Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

How nice it is to be back here again. I oppose Clauses 118, 119 and 120 standing part of the Bill. These clauses introduce a pre-emptive targeting of people based on location rather than behaviour. That should concern anyone who cares about the right to peaceful protest. Under these clauses, a senior police officer may designate an area in anticipation of a protest, based on a belief that an offence is likely to occur. Once that designation is in place, simply wearing an item said to conceal identity becomes a criminal offence. This applies to everyone in a designated area. Criminal liability comes not from conduct but from being in a certain place and from what a person is wearing. That is a profound shift in approach and one that I cannot support.

It is also a massively broad discretion. An inspector can designate a locality for up to 24 hours, extendable, on the basis of a prediction or guess, rather than evidence, of immediate serious violence. The result is a huge power to ban everyday protective coverings across a place at a time based only on an estimate of what might happen. That is exactly the kind of power that leads to overenforcement and a chilling effect on protest, particularly for those who already face risks from being identified.

The Government may say that defences to these provisions exist for health, religion or work, but those protections operate after arrest and charge, not at the point where the person decides whether it is safe for them to attend a protest at all. That is the key issue here. Liberty’s supporters have been clear about the real-world impact. One disabled person wrote:

“I am clinically vulnerable … Forcing disabled people like me to unmask is surely disability discrimination”.


Another said:

“As a single woman, I do not want to be identified”.


Women who have experienced domestic abuse may cover their faces for the same reason.

For others, including diaspora activists and those with credible fears of transnational repression, anonymity is not a political statement but a basic safeguard. We have already seen reporting on how mask restrictions at solidarity protests in the UK, including those linked to Hong Kong, have deterred participation because surveillance and reprisals are real concerns. This then becomes about who feels safe enough to exercise their democratic rights.

I must also ask: are these clauses really necessary? The police already have a targeted power, under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, to require the removal of certain items where this is justified. That power has been used in recent protest policing, including at protests outside a migrant hotel in Epping. Can the Minister say what evidence the Government have of a gap in existing targeted powers that they cannot meet, rather than simply a desire for broader, pre-emptive control? The Government have not demonstrated an operational gap so far. What we appear to have instead is a preference for wider, pre-emptive control rather than targeted, evidence-based policing.

That matters because Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights are absolutely clear: any restriction on protest must be necessary and proportionate, and the Strasbourg court has repeatedly warned against measures that deter peaceful participation through fear of sanction. A clause that criminalises ordinary behaviour across a designated area, without reference to a person’s actual behaviour, is precisely the kind of measure that risks crossing that line.

Will the Government consider narrowing the trigger to “imminent and serious violence or disorder” and introducing a clear front-end reasonable excuse protection, rather than relying on defences only after arrest? If the Government’s concern is intimidation or disorder, then the answer is the better use of existing targeted powers, not a blanket approach that sweeps up disabled people, women concerned about safety and minority communities, along with everybody else. For all those reasons, I support removing Clauses 118, 119 and 120 from the Bill.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.

History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.

The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:

“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.


That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:

“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.


These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:

“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.


That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.

I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.

She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.

The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.

I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.

I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The amendments in this group are motivated by understandable concern about the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ziegler case, which is [2021] UKSC 23. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Faulks, made powerful submissions relating to that case.

The Committee may wish to be reminded that the Supreme Court reconsidered the statements made in Ziegler in the abortion services case, which was [2022] UKSC 32. Further guidance on the issues in Ziegler was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, as the Lord Chief Justice in the Cuciurean case, which is [2022] 3 WLR 446. The Supreme Court said, in the abortion services case, that it is not for the jury or the magistrates in each individual case to assess whether the conduct of the defendant is protected by human rights law. That was the concern, as I understand it, of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that that is highly desirable, but that is not the law.

In the abortion services case, in paragraphs 63 to 66, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, who is the President of the Supreme Court, spoke for a seven person Supreme Court. It was an enlarged court because of the importance of the issue. He addressed the principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, said at paragraph 63:

“The first question was whether, in a case where the exercise of rights under articles 9 to 11 of the Convention is raised by the defendant to a criminal prosecution, there must always be an assessment of the proportionality of any interference with those rights on the facts of the individual case. The answer is no”.


In paragraph 64, he said:

“The second question was whether, where an offence is liable to give rise to an interference with the exercise of rights under articles 9, 10 or 11 of the Convention, it is necessary for the ingredients of the offence to include (or be interpreted as including) the absence of reasonable or lawful excuse in order for a conviction to be compatible with the Convention rights. The answer is no”.


