2 Lord Bridges of Headley debates involving the Ministry of Defence

Thu 10th Mar 2022
Tue 12th Jul 2016

Ukraine Update

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts
Thursday 10th March 2022

(2 years, 1 month ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Goldie Portrait Baroness Goldie (Con)
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From the outset, we gave Ukraine anti-tank missiles—and we were one of the first countries to do so—but we have been clear that these are bits of equipment that they use to defend themselves against attack; if there is no attack then there is no need to use them. We cannot leave Ukraine in a position where it is unable to defend itself while the rest of us sit back and shed tears. We are trying to put our money where our mouth is and give the Ukrainians what they need. I think we are managing to do that. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, raised the issue of Starstreak and asked whether it fell within the broad definition of what we understood to be legitimate and reasonable in the circumstances. We construe it to be so.

Lord Bridges of Headley Portrait Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)
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I do not wish to go into operational details but could my noble friend the Minister tell us what steps the Government might be taking or discussions they might be having with British business to ensure that our businesses are ready in the event of a possible Russian cyberattack?

Baroness Goldie Portrait Baroness Goldie (Con)
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As my noble friend will be aware, the United Kingdom has its National Cyber Security Centre, which is well placed to deal with and anticipate such attacks. It enjoys a close relationship not just across government departments but with those departments’ client users. Obviously, we can never guarantee that cyberattacks will not happen, but we will certainly do our level best to anticipate them and, were that to happen, to swiftly manage and restore communication.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts
Tuesday 12th July 2016

(7 years, 9 months ago)

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Lord Bridges of Headley Portrait The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)
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My Lords, this has been an excellent, if sobering, debate and I thank all those who have spoken. Once again the House has shown its wealth of experience and expertise. I fear I will struggle to do justice to many of the eloquent speeches we have heard, but I will try.

I start, as so many noble Lords started, by expressing my condolences and sympathy to those who lost loved ones in Iraq and to those who still bear the scars of the conflict today. Whatever our views on the conflict, we can surely all agree on one thing: the bravery and courage of British service men and women in Iraq was exemplary. They did their duty and, as my noble friend Lord Howe said, their record is not the slightest bit stained by the issues that the report highlights. We all owe it to those who served, died or were wounded in Iraq, be they servicemen or civilians, British, Iraqi or any other nationality—as the noble Lord, Lord Judd, said—to learn the lessons from this conflict.

In response to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, just made, I can say that the National Security Adviser is undertaking a process to learn lessons. The new Prime Minister will want to decide if she wants a formal response and what form that response would take. At this point, I cannot go beyond that.

It has taken years for the inquiry to complete its work. We need to learn the lessons from that process itself, including on its remit, the process of Maxwellisation and the machinery that supported it, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord King and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon. There can be little doubt that the report is forensic, it is balanced and, above all, it has avoided any sense of a whitewash. For that, we should all be thankful to Sir John and the other members of the inquiry including the late Sir Martin Gilbert.

The inquiry concluded that mistakes and failings were made that could have been avoided at the time, for which hindsight is no defence. Some of these mistakes could, possibly, be seen as matters of judgment. Those in office at the time will need to account for their actions. I am not going to comment on any of the criticisms directed at individuals in the report. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, reminded us and as said by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, we must temper our criticism by bearing in mind that Ministers were seeking to serve the national interest and were not driven by ignoble motives. However, as a number of your Lordships have said, many other mistakes were clearly failings of the machinery of government, or a breakdown in the ethos of government, where due process was not observed or did not exist and where decisions were made without the opportunity to debate, formally and privately, the evidence to support a course of action or the evidence on which an approach was based.

My brief experience of government has taught me that while the processes and ethos of government—the committees, minutes, impartial advice, collective responsibility, all these things—may not set the pulse racing, they are the rock on which good governance rests, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Butler. These processes are more important than ever in our 24/7 world, to which the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London referred. Politicians, whatever their party, must maintain this critical hidden wiring of our constitution. As the late, great Sir Michael Quinlan put it:

“Governing parties are more than just tenants of the constitutional structure; they have a right … to modify it … but they remain less than owners; they are more like trustees, with an obligation to maintain the structure and hand it on to successors in good working order”.

We shall never perfect the system of government. I am certainly not claiming that it has been perfected by the Conservatives. However, this report is a salutary tale of what happens when some of the basic concepts and processes that underpin collective responsibility are ignored and when not enough opportunity is given to challenge and to debate a policy or approach.

Lurking beneath so much of what has been said in the last few hours is a simple, big question to which the noble Lord, Lord Owen, so eloquently alluded. It is this: what has been done to learn the lessons from Iraq, to ensure that we do not repeat the same mistakes? I do not quite share the pessimism of the noble Baroness, Lady Tonge, that we never learn the lessons of our mistakes. We must surely try to learn, and we are trying to do so.

