Crime and Policing Bill

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Committee (9th Day)

Northern Ireland Legislative Consent granted. Scottish and Welsh Legislative Consent sought. Relevant documents: 33rd and 41st Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee, 11th Report from the Constitution Committee and 5th Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

15:33

Clause 118: Offence of concealing identity at protests

Debate on whether Clause 118 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

How nice it is to be back here again. I oppose Clauses 118, 119 and 120 standing part of the Bill. These clauses introduce a pre-emptive targeting of people based on location rather than behaviour. That should concern anyone who cares about the right to peaceful protest. Under these clauses, a senior police officer may designate an area in anticipation of a protest, based on a belief that an offence is likely to occur. Once that designation is in place, simply wearing an item said to conceal identity becomes a criminal offence. This applies to everyone in a designated area. Criminal liability comes not from conduct but from being in a certain place and from what a person is wearing. That is a profound shift in approach and one that I cannot support.

It is also a massively broad discretion. An inspector can designate a locality for up to 24 hours, extendable, on the basis of a prediction or guess, rather than evidence, of immediate serious violence. The result is a huge power to ban everyday protective coverings across a place at a time based only on an estimate of what might happen. That is exactly the kind of power that leads to overenforcement and a chilling effect on protest, particularly for those who already face risks from being identified.

The Government may say that defences to these provisions exist for health, religion or work, but those protections operate after arrest and charge, not at the point where the person decides whether it is safe for them to attend a protest at all. That is the key issue here. Liberty’s supporters have been clear about the real-world impact. One disabled person wrote:

“I am clinically vulnerable … Forcing disabled people like me to unmask is surely disability discrimination”.


Another said:

“As a single woman, I do not want to be identified”.


Women who have experienced domestic abuse may cover their faces for the same reason.

For others, including diaspora activists and those with credible fears of transnational repression, anonymity is not a political statement but a basic safeguard. We have already seen reporting on how mask restrictions at solidarity protests in the UK, including those linked to Hong Kong, have deterred participation because surveillance and reprisals are real concerns. This then becomes about who feels safe enough to exercise their democratic rights.

I must also ask: are these clauses really necessary? The police already have a targeted power, under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, to require the removal of certain items where this is justified. That power has been used in recent protest policing, including at protests outside a migrant hotel in Epping. Can the Minister say what evidence the Government have of a gap in existing targeted powers that they cannot meet, rather than simply a desire for broader, pre-emptive control? The Government have not demonstrated an operational gap so far. What we appear to have instead is a preference for wider, pre-emptive control rather than targeted, evidence-based policing.

That matters because Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights are absolutely clear: any restriction on protest must be necessary and proportionate, and the Strasbourg court has repeatedly warned against measures that deter peaceful participation through fear of sanction. A clause that criminalises ordinary behaviour across a designated area, without reference to a person’s actual behaviour, is precisely the kind of measure that risks crossing that line.

Will the Government consider narrowing the trigger to “imminent and serious violence or disorder” and introducing a clear front-end reasonable excuse protection, rather than relying on defences only after arrest? If the Government’s concern is intimidation or disorder, then the answer is the better use of existing targeted powers, not a blanket approach that sweeps up disabled people, women concerned about safety and minority communities, along with everybody else. For all those reasons, I support removing Clauses 118, 119 and 120 from the Bill.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.

History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.

The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:

“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.


That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:

“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.


These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:

“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.


That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.

I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.

She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.

The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.

I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, that was a powerful speech, but it really is not the case that all protesters are in the position of Martin Luther King, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mahatma Gandhi and the noble Baroness herself. There are protesters who have good reason for wishing to conceal their identity. If I am a protester against the current regime in Tehran and join a protest in London in order to express my views, I will be genuinely and properly concerned that my identity being revealed may well lead to action being taken against my family and associates in Tehran, and I have a very good reason for not wanting to have my identity disclosed.

I am concerned that Clause 118(2) is too narrow. It provides a defence for a person who has concealed their identity: showing that the reason they are wearing a mask is for

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others, the purposes of religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

Those are the only defences. That does not cover the example I gave—I could give many other examples—of the protester concerned about what is going on in Tehran. So I suggest to the Minister that, although I do not support the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to remove these clauses, I do think she has a point about the narrow scope of the defences in the clause.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made her point so ably that I was not tempted to speak, until I heard the counter-speech from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. It is simply ahistoric to suggest that the suffragettes—those protesters who everybody loves now but who were once incarcerated and tortured by the British state—

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

They went on hunger strike.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Indeed, they went on hunger strike. It is simply ahistoric to suggest there was not a significant clandestine element to their operations. I am sure that, if one were to examine other examples the noble Lord gave, one would find greater complexity than he offered us in his very glib comments about protest.

Just minutes ago in this Chamber, noble Lords from across the House expressed their horror at what has been happening in Iran. On any given day in your Lordships’ House, similar comments will be made about Hong Kong or protests anywhere else in the world. It is of concern that organisations that many of us respect, such as JUSTICE, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and so on, are now writing very concerning reports about silencing the streets of the UK.

15:45

Everyone loves protesters in their own cause, whether they are farmers or whoever they happen to be at the time; it is other people’s freedom of expression that is concerning. “My speech is free and everyone else’s is a little bit more expensive”. To suggest that people do not have valid reasons for concealing their appearance at protests is to totally misunderstand the danger that people have to put themselves into on many occasions to protest, particularly outside various embassies in this capital. The provisions on face coverings in the Bill are far too broadly drawn and are of a blanket nature. The existing laws that allow police officers to require individuals to remove a face covering—for example, when they are stopped and searched or arrested—are more than adequate.

I regret that noble friends on the Front Bench are now reneging on things that were said not long ago during the passage of 2022 and 2023 legislation in this Chamber, as if those comments about freedom of expression and protest were never made. In fact, the Government are now going further on all the anti-protest provisions in this part of the Bill. I regret that as a general proposition, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that, on the face-covering issue in particular, and on other provisions that we will come to this afternoon and no doubt this evening, there should be more targeting.

That was probably what I objected most to about the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra: the suggestion that “may” cause a problem is targeted and that allowing blanket designation by the police is targeted. It is the opposite of targeted; it is blanket. It chills freedom of expression, which experts say is already being chilled in this country. So I suggest that people take the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, very seriously indeed.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I agree with everything that she said. I start by reminding the Committee that I have an interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. In this group we are considering Clauses 118, 119 and 120, which are not only draconian in their effect but very poorly drafted. In the course of my speech, I have five questions about these clauses for the Minister, which I ask him to respond to when he replies.

Clauses 118, 119 and 120 create a new offence of concealing identity at protests. However, as I will demonstrate, and as has already been said, it is vital that individuals are able to preserve their anonymity at protests. Other clauses in the Bill promote the use of highly intrusive and totally unregulated facial recognition technology at protests. We are currently in the Wild West with this mass surveillance technology. It is being used by law enforcement and private firms without any permission, regulation or oversight from Parliament. The Bill contains the first mention of the phrase “facial recognition” in any legislation, yet it does nothing to control or monitor its use. Perhaps the Minister could explain why the Bill fails again to regulate and control this mass surveillance technology?

Authorising the use of this technology, as the Bill does, without first controlling how it is used, puts the cart way ahead of the horse. The combination of this mass surveillance and prohibiting face coverings at protests, as these clauses do, has a seriously chilling effect on people’s willingness to participate in demonstrations.

There are many categories of law-abiding citizens—we heard some from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—who may prefer to conceal their identity at protests for entirely legitimate reasons, such as those protesting against a hostile foreign state who fear retribution for themselves or their families; those who prefer that their employer does not know their political views; those who criticise their own religious or cultural communities; survivors of sexual violence and harassment, who need to stay below the radar; or those who simply do not wish to be the subject of mass surveillance by totally unregulated facial recognition technology. Anonymity is an important enabler of freedom of assembly and association. It allows participants a certain level of protection against authorities singling out or identifying specific individuals.

There are serious problems with the drafting of Clauses 118 to 120. Clause 119 does not require that a person knows they are in a designated area for them to commit an offence. This compares unfavourably with Sections 12(5A) and 14(5A) of the Public Order Act 1986, which also imposes conditions on processions and assemblies. That Act includes the requirement that, at the time of the offence,

“the person knows or ought to know that the condition has been imposed”.

There is no such requirement in Clause 119, so a protestor who knows nothing of such a designation could well be arrested and prosecuted. Can the Minister explain why that is right?

Worse still, Clause 118 appears to reverse the burden of proof, which means a defendant would have the burden—presumably on the balance of probabilities—to prove that they were wearing a face covering for health or other reasons. Why is this not the criminal burden or standard? This risks people being wrongly convicted on the lower standard of proof, which is especially concerning as the offence has such wide application. Furthermore, anyone wearing a Covid-style mask in the locality of a protest, even if they are there for a completely different reason, could be caught by this offence and would not have the protections of the normal burden and standard of proof at trial. Can the Minister explain why that is the case?

Clause 119 has no limit on the types of offences that would give rise to the power to make the designation. That means that the designation could be made disproportionately, such as on the basis of only minor offences. In addition, there is no protection from the offence itself and its designation being circular, which means that an officer may justify a designation against concealing identity on the basis that they believe the offence of concealing one’s identity may be committed.

Another problem with these clauses is that the maximum sentence of one month’s custody is the same as for the offence of refusing to remove a face covering under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. I think the Committee will agree that the conduct element of the Section 60AA offence—refusing to comply with the lawful direction of a police officer—is significantly more serious and by definition implies awareness of the condition, unlike the new offence. It seems disproportionate that the new offence would attract the same sentence. Does the Minister agree?

Clauses 118 to 120 are defective in many important ways. In any case, even if they were better written, they would still unreasonably and unnecessarily inhibit and have a chilling effect on lawful protests. For all these reasons, they must be strongly opposed and removed from the Bill.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I am quite open- minded about the clause on face coverings and whether it is a good or bad thing to have face coverings at protests. I have just a couple of points for the Government in considering whether to change the provisions in any way.

First, imposing more conditions, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested, to narrow the provisions might be laudable but will make them harder and harder to enforce. The officers on the street can take action only on what they see, and if the person alleges that they have a member of their family in Iran, or wherever it happens to be, it will be quite hard for the officer on the street, so it may make no difference at all to the initial action. At the ongoing investigation and prosecution that might follow, they may then want to rebut—if they intend to—the claim that that defence is available. It will impose more burden on the prosecution, so we must be very careful about the conditions that we impose on it.

Secondly, although we tend to think about face masks being worn by only some people in the crowd, we could anticipate that everybody in the crowd wears a mask. If that is the case, it can be quite intimidating, and it makes normal policing quite difficult to embark on. For example, one way in which you would notice if someone has a bail condition that they should not attend a protest is whether you can recognise them. In terms of general investigation, if everybody has a mask, it is quite difficult to distinguish one person from another. We might anticipate some of the things that we saw in the 1930s. We have the Public Order Act 1936, which was intended to stop people from wearing uniforms. It could become a kind of uniform, or at least an aspect of a uniform, to signify support for a political purpose.

This clause needs some thought if it is to go forward. I ask for as much consideration as possible for the enforcers, who will be criticised if they get it wrong, but we can anticipate now whether they might be left in an invidious position.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I rather agree with the noble Lord’s concern about how ever more protest laws are to be operated in practice by police officers, who are dealing with a growing and ever more complex statute book. But I wonder what he thinks about the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that the powers already exist to require and direct people to remove a mask, which could be done to individuals. In the hypothetical situation that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, gives of everyone wearing a mask as a form of intimidatory uniform, what does he think about the fact that the power already exists? What is an officer to do, faced with those duplicative powers and offences?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

It is a fair question. I would only say that, generally speaking, if you have a large crowd and a significant number within it wearing masks, the chances of you telling them all to take them off are very limited. If I understand the proposal, it is to prevent people arriving at the march with a mask rather than having to deal with it once they arrive. If you have to deal with it, you will have to deal with it. That is the only thing I would say: having allowed people to mask up, you cannot then expect officers to deal with a crowd of 5,000 or 6,000—it is just impractical. That is the argument against it, but I understand why the argument is made.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I broadly agree with the excellent comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in moving this, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. I was reminded, when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, reminded us of the exemptions, that retrospectively, having been arrested or having had your mask removed, or what have you, you can say, “I was wearing this mask for health reasons”, or for work reasons, or for religious observance. The fact that there are exemptions for those reasons and not for others indicates what a ridiculous situation it is. Why have those three things only as reasons why you are allowed to wear masks? Let us just think about it. At what work would you be allowed to wear a mask? Could you say, “Well, I deliver pizzas so I have a helmet on”? Everyone could then turn up wearing a helmet saying that it was to do with their work. That just does not make any sense.

16:00

The reason I say that is that, as we have heard, and as I want to emphasise, deciding to adopt anonymity on a protest—in society, in fact—is not necessarily a sign that you are a wrong ‘un. We live in a free society —you can decide not to reveal your identity when you go, legally, on a demonstration; it might just be that you do not want to be seen there, for any number of reasons. The Minister has been on many demonstrations and he will know that there will be police officers pointing at people, identifying them as troublemakers and so on, even if they are doing nothing wrong. It is intimidating. That is the way it is used.

Importantly, I know ex-Muslim women who have been critical of Islamists and who do not necessarily want to be seen on a demonstration criticising Islamism. Guess why that might be? Whistleblowers of all stripes might want to protect themselves from their employers, for all sorts of reasons that I do not need to spell out. There are examples these days of people being livestreamed by hostile political opponents and doxed for going on demonstrations, so you might well want to hide yourself. One of the briefings that we got made the point that it might just be that you are cold, in conditions such as today’s, and wrap a scarf around your face. Who is to decide between what is nefarious and dubious? The main thing is that the police surely have the powers at the moment to deal with people who they think are problematic.

I know what it is like to confront those cosplaying jihadists with their face coverings, which I know are designed to be intimidating. I have faced people in masks, on protests I have been on, screaming abuse. I can see that that is the problem that this is trying to address. The reality is that there is a principle here: in a free society, people should be able to go on a demonstration anonymously; unless they do something wrong, and if they do something wrong then go and get ’em—fine with me. If there is a problem, and we think that people are masking up to intimidate, the police can, as happens now, ask them to remove their masks.

When the police were asked why they wanted this law, they said that when they ask people to remove their masks, they go to another part of the demonstration and put them back on. Is not the solution to grab the mask off them? I am not very good on policing themes, but I do not think we need to ban masks—to ban anonymity, in effect—on demonstrations as a way of dealing with the fact that the police think there are practical problems with the law at the moment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I too support the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that Clauses 118 to 120 should be removed altogether from the Bill.

My reasons are twofold. First, I regard it as wrong and unjustified to prohibit people from concealing their identities at demonstrations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said, let alone prohibiting anyone in a designated locality concealing their identity if they so wish. That is what the Bill does, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out. My second point is that the purpose of the clause can only be to enable the use of live facial recognition technology to monitor demonstrations, to enable the authorities to determine who is attending them and, frankly, to take action against them subsequently. I regard that as an offensive justification, certainly given the present state of the technology and the present lack of regulation of live facial recognition.

On the first reason, overall, the prohibition of individuals concealing their identity involves introducing a Big Brother role for the state that is unwelcome and foreign to our notions of democratic freedom. The power may not be Orwellian in scale, but it has nasty totalitarian echoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four. We should remember that the catchphrase of the dictatorship in that novel is, “Big Brother is watching you”, the justified implication being that state observation of individuals is a principal instrument in the toolkit of dictatorship.

No doubt that is the reason why the power to prohibit such concealment is hedged around in the Bill by the complicated regime of designated localities, exempted purposes and limited durations. Those limits on the prohibition of concealing identity are intended to act as a brake on the power, but, in fact, all the weaknesses—mentioned by my noble friend Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others—emphasise how far the power is a fetter on individual freedom.

I fully appreciate that the power to designate a locality under Clause 119 would arise only if a senior police officer reasonably believed that a protest was likely to involve, or has involved, the commission of offences, and that it would be expedient to exercise the power to prevent or limit the commission of offences. However, that must be measured against not only the seriousness of the offences to be avoided, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out, but the right of individuals to wear a disguise, which may be, as others have pointed out, a perfectly reasonable thing to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke of protesters against the Iranian regime. What about journalists, of whatever political persuasion, who wish to report on a protest but do not want to be recognised by the protesters or the public? What about employees, who would rather not be recognised attending a protest by their employers? The employers may have a political objection to the cause that the protesters are pursuing. Any figure who may be publicly recognisable who wishes to take part in, or even just attend, a protest, and wishes not to be recognised, may legitimately have that right to conceal their identity. What about parents who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their children, or adult children who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their parents?

