Artificial Intelligence in Weapon Systems Committee Report

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Friday 19th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton. Like him, I congratulate the committee’s chair, the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and thank him for securing an early debate on the report, for his comprehensive and powerful opening speech and for his adroit and inclusive chairing of the committee. It is most important in these circumstances to have a chair who is inclusive. It was a pleasure to serve under his chairmanship and it is an equal pleasure to recognise and thank the clerks, the staff and advisers for their exemplary support.

The report and the record of its proceedings contain a great deal that is of value, including testimony from a range of experts which would repay concerted attention from Ministers and officials. Mindful of the time constraint, I wish to focus on one specific area: our working definition of AWS, or rather, the absence of one, which presents very real difficulties, both domestic and international.

The gateway through which I entered this somewhat Kafkaesque debate was a sentence from the Ministry of Defence which purported to explain why this country does not have an agreed definition of AWS. Cited on page 4 of the report and intermittently thereafter, it suggests that we do not have a working definition of AWS because, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has quoted more broadly than I will, such terms

“have acquired a meaning beyond their literal interpretation”.

The floor of your Lordships’ House is not an appropriate forum for a detailed textual exegesis, although I do enjoy that. However, that sentence recalled Hazlitt’s criticism of the oratory of William Pitt, which he stigmatised as combining

“evasive dexterity, and perplexing formality”.

This impression reflects the conclusion of the committee that this explanation is plainly insufficient. How can we actively seek to engage with policy in regulating AWS if we cannot find even provisional words with which to define it? It is like attempting to make a suit for a man whose measurements are shrouded in secrecy and whose very existence is merely a rumour. These are, of course, enormously complex questions but in making good policy, complexity should not be a refuge but a rebuke. It is the job of Governments of any political stripe to be able to articulate their approach and have it tested by experts and dissenting voices.

In advising the Government to adopt a definition, the committee was careful. While it suggested that a future-proofed definition would be desirable, the report makes it clear that even a more provisional operational definition would be useful. We understand that this could change as the technology dictates, but it would at least have the advantage of reflecting the Government’s contemporary thinking. In lieu of that, we are forced to make a series of inferential leaps in guessing details of the Government’s approach to this question. We are given to understand that the Government use the NATO definition of “autonomous”, which takes us a small step forward, although as the report makes clear, that leaves terms such as “desired”, “goals”, “unpredictable” and, extraordinarily, “parameters”, entirely undefined.

Questions about an agreed definition have vexed policymakers in other domestic and international fora, but we should at least be working towards a definition that would bring some measure of clarity to our regulatory and developmental efforts. I would urge, therefore, the Minister to reconsider the question of an operational definition.

In so doing, I remind the Minister of the evidence of Professor Stuart Russell, who noted that the lack of specificity was creating damaging ambiguity in intergovernmental co-operation, and of Professor Taddeo’s concern that the current definitional latitude allows unscrupulous states to develop AWS without ever describing them as such, and her further exhortation upon this Government to develop

“a definition that is realistic, that is technologically and scientifically grounded, and on which we can find agreement in international fora to start thinking about how to regulate these weapons”.

Royal Navy: Climate Change Training

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall ask the Minister a question that is within his brief. The respected Institute for Economics and Peace has identified 27 countries with over 700 million people who already face catastrophic ecological threats but at the same time have the lowest levels of societal resilience. This is a recipe for conflict. The list includes countries where we are likely to deploy our Armed Forces and other humanitarian and emergency responders if requested so to do. The Minister and I have had cause to discuss the complications and consequences of the manifestation of an unanticipated risk that caused the accidental death of a member of our armed services deployed with our allies in a foreign jurisdiction in a post-conflict environment. With that in mind, since we have identified the countries where we will need them, should we not be working on appropriate and comprehensive status of forces agreements now in anticipation of this situation arising again?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord. However, I make two points. First, we will not and cannot compromise military capability solely for a sustainable solution. A key principle here is to safeguard the national defence, and that is paramount. Secondly, having said that, the UK is world-leading in this area, and we should be proud of our Armed Forces’ efforts to gain an edge on the threats and challenges posed by climate change. Each service is making significant improvements.

UK Armed Forces

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I can do no more than take that message back, and take the tone of the House back, to the Secretary of State. He will not be surprised, but I will certainly undertake to do that.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will remember that, last year, a senior US general remarked that the British Army was no longer regarded as a top-level fighting force. Some short time thereafter—I cannot remember exactly when it was—at Defence Questions, the then chair of the Defence Select Committee invited the Secretary of State to comment on these remarks as he said they tallied with his committee’s own findings that the conflict in Ukraine had exposed serious shortfalls in the war-fighting capability of the British Army. I have no way of judging whether any of that is correct, but what interested me was the Minister’s response. The Minister, Mr Heappey, responded that

“underinvestment in the Army … has led to the point where the Army is in urgent need of recapitalisation”.

That was the word he used: “recapitalisation”. He went on to say:

“The Chancellor and Prime Minister get that, and there is a Budget coming”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/1/23; col. 5.]


