Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

63: Clause 18, page 11, line 23, leave out “France, Belgium or the Netherlands” and insert “any other country”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 63 seeks to future-proof the offence in Clause 18 of endangering another during a sea crossing. As currently drafted, the clause risks failing in its central purpose: to deter and prosecute those whose actions endanger lives at sea, regardless of where they are travelling from. Perhaps we should remind ourselves of what Clause 18 is intended to do. It is designed to create an offence for conduct that places others at serious risk of harm during unauthorised maritime crossings to the United Kingdom. That is a vital and necessary objective, especially given the number of people who choose to make this crossing—the number has breached 20,000 this year so far, a record high—and the very real risks of injury and loss of life for those involved.

However, as it stands, Clause 18 applies only to those travelling from France, Belgium or the Netherlands. I understand completely that those three countries are where the small boats are currently leaving from, but it is not necessarily true that this will always be the case. While this territorial limitation is not entirely arbitrary, it is illogical—it is predicated on a snapshot of today’s dominant routes, but we know all too well that the modus operandi of smuggling gangs is constantly evolving. Routes shift; departure points change. Those intent on profiting from human desperation will exploit any gap in enforcement or jurisdiction that we leave behind. What happens when a boat departs from Denmark, Germany or further afield? What if a criminal network re-routes its operations through new maritime channels not explicitly listed in the Bill? Are we to say that the same dangerous conduct, the same reckless disregard for life, somehow falls outside the scope of the offence? That is not a credible position, and neither is it a safe one. This amendment would ensure that the law is not constrained by geography. It would ensure that we legislate for principle, not convenience; that we criminalise the act of endangerment itself, wherever it occurs, not merely based on where the journey begins.

Our Amendment 64 in this group speaks to another critical shortcoming. The Bill as drafted appears to require a discrete, identifiable act that causes or risks serious harm, but in the case of these maritime crossings, the danger is not always the result of a single act. It is inherent in the crossing itself. It lies in the overcrowding, the use of flimsy dinghies and the absence of life jackets, navigation tools or any basic safety standard.

The act of stepping aboard such a vessel with others, knowing that it is patently unsafe, is itself the creation of danger and the act which places lives at risk. This very principle was, at the end of last week, endorsed by the Home Secretary, when she said that:

“Everybody who is arriving on a boat where a child’s life has been lost, frankly, should be facing prosecution … If you get on to a boat which is so crowded that a child is crushed to death in the middle of that boat … you should face some responsibility and accountability for that”.


We wholeheartedly agree, and our amendment seeks to incorporate this principle of collective responsibility into the Bill. Our amendment differs from the principle set out by the Home Secretary in one important way. It recognises this risk pre-emptively. It does not require tragedy to occur before the law is broken. If we are serious about saving lives, we cannot wait for them to be lost before we act. We need to intervene to ensure that actions taken to endanger life are themselves illegal.

The Government already recognise that the act of getting into a boat is dangerous and that everyone who gets into that boat is thereby creating a risk for other people. We therefore hope that they will agree that this principle should be applied proactively to save life, not just reactively once it has already been lost, and adopt this amendment to the Bill. The amendment is about targeting those who act with recklessness or self-interest in ways that expose others to mortal peril. We all recognise that the act of getting into a boat is creating that risk. This is our opportunity to combat those who, regardless, choose to do so.

The House has a duty not only to scrutinise the law but to ensure that it aligns with lived realities. Our amendments would make it clearer, more enforceable and more consistent with the Government’s stated goals.

On the other amendments in the group, Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would insert a requirement that for an offence to be committed under Clause 18, the individual must have acted “intentionally or recklessly”. The stated aim is to ensure that the offence targets people smugglers rather than those seeking asylum. However, this entirely misunderstands the purpose of the clause and the reality of these dangerous sea crossings. The threshold for this offence is already clear. It requires that a person commits an act that causes or creates a risk of death or serious injury during an illegal maritime journey.

