(4 days, 8 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025, which rightly moves to proscribe the group Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation under UK law.
The right to protest peacefully is a fundamental cornerstone of our democracy, as many noble Lords have expressed here this afternoon. It is a right that generations have fought to protect, but there is, and must be, a clear line between legitimate protest and violent coercion and wanton damage. Palestine Action has crossed that line repeatedly and deliberately, as its actions at RAF Brize Norton last month, which we have heard about, made absolutely clear.
This is not a question of silencing dissent, nor of suppressing pro-Palestinian voices; it is a move to uphold the rule of law and our true freedoms. It is intended to protect the public from targeted, dangerous and ideologically motivated criminal acts. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has tabled an amendment to regret the proscription of Palestine Action. She set out that she is concerned that civil disobedience is being misinterpreted. We on this side are clear that Palestine Action’s actions do in fact cross a line. Civil disobedience is one thing, but breaking into, attacking and seriously damaging our national defence infrastructure is another, as was made clear by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
If the noble Baroness does not want to take my word for it, maybe she will listen to the words of the group itself, previously cited by the Minister. Palestine Action’s own training materials have stated that it is
“not a non-violent organisation”.
The group has a footprint in all 45 policing regions in the UK and has pledged to escalate its campaign. A group that openly admits its intention to be violent cannot be disregarded as a threat in the way that the noble Baroness proposed. A group that advances its views through violence is itself a direct threat to the integrity of free speech in our country.
It is clear that Palestine Action’s entire modus operandi is to use direct, violent action in pursuit of political ends. Its members do not operate through petitions, campaigns or democratic engagement; they operate through sabotage, criminal damage and threats. They have repeatedly targeted companies involved in the UK defence sector, often without regard for legality. They do so with the explicit intention of coercing change through unlawful means.
The group was established on 30 July 2020, when activists broke into and vandalised the interior of the UK headquarters of Elbit Systems in London. From the very beginning, members of this group have been intent on causing damage and have acted to assert their views through criminal violence. Is that not the rightful definition of a terrorist organisation?
Time and time again, Palestine Action’s activities have endangered third parties. They have vandalised property, occupied buildings and attacked not only private companies but critical components of our national defence. Its tactics are both calculated and militant.
When a group pursues its aims, not through democratic discourse, but through organised campaigns of destruction and violence, and strives to terrorise legitimate businesses and opinion-formers, its acts are those of terrorism as defined by the law. This order does not criminalise views; it outlaws those who use terror and violence to force their views on others.
To fail to act would send a message that violent extremism would be tolerated if it is dressed up as enthusiastic activism. We cannot allow such ambiguity. We must be consistent. This country has proscribed far-right groups that promote violence under the banner of nationalism; it did so in the 1930s against the Blackshirts. We cannot allow such abhorrent methods today. We must apply the same standard to all who use violence and intimidation and who seek to advance political causes by criminal means against law-abiding members of society.
This proscription does not ban support for Palestinian rights or peaceful demonstrations; it is a necessary step to uphold public safety and the democratic rule of law. There are other voices lawfully making the case for Palestine and Palestinians; Palestine Action is not one of them. We support this order in its entirety because we believe in protecting the public, defending our democracy and drawing a firm line against those who would use violence to impose their political will. We therefore welcome the Government bringing this order and are pleased to support it.
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to what has been a thorough and testing debate. Having introduced the order on behalf of the Government, it is my responsibility to respond to the points that have been made today. All three organisations in the order before us—this is a very important point for Members to remember—are subject to the same tests under the 2000 Act that this House and the House of Commons passed and put in place for 25 years, along with, to date, around 80 proscription orders that were passed under similar tests.
This debate is not about whether you support the rights of the Palestinian people to a homeland, whether you are appalled at the actions of the Israeli Government, or whether you think the Israeli Government are acting fairly and proportionately following the Hamas kidnappings and murders. This is not about that issue. It is not, dare I say it, about the right to protest. I served with my noble friend Lord Hain in Northern Ireland for two years, and I have some admiration for the way that he has approached some of the issues that I shared. I said at the outset that I have been carried out of a building for protesting the apartheid regime, I protested against the fascist regime in Chile and I have been on a picket line during the miners’ strike. I have been involved in protests across my political life that have been fair and open, but not those that have not led to harassment, intimidation, violence and criminal damage.
Noble Lords in this debate have, dare I say it, fallen into two camps—with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who asked legitimate questions that I will return to. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the noble Lords, Lord Harper, Lord Beamish, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, Lord Austin of Dudley, Lord Turnberg, Lord Carlile, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, and the Official Opposition have all, in one way or another, supported the approach that the Government have taken.
From this Front Bench, I recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has tabled an important amendment that has generated this debate—which is an important part of the democracy that I believe we should stand up for. She has had support from my noble friends Lord Hain and Lady O’Grady, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Bennett. Again, she has put forward a legitimate point of view, but I want to draw noble Lords back to the essence of this debate.
Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe organisations that she believes are concerned with terrorism. There is a clear definition of terrorism in that Act, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said, has stood the test of time:
“‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action … designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public”
and the actions used or threatened must involve
“serious violence against a person … serious damage to property … endangers a person’s life … creates a serious risk to … health … or … is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”.
I say again that all three organisations in this order are being judged on their actions as to whether they are committing or participating in acts of terrorism, preparing for terrorism, promoting terrorism or are otherwise concerned with terrorism. If that statutory test is met, factors that the Home Secretary takes into account include the nature and scale of the organisation, the specific threat, the extent of the presence and the need to have support from members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.
The Home Secretary does not sit in 2 Marsham Street and say, “What’s happening today? Should I proscribe these organisations?” There is a decision, which is never taken lightly. That decision has robust processes in place to ensure the evidence is available and is carefully reviewed and considered. The decision to proscribe Palestine Action has been taken with significant considerations, which include technical assessments, deep engagement with the subject matter, experts from across government, policy officials, law enforcement and a proscription advisory group that makes recommendations to the Home Secretary to determine whether that proscription is legitimate.
(4 days, 8 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend goes right to the heart of the Question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham. Individuals from any community, in this case the Jewish community, have the right to enjoy their lives without intimidation, threat or harassment, or indeed calls for death to be implemented on sections of a community. There is a role for peaceful protest and for argument about who and what happens in the Palestine-Israeli situation; that is perfectly legitimate. It is not legitimate to move that into harassment, intimidation or death threats.