We have now had two Budgets. There was no recapitalisation in the first. There certainly was no recapitalisation, for the reasons that my noble friend pointed out, in the second. So, when is this recapitalisation going to happen? This, out of the mouths of Ministers, is in direct contrast to the description the Minister gives this House. Why is that?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, one can look at the recapitalisation—and I understand it is a very strong word—and the environment we find ourselves in at the moment. Let us think about the orders we have placed at the moment. There are 22 ships and submarines either on order or under construction, and I have seen some of them; we have got 1,200 armoured vehicles on order; we support, in this country, over 400,000 jobs across the union. We spend £25 billion with the UK defence industry, including £5.5 billion on shipbuilding and repair, close to £2 billion on aircraft and spacecraft, and over £2 billion on weapons and ammunition. We continue to support the defence industry and our Armed Forces as best we can. On the absolute amount of money, I completely understand the level of concern.

AUKUS

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 29th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, while the events in Ukraine and the Middle East have understandably engrossed the world’s attention, we have seen developments in the Indo-Pacific that signal its increasing geopolitical centrality: in 2022, China struck a security pact with the Solomon Islands; in January, Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China; and, a month ago, Papua New Guinea confirmed early-stage talks with Beijing on a security and policing agreement. Post AUKUS, Chinese-driven media activity across several Pacific island nations demonstrates that China regards the agreement as a major impediment to its geopolitical ambitions, as does its concerted diplomatic pressure on smaller nations across the region.

I do not question the aims of AUKUS, but I have three questions about our approach to realising those aims and our capacity so to do. The first is about the future of submarine warfare. The last two years have seen advances in uncrewed submarine capabilities by our allies and our strategic adversaries. In Russia, the K-329 Belgorod submarines emerged—unmanned nuclear-powered submarines that purportedly offer nuclear-strike capabilities, as well as deterrence support. Last year, North Korea unveiled its first nuclear-armed unmanned submarine.

While encouraged by our own Project Cetus, I ask whether any assessment has been made of the extent, if any, that crewed, nuclear-strike submarines will have been superseded by the time Australia is building SSN-AUKUS boats. Given the rapidity of relevant technology advances, it would be useful to know if any such work has been or is likely to be commissioned.

Secondly, on our industrial capacity, can we meet our obligations under the AUKUS agreement’s optimal pathway? Each of the last Astute-class submarines under commission took around 130 months to complete. We are told that HMS “Agincourt” will commission after a 99-month build. Why does the MoD believe that we will be able to complete work on HMS “Agincourt” 31 months more rapidly than we did for the previous four submarines in the class and 13 months faster than BAE Systems has ever built an Astute?

Lastly, on the reliability of the MoD’s financial estimates, on 7 December I asked why the three services have different approaches to cost forecasting, with the Navy and RAF including predicted costs for the capabilities planned while the Army includes only what it can afford. The noble Earl the Minister said that he was in “entire agreement” on the question of consistency and conceded that in 40 years of looking at budgets he had

“never seen a budget that resembles anything like this one”.—[Official Report, 7/12/23; col. 1570.]

On top of this supervening inconsistency, we have seen the NAO describe the MoD’s equipment plan to 2033 as “unaffordable”; the MoD’s own worst-case forecast concedes a funding gap of almost £30 billion. What financial contingencies has the Minister’s department instituted or considered to ensure that we meet all our pillar 1 and 2 AUKUS obligations? Any assurance in the Minister’s answers to these questions would be extremely welcome.

Iran: Military Power

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what recent assessment they have made of Iran’s capacity to project military power beyond its borders.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (The Earl of Minto) (Con)]

My Lords, the Ministry of Defence regularly makes assessments of our adversaries’ ability to project military power beyond their borders and how this may affect UK interests. We continue to monitor developments in the Middle East, including Iran’s destabilising actions in the region. The UK has long condemned Iran’s reckless and dangerous activity in the Middle East. Iran’s support to militant groups directly counters UK interests. The Government are committed to working with international partners to deter Iran’s destabilising activity, including by holding Iran to account at the UN and maintaining our permanent defence presence in the region.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, Iran arms—including by supplying Shahed drones—trains and funds militias and political movements in at least six countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Yemen. This is because it is a revisionist state seeking to change the regional order. Possession of a nuclear weapon would magnify its ability so to do. This would embolden not only Iran but its proxies, which is why preventing that must continue to be a foreign policy priority. What measures are we taking with allies and regional partners to ensure that Iran is not able to achieve nuclear weapon status? If we are to adopt a more stringent policy to frustrate Iran’s objectives, deepening engagement with regional partners will be critical. What is His Majesty’s Government’s assessment of the state of our alliances in the region? How are we seeking to enhance these relationships and to bolster our partners’ resistance to Iran’s proxies?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very thorough and important point. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution and are prepared to use all diplomatic options to prevent Iran developing a nuclear weapon, including, if necessary, triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism, which allows for the rapid reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran. Along with partners, including the US, France, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UK is leading international efforts to deter Iran. This includes keeping international focus on Iran to dissuade it from proliferating, stopping the supply of weapons components into Iran, and deterring potential purchasers of all Iranian weapons.