Before I talk about specific changes that we have made to the machinery of government, I have a word to say about culture. We all know that the machinery of an organisation might be perfect on paper, but if the culture—that is, how people behave, the people to whom the noble Lord, Lord Judd, referred—is wrong, the machinery and all the those pretty organigrams with which one is presented are not worth a jot, a point well made by my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones. As the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, said, good processes do not guarantee good decisions. Nor do they guarantee good behaviour. We need a culture of government where politicians and, crucially, civil servants and service personnel can challenge consensus. In the old adage, Ministers and advisers need to be able to speak the truth unto power and have the confidence and ability to challenge those above them without any qualm.

While preparing for the debate today, I came across something my grandfather said when he was head of the Civil Service back in the 1940s. I hope noble Lords will forgive me for quoting this; I do so merely because he put it much better than I ever could. He said:

“The whole training you have in the Civil Service leads you, when you tackle a problem, first of all to direct yourself to getting the facts: you are given a statement and you say, ‘Is this really so, why is it so, and what evidence does it rest upon?’; and you check it and counter-check it and you say, ‘I wonder whether this is really true, let us ask somebody who has got a different angle of approach to it’; and then you look to see what the different consequences of it are; and finally you are in a position to put something up to your Minister which is really pretty hard boiled as far as the facts and probable consequences are concerned”.

I would argue, although of course I am biased on this point, that that is the culture we want. We need advisers to present Ministers with hard-boiled facts and arguments, however unpalatable they might be. And it is not enough simply for us politicians to utter such words; it falls to politicians to create an environment in which such a culture can thrive, in which those politicians welcome challenge and provoke it themselves. That requires a framework that encourages debate and deliberation.

That brings me back to the machinery of government. At the core of the Government’s response is of course the National Security Council, a Cabinet sub-committee chaired by the Prime Minister. As my noble friend Lord Howe said, it is a formal, dedicated structure for collective strategic leadership on national security and crisis situations, providing an opportunity not simply to share and assess information but to challenge policy and ideas. A number of your Lordships have referred to the NSC, and I would make one big point, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about process. There are regular meetings of all key departments and agencies; experts who are empowered to give their advice; minuted conclusions; and a National Security Adviser, with a strong team, who is responsible for ensuring that decisions are implemented and relevant departments are briefed. Those simple but critical aspects help to address many of the basic failings that the inquiry identified in the machinery of government and, specifically, address many of the failings identified by the report regarding the assessment of the legality of any proposed action, the intelligence on which decisions are made and the Government’s preparedness for action. Entrenching these processes is one—admittedly, just one—way of avoiding the mistakes set out in the report.

I shall say a brief word about each of them. First, on legal advice, as the report says, the Government of the day decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation in the war. The inquiry did not take a view on whether the war was unlawful and I am not going to revisit that issue. However, as has been remarked, the report stated that the legal process was “far from satisfactory”, a point mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Campbell, Lord Morgan and Lord Thomas of Gresford. Again, the NSC has helped us to rectify that. Since its creation, between 2010 and 2015 the Attorney-General was invited to attend NSC meetings when decisions on conflict intervention were under consideration. From 2016 the Attorney-General has become an NSC member in his own right and is therefore privy to all NSC discussions relating to conflict as well as other national security issues.

Next I shall consider the assessment of intelligence. As the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who speaks with great experience on these issues, said, despite the criticisms of the intelligence services in the report it is always important to remember that intelligence, if used properly, is a vital tool. We see examples throughout history, such as the use of Ultra to break the German Enigma codes in World War II or, more recently, in the field of counterterrorism both in Northern Ireland and against Islamist extremism. The UK faces constantly evolving threats, and the work of the intelligence and security services remains critical to our national security.

That said, when assessing intelligence we must not succumb to groupthink, to which my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred, and the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, spoke very eloquently about this. The review in 2004 by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, led to a systematic overhaul of the UK’s intelligence machinery. Today, although we are not complacent, there are more robust measures in place to ensure that intelligence is used appropriately and is challenged in the right way. There is now strong, independent oversight of the intelligence community. For example, the post of professional head of intelligence analysis was established to advise on gaps and duplication in analyst training and on the development of analytical methodology across the intelligence community. Crucially, the JIC chairman is appointed in accordance with the criteria of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that the chair should be,

“someone with experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence”.

On top of this, the Secret Intelligence Service has appointed a senior officer to validate and oversee the quality of human intelligence sources. Furthermore, at the beginning of every NSC meeting, the JIC chairman provides JIC assessments so that the NSC knows the basis of the intelligence we have at our disposal. Clearly, we will reflect on the Chilcot recommendations very carefully and identify areas where we can go even further. Some new proposals are already under way—for example the Investigatory Powers Bill, which will introduce an even more robust safeguards regime for the intelligence community.