With regard to the BBC, as I have mentioned, my right honourable friend is in active negotiation and discussion with the chair of the BBC. I am sure she will make further statements. Indeed, this very morning at DCMS Questions in the House of Commons, she answered further questions on this. There are certainly lessons to be learned, but I reassure my noble friend that members of the Jewish community, and indeed members of any community who face harassment and intimidation, deserve the support of the law, which is why Avon and Somerset Police are currently investigating to see whether that criminal threshold has been crossed.
My Lords, the Hamas attacks of 7 October targeted innocent people attending a music festival, so it was horrifying to see the events at Glastonbury. Yesterday, during a protest in Whitehall, protesters were repeating the very same chant used by those performers at Glastonbury and currently under investigation by police. Can the Minister confirm that the Government share the view that this calling for the death of Israeli soldiers is incitement to violence, and can he confirm that, in the interest of applying the law equally, leading on from the point made by my noble friend Lord Bellingham, the same action will be taken against those who incite violence on our streets, not just those who do so from a stage?
I hope that I can again reassure the noble Lord. Legislation is in place, and his Government previously and this Government now want to see that legislation implemented when the police judge that criminal thresholds have been crossed. It is not for Ministers to determine whether a criminal threshold has been crossed; it is for the police to present a case to the Crown Prosecution Service, for the Crown Prosecution Service to put that to the courts and for a jury to convict or otherwise on the basis of evidence supplied. But I am supportive of his general aim. It is important that harassment, intimidation, threats and calls for death are seen as the serious criminal events that they potentially are. Therefore, it is right and proper that in this case Avon and Somerset Police follow that through, and it is right and proper that in any event, be it at a music festival, a football ground, a street protest or anything else, people have the right to protest but not the right to threaten, harass, intimidate or call for death.
(5 days, 8 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, next to North Korea, the UK rates as one of the countries with the greatest surveillance presence—which, I might add, is no bad thing in my book. We heard from the Government that they are exploring whether legislation on facial recognition technology is necessary. What steps are they taking to address the great deal of public concern that clearly exists about this issue? How might this tie in with the Government’s position on ID cards?
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support for a range of surveillance methods. CCTV, for example, is one of the greatest crime prevention tools brought in in the last 30 years. It shows what happened at an event, not what might have been perceived to have happened, so it is very valuable. With DNA, CCTV and, potentially, facial recognition technology, progress is made through public confidence; and the Peelian principle of the police having the trust of the community is paramount. Going back to question of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that is why we have consulted to get a range of views on this issue before potentially bringing forward better regulation to meet the very issue my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has raised.
As to ID cards, when I was last a Home Office Minister, in 2009-10, we had ID cards; in fact, I had ID card number 3, I think. It proved to be useless because the Government he supported abolished ID cards in around 2011. If he wishes to bring them back, that is a debate we can have, and I look forward to engaging with him on it in due course. But it was not me who abolished them.
(6 days, 8 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. In the coming weeks, we will be preparing to support our home nations in what will be a proud moment for Britain. The 2025 UEFA European Women’s Championship will be held in Switzerland. I am delighted that, this year, both the England and Wales women’s national teams have qualified for this prestigious moment. For Wales, this monumental occasion will mark the first time they have qualified at the European Women’s Championship. For our defending champions, England, this will be their 10th appearance at the competition. If I may say so, in the spirit of good internation relationships, I wish both teams well, and both are to be congratulated on having the opportunity to appear there.
We must recognise the symbolic significance of historical moments such as this for future generations of female footballers and athletes. Last year, the Football Association reported a 56% increase in the number of women and girls playing football. Between 2020 and 2024 alone, the number of female coaches rose by 88% and the number of referees increased by 113%. That is why it is essential for us to support the statutory instrument introduced today, which proposes a temporary extension of licensing hours across England and Wales should either or both teams progress to the semi-finals or the final.
The extension of the licensing hours comes after overwhelming support from a Home Office consultation. Under the instrument, the normal licensing requirements of submitting a temporary event notice application and the £21 fee to the local authority will not apply. The extension will apply only to the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises, such as bars and pubs, but will not be applicable to off-trade premises, including supermarkets and off licences.
We must recognise that this occasion is one that can help support local pubs in England and Wales, many of which have faced challenges over recent years, with an unprecedented number of closures. During the Lioness’s 2022 triumph, a peak of 17.4 million viewers tuned into the BBC1 programme, making it the most watched women’s football game on UK television. An additional 5.9 million viewers streamed the game online to watch on the BBC iPlayer and the BBC Sport website and app.
Not only will the extension of licensing hours help boost business for pubs and bars but it will allow them to accommodate the increase in demand during these key tournament dates. Fundamentally, this is an opportunity for us to come together and cheer on our national teams, who have done so much to inspire people across the country. I am sure that both sides of the Committee will agree with the positive benefits of the statutory instrument raised in today’s debate, from inspiring the next generation of footballers to boosting our local businesses. We have lots to celebrate over the coming weeks, and I am sure noble Lords will join me in wishing the very best to both Wales and England for the tournament.
I am grateful to the three noble Lords for their contributions. The noble Lords, Lord Hayward and Lord Addington, have moved the goalposts slightly, in the sense that this was a women’s football order. It has had a full consultation, which has given the support to date that I have mentioned. Noble Lords have made a very compelling case for the Women’s Rugby World Cup based in the United Kingdom to be considered. I will certainly consider those representations, and I will get back to both noble Lords. At the moment, there are no plans in the Home Office for such an order, but that does not mean that we cannot consider it. However, there needs to be a public consultation, because we have to do that. I will have to reflect on whether that would fit in with the timescales for the event that both noble Lords mentioned.
(6 days, 8 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, we on this side recognise the Government’s intention to update the Investigatory Powers Act introduced by the previous Government, and we are supportive of introducing measures that protect the public by giving law enforcement the tools they need to prevent and prosecute crime.
As noble Lords across the Committee are aware, technology is a fast-moving space. As society’s use of technology changes, it is essential that we adapt and it is imperative that our public authorities are fully equipped with capabilities to prevent criminals exploiting technology features, hiding their identity, evading detection and putting the public at risk.