As we have rightly recognised in our own amendment, the very act of boarding a dangerously overcrowded and ill-equipped vessel to cross the channel is reckless. It is done not in ignorance but knowingly, with an awareness of the risks not just to oneself but to others on board. This therefore automatically meets the “intentionally or recklessly” threshold that the noble Baroness talks about. To insert this new mental element, “intentionally or recklessly”, is not a clarification but an unnecessary restriction. It risks introducing a legal loophole that could allow individuals to escape prosecution, even where their actions had demonstrably endangered lives. We must not forget that the endangerment to life is a collective responsibility. The people whom we are talking about have knowingly made the decision to endanger themselves and, crucially, others.

This offence is not designed to criminalise those merely seeking safety; it is designed to ensure that anyone, whether a smuggler, pilot or fellow traveller, who engages in conduct that places lives in jeopardy can be held accountable. We cannot allow the law to be softened to the point where it fails to deter the reckless behaviour that is putting people, including children, at risk. This is not an academic concern. People have died making this crossing. People will continue to die making it unless we take robust action now which recognises the danger that this collective action creates.

Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, addresses a similar point and falls to the same problem in assuming that endangerment to life is an act that can be limited to a small number of people who are likely not on the boat at all. We must ensure that we prosecute people for the actions that they take, the risks that they run and the danger that they pose to others. Whether this is done for personal or financial gain is an unnecessary additional clarification which misses the point that the people whom we are talking about have endangered lives and well-being simply by choosing to get into the boat in the first place.

Finally, Amendment 67, in the name of my noble friend Lady May, serves as an important reminder in this debate that we need to consider the plight of those acting under duress of slavery, but I have to say to her that we have the same concerns about this amendment as those which I raised earlier. I am conscious of what my noble friend Lord Cameron said on an earlier amendment, which is that it risked creating a loophole which could be exploited by bad actors looking for a way to get out of being held to account for the crimes they will be committing. That said, I welcome the amendment from my noble friend, again on the grounds that it raises important issues which I hope the Minister will fully address in his response. I beg to move.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken. Clause 18 seeks to address a very real threat to life, but none the less confines itself to an arbitrary, narrow set of departure points, as if dangerous crossings were the exclusive preserve of the channel route. This is plainly not the case, and it is naive to legislate as though it were. If we want to future-proof our border laws, they must reflect the realities of irregular migration as they evolve; we must not freeze them in the present moment and base them on the sort of activity we see now, rather than that which could emerge in the future.

More than that, the amendments go to the heart of what it means to endanger life at sea. The danger does not begin when a trafficker pushes someone overboard. It begins the moment an individual, whether an organiser or a participant, boards an unseaworthy vessel, knowing it is not fit for the journey and puts lives at risk, often doing so for profit. I want to emphasise the point that we are not seeking to criminalise desperation. We are seeking to hold accountable those who, through their actions, their choices or their complicity endanger the lives of others. I will consider what the Minister has said but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I also have Amendment 209 in this group. Clause 19 defines “relevant person” for the purposes of search and so on in relation to what these days are simply called “devices”. There are other terms in Clauses 20 to 23. The amendment particularly goes to the point of retrospectivity. The clause provides that a relevant person is someone who has entered or arrived, whether before or after the section comes into force. The amendment would leave in as a subject someone who has entered in breach of a deportation order. It seems to me that there is a rather different flavour to retrospectivity here, because the individual knows what he is doing. Having been on the receiving end of a deportation order, he can hardly ignore that that is going to be relevant.

In the other cases, the wording puts it into the future: if the person

“requires leave … requires entry clearance … is required … not to travel … without an electronic travel authorisation”.

In parentheses, I wondered about the term “entered” compared with “arrived”, which I think might technically be the position, and the Explanatory Notes do not seem to help—but that is by the way. That first amendment would deal in all but one of the cases in this clause with the retrospective element.

Amendment 209 would require the affirmative procedure for regulations under Clause 25, extending powers to persons designated by the Secretary of State. This is a point made by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. As we said in our report, the committee has

“previously raised concerns about the extension to persons who are not recognised legal officials of powers which might be used to interfere with individual liberty”.

The Government say that the requirements would not create any new powers; they would extend the cohort of people who can use the powers, and the Secretary of State can impose such safeguards as she considers appropriate. The Constitution Committee reminds the Committee not only that it has previously raised these concerns but that the safeguards about designation of other people should be set out on the face of the Bill, so that this is not left to the discretion of the Secretary of State.

