Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these stand part notices. However, we on these Benches are unable to support her as we have general support for Clauses 118 to 120.

The clauses address a very real and increasingly familiar problem in modern protest policing: the deliberate concealment of identity to frustrate lawful policing and avoid accountability for criminal acts. I am sure that all noble Lords have seen videos circulating on the news and online of protests where large groups of people arrive masked or disguising their identity. Often, the only reason for that is to embolden themselves and each other to commit offences, knowing that their identification and subsequent prosecution will be next to impossible. This undermines both public confidence and the rule of law.

Clause 118 creates a relatively tightly drawn offence that would apply only where a locality has been designated by the police because there is a reasonable belief that a protest is likely to involve, or has involved, criminality. It is not a blanket ban on face coverings. Rather, the clause provides clear statutory defences for those wearing items for health reasons, religious observance or work-related purposes. I do not have concerns that these defences may be abused, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some assurances as to how he intends that this will not be the practical reality.

Clauses 119 and 120 provide for necessary safeguards and structures relating to the powers of Clause 118. They stipulate that designation must be time limited, based on a reasonable belief and authorised at an appropriate level. There are explicit requirements to notify the public of the designation, the nature of the offence and the period for which it applies. These safeguards are consistent with other provisions of the Public Order Act that relate to police powers to impose conditions on assemblies and processions.

Removing these clauses would make policing protests even more difficult, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. Offenders who attend protests with the primary intent to commit crimes, whether related to the protest topic or not, will be able to evade justice more easily. The vast majority of peaceful protesters are unfairly associated with disorder that they did not cause. Effective policing protects the right to protest by isolating and deterring criminal behaviour within it. For those reasons, we cannot support the stand part notices in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling her intention to remove Clauses 118 to 120. The Committee is aware of the purpose of those clauses. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, for the broad principle of the clauses.

I start by referring the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to the front page of the Bill. She will see that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint—which is me—has made the statement that the provisions of the Bill are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, which answers the first point that she put to me.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so grateful to my noble friend the Minister for giving way. I am glad to hear him restate his commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights. He will know that that statement at the beginning of any Bill is not a certificate of compliance but a belief in the compliance of the contents of the Bill. I wonder whether my noble friend could help me understand whether there has been any assessment in the department of measures such as this in the hands of a future Government who do not share his commitment to human rights and how such powers might be used.

On the issue of having powers to limit expression when offences are taking place, as my noble friend said a couple of moments ago, I remind him that in Clause 119, which is the mechanism for designation, the test is not that offences are taking place; it includes preventing the possibility of offences. In relation to compliance, he will know that any limits on convention rights must be proportionate, yet the test for designation in Clause 119 is not proportionality but expedience. Can my noble friend help the Committee understand why the human rights language of proportionality has been substituted for the test of expedience?

Finally, can my noble friend say why protest has been singled out in this way and not, for example, carnivals, religious prayer vigils or other gatherings of people where they might conceal their identity?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There were a number of points there. If my noble friend will allow me, I intend to answer the points made during the course of the debate. I say to her straightaway that we have published our analysis of the ECHR obligations; I can refer her to it. I will ensure that if she does not have it to hand, I will send it to her. It is published and is available for that.

As I will come on to in a moment, the rights that we are seeking in this piece of legislation for protesters, the community, the Government and police forces are measured in a way that I believe is acceptable. In recent years, policing large-scale protests has posed significant challenges; the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to that. While most participants exercise their rights peacefully and lawfully, a small minority have engaged in criminal acts while concealing their identity. It is because the police have highlighted this issue with existing powers to identify those committing offences during protests that we have brought these issues forward. It is essential that the police can identify those committing offences during protests, not only to ensure accountability and justice but to protect peaceful demonstrators and the wider public from harm.

As a whole, Clauses 118 to 120 strike a careful balance. This will not apply to all protests. It applies only to protests that have been designated by a senior police officer of inspector rank or above. In addition, as was mentioned by a number of contributors to the debate, although the police currently have powers to remove face coverings in designated areas, they themselves have said to us—this goes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—that those measures are not always effective in the context of managing protests. People often comply but then replace a face covering later, which is difficult to monitor in large gatherings. The new offence addresses this by making it unlawful to wear a face covering once a locality has been designated by a police officer—not by a Minister or by the Government—in the light of upholding rights as a whole.

