Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Bishop of Manchester Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 382H, to which the noble Lords, Lord Godson and Lord Hogan- Howe, have added their names, covers the use in this area of the law of the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse in relation to public order offences.

As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, the law is in a state of incoherence at the moment. It is important, of course, that the law in this area adequately reflects the right to protest, about which there is no issue among any of your Lordships. It also must reflect the interests of third parties significantly affected by protests. The law must be sufficiently clear for the police to be able to know what their powers are and to exercise them sensibly and lawfully. Finally, the law has to be sufficiently clear that members of the public think that it reflects the various interests reasonably involved in the whole question of what lawful protest is and its limits.

The decision in Ziegler was, I think it is broadly accepted, a wrong turning by the Supreme Court; it is accepted by people across political persuasions. I too, like the noble Lord, Lord Davies, very much praise the long and persistent work of Policy Exchange to expose the shortcomings of that decision and the uncertainty it has created in terms of the application of the law. It is never easy for a court to decide what is a reasonable or lawful excuse, but the amendment we have put down assumes that there is sufficient evidence for there to be an offence in the first place. That is a significant rider, of course, but it also provides, in proposed subsection (2), that there is no excuse for the conduct if:

“(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or (b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage”.

What is perhaps somewhat unusual about this amendment, as opposed to the other amendments in the group, is subsection (5) of the proposed new clause, which says:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.


As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, the European convention and its incorporation in our law by the Human Rights Act has very much changed, or potentially changed, the analysis of all sorts of legal situations, particularly in this area. The common law provides that there are certain rights that we recognise, such as the right to free speech or freedom of association. But, as those of us who remember our legal lectures will be told, those rights exist only in so far as they are not made unlawful by some other intervention, either of the courts or of Parliament. Those rights do not trump anything but, none the less, nobody would doubt that we have freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

One of the problems about the European convention is that it states rights, and some of the rights are absolute and some of the rights are qualified, such as—relevant to this particular area of the law—Articles 10 and Articles 11. Therefore, it does not provide an absolute trump card that you can never, as it were, contravene a law on the basis that you have an absolute right to freedom of expression under Article 10 or a right to peaceful assembly under Article 11. In fact, the European court in Strasbourg has not said that it is not open to individual countries to decide what are reasonable limits of those rights.

Where I think Ziegler went seriously wrong was, as it were, ducking the issue by simply saying that, quite apart from what Parliament has said about reasonable excuse and the like, a particular court has to decide proportionality for itself, whether that is by a judge or a jury. In particular, paragraph 59 said:

“Determination of the proportionality … with ECHR rights is a fact-specific enquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.


With great respect, that is not very helpful for a court in deciding whether an offence has been committed or whether a defence is permitted in law.

In fact, I think it went too far because the European Court of Human Rights does not say that individual legislatures should not attempt to legislate by striking the balance, to reflect those matters that I referred to at the beginning of my remarks. For example, in the case of Laurijsen v Netherlands, in 2024, the court said that,

“physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention”.

In other words, Strasbourg does not say that Parliament cannot legislate in this space if it thinks it appropriate to reflect the various matters that are so important in deciding what the limits of lawful protest are.

My amendment—and I support other amendments in this group—would make the law a great deal clearer. It says that you should not invoke some vague notion of proportionality; you simply decide whether there is a lawful excuse, in accordance with the fairly straight- forward provisions we have contained in our amendment, and you may remove from your considerations any of the vagueness of proportionality that emanates from the European court at Strasbourg. That is because we can take it that Parliament has decided that, in all the circumstances, it has taken into account all those rights—whether they be rights of common law or rights in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights—and it has satisfied itself, just as the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, satisfied himself about this Bill, that it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. That is clarity; that is what this amendment seeks.

I imagine that the Minister may have in his notes, when responding to this group, the name of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. By the look on his face, I am not wrong about that. I greatly respect the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and am sure that he will come up with some extremely sensible suggestions. However, we know that the law is not in a good place at the moment and that protest is a particular feature—and why not at the moment, when there are, after all, so many things to protest about? We need the law to be clearer sooner than even the diligence of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, may produce. I therefore suggest that the Minister, who I know will be taking on board all the ideas in this space, should consider carefully whether we can remedy this wrong and make the law clearer, so that all involved in this sphere of law can know what the law is.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, the more I listen to the debate this afternoon, the more worried I am getting. It seems to me that, over recent years, we have successively tightened up regulations around protests, including quite peaceful protests, making it harder and harder for people to express publicly their deep concerns around a whole range of issues. I am not sure that we need more clarity; that is for judges and juries to determine on the details of a particular case. The whole principle of the jury system is that we are judged by our peers and that, if we have undertaken some activity which has brought us before the courts, it is for other people like us to determine on the particular instances. They can take into account the culture and context, in a way that is impossible to do by way of legislation. I am quite wary about over- specifying here. Sometimes clarity is not necessarily the best thing to achieve.

I have one final small point. A number of amendments in this group and others refer to processions. In the area I grew up in, the Whit Friday processions in Mossley and Saddleworth in Greater Manchester are a thing of beauty and a joy for ever. In whole towns and villages, many roads are closed for much of the day, clearly causing massive disruption to people who would otherwise be travelling on those through roads. I want some assurances from the Minister that there is no intention for Bill to be used to prevent traditional religious processions or other processions simply because they happen to close the road for a while.

I think of the procession in Liverpool city centre a few months ago, when that dreadful incident happened; I guess the bloke driving his car felt that his journey was being impeded. But people must have the right to hold their processions to celebrate the victories of their football teams—even in Liverpool, which, as a Mancunian, I struggle with—to have civic processions, football processions and, please, in Greater Manchester, religious processions. I would be grateful if the Minister could assure us that nothing in this Bill could be used to limit those kinds of peaceful, traditional celebrations and processions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

This amendment invites misuse and undermines trust in both policing and Parliament. That is why, in a joint statement, trade unions, charities, non-governmental organisations, and faith, climate justice and human rights organisations have been vocal in their opposition to it only this week. In rejecting it, I hope noble Lords will honour our democratic heritage and safeguard those freedoms for future generations. I urge your Lordships to vote against the new clause contained in government Amendment 372 if it is retabled on Report.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak as these amendments deeply affect places of worship and religious practice. It is always an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hain, whose track record around protests over so many years is one we can all learn a great deal from.

Noble Lords have referred to the attack in Manchester on Yom Kippur. That took place 15 minutes’ walk from my house. I know that because I walked there the day after to meet people. The rabbi is Daniel Walker. We share a surname and an initial, but we do not think we are related—the noble Lord is quite right to say that he has more beard than me. He and I have been good friends for many years. He is an extraordinarily brave man, and I am glad that we are able to reflect on that tonight.