This statutory instrument amends the Investigatory Powers Act by providing 11 new public authorities with the power to obtain communications data. Seven of the new public authorities listed will have the power to apply for an independently approved authorisation to compel telecommunications and postal operators to disclose communication data. The remaining four entries are English ambulance trust services that were previously designated under the definition of an ambulance trust in England, which included a total of 10 ambulance services in England. Under the changes, this definition has been removed and replaced with individual entries, as six of these ambulance services have confirmed they no longer require the communication data powers.
Following the Home Office’s review of Schedule 4, this instrument ensures that only public authorities with a need to acquire communications data will be able to request access. While we on these Benches do not oppose the amendments being made, we must question why certain ambulance services will hold the ability to retain this power over other ambulance services.
We recognise that some ambulance services should retain these powers, which may help in preventing serious injury or death, but we must consider whether the inconsistent treatment of ambulance services presents any future risks. We understand that access to communications data is useful for some ambulance services, but we must not rule out that others might require access in future. Can the Minister assure us that services requiring access in future will not be unduly limited or delayed if judged to be in the pursuit of legitimate public interest?
We recognise that these powers are necessary, but they need to be complemented by adequate resources if they are to be wielded effectively. Can the Minister therefore update us on what consultations his department has undertaken with the public authorities empowered by the regulations? Can he confirm that those authorities have adequate resources and legal advice on the use of the new powers?
We recognise that the addition of entries to Schedule 4 increases the demand and strain on the resources of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. This concern has been raised in Brian Leveson’s annual report on the use of communications data. It is essential that the Government consider ways to reduce pressures on the operational effectiveness of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. Can the Minister set out what steps will be taken to address this?
In conclusion, while we do not oppose the measures being introduced, we would like some reassurance that those ambulance services that have been excluded will not be disadvantaged in the pursuit of preventing injury or death. We urge the Minister to recognise the impact of the amendments on the resources of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office and ask for further clarification on how these authorities will be supported in exercising these powers in the interests of the public.
I am grateful to noble Lords for the short and useful debate. As my noble friend Lord Jones, who I have known for a very long time, said, it is useful to challenge the Executive on a number of matters to date.
If I may, I will start with my noble friend Lord Jones, who made an all-encompassing comment regarding the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The current IPC is Sir Brian Leveson. He will be well known to Members of this House and has served in a number of capacities, including as a High Court judge. The commissioner is assisted by a team of 13 commissioners, who must all have held senior judicial office. Together they are responsible for the use of investigatory powers by public authorities. They are supported by a body of civil servants, known as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which includes authorising officers and inspectors. Self-evidently, as I mentioned earlier, they were put in place by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Their responsibilities include a statutory obligation to inspect the use of certain investigatory powers and to exercise delegated functions, as part of which they independently review communications data under Section 60A applications submitted by public authorities.
My noble friend touched on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the budget. In the financial year 2023-24, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office operated within a budget of £15.74 million, of which it spent only £13.06 million. That was confirmed in the IPCO annual report 2023, which was published in May of this year. I hope that helps my noble friend.
I am grateful for his service, not just in both Houses but on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and for his kind words about my service. I hope that also answers in part the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper—who I will come back to in a moment—and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower.
The noble Lord, Lord Harper, made a very valid point about what the process is for a public authority to be added to Schedule 4. Public authorities can be added to Schedule 4 either through primary legislation or by the use of a delegated power provided at Section 71. The delegated power provided at Section 71 provides that we have an enhanced affirmative procedure, which includes the requirement for a 12-week statutory consultation with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The changes being made here are, in a sense, the result of the bodies themselves asking either to be included or removed from the Act. If they wanted to be added to Schedule 4, they had to supply a very comprehensive business case that officials in the Home Office have examined and evaluated in some detail. The Home Office has then had to include a 12-week consultation process with public authorities and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. In this case, the consultation period for the new additions began on 23 October 2024 and completed on 17 January 2025. The IPC agreed that the seven public authorities had made a clear case for access, and the IPC response informed the Home Secretary’s policy assessment to include the amendments in the regulations that we have put before the Grand Committee today.
(6 days, 8 hours ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend. He mentioned a report, which was from 2023. This Government have been very clear that, as I said in my original Answer to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, we need to provide accommodation that meets all contractual standards and is safe, fit for purpose and properly equipped. The contractual standards, which are in the Asylum Accommodation and Support Contracts, must meet decency levels and be maintained. That is the objective of this Government. As I say, the details my noble friend gave are from 2023.
My Lords, if the Minister wants to talk about voting against the Government, perhaps he might like to recall that his party voted more than 130 times against our Bill designed to avoid this situation. Under the Conservatives, the number of asylum seekers being housed in hotels decreased in three consecutive quarters prior to Labour coming into office. Since Labour gained power, the number of asylum seekers housed in hotels has risen by some 29%. At what point does the Minister think his Government will honour their manifesto, given that small boat arrivals are now over 20,000, which is an increase of around 50% on this time last year?
The Government set a clear direction of travel on reducing hotels, tackling the asylum backlog, trying to prevent people coming to this country unfairly in the first place and, when they do claim asylum, processing those claims much quicker. I point the noble Lord to one figure, which I hope is helpful to him. That figure is 9,208, which is the number of people who have been removed from the United Kingdom up to the end of 2024, since the general election. This compares with an average figure of around 2,000 for the previous Government during their term of office. The noble Lord and his Government got us into the position of a rise in hotel numbers to a maximum of 400, a rising cost to £9 million, a record number of people coming to this country, a failure to remove people who are being denied asylum, and a failure to process asylum claims in a speedy and effective way. We are clearing up his mess and doing the best we can to achieve that.
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to open this first day of Committee. I will speak also to my Amendments 2, 26 and 27 in this first group. At Second Reading, a number of noble Lords raised the issue that the commander will essentially be a civil servant with co-ordination functions: a commander with nothing to command. I have tabled these amendments and a number of others to seek to rectify the situation and probe the Government’s full intentions for the new role.
Amendment 1 seeks to replace the words
“designate a civil servant as the”
with “appoint a”, thereby specifying that the commander does not have to be a civil servant. Nothing here serves as a critique of the current border security commander, Martin Hewitt, coming as he does from a law enforcement background; rather, it is a critique of the Government’s limited ambition for this new role.
That is not just my view but that of Tony Smith, the former director-general of UK Border Force. He said in evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place that
“the first thing that struck me is that the Border Security Commander will be another civil servant. I think it will be a director general post in the Home Office. I was a director general, and we already have quite a lot of them. I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 27/2/25; col. 40.]
