from both constituents and other families who have the same concerns.

One of the main concerns is that the income requirement—£18,600 to sponsor a non-EEA spouse or partner, more if there are also children—is high for many British people and permanent residents of the UK. According to the accounts we received, the income requirement has affected some British people who appear to have more than adequate means to support themselves and family members. Some people seeking to sponsor a non-EEA spouse or partner told us that they were not receiving any benefits and were living well within their means, but that the application process did not allow them to reflect their self-sufficiency.

Many individuals who submitted evidence said that they were in employment in the UK and being paid a wage above £12,850, which hon. Members will recognise as the current level of the national minimum wage. We heard from the Migration Observatory at Oxford university that 47% of the UK working population would now be unable to meet the income requirement through earnings alone.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

That fact has led people in my constituency to say—although this would not suit the hon. Gentleman’s area—that there should be some regional recognition of the fact that in low-wage areas, the problem is even worse.

[Mr Sharma]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his appropriate intervention. I am sure that other Members will have heard their constituents expressing the same concerns.

EU Police, Justice and Home Affairs

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 12th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

Yes. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that it is indeed the Government’s intention to provide Parliament with a list of the measures that we wish to opt back into, so Parliament will have that before it votes on the matter.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

The Government have repeatedly said that they want to engage with Select Committees as part of the process, but still, many months after they were promised, we do not have the explanatory memorandums, and Committees are not in a position to factor into their work the consideration that will be required to inform the vote that the Home Secretary has just referred to.

[Mrs May]

I recognise the point that my right hon. Friend makes. We will supply the Select Committees with explanatory memorandums and the list of measures that the Government propose to opt back into, and we will also discuss with relevant Committees how the vote will be taken in Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

I say to my hon. Friend that, given that I have not published a list, he is not in a position to know which parts of ACPO’s advice I have listened to or not. What I have said is that I have listened to ACPO’s advice and it is absolutely clear that it thinks that a very limited number of measures are beneficial to policing and that a significant number are of no practical benefit whatsoever. We have also listened to a number of other organisations with relevant experience in this particular field.

The Government have been clear that we must consider the full impact of ECJ jurisdiction on each of these measures. The European Union Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding has made it clear that the old third pillar often led to outcomes at the lowest common denominator, mostly in order to secure unanimity. The vast majority of these measures were not negotiated with ECJ jurisdiction in mind, and the drafting often reflects that. We should be very careful about allowing the ECJ to interpret such measures.

Why do I say that? Because it is for this House to write the UK’s laws. For example, where Parliament agrees with the judgment of the UK Supreme Court, Parliament can pass a law to make its will clear and remedy the effect of that judgment. However, judgments passed down in Luxembourg by the European Court cannot be addressed in this way. Instead, they require a change to EU law, which cannot be brought about by the UK alone. That is an important point for us to consider.

In the Metock case, for example, the European Court of Justice made a ruling that extended free movement rights to illegal migrants if they are married to a European economic area national who is exercising those rights. Since the Metock judgment, we have seen a steady increase in sham marriages involving EEA nationals. However, the UK cannot fix that issue alone, despite there being agreement on both sides of the House.

Let me be clear: I am not saying that there is never a role for the European Court of Justice. If that was the case, we would never opt into any new measures. However, as a question of policy, we need carefully to consider the Court’s ability to interfere in our criminal justice system and weigh that against any benefits that the measure may bring.

As the shadow Home Secretary has said on quite a few occasions, the opt-out decision involves the European arrest warrant. I know that that measure is of particular interest to many Members. Let me start by refuting the fatuous suggestion that we would consider opting out of it simply because it has the word “European” in its title. The Government are looking at each measure on its merits and nothing else. When the case is made that a measure is in our national interest, we will participate in it. As I have said previously, we will consider how each measure contributes to public safety and security; whether practical co-operation is underpinned by it; and whether there would be a detrimental impact on such co-operation if we pursued it by other mechanisms before making a final decision. The European arrest warrant is no different in that respect.