That senior police officer, who will be at least of the rank of inspector, must reasonably believe that a protest is likely to occur, that it is likely to lead to criminal behaviour—that is the critical point, which comes to the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others—and that it is necessary to act to prevent or reduce such offences. That is an important caveat, not the Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seems to—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

In a moment. It is not a Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia, me becoming Orwellian or the Government becoming Big Brother and being all-seeing. It is about potential criminal activity where a police officer—not the Government, this House or the House of Commons—determines that this action should be taken. If a police officer determines that that designation needs to occur at that space and time, that is a reasonable thing, allowing protests but also stopping criminal behaviour.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I simply want to ask him this question: how far have the Government stress-tested these clauses against the test posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti? Under the auspices of a future Government less benign than this Labour Government—whom I respect, and he knows that—to what extent has that stress-testing tested, for instance, how far the promotion of police officers to the rank of inspector may produce benign results, or how far the results could be Orwellian? I do not suggest that this Government are Orwellian. My suggestion is that there is potential, in these clauses as drawn, for bad consequences.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will say two things to the noble Lord in our defence. His presumption assumes that a police force in five years’ time will be dominated by right-wing Conservatives, Reform members or Socialist Workers Party members, who instruct the police force to instigate that designated area. I happen to believe— I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would agree with me—that the police are independent of government, they have integrity, and they determine policies based on legislation.

This does not give a police officer the power to be a political commissar, whether of right or left, but gives the police the power to say, “There is potentially criminal action in this designated space; therefore, in this space we need to ensure that we can remove face coverings”. If there is another Government who he fears in the future—all of us may fear different Governments of different authoritarian natures—I guess that they will have won an election and will have 400 or so Members of Parliament, and they can pass what the heck they like anyway.

Therefore, there is an argument to say to the noble Lord that his fears are undermining the integrity and the independence of the police force, and all I am doing in this legislation is giving the police the power to take action should they, as the police, determine that they want to do it.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned that it does not require someone to know they are committing the offence. Clause 119(2) requires the police to notify in writing that the designation has been made, the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period for which it applies. So it could even be a designation in writing for a limited time and in a limited place, but it is important that we do so.

A number of noble colleagues have raised religious and medical exemptions and further loopholes. The purpose of the new offence is, as I have said, to prevent protesters concealing their identity in order to avoid conviction for criminal activity in the designated place.

The measure does provide a reverse legal burden on the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they wore a face covering for work purposes, or religious or health reasons. But, as with any charge, that is a defence in the Bill, in the future Act, in law, that allows people to say, “I am a paint sprayer”, or that they were seeking to prevent illness that might cause further illness if they did not wear a mask, or that, potentially, they had a religious reason to wear a mask. That is a defence in the event of any charge being made. But, again, it is a defence at the time when the police officer might well say to an individual that that mask needs to be removed.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Be that as it may, what does the Minister say to people in all the other categories which are not mentioned in the clause as exemptions? People who have work reasons or marital reasons or whatever are not mentioned as exemptions; what do you say to them about attending protests? Are they just to avoid protests on that basis?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are designations that we have set down in law and there are designations that are not set down in law, but the measure is a proportionate one that the police can undertake, and in the event of an individual knowing that that is happening, they can accordingly take their own measures and decide to either protest or not protest. That does not curtail the right to protest.

The measure does not ban face coverings at every protest. An individual can go to a protest; they can wear a face covering for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, has outlined, and only if the police believe that criminal actions could be taken is that area designated. Then it is a matter for the individual, and I believe a majority of peaceful, legitimate protests will not be captured by this legislation, and the police must take great—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The Minister is making a very powerful case but I ask him to focus on the defences which he has recognised. I do not understand why it is a defence for me to show that I wore a face mask because of my religion, but it is not a defence for me to prove, the onus being on me, that I wore a face mask because I was protesting against the Iranian regime and I have family in Iran.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes. We have drawn a line in the defences. I come back to the principle that the power to be used by the police officer, not the Government, is to determine this in the event of suspected criminality occurring.