Those were the words of the person whose job it was to lead the agency that polices our borders. As he stated, there are already enough civil servants co-ordinating activities within the Home Office. The Small Boats Operational Command already exists, so can the Minister tell the House how it will work with the commander? How will their roles differ, and what degree of interoperability will exist?
As Tony Smith made very clear to the committee in the other place, if the Government wish to achieve their stated goals, Border Security Command needs to have expanded powers, for example to arrest and detain in the same manner as Border Force, the NCA and Immigration Enforcement. If the powers of the commander and his team remain as they are instituted in this Bill, they will be essentially toothless in their ability to tackle illegal migration. This is a role that, by the Government’s own admission, is meant to help secure our borders, disrupt criminal networks and co-ordinate multiple agencies in the face of complex cross-border threats. Surely, we can all agree that this is not a job for a generalist administrator or a nameless Whitehall official; it demands specialist knowledge, strategic leadership and operational credibility.
Amendments 26 and 27 are essentially consequential. They amend Clause 7, which relates to delegation of the commander’s functions, and Clause 8, which permits the designation of an interim commander. Just as I am concerned by the first clause, I am potentially even more concerned about the possibility of delegation. This commander might be well qualified for the task, but who will he delegate to? As the Bill stands, this will be a civil servant. We must ask whether this is appropriate for the task at hand. My amendment would ensure that only a person of appropriate rank—a similar rank to the commander—would be able to undertake any of the functions bestowed on the commander under the Bill. These amendments would therefore introduce a vital safeguard: that the commander may appoint only a person of appropriate rank and qualifications to fulfil delegated functions, not just anyone who happens to be on the departmental payroll. They would help ensure that we do not fall into the trap of creating yet another abstract, symbolic post—another title without substance, which I am afraid is what the Bill proposes.
I had the pleasure of meeting and spending an evening with the honourable Scott Morrison a few weeks ago. He explained that, when Australia began Operation Sovereign Borders, it instituted a structure that, on the surface at least, appears somewhat similar to this Government’s Border Security Command. Its job was to co-ordinate and lead the 16 agencies that had border security functions. However, there are two crucial differences: first, the Australian system came with far more robust powers than are in this Government’s plan; and, secondly—this is the crucial difference—the Australians appointed a senior military commander, Deputy Chief of Army Major General Angus Campbell, to lead their border security efforts.
This leads on to my Amendment 2, a probing amendment which seeks to gauge the type of background that the Government think most appropriate for the role of commander. I have specified that the commander should be only a former or current officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council—meaning assistant chief constable or above—commander or above in the Metropolitan Police, a senior officer in Border Force or Immigration Enforcement or a senior military officer of at least brigadier-general, commodore or air commodore rank in the Royal Air Force. This amendment would therefore specify that the commander should be a senior police, immigration or military officer, which I believe would put the office on a stronger footing.
If we are serious about this role having teeth and want it to be a powerful, directive position that can genuinely drive change, then the least we can do is to require that the person filling it has the experience to do so effectively. We cannot afford to build this office on vague criteria and wishful thinking. The public deserve confidence that this position is not just another bureaucratic appointment but one that is fit for purpose from day one. I urge the Committee to support this, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I should explain that I have not usurped the position of my noble friend Lord German, who is in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for not being physically on the Front Bench; from this position, I can be propped up.
Although Martin Hewitt has, as the noble Lord, said, a law enforcement and—I believe—Army background, I do not think it is necessary for the commander to have “rank”, to use the term in his Amendment 26. If the border command and the commander prove effective—in other words, if the institution lasts—I hope that the Secretary of State would be imaginative enough to think outside the box of people to whom the rank might be applied and consider those who might usefully carry on the function.
I do not want to speak too long at this point, but the noble Lord picked up the issue of delegation. It struck me—I understand it is not possible to amendment it—that the heading to Clause 7 really does not describe what is in the clause. The clause is right; it spells out where responsibility lies—that is not delegation. The responsibility remains with the commander, and I think that is correct. I do not know whether anyone can pick that up somewhere behind the scenes, at a later point.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who, acting as super sub today, continues to make very valid points on this issue. Let me go to the heart of the amendments, if I may. The group contains various amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. First, they seek to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander is a civil servant. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and that the commander leads a directorate within the department, it is logical that the role sits within the Civil Service.
This does not mean that the post of Border Security Commander is reserved solely for existing civil servants. Indeed, the current officeholder was recruited externally. Any future recruitment exercises would seek to identify the most suitable candidate, irrespective of their background. Ultimately, they are acting in a Civil Service role, accountable to the Home Secretary. That is the important point, and I hope the noble Lord will reflect on that.
The noble Lord also raised the very important point about the prior experience required to be eligible to be appointed as Border Security Commander. As Members have recognised, the current Border Security Commander served previously as an officer of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. I do not believe it is prudent to limit the pool of candidates eligible to serve in this important position, and we believe that any future recruitment exercise would have the scope to identify the best talent, without limitation, ensuring that we bring the effectiveness of the role to its maximum potential.
The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for requiring the step change in the UK’s approach to border security—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, addressed. We want to provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, to bring together and provide leadership to all parts of the system, to work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and this work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on a statutory footing, for the very reasons that I hope I have outlined. It creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duty.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the issue of the background of an individual. We want to have as wide a pool as possible—I hope that addresses her point.
The commander has already used his post and the associated capabilities to deploy key functions to date across government on the border security system. He has also helped support the Home Secretary in signing a landmark agreement with the Iraqi Government. We have struck a new anti-smuggling action plan with the G7; we are hosting an international summit on organised immigration crime; and we have meetings early next month with colleague nations in the European community to look at how we can work on this issue. Those are important roles and tasks. They add value to the work we are trying to do in very difficult circumstances to smash the criminal gangs and to stem the flow across the channel.
The House can have confidence that those roles being exercised currently will be in future on a statutory basis, and issues to do with reporting and accountability have been set down in law. Therefore, it is not for today, but I hope the noble Lord will reflect on what I have said and, at a later date, not push the amendments to a vote.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who contributed to this debate.
We have heard the words from the Government Benches about co-ordination, structure and strategic intent, but let us not lose sight of what this role is supposed to be: a commander. That word carries meaning. It is not simply a metaphor or a piece of Civil Service terminology. I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, when she says it is not about rank. Rank implies leadership, authority and the ability to direct. Without that, the title is misleading at best and meaningless at worst.