The arrest warrant has had some success in streamlining the extradition process within the EU. The shadow Home Secretary referred to the arrest last month of Andrew Moran, one of Britain’s most wanted fugitives, by the Spanish police. However, as I set out in my statement in October, there have also been problems. The Government are concerned about the disproportionate use of the arrest warrant for trivial offences and its potential use for action in the United Kingdom in relation to activity that is not considered to be a crime in the UK. We also have concerns about the lengthy pre-trial detention of British citizens overseas.

The motion and the shadow Home Secretary’s response to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) suggest that the Opposition finally share our concerns about the European arrest warrant and would like to see its operation reformed. If that is the case, the whole Government welcome the admission that Labour got it wrong on the European arrest warrant and I am glad that we will have its new-found support if we wish to make any changes in that regard.

We may not have had much clarity from the Opposition today, but I am grateful for the opportunity to hear the views of Parliament on this important matter. This Government, more than any before us, have done our utmost to ensure that Parliament has the time to scrutinise our decisions relating to the European Union and that its views are taken into account. As I have said, we have made a commitment to hold a vote in both Houses of Parliament before we take a final decision on the opt-out. That vote will take place in good time before May 2014. However, I remind hon. Members that current and forthcoming proposals in the EU will have an effect on the 2014 decision.

[Sir Alan Beith]

In giving that assurance, will the Home Secretary indicate when Select Committees will receive the explanatory memorandum that we have been promised for so long?

Alcohol: Minimum Unit Price

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Browne]

As is being said around me, the right hon. Gentleman seems to have made a good case for why he should have taken action when he was Home Secretary. He chose not to do that, but he has explained one side of the argument on minimum unit pricing, and a number of representations replicated the point he has just made.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Will my hon. Friend bear it in mind that we could have minimum pricing in Scotland but not in England? Will he condemn the irresponsible policy of the Labour party on Northumberland county council, which is that if that happens Northumberland should be promoted as a cheap booze destination for Scots?

[Mr Browne]

rose—

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Diana Johnson]

I want to discuss amendment 75, which deals with the Osmotherly rules, amendment 76, which deals with the protection of ISC proceedings, and amendment 74, which deals with pre-appointment hearings.

Amendment 75, tabled by me and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), would remove the Government’s ability to refuse to disclose information to the ISC when it is information “not proper” to be disclosed to a Select Committee under the Osmotherly rules. The Bill currently allows a Minister to withhold information if

“it is information of such a nature that, if the Secretary of State were requested to produce it before a Departmental Select Committee of the House of Commons, the Secretary of State would consider (on grounds which were not limited to national security) it proper not to do so.”

What Ministers are able to disclose to Select Committees is governed by those famous Osmotherly rules, which we discussed in Committee. There are three reasons for withholding information: disproportionate cost, the fact that the information is sub judice, and the fact that it relates to a previous Administration. Our amendment would rule out the use of the Osmotherly rules altogether, although we would be happy for an agreement on cost to be included in the memorandum of understanding, which would achieve the same result.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

The so-called Osmotherly rules were devised by the Executive but were never accepted in any form by Parliament, and were not considered by Parliament’s Committees to have any binding force.

[Diana Johnson]

That is an interesting point, but because of the way in which the Bill is drafted and because of the references that have been made to the use of the Osmotherly rules, we think that there is a case for excluding them completely from the Minister’s decision making.

We do not think that sub judice information should be excluded from the ISC’s hearings, because that might may prevent it from seeing particularly important information. As significant procedures exist to ensure that information will be protected, we should not worry about the ISC seeing the information if it would assist it. We also feel that the ISC should have access to information held by previous Administrations, for two main reasons. First, the matters that the ISC investigates are rarely politically sensitive, although they will be sensitive in other ways. Secondly, the ISC will often be able to investigate an issue only after a change of Administration. Its role is usually retrospective, which means that there will often be a long delay before it can begin an investigation.

[Sir Alan Beith]

The ISC has, on occasion, sought permission from Ministers in a previous Administration to obtain access to material, and indeed has been given it, only to find that current Ministers decline to give permission on other grounds.