There may not be, in the case that the noble Lord has mentioned, the need for that designation, because the police may make a judgment, which is their judgment to make, that a protest outside the Iranian embassy, for example, would not lead to potential criminal activity. That is the judgment that we are making. That is the line that we have drawn. I see the point that he has made, but that is the defence that I can put to him today. Because—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I very much support what the Minister is saying. The only question is: will the police have the power not to require this person to take his mask off if they accept his view that that would cause some danger to him or his family in Iran?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The exemptions in the Bill are very clear, and I have already talked about those that relate to religious, work or health reasons. Police officers will make a judgment on those issues on the ground and, as in the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, they have a significantly difficult job to do at any demonstration.

If I can give any comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, all the offences under the Bill are currently under review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, as part of the review that he is undertaking, to be completed by spring 2026. I have no doubt that he will pay close attention to the comments that are made in this debate and make an assessment to government about whether the points made by noble Lords are ones that he should reflect on. I would say to the Committee—

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I am astonished by that statement. Is the Minister saying that we should knowingly pass faulty legislation because we know that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will pick it up and sort it out later?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord opposes the clauses; I do not. We have a difference of opinion on that. This is what Parliament is about. On Report we may have a vote on it. I have heard the support of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Blencathra, and others. I will seek their support in a Division and the House will determine what the House of Commons has already determined, which is whether those clauses are right or wrong for inclusion.

What I am saying is that, on all occasions, there are things that can be looked at and examined. If the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are worthy of consideration, we will have opportunities to have those reviewed, because the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is going to produce a report for the Home Secretary on protest generally. I cannot say what he is going to say or what recommendations he is going to make, or whether we will accept those recommendations. I simply say to the noble Lord today that I believe Clauses 118, 119 and 120 should stand. He does not. I believe that they are right and proper and effective and give powers to the police to do business in a co-ordinated way to prevent crime. There are points that have been made today which no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will reflect on. He may make recommendations to government accordingly, and we may make issues later on. But I say to him now, and to anybody else in the Committee, that these powers are ones that the police have asked for to ensure better policing to prevent crime. They are compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, in my view. They are proportionate and they provide a mechanism to ensure that people at a protest who commit crimes do not commit those crimes without any understanding.

I will make one final point before giving way to my noble friend. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, also talked about facial recognition. He will know that, later on in this Bill, we will deal with issues to do with facial recognition. He will also know that the Government are currently undertaking a consultation on facial recognition, pending comments from anybody who wishes to make them and pending, therefore, better regulation of how any facial recognition is utilised in later legislation at some future point post this Bill. So, whatever concerns the noble Lord has on facial recognition, I believe it is still a valuable tool for policing, but we can examine them at some point downstream and there will be an opportunity to test his views versus the House’s at some point.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his detailed responses and for his patience in taking interventions. Could he in a moment deal with my point about why the word “expedient” has been used in Clause 119 rather than “proportionate”? He himself has talked of proportionality many times, and of course he will know that the test for lawful interference with convention rights is proportionality rather than expedience. And, in the light of comments made in this Committee by noble Lords such as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who does not oppose the provision outright, would he consider, between now and Report, adding an additional defence of fear of reprisal to the health provision, for example?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The wording in the Bill is the wording the Government have agreed. That is the position that we have taken. We may have a disagreement on that. If my noble friend wishes to put an amendment down on Report to change that wording, that is a matter for her. She has made a further suggestion about a further defence. Those are matters that I suggest should be considered by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If she wishes to expediate that quickly, she has the opportunity along with anybody else to table an amendment on Report. But the Government have given serious consideration to this and Clauses 118, 119 and 120 are the result of those considerations. They are at the request of the police, they are proportionate, and they are, in my view, compliant with human rights. I commend them to the House and in a gentle way urge the noble Baroness, either today or in the future, not to seek to withdraw them.