What we are being offered in the Bill is a model that risks falling flat. The important point is that it risks creating an official with no clear mandate, no operational standing and no public visibility—in short, a co-ordinator with a title that suggests much more than they are empowered to deliver.
If we fail to define this role properly now, we risk embedding a model that lacks clarity, ambition and—crucially—the power to deliver the very outcomes the Government claim to seek. We cannot risk this position becoming yet another layer of the Whitehall machine, held by a nameless bureaucrat with no real responsibilities.
The amendments we have tabled do not ask for the impossible. They do not tie the Secretary of State’s hands. They simply ensure that the commander is someone of appropriate rank, experience and credibility—someone who can command confidence not just within government but with operational partners and the public alike.
We have seen what can be achieved when such roles are taken seriously. I referenced the Australian example earlier, where a senior military figure led a co-ordinated, multi-agency border response, which shows what is possible with the right leadership and mandate.
We can do the same, but we will not get there by default or by quiet delegation within the Home Office. We must decide now whether we want this to be a genuinely powerful and directive post, or just another name in a long line of forgotten titles.
These amendments are a simple safeguard against mediocrity and a clear statement of intent that this House expects better than business as usual. We will look at this as the Bill progresses but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to extract some more information from the Government about who is going to be entrusted with the position of Border Security Commander. The Bill sets out that the Secretary of State can determine the terms and conditions of a designation as the commander. Our Amendment 3 seeks to tie the Government to publish these terms and conditions once they have been defined.
Crucially, our amendment also clarifies that the Government must define the KPIs that will be used to measure the performance of a commander in their role. This will allow not only the Government but these Houses and the wider public to review how effectively the commander is undertaking these duties.
The Border Security Commander is a big part of the Government’s offering on this question. We need to make sure that the person appointed is delivering a solution to the problem we are discussing, and how the Government are working to define parameters and conditions which will ensure that this is the case. If the Government are convinced that their policy will indeed tackle this issue effectively, I am sure that they will have no hesitation in welcoming the principle of these amendments as an opportunity for them to show the public how well their new policy is working, and to show their ambition in setting high standards for their new commander.
Furthermore, our Amendment 5 to Clause 2 seeks to incorporate greater oversight into the termination process for the Border Security Commander. The Government are creating a role which will be politically sensitive and upon which there will be a great deal of pressure, without necessarily the powers or duties to fulfil these demands. It is a post that demands public trust—and where public trust is concerned, silence is not an option.
To remove someone from that role without any explanation, transparency, accountability or scrutiny risks breeding, confusion, suspicion and the perception that something has gone wrong behind closed doors. That is precisely what undermines confidence in public institutions.
There is also precedent, as we know. When high-profile public officials are dismissed or step down, it is customary—indeed, expected—that a Ministerial Statement is made, and we have seen that with senior civil servants and the heads of public bodies. Unfortunately, the Government have been far too unwilling to come to Parliament to outline the reasons why they have chosen to terminate senior officials. We saw that only recently when the Government ousted the head of the Competition and Markets Authority, Marcus Bokkerink. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade issued a Written Ministerial Statement, but it took an Urgent Question from my honourable friend Andrew Griffiths for a Government Minister to come to the Dispatch Box in the other place to update Parliament. That should not be the case.
On a matter as important as this, we cannot afford to construct roles that can be managed and changed in the dark. We need to appreciate and understand the fact that the public have lost trust in the Government on this, and we need to make sure that the next steps we take command trust and regain the confidence that the public must have in us. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. It is a pleasure to participate in your Lordships’ Committee on this very important Bill.
Noble Lords will be aware that voter salience on the issue of immigration and border control is extremely high, and it is probably the second most important issue, behind the cost of living. That said, the Bill, as currently drafted, does a reasonable job, and we broadly welcome many of its measures, as the Minister will know. He started off as a bruiser, but he is now much more emollient in his reaction and in his Dispatch Box performance, and we agree on many things.
The Bill is very good on the accountability from civil servants, the Home Office and other key stakeholders to Ministers but less strong on that between Ministers and the outside world. When one looks at the level of scrutiny and oversight in, for instance, the Bundestag, the United States Senate or other legislative bodies that are performing a very vital scrutiny and oversight role of the border issue—which is, naturally, a very live issue now in the United States—one will see that there is nothing to lose by us having the opportunity to be open and transparent in seeing what the commander is actually doing.
It is vital that we put in primary legislation the ability of a parliamentary committee to bring the border commander to Parliament to answer questions at least once a year, to measure the efficacy of their policies and whether success is happening in line with what the elected politicians and your Lordships’ House require and to keep that bond of trust with the voters. There is a very low level of trust among the voters of all parties to deal, in the long term, with the issue of border control and the safety and security of the people of this country. It would be a very good idea for the Minister to at least consider that in relation to Amendment 3.
We also need clarity and openness about what the commander is doing. The worst thing about a closed system, where you have accountability only between one part of government and another, is that conspiracy theories and cynicism grow, and people cannot see that the Government are achieving their objectives. It would therefore be very useful to have the explicit terms and conditions to be laid down before Parliament included in Bill. I agree very much with my noble friend on that.
Finally, this is not an issue about the Labour Government; all Governments fall out with senior officials. It happened under the Blair Government, certainly under the Brown Government, and under the coalition Government. It is not ignoble to think that the person you have appointed no longer has the same priorities and imperatives that they should have in carrying out their role. Therefore, you have to do what they say in HR now and “dis-board” them—the opposite of onboarding and the equivalent of getting rid of them. We could say “giving them a new career trajectory”—let us be charitable. That should be the disinfectant of transparency. Bagehot once said, I think, that openness is needed to see what Governments are actually doing. The Government should therefore explain to the voters why that person did not fit in and was not able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. That is the essence of Amendment 5.
On that basis, I ask the Minister to think about these things. As I often say, it would not invalidate the central premise of the Bill—it is very good in many respects, especially the first chapter—but it would be certainly improved by accepting the amendments. It would be a very powerful message from this Government and future Governments that they are serious about this topic, they are accountable and they are getting things done on behalf of the people who elected them.
I am again grateful to noble Lords for tabling these amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss them.
I am slightly disappointed that I have moved from being a bruiser to being emollient—but there we go. I will take that as a potential compliment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. I just remind him that I reserve my right to bruise, if it is needed, but I hope it will not be on these issues.