[Diana Johnson]

It is helpful to know that. However, time is pressing, so I shall move on to amendment 76. The Minister spent a fair amount of time discussing the amendment and the issues that he considered arose from it. It would exempt all proceedings of the ISC from civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings¸ which would protect members of the Committee, staff of the Committee, and evidence held by the Committee. In that respect, it extends the protections that the Government inserted in the Bill in Committee, which have now been refined in their amendments 61 and 62.

Before I go into the details of the difference between amendment 76 and the Government amendments, I should establish why these protections are important. They are important because we want witnesses to be able to give full and frank evidence to the Committee, and we want the Committee to be able to receive evidence in confidence. It may be helpful to compare the provisions governing the ISC to the provisions governing Select Committees. Evidence given to Select Committees, whether written or oral, is subject to parliamentary privilege, which means that the evidence cannot be used in any court proceedings against the witness or anyone else.

This is a central tenet of our democracy and allows witnesses to give the frankest possible answers without fear of reprisals. Witnesses giving evidence to the ISC are likely to be particularly mindful of the legal obligations on them. Evidence is likely to be covered by the Official Secrets Act and, technically, an offence would be committed every time a witness exceeded the explicit permission they had been given, which could be frequent.

This may not be the only restriction on a witness’s ability to give evidence. Restrictions are likely to be contained within the witness’s employment contract and the civil service code. Such restrictions have the potential to pose two problems to the ISC. First, they could slow down or prohibit witnesses where there is no genuine need for them not to be able to divulge evidence but it is not clear they have the legal authority. Secondly, they could prevent the Committee from taking evidence from whistleblowers. In recognition of these difficulties, in Committee the Government tabled amendments introducing statutory protection for witnesses, exempting evidence they provided to the Committee from civil, disciplinary or criminal proceedings. Amendments 61 and 62 refine that. They maintain the complete exemption from civil or disciplinary proceedings, but limit the exemption in criminal proceedings to action taken against the witness.

The Opposition welcomed the introduction of these protections and accept the refinements made today, but it is important that the House realises that these protections fall far short of those enjoyed by Select Committees and leave many unanswered questions. It is also important to realise that because these are statutory protections and not privilege, it would be possible for the Government or an agency to obtain an injunction preventing a witness from appearing before the Committee.

As I have stated, parliamentary privilege covers all the proceedings of a Select Committee, and it is important to realise what that means in practice. It means the evidence presented to a Select Committee is covered by privilege. That is not any document submitted to the Committee, but documents accepted by the Committee as evidence. Privilege also covers all proceedings of the Committee, including advice given by the Clerks to members of the Committee and actions of members while serving on the Committee.

I highlight these areas because it is not at all clear to me what alternative protections are given to the ISC in such situations. I would like to ask the Minister about a hypothetical situation where the ISC receives classified information relating to serious wrongdoing on the part of an element of the security agencies. Let us say, for example, the ISC were anonymously to receive Secret Intelligence Service transcripts indicating an agent had committed torture. I am not saying this has ever happened; I just want the Minister to say what would happen if it were the case.

It is questionable whether the ISC would be able to act on the evidence it received. That would depend on the provisions in clause 2. These documents may be directly related to an investigation the ISC was already undertaking, but that is not the question I want to focus on here: I am asking whether the ISC is even in a position to accept these documents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I am entirely sympathetic to what the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has said about that case. However, a statutory avenue is already available under the Regulation and Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which set up the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Further to the intervention by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a fellow member of the Committee, one might not be able to describe the proposed power that she wishes to provide as quasi-judicial, but it might possess a hybrid relationship in being both investigative and judicial, or in a position of seeking to create redress.

Apart from that, there is a fundamental statutory point. The hon. Lady’s proposed subsection (4A) refers to a situation in which

“a plausible claim has been made by or on behalf of an individual to the ISC that the Security Service…has disseminated any information to any recipient concerning any person that appears to be…materially false; and…harmful to the person defamed.”

The breadth of that goes far beyond even the jurisdiction of any court in the United Kingdom of which I am aware. Proposed subsection (4B) says that

“the ISC shall fully and expeditiously investigate the claim”—

so it does involve an investigative function—

“and, where the claim appears to be well founded, shall ensure that the misinformation is expeditiously corrected.”

