(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it was actually the turn of the Cross Benches, although I do not know what the Lord Speaker will decide, because we are now out of time.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI can simply clarify to the Chamber that the AUKUS programme’s SSN-AUKUS submarines are nuclear-propelled, not nuclear-armed.
My Lords, the first AUKUS pillar 2 autonomous weapons and artificial intelligence trial took place in April. On 27 June, the White House Indo-Pacific co-ordinator, Kurt Campbell, said that there would be co-operation with all three countries on artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and that other allies and partners would be invited to join this development. That is quite a significant development, although not unexpected, given the elements of AUKUS. Is there any possibility that we will get a ministerial Statement on this matter?
What I can confirm to the noble Lord is what is already in the public domain. We have always said that, as progress is made with the three countries on pillar 2—which is distinct from the original pillar, which is trilateral—other critical defence capabilities will then seek opportunities to engage allies and close partners. As the noble Lord correctly indicated, the trial held in April was most encouraging, and a two-minute video was released by all three nations. We have to take one step at a time.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of Ofsted’s welfare inspection regime in respect of the Army Foundation College in Harrogate.
My Lords, we welcome that Ofsted rated the Army Foundation College in Harrogate as outstanding in all areas and for overall effectiveness, reflecting the excellent standard of the provision of duty of care and welfare. Ofsted praised the strong ethos of emotional and psychological safety, inclusion and teamwork that it identified as firmly embedded. The college continues proactively to engage with Ofsted’s recommendations to ensure that all recruits are prepared for and supported throughout their training.
I thank the Minister for that Answer. In 2013, 2018 and 2021 Ofsted graded welfare and safeguarding at AFC Harrogate as outstanding. Answers to Parliamentary Questions and the MoD’s own records reveal, among other examples, that between 2014 and 2023 the college itself recorded 72 complaints of violence by staff, at least 13 of those cases being proven; that in 2018 a prosecution of 16 accused members of staff collapsed for procedural reasons due to the flawed handling of the case by the RMP; and that in February this year Simon Bartram, an AFC instructor, was found guilty of disgraceful conduct and sexual assault over a nine-month period between 2020 and 2021. Ofsted, despite being invited so to do, says it cannot engage with the information relating to any of these events. How can the Ministry of Defence be comfortable with this? What steps, if any, is it taking to improve the inspection of welfare and safeguarding at the AFC?
The noble Lord refers to profoundly regrettable and utterly unacceptable incidents, but it is important to put the period of nine years to which he refers into a more specific context. First, the college, having learned from those earlier appalling incidents, has introduced important changes, reflected in the much-improved environment on which Ofsted commented so positively in its 2021 report. Secondly, the MoD has introduced new policies and changes to deal with sexual offences and unacceptable sexual behaviour below the criminal threshold. It has taken steps to improve the complaints system, has created the Defence Serious Crime Unit and has a zero-tolerance policy for sexual offences and sexual relationships between instructors and trainees. All of that now reflects a much-improved climate at the college.
I can confirm that the specific case to which the noble Lord referred was dealt with through the service justice system. The individual was found guilty of nine charges. He was sentenced to detention, reduced in rank and discharged from the Army. Sadly, we cannot ever eliminate the prospect of something unacceptable happening, but significant steps have been taken to try to reduce that possibility.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not share the noble Lord’s pessimistic assessment. As I have pointed out, there is in place an exciting programme of land vehicles. For Boxer, initial operating capability will be achieved in 2025. We anticipate that very good progress is being made on Ajax, and they will come into play later on in this decade. I point out to the noble Lord that, as he is aware, we have Warrior functioning; it is part of the transition. We have Challenger 2, and we are upgrading to Challenger 3. We have got a perfectly well-equipped Army. We observe our obligations to NATO and we observe our obligations to keep this country safe.