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

I happen to support these clauses, but I have the same concern as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that this has been drawn rather too narrowly and there may be areas that may have to be considered.

Secondly, the noble Lord is quite right: the clauses give this power to the police to prevent crimes being committed. What happens if the police get it wrong? We all know what happened with the sus law and reasonable grounds to suspect: they suspected and stopped people again and again, and nothing was actually worth suspecting. I do not want an answer; I want the possibility of considering what will happen if the police get it wrong. We have the Birmingham question still; I do not want to talk about it, because there are inquiries going on. What measures does the noble Lord want to address the particular conundrum that is there?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I add this, to save time. I know people are trying to expand the number of conditions, but I would like us not to run away with the assumption that the work face mask makes sense. Intuitively, it does, but I do not understand the paint sprayer who is at a protest wearing their mask. They are either at the protest or at work; I am not sure why they are wearing the mask at the protest. I do not understand that juxtaposition, and it may be for the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to consider as well.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, time is pressing for the response, but that is largely due to interventions. I say to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that the main objective of the police in this process will be to ensure that there is a peaceful demonstration, with no trouble for the community at large. If the police overpolice an issue, that is potentially an area where trouble can commence. So I give the judgment to the police to do this in a proper and effective way.

A number of comments have been made, and we will always reflect on those comments, but I stick, particularly because of time, to the contention that the clauses should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I cannot tell you how much energy and self-control it has taken to stay seated, with all these interventions and comments. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his very kind comments and the photographs, which have obviously brought back a lot of very nice, happy memories. I thank him for that. The other aspect to my having to exercise loads of self- control in staying sitting down is that I get very agitated —very irritated, in fact—and I scribble all over the papers I have in front of me, which sometimes makes it difficult to reply fully. I am going to do my best, and I beg the patience of the House in allowing me to go through all my scribbles.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox, and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Marks, for their support. I am very grateful. Obviously, this is a day that will go in my diary: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, actually agreed with something I said. That is quite rare.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I will try to respond to what has been a wide but, at the same time, restricted debate, if that makes sense.

The amendments deal principally with the reasonable excuse defences applicable to various public order and criminal damage-related offences. Amendments 369A and 369B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which had the support of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and others, would exclude a political belief from being considered a reasonable excuse or good reason under the new offences in Clauses 121 and 122.

My view is that this would narrow the scope of the statutory defences and reduce flexibility for the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to consider individual circumstances, particularly given that political belief is a broad and loosely defined concept and not a term commonly used in legislation. The lack of clarity could create uncertainty in its application.

The amendments would also have wider operational implications. By prescribing what cannot constitute a defence, the amendments limit the discretion of the courts, the CPS and the police to make case-by-case judgments. This is important because it could restrict the operational independence of the police, the prosecutors and the judiciary, which must weigh factors such as motive and proportionality when deciding to take enforcement action or to prosecute. That goes to the heart of the noble Lord’s amendments, but the Government consider that the current provisions are sufficient and proportionate, and the defences, as drafted, ensure that enforcement and prosecution decisions are made proportionally and in line with the important human rights legislation and obligations that we adopt and accept.

Amendment 369AA, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—and I thank him for his comments—would remove the good reason defence in Clause 122. I say to the noble Lord simply that this defence is intended to cover circumstances which are also important. For example, it could be that someone needs to climb on a specified memorial to repair or clean it. We should not be criminalising people in such circumstances, but the acceptance of that amendment would mean that could, in theory, be the case.