But by what means? The ISC is not in a position to implement any such action. The amendment is not legally well-founded. In any event, as has been pointed out, its scope goes far beyond anything that the Committee’s staff and resources would permit. Moreover, there is no indication of how the powers would be exercised or how they could ever be implemented.

[Sir Alan Beith]

I want to consider briefly the restrictive wording of parts of clause 2 and the voluntary issue that has been raised by a number of Members.

I served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for about 11 years from its very beginning. It was a slow and painful task to get the first generation of heads of agencies and civil servants from Departments to understand the Committee’s need for a deep understanding of the relevant matters in order for us to do our job effectively. Subsequent generations of heads of agencies were ready to involve the Committee more closely and to bring up operational matters, whatever the statute said. It did not take me long to realise that it was not possible for members of the Committee to do their job properly unless they understood how various kinds of operations were conducted and the constraints and problems faced by the agencies. In particular, it was not possible to discharge an important responsibility without an understanding of operational matters.

One of the purposes of the ISC, where Members of both Houses of Parliament look closely at the work of agencies, is to give people on the outside—both in this place and in the community at large—a sense that Members who are there by democratic means are observing the agencies sufficiently closely to give confidence that their work is within the framework not only of the law, but of the ethics and principles by which we try to run our country. The background is that agencies were often accused of doing precisely the opposite in years gone by. Unless we can give people that confidence and say, “Yes, I have looked very closely at this matter and I do not think you need to be concerned about it,” the Committee will not be discharging properly one of its most important roles. We found that we had to look very closely at operational matters and that became easier as time went on.

The work sometimes involves what are, in effect, ongoing intelligence operations. In some fields, the work never stops and an operation to do with a particular recurrent problem does not have a simple end, so the provision in clause 2(3)(a)(i) is restrictive.

I fully understand how the Government have arrived at the word “voluntarily”. It would have been absurd if the wording had prevented the Committee from continuing to work closely with the agencies in the way it has done in recent years. That would have been ridiculous, so the word is there for a perfectly respectable reason. Indeed, things have been improved by the insistence that, if the Committee requests something, that does not by definition make it involuntary. However, I still think, as the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, that that is not the kind of language we want to see in the Bill. Nor does it give people outside the confidence that this Committee will be able to find out whether something is going wrong when it needs to do so, or that it can be relied on when it seeks to give assurance that all is reasonably well.

The task of getting this right is by no means over. The memorandum of understanding may be able to deal with those issues better, but, even then, words are being put on paper and when that happens, as we have discovered, simple, practical and sensible ways of doing things may appear to be precluded. Moreover, when there is friction or tension, it becomes easier for the head of an agency or, at least as often—indeed, perhaps more often—a Minister or civil servant to say, “This goes beyond the memorandum of understanding. It is outwith the terms of the statute.” We have heard such language and the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), who is a previous Chairman of the Committee, will remember how rigid some people in the relevant Departments could be from time to time.

Ministers need to make it clear, as they have done to some extent in these discussions, that it is in the interests of the democratic accountability of these extremely important and valuable agencies that the public have confidence, not only in the agencies, but in that process of democratic accountability, circumscribed as it is by the need to protect the work of those agencies.

[James Brokenshire]

This has been a useful debate underlining the importance the House attaches to the scrutiny provided by the ISC and how it is being enhanced by the steps contemplated as a consequence of the Bill. The right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), the Chairman of the Justice Committee, made the point about the scrutiny so far seen in the House and how we are seeking to strengthen it further.

I shall respond first to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and her amendment 71. As others have said, the essentially judicial function she seeks does not sit well within the ISC, which is intended to be a Committee of Parliament. It is not for the ISC to consider, much less determine, individual complaints about the intelligence services, especially given that there is already a body that can consider these matters and which we believe is well equipped to do so. Right hon. and hon. Members have highlighted the work of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which is the appropriate route through which complaints should be made.