Paragraph 65, says:

“The third question was whether it is possible for the ingredients of an offence in themselves to ensure the compatibility of a conviction with the Convention rights under articles 9, 10 and 11. The answer is yes”.


The position under the law is that the prosecution will say that Parliament has enacted a specific offence; that is the law of the land, and it is simply not open to the defendant to say that they are entitled to seek to overturn the ingredients of the offence by reference to convention rights. The law of the land is set out in the criminal offence. Therefore, respectfully, much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law—notwithstanding Articles 9 to 11 of the convention.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in this group. First, I say to the right reverend Prelate that the peaceful religious processions that he had in mind, such as those at Easter, were not the sort of processions that the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police had in mind when he recently said something to the effect of him having seen an appalling increase in aggro and violence in demonstrations, and that:

“The intolerable has become normalised”.


That is quite different from the peaceful processions that the right reverend Prelate had in mind.

Before I turn to my amendments, I want to say how much I enjoyed the Minister’s winding-up speech in the previous debate. He was in absolutely top form, especially in his demolition of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I suspect that most of the best bits in his speech were not written by his officials; I shall treasure them. I hope that I do not become a victim of such a wonderful oration against me.

I have two amendments in this group. The first is quite small, simple and titchy, and the second is slightly more complicated.

Clause 122(2) says:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they—


(a) had a good reason for climbing on the specified memorial,


(b) were the owner or occupier of the specified memorial, or


(c) had the consent of the owner or occupier”


to do so. My first amendment would delete the general excuse of having a “good reason”. The only defences left for a person charged with an offence under Clause 122 would be that they were the owner or occupier of the memorial or had the consent of the owner or occupier to climb on it. I wonder about “occupier”; I presume that that is to cover memorials that are not just statues but buildings, such as the Hall of Memory in Birmingham. I would be grateful for a slight elucidation on what is meant by the occupier of a memorial.

I turn to the proposed new clause in my Amendment 378B. It is simple in principle but looks a bit complicated. It simply reproduces the operative test, as well as the definition of “community”, in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 and would put them in the Bill, giving them primary law status. This would improve legal certainty and parliamentary scrutiny.

Many clauses in the Bill, and many of the amendments, speak of

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

We may conclude from this that the disruption must be pretty serious indeed to qualify as “serious”. However, that is not the case since the previous Government passed the 2023 regulations, which defined and, some commentators would say, diluted the concept of serious disruption.

In plain terms, my proposed new clause would place in the Bill all the illustrative examples and interpretive tests introduced in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations. As I suggested, those regulations make amendments to provisions in the Public Order Act 1986 concerning the meaning of the expression

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Section 12 of the Act gives the police the power to impose conditions on people organising and taking part in public processions. A senior police officer can exercise this power if they reasonably believe that a procession may result in

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Serious disruption to the life of the community is not defined in the Act itself, but Section 12(2A) sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute serious disruption.

The 2023 regulations refine that list. The amendments to Section 12(2A) and (2B) of the Act also provide that, when considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption, a senior police officer must take into account the disruption that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held, as well as the disruption that may result from the procession, and may take into account the cumulative disruption that may be caused by more than one public procession or public assembly in the same area. The amendments also provide that the term “community” extends to anyone who may be affected by the public procession regardless of whether they live or work in the vicinity of the procession. They state that “disruption” is anything

“that is more than minor”,

in particular to

“the making of a journey”

or access to goods and services. The regulations define this as

“access to any essential goods or any essential service”,

including access to

“the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a place of worship … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service relating to health”.

That is what the regulations say in redefining

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

in the Act. Although my amendment looks complicated, it simply suggests that those regulations should be incorporated into the Bill as primary legislation. Transferring the regulations into the Bill would bring legal clarity—the police, courts and organisers would read the statutory test directly from the Act rather than a separate statutory instrument, reducing uncertainty about where the operative tests are located. It would mirror the stated purposes of the 2023 regulations to provide greater clarity. It would bring consistency of application—putting the tests in primary legislation would reduce the risk of interpretive divergence between different SIs or guidance and make the threshold for imposing conditions more visible to Parliament and the public. The cumulative effects would be preserved—the clause could, and should, reproduce the regulations’ treatment of cumulative effects so that multiple impacts are properly captured, as the regulations already contemplate cumulative assessment.

Of course, the Minister will say that embedding illustrative examples in primary law makes future policy adjustments harder and might require primary legislation and time to respond to unforeseen operational guidance. However, I suggest that retaining my proposed new clause, to secure clarity and parliamentary oversight but add a short delegated powers safeguard—a power to change it in future by regulations—would be perfectly okay.