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relied on the public protests of Emmeline Pankhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly objected to that comparison. There were countless other suffragettes who did not want friends or family to know of their support for, or activity as, suffragettes in protests because they might disagree with their family, parents, husbands, wives or friends, or simply out of concern for their own safety. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, expressed the position of ordinary citizens who wish to keep their identities private. I go further: in peacetime, it is the right of people to keep their identities private. The state would have to justify any limit on that power, and it has not done that.

We all agree that everyone has a right to protest but we must all acknowledge that protests can, and often do, involve the commission of offences by some. But the fact that protest may involve, or be likely to involve, the commission of offences by some people does not justify the police or the state in denying everybody in the designated locality the right to conceal their identities. This prohibition says to people that if you take part in or attend the protest, or are in the locality covered by the designation, you must be recognisable. I say to the Minister that that is an unjustifiable arrogation of power by the state. It must be justified by the Government if they wish to legislate for it, and they have not gone anywhere near justifying that arrogation of power.

My second reason for opposing this clause is that the prohibition on concealment of a citizen’s identity can have only the one purpose of enabling them to be monitored on camera, with a view to being identified later. Let us examine that. At its most benign, the power may be directed only against those who commit offences. Where it is for that limited purpose, it can be argued that preventing offences by the persons identified on camera may be a legitimate exercise of the power of the state, but I will repeat the points made by my noble friend Lord Strasburger on that. Just as police officers justify surveillance, so this power, if it were sufficiently defined and limited, might be justifiable, but the purposes of surveillance in the Bill go much further and unacceptably so. A dictatorial state may regard it as permissible to identify supporters of a particular view, political party or cause for the purpose of keeping them under further surveillance; worse still, branding them as trouble-makers for the future; or, at the extreme, taking action against them, ranging from pulling them in for questioning to arrest and unlawful imprisonment.

We have seen abuse of powers such as that in countries all over the world; the country that is currently under consideration is Iran, but it has happened in many others. We prevent abuse of power only by being astute to limit police powers and state infringement of individual liberties in the first place. This is not just an argument about live facial recognition technology, which my noble friend considered—we will discuss that more later—but an important argument about the legitimate limits on state power. Clauses 118 to 120 come nowhere near falling within those limits, even had they been tightly drawn—which they are not, as my noble friend and others have pointed out. For that reason, these clauses really ought to go.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these stand part notices. However, we on these Benches are unable to support her as we have general support for Clauses 118 to 120.

The clauses address a very real and increasingly familiar problem in modern protest policing: the deliberate concealment of identity to frustrate lawful policing and avoid accountability for criminal acts. I am sure that all noble Lords have seen videos circulating on the news and online of protests where large groups of people arrive masked or disguising their identity. Often, the only reason for that is to embolden themselves and each other to commit offences, knowing that their identification and subsequent prosecution will be next to impossible. This undermines both public confidence and the rule of law.

Clause 118 creates a relatively tightly drawn offence that would apply only where a locality has been designated by the police because there is a reasonable belief that a protest is likely to involve, or has involved, criminality. It is not a blanket ban on face coverings. Rather, the clause provides clear statutory defences for those wearing items for health reasons, religious observance or work-related purposes. I do not have concerns that these defences may be abused, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some assurances as to how he intends that this will not be the practical reality.

Clauses 119 and 120 provide for necessary safeguards and structures relating to the powers of Clause 118. They stipulate that designation must be time limited, based on a reasonable belief and authorised at an appropriate level. There are explicit requirements to notify the public of the designation, the nature of the offence and the period for which it applies. These safeguards are consistent with other provisions of the Public Order Act that relate to police powers to impose conditions on assemblies and processions.

Removing these clauses would make policing protests even more difficult, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. Offenders who attend protests with the primary intent to commit crimes, whether related to the protest topic or not, will be able to evade justice more easily. The vast majority of peaceful protesters are unfairly associated with disorder that they did not cause. Effective policing protects the right to protest by isolating and deterring criminal behaviour within it. For those reasons, we cannot support the stand part notices in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling her intention to remove Clauses 118 to 120. The Committee is aware of the purpose of those clauses. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, for the broad principle of the clauses.

I start by referring the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to the front page of the Bill. She will see that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint—which is me—has made the statement that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, which answers the first point that she put to me.

16:15

As someone who has been on protests, I want to commit the Government to upholding the right to peaceful protest, but it must be proportionate to the rights of others to live, work and travel without fear, intimidation or serious disruption.

I totally reject the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that somehow I am in a Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia by producing some limits on protest where there is criminal action taking place. It is perfectly reasonable for Parliament to determine legislation as to how and when protest is policed, so that the right to protest is upheld to the same point that the rights to enjoy life or to not have criminal activity are upheld.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so grateful to my noble friend the Minister for giving way. I am glad to hear him restate his commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights. He will know that that statement at the beginning of any Bill is not a certificate of compliance but a belief in the compliance of the contents of the Bill. I wonder whether my noble friend could help me understand whether there has been any assessment in the department of measures such as this in the hands of a future Government who do not share his commitment to human rights and how such powers might be used.

On the issue of having powers to limit expression when offences are taking place, as my noble friend said a couple of moments ago, I remind him that in Clause 119, which is the mechanism for designation, the test is not that offences are taking place; it includes preventing the possibility of offences. In relation to compliance, he will know that any limits on convention rights must be proportionate, yet the test for designation in Clause 119 is not proportionality but expedience. Can my noble friend help the Committee understand why the human rights language of proportionality has been substituted for the test of expedience?

Finally, can my noble friend say why protest has been singled out in this way and not, for example, carnivals, religious prayer vigils or other gatherings of people where they might conceal their identity?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There were a number of points there. If my noble friend will allow me, I intend to answer the points made during the course of the debate. I say to her straightaway that we have published our analysis of the ECHR obligations; I can refer her to it. I will ensure that if she does not have it to hand, I will send it to her. It is published and is available for that.

As I will come on to in a moment, the rights that we are seeking in this piece of legislation for protesters, the community, the Government and police forces are measured in a way that I believe is acceptable. In recent years, policing large-scale protests has posed significant challenges; the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to that. While most participants exercise their rights peacefully and lawfully, a small minority have engaged in criminal acts while concealing their identity. It is because the police have highlighted this issue with existing powers to identify those committing offences during protests that we have brought these issues forward. It is essential that the police can identify those committing offences during protests, not only to ensure accountability and justice but to protect peaceful demonstrators and the wider public from harm.

As a whole, Clauses 118 to 120 strike a careful balance. This will not apply to all protests. It applies only to protests that have been designated by a senior police officer of inspector rank or above. In addition, as was mentioned by a number of contributors to the debate, although the police currently have powers to remove face coverings in designated areas, they themselves have said to us—this goes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—that those measures are not always effective in the context of managing protests. People often comply but then replace a face covering later, which is difficult to monitor in large gatherings. The new offence addresses this by making it unlawful to wear a face covering once a locality has been designated by a police officer—not by a Minister or by the Government—in the light of upholding rights as a whole.

That senior police officer, who will be at least of the rank of inspector, must reasonably believe that a protest is likely to occur, that it is likely to lead to criminal behaviour—that is the critical point, which comes to the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others—and that it is necessary to act to prevent or reduce such offences. That is an important caveat, not the Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seems to—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

In a moment. It is not a Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia, me becoming Orwellian or the Government becoming Big Brother and being all-seeing. It is about potential criminal activity where a police officer—not the Government, this House or the House of Commons—determines that this action should be taken. If a police officer determines that that designation needs to occur at that space and time, that is a reasonable thing, allowing protests but also stopping criminal behaviour.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I simply want to ask him this question: how far have the Government stress-tested these clauses against the test posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti? Under the auspices of a future Government less benign than this Labour Government—whom I respect, and he knows that—to what extent has that stress-testing tested, for instance, how far the promotion of police officers to the rank of inspector may produce benign results, or how far the results could be Orwellian? I do not suggest that this Government are Orwellian. My suggestion is that there is potential, in these clauses as drawn, for bad consequences.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will say two things to the noble Lord in our defence. His presumption assumes that a police force in five years’ time will be dominated by right-wing Conservatives, Reform members or Socialist Workers Party members, who instruct the police force to instigate that designated area. I happen to believe— I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would agree with me—that the police are independent of government, they have integrity, and they determine policies based on legislation.

This does not give a police officer the power to be a political commissar, whether of right or left, but gives the police the power to say, “There is potentially criminal action in this designated space; therefore, in this space we need to ensure that we can remove face coverings”. If there is another Government who he fears in the future—all of us may fear different Governments of different authoritarian natures—I guess that they will have won an election and will have 400 or so Members of Parliament, and they can pass what the heck they like anyway.

Therefore, there is an argument to say to the noble Lord that his fears are undermining the integrity and the independence of the police force, and all I am doing in this legislation is giving the police the power to take action should they, as the police, determine that they want to do it.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned that it does not require someone to know they are committing the offence. Clause 119(2) requires the police to notify in writing that the designation has been made, the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period for which it applies. So it could even be a designation in writing for a limited time and in a limited place, but it is important that we do so.

A number of noble colleagues have raised religious and medical exemptions and further loopholes. The purpose of the new offence is, as I have said, to prevent protesters concealing their identity in order to avoid conviction for criminal activity in the designated place.

The measure does provide a reverse legal burden on the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they wore a face covering for work purposes, or religious or health reasons. But, as with any charge, that is a defence in the Bill, in the future Act, in law, that allows people to say, “I am a paint sprayer”, or that they were seeking to prevent illness that might cause further illness if they did not wear a mask, or that, potentially, they had a religious reason to wear a mask. That is a defence in the event of any charge being made. But, again, it is a defence at the time when the police officer might well say to an individual that that mask needs to be removed.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Be that as it may, what does the Minister say to people in all the other categories which are not mentioned in the clause as exemptions? People who have work reasons or marital reasons or whatever are not mentioned as exemptions; what do you say to them about attending protests? Are they just to avoid protests on that basis?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are designations that we have set down in law and there are designations that are not set down in law, but the measure is a proportionate one that the police can undertake, and in the event of an individual knowing that that is happening, they can accordingly take their own measures and decide to either protest or not protest. That does not curtail the right to protest.

The measure does not ban face coverings at every protest. An individual can go to a protest; they can wear a face covering for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, has outlined, and only if the police believe that criminal actions could be taken is that area designated. Then it is a matter for the individual, and I believe a majority of peaceful, legitimate protests will not be captured by this legislation, and the police must take great—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister is making a very powerful case but I ask him to focus on the defences which he has recognised. I do not understand why it is a defence for me to show that I wore a face mask because of my religion, but it is not a defence for me to prove, the onus being on me, that I wore a face mask because I was protesting against the Iranian regime and I have family in Iran.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes. We have drawn a line in the defences. I come back to the principle that the power to be used by the police officer, not the Government, is to determine this in the event of suspected criminality occurring.

There may not be, in the case that the noble Lord has mentioned, the need for that designation, because the police may make a judgment, which is their judgment to make, that a protest outside the Iranian embassy, for example, would not lead to potential criminal activity. That is the judgment that we are making. That is the line that we have drawn. I see the point that he has made, but that is the defence that I can put to him today. Because—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I very much support what the Minister is saying. The only question is: will the police have the power not to require this person to take his mask off if they accept his view that that would cause some danger to him or his family in Iran?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The exemptions in the Bill are very clear, and I have already talked about those that relate to religious, work or health reasons. Police officers will make a judgment on those issues on the ground and, as in the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, they have a significantly difficult job to do at any demonstration.

If I can give any comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, all the offences under the Bill are currently under review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, as part of the review that he is undertaking, to be completed by spring 2026. I have no doubt that he will pay close attention to the comments that are made in this debate and make an assessment to government about whether the points made by noble Lords are ones that he should reflect on. I would say to the Committee—

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I am astonished by that statement. Is the Minister saying that we should knowingly pass faulty legislation because we know that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will pick it up and sort it out later?

16:30

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord opposes the clauses; I do not. We have a difference of opinion on that. This is what Parliament is about. On Report we may have a vote on it. I have heard the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Blencathra, and others. I will seek their support in a Division and the House will determine what the House of Commons has already determined, which is whether those clauses are right or wrong for inclusion.

What I am saying is that, on all occasions, there are things that can be looked at and examined. If the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are worthy of consideration, we will have opportunities to have those reviewed, because the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is going to produce a report for the Home Secretary on protest generally. I cannot say what he is going to say or what recommendations he is going to make, or whether we will accept those recommendations. I simply say to the noble Lord today that I believe Clauses 118, 119 and 120 should stand. He does not. I believe that they are right and proper and effective and give powers to the police to do business in a co-ordinated way to prevent crime. There are points that have been made today which no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will reflect on. He may make recommendations to government accordingly, and we may make issues later on. But I say to him now, and to anybody else in the Committee, that these powers are ones that the police have asked for to ensure better policing to prevent crime. They are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, in my view. They are proportionate and they provide a mechanism to ensure that people at a protest who commit crimes do not commit those crimes without any understanding.

I will make one final point before giving way to my noble friend. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, also talked about facial recognition. He will know that, later on in this Bill, we will deal with issues to do with facial recognition. He will also know that the Government are currently undertaking a consultation on facial recognition, pending comments from anybody who wishes to make them and pending, therefore, better regulation of how any facial recognition is utilised in later legislation at some future point post this Bill. So, whatever concerns the noble Lord has on facial recognition, I believe it is still a valuable tool for policing, but we can examine them at some point downstream and there will be an opportunity to test his views versus the House’s at some point.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his detailed responses and for his patience in taking interventions. Could he in a moment deal with my point about why the word “expedient” has been used in Clause 119 rather than “proportionate”? He himself has talked of proportionality many times, and of course he will know that the test for lawful interference with convention rights is proportionality rather than expedience. And, in the light of comments made in this Committee by noble Lords such as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who does not oppose the provision outright, would he consider, between now and Report, adding an additional defence of fear of reprisal to the health provision, for example?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The wording in the Bill is the wording the Government have agreed. That is the position that we have taken. We may have a disagreement on that. If my noble friend wishes to put an amendment down on Report to change that wording, that is a matter for her. She has made a further suggestion about a further defence. Those are matters that I suggest should be considered by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If she wishes to expediate that quickly, she has the opportunity along with anybody else to table an amendment on Report. But the Government have given serious consideration to this and Clauses 118, 119 and 120 are the result of those considerations. They are at the request of the police, they are proportionate, and they are, in my view, compliant with human rights. I commend them to the House and in a gentle way urge the noble Baroness, either today or in the future, not to seek to withdraw them.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

I happen to support these clauses, but I have the same concern as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that this has been drawn rather too narrowly and there may be areas that may have to be considered.

Secondly, the noble Lord is quite right: the clauses give this power to the police to prevent crimes being committed. What happens if the police get it wrong? We all know what happened with the sus law and reasonable grounds to suspect: they suspected and stopped people again and again, and nothing was actually worth suspecting. I do not want an answer; I want the possibility of considering what will happen if the police get it wrong. We have the Birmingham question still; I do not want to talk about it, because there are inquiries going on. What measures does the noble Lord want to address the particular conundrum that is there?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I add this, to save time. I know people are trying to expand the number of conditions, but I would like us not to run away with the assumption that the work face mask makes sense. Intuitively, it does, but I do not understand the paint sprayer who is at a protest wearing their mask. They are either at the protest or at work; I am not sure why they are wearing the mask at the protest. I do not understand that juxtaposition, and it may be for the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to consider as well.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, time is pressing for the response, but that is largely due to interventions. I say to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that the main objective of the police in this process will be to ensure that there is a peaceful demonstration, with no trouble for the community at large. If the police overpolice an issue, that is potentially an area where trouble can commence. So I give the judgment to the police to do this in a proper and effective way.

A number of comments have been made, and we will always reflect on those comments, but I stick, particularly because of time, to the contention that the clauses should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I cannot tell you how much energy and self-control it has taken to stay seated, with all these interventions and comments. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his very kind comments and the photographs, which have obviously brought back a lot of very nice, happy memories. I thank him for that. The other aspect to my having to exercise loads of self- control in staying sitting down is that I get very agitated —very irritated, in fact—and I scribble all over the papers I have in front of me, which sometimes makes it difficult to reply fully. I am going to do my best, and I beg the patience of the House in allowing me to go through all my scribbles.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox, and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Marks, for their support. I am very grateful. Obviously, this is a day that will go in my diary: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, actually agreed with something I said. That is quite rare.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I did not necessarily agree that the Baroness, Lady Jones, should be mentioned in the same sentence as Martin Luther King and Emmeline Pankhurst—I just wanted to make that clear.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the noble Lord. I would like to say, by the way, that I did go to Aldermaston, but my first real protest was in 1968 when I was 18. I went on a CND rally, and it was peaceful—at least, I think it was; I cannot remember.