The hon. Lady referred to the case of Shaker Aamer. I assure her that his case remains a high priority for the UK Government and we continue to make it clear to the US that we want him released and returned to the UK as a matter of priority. We continue to work with US counterparts to consider the implications for Mr Aamer’s case of the 2013 National Defence Authorisation Act. Discussions continue with senior officials within the US Administration. The Foreign Secretary raised Mr Aamer’s case numerous times with former Secretary of State Clinton and will continue to do so with Secretary of State Kerry. As the Foreign Secretary told Parliament last October, he and the Defence Secretary also made representations to the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta last June.

Crime and Courts Bill [Lords]

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 14th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I must then say to the Home Secretary that she does not need to legislate for it now. If she has genuinely not made a decision, why take pre-emptive legislative powers for a decision she has not yet taken and a review she has not yet done? She will know that the nature of the Home Office means that Home Office legislation is always being introduced, and there will be plenty of opportunity for primary legislation and a proper debate in this House and in the other place. How are Members of this House and Members of the House of Lords, where, as she knows, there is considerable expertise on counter-terror and on policing, supposed to debate a hypothetical proposition—she now says she has not yet made it—and a decision she has not yet reached? It would be far better to respect the expertise in the other place and the views of this House by not legislating now on this matter, by holding a proper review, and by having that genuine debate on it and then coming back to the House with proper proposals in primary legislation, if she so concludes that it is the right thing to do.

We will also wish to discuss other areas of the Bill in Committee. I hope that the Home Secretary will also now accept the Lords amendments on the regulation of bailiffs, adding safeguards to prevent abuse. We also hope that she will support our proposals to go even further with stronger powers for immigration officers to tackle illegal immigration. She has raised the issue of the forum bar, on which she wishes to introduce amendments, and we hope that extensive discussion can take place on that. We have discussed it briefly when she has made statements to the House before and we are keen to work with her on how to make that bar effective. As she knows, some legislation is already on the statute book on this issue, but all sides have found it difficult to work out how to make the detail work. We therefore look forward to those discussions.

We also wish to discuss stronger checks and balances for the NCA through the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The safeguards in respect of the IPCC looking at the NCA are astonishingly weak in the Bill, and we hope the Home Secretary will strengthen them. She will also know from the points that hon. Members have made that there is concern about visa appeals. The point she needs to consider is that in a third of cases looked at by the inspector the entry clearance officer had not considered the evidence properly. That was not about new evidence; the entry clearance officer had not considered the existing evidence properly. So there is a serious concern about the quality of the initial decision making.

We also want to deal with the issue of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. I hope that before that comes up in Committee the Home Secretary and her Ministers will be able to provide the House with an assessment of the impact of section 5 on different groups, particularly vulnerable and minority ones. Many people have said that the existing section 5 has formed some kind of protection for them, so it would be helpful to know that before we reach that point in Committee.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Does that mean the Labour party does not share the welcome voiced by the two parties on the Government Benches for the Government’s acceptance of clause 38 and the removal of the word “insulting” from the Public Order Act?

[Yvette Cooper]

Like the Home Secretary, I have always questioned whether there was a case for removing this measure in the first place. If she has carried out further analysis and believes it can be removed while maintaining protection for groups that might be discriminated against or where the police need to have the flexibility to respond effectively, we would be keen to see that evidence before we get to Committee. It is important to ensure that we protect freedom of speech, but it is also important to ensure that we can protect vulnerable groups from unfair discrimination.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), a former Home Secretary who always brings a refreshing frankness to the proceedings. I do not agree with him on his last point. I think that the Government were right to move away from the idea of the Lord Chancellor sitting on the panel that makes the crucial appointments to the top of the judiciary. I do not think we would ever have been able to persuade anybody that that did not represent an excessive direct involvement of a politician in the process of choosing judges, notwithstanding the fact that the Lord Chancellor is involved at the end of the process.

The right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) described the Bill as a typical Home Office—or, in this case, Home Office and Ministry of Justice—Christmas tree, but it does not contain quite as many unwanted gifts as previous such Christmas trees. Indeed, it contains many welcome things, and I want to concentrate on those that relate to the work of the Justice Committee.