The affirmative procedure is of some assistance in scrutinising—but not really blocking—the provisions. It would, of course, enable parliamentarians to debate and scrutinise in public this power of the Secretary of State to designate whoever it might be.

The Bar Council has raised another issue on the provision that the Bill will allow civil servants, if so designated, to access and keep information found on devices. A police constable exercising powers such as these needs authorisation from a superintendent; that is the usual level of authorisation. This Bill will allow junior Home Office civil servants and immigration officials to do so without oversight.

The Bar Council has briefed on its concern about the potential for violating the rights of privacy and legal privilege of people who may have entered the UK years ago and are engaged in legal proceedings against the Home Office.

So, that is a range of concerns, which I hope would be addressed by my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it would be remiss of me if I did not begin my remarks on this group by mentioning the puzzling inclusion of Clauses 20 to 23 in the Bill, given that these powers already exist in statute. Section 15 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Illegal Migration Act 2023 already grant these exact same powers of search, seizure and access for electronic devices. Rather than retain the provisions that are already law, the Government are repealing those parts of the Illegal Migration Act and then re-enacting them through this Bill; I would submit that that does not really make much sense.

In fact, the wording of the sections that the Government are repealing are virtually identical to the clauses in the Bill. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act says:

“An immigration officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article, if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”,


while Clause 20(1) of the Bill says:

“An authorised officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”.


The only difference is that the Bill grants the powers to an authorised officer rather than an immigration officer. I understand the purpose of the distinction, as Clause 19 states that under the Bill the powers will be able to be used by police officers as well as immigration officers. I have no issue with that, but why repeal the whole of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act simply to replace one word?

The similarities continue. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act authorises the search of vehicles and containers for electronic devices, and Clause 20(6) of the Bill does exact same thing. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 2 authorises the search of premises for an electronic device, while Clause 20(5) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 authorises the search the person’s property for an electronic device, while Clause 20(4) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 authorises the seizure of electronic devices, while Clause 21(1) of the Bill does the exact same thing and has precisely the same wording. I could go on, but I believe it should be blindingly obvious that there is no practical purpose to Clauses 20 to 23; they are simply regurgitated provisions of already existing statute that the Government are performatively repealing.

I turn to one of the very few aspects of the powers relating to electronic devices that the Government have actually changed. My Amendment 69 is intended to probe the Government’s definition of “relevant articles” from which electronic information can be accessed and stored under Clauses 20 to 23. As drafted, the Bill essentially defines that as any electronic item that could contain information relating to an offence under Section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971. Consequently, the powers under Clauses 20 to 23 can currently be used only to garner information relating to the facilitation of unlawful entry or the illegal facilitation of the arrival of asylum seekers.

However, those are not the only offences that immigration officers might need to access electronic devices to investigate. For example, what about the information on electronic devices pertaining to offences under Section 24 or Section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971? If the Bill is aimed at tackling illegal immigration and protecting our border security, should it not address that in its totality? Why should immigration officers and police officers not be able to utilise information they have gleaned from the electronic devices of illegal entrants as evidence of the commission of the offences of illegal entry or the use of deception to gain leave to enter or remain? Is the prevention of those offences not crucial to our border security?

The previous Government recognised that these powers need to extend to information relating to a wider range of offences, which is why in the Illegal Migration Act we did not limit the definition of electronic devices in such a way. Rather, relevant articles were defined as anything containing information related to

“any function of an immigration officer, or … of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality”.

That offered a far wider-ranging power to investigate the whole plethora of immigration crimes, all of which would fall under the Government’s definition of border security in Clause 3 of the Bill.