This group contains various amendments relating to the appointment of the Border Security Commander, again tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron. The key issue in the amendments is about how the Border Security Commander will engage with Parliament. The amendments state:
“The Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament”
when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander and to ensure that the Border Security Commander appears before any parliamentary committees when invited, and to make a Statement to Parliament in the event that the designation of the Border Security Commander is terminated, setting out the reasons for that termination.
If and when an individual is designated as the Border Security Commander—as well as the event of their ultimate termination—that would be announced in the usual way for senior officials in the Civil Service. We would make a Statement on that, and there would be the ability for a Private Notice Question or an Urgent Question to be tabled, depending on the House. There would be opportunities for the Government to table WMSs, and for Questions to be asked, on a daily basis in this House and on a regular basis in the House of Commons, about the reasons behind those decisions. The Government will certainly be transparent on these matters.
We also value the role that parliamentary committees play. If requests are made to attend committees, every effort will be made for the border commander to attend. There are already opportunities for officials across the Home Office and other government departments, who are at the level of the border commander, to appear, either independent of Ministers or in support of Ministers on key issues.
The final amendment in the group would require that the terms and conditions of the Border Security Commander and the key performance indicators used to determine their effectiveness are published. I draw the attention of noble Lords to Clause 2, which sets out the terms and conditions of the designation of the Border Security Commander. Although it would not be appropriate to disclose the detailed terms and conditions of an individual civil servant, the Border Security Commander is a director-general-level position in the Home Office and has the terms and conditions in line with that appointment.
The Government have been very clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for leading the required step change in the UK’s approach to border security, providing a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership, and working to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems, both domestically and internationally. The significance of this role and its work is reflected in the Bill, which puts this office on the statutory footing we talked about earlier and creates legal requirements on the officeholder in fulfilling their duties.
The key performance indicators are the ones that the Government are setting themselves. We want to smash the gangs, reduce crossings made on an illegal basis, reduce and speed up asylum claims, and make sure that we reduce the number of hotel accommodations being used. Those are performance indicators which the Government have put in place. The Border Security Commander’s role is to help the Government co-ordinate those activities, with the budget and the staffing that they have, and to help deliver on those objectives. There is transparency and clarity on these issues. I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord on the amendments that he has brought forward.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response. I point out to noble Lords that these amendments are not about creating additional bureaucracy. They are very much about reinforcing something far more fundamental, which is trust—trust in the effectiveness of the new Border Security Commander, trust in the process by which they are appointed, assessed and, if necessary, removed; and trust in the Government’s commitment to openness and transparency on a matter of genuine public concern.
I just ask the noble Lord this question. Does he feel that the Home Secretary in the House of Commons and me, as the Minister in the Lords for the Home Office, would not be held to account for both the appointment and any removal of the Border Security Commander and their performance—by which I mean also the Government’s performance—as regards the issues which are of great concern to both sides of this House? That is where I think we are. This is the place to hold us to account on performance.
I fully accept what the Minister says. He can rest assured that he will be held to account in the House of Lords, and I am sure my friends in the other place will be holding the Home Secretary to account.
The Government have chosen to elevate this role, presenting it as central to their response to illegal migration and cross-border criminality, yet, as it stands, the Bill offers almost no insight into how that role will be structured, what standards of performance will apply, or what transparency will be in place if the arrangements break down. If the Government believe that this new position will be effective, and if they believe in the strength of their policy, then publishing the terms and conditions, setting the key performance indicators and offering transparency around dismissal should be welcome. These amendments would give Ministers the opportunity to prove they are serious about making this role deliver real results.
We cannot tackle this issue with platitudes and meaningless positions. The public need to know what sort of deal they are getting through this Bill. With that, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I confess to being irredeemably urban—or perhaps suburban—but “The Archers” does have a function in reminding us about pig breeding and the sizes of litters. Listening to noble Lords’ comments has made me think of a number of related issues. I think it is found in a number of parts of life that people who commit one type of crime often commit another type of crime as well. We are well aware of the flexibility, if that is the right term, of the smuggling gangs. It is entirely possible that there is some sort of read across, or at least something that we should be being flagged about.
This also made me think about health, because I believe that somebody came back from Morocco with rabies very recently. It particularly made me think about the competition for facilities at ports, certainly at Dover and, I dare say, at others as well. When I was a member of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, it was made quite clear, particularly by the Port of Dover, that the issue of space to undertake immigration controls was a really big issue.
The answer may be for these relationships to be governed by other authorities falling within the category of partner authorities. However, as well as the points that previous speakers have made very powerfully, there are relationships that need to be thought about very carefully, and the competition for resources of all sorts which are raised by these arrangements.
We have Amendment 19 in this group, which probes whether cybersecurity is an element of border security; it is clearly an element of security. GCHQ is not a partner authority in the Bill, so it is not within the functions of Clause 3, nor is there a general duty to co-operate as applies under Clause 5—there are to be special arrangements. I do not have a solution to this, but it is a genuine question about where cybersecurity falls within the responsibilities and how the border commander is to take account of cybersecurity.
My Lords, my Amendment 18 seeks to introduce another criterion to the definition of what constitutes a threat to border security. We believe it addresses a crucial and glaringly absent dimension from the definition of threats to border security—harm to the economic interests of the United Kingdom.
As drafted, the clause defines relevant threats as those involving criminality, risk of offence, or harm to persons or property. All that is right and necessary, but to leave out the economic dimension is to ignore one of the most significant consequences of border insecurity in the modern age. Illegal entry, organised immigration crime and abuse of our immigration system come at a cost, not just to public safety or border integrity but of real and measurable economic harm. This includes the burden placed on housing, healthcare and social services, and extends to the impact on wages, labour market distortions, the exploitation of workers and loss of public confidence in our immigration system.
These are some of the effects of illegal immigration which people across this country feel most keenly. We must ensure that we reflect this in our assessment of the threat which illegal immigration poses to us. If individuals are entering the UK unlawfully in ways that undermine legal labour markets, displace lawful employment or distort local economies through illicit practices, surely that is a matter of national interest. Surely that is as much of a threat to border security as any physical or legal risk. If our legal framework cannot even acknowledge that reality, how can it ever be expected to address it? This amendment would ensure that this important consideration is included in the Bill, in recognition of economic harm being one of the most serious effects of this issue.