My Lords, between the cancelled Warrior capability sustainment programme and the extraordinarily delayed Ajax programme—it may well be in a good place now, but it is not expected to have what is called “full operating capability” until 2029, which is a full decade longer than was planned—the MoD has spent over £3 billion in failing to introduce or upgrade two armoured vehicles. What lessons have been learnt from this, and what changes to procurement have been made? Is there nowhere else in the world a vehicle already in production that we could buy with some of the £41 billion set down for capability of this nature in the future?
In relation to Ajax, I confirm for the noble Lord that the initial operating capability requires 50 operational deployable vehicles to be delivered and to be achieved by December 2025, and that will be a significant augmentation of the capability. The full operating capability requires 422 of the 589 operational deployable vehicles to be delivered; that is to be achieved between October 2028 and September 2029. As I indicated to my noble friend Lord Lancaster, there is a very exciting period of development for land capability; I think we should celebrate that.
On the final point of the noble Lord’s question, I have acknowledged that I think there is the opportunity for the MoD, in procurement, to look at different models of getting things when they need them. I think this is recognised within the MoD, and I think the phrase used has been that we have pursued the exquisite, involving cost and time, perhaps at the expense of actually getting what we need, when we wanted it.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI say to the noble and gallant Lord that I think that the evidence to date has been that Ukraine has mounted an extraordinarily courageous and very effective response to Russian air aggression. Among the many types of equipment we have supplied to Ukraine, we have included anti-aircraft missile systems that can be launched from both land and ship.
My Lords, for the obvious reason that we must at all costs avoid an escalation of this war, Ukraine’s allies have equipped Ukraine for a defensive war, but now all the talk is about offensives. Attacking is certainly much more difficult than defending. If all the Leopard 2 tanks that have been promised arrive, will there be sufficient to break through the Russian defences? Who is going to provide the air support that will be necessary for any offensive to be effective?
Obviously we remain engaged with Ukraine on its immediate needs and how best we, in conjunction with partners, can respond to them. I am not at liberty to disclose operational matters, for reasons widely understood. We constantly monitor the situation, and we will continue to do whatever we can to support Ukraine as it tries to repel this illegal invader.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble and gallant Lord makes a number of important points; let me try to deal with them.
On the management of contracts and the willingness to have teeth and bite where that is necessary, I think the noble and gallant Lord would be encouraged to see the complete difference in approach in the MoD now compared with some years ago. That is partially because the MoD has woken up to the need to be much more effective in how it manages these enormous contracts with vast sums of taxpayers’ money. To be honest, it is also because we felt the bite from teeth—from your Lordships in this Chamber, from our friends in the other place, and from entities such as the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee. These were unpleasant experiences for the MoD but what they signalled was an absolute need to radically reform and revise what we were doing.
In addition to all that, the one word of comfort I can offer to the noble and gallant Lord is this: bear in mind that this is a trilateral arrangement and agreement. There is, therefore, a triumvirate interest in ensuring that nobody is slipping and everybody is keeping up to the mark. That will be an added enhancer to how we monitor and regulate the performance of the contract.
On the important matter of skills, industries are already engaged—I have seen it at first hand—in really imaginative programmes in their communities with young people. I have been hugely encouraged when I have seen how they operate in different parts of the country. They are engaging with both primary and secondary schools. They are making these critical connections with young people, many of whom then make the choice not only to follow a career in technology but to do it with a particular company. That is one very positive way of trying to increase the skills base available to our industry partners.
At government level, particularly in the Department for Education, there is a recognition of the unrelenting need to reappraise constantly how we seek to improve the provision of skills and ensure that education is aligned with what the economy and industry are asking for. I do not have at my fingertips the details of what we have done so far but I would be happy to write to the noble and gallant Lord about that.
My Lords, welcome as this Statement is, there is nothing at all in it about the financial or opportunity costs of this partnership. Is it true that it will cost $245 billion over three decades? How much of that cost will we bear? Which budget will it come out of? In answering a question today posed by the noble Lord, Lord Swire, on the fourth Oral Question, the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Penn—indicated that all nuclear capability would be charged from some other part of the budget. I do not understand that to be the case but, if it is the case, it is a change; if it comes with this, it is very welcome. How much is this going to cost, is it going to come from the existing Ministry of Defence budget and what will be the opportunity cost of that if that is correct?