The Prime Minister has spoken on many occasions of giving the Border Security Commander counter- terrorism-like powers. I have to say to the Minister that the substance of what is contained in Clauses 19 to 23 is utterly consistent with the tough language that the Government have been throwing around, and if they are indeed serious about matching their rhetoric with their actions then they should accept Amendment 69 and expand the definition of relevant articles in Clause 19.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I always hope to be helpful to the noble Lord. I suggest that we consider those matters in some detail when we reach Clause 33. These amendments relate to the additional powers for the National Crime Agency and bringing the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Police Service of Scotland into the remit of the legislation. They have all been done in consultation with the three responsible bodies—the Home Secretary and the two devolved Administrations. I am very happy to examine Clause 33, but I think it would be in order to do so just after Clause 32 and before Clause 34.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we appreciate that, as the Government go through the Bill, they will make minor adjustments to the language or corrective amendments to tighten it up, but the amendments in this group incorporate substantial changes that could well have been included in the Bill before. The fact that we are now turning to 17 government amendments, with at least eight substantive ones, speaks to the fact that the Bill could have been more carefully drafted. I will not take too much time dwelling on this issue, but it is important to raise that we on this side have been clear throughout Committee that we need to develop legislation that is robust and unambiguous and that can tackle this serious problem. That the Government are only just realising at this late stage that they have missed out key provisions perhaps does not inspire confidence.

Broadly speaking, we support the amendments in this group, in so far as they allow the more effective enforcement of some of the provisions in this Bill, in particular specifying that the NCA will have the capability to seize relevant articles and exercise reasonable force. However, we need to make sure that these powers are exercised with due care and proper procedure and process. I hope the Minister will set out how this will be ensured.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

72: Clause 20, page 14, line 1, leave out subsection (2)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the requirement that a person can only be searched if they have not previously been searched.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group speak to the important principle that, if we are going to do something serious about this issue, we need to make sure those who will be undertaking that vital work are given all the tools they need.

Amendment 72 removes the restriction under Clause 20 that a person may be searched only once. That limitation is both arbitrary and impractical. In the real world, people arriving in the UK illegally may conceal items, documents, electronic devices and false identification, only to reveal or discard them later. Preventing further searches, even when officers have fresh grounds for suspicion, is not a safeguard; it is a gift to traffickers and smugglers. This amendment would correct that mistake and restore operational flexibility where there is lawful cause. Indeed, we need look no further than the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for precedent and recognition of this fact; it permits multiple searches of a person if there are reasonable grounds. This is a commonplace power and we must ensure that it is incorporated in the Bill if we are to effectively tackle this sort of criminality.

Furthermore, Amendment 73 removes the requirement that a person must have been on the premises before a search can take place. Criminal organisations are constantly adapting their tactics, using safe houses, transferring items between locations and avoiding detection by not being physically present. By tying an officer’s hands to whether a suspect was on the premises at a precise moment, we risk losing vital evidence and allowing dangerous networks to evade accountability. This change would ensure that we are not outwitted by legal technicalities.

Furthermore, Amendment 74 removes unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles that require prior authorisation from an inspector and notification to a superintendent for a constable to conduct a search. Amendment 78 applies this principle to the seizure of relevant articles. Of course, oversight is vital, but we must not confuse oversight with obstruction. Our officers already operate within a strict legal framework and we are of the view that adding yet another layer of sign-off, particularly in time-sensitive operations, risks slowing down action, delaying disruption and missing crucial opportunities to intercept criminal activity. Officers need to be able to respond quickly, flexibly and effectively if we are to stand up to those who violate our borders. Indeed, constables are not subject to this requirement to seek permission to conduct a search under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and in Section 18 of that Act, police offers are only required to inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector as soon as is practicable after they have conducted a search, not before. This provision to seek permission is therefore unnecessary and not in line with the relevant existing legislation.

These amendments are about restoring operational realism and strengthening our capacity to protect. If we are serious about securing our borders, cracking down on illegal entry and dismantling the networks that exploit vulnerable people for profit, we must give our officers the clear, workable powers they require. These amendments are sensible proposals that would cut back bureaucracy and allow us to get on and deal with this problem more effectively.

Finally, Amendment 91 would remove the requirement that a constable must obtain authorisation from an inspector and that the inspector must notify a super- intendent before accessing, copying or using information from a relevant article seized under Clause 23. We need to be clear on this. Clause 23 deals with information that may relate to the commission of serious immigration offences. In such cases, time is not a luxury. It is often the difference between success and failure—between a dismantled network and a missed opportunity. Indeed, this issue runs through all the amendments that I have spoken to in this group.