Amendment 382D in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to remove the reasonable excuse defence available to individuals charged with specific offences under the Public Order Act 2023 and Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. These offences include locking on to an object, tunnelling, or interfering with key national infrastructure. Again, the Government are of the view that the reasonable excuse defence is necessary in these instances to ensure an appropriate balance between protecting the wider community and the right to protest.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope the noble Lord did not take my comments in that vein. It is completely unacceptable for individuals to have their lives disrupted by that level of protest, but it is for the police on site to determine. I was not there on the night; I did not witness the protest. I read about the concerns prior to today, and during the course of this debate I have examined again the reports that have occurred. But it is for a police officer on site to determine. Under existing legislation, there are offences of harassment, of inciting violence and other offences and, as the noble Lord knows, because we have debated this at Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill to ensure that people can, with the police, determine a protest route and the regularity of a protest as part of the proposals in this legislation. I am not ducking the question; it is important that people have the right to live their lives in freedom, and to enjoy a restaurant meal. But I cannot be the police on the night, determining whether the offences that are potentially covered currently by law are exercised by the police. I hope the noble Lord will accept the comments that I have made. With that, I invite the noble Lord not to press the proposed amendments, and to revisit them should he so wish.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, to those who have supported my amendments and even to noble Lords who disagreed with them, because this discussion has laid down the real issue before us: who decides where the limits of protest lie —Parliament or the courts?

Much of the criticism rests on the claim that removing reasonable excuse defences is somehow draconian. I profoundly disagree. I say to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that peaceful protest remains fully protected. These amendments address not expression but coercion, not persuasion but disruption, not dissent but deliberate law-breaking carried out in the expectation that the courts will excuse it after the fact.

That expectation is not hypothetical. It is precisely what flowed from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ziegler. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his interpretation of the law as it stands, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, for his further clarification. The Ziegler decision has encouraged protesters to view arrest as a tactical step, confident that they can later invoke proportionality, sincerity of belief and human rights arguments to defeat prosecution. We saw this with a recent case, whereby Just Stop Oil protesters threw powder paint at the historic Stonehenge. They were acquitted, of course, on all counts. The result is uncertainty for the police, frustration for the public and an erosion of respect for the law.

Noble Lords may agree that the answer lies in better guidance or more nuanced drafting, but we have been down that road. The debates on the Public Order Act 2023, particularly those led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, were an earnest attempt to clarify the law while retaining reasonable excuse defences, but Labour denied the opportunity to do so. The outcome has been complexity layered upon complexity, and still the courts are left to decide case by case whether obstruction, damage, or intimidation was worth it, given the cause advanced.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for his Amendment 370 seeking to update public order legislation. For the benefit of any doubt, let me echo the words of the noble Earl, Lord Atlee, that this is a serious disruption to key infrastructure caused by protest tactics, and I understand the difficulties and challenges met by those types of protests. The amendment seeks to criminalise acts that cause serious disruption to road transport infrastructure. I say gently to the noble Lord that our view is that, under Section 6 of the Public Order Act 2023, there is an offence already on the statute book of obstructing major transport works, and Section 7 makes it an offence to interfere with key national infrastructure, including roads and other transport infrastructure, as defined by Section 8 of that Act. Introducing a new offence that closely mirrors existing provisions risks unnecessary duplication. It could create confusion for police and prosecutors and it could add complexity where clarity is needed. That does not take away the disruption that can be caused, even the occasional minimal disruption where an individual might be stopped by an ambulance, for example. Those are real key issues, but I suggest that existing legislation covers those proposals.

Amendment 382A seeks to amend Section 13 of the Public Order Act to enable a chief officer of police to consider serious damage to property, serious disruption to the life of the community, and the demands on police resources when determining whether to apply for an order prohibiting public processions. Section 13 of the 1986 Act already rightly sets a high threshold for considering whether public processions should be prohibited. It is one thing to place conditions on protests, as provided by elements of the 1986 Act, to enable them to take place peacefully and with minimum disruption; it is quite another to ban processions altogether. I find myself at one with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, on these matters. On occasion, I can reach out with the hand of friendship to him, as well as to other Members of the House.

It is important that all public order legislation continues to be compatible with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and Section 13 of the 1986 Act allows for the banning of a protest only where it is necessary to prevent serious public disorder. Widening the scope of the power to include taking into account police resources would risk undermining the right to peaceful protest and the legislation becoming incompatible with the obligations that we seek to maintain under the ECHR.