Given that China poses threats in every domain, not just under the water, what assessment have we made of Australia putting so many of its eggs in this exquisite capability basket, given that we will depend on it in all these other domains to be an active ally with capability?
On cost, the noble Lord will not be surprised that I am unable to give specific figures, for what I think are widely understood reasons. I imagine that differing levels of cost will apply because, for example, the role of the United States is based on it having an established Virginia class of submarine being built; as the noble Lord will be aware, part of the agreement is Australia seeking to buy three of those. There are now huge issues for Australia in creating the infrastructure that it will need to build the submarines, so, again, it is anticipated that its costs will be different from those of either the US or the UK.
For our own part, as is indicated, we in the UK have been investing in our submarine-building infrastructure. Some £2 billion was announced last year to support the Dreadnought class of submarines. The recent integrated review refresh announcement of £5 billion—obviously, I am rounding the figure up for ease of use—will be split into three, spread over two years, to sustain the nuclear enterprise. My understanding is that the additional £6 billion, which will be spread over three years—£2 billion per year—is also allocated to the nuclear enterprise, excluding the Dreadnought enterprise. That is money that we know is going to be there, and we are therefore able to budget appropriately.
It is important to go back to what the Prime Minister and the Chancellor have clearly indicated: that, having regard to the turbulent world in which we live, they see defence as a national primary responsibility and priority. They are prepared to work, even in difficult economic circumstances, to ensure that we do as much as we can to sustain a powerful and effective defence capability.
I turn to the last part of the noble Lord’s question, which was about this perhaps being a unique solution for Australia. Australia must make its own strategic decision about what it seeks and what it wants. Eighteen months ago, it identified that it had a need and that the best way to respond to that need was to seek a nuclear-propelled submarine. It is positive and gratifying that it then looked to the United Kingdom and the United States. As the noble Lord will be aware, we have a long-standing and close relationship on the construction of submarines. Australia has made a perfectly balanced decision that this type of submarine, propelled as it is by nuclear propulsion, offers huge advantages: it is far more effective in itself; it can circumnavigate the globe without coming up; it is difficult to detect; and it is much more efficient to run. For those who, naturally, care about the environment, it produces a cleaner form of emissions than, for example, a diesel-powered submarine.
Australia has looked at this closely and come to its own strategic, sovereign decision about what it wants. We should all feel very proud that it wants the UK to be part of this vital partnership in delivering what it seeks.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the plans of the United States of America’s Department of Defense to commission an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of its (1) nuclear weapons, (2) nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), and (3) integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems; and whether they intend to carry out a similar failsafe review.
My Lords, in begging leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests.
My Lords, it would not be appropriate for His Majesty’s Government to comment on the United States Government’s plans to commission an independent review into the safety, security and reliability of their nuclear capabilities. We have absolute confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, but for the purpose of safeguarding national security, we will not provide detailed comment on arrangements for its assurance.
My Lords, on 27 February, the Minister for Europe, Leo Docherty, addressed the UN Conference on Disarmament. He mentioned emerging threats posed by new technologies, promised transparency, and committed to the continuing development of concrete initiatives in reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. He did not mention the US Administration’s ongoing public and independent review of the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapons, command and control, and warning systems to reduce the chance of a blunder or miscalculation, particularly from cyber threats, as an example of a confidence-building, concrete, risk reduction initiative. Since all nuclear-armed states face the same risks, surely this is a concrete and transparent risk reduction initiative, which the UK and France, at least, as nuclear and NATO allies, should also commission. Will this be on the agenda for the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Macron on Friday?