The current drafting imposes a two-tier authorisation system before any such information can even begin to be examined. The requirement to obtain inspector-level authorisation for each individual access, and then to escalate that to a superintendent, adds a bureaucratic burden that could hinder fast-moving investigations, especially when such information could reveal links to other suspects, routes and wider criminal infrastructure. Our amendment would ensure that our officers have the practical powers they need in a way that means they can be exercised with urgency and purpose. The constable will still be required to act lawfully, proportionately and within the scope of the clause, but removing these layers of procedural delay would ensure that our enforcement efforts are not undermined by red tape.

We cannot, on the one hand, claim to be taking a tough stance on illegal immigration and organised criminality and, on the other, design a framework that ties the hands of those trying to enforce the law. Amendment 91 works alongside our other amendments in this group to correct that imbalance. It would strengthen our operational capability while retaining the legal and ethical standards we rightly demand. I urge the Committee to support these amendments, and I beg to move.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I rise to speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench. As we have heard, Amendment 72 proposes to remove the requirement for an authorised officer to ensure that a person has not previously been searched using these powers. I respectfully but robustly oppose this proposed change. These are intrusive powers that allow for the physical searching of individuals who are not under arrest and could be victims or witnesses. To apply such powers multiple times to the same person without any procedural check not only is disproportionate but risks undermining public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of our system. We must remember that this safeguard was introduced for good reason. It was informed by lessons learned from previous misuse that led to legal challenge. Its inclusion has helped to address legitimate concerns about the potential for abuse of power.

Amendment 73 proposes removing the requirement that the relevant person must have been on the premises when, or immediately before, they were encountered by an authorised officer. We respectfully oppose this change. This safeguard is essential. It ensures that there is a clear and direct link between the individual suspected of possessing a relevant article and the premises being searched. Without it, the power becomes too broad, allowing searches of premises even when there is no reasonable basis to believe the person was ever present. The presence of the individual is often the only factual basis upon which an officer can form reasonable grounds to suspect that a device or article is located there. Removing this requirement risks turning suspicion into speculation.

Amendments 74, 78 and 91 propose removing the requirement for police constables and National Crime Agency officers to obtain authorisation from an inspector or equivalent grade before exercising powers under Clauses 20, 21 and 23. Furthermore, the amendments would remove the requirement that an inspector notifies a superintendent or equivalent grade as soon as reasonably practicable. We strongly oppose these proposed changes. These are significant intrusive powers, and the current authorisation process is not an administrative burden. Rather, it is a vital safeguard to ensure the powers are applied with proportionality, due process and respect to the legal system. It ensures that decisions to use the powers where we are obtaining personal data and privacy are subject to senior oversight and scrutiny, helping to prevent misuse and maintaining public confidence and trust in those who use the powers and in the Government.

Unlike immigration officers, who may use these powers more routinely, police and NCA officers may not exercise them as frequently. That makes the case for retaining oversight stronger, not weaker. Removing this safeguard risks inconsistent application of the powers and undermines the legal and ethical standards we have worked very hard to uphold. Again, we want the system that we are introducing to command confidence across all of society. That means that we have to balance powers given to the authorities with safeguards and proportionality. We must ensure that these powers are used lawfully, proportionately and effectively. Retaining the requirement for senior authorisation is an essential part of achieving that balance.

For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, at the heart of this group of amendments lies the proposition that, if we are to confront the scale and complexity of illegal entry into this country, and indeed the criminal networks that are facilitating it, we must empower those on the front line to act swiftly, decisively and within a framework that reflects operational reality, not burdensome bureaucracy.

We on these Benches have listened carefully to what the Minister has said, but I am afraid that I have heard no compelling justification for why officers should be constrained to a single search, even in circumstances where new evidence arises, nor have we been given assurance that the narrow drafting of the premises clause will not impede investigations where criminal activity is thought to be located. I say to the Minister that those who orchestrate illegal crossings are not bound by procedure or protocol. Current legislation with regard to searches does not require such restrictions, so why should it apply here?