I take this opportunity to speak to some of the other amendments in this group. Amendments 6 and 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, address an important and often overlooked issue. Illegal meat imports present a genuine risk to our agricultural sector, as we have heard, and affect our food supply chains and public health. The potential introduction of diseases such as African swine fever or foot and mouth through contaminated meat would be catastrophic, economically and environmentally. Biosecurity is a key part of our national security. The Government need to take action to ensure that this threat is addressed.
The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raises a matter that I hope the Government will clear up in their response. Cybersecurity is an important responsibility of the Government. I am not quite sure how it relates to border security and asylum, but this is none the less a probing amendment that I hope that the Government respond to. I share the noble Baroness’s concerns about cybersecurity. We have seen a number of high-profile and extremely damaging cyberattacks in recent months. Ministers will be aware of the urgent need to tackle this. The noble Baroness is right to raise this issue. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
My Lords, I will add a couple of points to the excellent points that have been made by previous speakers. My noble friend Lady Hamwee’s point about the opportunism that is evident in the kinds of product that criminals can switch between was well made: they might one day smuggle people and another day smuggle contaminated food products, including meat.
The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, concerning the impact on the economic interests of the UK very much ties up with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in particular, and with trying to persuade the Treasury that the costs of foot and mouth, BSE and bird flu are important. You would think that this was self-evident, even to the Treasury. I would like to say that I was surprised at hearing that it was not, but maybe I was not.
You do not have to be a countryman to think that. I admit that you could not get a lot more metropolitan than I am, but like my noble friend I listen to “The Archers” and care about the countryside. It is not true that all of us who live in cities do not care about the countryside, but we must care about biosecurity as consumers, as well as about the impact on farmers. I absolutely support that idea, but I look forward to the Minister’s response on whether it should be part of the functions of border commander. It certainly needs to go much higher—I was going to say “up the food chain”, but that would be a bad pun—up the profile of government priorities to protect the country from biosecurity threats.
There has been a lot of concern about whether post-Brexit controls are being implemented. I am not a world expert, but the can has been kicked down the road time after time on those controls. There is also concern about whether Border Force and port health authorities are being given enough resources to stamp out illegal meat and other contaminated food imports. The Minister’s colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, was given a grilling by the EFRA Select Committee in the other place early last month; I do not know whether there has been any product from its evidence sessions, chaired by my friend in the other place Alistair Carmichael, but that committee is showing how importantly it takes these issues. We have noble Lords with experience of senior government posts in this area—the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey—so I hope the Minister will give us a positive response.
Lastly, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, mentioned the role of trading standards, which has been so underfunded, sadly. We know what pressure council budgets are under. As a consumer, trading standards is not even on my radar, these days. Where do you go if you have a consumer complaint? I have no idea. Was it not batted off to Citizens Advice a long time ago? Anyway, we know about this function: you have the border and then you have the inside the country attention to these matters. Probably we ought to be aware that they all seem to be quite underfunded and a bit fragile in places. We know that there are so many issues that the police are unable to deal with these days, in this whole area.
There is a lot of press coverage of things such as illegal meat imports, so it would be good to hear from the Minister that the Government—not only Defra but across government—understand and will take action on the very real threats that have been raised by the amendments tabled and discussed in this group.
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott said last week in response to the Government’s previous U-turn on winter fuel payments, we are pleased that the Government have finally listened to the wishes of the British public and agreed to hold a full national inquiry into grooming gangs.
The abhorrence of the crimes committed by these gangs is beyond belief. It is vividly apparent that the victims have repeatedly been let down. The audit by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, lays bare the scale of the institutional failure across the country. I pay tribute to all those survivors who were systematically ignored by authorities for fear of being branded racist. Those who have come forward to whistleblow and share their harrowing stories have demonstrated unbelievable bravery, such as the survivor Fiona Goddard, who was exploited and abused by an Asian grooming gang at the age of 14 when living in care in Bradford. She was led to believe that her abusers cared for her, before they plied her with drugs and continuously raped her. I cannot imagine the horrors experienced by the many thousands of children groomed by these gangs. I am particularly concerned—I raised the matter with the Minister at Questions earlier today—about what steps the Government will take to ensure that the victims are at the centre of their response.
We must be under no illusions. This is not a historic sexual abuse story; these vile crimes are still being perpetrated. Young girls are still, to this very day, being groomed and sexually exploited by gangs, as the report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, makes abundantly clear.
The fact that these gangs continue to operate, with young girls still not being believed and their voices still not being heard, makes it even more difficult to understand why the Government have taken so long to listen to what my right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition has been saying since January. The Conservatives gave the Prime Minister three opportunities in the other place to back a full national inquiry, and Labour Members voted against these measures on all three occasions.
Not only that, but Government Ministers repeatedly opposed such an inquiry. The Secretary of State for Education accused those who called for an inquiry “bandwagon jumpers” who “don’t care about children”. The Leader of the House of Commons claimed that the issue of grooming gangs was a “dog whistle”. The Minister for Safeguarding rejected an appeal by Oldham Council for a national inquiry last October, and in April this year announced just five local inquiries. Indeed, the Minister here said on 22 April, in response to a question that I posed to him, that:
“We could certainly have a national inquiry, as the noble Lord has mentioned, but this Government’s judgment is that we know what the problem is”.—[Official Report, 22/4/25; col. 624.]
Even the Prime Minister himself said that anyone calling for an inquiry was jumping on a far-right bandwagon and repeatedly opposed holding such a national inquiry. He has, of course, now changed his mind once again.
Can the Minister explain why the Government opposed a national inquiry for so long, and why they have now done such a complete about-face on this issue? Surely now is the time for the Government to apologise for repeatedly making false claims about those who have been calling for this national inquiry since January.
I place on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, for her no-nonsense, hard-hitting and thorough audit. Her candour and tenacity are exemplary. She has not shied away from highlighting the fact that these child rape gangs were largely comprised of Pakistani men, a point that all too many have previously been scared to make. She also highlights faults in the available datasets. As the report states, the complex organised child abuse dataset includes all child sexual abuse and exploitation that is committed by two or more perpetrators, and this includes familial abuse, child-on-child abuse and institutional abuse. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the true scale of grooming gangs.
There are 12 recommendations presented in the audit. I look forward to hearing the detail of how and when the Government will take them forward.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I pay tribute to the victims and the whistleblowers from the police and other authorities for their bravery and absolute consistency in continuing to fight for their cause.