It is not difficult to counter the arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He talked about my being brave enough—perhaps he did not use the word “brave”—to go to protests without a mask, but, of course, I am a highly privileged white female and he is a highly privileged white male. It is not for us to say who might be vulnerable and who might not, and who might fear reprisals and who might not. Let us remember that there are people who live in fear of other people, and those people could easily be deterred from going to protests.

On the points from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the Minister, the fact is that the police have enough powers already. If they really are requesting this, surely the Government should have a little bit more pragmatism about what they are passing. The fact that the Minister is so happy that two Tories are supporting him is something I honestly find quite shocking. If they are the only people he can rouse to support him in your Lordships’ House, that really says something—and I do not mean for any of you to stand up and support him: it is not necessary.

On the issue of the police getting confused, because the legislation at the moment is very confused—there is so much of it—

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Too much.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Thank you. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, is absolutely right. For example, Steve Bray, the man who does all the loud Brexit protests in Parliament Square—

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

Lock him up.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I will thank Members on this side not to comment on my speech if possible.

Apparently last week the police tried to close Mr Bray down in spite of the court ruling that said that what he was doing was legal. They made, I am told, the absurd and fatuous claim that the judgment had been repealed. That is completely wrong; it is complete nonsense. That is what the police said. They are confused. I do not blame the police for that; I think that the law on protest has now reached such proportions that they really cannot be expected to stay up with what is happening. The Minister said that the police are going to make these decisions and that we have to trust the police and have lots of confidence in them, but if you make bad law, you are responsible and not the police. You are responsible for passing laws that are, first, unnecessary and, secondly, plain wrong. The police have to try to put that into practice, and that is not fair.

I think I might have said everything actually.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I think this is terrible; these clauses should be thrown out or should at least be rewritten, because they are not useful. They are not useful to people who are in genuine fear of their lives but who want to protest about something, and they are not useful for the police, who already have the powers. I asked in my opening speech whether the Minister could point me to the gap in legislation. If the police have really asked for these clauses, then they do not even know the legislation properly.

Very unwillingly—and I am glad the Minister suggested I bring this back on Report—I will withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 118 agreed.

Clauses 119 to 120 agreed.

Clause 121: Possession of pyrotechnic articles at protests

Amendment 369A

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

369A: Clause 121, page 149, line 32, at end insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of the defence in subsection (3), a person does not have a reasonable excuse by way of an honestly or sincerely held political belief, irrespective of the nature of the belief.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that a person cannot claim a reasonable excuse for the possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest because of a sincerely held political belief.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, ever since the Supreme Court ruled in the DPP v Ziegler in 2021, the state of public order and protest law in this country has been nothing less than a confused mess. As Policy Exchange noted in its report, ‘Might is Right?’, we have entered an era of increasingly disruptive protests. We have seen severe disruption from the likes of Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion and pro-Palestinian groups. My amendments together seek to restore clarity and proportionality to our public order law following the deeply troubling consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ziegler.

The starting point must be an uncomfortable truth: the law as it now stands has tilted too far in favour of those who seek to justify criminality and serious disruption on the basis of contentious political beliefs. That tilt did not arise from legislation passed by Parliament but from judicial interpretation. It has been Parliament’s clear intention to prevent such actions occurring in the name of protest—that is evident in the legislation that has been passed in recent years—but the will of Parliament has been, to at least some degree, undermined by the judiciary, most notably in the Ziegler ruling, which has elevated protest-related rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights above the practical ability of the state to prevent intimidation, obstruction and damage. I argue that the proportionality analysis mandated by the Human Rights Act 1998 has migrated from being a safeguard of last resort to being a routine defence for conduct that Parliament has plainly intended to criminalise.

In effect, the courts are being invited to weigh the importance of a cause against the harm done to the public. That is not the rule of law; it is moral relativism dressed up as jurisprudence. These amendments offer a direct and refreshingly simple response.

16:45

The first two amendments, Amendments 369A and 369B, would make it clear that

“an honestly or sincerely held political belief”

cannot constitute a “reasonable excuse” or “good reason” for the new offences of possession of pyrotechnics at protests or climbing on specified war memorials. These provisions speak to a wider principle: the law applies to all, and it cannot be overridden by the subjective beliefs of the offender, however passionately held. It does not matter if you think that your cause is more morally righteous than another’s, nor does it matter how sincerely you hold that belief. If you are committing criminal acts, you should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

The more substantive amendments, Amendments 382B and 382D, as well as Amendment 378B from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, address the heart of the problem exposed by Ziegler. Amendment 382B would reform the “lawful excuse” defence in the Criminal Damage Act 1971 so that it cannot be relied upon where damage is committed

“to intimidate, harass, inconvenience or … harm another person”

where it is justified solely by belief or where it is carried out in the course of a public protest. It would also restore an objective element to “belief”, requiring it to be “reasonable” as well as “honestly held”. That is a critical correction.

We have seen the impact of the current state of affairs in action. In October 2024, Manchester Magistrates’ Court cleared two Just Stop Oil activists who had glued themselves to a painting in the Manchester Art Gallery in 2022. The court ruled that they were not guilty because their actions were proportionate in the face of the climate crisis. How can this be? How can we allow the law to permit the commission of criminal offences simply because a person is concerned by climate change?

Amendment 382D goes further by removing the “reasonable excuse” defence altogether from a range of public order offences, including those introduced in the Public Order Act 2023. This is not radical; it is consistent. Parliament has already decided that conduct such as locking on, tunnelling and obstructing key infrastructure is inherently harmful. To then allow a broad, open-ended reasonable excuse defence is to invite precisely the kind of litigation and uncertainty that Ziegler has produced.

Noble Lords will recall that, during the Report stage of the Public Order Act 2023, a number of Peers, most notably the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the then Minister, my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, sought to introduce amendments to clarify and constrain these defences. Those debates revealed a shared concern across the House that complexity and judicial direction were undermining the effectiveness of the law. The amendments before us today pursue the same objective but in a more straightforward way. Rather than endlessly refining what counts as a reasonable excuse, they would remove that ambiguity altogether.

Turning to Amendment 369AA in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, I wholeheartedly agree with the reasoning that he has set out, and this is very much in line with the argument that I have put forward. There is no good reason to climb on a war memorial or a memorial of a past leader except for when the individual has the consent of the memorial’s owner. This exception is accounted for in Clause 122(2)(b) and (c), and so I see no reason for the extra defence in subsection (2)(a). Perhaps the Minister can clarify which other motives would count as a “good reason” for climbing on memorials.

Finally, we must confront the constitutional issue. The European Convention on Human Rights, as given domestic effect by the Human Rights Act, has come to operate as a break on Parliament’s ability to legislate decisively against disruptive protest. The balancing exercise required by Strasbourg jurisprudence is not neutral. It systematically favours protest activity even where it causes serious harm to others. These amendments would simply reassert Parliament’s right to draw clear boundaries in the public interest. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 382H, to which the noble Lords, Lord Godson and Lord Hogan- Howe, have added their names, covers the use in this area of the law of the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse in relation to public order offences.

As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, the law is in a state of incoherence at the moment. It is important, of course, that the law in this area adequately reflects the right to protest, about which there is no issue among any of your Lordships. It also must reflect the interests of third parties significantly affected by protests. The law must be sufficiently clear for the police to be able to know what their powers are and to exercise them sensibly and lawfully. Finally, the law has to be sufficiently clear that members of the public think that it reflects the various interests reasonably involved in the whole question of what lawful protest is and its limits.

The decision in Ziegler was, I think it is broadly accepted, a wrong turning by the Supreme Court; it is accepted by people across political persuasions. I too, like the noble Lord, Lord Davies, very much praise the long and persistent work of Policy Exchange to expose the shortcomings of that decision and the uncertainty it has created in terms of the application of the law. It is never easy for a court to decide what is a reasonable or lawful excuse, but the amendment we have put down assumes that there is sufficient evidence for there to be an offence in the first place. That is a significant rider, of course, but it also provides, in proposed subsection (2), that there is no excuse for the conduct if:

“(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or (b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage”.

What is perhaps somewhat unusual about this amendment, as opposed to the other amendments in the group, is subsection (5) of the proposed new clause, which says:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.


As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, the European convention and its incorporation in our law by the Human Rights Act has very much changed, or potentially changed, the analysis of all sorts of legal situations, particularly in this area. The common law provides that there are certain rights that we recognise, such as the right to free speech or freedom of association. But, as those of us who remember our legal lectures will be told, those rights exist only in so far as they are not made unlawful by some other intervention, either of the courts or of Parliament. Those rights do not trump anything but, none the less, nobody would doubt that we have freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

One of the problems about the European convention is that it states rights, and some of the rights are absolute and some of the rights are qualified, such as—relevant to this particular area of the law—Articles 10 and Articles 11. Therefore, it does not provide an absolute trump card that you can never, as it were, contravene a law on the basis that you have an absolute right to freedom of expression under Article 10 or a right to peaceful assembly under Article 11. In fact, the European court in Strasbourg has not said that it is not open to individual countries to decide what are reasonable limits of those rights.

Where I think Ziegler went seriously wrong was, as it were, ducking the issue by simply saying that, quite apart from what Parliament has said about reasonable excuse and the like, a particular court has to decide proportionality for itself, whether that is by a judge or a jury. In particular, paragraph 59 said:

“Determination of the proportionality … with ECHR rights is a fact-specific enquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.


With great respect, that is not very helpful for a court in deciding whether an offence has been committed or whether a defence is permitted in law.

In fact, I think it went too far because the European Court of Human Rights does not say that individual legislatures should not attempt to legislate by striking the balance, to reflect those matters that I referred to at the beginning of my remarks. For example, in the case of Laurijsen v Netherlands, in 2024, the court said that,

“physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention”.

In other words, Strasbourg does not say that Parliament cannot legislate in this space if it thinks it appropriate to reflect the various matters that are so important in deciding what the limits of lawful protest are.

My amendment—and I support other amendments in this group—would make the law a great deal clearer. It says that you should not invoke some vague notion of proportionality; you simply decide whether there is a lawful excuse, in accordance with the fairly straight- forward provisions we have contained in our amendment, and you may remove from your considerations any of the vagueness of proportionality that emanates from the European court at Strasbourg. That is because we can take it that Parliament has decided that, in all the circumstances, it has taken into account all those rights—whether they be rights of common law or rights in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights—and it has satisfied itself, just as the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, satisfied himself about this Bill, that it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. That is clarity; that is what this amendment seeks.

I imagine that the Minister may have in his notes, when responding to this group, the name of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. By the look on his face, I am not wrong about that. I greatly respect the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and am sure that he will come up with some extremely sensible suggestions. However, we know that the law is not in a good place at the moment and that protest is a particular feature—and why not at the moment, when there are, after all, so many things to protest about? We need the law to be clearer sooner than even the diligence of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, may produce. I therefore suggest that the Minister, who I know will be taking on board all the ideas in this space, should consider carefully whether we can remedy this wrong and make the law clearer, so that all involved in this sphere of law can know what the law is.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, the more I listen to the debate this afternoon, the more worried I am getting. It seems to me that, over recent years, we have successively tightened up regulations around protests, including quite peaceful protests, making it harder and harder for people to express publicly their deep concerns around a whole range of issues. I am not sure that we need more clarity; that is for judges and juries to determine on the details of a particular case. The whole principle of the jury system is that we are judged by our peers and that, if we have undertaken some activity which has brought us before the courts, it is for other people like us to determine on the particular instances. They can take into account the culture and context, in a way that is impossible to do by way of legislation. I am quite wary about over- specifying here. Sometimes clarity is not necessarily the best thing to achieve.

I have one final small point. A number of amendments in this group and others refer to processions. In the area I grew up in, the Whit Friday processions in Mossley and Saddleworth in Greater Manchester are a thing of beauty and a joy for ever. In whole towns and villages, many roads are closed for much of the day, clearly causing massive disruption to people who would otherwise be travelling on those through roads. I want some assurances from the Minister that there is no intention for Bill to be used to prevent traditional religious processions or other processions simply because they happen to close the road for a while.

I think of the procession in Liverpool city centre a few months ago, when that dreadful incident happened; I guess the bloke driving his car felt that his journey was being impeded. But people must have the right to hold their processions to celebrate the victories of their football teams—even in Liverpool, which, as a Mancunian, I struggle with—to have civic processions, football processions and, please, in Greater Manchester, religious processions. I would be grateful if the Minister could assure us that nothing in this Bill could be used to limit those kinds of peaceful, traditional celebrations and processions.

17:00

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The amendments in this group are motivated by understandable concern about the decision of the Supreme Court in the Ziegler case, which is [2021] UKSC 23. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Faulks, made powerful submissions relating to that case.

The Committee may wish to be reminded that the Supreme Court reconsidered the statements made in Ziegler in the abortion services case, which was [2022] UKSC 32. Further guidance on the issues in Ziegler was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, as the Lord Chief Justice in the Cuciurean case, which is [2022] 3 WLR 446. The Supreme Court said, in the abortion services case, that it is not for the jury or the magistrates in each individual case to assess whether the conduct of the defendant is protected by human rights law. That was the concern, as I understand it, of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that that is highly desirable, but that is not the law.

In the abortion services case, in paragraphs 63 to 66, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, who is the President of the Supreme Court, spoke for a seven person Supreme Court. It was an enlarged court because of the importance of the issue. He addressed the principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, said at paragraph 63:

“The first question was whether, in a case where the exercise of rights under articles 9 to 11 of the Convention is raised by the defendant to a criminal prosecution, there must always be an assessment of the proportionality of any interference with those rights on the facts of the individual case. The answer is no”.


In paragraph 64, he said:

“The second question was whether, where an offence is liable to give rise to an interference with the exercise of rights under articles 9, 10 or 11 of the Convention, it is necessary for the ingredients of the offence to include (or be interpreted as including) the absence of reasonable or lawful excuse in order for a conviction to be compatible with the Convention rights. The answer is no”.


Paragraph 65, says:

“The third question was whether it is possible for the ingredients of an offence in themselves to ensure the compatibility of a conviction with the Convention rights under articles 9, 10 and 11. The answer is yes”.


The position under the law is that the prosecution will say that Parliament has enacted a specific offence; that is the law of the land, and it is simply not open to the defendant to say that they are entitled to seek to overturn the ingredients of the offence by reference to convention rights. The law of the land is set out in the criminal offence. Therefore, respectfully, much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law—notwithstanding Articles 9 to 11 of the convention.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in this group. First, I say to the right reverend Prelate that the peaceful religious processions that he had in mind, such as those at Easter, were not the sort of processions that the chief constable of Greater Manchester Police had in mind when he recently said something to the effect of him having seen an appalling increase in aggro and violence in demonstrations, and that:

“The intolerable has become normalised”.


That is quite different from the peaceful processions that the right reverend Prelate had in mind.

Before I turn to my amendments, I want to say how much I enjoyed the Minister’s winding-up speech in the previous debate. He was in absolutely top form, especially in his demolition of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I suspect that most of the best bits in his speech were not written by his officials; I shall treasure them. I hope that I do not become a victim of such a wonderful oration against me.

I have two amendments in this group. The first is quite small, simple and titchy, and the second is slightly more complicated.

Clause 122(2) says:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they—


(a) had a good reason for climbing on the specified memorial,


(b) were the owner or occupier of the specified memorial, or


(c) had the consent of the owner or occupier”


to do so. My first amendment would delete the general excuse of having a “good reason”. The only defences left for a person charged with an offence under Clause 122 would be that they were the owner or occupier of the memorial or had the consent of the owner or occupier to climb on it. I wonder about “occupier”; I presume that that is to cover memorials that are not just statues but buildings, such as the Hall of Memory in Birmingham. I would be grateful for a slight elucidation on what is meant by the occupier of a memorial.

I turn to the proposed new clause in my Amendment 378B. It is simple in principle but looks a bit complicated. It simply reproduces the operative test, as well as the definition of “community”, in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023 and would put them in the Bill, giving them primary law status. This would improve legal certainty and parliamentary scrutiny.

Many clauses in the Bill, and many of the amendments, speak of

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

We may conclude from this that the disruption must be pretty serious indeed to qualify as “serious”. However, that is not the case since the previous Government passed the 2023 regulations, which defined and, some commentators would say, diluted the concept of serious disruption.

In plain terms, my proposed new clause would place in the Bill all the illustrative examples and interpretive tests introduced in the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations. As I suggested, those regulations make amendments to provisions in the Public Order Act 1986 concerning the meaning of the expression

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Section 12 of the Act gives the police the power to impose conditions on people organising and taking part in public processions. A senior police officer can exercise this power if they reasonably believe that a procession may result in

“serious disruption to the life of the community”.

Serious disruption to the life of the community is not defined in the Act itself, but Section 12(2A) sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute serious disruption.