I should say in passing that I very much welcome the Government’s acceptance of clause 38, which relates to the Public Order Act 1986. I noted Labour Front Benchers’ dithering on this matter, if it is indeed dithering; perhaps they will retain their past position of wanting to keep the law as it is—I do not know. From a free speech and civil liberties point of view, bearing in mind the clear statement by the Director of Public Prosecutions about what can be done without having the word “insulting” in the law, the Government have sensibly accepted an overwhelming decision in the other place.

[Mr Leigh]

Of course, it was in the Lib Dem manifesto, and when we can agree on things, we should agree—that is what marriage is about.

[Sir Alan Beith]

It is what coalition is about.

I welcome the drug-driving provisions, which I am very glad to see in the Bill, but I will turn first to family justice issues and the single family court, which I strongly welcome. There is still a problem about openness in the family courts, and the lack of it helps to feed very strong views among fathers about how private law cases are decided and among families about how public law cases are decided. That creates, or strengthens, a sense that wrongful decisions may be taken, and people do not understand the reasons for decisions. We have had some advances through anonymised judgments being brought forward, but it remains a problem.

In 2005 and 2006, my predecessor Committee argued for openness provisions of the kind that were eventually legislated for, but when they were on the statute book and we took further evidence for our 2011 report, we did not find a single witness who was happy with them. In the face of that, we were right to say that the Government cannot proceed on this basis, and they are right not to do so. However, we cannot simply abandon the issue. We have to look at more ways of spreading understanding and recognition of what goes on in the family courts and having them exposed to the pressure that public justice—open justice—applies everywhere else. There are compelling reasons why that cannot be done in the same way in the family courts, but we have to take account of the fact that the absence of transparency presents a problem.

On the delegation of functions to legal advisers, the Committee felt strongly that there must be clear supervision by a district judge of any judicial function that is being carried out by a legal adviser.

Fine collection is one area where the Committee said that improvement was still needed. We recognise that some improvement has taken place, but there certainly needs to be more. We welcome the chasing of old debts and recognise that there is potential benefit from the private sector being drawn into this activity. However, there is not merely a loss of public revenue when fine collection is not achieved; there is a serious undermining of the justice system when people see that fines have not been paid and that those involved have got away with it.

The self-defence provisions are probably not legally necessary, but they may have some beneficial impact as regards how the police view cases of this kind. Someone who has been attacked in a terrifying way—whose house has been frighteningly invaded—deserves to be treated as a victim of a crime and have the respect accorded to such a victim even while there is some consideration as to whether there was any grossly disproportionate response on their part. The underlying purpose of the change in the law must be to get that recognition. I do not think that it will actually change the way in which any cases are decided; if I thought that it would, I would worry that it had gone too far.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) referred to deferred prosecution agreements, on which he has done a great deal of work. My Committee took evidence from the Director of Public Prosecutions on such agreements. He saw them as an additional tool for prosecutors, but not in any way a replacement for bringing cases to court in many circumstances. However, there are clearly cases in which it would be to everyone’s benefit to take action that did not involve a long drawn-out court case, but that none the less provided restitution for the victims of fraud and perhaps enabled the continuance of a business under new management. The alternative, as my right hon. and learned Friend vividly described in referring to the Arthur Andersen case, can involve a massive loss of jobs and many other adverse consequences that are in no one’s interest.

I want to talk about the provision for non-custodial sentences, and the requirement for a clear element of punishment in such sentences. I do not disagree with that principle, but we should remember that many offenders regard community sentences as more arduous than prison sentences. On more than one occasion, ex-offenders appearing before the Justice Committee have told us that they have committed further offences because they were sick of the requirements of their community sentence and thought that a short spell in prison would be much easier. That might seem counter-intuitive—it might not be what most of us would imagine—but for plenty of criminals, a long and arduous community sentence that places requirements on them, whether it appears punitive or not, is more exacting. They would rather be sitting in prison getting three meals a day and not having a great deal to do.

This provision must not result in our administering a measure that is not the most effective way of changing someone’s life and preventing them from reoffending. We are trying to ensure that there are no more victims of a particular person’s crimes, and to turn around the way in which they behave. We should measure what we are doing in accordance with that aim. More often than not, the challenging requirements that the provision will place on the person to face up to the consequences of what they have done—through restorative justice, for example—to face up to a victim when that is possible, and to make effective reparation to society will be more punitive in practice than a prison sentence. We need to have an understanding of that process.

