Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Howard of Lympne

Monday 2nd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

In moving Amendment 10 and speaking to Amendment 11, I am returning to an unimplemented recommendation made in his March 2014 report by the independent reviewer about which I spoke at Second Reading and in Committee. These are the only amendments which relate to Part 2 on TPIMs. I want to make just five points.

First, the main and certainly the most contentious change in the TPIM regime brought about by Part 2 is the provision for internal relocation orders—internal exile, as it is being called. In short, it gives the Secretary of State power to require someone who is suspected of involvement in terrorism to move as far as 200 miles away from their present home. Not surprisingly, these highly disruptive kinds of order—which, in years past, used occasionally and contentiously to be made in control order cases—are deeply resented. Occasionally, however, I accept that they are a regrettable necessity.

Secondly, one of the conditions to be satisfied before any TPIM order can be made is that the individual in question is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity, which is known as condition A. Under the present legislation, the 2011 Act, that condition is met if the Secretary of State “reasonably believes” that that is the situation. Clause 20(1) of the Bill would substitute for the requirement of reasonable belief on the part of the Secretary of State the requirement that he be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the person is involved in terrorism.

Thirdly, to my mind there is no practical difference between those two tests, hence the effect of Amendment 10 would simply be to leave out Clause 20(1), which substitutes one for the other. But far, far more important than Amendment 10 is Amendment 11, which is directed to the court’s oversight powers with regard to TPIM orders. Under the 2011 Act as it stands there is provision for initial review hearings of these orders and later for appeals by the High Court in each case. However, for reviews and appeals, the 2011 Act expressly provides that:

“The court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review”.

Amendment 11 would widen the court’s jurisdiction so that it would be for the court to decide for itself whether the person in question was probably involved in terrorism and not merely for the court, as now, to ask itself whether the Secretary of State’s conclusion about that was one that he could reasonably arrive at or whether it was, on the contrary, perverse.

Fourthly, this strengthening of the court’s oversight powers was specifically recommended by Mr David Anderson, the independent reviewer, in his report of last year. In his recent oral evidence that he gave in November and December respectively to the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, he expressly regretted that his recommendation had not been implemented. In fact, Amendment 11 is more limited than Mr Anderson recommended. He recommended that in all TPIM cases the final decision on whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity should be one for the court rather than for the Secretary of State, subject only to judicial review. My amendment would secure that this is so only in those most troubling of cases that I have already mentioned where the suspect is to be relocated far away from his own home.

Fifthly and finally, I should note with gratitude that last Thursday, after the debate in Committee at which widespread support was shown for my amendment, the Minister was kind enough to see me to discuss this question. Essentially, as I understand it—he will correct me if I am wrong—the Government’s position is that this amendment is not necessary because case law shows that the court interprets and applies its review powers in such a way as to suggest that in effect the court already takes the final decision itself. If that remains the Government’s view, I would challenge it for these reasons.

First, it postulates, necessarily, that the court is disobeying the express statutory prohibition placed on it by the 2011 Act against exercising any fuller or wider jurisdiction than that of judicial review. Secondly, I must ask rhetorically why the independent reviewer would make this recommendation and, indeed, regret its rejection if in truth it is quite unnecessary. Thirdly, given that the Government accept that what they suggest is the court’s actual present approach to these cases—namely, that of deciding the question for itself— why on earth not write that into the statute and thereby, as Mr Anderson himself put it in his report,

“help reinforce the legitimacy of TPIMs”,

and reassure a sceptical public and a worried minority community that the court is indeed playing its full part in safeguarding those at risk of these orders against the inappropriate use of this draconian power?

Amendment 11 is the important one. Amendment 10, as I indicated in Committee, is really an optional extra. I beg to move.

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Amendment 11. I shall be brief, but I appreciate that what I am about to say runs the risk of disturbing the relative tranquillity of this afternoon’s proceedings. Amendment 11 seeks to transfer the responsibility for the making of a crucial decision in this process from the Secretary of State to the courts. It is but another skirmish in the turf war between some judges on the one hand and Ministers and Parliament on the other hand which has featured so extensively in recent debates in your Lordships’ House, not least in the context of judicial review. It is my contention that decisions as important as the one we are currently contemplating should be made by the Secretary of State and not by the courts, so I hope that the view which was ascribed by the noble and learned Lord to the Minister about who is to take the final decision is based on a misapprehension. That is because I am firmly of the view that it is the Secretary of State who should take the decision.

My reason is very simple. It is the Secretary of State who has the responsibility of protecting the people of our country from terrorism and terrorism-related activities, and it is the Secretary of State who is accountable to the people of our country for the exercise of that responsibility: accountable to the electorate both in their capacity as an individual Member of Parliament and in their capacity as a member of the Government of the day.

It is right, as the noble and learned Lord has acknowledged, that the decision of the Secretary of State should be subject to the normal processes of judicial review. That is a feature of the current proposals. But it is the Secretary of State whose decision it should be, not a decision of the courts.