Finally, on Amendment 382C, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, takes this in the best way possible, but I agree with him again on the matter of the requirement to increase the notice period for a protest from six days to 28 days. Six days is an adequate time for the police to be able to determine whether a protest should occur. As the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said, there are occasions where protests flare up because of incidents that have occurred. Guidance to police already provides the necessary operational flexibility to allow forces to work with organisers planning protests to ensure that the conditions imposed are necessary and proportionate. I say regretfully to the noble Lord that I believe increasing the statutory notice period is unnecessary, and the following is an important point. Sometimes I come to the House and say that the police have requested matters and that is why I am bringing them forward. We have had no requests from the police to look at increasing the number of days from six to 28.

Having said all that again—and I know the House will become tired of the record that I am playing this evening—all matters of public order legislation fall within the terms of reference of the review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. If his review brings forward issues that need to be examined, we will examine them and consider the findings and recommendations very carefully. But, at the moment, with regret, because he has been so supportive this evening on some other matters, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that I cannot accept his amendments tonight, although I do understand his references and those of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to the disruption these matters can cause. We believe it is covered by existing legislation and I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I have been in your Lordships’ House for 33 years. I have lost count of the number of times that Ministers have said that an amendment is unnecessary, and I have used the same argument myself. That being the case, how is it that we saw the M25 being blocked?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have had 30 years in Parliament, not all in this House, and I have used it occasionally and had it used against me occasionally. It is unnecessary given that we have had the legislation on the statute book to date. The noble Earl asks the quite reasonable question of how the M25 gets blocked. I put it to him that this House, this Government, this Parliament and any other parliament passes legislation. It is not for Ministers to implement that: it is for the local police, at a local level, to take a judgment on the legislation at that time. In the cases where there is legislation on the statute book, the police could exercise that legislation. They may or may not choose to do so, because it may inflame the situation or not. It is a matter for judgment by the local police. I simply say to him that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, are already in place. For that reason, I ask him to not to press them.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, raised the issue of facilitating protest, which is often cited. It made me think, “I don’t know where that is”. I have just had a quick look, and I do not think it exists. I think Article 11 of the ECHR suggests that the police should not inhibit public protests and certainly should not try to intimidate protesters; that is different from making it sound as though they are there to market protest or to be the arrangers of protests so that they achieve their aim. The trouble is that the police have got into that mindset. They would have to do everything to protect the protester and, if they are not careful, forget the rest. That is why I challenge the Minister, not because I think it is badly intended but because I do not think it is accurate in terms of the ECHR.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will take that as a comment for me and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, to reflect on, but I maintain the position. The police have a difficult job. Legislation is in place currently, and the proposals brought forward would replicate that. I am trying to sit down, but I see the noble Lord, Lord Harper, so once again I will take an intervention.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Very briefly, in the spirit of trying to be helpful, and in answering my noble friend Lord Attlee, one of the things that was very helpful in my time at the Department for Transport was that National Highways sought a pre-emptive injunction to set out certain behaviours that should be prohibited and was successful in getting that, which was very effective at giving the necessary tools to the police to keep the motorway open.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper. I add that into the mix of the debate today, but I still come to the conclusion that existing legislation, however it is interpreted, covers this. Therefore—for the last time, I hope—I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate, but I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed and to my noble friend Lord Attlee for supporting my amendments.

The police are charged not only with facilitating lawful protest but with protecting the safety and liberties of all citizens, yet the current legal framework, I suggest, often leaves officers with insufficient tools to intervene meaningfully before disruption becomes entrenched. Amendment 382A strikes at the core of this problem by allowing chief officers to seek prohibition in defined circumstances, including where marches are likely to cause serious disorder, damage or disruption or to place undue demand on limited policing resources. We align the law with operational reality and public expectations.

What do the public expect? Polling shows that large majorities support police intervention in protest scenarios that go beyond peaceful lawful conduct. They reveal a public who very much distinguish between legitimate expression and conduct that crosses into intimidation and disorder. Similarly, extending the notice period to 28 days is a common-sense enhancement that gives police and local authorities the time needed to prepare for large and potentially complex processions. This is about ensuring the responsible ordering of protest in a way that protects public safety, minimises disruption and allows ordinary citizens to go about their lives.

These amendments are a measured, evidence-based response to the challenge of protest policing in the 21st century. I hear what the Minister says, but I hope the Government can give them some serious consideration. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.