However, critical to assessing options for action and responding to challenges is the preparedness of our Armed Forces. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, brought out well the way in which technical advances and the constant demands of the news cycle make the responsibilities of the commander ever more complex. Today more than ever, our Armed Forces and those commanders need to be properly funded, and to have a robust means of planning and the right equipment.

First, on funding, it is worth noting, as my noble friend Lord Attlee said, that the report found the Government’s decision to take part in military action against Iraq was not affected by consideration of the potential financial costs to the UK—either of the invasion, or the post-conflict period—and that the arrangements for funding urgent operational requirements and other military costs worked as intended and did not constrain the UK’s military ability to conduct operations in Iraq. However, as my noble friend Lord Howe said, the coalition Government addressed the £38 billion funding shortfall in 2010 and this Government have committed to meeting the NATO pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defence every year this decade.

Next, I turn to the subject of equipment, which the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and my noble friend Lord Attlee also spoke about. While I do not wish to sound complacent on this point either, progress has been made to address some of the failings that have been recognised. Since 2010, the MoD has implemented fundamental reforms to its structure and management, thanks in large part to my noble friend Lord Levene’s defence reform review. It is now a simpler and more cost-effective organisation but, crucially, one where the focus is now unremittingly on military capability. The MoD has strengthened the urgent operational requirements process to better meet specific operational needs. Where commanders on the ground identify an issue, it can address any equipment issue quickly and effectively.

I turn now to stabilisation and post-conflict work. As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said last week, fighting a war can sometimes be easier than building peace. Again, there are important lessons to be learned about what went wrong in Iraq, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and my noble friend Lord Jopling said. The report highlighted the need not simply for better and timely planning across government, but for a means to assess progress and adapt plans in the face of unexpected challenges.

With that in mind, we have now brought the stabilisation unit under the National Security Council. It produces joint assessments of conflict and security to inform NSC strategies as well as departmental and cross-government programmes, so we are better equipped to plan for post-conflict situations. Part of that, as my noble friend Lord Carrington of Fulham said, is understanding the complexity of other cultures, especially across the Middle East. On top of that, last year we created a dedicated Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. With £1 billion a year, it can support the national security strategy and individual departments’ needs. Furthermore, civilians in the military now routinely train, plan and work together. DfID officials now attend MoD training courses for senior military personnel and its advisers participate in military planning exercises.

The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, made an interesting point about how we might conduct post-conflict planning with other nations and bodies—a point I am sure my noble friend will mull over. As for our support in Iraq today, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London asked about support for charities on the ground. The UK is funding local Iraqi NGOs via the Iraq Humanitarian Pooled Fund to support those in need, including refugees from Fallujah. Through the CSSF we are contributing £6 million to help the Iraqi Government to stabilise areas liberated from Daesh. In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Williams, Daesh is now on the back foot, having lost about 45% of the Iraqi territory it once held. On top of the support that I have mentioned, the Government are making a significant contribution to the $3.6 billion economic support package announced at the G7 summit in Japan.

I should like to write to the noble Lord, Lord Wright, on the questions that he raised about Syria. However, I can say that the transition to a more inclusive political system has remained the UK’s primary objective. The UK has supported civilian operational government structures in liberated areas of Syria, providing real alternatives to Assad and helping the conditions for political transition.

I am very conscious that one cannot do justice to a report of this size, nor the contributions made in today’s debate, in a few short minutes. Although we have made progress in addressing some of the failings identified by Sir John, that process must not stop. There is always more that we can do to improve how decisions are made and implemented. Complacency is the enemy of good government.

More than that, we owe it to those who put themselves in harm’s way in order to protect us and stand up for the values we cherish never to stop asking: how can we do things better? Change we have and change we must, but we should desist at all costs from drawing the wrong conclusions from what the inquiry found. As many of your Lordships have said, the decision to go to war in Iraq shook people’s trust in politicians to its core. The bloodshed and chaos that followed led people to question our nation’s role in the world.

We should not forget that those who serve as politicians and civil servants and in our Armed Forces are, in all but a minority of cases, motivated by a simple desire to serve our country and help to improve the lot of others. Today more than ever, if we are to improve our lot, we must continue to play our part in world affairs. As a number of your Lordships, such as the noble Lords, Lord Soley and Lord Jay, said, not intervening can have serious and disastrous consequences. Learning the lessons from Iraq does not mean pulling up the drawbridge—quite the reverse. We must engage, make our voice heard and continue to do our bit.

Motion agreed.