I am sorry that the Conservative spokesman has taken the line that he did. I am afraid that from these Benches we have a different standpoint. It was really disappointing on Monday to hear the leader of the Opposition attack the current Government when this applies to Governments of all parties over recent decades, including my own, but especially the Conservative Government who commissioned Professor Jay’s IICSA report, published a response but then did nothing. Surely it is better for all of us to come to this in humility and admit that, time after time, politicians failed to listen. This is not just about parliamentarians; it is about elected mayors, councillors, assemblies and combined authorities too. We did not just fail to listen but we all failed to act.
The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, said that now is the time to right wrongs, and that is correct. The victims and the whistleblowers, even when reported in the news and documentaries, have had to listen time and again to promises of action but nothing changing. It is refreshing that the Statement says that the Government will act on all the noble Baroness’s recommendations. But we know that this promise has been made before in response to complex, long-standing and shameful incidents over the years, and I am sure that some still continue. As Professor Jay said in her IICSA report, we lie to ourselves if we think that child sexual abuse and exploitation are not happening now.
We are seeing similar issues with the slowness of the infected blood compensation scheme, the Post Office Horizon compensation scheme and the Windrush scheme. Will your Lordships’ House hear that the inquiry will be set up swiftly and will be fully funded, including support for victims, as has been promised for the other schemes I have just mentioned, but which has not always appeared? Will the inquiry also draw evidence from the previous reports and reviews, so that the evidence it takes will build on what is already known? As I mentioned at Oral Questions, there are two reasons for this. First, it is much less traumatic for the victims and whistleblowers, many of whom have had to give the same evidence many times, each time revictimising them. Secondly, that should ensure a shorter evidence period of the inquiry; as the Statement says, there is an urgent need for action and accountability, whether for the perpetrators or the organisations that did not protect these children when they were raped and groomed, including councils, the police, the judiciary, social workers and more.
Will victims, including whistleblowers, be supported properly, right from the start, and not be revictimised? How long will it take to review the convictions that some of these young people, mainly girls, received, because they were perceived as complicit and able to give consent when they were plainly children? What steps will the Government take, in the light of the noble Baroness’s audit review, to ask councils, the police, the judiciary, social workers and others to review their working practices now? While the inquiry’s future report and recommendations are important, it is evident that there is enough for those organisations to reflect and change their practice now, in light of this audit review.
The Government have promised a form of mandatory reporting, as well as a Bill on the duty of candour, or Hillsborough law. Can the Minister say when we will see them in Parliament? Both are urgent to prevent this happening again in the future.
The recommendations on appropriate data collection and data sharing are also vital and, I am afraid, long overdue. The use of the Smith algorithm in West Yorkshire sounds helpful in identifying people possibly in scope as victims and survivors. Will it be rolled out elsewhere, given West Yorkshire’s positive experience?
The noble Baroness’s report proposes research into taxi drivers for group-based child sexual exploitation, including online. Unlike the monks, teachers and children’s workers involved in other group child sexual exploitation, taxi drivers are below the regulatory radar, other than the licence for their taxis. So will the Government ensure that statutory standards for taxi drivers will be brought in, to end “out of area” taxis plying their trade in places many miles away, where they are not on the radar of the local authority in which they are trying to work?
Will the Government publish a plan for communication to the wider public? This is a highly sensitive topic for young people, families and communities. In particular, will the Government work with faith groups and community groups? The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, rightly pointed out during Oral Questions that most Muslims are absolutely horrified by the behaviour of small groups of truly evil men, but it will be important for these communities to understand what they need to do to prevent it from ever happening again.
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Baroness. We are trying to do that as quickly as possible. I cannot give a definitive date, but if I say to her that we want to get this started as quickly as possible, I hope she will understand that I am trying to do that. I will report back to this House in due course when that is possible to do.
My Lords, as has already been alluded to, our foremost priority must be to those who have suffered so badly, to ensure that their voices are not only heard but placed at the centre of our next steps. Justice must be delivered, and it must be delivered swiftly. Can the Minister therefore outline what specific steps the Government are taking to support victims at this stage? In particular, how do they intend to ensure that any investigation is thorough and timely, with particular reference to those in authority who have failed the victims so far, and that the investigation truly reflects the urgency and seriousness that the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, has rightly emphasised?
One of the key recommendations from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was that we review convictions of victims and look at how victims have experienced the system. We have accepted that recommendation in full, and we will be bringing forward measures in the Crime and Policing Bill very shortly, which is finishing its progress in the other place this very day. It will be with this House, at least for Second Reading, before the Summer Recess, I hope. We will have amendments to that Bill in Committee stage that will deal with victim support.
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberIt is really important that we try to retain police officers in post. Of the people who left in the past 12 months, approximately one-third were those who had reached retirement age and were going anyway. The largest group—48% of those who left the force—were people who had been there under two years. So, contrary to public perception, we are finding that people are retiring—people do retire—but the difficulty is retaining those recruited into the police force.
The noble Baroness makes an extremely important point about needing to ensure that we use that experience seriously to bear down on crime. What I want is to retain individuals who are recruited—it is a costly exercise, recruiting people who then leave after two years—but we also want to manage expectations. Again, trailing the police reform White Paper, those issues are part of the Government’s potential future plans once the White Paper is produced.
The latest Home Office police workforce statistics report includes data on officer age profiles, and it shows an ageing workforce in which 47% of officers are aged between 41 and 55. Can the Minister update the House on what the Government are doing to stop the haemorrhaging of officers we are seeing on his watch, and what exactly is the department doing to recruit young police officers? I understand that the numbers are now down to 122,000 nationally.
It worries me when the noble Lord says that people are ageing when they are 55—it strikes a cold blow to my heart—but the point he makes is extremely important. We need to ensure that we recruit police officers, and the Government are committed to recruiting an additional 13,000 neighbourhood police officers during this Parliament—3,000 this year. We have put in £1.2 billion of investment this year. As I just said to the noble Baroness on the Liberal Democrat Benches, we need to retain those we recruit, because 72% of the people who leave are leaving within three years and 48% are leaving within two years. That is not a good prospect. We need to retain those people and improve recruitment procedures to do that, but we also need to up the numbers, which the Government are trying to do. We need to ensure that we make effective use of resources, which is what the White Paper will be about. I look forward to the noble Lord’s help and support in achieving those objectives.