That leads me to the subject of restorative justice, which has great potential; I am glad that there is provision for it in the Bill. We all recognise that it cannot be forced upon victims, but the level of satisfaction among victims that we have seen in evidence to the Committee has been very encouraging indeed. There is also a growing public view that it makes sense for criminals to be faced with the consequences of their crimes and with the harm that they have done to others, and required to change their lives as a result.

The right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East referred to a provision that was added to the Bill in the Lords, relating to non-custodial sentences for female offenders. The Justice Committee is embarking on an inquiry into women offenders, and we have already expressed the view on more than one occasion that more needs to be done to ensure that courts have at their disposal appropriate and effective means of dealing with women offenders. Indeed, our report on the probation service, which we produced in July 2011, stated:

“The probation service’s approach—where resources tend to be directed towards dealing with offenders who present the highest degree of risk—can fail adequately to support women offenders. The approach recommended by Baroness Corston for the provision of holistic services that address all women’s needs is still a long way from being realised.”

The Government now need to include in the Bill a reminder that more needs to be done in that respect.

This Home Office and Justice Bill provides an us with an opportunity to welcome an unusually large number of provisions. There are others that will be pored over in detail in Committee. The effective implementation of the provisions on fines and on non-custodial facilities for women offenders, for example, will add to our ability to do what we are supposed to be doing, which is using the criminal justice system to stop people becoming the victims of crime in the first place.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Damian Green)]

I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to what has been a wide-ranging debate—irrespective of whether they did so at normal speed or, as in the case of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (John Hemming), at turbo-charge speed.

As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary noted when she opened the debate, we need to do more to protect the public against serious and organised crime, and to improve further the efficiency responsiveness and transparency of the justice system. I welcome the broad support of a number of provisions from all sides, including from the hon. Member for Darlington (Jenny Chapman) who wound up the debate for the Opposition.

In establishing the National Crime Agency as a key objective of the Bill, it also brings forward, as we have heard today, many other noteworthy reforms. The package of court and justice reforms introduced in part 2 will deliver a swifter, more open and effective courts and tribunal system while improving judicial diversity and establishing a new tool to tackle economic crime—namely, deferred prosecution agreements. For that work, the House should pay tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier). In many instances, these reforms will have a real and meaningful impact on those who use the court and justice system. For example, the establishment of a single family court will make the court system more accessible and less confusing for families who come into contact with it.

We are also determined to improve the public’s confidence and understanding of the criminal justice system. That is why this Bill introduces measures that require courts to include a punitive element in every community order for the first time. This will help bring community orders into line with other sentences such as fines and custody where it is clear that punishment is a key purpose of the sentence.

Furthermore, the introduction of court broadcasting, initially in the Court of Appeal, will help to demystify the justice system. Justice must be done and seen to be done if it is to command full public confidence.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Can the Minister give us any clue as to how we know what constitutes a punitive element in a community sentence?

[Damian Green]

I think those receiving the sentence will know. I cannot set out the details, because that is for the courts. Anything that requires the deprivation of liberty at a particular time or the performance of a task at a certain time can contribute to the punitive element of a sentence.

Let me move on to deal with some of the detailed points raised during the course of the debate.

Intercept Evidence

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lammy]

My hon. Friend raises a very important point. Of course, serious and organised crime is dealt with by a particular agency and it would be for a Home Secretary to determine whether it would fall within the scope of any provisions.

Let me move on to the other steps that can be taken to ensure that we do not compromise and that we separate the material from the means. Successive Home Secretaries have been concerned about the means, when there is really a need to separate the means from the material provided.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I have great respect for the right hon. Gentleman and for the particular problem that has led him to take this position. I hope, however, that he does not underestimate the complexity of the task—something I have also been engaged in—of finding a way to achieve what we all agree is desirable. A combination of the disclosure requirements that operate in English courts, and article 6 of the European convention on human rights, could lead to massive requirements for retention and transcribing, and that could impair the operating efficiency of our security and intelligence services.

