King’s Speech

Lord Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Excerpts

Monday 18th May 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich (Maiden Speech)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to make my maiden speech in this House. I begin by expressing my sincere gratitude for the warm welcome I have received from all sides. I thank the officers and staff of this House for their patience, professionalism and kindness in guiding new Members through these early days. As Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich, I serve the people of Suffolk, that great east of England county upon which the sun rises first each morning. I aim to join those who live out the particular Suffolk virtue of quiet service: people getting on with the task, often without applause, motivated by a genuine desire to make their communities better places for all.

My academic literary research before ordination took me deep into the works of the great Elizabethan poet, Edmund Spenser, whose Fairie Queene examines some of the private and public virtues needed to uphold the common good and the bonds of society. Whether biblically or classically rooted, virtue is much needed. Leadership in this current age needs to refocus on the common good, the social bonds and contracts that hold individuals together as communities. Of course, I include in that a matter at the heart of our debate today in response to His Majesty’s gracious Speech: justice, with a specific interest in the realities of and responses to miscarriages of justice. I thank my right reverend friend the Bishop of Gloucester, from whom we will hear later in this debate, for her energy, commitment and expertise over the years in urging us to reimagine a better criminal justice system for all. I welcome the Government’s desire to improve the courts and look forward to seeing their proposed legislation in these areas.

The United Kingdom has long been seen as a standard-bearer for the rule of law—yet even strong systems are not immune to error. When those errors lead to wrongful convictions, the impact is profound, not just for individuals but for confidence in the whole system. In this landscape, the role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission is indispensable. It exists as a safeguard—a recognition that the justice system must contain within it the means to correct its own errors. It is in relation to the CCRC that I draw this House’s attention to the case of Jason Moore, convicted in 2013 for the murder of Robert Darby. I mention this matter with the permission of Jason and his sister Kirsty. Both Jason Moore’s and Robert Darby’s families have spent the last 13 years campaigning to have that conviction reviewed. Amid fiascos of lost evidence and problems with the management of identity parades and vital witnesses, Jason is still waiting for the CCRC to come to a decision about sending his case to appeal. His case has been under consideration by it for six years now.

Miscarriages of justice are not abstract legal concepts but lived human experiences. They concern individuals who maintain their innocence while navigating a system that can be slow, complex and difficult to penetrate. Wrongful conviction is not simply the loss of liberty; it is the loss of years, sometimes decades. When convictions are ultimately overturned, the sense of relief is tempered by a stark reality: lost time cannot be restored. Noble Lords may be aware of previous criticism of the CCRC and the promise of a review of it by the Law Commission. Since justice delayed is justice denied, this review needs to be concluded, with any actions that follow from it considered with urgency. I therefore press the Minister for a timescale for the completion of that review.

As this House considers the legislative programme set out in His Majesty’s gracious Speech, I hope we will give due weight to those whose voices are hardest to hear: individuals maintaining their innocence over many years from within prison, and the families who stand alongside them. Any system worthy of public confidence must be able to correct and learn from its mistakes. In the words of Edmund Spenser,

“Where justice grows, there grows eke greater grace”.


If I can contribute in however a modest way to strengthening fairness, timeliness and accountability within such systems, I shall consider it a privilege to do so.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, here we go again. First, they came for the asylum seekers and then for the prisoners. Which unpopular and demonised group—to quote my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—will be next to be deprived of some of the rights contained in the Human Rights Act?

As some of us have been arguing during the passage of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill, to deprive marginalised groups of their human rights in this way undermines the principle of universality at the heart of human rights. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, quoted back at us that it is

“a fundamental tenet of modern human rights that they are universal and indivisible”.—[Official Report, 14/2/24; col. 342.]

He then went on to try to justify the very opposite.

In answer to some general Oral Questions on our human rights legislation in June, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice emphasised the Government’s commitment to

“a human rights framework that … works for the British people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/23; col. 145.]

He later talked about our legislation delivering on the interests of the British people. Leaving aside whether universal human rights can be confined to the British people, it raises the question of whether prisoners no longer count as British people.

As it is, some of the briefings we have received, including from the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Prison Reform Trust, make the point that in the words of the latter,

“it is precisely in custodial institutions like prison … that human rights protections are most vital, because individuals are under the control of the state”.

The NAYJ, a member organisation which campaigns for the rights of and justice for children in trouble with the law, is particularly anxious about the implications for children in prison. The Law Society, the EHRC and the then chair of the JCHR have all expressed their deep concern about the diminution of human rights protection represented by these clauses. The EHRC, in particular, warns that there may be an impact on the UK’s international legal obligations.

The Constitution Committee sets out the government justification for these clauses in the human rights memorandum on the Bill, but invites us to seek further explanation from the Government as to what effect they intend to achieve with the disapplication of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. According to the memorandum, the intention is to ensure that the HRA does not get in the way of the policy intentions of the release regime. In other words, it seems to be saying that human rights should not trump government policy. No evidence is provided to justify the need for this diminution of human rights, and of course the clauses were not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny.

In his response to the Second Reading debate, the Minister seemed to say that all the organisations expressing concern are making a mountain out of a molehill because Section 3 of the HRA is “a procedural provision only”. He argued that it gives the courts an

“unusual power to reinterpret what Parliament has said in a manner that may not have been and probably was not Parliament’s original intention so as to render a particular provision compatible with the convention”.—[Official Report, 23/12/23; col. 2135.]

This, he suggested, was a “neutral” description of the function of Section 3.

I am grateful to Amnesty for its help in making sense of what the Minister said, although it would be the first to emphasise that its analysis is in line with that of the independent Human Rights Act review, established by the Government. It questioned whether this was a “neutral” interpretation of the role of Section 3. The reference to reinterpreting legislation seemed to suggest that there is one legitimate act of interpretation, which is then challenged by a second questionable one under Section 3. But this interpretation is itself highly questionable. I am advised that Parliament intended for Section 3 to be used in the way that it is. There is no reason to think that Section 3 interpretations lead to interpretations that are “probably not” in line with Parliament’s original intention, as confirmed by the Human Rights Act review, even if that was not the view of one member of the commission cited by the Minister.

More practically, and I think for the first time in this context, the Minister suggested that it has been a difficult section to apply, with the case law having “gone all over the place” and the introduction of uncertainty where the Government want certainty. I am advised that while this may have been true of when Section 3 was first brought into force—although “all over the place” is a misleading description—that period has long passed and the legal issues around it have not substantively changed for the past decade or so. As the Minister acknowledged, it has “settled down more recently”. So having been in effect for 20 years, it is not at all clear why its continued function would create the kind of complexity and uncertainty the Minister fears.

If the Minister cannot come up with a more convincing case for the disapplication of Section 3 from a group of citizens for whom the protection of the Human Rights Act is especially important, given their relationship to the state, I certainly think that these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I have yet to hear any argument that justifies this further breach of the principle of the universality of human rights.

[The Lord Bishop of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich]

My Lords, my right reverend friend the Bishop of Manchester regrets that he cannot be here today to speak to the amendments to which he has put his name.

The basis of our opposition to Clauses 49 to 51, to echo points made by the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, is that human rights need to be applied universally, even when disapplication might seem expedient. We know that, when people are marginalised, it is then that human rights protections are most necessary and, as such, the disapplication of rights to prisoners, who rely on independent courts and the justice system to guarantee basic minimum standards of fairness and respect, is particularly egregious. The Law Society has warned that these clauses

“significantly weaken the system of human rights protections in the UK”.

My right reverend friend and I add our voices to these concerns.