The 2023 regulations refine that list. The amendments to Section 12(2A) and (2B) of the Act also provide that, when considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption, a senior police officer must take into account the disruption that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held, as well as the disruption that may result from the procession, and may take into account the cumulative disruption that may be caused by more than one public procession or public assembly in the same area. The amendments also provide that the term “community” extends to anyone who may be affected by the public procession regardless of whether they live or work in the vicinity of the procession. They state that “disruption” is anything

“that is more than minor”,

in particular to

“the making of a journey”

or access to goods and services. The regulations define this as

“access to any essential goods or any essential service”,

including access to

“the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a place of worship … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service relating to health”.

That is what the regulations say in redefining

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

in the Act. Although my amendment looks complicated, it simply suggests that those regulations should be incorporated into the Bill as primary legislation. Transferring the regulations into the Bill would bring legal clarity—the police, courts and organisers would read the statutory test directly from the Act rather than a separate statutory instrument, reducing uncertainty about where the operative tests are located. It would mirror the stated purposes of the 2023 regulations to provide greater clarity. It would bring consistency of application—putting the tests in primary legislation would reduce the risk of interpretive divergence between different SIs or guidance and make the threshold for imposing conditions more visible to Parliament and the public. The cumulative effects would be preserved—the clause could, and should, reproduce the regulations’ treatment of cumulative effects so that multiple impacts are properly captured, as the regulations already contemplate cumulative assessment.

Of course, the Minister will say that embedding illustrative examples in primary law makes future policy adjustments harder and might require primary legislation and time to respond to unforeseen operational guidance. However, I suggest that retaining my proposed new clause, to secure clarity and parliamentary oversight but add a short delegated powers safeguard—a power to change it in future by regulations—would be perfectly okay.

I support Amendment 369A on pyrotechnics at protests tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower on the Front Bench, but it does not go far enough. I cannot think of any lawful excuse for possessing pyrotechnic articles while taking part in a protest. Protests are a vital part of our democratic life. They are a place for voices to be heard, grievances to be aired and change to be sought. But they are not a place for devices that can cause panic, injury or irreversible escalation. Pyrotechnics are designed to startle, burn, explode and smoke; they are not tools of peaceful persuasion. To allow a defence based on an honestly held political belief risks turning lawful protest into a dangerous theatre of risk and fear. Public safety must be paramount.

There are a few other things I could say about pyrotechnics at protests, but I will cut short my remarks in the interests of time. I see no justification whatever for anyone to have pyrotechnics at any protest or for there to be a lawful defence for it.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support and have added my name to Amendment 382H. I also support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. My support is based on the concerns over and consequences of the Ziegler case. Noble Lords have said today that it was wrong in law, but that is not for me to say. The policy consequences for policing the streets of this country have been profound and negative, particularly in the area of public protest and disorder policing.

The Ziegler case was one of the simplest offences to prove in the criminal law. It was an offence of wilful obstruction of the highway. There were only three parts to prove; it was wilful, it was obstruction and they were on a highway. That was the offence, and it is one of the simplest we have policed over the years. It became complex only when people alleged that there was a reasonable excuse—for which read “a political purpose”—for their obstruction of the highway.

In the past, all the police needed to prove was that it was a highway—which is well established in law—that it had been obstructed and, usually, that they had asked someone to move on and they had either returned or not moved. That was about as complicated as it was. But as soon as you have to import intent, recklessness or reasonable excuse, the offence starts to become more complex and the police have to think carefully before intervening. I know that in this House people sometimes talk about the police being careless with the law, reactive and reactionary—I am not talking about any individual; I am just saying, as a general comment, that it has been said—but my experience is that, on the whole, they try to get it right and to balance everybody’s rights, often in very difficult circumstances.

My reading of Ziegler is that the Supreme Court seemed to say that dealing with obstruction of the highway is far too simple when dealing with protesters—that it is okay for everybody else but for protesters it gets a little more complicated. The Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of the convention rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association, sometimes grouped together as the right to protest, constituted a lawful excuse, which means that before a person can be convicted for obstructing the highway, the prosecution must prove that a conviction would be a proportionate, and thus justified, interference with that person’s convention rights. The Ziegler judgment has caused very real difficulties for police in dealing with environmental and many other protests and, I argue, for judges in attempting to run trials fairly and efficiently and instruct juries about what must be proved.

17:15

In a courtroom, or occasionally in this Chamber, this discussion can produce many hours of pleasure. But in producing laws, we have to consider the officers who have to apply them and the circumstances in which they do so. When policing protests, officers are often outnumbered; in fact, if they outnumber the protesters, they are accused of intimidatory behaviour. The protesters believe sincerely and passionately in their cause and that the only people preventing them achieving their aim are the police—although in all cases I would argue that it is preferable for the police to make the interventions and the challenge, rather than the people on the other side of the argument or the general public. Quite often, members of the general public are offended not by the cause of the protesters but by their methods, which members of the public believe to be a nuisance. So it is better that the police deal with this rather than everybody else, who may have got quite emotive about the situation at the time.

I am afraid that not all protesters are sober, reflective and balanced in their views or behaviour, and more and more the police are recorded in every aspect of their decision-making. I do not think that is a bad thing; it is just the way in which life has progressed. Yet in the middle of this volatile situation, the officer is now expected to weigh up the rights of a protester against the rights of a citizen to go about their life in the usual way. In my view, that has led to senior police officers allowing sit-down protests to continue because there is an alternative route for traffic.

Noble Lords might remember that a ship was built in Oxford Circus at one stage, and it stayed there for weeks. It is one of those things where, now that we are no longer in the roles that we were in then, you wonder why the heck somebody did not move that ship. You are left wondering how it got there. Did somebody bring it on the Tube? If we put that to one side, we have had protests outside mosques; we have had services outside mosques when it was said that there were too many people in the place of worship and they had to block the street. I do not think that was accurate, but that is what happened. We have had various examples where the police have tried to balance those rights and have been left in rather a confused position.

Sometimes the exercise of police discretion is reasonable, if the impact on the local community is minimal. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester mentioned that sometimes there are very serious disruptions that we all accept, such as Remembrance Day and religious parades. I point out that the Orange parade in Liverpool, which he mentioned in passing, had various aspects over the years, many of which I am afraid were very violent. So sometimes some of those things have to be looked at in a slightly different way.

It leaves the police having to worry about whether ambulances and the fire brigade can get through, rather than the protesters worrying about their criminal liability in preventing emergency service access. For me, the impact of this decision has been paralysing for senior officers, and in turn for officers on the ground who are dealing with protests. They have been criticised for not taking action on what I would say is the most blatant of obstructions—and I have given a couple of examples—or the most intimidating behaviour. They are genuinely trying their best to balance human rights, the rights of the protesters to protest and the rights of everyone else to enjoy their lives uninterrupted, but they cannot always do that easily when faced by howling protesters.

I mention in passing, as I mentioned last week, that the Human Rights Act has a preamble that mentions human responsibilities—everybody forgets it. There is no enforceability to it—to our responsibility to each other to maintain a good society, and the positive things that we all ought to be doing for each other. There is something in this, when thinking about how protesters have to consider not only their own rights but the rights of other people to enjoy their privileges and rights while just enjoying their life.

The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, asked what happens if the police get it wrong. Generally, what happens is that protesters can go to civil law, they can ask for injunctions and they can go to criminal law, if the officers have breached the law. So remedies are available. What is happening at the moment is that we are all losers, and it needs to be remedied.

I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that perhaps the Supreme Court on a couple of occasions has tried to give better clarity. The problem for the cops is that they do not easily understand how Supreme Court decisions and judgments pan out. That is why we have law: to articulate what the Supreme Court has sometimes made clear to itself but does not always make clear enough for officers on the ground. The fact that the court needed to remedy it indicates that perhaps there is a gap in the law that the Government might want to remedy now. This is a great opportunity to provide clarity, which I argue that Amendment 382H would do.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to commend the noble Lords who have brought this amendment. I add my praise and gratitude for Policy Exchange in having led the charge on this. I benefited greatly from Richard Ekins’s report in producing my own review, which was published in May last year. One of the recommendations of my review was for the then Government—it falls now to this Government—to set out a clear plan to move on and clarify after the Ziegler judgment. There have been a number of pertinent cases since then. The Court of Appeal’s ruling on the Colston statue case has, in my understanding, made it clear that this is not an unqualified defence. Nevertheless, it has left a level of confusion, for magistrates and for the police, over more minor but still significant criminal damage, such as spraying paint on statues or throwing soup over a painting. This situation is highly complex and difficult for the police and the courts to navigate now. Leadership from the Government and Parliament is needed to put the matter right.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I find myself in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and in particular I draw attention to the excellent work of Professor Ekins and Policy Exchange in this area.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, observed in his opening remarks in respect of Amendment 382H, it is plain that the Supreme Court took a wrong turn in the Ziegler case. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, notes that a number of subsequent cases have touched on the finding in Ziegler and come to an apparently inconsistent conclusion, the most notable of those being DPP v Cuciurean and the Bristol Colston statue case. As the noble Lord, Lord Walney, observes, the Court of Appeal in that case found that the Ziegler judgment had prominently spilled over into trials concerning criminal damage. The Court of Appeal, in its criminal context, made it clear that the defence of lawful excuse was not available in that context, and that sits uneasily with the Supreme Court’s findings in Ziegler.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pre-eminent member of the Bar that he is, says that the law is tolerably clear and should survive with the embellishments of the subsequent cases. I am afraid that, in this context, for the reasons so ably set out by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, that is not adequate for the purposes of either the protesters or the police.

In my submission, Amendment 382H is a model amendment, in that it is clear and brief, and sets out with admirable clarity what it is seeking to do. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that it would apply, across the gamut of all offences which contain a lawful excuse provision, the words,

“the excuse must be a lawful excuse or … must be a reasonable one”.

There are many areas across the canon of criminal law that can be engaged with protest that may give rise to this, thus the application of this amendment would be wide-ranging and provide considerable clarity.

Amendment 382H sets out, in proposed new subsection (2), when it is no excuse, and does so with great clarity. I submit that the various judges trying these cases would be greatly aided when making decisions in summary offences and when giving directions to juries on this area in the light of this amendment.

Finally, in proposed new subsection (5), the amendment directly addresses the provision in the Human Rights Act, which takes into account whether or not this is the exercise of a qualified right and provides that this provision is necessary in a democratic society. It therefore sits happily with the human rights arrangements, so ably highlighted by the Minister in his closing speech on the last group. For those reasons, I hope that this amendment is brought back on Report. I, for one, will heartily support it.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the War Memorials Trust. I am grateful to the Government for including Clause 122 in the Bill and what I have to say goes to my noble friends’ Amendments 369A and 369B.

I have some quick questions for the Minister. First, where can I find the Government’s definition of a war memorial? It is clearly important that there is one. Secondly, I make the point that certain war memorials are specifically designed as immersive experiences or paths people can walk or even climb on—examples are the Carnoustie war memorial and the tomb of the unknown warrior. Can I assume that the walker or climber will have to rely on the defence that he or she had the consent of the owner or occupier of the war memorial? Thirdly, on Clause 122, I ask the Minister— I know we will come to this in more detail in due course—why Schedule 12 is confined to 24 war memorials, which I think are simply the top 24 from the national heritage list. He will know that there are tens of thousands of war memorials across the UK and that many more than 24 are very important and in prominent positions, and therefore arguably just as vulnerable as those listed in Schedule 12.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

I raise a point on Amendment 378B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. Unless I have missed something in that lengthy amendment, the effect of it might well be to interfere with the exercise of the right to picket in an industrial dispute. The right to picket is protected by Section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act and, in a lawful industrial dispute, by Section 219. I doubt that that was the intention of the mover of the amendment. Is it possible to have some clarity on that point?

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is my intention, and I believe it is the case—possibly the Minister will confirm—that my amendment would not change one iota. It would simply incorporate all the current regulations from the 2023 regulations and move them verbatim into the Bill, making it a primary case. It would not change any of the provisions at all. If there are technical drafting issues then they can be corrected later, but there is no intention to change any of the concept.

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments and will speak to a point that comes up in Amendment 378B. Because it arises in 378B, I am raising it now, but it affects the subsequent amendments in the next few groupings, particularly my amendments. It all flows from Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986.

Essentially, there is some concern that so much discretion will be left to the police. It is clear that, for one reason or another, the police have not been effective in controlling protesters to date. Noble Lords may have seen the video clip on social media showing Gideon Falter, CEO of the Campaign Against Antisemitism, being told by police he was “quite openly Jewish”, and therefore causing a breach of the peace.

We are in the middle of assessing the appalling decisions by the West Midlands police, who consulted a large number of mosques, including some very radical ones that housed an imam who stated that women should not leave their home without their husband’s permission. These people were consulted on whether or not Israeli tourists should be allowed to visit the West Midlands. The police claimed they had consulted the Jewish community in the area: that was not true. It is clear they realised that the Israeli tourists would be in danger, but they decided to ban them from coming on the false excuse that they would be the aggressors. So they turned the victims into the guilty ones.

Your Lordships may have seen another video clip— on Friday or Sunday night—outside an Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill called Miznon. There were some very aggressive and intimidating protesters and the police simply stood there. There may have been one arrest, but that was it. So innocent employees, eaters, diners and members of the public faced a very unpleasant situation.

17:30

One can only hope that Chief Constable Guildford leaves his post soon. Meanwhile, I remind your Lordships that these clauses all amend the Public Order Act 1986, which was written a long time ago. Section 12 empowers the senior police officer—who is defined as

“the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene”—

to make the decisions about protests. There is some unease from some people about giving them that power. So I ask the Minister reflect on whether that is still the appropriate person to make the final decision, given the recent behaviour of some police officers, albeit a very small minority, and to be given total discretion on taking action?

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue of Miznon and Erev in Notting Hill. There have been a number of protests outside that restaurant, which is actually on my street. The owners of the restaurant and the residents who use it, including me, have been subjected to the vilest form of antisemitism, and the police have done nothing.

So I support this and will ask the Minister a number of questions about it. It is not enough to say that the senior officer should be responsible for this; much clearer principles and rules are needed around what is and is not acceptable, if the police are evidently—based on recent events—not capable of exercising that judgment themselves. So I support this and hope that the Minister will take it seriously.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will confine what I say to a few points in response to some of the speakers we have heard from.

I found myself in considerable agreement with the general concerns about balance expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. It seems to me that, in some of the consideration of these clauses, we have lost sight of what we agreed in Committee last week. Everybody agreed that questions for the courts and others about considering breaches of public order law—as well as the introduction of new public order provisions—do raise the question of balance between, on the one hand, the right to protest and, on the other, the rights and freedoms of others.

I will resist the temptation to respond in detail to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in spite of his claim that he relished the Minister’s demolition of my arguments about stress-testing this legislation for the future and not relying on the benign intentions of this Government. I have concerns about the noble Lord’s amendments; I am sure that the Minister will deal with them. They include questions about what “serious disruption” is and what should amount to “essential services” within the meaning of the Act, as well as he whole question of cumulative disruption, to which we will turn later.

Those concerns—and the Minister’s comments in the previous group on the publication of the review of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven—raise an important issue about the timing of this legislation, compared with the timing of the noble Lord’s expected report. I share the confidence that he will consider all these issues with great care, but might it not have been better had the review come first and the introduction of this legislation and its consideration in this House come second? From what the Minister said in his speech on the previous group, I take it that it is the Government’s present intention to give further consideration to public order law in the light of the noble Lord’s expected report. If that is the case—and if that attention will be given objectively and carefully, and then lead to such legislation as is necessary—that may be the best we can do with the timing that we have now. But my comments stand about the order in which this has been done stand.

I turn to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I do not propose to give him many hours of pleasure in listening again to arguments about balance as a matter of law; however, I do repeat the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, about how confident he is that police officers, including senior police officers, always get the balance right. That is a difficult assertion to make or defend. I am not suggesting that he went as far as that, but it is very important, not only for the Government but for us as parliamentarians, to consider the possibility that police officers sometimes fail to get the balance right.

I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made that it is often a very difficult balance to strike. We need to be very careful in commenting on how the police should strike it and not place too much confidence in the police in the future and, in particular, in the event of changes in government that, as the noble Lord recognised, might be unwelcome to many of us. Nevertheless, they could be changes of an elected Government.

That brings me to Amendment 382H, which was welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, and elegantly presented by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I will draw the Committee’s attention to one problem. Proposed new subsection (5) is not simply definitional; it is designed to act—and would act, in some sense—as an ouster for the purposes of domestic courts of the effect of the convention rights. It uses the language of Article 11 when it states:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.