As I said in my initial response to the noble Lord, there is a very robust system within the United Kingdom, as he will be of aware, for how we deal with the safety of our nuclear weapons—there is a surveillance programme to check that they are continuing to be reliable and safe—their security and the regulatory regime that covers our nuclear activity. We continue to invest in future capabilities to underwrite safety and performance. That includes collaboration with France under the 2010 Teutates treaty; we are jointly building and operating a hydrodynamic trials facility—EPURE—in France and a complementary capability, AWE. It is interesting that the United States last carried out a review in 1991, I think. I am aware of the noble Lord’s organisation and I pay tribute to his knowledge. His interest in this matter has been encouraging the US to carry out a review, but I reassure noble Lords that there are very robust structures within the United Kingdom.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones. I agree with her and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that it is essential that we plan for the longer term. I believe that in Euro-Atlantic security—strategic stability in the space between Vancouver and Vladivostok—now is always the time to plan for the longer term. In the past I have been critical of people not thinking in those terms. To some degree that may have contributed to where we find ourselves today.
It was a privilege to hear the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Soames. I congratulate him on an excellent and characteristically robust speech. It was informed, wise and delivered exceptionally well. I think the best I can say for him is that in that speech, and otherwise, he has earned and deserves the ear of your Lordships’ House.
I find myself for the second time in a few weeks embarrassed and apologetic to be in a position where I know that, as I am contributing to a debate on a Thursday afternoon, it is improbable that I will be here for the winding up if I hope to get home today to Scotland. Today it is a function of the addition, at relatively short notice, of important business to the list. It is also a function of the increasing unpredictability and lack of capacity of the transport systems to Scotland. I know I am not the only Scot in your Lordships’ House today who is suffering to some degree because of this. In any event, I explained my problem to the Whips’ Office, my own Whips and both Front Benches. I am immensely grateful for the generous way in which they responded.
As the US State Department, among many others, predicted, winter has brought with it a relatively static front in eastern Ukraine along lines largely unchanged since that extraordinary Ukrainian counteroffensive in September. However, we must guard against complacency, and many speeches have echoed that. Troop movements over the last few days indicate that Putin is moving his planned spring offensives forward and we must expect an intensification of fighting in pretty short order. If the WhatsApp from the friend of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, proves to be correct, that order may be shorter than many of us expected. Although the front is relatively static for the moment, we must ensure that this does not result in any abatement of focus from the NATO powers.
This debate gives us a welcome opportunity to remind ourselves of the ongoing consequences of Russia’s unprovoked aggression. Russian forces continue to occupy more than 100,000 square kilometres of Ukraine, around 15% of its total territory. Fierce fighting continues in Bakhmut and elsewhere, and civilians continue to die on a daily basis. On 14 January a missile struck an apartment building in Dnipro, killing at least 46 people. It was deliberately targeted there. On 29 January at least one civilian was killed in strikes on Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, which has been under constant attack since the invasion began. On 1 February a Russian missile killed at least three people in Kramatorsk, a city in the Donetsk region.
Noble Lords will recall the profound trauma this nation experienced on 7/7, when 52 people lost their lives to co-ordinated and malign terrorist activity. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that more than 7,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed by Russian activity since February last year, with many more thousands seriously wounded. That is equivalent to 134 7/7s, with no end in sight. It is a daily experience for the people of Ukraine.
Human Rights Watch reminded us:
“Russian war crimes began literally from day one”.
Russian cluster munitions hit a hospital and a preschool on 24 February last year, the first day of the invasion. The European media director of Human Rights Watch asserted last week:
“Russia has committed more atrocities than all the human rights groups in all the world could ever have the capacity to investigate.”
I make these points as a reminder that the front line becoming static does not in any way mean that the horrors of conflict have begun to dissipate. Civilian lives, and those of soldiers, are still being lost every day. That fact should act as a constant spur to action, ensuring that we continue to give Ukrainian forces what they need so that they, in turn, can continue their efforts to repel Russian aggression.