I support Amendment 369A on pyrotechnics at protests tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower on the Front Bench, but it does not go far enough. I cannot think of any lawful excuse for possessing pyrotechnic articles while taking part in a protest. Protests are a vital part of our democratic life. They are a place for voices to be heard, grievances to be aired and change to be sought. But they are not a place for devices that can cause panic, injury or irreversible escalation. Pyrotechnics are designed to startle, burn, explode and smoke; they are not tools of peaceful persuasion. To allow a defence based on an honestly held political belief risks turning lawful protest into a dangerous theatre of risk and fear. Public safety must be paramount.

There are a few other things I could say about pyrotechnics at protests, but I will cut short my remarks in the interests of time. I see no justification whatever for anyone to have pyrotechnics at any protest or for there to be a lawful defence for it.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support and have added my name to Amendment 382H. I also support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. My support is based on the concerns over and consequences of the Ziegler case. Noble Lords have said today that it was wrong in law, but that is not for me to say. The policy consequences for policing the streets of this country have been profound and negative, particularly in the area of public protest and disorder policing.

The Ziegler case was one of the simplest offences to prove in the criminal law. It was an offence of wilful obstruction of the highway. There were only three parts to prove; it was wilful, it was obstruction and they were on a highway. That was the offence, and it is one of the simplest we have policed over the years. It became complex only when people alleged that there was a reasonable excuse—for which read “a political purpose”—for their obstruction of the highway.

In the past, all the police needed to prove was that it was a highway—which is well established in law—that it had been obstructed and, usually, that they had asked someone to move on and they had either returned or not moved. That was about as complicated as it was. But as soon as you have to import intent, recklessness or reasonable excuse, the offence starts to become more complex and the police have to think carefully before intervening. I know that in this House people sometimes talk about the police being careless with the law, reactive and reactionary—I am not talking about any individual; I am just saying, as a general comment, that it has been said—but my experience is that, on the whole, they try to get it right and to balance everybody’s rights, often in very difficult circumstances.

My reading of Ziegler is that the Supreme Court seemed to say that dealing with obstruction of the highway is far too simple when dealing with protesters—that it is okay for everybody else but for protesters it gets a little more complicated. The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the convention rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association, sometimes grouped together as the right to protest, constituted a lawful excuse, which means that before a person can be convicted for obstructing the highway, the prosecution must prove that a conviction would be a proportionate, and thus justified, interference with that person’s convention rights. The Ziegler judgment has caused very real difficulties for police in dealing with environmental and many other protests and, I argue, for judges in attempting to run trials fairly and efficiently and instruct juries about what must be proved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

I raise a point on Amendment 378B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. Unless I have missed something in that lengthy amendment, the effect of it might well be to interfere with the exercise of the right to picket in an industrial dispute. The right to picket is protected by Section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act and, in a lawful industrial dispute, by Section 219. I doubt that that was the intention of the mover of the amendment. Is it possible to have some clarity on that point?

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is my intention, and I believe it is the case—possibly the Minister will confirm—that my amendment would not change one iota. It would simply incorporate all the current regulations from the 2023 regulations and move them verbatim into the Bill, making it a primary case. It would not change any of the provisions at all. If there are technical drafting issues then they can be corrected later, but there is no intention to change any of the concept.

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments and will speak to a point that comes up in Amendment 378B. Because it arises in 378B, I am raising it now, but it affects the subsequent amendments in the next few groupings, particularly my amendments. It all flows from Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986.

Essentially, there is some concern that so much discretion will be left to the police. It is clear that, for one reason or another, the police have not been effective in controlling protesters to date. Noble Lords may have seen the video clip on social media showing Gideon Falter, CEO of the Campaign Against Antisemitism, being told by police he was “quite openly Jewish”, and therefore causing a breach of the peace.

We are in the middle of assessing the appalling decisions by the West Midlands police, who consulted a large number of mosques, including some very radical ones that housed an imam who stated that women should not leave their home without their husband’s permission. These people were consulted on whether or not Israeli tourists should be allowed to visit the West Midlands. The police claimed they had consulted the Jewish community in the area: that was not true. It is clear they realised that the Israeli tourists would be in danger, but they decided to ban them from coming on the false excuse that they would be the aggressors. So they turned the victims into the guilty ones.

Your Lordships may have seen another video clip— on Friday or Sunday night—outside an Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill called Miznon. There were some very aggressive and intimidating protesters and the police simply stood there. There may have been one arrest, but that was it. So innocent employees, eaters, diners and members of the public faced a very unpleasant situation.