Article 11 requires that the rights that are respected

“are necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

If Parliament legislates that a section must be treated as necessary, it precludes within this jurisdiction any testing of the proposition that such provisions, as interpreted, are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. That is the province of the European Court of Human Rights to consider. It is a requirement of the Human Rights Act that domestic courts here give effect to the European convention and interpret legislation, where they can, as compatible with the convention.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

Of course, this is an amendment, so the Government will not have given the certification of compliance with the European convention. Were the Minister to accept the amendment and it to become part of the Bill, the Government could then certify that it did comply with the European convention and it would be unnecessary to put that particular provision in. But, as an amendment, it is making clear that that particular provision takes into account that there are convention rights and, notwithstanding those convention rights, the amendment is to have the effect that it does.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, that is a complicated justification of the inclusion of that subsection in the amendment. I just about understand what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is saying there. But were his amendment to be accepted, it would raise difficulties about the compliance or cohesion of that amendment with the European Convention on Human Rights. I leave the point there. It is for the Minister to deal with it. If he says he can accept the amendment, subject to later adjustment to take out that subsection, so be it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I will try to respond to what has been a wide but, at the same time, restricted debate, if that makes sense.

The amendments deal principally with the reasonable excuse defences applicable to various public order and criminal damage-related offences. Amendments 369A and 369B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which had the support of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and others, would exclude a political belief from being considered a reasonable excuse or good reason under the new offences in Clauses 121 and 122.

My view is that this would narrow the scope of the statutory defences and reduce flexibility for the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to consider individual circumstances, particularly given that political belief is a broad and loosely defined concept and not a term commonly used in legislation. The lack of clarity could create uncertainty in its application.

The amendments would also have wider operational implications. By prescribing what cannot constitute a defence, the amendments limit the discretion of the courts, the CPS and the police to make case-by-case judgments. This is important because it could restrict the operational independence of the police, the prosecutors and the judiciary, which must weigh factors such as motive and proportionality when deciding to take enforcement action or to prosecute. That goes to the heart of the noble Lord’s amendments, but the Government consider that the current provisions are sufficient and proportionate, and the defences, as drafted, ensure that enforcement and prosecution decisions are made proportionally and in line with the important human rights legislation and obligations that we adopt and accept.

Amendment 369AA, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—and I thank him for his comments—would remove the good reason defence in Clause 122. I say to the noble Lord simply that this defence is intended to cover circumstances which are also important. For example, it could be that someone needs to climb on a specified memorial to repair or clean it. We should not be criminalising people in such circumstances, but the acceptance of that amendment would mean that could, in theory, be the case.

Amendment 382D in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to remove the reasonable excuse defence available to individuals charged with specific offences under the Public Order Act 2023 and Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. These offences include locking on to an object, tunnelling, or interfering with key national infrastructure. Again, the Government are of the view that the reasonable excuse defence is necessary in these instances to ensure an appropriate balance between protecting the wider community and the right to protest.

17:45

Amendment 382H, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and supported in name by the noble Lord, Lord Godson, and in speech by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, today, similarly seeks to extend the limit to the application of lawful or reasonable excuse defences in the public order context. The amendment would provide that any such defence will not cover conduct which is

“intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”,

or conduct designed to put people or property at risk of loss or damage. The noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, also supported that proposal.

As with the comments I have made on Amendment 382D, the Government are not persuaded that this amendment is needed. Public order offences have been developed to ensure that those reasonable excuse defences apply only when appropriate and respect the need to balance the right to protest with the ability of the police to manage potential disruption to communities, and unlawful behaviour.

Amendment 382B from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to amend the operation of the lawful excuse requirement under Section 5 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. I hope I can be helpful by explaining that the requirement is part of the various offences of criminal damage. It is already limited so that a person is automatically treated as having a lawful excuse only under two specific circumstances. The first is that the defendant honestly believes that the person who was entitled to consent to the damage has given consent or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances. That might seem convoluted, but, for example, it could be the honest belief that the owner of a car in which a child was locked on a hot day consented or would have consented to the defendant smashing the window to get the child out. That is an example I just wish to place before the Committee.

The second is if the defendant acts to protect their own or someone else’s property; for example, if a person damages another person’s property while accessing the property to prevent a fire. Again, they are limited sections, but it does give reason to whether the person’s belief in those circumstances is reasonable or justified. It just needs to be honest. I do not doubt that noble Lords would think that the actions I described in those circumstances would be entirely within the realm of lawful excuse.

Amendment 382B seeks to limit the lawful excuse defence in cases where a person’s actions intend to intimidate, harass, inconvenience or harm people. As the law currently stands, there is no suggestion that someone can have a lawful excuse to damage property if they did so with the intention to intimidate, harass or harm another person. The excuse, after all, has to be lawful. It is difficult to think of a scenario where damaging property with such malicious intent would fulfil this criterion.

In addition, the amendment seeks to disapply the lawful excuse defence in cases where someone has

“an honestly or sincerely held belief, irrespective of the nature of that belief”.

The amendment then states that any belief must be “honestly held and reasonable”. I suggest to noble Lords that these two provisions are at odds with each other and would only add uncertainty to the operation of the law.

Finally, the amendment seeks to ensure that there can be no lawful excuse for criminal damage committed in the course of a public protest. The right to freedom of association is a fundamental cornerstone of our democracy, along with the right to free speech. The law does not allow wanton criminal damage in furtherance of political aims, and the lawful excuse requirements have been carefully crafted to ensure this so that it applies in the specific circumstances that I have outlined.

The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, and other noble Lords mentioned the incident in Notting Hill recently, with protests outside a restaurant. I just say with, I hope, helpful clarity to the noble Baroness that the potential offences of harassment or inciting violence may or may not have been applicable in that case, but it is for the police on the ground to make a judgment about the action they wish to invoke in that circumstance. I do not wish to second-guess the police on those issues at this point, but the potential is there for complaints to be made to the police if any of those offences took place.

In answer to noble Lords who questioned the “good reason” defence at Clause 122(2)(a), “good reason” covers unforeseeable offences such as, for example, the removal of a flag that has been inappropriately put on a site but where the person may not have had the permission of the owner at the time.

On the definition of serious disruption, which the right reverend Prelate mentioned, serious disruption to the life of a community is set out in Section 12(2A) of the Public Order Act 1986, so there is clarity about what it means. Again, a judgment is made on issues such as Remembrance Sunday or wakes or religious festivals, where, although there may be serious disruption, it is not in the spirit of the legislation to date. To date, I can think of a handful of occasions when the Public Order Act 1986 has been invoked, such as the case that the right reverend Prelate mentioned during Remembrance Sunday, so I hope that the legislation has stood the test of time. That goes to the points that noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, mentioned.

The Court of Appeal has already held that the only relevant circumstances are those that relate to the circumstances of the damage or destruction, not to broader political matters. For example, the political beliefs of those protesting are not to be taken into consideration when the offence has occurred. The relevant belief must be held by the defendant at the time of the event, and it must be that the owner consented or would have done so at the time, rather than as a result of the damage.

Finally, Amendment 378B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to amend Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to reintroduce the “more than minor” definition of serious disruption from the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023, which were quashed by the Court of Appeal in May 2025 following a judicial review, which noble Lords referred to. The Government have acknowledged the finding of the court and consider the cumulative disruption provision as provided for in government Amendment 372 to be a proportionate response to provide the police with the powers they need, all of which—I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who anticipated that I might say this—are of course subject to consideration by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, as part of his review.

We have also had some discussion, which I just want to touch on briefly, about the term “occupier” and whether that covers memorials which are not just statues but buildings such as halls of memory. The terms “owner” and “occupier” take their usual legal meaning, whereby the occupier may be in possession of the memorial or the land on which the site is positioned but not the legal owner: for example, a tenant who has permission to use the land on which the memorial is situated and has responsibility for maintaining the memorial. Some statues are privately owned. Where the statue is on public land, there may not be a clear owner. The occupier could, for example, be a local authority in that case. The defences would cover, for example, a contractor appointed by the owner to clean and repair a memorial, to climb on the memorial for those purposes. Under Clause 122,

“‘memorial’ means a building … or any other thing, erected or installed on land … which has a commemorative purpose”.

I also just want to touch briefly on the point that the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, made. We will come to it later in further consideration, but it is important that we examine what a war memorial is. The position is that we have listed the ones here because those 25 are the ones that are currently grade 1 listed memorials, and that is why the Home Secretary has added the Winston Churchill statue in Parliament Square over and above that. That is why there are those specific war memorials, but I will happily again return to that in further consideration on the Bill.

“Memorial” refers to publicly accessible structures on a site of national significance that has a commemorative purpose. Initially, this included the 25 war memorials designated as grade 1 listed by Historic England, such as the Cenotaph and the Royal Artillery Memorial. The scope has been expanded to the statue of Winston Churchill in Parliament Square because we have seen demonstrations there. The Home Secretary has also publicly committed that this will include the national Holocaust memorial, which will shortly be built near Parliament Square, and the national Muslim war memorial. That is the initial designation. There are very strict criteria, but they can be reviewed in due course.

I hope that the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, may well assess further whether the powers existing in the 1986 Act are still fit for purpose. As I said, if there are any recommendations from the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, the Government will consider them, and there will be further opportunities potentially if we agree to legislate at a later date, but not within the Bill. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in what has been an interesting, complex—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister responded to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, and their understandable concerns about the protests outside the Israeli-owned restaurant in Notting Hill by saying that this is a matter for the police. Have the Government no position on whether it is acceptable for people who are dining in an Israeli-owned restaurant to be subject to abuse and intimidation of the sort that we have seen on London streets?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord did not take my comments in that vein. It is completely unacceptable for individuals to have their lives disrupted by that level of protest, but it is for the police on site to determine. I was not there on the night; I did not witness the protest. I read about the concerns prior to today, and during the course of this debate I have examined again the reports that have occurred. But it is for a police officer on site to determine. Under existing legislation, there are offences of harassment, of inciting violence and other offences and, as the noble Lord knows, because we have debated this at Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill to ensure that people can, with the police, determine a protest route and the regularity of a protest as part of the proposals in this legislation. I am not ducking the question; it is important that people have the right to live their lives in freedom, and to enjoy a restaurant meal. But I cannot be the police on the night, determining whether the offences that are potentially covered currently by law are exercised by the police. I hope the noble Lord will accept the comments that I have made. With that, I invite the noble Lord not to press the proposed amendments, and to revisit them should he so wish.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to those who have supported my amendments and even to noble Lords who disagreed with them, because this discussion has laid down the real issue before us: who decides where the limits of protest lie —Parliament or the courts?

Much of the criticism rests on the claim that removing reasonable excuse defences is somehow draconian. I profoundly disagree. I say to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that peaceful protest remains fully protected. These amendments address not expression but coercion, not persuasion but disruption, not dissent but deliberate law-breaking carried out in the expectation that the courts will excuse it after the fact.

That expectation is not hypothetical. It is precisely what flowed from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ziegler. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his interpretation of the law as it stands, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, for his further clarification. The Ziegler decision has encouraged protesters to view arrest as a tactical step, confident that they can later invoke proportionality, sincerity of belief and human rights arguments to defeat prosecution. We saw this with a recent case, whereby Just Stop Oil protesters threw powder paint at the historic Stonehenge. They were acquitted, of course, on all counts. The result is uncertainty for the police, frustration for the public and an erosion of respect for the law.

Noble Lords may agree that the answer lies in better guidance or more nuanced drafting, but we have been down that road. The debates on the Public Order Act 2023, particularly those led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, were an earnest attempt to clarify the law while retaining reasonable excuse defences, but Labour denied the opportunity to do so. The outcome has been complexity layered upon complexity, and still the courts are left to decide case by case whether obstruction, damage, or intimidation was worth it, given the cause advanced.

18:00

The amendments before the Committee offer a cleaner solution. They would remove the invitation to judicial moral balancing and replace it with clear rules set by Parliament. They say plainly that political belief does not justify criminal damage, the desecration of memorials, the use of pyrotechnics, or the obstruction of the public highway and critical infrastructure.

As for the repeated invocation of the European Convention on Human Rights, we should be honest with ourselves. The convention and the Human Rights Act that incorporates it have increasingly constrained Parliament’s ability to respond to new forms of protest that are deliberately designed to maximise disruption.

This is about ensuring that the strongest, loudest or most disruptive do not prevail simply because they are willing to break the law and then litigate. In that sense, these amendments are a distinct and necessary corrective to the outcome of Ziegler. Whether noble Lords agree that my amendments are the correct approach or not, what is evident is the unsustainability of the current position. It is regrettable that the Government do not accept my arguments and support my amendments in this group. On that basis, I suggest that we will return to this on Report, but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 369A withdrawn.

Clause 121 agreed.

Clause 122: Climbing on memorials

Amendments 369AA to 369B not moved.

Clause 122 agreed.

Amendment 370

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

370: After Clause 122, insert the following new Clause—
“Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructureAfter section 8 of the Public Order Act 2023 (key national infrastructure) insert—“8A Causing serious disruption to road transport infrastructure(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) they do an act which causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to—(i) two or more individuals, or(ii) an organisation,in their use or operation of road transport infrastructure, and(b) they intend that act to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (a).(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).(4) In this section—“the maximum term for summary offences” has the meaning given by section 6(4); “road transport infrastructure” has the meaning given by section 8(2);“trade dispute” has the meaning given by section 7(10).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause creates a new offence of creating serious disruption to road transport infrastructure.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 370 would create an offence of intentionally causing disruption to road traffic infrastructure where the action in question affects multiple individuals or organisations. The amendment originates from the growth, in recent years, of protests designed to cause maximum public disruption to further narrow ideological ends. Activist groups comprising self-aggrandizing ideologues began to realise that, by taking part in large-scale obstructions that affected the law-abiding public, they could get their causes into newspaper headlines and Twitter feeds. The consequence was that groups such as Just Stop Oil became household names through their disruptive tactics. They targeted the lives of everyday people, disrupting people’s livelihoods and hampering the functioning of society.

The most damaging of these protests has become the disruption to road traffic. Protesters sit on busy roads and grind traffic to a halt. People are late for jobs, emergency services are delayed and police time is wasted, and it is the public who, ultimately, must pay the price. In 2022, Just Stop Oil shut down the M25 for four successive days, causing more than 50,000 hours of vehicle delay to over 700,000 vehicles. This cost the public over £700,000, and the cost to the Metropolitan Police was over £1.1 million. Despite 45 people engaging in the protest, only five organisers were arrested and held in custody. If we do not punish those who cause such obscene disruption, we leave the public vulnerable to further disorder.

The Government have taken forward several measures from our previous Criminal Justice Bill, including the provisions to ban possession of pyrotechnics at protests, the new offence of concealing one’s identity at a protest and the prohibition on climbing on specified memorials. However, it is a shame they have neglected to carry forward this particular measure to prevent serious disruption on roads. Avoiding prosecuting disruptive individuals ultimately comes at the expense of the public. I hope the Government can recognise this and will reconsider the amendment.

My further two amendments in this group respond to a stark reality. We have seen successive waves of disruptive protests that have strained our communities, stretched the capacity of our police forces, and left the public questioning whether the law was operating as intended. It is abundantly clear that undue weight has too often been placed on the rights of disruptive activists at the expense of the rights, well-being and interests of the wider public.

Take, for example, the recent Palestine-related demonstrations. The Metropolitan Police has stated that the costs of policing these protests in London between October 2023 and June 2024 were £42.9 million. Some 51,799 Metropolitan Police officers’ shifts and 9,639 police officer shifts from officers usually based outside the Metropolitan Police area were required. Further, 6,339 police officers have had rest days cancelled between October 2023 and April 2024, all of which will eventually have to be repaid to those officers. Such demands on police capacity inevitably divert resources away from policing crime and protecting vulnerable communities.

It is against this backdrop that Amendment 382A seeks to empower chief officers to act decisively. By way of background, Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986 currently permits the chief officer of a police force to apply to the local council for an order to prohibit the holding of all demonstrations in a particular area for a period of up to three months. The threshold, as it currently stands, is that the chief officer of police reasonably believes that the powers in Section 12 of the Act—that is, the power to impose conditions on protests—are insufficient to prevent serious public disorder.

However, this threshold of “serious public disorder” overlooks a number of further factors. It does not consider the potential for property damage, the impact on the rights of others not involved in those protests, or the demands placed on police resources. My amendment would replace Section 13(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 to introduce the ability for the relevant chief officer to consider the risk of

“serious public disorder … serious damage to property … serious disruption to the life of the community”

and

“undue demands on the police”.

There is precedent for this. Section 11 of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 permits the police to prohibit processions if they believe that the protest would place undue demands on the police or military forces. Although I recognise the unique historical context of public processions and assemblies in Northern Ireland, there is no reason why, with modern protest tactics, police forces in England and Wales should not also be able to consider the cost and burden on the police imposed by the policing of the protest.