I will also mention the situation of Russian conscripts. In many cases, they are young men who have no desire to threaten Ukraine and are being compelled to enlist for service through a mixture of intimidation, avowedly prescriptive legal pressures and crude propaganda. They are Putin’s victims too, as are their families and loved ones.
What of the broader strategic picture? Last week Putin reached into his quiver of bizarrely inapt historical parallels and compared the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine with the Battle of Stalingrad. It is evident that his faltering offensives, undertaken without provocation, bear about as much similarity with the Soviet Union’s heroic rearguard action as they do with the battles of Jutland or Thermopylae. But his recourse to historical parallels, however tenuous, usually tells us something about his intentions, as it does in this case. Noble Lords will recall the essay he produced in 2021 entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. Academically, it was valueless and reminiscent of the work of David Irving in issuing a miasma of pseudo-scholarship to conceal its central immorality. But it made plain his ambitions, including his belief that Ukraine and Belarus have no right to exist and his desire to reshape Eurasia accordingly. What might his evocation of Stalingrad tell us? Coupled with his stated desire to broaden the parameters for the next wave of conscription, it may suggest that he is preparing the ground for an attritional conflict and that he is preparing the Russian nation’s psyche for the reality of a lengthy struggle, costing thousands of lives, to be pursued even where progress is minimal or non-existent.
In a previous debate in your Lordships’ House on this subject, I echoed all the wise senior military officers I have met in my engagement in these issues, two of whom have already spoken in the debate. I said:
“In modern warfare, there is no such thing as a conflict that can be won by purely military means. The best that combat can offer is to fashion a context within which an acceptable settlement can be reached.”—[Official Report, 1/12/22; col. 1956.]
When we are asked to justify our support for President Zelensky and the people of Ukraine, I believe an answer is that we, together with NATO allies, are determined to allow him the scope to shape a context within which this conflict can be ended on terms that are equitable for Ukraine and on a scale commensurate with its sacrifice. We know that ultimately there will have to be a set of terms to which both Ukraine and Russia will be prepared to accede if this conflict is to end. The timetable and context of those negotiations is a matter for President Zelensky and the people of Ukraine. But our military and humanitarian support gives them the opportunity to resist the use of unprovoked brutality and to avoid the necessity of chafing under the terms of a Russian-dictated peace, with all the risks of revanchist violence that would engender.
Even as the military challenges continue, we must not fail to consider the different but enormous challenges we will face in assisting Ukraine to rebuild. Figures from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index show that endemic problems with corruption remain, with Ukraine ranking 122nd out of 180 countries. President Zelensky’s recent dismissal of his deputy infrastructure Minister and a number of regional officials shows that he is aware of this problem and its implications for the efficacy of military and humanitarian support today and for the post-conflict reconstruction process.
In thinking about how our support can be directed where it will do the most good for the people of Ukraine and the most harm to Russian intentions, it would be useful to consider the example of the US, which last month sent its own auditors to Ukraine for just that purpose.
We all want this conflict to end as swiftly as possible, and in terms that reduce the risk of further aggression. I believe that continuing our military and humanitarian support and intensifying it where necessary is the course of action most likely to achieve those aims.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, hold our Armed Forces in the highest esteem. and I welcome this wide-ranging inquiry. However, I am bound to say that I do not think anybody could read this Statement and the detail of the terms of reference without coming away with a very strong sense of disquiet about how these cases were investigated until now and how much other activity beyond these two cases the inquiry will have to investigate.
The Minister refers us to Saifullah and Noorzai, the two judicial review cases which are—or appear to be—key to this investigation happening at all. The second paragraph of the Statement opens:
“The decision has been informed by two ongoing judicial review cases known as Saifullah and Noorzai. The claimants in those cases assert that relevant allegations of unlawful activity were not properly investigated.”
The last sentence of the fourth paragraph reads:
“The Saifullah and Noorzai claimants have been consulted on the terms of reference but I will not comment further on ongoing court proceedings.”