[Mr Lammy]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman who I know has huge experience in these matters. Inquests have been with us since shortly after the Domesday Book, and if other major jurisdictions can crack this complexity, surely we in our developed democracy should be able to do the same.

Surveillance evidence has long been admissible in court. The police can eavesdrop on a conversation in a pub, and use the evidence in court. Someone’s phone conversation can be recorded on a microphone hidden under a desk and played back in court. If something is recorded, it is fine. There is only a problem if the conversation is contemporaneous, which seems strange.

If someone’s call is intercepted in a foreign country where intercept evidence is admissible—that is the case in every country other than the United Kingdom—that material can come before the courts. That is absurd. If sensitive material gathered by any other means can be heard in court, from transcripts of telephone surveillance to the account of an informant—informants are obviously important in this context—why can we not find a way to make contemporaneous intercept evidence admissible, handling the sensitivity of that material with due care?

We must dispose of the notion that intercept evidence is categorically more sensitive than evidence gathered by other means such as surveillance or informants. Evidence of any other kind is handled based on the sensitivity of the material, but that is not so with intercept evidence, which is the only evidence that has a blanket, categorical ban. In practice, it means that evidence from a phone interception of a conversation detailing a planned robbery is categorically inadmissible in court. At the same time, detection of a human trafficking ring through highly sensitive material provided by an informant faces no such categorical ban.

Of course, no hon. Member would wish to compromise the gathering of intelligence, but I wish to put to one side the notion that because maintaining records of intercept evidence may require logistical consideration, it is not worth doing. If intercept evidence recorded in another country is good enough for the eyes and ears of the British public, how can we maintain the position that evidence intercepted on our soil is not? If America, Canada and Australia allow intercept material to be used in court, one might suppose that the logistical hurdles are not insurmountable.

It simply does not hold true that removing the ban imposed by section 17 of RIPA would hamper the secret services from developing interception technology without exposing their methods to the public. Admitting intercept evidence in court would not restrict the way such evidence is collected any more than existing legislation. The British justice system already has a system that allows prosecutors to disclose material without disclosing its source. Given the strong similarity between admissible surveillance evidence and inadmissible intercept evidence, surely a similar system of disclosure could be applied. Indeed, a framework for making intercept evidence permissible in court already exists in public interest immunity plus. Public interest immunity is already used in cases where admissible surveillance data are heard. I see no reason why a similar safeguard cannot be applied to intercept evidence that has been made admissible in court. As with all difficult tasks, implementing a comprehensive safeguard will not be straightforward, but we cannot afford to give up on challenging the ban.

Yes, the Government have received legal advice against public interest immunity plus in the light of European Court of Human Rights rulings on similar cases from Finland in 2008, and public interest immunity may need refining, but to take the ECHR rulings as a definitive rejection of the principle of a Home Secretary or senior judge assessing the material and deciding which bit is relevant would go too far.

The alternative in amending the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 would allow a coroner to fulfil their role in determining the cause of death in mysterious circumstances. Such amendments were proposed in the Lords to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. They proposed that the coroner nominated by the chief coroner should be able to see the intercept material and make a decision on its disclosure. Material would only be redacted when strictly necessary and in proportion to the public interest. If we wanted to go further, we could confine the role to the senior coroner in such cases.

I am not concerned with the question whether the state should intercept private communications between individuals. My concern lies with the ludicrous situation that there is a statutory ban on using material gathered through interception in court, despite a clear legal case for admitting it. That is a bizarre situation that leaves a family in my constituency without a full inquest into the death of their son more than a year since he was killed. That stubbornness might prevent there ever being an inquest into the death of Mark Duggan. That is unconscionable following the scenes of last August.

As it stands, section 17 represents legislation that obstructs, restricts and obfuscates—bad legislation. It is the House’s duty to return to the matter. Will the Minister say when Chilcot will end the reviewing period—it seems to have gone on for ever? The arrangements are small but necessary, and I hope we can make them. I do not want to compromise the important interception work that is done in cases throughout the country, but we should at least allow a senior coroner or judge, or the Home Secretary, through the use of public interest immunity, to look at the material and redact what is necessary to ensure that the means are not compromised.