On Amendment 382C, the existing six-day notice period for marches under Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 simply is not fit for modern policing needs. When tens of thousands of officers must be mobilised at short notice to manage demonstrations that may span multiple days and locations, six days’ advance notice does not provide sufficient time for intelligence assessment, resourcing and engagement with organisers. Extending this to 28 days would acknowledge the complexity and scale of contemporary protest events. It is a proportionate adjustment that gives police forces the lead-in they need without unduly restricting peaceful protest.

I emphasise that these amendments support peaceful, lawful expression, which is a cornerstone of our democracy. They do not, and are not intended to, curtail genuine dissent. They do, however, ensure that, in protecting the ability to protest, we do not trample the rights of those affected by serious destruction.

We are often reminded that the right to protest must be balanced with the rights of others. I put it to noble Lords that these amendments deliver that balance. I beg to move.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend on the Front Bench. I think we grossly underestimate how much damage to the UK economy is caused by stopping motorways, particularly the M25. I have not seen authoritative figures for how much it costs to block a motorway, which happens with road traffic accidents. Years ago, I saw a figure of £0.75 million per hour. I do not know whether the Minister has a figure for how much it costs when the M25 or another important motorway is closed. It is not just the effect on motorists; it is the effect on industry, transport and supply chains, and the need to build in extra float in the transport system to allow for that. So, I strongly support my noble friend in everything he said.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, some months ago I was trying to get to Oxford Street and at Oxford Circus a large number of people were sitting on the ground, making it impossible for either end of Regent Street or Oxford Street to move. I believe they were there for several days. All I can say is that, as an ordinary member of the public, I found it extremely irritating, so I am very sympathetic to Amendment 370.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I will comment briefly on Amendments 382A and 382C. Amendment 382A amounts to the banning of protests in almost any circumstances at the behest of the police. Proposed new subsection (2)(1B) is particularly guilty in this respect, allowing, as it does, for a protest to be banned because, in the opinion of a chief officer of police, it would place undue demands on the police. But the police, as a public authority, have a duty to facilitate protests, not prevent them. Of course, that duty to facilitate protests has resource implications for the police, sometimes serious implications. That means that the police must be provided with adequate resources by the Government, but it does not mean that, as an alternative to proper resourcing, financial corners should be cut by the Government, thus making it impossible for the police to carry out their duty to facilitate protest. But that is precisely what Amendment 382A would do. It says that protests should be banned because the police are underresourced. It would be better if it said that the police must be sufficiently resourced to allow them to facilitate protest. It does not, and for that reason Amendment 382A must be opposed.

Amendment 382C seeks to extend from six days to 28 the notice period for informing the police of a demonstration, but many demonstrations are spontaneous or are, by necessity, organised at short notice. In any case, the amendment would appear to not achieve anything, because this section of the Bill already contains a provision for late notice as soon as practicable, so there is nothing to be gained by increasing the formal notice period, unless the goal is to make it ever more difficult to organise a protest. Amendment 382C should also be opposed.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

I will briefly comment on the issue of notice periods for protests, because I have sympathy for the desire to create an ordered system where there is more notice for protests, although I struggle to see how it could be practical in some ways. But the main issue that I would like the Government to reflect on is the now fairly routine practice of the police disregarding the fact that many protests do not meet the current seven days. They may have their reasons, but they take a view to not have any form of prosecution for that. Even if they were to prosecute, the fines are relatively low and therefore not a deterrent. So any change in the notice period needs to be wrapped in with looking at the issue that this law is simply not being enforced at all officially at the moment.

18:15

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his Amendment 370 seeking to update public order legislation. For the benefit of any doubt, let me echo the words of the noble Earl, Lord Atlee, that this is a serious disruption to key infrastructure caused by protest tactics, and I understand the difficulties and challenges met by those types of protests. The amendment seeks to criminalise acts that cause serious disruption to road transport infrastructure. I say gently to the noble Lord that our view is that, under Section 6 of the Public Order Act 2023, there is an offence already on the statute book of obstructing major transport works, and Section 7 makes it an offence to interfere with key national infrastructure, including roads and other transport infrastructure, as defined by Section 8 of that Act. Introducing a new offence that closely mirrors existing provisions risks unnecessary duplication. It could create confusion for police and prosecutors and it could add complexity where clarity is needed. That does not take away the disruption that can be caused, even the occasional minimal disruption where an individual might be stopped by an ambulance, for example. Those are real key issues, but I suggest that existing legislation covers those proposals.

Amendment 382A seeks to amend Section 13 of the Public Order Act to enable a chief officer of police to consider serious damage to property, serious disruption to the life of the community, and the demands on police resources when determining whether to apply for an order prohibiting public processions. Section 13 of the 1986 Act already rightly sets a high threshold for considering whether public processions should be prohibited. It is one thing to place conditions on protests, as provided by elements of the 1986 Act, to enable them to take place peacefully and with minimum disruption; it is quite another to ban processions altogether. I find myself at one with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, on these matters. On occasion, I can reach out with the hand of friendship to him, as well as to other Members of the House.

It is important that all public order legislation continues to be compatible with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and Section 13 of the 1986 Act allows for the banning of a protest only where it is necessary to prevent serious public disorder. Widening the scope of the power to include taking into account police resources would risk undermining the right to peaceful protest and the legislation becoming incompatible with the obligations that we seek to maintain under the ECHR.

Finally, on Amendment 382C, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, takes this in the best way possible, but I agree with him again on the matter of the requirement to increase the notice period for a protest from six days to 28 days. Six days is an adequate time for the police to be able to determine whether a protest should occur. As the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said, there are occasions where protests flare up because of incidents that have occurred. Guidance to police already provides the necessary operational flexibility to allow forces to work with organisers planning protests to ensure that the conditions imposed are necessary and proportionate. I say regretfully to the noble Lord that I believe increasing the statutory notice period is unnecessary, and the following is an important point. Sometimes I come to the House and say that the police have requested matters and that is why I am bringing them forward. We have had no requests from the police to look at increasing the number of days from six to 28.

Having said all that again—and I know the House will become tired of the record that I am playing this evening—all matters of public order legislation fall within the terms of reference of the review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If his review brings forward issues that need to be examined, we will examine them and consider the findings and recommendations very carefully. But, at the moment, with regret, because he has been so supportive this evening on some other matters, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that I cannot accept his amendments tonight, although I do understand his references and those of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to the disruption these matters can cause. We believe it is covered by existing legislation and I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I have been in your Lordships’ House for 33 years. I have lost count of the number of times that Ministers have said that an amendment is unnecessary, and I have used the same argument myself. That being the case, how is it that we saw the M25 being blocked?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have had 30 years in Parliament, not all in this House, and I have used it occasionally and had it used against me occasionally. It is unnecessary given that we have had the legislation on the statute book to date. The noble Earl asks the quite reasonable question of how the M25 gets blocked. I put it to him that this House, this Government, this Parliament and any other parliament passes legislation. It is not for Ministers to implement that: it is for the local police, at a local level, to take a judgment on the legislation at that time. In the cases where there is legislation on the statute book, the police could exercise that legislation. They may or may not choose to do so, because it may inflame the situation or not. It is a matter for judgment by the local police. I simply say to him that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, are already in place. For that reason, I ask him to not to press them.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, raised the issue of facilitating protest, which is often cited. It made me think, “I don’t know where that is”. I have just had a quick look, and I do not think it exists. I think Article 11 of the ECHR suggests that the police should not inhibit public protests and certainly should not try to intimidate protesters; that is different from making it sound as though they are there to market protest or to be the arrangers of protests so that they achieve their aim. The trouble is that the police have got into that mindset. They would have to do everything to protect the protester and, if they are not careful, forget the rest. That is why I challenge the Minister, not because I think it is badly intended but because I do not think it is accurate in terms of the ECHR.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will take that as a comment for me and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, to reflect on, but I maintain the position. The police have a difficult job. Legislation is in place currently, and the proposals brought forward would replicate that. I am trying to sit down, but I see the noble Lord, Lord Harper, so once again I will take an intervention.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Very briefly, in the spirit of trying to be helpful, and in answering my noble friend Lord Attlee, one of the things that was very helpful in my time at the Department for Transport was that National Highways sought a pre-emptive injunction to set out certain behaviours that should be prohibited and was successful in getting that, which was very effective at giving the necessary tools to the police to keep the motorway open.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper. I add that into the mix of the debate today, but I still come to the conclusion that existing legislation, however it is interpreted, covers this. Therefore—for the last time, I hope—I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate, but I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed and to my noble friend Lord Attlee for supporting my amendments.

The police are charged not only with facilitating lawful protest but with protecting the safety and liberties of all citizens, yet the current legal framework, I suggest, often leaves officers with insufficient tools to intervene meaningfully before disruption becomes entrenched. Amendment 382A strikes at the core of this problem by allowing chief officers to seek prohibition in defined circumstances, including where marches are likely to cause serious disorder, damage or disruption or to place undue demand on limited policing resources. We align the law with operational reality and public expectations.

What do the public expect? Polling shows that large majorities support police intervention in protest scenarios that go beyond peaceful lawful conduct. They reveal a public who very much distinguish between legitimate expression and conduct that crosses into intimidation and disorder. Similarly, extending the notice period to 28 days is a common-sense enhancement that gives police and local authorities the time needed to prepare for large and potentially complex processions. This is about ensuring the responsible ordering of protest in a way that protects public safety, minimises disruption and allows ordinary citizens to go about their lives.

These amendments are a measured, evidence-based response to the challenge of protest policing in the 21st century. I hear what the Minister says, but I hope the Government can give them some serious consideration. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 370 withdrawn.

Amendment 370A

Moved by

[Lord Walney]

370A: After Clause 122, insert the following new Clause—
“Designation and restriction of Extreme Criminal Protest Groups(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate a group as an Extreme Criminal Protest Group (“ECPG”) where the Secretary of State reasonably believes that—(a) the group has as its purpose, object or practice the deliberate commission of imprisonable offences, including but not limited to sabotage, criminal damage, obstruction of critical national infrastructure, or serious public order offences,(b) such offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making, or the exercise of democratic functions, and(c) the activities of the group create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others.(2) A designation under subsection (1) does not amount to terrorist proscription for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000.(3) The following are offences in relation to group designated as an ECPG under subsection (1)—(a) membership of a designated ECPG;(b) promotion of a designated ECPG, including public advocacy, recruitment, or dissemination of the group is materials;(c) fundraising for a designated ECPG, including soliciting or providing funds or financial benefit;(d) organising, directing or coordinating activities of the group;(e) providing material support, training, funds or equipment to the group where the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the recipient is a designated ECPG.(4) Any offence under subsection (3) is punishable on conviction—(a) on indictment, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine, or both.(5) Before making a designation under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement of reasons, subject to the protection of sensitive information.”

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to move Amendment 370A in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Goodman of Wycombe. I also intend to speak to Amendment 371AA in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lord Mendelsohn, Amendment 378A in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and Amendment 380 in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Polak, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee.

Several of these amendments seek to enact recommendations from my review, Protecting our Democracy from Coercion, laid before Parliament in May 2024 in my then role as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence and disruption. These remain an excellent set of recommendations that the Government are entirely free to accept at any point, notwithstanding the new review set up by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, which has already been mentioned a number of times by the Minister’s colleague.

Let me pre-empt his response and enable him to give a subtly different response from his colleague’s. He will say, or is probably gearing up to say, at the end of this debate that we must all wait for the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to conclude and then wait and see after that. I gently put it to the Government that they have chosen not to do that themselves in one of the amendments that they have put forward on cumulative disruption. If it is good enough for His Majesty’s Government on that amendment, it is entirely within their power, and proper, to move on some of these other issues while the noble Lord looks at the wider picture. He has about 45 minutes—probably a bit more—to make up his mind on that, and I am sure we will see.

I will try to be brief. Amendment 370A, on extreme criminal protest groups, would create a power for the Secretary of State by regulations to designate an extreme criminal protest group

“where the Secretary of State reasonably believes that … the group has as its purpose, object or practice the deliberate commission of imprisonable offences, including … sabotage, criminal damage, obstruction of critical national infrastructure, or serious public order offences”

in order to influence public policy or democratic decision-making, and where those activities

“create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions, or the rights of others”.

This amendment is carefully framed. It makes explicit that designation is not terrorist proscription, and it would seek to restrict membership, promotion, fundraising, organising and material support, with proportionate penalties less than those that a proscribed terrorist group would attract.

I think we can see a reason why this amendment—having this power available to the Government—would have been so valuable in recent years. For that, we should look at the example of Palestine Action. Now, there are deeply opposed views in this House on whether it was appropriate to designate Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation. It has divided the House, it has divided some of my friends with whom I usually agree on the vast majority of issues, and it certainly would divide the country. But I put it to the Committee and the Government that there would be a much greater consensus if it had been available to the Government to stop this organisation, which was avowed in its criminal intent and carried out criminal operations for a period of five years before it was eventually seen to reach the terrorism threshold and was designated.

18:30

I am sure there are Members who will speak against this, but I ask them to consider the views of the overwhelming majority of the public. They might not agree that economic damage—it is primarily economic damage but let us not forget that there are incredibly serious cases going through the courts at the moment involving the use of a sledgehammer to cause harm to a police officer—meets the definition of terrorism. It has not always. It does not necessarily meet people’s common perception of what a terrorist organisation does, which is focused largely on violent actions against individuals. However, I think there would be overwhelming support for saying that an organisation that is dedicated to breaking the law to get its way, even if it is not designated as terrorist, should not be free to advertise, recruit or livestream its crimes on social media. I put it to the Government that this is a genuinely common-sense measure, so that the next time that this occurs—and this will happen again—it gives them a tool to nip the activities in the bud and avoid the controversy which has been a feature of having so many people unnecessarily clogging up police time and the courts by making a protest against the terrorist designation.

I will speak briefly on Amendment 371AA and allow the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, to expand on the substance in due course. This is a modest but important amendment to Clause 124 so that the Bill’s reference to disruptive, intimidating demonstrations outside places of worship would extend to faith schools and faith community centres, which can clearly be the target of deeply intimidating, inappropriate protests. They are targeting the Jewish community at the moment, but they could absolutely be extended to other faith communities in future.

Amendment 378A in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Pannick is about the potential to place restrictions on inappropriate protest activity around buildings of democratic importance. It would amend the Public Order Act to allow conditions to be imposed on processions, assemblies and one-man protests

“in the vicinity of premises used for the purposes of democratic decision-making, or premises occupied by a Member of Parliament for the purposes of their parliamentary duties”,

specifically if they

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from accessing those premises for the purpose of carrying out their work”.

Now, this is not—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

This is a slightly delayed response, but I have just realised that the noble Lord was speaking to Amendment 371AA. I realise that there are a lot of amendments in this group, and there have been some changes in the groupings since the previous day in Committee. Amendment 371AA is in group 6. I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord’s flow, but I wanted to make that clear for the Committee.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

I will leave the clerks to unpick that mess. Forgive me. Does that mean we all have to stay incredibly late for group 6? It probably does, does it not?

[A noble Lord]

Yes.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

Oh good, that is such great news. Amendment 378A is not about shielding politicians from criticism but about ensuring that elected representatives, working people and members of the public can access democratic institutions and that those who work in and around them can do so without the fear of intimidation. There is clearly a divide in this Chamber on the kind of noisy, disruptive protest to which elected Members and Parliament are now exposed with increasing regularity. I think it is important that we draw a firmer line, and that the Government set the lead in this, in saying that engagement with the democratic process can actually be diminished by aggressive, angry protests, which implicitly can be a menace, a threat of implied force, rather than freedom of expression and making the views of individuals or groups known to their elected representatives, which there are myriad ways of doing in our advanced society.

Amendment 380 is related to the shadow Minister’s previous set of amendments on cumulative disruption. It is in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Pannick, the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and the noble Baroness, Lady Foster. This builds on the Government’s own amendments to put the principle of cumulative disruption more clearly into Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act, which is welcome. It has been shown to be necessary by the detrimental impact, primarily on Jewish communities, since the Gaza conflict. Many Jewish people have felt intimidated from coming into central London and other places by regular marches and have been beseeching the Government and the police to do something about this—not to ban protests, but to strike a better balance so that they are able to go about their lives and not find themselves in the situation where if a protest group, such as the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, wants to organise a march in central London every Saturday, then, in effect, many Jewish people find that area out of bounds.

It is welcome that the Government have sought to strengthen the ability of the police to place conditions on those protests, but Amendment 380 is necessary because when I, members of the Jewish community and other Peers discussed this with the Metropolitan Police in the thick of the protests, it was clear that its understanding was that that was simply about choosing one street rather than another or perhaps limiting the time, but did not give the ability to say, “You have already been in the centre of London on two Saturdays, so you have to pick a different day”, or “You have to give it a rest this Saturday. Come back the Saturday after”. Under Section 13, that would require recommending that the Secretary of State says no to a march. Therefore, the cumulative impact proposal from the Government will prove insufficient unless it is extended to Section 13 —the ability, on occasion, to say no.