I am bound to say that after a quarter of a century of practising in a court, in plain English that seems to me that we were compelled by the fact that we were going to lose these cases to have this investigation, and that is why the cases have been suspended while a proper investigation takes place.
There is another point I feel bound to ask the Minister about. On 14 July, James Heappey, the Minister for the Armed Forces, answered a UQ arising from a “Panorama” programme, which used language that my noble friend Lord Coaker repeated—and I encourage that sort of language in the House of Commons. He said among other things that the
“alleged criminal events referred to in the … programme have been fully investigated by the service police”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/7/22; col. 490.]
The circumstances of these two cases, Noorzai and Saifullah, were referred to in the programme. Why is there no mention of this “Panorama” programme in the Statement? A completely different impression was left in July in the House of Commons, and indeed in your Lordships’ House, about the reliability of that “Panorama” programme and the fact that it had happened at all, so why was there no mention of that? Did the Minister for the Armed Forces know about these two ongoing judicial reviews when responding to the UQ? Why did he not mention them to the other place, and why were they not mentioned in your Lordships’ House at that time? That suggests to me that not all the information that should have been given to Parliament was given at that time.
I will deal first with the matter of previous investigations. The noble Lord will be aware that significant investigations and reviews have already been undertaken by the MoD to investigate the allegations. That includes through service police investigations; reference was made to Operations Northmoor and Cestro. Steps have also been taken to improve the service justice system, and the inquiry will take all this into account.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, I said that the Secretary of State proposed back in May that progress should be made on looking at an inquiry. I cannot specifically comment on what my right honourable friend Mr Heappey said in the other place on 14 July; I would need to look at Hansard. I think it would be for him to respond to the noble Lord’s challenge or charge that he did not fully disclose to Parliament what the current situation was. Obviously I am not privy to what he knew, and it will be for him to address these matters.
As I previously indicated, a process was already under way to look at the possibility of a statutory inquiry. On the “Panorama” programme itself, the Royal Military Police has independently requested material from several sources, and legal engagement continues to secure access to that material, but as yet no new evidence has been received. This matter will now pass to the inquiry and to Lord Justice Haddon-Cave to pursue whatever channels of evidence he wants to procure.
I do not think there is anything more I can offer the noble Lord. He will see from the terms of reference that this goes much wider than just the two events investigated under Northmoor and Cestro. There is a very wide remit for the inquiry and for Lord Justice Haddon-Cave to investigate a whole raft of things. To go back to the earlier point on which I think we are all agreed, if anything needs to be discovered and to come out, it is in the interests of all those who serve this country bravely and with the highest standards of professionalism that their reputations are kept intact. If there has been any wrongdoing, this inquiry will seek to uncover that.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs the right reverend Prelate will be aware, it is not so much the numbers of drones as the way in which they are used, which is required to comply with international law and the law of armed conflict. Drones have allowed Ukraine to stretch the limits of its armed forces, and certainly, having eyes in the sky to spot targets and then direct artillery fire means that it can make better use of what it has.
My Lords, the Government are to be commended for imposing sanctions on three individuals and one commercial entity here in the UK who have been responsible in part for the provision of kamikaze drones to Russia from Iran. What plans do the Government have to work with allies to ensure that sanctions are tethered to international criminal accountability, following the French example? Only two days ago, the French courts decided that two senior executives at Amesys should face prosecution for knowingly providing technology that facilitated the torture of Libyan citizens by the Gaddafi regime. Should we not be following that example?
What is important is that, first, we have an effective sanctions regime. As the noble Lord indicated, the UK has sanctioned more than 1,100 individuals and 100 entities, and with our allies has frozen around £275 billion of assets. The noble Lord will be aware that certain actions constitute breach of law, and those will be acted upon. But perhaps pertinently, the Government are considering closely with international partners all options for seizing assets. They could be used, perhaps, to support the people of Ukraine and contribute towards the reconstruction of their country.