Under the current drafting of Clauses 20 to 23, the Bill proposes the imposition of a procedural bottleneck on our officers, who are working under pressure, often with incomplete information and in fast-moving, high-risk environments. We expect these officers to deliver results. Indeed, the Minister and his Government have staked a huge amount of political capital on these officers delivering results. Therefore, we need to make sure that we take decisions in this place so that those officers are equipped and empowered to get the job done.

These amendments would not lower standards; they would reduce delay and would not undermine safeguards. They would ensure that the law serves those it is meant to protect, not those who seek to exploit its gaps. If we are truly committed to securing our borders, upholding the rule of law and dismantling the infrastructure of exploitation that underpins these crossings, we must match the rhetoric with reality. These amendments certainly speak to our ambition, which is to give the officers the tools they need to do their jobs effectively.

Amendment 72 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, having supported the noble Baroness on her previous amendments, from these Benches we do so on these, too.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendments 84 and 90, tabled by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead. These amendments raise a serious and important concern that we believe merits the attention of the Committee. It seeks to ensure that, where personal belongings are retained by the authorities under Clause 23, particularly in the case of potential victims of modern slavery, those items and the information they contain are preserved in a manner that allows them to be relied on as part of a national referral mechanism determination.

For many victims of trafficking, the evidence contained on a mobile phone or similar device may be the only proof they possess of their exploitation, whether that be messages, photographs or location data. To risk the loss, corruption or mishandling of that data would not only undermine the pursuit of justice but could place the individual concerned at even greater risk. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. These protections are vital.

That said, we also recognise that many of these safeguards may already be provided for under the existing statutory framework, particularly under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which governs how evidence is secured and handled. But I accept what my noble friend said earlier about retention by police in some cases. If the Minister can offer the Committee reassurance that those protections already apply in the context of Clause 23 and that the rights of potential victims are adequately safeguarded in practice, that will be most welcome. This amendment raises a proper, necessary point of clarification and we hope the Government will respond accordingly.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, in addressing Amendments 84 and 90 proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, I first take the opportunity to pay tribute to her work in this area, particularly as chair of the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, and indeed I acknowledge and pay tribute to her continued dedication to protecting vulnerable individuals. However, having said that—there is always a “however”—we feel that the amendments that she has tabled are not entirely necessary.

The amendments seek to introduce a statutory requirement to protect seized or surrendered items so they may later be used as evidence in court or in the national referral mechanism. Although obviously we agree with the intention behind them, we believe that they are unnecessary. The policy objective underpinning this measure is to ensure that the United Kingdom has the necessary powers to search for, seize, retain and use information from electronic devices belonging to irregular entrants or arrivals in relation to facilitation offences. These powers are vital to disrupting the operations of organised crime groups that exploit vulnerable individuals. It is essential that the focus of these powers is not changed and that authorised officers are fully equipped to use them effectively.

First, the current legislative framework already provides robust safeguards for the handling of personal property—notwithstanding the exchange with the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson, which I am afraid I was not in the Chamber for, on the operation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The Bill ensures that any electronic devices seized are treated appropriately and that any data they contain is preserved and processed in accordance with data protection laws, evidentiary standards and human rights obligations.

Safeguards are particularly important in the context of modern slavery and human trafficking, where, as we have heard, victims may be in possession of devices that contain sensitive personal information, indeed evidence of exploitation, or communications with support services. The Bill ensures that such material is handled with care and integrity, protecting both the individual’s privacy and the integrity of any ongoing investigation.

We recognise the importance of timely access to personal devices, particularly for victims of modern slavery, who may rely on them for communication, evidence or support. If we are able to successfully download relevant data from a device, we will return the phone to the individual at the earliest opportunity. If the device is still required for the purposes of investigation, we will retain it for only as long as is reasonably necessary. If the device must be retained, we can provide the victim with any downloaded material they may need to support a national referral mechanism application or to access support services.

As I said, the Bill makes it clear that devices and other personal property will be retained only for as long as necessary. Once they are no longer required for the purpose for which they are seized. they must be returned to the individual as soon as is practicable. This approach, we feel, strikes the right balance between empowering law enforcement to act decisively against organised immigration crime and trafficking networks, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of individuals, particularly those who may be victims of modern slavery. Given that, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.