Finally, and briefly—because time is marching on and the issue has been raised in a previous amendment— I turn to Amendment 382E concerning the cumulative impact on policing resources. At the moment, the police are not able to factor in the huge drain on resources that weekly mass marches have been placing on their ability to regulate a protest. Therefore, the bill is racking up to tens of millions of pounds. Bluntly, that is either being placed on taxpayers at a time of increasing fiscal scarcity, or it is going to impact on other front-line policing priorities.

Yes, absolutely, there is a right to protest in this country, but that right is qualified and balanced with other factors. I put it to the Government that ensuring the ability of the police to factor in their own depleted resources in making decisions on repeat processions would be absolutely proportionate. Going out on the streets in mass numbers is probably not the most effective way of getting your view across anyway, in my entirely subjective judgment. It is certainly only one of a myriad of ways in which we have the privilege in our liberal democracy to be able to get our views across. Ultimately, we can also choose to change them every election if we wish.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I just wanted clarification on Amendment 370A. Am I to understand that, if this amendment had existed in law, there would not have been any need to use terrorism laws to proscribe Palestine Action?

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My view on this is, admittedly, from the outside; I had some access as the Government’s independent adviser on political violence for a number of years while this issue was being debated. But, yes, my clear view on looking at this is that you would have been able to place a restriction on Palestine Action much earlier in the process, which would have stopped or been able to inhibit much of the criminal damage. Crucially, it would have meant restrictions before they got to the terrorism threshold, and much of this controversy could have been avoided. I beg to move.

[Baroness Blower (Lab)]

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hain for having signed them. It will not come as a great surprise to the noble Lord, Lord Walney, that I have differences with his presentation. My amendments represent a compromise rather than the stand part objection in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, although I have to say that the stand part argument does have some attractions.

The first of my sets of amendments is on the question of “in the vicinity”. When discussing a different Bill in this House, the phrase “in the vicinity” was taken to mean within 10 miles. I imagine that that is not the intention of this clause, but it is imprecise. I hope that many noble and learned Lords in the Committee might agree with me that precision in this aspect of the legislation would be helpful and, perhaps, is even necessary. This is what Amendments 371A, 371C and 371E seek to address.

It is accepted from all sides of the Committee that the right to protest should operate in a free, democratic and pluralist society such as ours. It therefore behoves us that, if we infringe on that right, as this Bill clearly does, we do so with clarity in law—I apologise to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, but I do think that, in this case, clarity would help—so as to do the least damage to that right, particularly as, in my view, we must always seek to protect the Article 11 right to freedom of assembly.

18:45

My amendments seek to ensure that, in organising marches, processions and protests, both the organisers, from their point of view, and the police, given responsibility for maintaining order, should be clear about the parameters. That is why I have specifically included a reference to “within 50 metres”, to ensure that there is clarity but also to ensure that there is a debate about this. I would, of course, be open to a conversation with my noble friend the Minister about specific wording. I repeat, however, that I believe clarity in defining much more closely what is intended by “in the vicinity” is both appropriate and necessary.

On my other amendments, Amendments 371B, 371D and 371F, the wording I propose is unambiguous in both accepting and promoting the proposition that

“the purpose of intimidating individuals accessing places of worship”

is unacceptable. Once again, I propose wording that would have the effect of much greater clarity for the police and for all parties concerned.

In my many years as an activist, I have protested on a variety of causes and used the right to protest extensively. I protested to end apartheid in South Africa, which took many years of protest to achieve. I protested against the blockade of Cuba by the US Government, and I have protested to reclaim the streets so that they are safe for women at night; neither of these goals has yet been achieved. I have also campaigned for Palestinian rights. On none of those occasions have I ever set out to intimidate individuals, whether accessing places of worship or in any other way. While accepting that non-violent direct action may sometimes be used, personally I believe in the force of argument rather than the argument of force. Many hundreds and thousands of protesters would say exactly the same.

As I have said, a protest or march or procession for the purpose of intimidating is clearly unacceptable, which is why my amendments provide more appropriate wording to offer clarity to the police in the discharge of their duties. They would be on safer ground in determining whether a protest or march or procession was designed with

“the purpose of intimidating individuals accessing that place of worship to carry out religious activities”.

No noble Lord would support the deployment of such intimidation; I certainly would not.

However, the clause as it stands widens the circumstances in which the police can impose conditions on protest where it “may” be intimidating to a “person of reasonable firmness” and “deter” them from entering a place of worship. In my estimation, this is a very low threshold and difficult for the police to determine. The amendments seek to make it far clearer and less open to subjective interpretation regarding an intention to intimidate or where people are deliberately prevented from entering a place of worship.

There are many organisations with concerns about this Bill, and they are supporting these amendments. This was made plain and public in the statement released yesterday, and covered in the Guardian newspaper, from more than 40 civil society and religious groups. I am sure that more will be said about this in relation to the “cumulative impact” amendments to the Bill. At this stage, I simply remind your Lordships that change requires persistence and repeated action, as with the farmers so warmly praised in this Chamber for winning changes on tax by demonstrating.

The Quakers, who have signed the statement, have first-hand experience of the repression caused by other recent anti-protest legislation. In March 2025, the Metropolitan Police raided Westminster Quaker Meeting House and arrested six people who were planning non-violent protests. Many Quakers, and indeed people of many faiths, have been arrested for non-violent protests on issues such as climate change and Palestine. They point out that their ability to protest goes hand in glove with their ability to live in accordance with their own religious values of peace. I commend, therefore, consideration of these amendments as providing greater clarity and precision on the parameters for policing protests and assemblies in these circumstances.

The point was made in the passage of previous legislation relating to protest, as it has been today, that we defend the right to protest. However, defending the right is not enough. We have to avoid enacting legislation which can give rise to a chilling effect on that right to protest. I would welcome a conversation with my noble friend the Minister on these important issues and will, of course, listen closely to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I should just begin by agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, about the farmers, but I note that they did not call to globalise the intifada.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and thank him for the work that he has done and continues to do on counterterrorism. It is deeply appreciated by many, and, from the point of view of the Jewish community, he is a leading non-Jew—a righteous gentile, if I may add—in everything he does.

I have added my name to Amendment 370A and to two or three other amendments in this group. Supporting this amendment would ensure that those creating a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions and the rights of others are curtailed. This can include all sorts of groups, and we know some of them. These groups can pose a clear and tangible threat to public order and public safety, even where their activities may not, in every instance, meet the statutory threshold for terrorism.

The Committee will recall, for example, the incident in November 2023, when Just Stop Oil protesters obstructed an emergency ambulance with its blue lights flashing on Waterloo Bridge—an action that plainly placed lives at risk. An amendment of the nature of Amendment 370A would ensure that such groups, which demonstrably endanger the public and interfere with essential services, could be addressed at an early stage. It would enable more timely and effective intervention where there is a sustained pattern of reckless, disruptive conduct, before serious harm occurs.

On Amendment 370AA, “intifada” is not a neutral expression but one rooted in campaigns of organised violence and terrorism, yet the Government seem to fail to understand, or choose to ignore, what intifada really was and what it truly means, with tragic consequences. I look over at the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and think of Heaton Park synagogue at Yom Kippur. Melvin Cravitz and Adrian Daulby are no longer with us. Sydney might be the other end of the world, but what went on there—15 innocent people murdered—was a massacre that shows the results that antisemitism can lead to. These people are the victims of the so-called global intifada. When this Government and Governments around the world do not heed the warnings about the severe and dangerous impact that these words have, this is what happens. This amendment would help stop Manchester or Bondi Beach happening again and would provide clarity for CPS enforcement, in ensuring that Parliament draws a clear line before more lives are lost rather than afterwards. Waiting until loss of life to act is, quite simply, deeply shameful.

I have added my name to Amendment 380. It cannot be right in a free society that any community feels unable to go about its daily life because of repeated demonstrations, however lawful they may each be. This was starkly illustrated by the protest that took place the day after the Manchester synagogue attack, when a traumatised community was given no space to grieve. In such circumstances, managing or conditioning a protest is not always enough. The police must have clear legal authority to prevent such protest going ahead where the cumulative effect tips into serious disruption and intimidation. This amendment would provide that clarity and ensure that the law properly protects public order and the right of communities to live without fear. I would be very interested in the views of the Minister on that.

Finally, Amendment 486B would address a serious problem in our framework for public funding. This problem was exposed most clearly, I guess, by the debacle surrounding the band Kneecap, which was permitted to retain a grant of £14,250 from the British taxpayer, despite a catalogue of deeply troubling activity. This includes behaviour glorifying terrorism, when one of the band members held up a Hezbollah flag on stage, shouting, “Up Hamas! Up Hezbollah!” Artistic expression must be protected but it must never be allowed to cross the line into incitement—and when it does, public money should certainly not be supporting it. This incident demonstrates how ill equipped our current law is to prevent funds flowing to individuals or organisations whose conduct runs directly counter to our values and our security.

However, the problem is not just Kneecap. An organisation funded by the UK taxpayer, the Collections Trust, issued guidance referring to Hamas, a proscribed terrorist organisation, as “anti-colonial freedom fighters”. That language is not accidental or trivial. It legitimises and sanitises terrorism, and it was disseminated with public funds.

This amendment would make it clear that no organisation should be permitted to receive or retain taxpayer support if it promotes or excuses criminal conduct or narratives that undermine our democratic values. Again, I ask the Minister whether he agrees that public money must never be used, directly or indirectly, to legitimise extremism, and that we here in Parliament have a duty to draw that line clearly and unequivocally.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have given notice of my opposition to Clause 124 standing part of the Bill. I have done this for two reasons. First, I think it is unnecessary and, secondly, it could be even more repressive than the law that this Labour Government have already passed.

Let me be clear: I support the right to worship and to access places of worship freely and safely. I would go along to anywhere where people are protesting and making life difficult for anybody who wants to worship, as that is unacceptable. However, this clause is not a targeted protection against genuinely threatening behaviour. It is a broad, low-threshold power that risks sweeping up lawful, peaceful protest on the basis of guesswork rather than evidence, exactly the same as was discussed in the previous group.

Clause 124 allows conditions to be imposed where a protest

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”

in “the vicinity” of a place of worship. The word “may” is doing a lot of work here, as is “vicinity”; neither is defined and together they create a power that is open to misuse. This is not about stopping harassment or threats—we already have strong laws for that. If someone is genuinely intimidating worshippers, the police already have plenty of powers to intervene. What does this clause actually add?

The real problem is that the clause allows restrictions to be imposed even where the protest is peaceful, so long as someone claims they might feel intimidated. That is not a hypothetical risk. Almost any protest that touches on controversial issues could be said to intimidate somebody. Pride marches, trade union demos, climate protests and peaceful protests against war or injustice could all be caught by this wording if they happen to be near a place of worship. In many places in our cities, including London—particularly central Westminster, where so many protests happen—it is very difficult not to be near a place of worship. That creates a very real danger of rolling exclusion zones where protest is progressively pushed out of public space altogether, not because of evidence of harm but because of location and perception.

19:00

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has already warned about powers like this, where restrictions follow from assertion rather than demonstrated necessity. Once again, the risk is that enforcement becomes inconsistent, subjective and influenced by the popularity or political content of the protest. Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights require necessity and proportionality. They also impose positive obligations on the state to enable peaceful protest to take place, not to hollow it out as this clause does. We should protect people from real intimidation—of course we should. We should not undermine the right to protest, though, by legislating on the basis of fear, speculation and guesswork.

The proscription of Palestine Action has been brought up today. That looks slightly rushed compared with the Government’s reluctance to proscribe another potential terrorist organisation—for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Why do this Government keep legislating on issues that we do not need and not on things that we do need? For example, they could usefully bring in some sort of control of facial recognition.

How will “vicinity” be interpreted in practice, especially in areas such as central Westminster where multiple places of worship sit quite closely together, which obviously creates a risk of a rolling exclusion zone? What does Clause 124 add that is not already achievable through existing public order powers and criminal offences, without lowering the threshold into speculation? This Government really need better advice on the legislation that they keep trying to bring through— I say “keep trying” but they are, of course, just pushing it through regardless and not listening. This is another example of very bad law.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with and endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said about Bondi and the Manchester synagogue, because those terrible attacks were modern examples of the persecution and pogroms that Jewish communities have suffered for centuries. He was right to remind us about that.

I wish to speak to the amendments to Clause 124 tabled by my noble friend Lady Blower, to which I have added my name, and, most importantly, on my opposition to the new clause tabled as Amendment 372 by my noble friend the Minister. He has been a long-standing friend for decades, as a fellow Welsh MP and a valued member of my ministerial team when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Freedom of expression and the right to peaceful protest form the bedrock of any liberal democracy like our own. These rights are not a mere courtesy granted by the state; they are a fundamental part of British liberty, also enshrined by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act. These freedoms are deeply woven into our history, through iconic protest movements from the Tolpuddle Martyrs and Peterloo to the Chartists, the suffragettes and the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Each of these causes, I stress, was disruptive—indeed, vilified—at the time, but they are now recognised as vital movements, successfully winning fundamental rights for millions of British citizens and others abroad. Yet that long tradition of assembly and free protest is now, sadly, under threat.

Any proposal that hands the police unprecedented powers to restrict this right should give this House and every British citizen serious cause for alarm. That is precisely why I find Clause 124 so worrying. First, it would allow protests to be banned and restricted in the so-called “vicinity” of places of religious worship, yet this House is being asked to legislate without clarity. As my noble friend Lady Blower said, “vicinity” is undefined; the term “may intimidate” is equally vague. Such imprecision invites arbitrary interpretation and risks handing law enforcement sweeping discretionary powers to curtail lawful protest. It may also put police officers in an impossible position when doing their jobs.

Secondly, let us be honest about the context here. Clause 124 does not arise in a vacuum. It is clearly framed as a response to national demonstrations in support of Palestinian rights, demonstrations that have been repeatedly and wrongly labelled as hate marches. These protests have never targeted places of worship; they never would and indeed never should. What is more, Jewish campaigners and organisations have been integral to many of those marches and, despite hundreds of thousands of people taking to the streets, arrests have routinely been fewer than at most football matches. Indeed, the police themselves acknowledge that there has been no evidence of any threat to places of worship linked to these marches and, across more than 33 national demonstrations, not one has targeted or deliberately passed a synagogue.

Of course, the appalling antisemitic attack on a synagogue in Manchester and the Islamophobic attack on a mosque in Peacehaven remind us why our Jewish citizens and all religious communities must be properly protected, but surely Ministers must agree that those terrible attacks were entirely unrelated to protest. Crucially, the police already possess robust and extensive powers to safeguard places of worship and individuals under genuine threat. We must also ask: would these powers be applied to far-right mobilisations outside asylum hotels, where vulnerable refugee communities are explicitly targeted and intimidated, or is enforcement selective?

Clause 124 risks introducing political censorship through the backdoor. The right to worship freely and the right to protest peacefully are not competing freedoms; both must be upheld. This clause sets them against one another and, in doing so, weakens both. Existing powers have already been used repressively against campaigners and at great public cost. Clause 124 would further entrench that approach in law. For these reasons, I support the stand part notice tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Blower. I ask the Government to think again. If there is no such rethink and if it comes to it, I will vote against Clause 124.

The proposed new clause after Clause 124, although presented as a response to public inconvenience, poses a serious danger to freedom of speech and peaceful protest. Expanding the definition of serious disruption by introducing the concept of so-called “cumulative disruption”, it imposes a sweeping duty on the police to restrict or prohibit protests based not on their conduct but on their frequency or persistence in a particular area. Restricting protest simply because it disrupts daily life undermines the very mechanism that gives protest its power. It was precisely cumulative disruption over many years that made early trade unionists, the suffragettes and the civil rights and anti-apartheid movements so effective. No protest movement has ever brought about change through a single demonstration; it is through cumulative protests. To criminalise that principle is to hollow out that very right itself.

The new clause re-characterises protest as an inconvenience to be managed rather than a democratic right to be protected. Its language is dangerously broad. It fails to define when disruption becomes “cumulative”, over what timeframe this is to be assessed or how significant that disruption must be. Such elasticity gives the police sweeping powers to apply arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement, and creates a serious chilling effect on free expression. It would also allow the police to relocate protests to areas of minimal visibility or impact, permitting demonstrations for politically favourable causes in prominent locations while pushing unpopular dissent to the margins.

If this power had been statutorily available from 1969, when I was leading protests at Twickenham rugby stadium and Lord’s cricket ground, among many other sporting venues right across Britain, against touring apartheid all-white South African teams, surely they would have been blocked—thereby blocking the subsequent sports boycott almost universally imposed against whites-only sports tours from apartheid South Africa, which Nelson Mandela, among others, judged to have been decisive in bringing about the downfall of apartheid.