Conventional Weapon Stocks: Expenditure

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, a lot of orders are outstanding, as I have just said, with an enormous amount coming through in the next 12 months. We are replacing everything that we have gifted to Ukraine as expeditiously as we can. As I think I have described once before, this is a holistic view. We are not just replacing like for like; we are taking advantage of improvements in technology to ensure that we have the correct weapons to meet the threat that defence faces.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, Russian shell production—not shell orders—next year is assessed to run at 4 million per year. The Secretary-General last week asked member states to increase arms production. In response, arms manufacturers, including Norway’s Nammo, suggested that this would be possible only if Governments shared risks with manufacturers, given the scale of the capital investment needed. Therefore, what discussions are we having with our NATO partners about formal mechanisms through which this can be achieved?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

The noble Lord raises an extremely important and valid point. Noble Lords will know that NATO placed an order for 155 mm artillery shells on 23 January worth $1.2 billion. We have also placed two orders with BAE Systems and invested in its production capacity to ensure that we can also take delivery of the right amount of 155 mm shells. I understand that it has increased the production rate by eight times.

Afghan Relocations: Special Forces

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 5th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I will certainly take up that question about the British Council. The Government are absolutely clear about their responsibilities under ARAP and ACRS, and are doing their absolute best to ensure that we end up with a fair and equitable solution.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the fact that the Government have undertaken to review all those applications that were deemed to be ineligible. Some of those very brave men are in hiding in Afghanistan, and some of them are in Pakistan, but some are here. In the chaos of leaving Afghanistan, they were all denied access to the evacuation flights. They all knew the Taliban knew where they lived. They were forced, in those circumstances, to get here by irregular and dangerous routes. Will the Ministry of Defence undertake not to make them ineligible for ARAP because of the way they got here?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, my understanding is that that is absolutely correct. Everything is being considered on a case-by-case basis, and the information now needs to be as pure as it possibly can be to enable us to decide whether those employees of the Afghan Government are eligible to relocate into this country.

Royal Navy: Drone Attacks in the Red Sea

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 5th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My noble friend makes a very good point. The French are extremely supportive, but of course it is each sovereign nation’s decision whether or not to become lethally involved.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, given the importance of Sea Viper—the missile that was used to shoot down these drones—to our operational capacity, what plans do we have to follow the example of the United States and prioritise work on a transportable rearming mechanism? This is a technological advance that would allow HMS “Diamond” and other vessels to reload vertical launch missiles at sea, rather than putting into port as they presently have to do.

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, that is a very good point. Sea Viper is extremely effective, and there is a new version, which I think is called Sea Viper Evolution. A very substantial amount of money—about £400 million— is being spent to upgrade that. Rearming at sea is something I am not particularly knowledgeable about, so I will find out and write to the noble Lord.

Former Afghan Special Forces: Deportation

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness makes a very good point. The accuracy of the data held on large numbers of people requires double- checking and checking again. At the heart of approval under ARAP is the accuracy of exactly what these individuals did.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in responding to a question about specific individuals in the other place, the Armed Forces Minister told the House that His Majesty’s Government

“do not have the employment records of the Afghan special forces”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/12/23; col. 631.]

Today, I was informed by a very reliable source that, until at least August 2021, our embassy in Kabul held nominal records for members of CF333 and ATF444, for the purposes of their “top-up pay”. They were in our employment and, until at least August 2021, His Majesty’s Government held their employment records. Surely, they still exist?

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I am not certain that the word “pay” is accurate. I think expense recompense is more appropriate, which is different: you gift something and get something back. If the records are there, we will follow them down. I was not aware that they were held.

Ministry of Defence: Equipment Plan

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 7th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a good point. In fact, there is considerable investment in skills—particularly in the areas of nuclear and shipbuilding—within these figures, all of which are costed. She is absolutely right that the skills gap that the industry is facing is entirely being funded and down to government.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, following on from the most important question arising from this report, raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, I wish to make a couple of points to the Minister and ask him a question. First, this report, like all NAO reports, was agreed by the department.

Secondly, the report specifically says that the equipment plan

“does not reflect all the cost pressures to develop new and support existing capabilities set out in the 2021 Integrated Review”,

which was updated in March this year. I recollect that the then Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, said that the extra £5 billion was welcome but that £11 billion was needed.

Thirdly, the report highlights the fact that the individual services have differing approaches to preparing the forecast in the plan. The Navy and the Royal Air Force include predicted costs for the capabilities that the Government expect from them while the Army includes only what it can afford. These issues need immediate attention, do they not? They should be attended to immediately.

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord has said. One of the key points about the NAO report is that it does not reflect the aspiration to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP when economic and fiscal conditions allow. If one puts that back in, it obviously completely changes the finances.

On the question of consistency, I am in entire agreement. I am very new in this role. I have looked at budgets for the last 40 years and I have never seen a budget that resembles anything like this one, and that is not just the absolute figures. The way in which it is constructed means that it is very difficult to get to exactly the way in which the money moves around. That is something that I commit to the House that I will learn and then lose not much more sleep over.