The term “area” is to be widely interpreted. Would restrictions be imposed on entire towns, or even the whole of central London? Non-violent disruption is often the only way that marginalised communities and civil rights protesters can make themselves heard by those who would otherwise ignore them. Neutral policing is a laudable objective, and I upheld that principle when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, but this new clause would make policing politically oppressive.

It is difficult to ignore the political context. The amendment follows sustained marches in support of Palestinian rights and in opposition to the war in Gaza. I have already opposed the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist group—I am not going to rehash those arguments—because that proscription equates it with the appalling terrorism of al-Qaeda and Islamic State. For objecting to the shameful proscription, it is no surprise—to me, at least—that hundreds of peaceful protesters, including disabled people, the elderly, the young, retired vicars and magistrates, have been arrested as terrorists. Now there are protesters in prison on bail on hunger strike. If they die, that will be an even more shameful stain on this Government and this Parliament.

The new clause contained in government Amendment 372 risks compounding those injustices rather than correcting them. It is oppressive and unjust. Yet it will not just be marches for Palestinian rights that are affected; the impact will be much more wide-ranging. The amendment is also open to abuse by future Governments—Governments of the right, which could urge the police to stamp out political demonstrations.

This House has been here before. In February 2023, your Lordships rejected a similar Conservative amendment to the Public Order Act, which sought to restrict protests on the basis of cumulative disruption. In May 2023, the then Home Secretary, Suella Braverman, attempted to introduce the same concept by statutory instrument, only for the High Court to rule it unlawful a year later. I am afraid the new clause contained in government Amendment 372 is simply the latest chapter in a familiar and troubling pattern.

While I acknowledge that some protests can be upsetting or experienced by some as intimidating, sweeping restrictions on peaceful assembly are not the solution. Freedom of expression is not absolute and the police already possess a huge range of extensive powers to deal with hate speech, incitement to violence and serious threats—as indeed they should. The new clause contained in government Amendment 372 goes much further, allowing the state to pre-emptively silence thousands of people based on an ill-defined and speculative concept of disruption that is disproportionate, dangerous and profoundly undemocratic. Eroding protest rights weakens accountability between elections and risks fostering authoritarianism. Once such powers exist, they rarely contract. They expand, often exponentially, and could well do so, especially under future Governments if they were less committed to the right of democratic dissent.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

Can I ask I the noble Lord to bring his remarks to an end? He has gone well over 10 minutes.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

This amendment invites misuse and undermines trust in both policing and Parliament. That is why, in a joint statement, trade unions, charities, non-governmental organisations, and faith, climate justice and human rights organisations have been vocal in their opposition to it only this week. In rejecting it, I hope noble Lords will honour our democratic heritage and safeguard those freedoms for future generations. I urge your Lordships to vote against the new clause contained in government Amendment 372 if it is retabled on Report.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak as these amendments deeply affect places of worship and religious practice. It is always an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hain, whose track record around protests over so many years is one we can all learn a great deal from.

Noble Lords have referred to the attack in Manchester on Yom Kippur. That took place 15 minutes’ walk from my house. I know that because I walked there the day after to meet people. The rabbi is Daniel Walker. We share a surname and an initial, but we do not think we are related—the noble Lord is quite right to say that he has more beard than me. He and I have been good friends for many years. He is an extraordinarily brave man, and I am glad that we are able to reflect on that tonight.

19:15

I have some concerns with some of the amendments. I am drawn mostly to what the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, spoke about. This is one of the occasions I will accept a degree of precision. I think “in the vicinity” is a very vague term. I am not sure that 50 metres gets it quite right: large chunks of Parliament Square are clearly within 50 metres of St Margaret’s Church Westminster, and we would not want to outlaw protest there.

The heart of this clause—the religious effect—should be about protests that are deliberately targeted at a particular religious community, either in its place of worship or, as a later group will determine, a school or community centre that that community uses. We need to protect people who are accessing their religious premises for proper religious purposes against those who seek to intimidate them. Again, I welcome the notion about the intention to intimidate, rather than simply that it might have the effect of intimidating. That would give very helpful clarity, but I am concerned that we do not draw this too widely.

I am concerned that those in the Jewish community in particular, who are often attacked by antisemitic comments, are able to attend their synagogues, schools and yeshivas without fear. I pay tribute to the Community Safety Trust, which does such fantastic work in enabling Jewish communities. I see them up and down my street in their hi-vis uniforms so much of the time. It is a pity they are needed, but they do a fantastic job and they keep many of my Jewish neighbours safe while they are practising their religion.

I wonder whether we might look back through Hansard at the debates on a Bill we dealt with a few years ago. We were looking at protests near abortion clinics. After a rather difficult Committee debate, a group of us got together from across the House and produced an amendment for Report, which won the House over quite substantially. It was looking at how much of a protest can be directed at a particular thing close to the site where it is taking place, when people are lawfully seeking to access, in those cases, a legitimate medical facility. It may help if, before Report, the Minister has a look back through Hansard to see how we solved that tricky issue and whether that might be applied to this clause.

On Amendment 370AA, I worry about the notion of holy war; I do not think we can put that into legislation. I might feel I am taking part in a holy war against poverty or against homelessness. I might see it in those terms. What does “holy war” mean? We know that we do not want people inciting violent uprisings, but the phrase “holy war” is perhaps not the right terminology.

I am concerned a little about cumulative impact. I see that we cannot necessarily have counter demonstrations too close to each other, but I am not sure that saying “This area has had enough demonstrations for a while, they need to move somewhere else” finds the mark. I would advise being a little bit more precise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, suggested, and in particular looking back at how we solved the issue around abortion clinics as a way of solving the issue of protests close to religious centres.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Polak, in thanking my noble friend Lord Walney for all his hard work and leadership in seeking to secure a fairer balance in this context. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I positively welcome government Amendment 372, because it will ensure that the police must take account of cumulative disruption when exercising their power to impose conditions on public processions and assemblies.

The amendment will be, and is, particularly welcomed by synagogues and their members, whose access to and from Saturday prayers has been regularly disrupted by hostile, abusive and intimidating crowds of protesters. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester suggested that we should look at intention here, but whether that is the intention of the protestors, it is the effect, and it is very damaging to the right—and it is a right—of worship.

With great respect, the noble Lord, Lord Hain, should recognise that there are competing rights here. There is not just the right to protest but the right to go to a synagogue, to have access to a synagogue, to be able to leave a synagogue, and not to be deterred by hundreds of abusive protesters protesting in favour of a particular cause. The noble Lord made the point that cumulative protests may be very effective, and I am sure he is right about that in many contexts. However, the point of government Amendment 372 is not to stop protests or people expressing their view about matters of public policy. The question concerns where the protest takes place, and why it is necessary to go past the same synagogue with hundreds of people every Saturday, preventing those who wish to exercise their right of religious observance—and their right to get there and to leave—doing so peacefully and securely. Yes, protest, but you do not have to do it in the same place, along the same street, every week. The street has no significance for the protester, but it has a real significance for those who want to go to the synagogue.

The noble Lord, Lord Hain, says that the right to protest is not in conflict with the right to religious observance, and he is right. The problem arises, as here, where the protesters go along the same road each week. As I say, they do not have to go along that road; they can protest somewhere else, and that is what this amendment is concerned to achieve.

The amendment would reintroduce, with an improvement, the secondary legislation introduced by the previous Government which was held to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal in a case brought by Liberty. Contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, suggested, the secondary legislation was held unlawful by reason of matters other than cumulative disruption. The Court of Appeal did not say that the cumulative disruption provisions in the statutory instrument were unlawful. It said that other parts of the statutory instrument that sought to define the circumstances in which protest was unacceptable were unlawful, not those on cumulative disruption. Amendment 372 is an improvement on what the previous Government introduced because it imposes a duty on the police to have regard to cumulative disruption. The statutory instrument introduced by the previous Government merely conferred a discretion.

I turn to Amendments 373 to 378 from the Opposition Front Bench. I am grateful to the Opposition Front Bench for producing these amendments, which would vary the criteria in government Amendment 372 by focusing attention, for the purposes of cumulative disruption, not on the geographical area in which the public procession or assembly is repeatedly held but on whether the repeated procession or assembly concerns “the same subject matter”.

I recognise that these amendments are well motivated, but I do not support them. The vice of cumulative disruption is that it occurs repeatedly in the same geographical area—for example, in the same street near the synagogue—and causes disruption every Saturday. To focus on whether the repeated protests concern “the same subject matter” misses the point. I am also concerned that legislating with reference to the same subject matter will inevitably provoke disputes over how the police should apply such a criterion. Protesters would inevitably say that last week’s march was in support of Gaza, this week’s is against the Netanyahu Government and next week’s is against the policy of the Trump Administration. I am very doubtful that a specific reference to 50 metres, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, would suffice. It all depends on the size of the protest and the nature of the premises, does it not? This is a context where police discretion is desirable.

Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 380, tabled by my noble friend Lord Walney, which would apply the duty to take account of cumulative disruption to the power to prohibit public processions. The same reasoning that justifies the Government’s wish to require cumulative disruption to be considered in relation to the power to impose conditions also justifies a duty to take account of cumulative disruption in relation to the power to ban a public procession.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak; I have been listening with great interest to the competing arguments. However, I am utterly convinced by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the government amendment.

It crosses my mind that, just as Jews and synagogues are currently at risk, I can see a situation in the future where mosques and people who support Muslims, or indeed the gurdwaras of the Sikhs, are under threat. You might get an extremist group of Sikhs opposed to the current Sikh processes who decide to have a demonstration every single week against a series of gurdwaras in a certain area. What the Government are seeking to do is entirely sensible. It will impose on the police a duty and give them a power to decide whether to carry out what may or may not be needed. We need to accept this government amendment. I am also very attracted to the amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, which would add a bit to the government amendment. Having listened, I really think that the government amendment must get through.

[Lord Mendelsohn (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 370AA, which stands in my name as well as that of the noble Lord, Lord Austin, and the noble Lord, Lord Polak, who has already spoken to it. I also support Amendment 486C, which I tabled with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech.

I start by thanking the Government for introducing this clause and their amendment, both of which are very important measures. I am grateful to them for introducing them, and I hope that they remain as strong and as resolute as they can be in pushing them through.

I will try to give noble Lords the context of what we are doing. The reason we are here is that we are facing the considerable problem of non-prosecutions. This is the type of thing happening in our society that is undermining democratic resilience and social cohesion, and which is particularly targeting the Jewish community. That is the area where my amendments are particularly relevant, and they apply in that context.

It is absolutely clear that one of the issues coming up is that a lot of existing powers are not used. I fear to mention Policy Exchange again, but I note that that Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, made a significant point in his speech there today. He said:

“My perception is that if you don’t deal with anti-Israeli hatred, you leave wriggle room for those who indulge in antisemitism but formally disavow it. Once hatred to Israelis is tolerated then it is carried around like a flame”.


He made the further point, which I think is immensely significant:

“The truth is that hatred of nationality fits onto hatred of race like a glove. And importantly, our law recognizes this. The Public Order Act 1986 prohibits stirring up racial hatred. Let me read section 17 of the 1986 Act which defines racial hatred, and I am going to do this slowly: ‘In this Part “racial hatred” means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins’”.

19:30

What is very clear are the number of things that should have already been prosecuted, not least the actions against the restaurant that was raised earlier. The reason why I raise this, and I put this in the context of why we tabled this amendment, is that there is a considerable problem here around enforcement. We tabled the amendment to be very clear about what we should enforce against, because the law is not being applied. This refers to something that two police chief constables, the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and the chief constable in Manchester, have had to make into an act of political courage in saying that they will enforce the law. How shameful that something that should have been dealt with ends up being an act of courageousness by a couple of senior police officers alone.

Herein is the problem—we are not sending the right signals about what this is. That is why the job of Parliament exists. The reason to put this in the Bill is to be clear that it is a political priority. I am sure many of the reviews we have will say the problem is that we are not enforcing the law. The point is that a large part of what we are having to do within the context of the Bill is to define it further in order to do that.

That brings me to Amendment 486C. It is not just a problem about the police or not being clear enough on political signals. I wish we had been much clearer earlier on and signalled whether it was appropriate to make the sorts of protests outside a restaurant that took place. Clearly, there are concerns and considerations about whether the CPS is being too cautious in doing this and not being able to do its job. We have an amendment suggesting that we set up a particular unit inside the CPS to specialise in this. I am not sure that is an entirely good idea and I can quite comfortably speak against it. Such units tend to end up being an act of caution against taking any action. But I want to highlight the issue and probe whether we have got this right and have sent the right signals from this House and from Parliament as to what we intend to do.

Although I associate myself with some of the other amendments proposed here, there are some that I find deeply disturbing and concerning. I cannot overstate my opposition to and hope that the Government take absolutely no account of the amendments from my noble friend Lady Blower. I find the notion deeply troubling. We are trying to define that there is a right to protest in a free and democratic society, but that has to be balanced with not restricting the rights of others in that society.

What we face is not the litany of things that many have said are great acts. These are absolutely terrible incidents where the police do not have the powers to intervene. I find reprehensible the idea that we are to have definitions about what is or is not acceptable, or even distances. I do not believe that any noble Lord tabling these amendments has actually been to any of these protests—if they have, I am even more deeply concerned—to see the type of thing that takes place: the abuse, the phone in the face, the absolute frenzy of hatred and the attempt to restrict movement. These are things that happen not just to the people who are going to these activities but to the caretakers, the cleaners and any of the staff or other people.

I am deeply ashamed that even on my side of the House, people who associate themselves with the rights of workers to be able to work inside communities that are trying to express themselves can be intimidated by people. Giving this discretion to the police, who have had to experience this for a long period of time, is a very proportionate measure. I hope that the Government keep firm in rejecting the accounts that have been given by others as to why this needs any change.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, the Committee is in the business of precision and proportionality. Those two concepts have rightly been raised by a number of noble Lords and my noble friends. It is because of reasons of proportionality and precision that I agree that the concept of “the vicinity” is too vague and too broad. I say that while completely acknowledging that places of worship are sensitive places and that it is completely proportionate within the European Convention on Human Rights to give them some extra protection.

There is precedent in Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for the concepts of “area” and “vicinity” being too flabby and too broad. Noble Lords may remember that this allowed an area not defined to be designated for the purpose of suspicionless stop and search. In 2003, in response to the anti-arms demonstrations at the ExCeL centre in the Docklands, a number of protesters were stopped and searched and issued notices. Only through the parliamentary debates and litigation that followed did the public become aware that all of England and Wales had been designated during the Iraq war. That was the breadth of the area for suspicionless stop and search—a power that was used as an anti-protest power.

That does not mean that there cannot be limitations, but they need some definition. After many years of litigation in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the UK Government were found wanting because of that breadth and the blanket nature of the power, because there was no definition. I am trying to help my noble friends in government by suggesting that concepts such as areas and vicinities will be better for definition, so I support my noble friend Lady Blower and commend her remarks in speaking to her amendment.

I also commend my noble friend Lord Hain and remind the Committee that he was not just an anti-apartheid activist in his day, digging up sports fields and whatever else he was digging up—

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

I was sitting on them, not digging them up.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry. He was sitting on them. I do not mean to defame him.

My noble friend of course went on to be Northern Ireland Secretary and therefore has some understanding of the need to balance rights—the rights of peaceful dissent but also the rights of people to go about their business, particularly in their homes and places of worship and so on. That is proportionality and precision.

This vice of vagueness with the concept of “vicinity” is mirrored in the concept of “area” for the purposes of cumulative disruption. As with the Section 44 provision that ended up being impugned in the Strasbourg court, “area” for the purposes of cumulative disruption is not defined, so we are looking at a very broad power here. I say to noble Lords, with all solidarity with their concerns about, for example, synagogues and places of faith and worship, that provisions such as these can be applied as much to a counterprotest as to a protest, and to one group or another group at different times. When we legislate, we need to have a mind to how these powers might be used in the future.

To those noble Lords who spoke of a new quasi-terrorist proscription but for groups that do not quite meet the threshold—

[Lord Walney (CB)]

Not terrorist.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Not for terrorism but for extreme protest et cetera that by definition does not meet the test of terrorism but something less than that, I urge extreme caution. There is a reason why powers to proscribe have to date been limited to terrorist groups—that exceptional threat—and the reason is that guilt by association is extremely dangerous when you are dealing with broad communities, potentially millions of people, and protest movements.

I have no doubt that some of the activities by some suffragettes—and we saint them now; everyone in this Committee saints and canonises the suffragettes—would meet the terrorist threshold. But does that mean that we want to tar them all in the same way and suggest that the entire movement should be subject to proscription? I urge caution with that and with any amendments in this group that go further than is precise or proportionate.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.39 pm.