Manchester Terrorism Attack

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 15th October 2025 Lords Chamber

However, at the same time we must not let this attack defeat us, nor forget who we really are, because the real face of this country was not that of the vile monster who conducted this attack. It was those who stood up to him and saved their fellow worshippers, and the emergency services who sprinted towards danger to bring the attack to an end. The real face of this country was not those who took to the streets and protested the very next day, but rather those who were horrified by the attack, stood with their Jewish neighbours and chose the path of solidarity over division. The antisemitic terrorist attack of 2 October was a horrifying act. In response to it, I hope the whole House can be united in a simple message: those who seek to divide us by pitting one against another will fail. No act of terror will ever defeat us. I commend this Statement to the House”.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it has been almost two weeks since Manchester was left reeling from yet another terrorist attack. The events of 2 October not only ended the lives of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz but left our entire Jewish community worrying about their safety. We are in an appalling situation now where we have to have armed police and security patrols outside synagogues and Jewish schools simply to ensure that British Jews can go about their daily lives safely. In the immediate aftermath of such an attack, such measures are, of course, necessary, but our places of worship and our community centres should be places of safety. No British citizen should have to live in perpetual fear simply because they are Jewish.

I have an observation to make. Whenever we speak in this House and elsewhere of terrorist attacks, atrocities and acts of extreme violence, we often offer our thoughts and prayers to the victims and their families. It has also become commonplace to repeat the refrain, “Never again”. We have said these words too many times; we hear them too often. We must move on from simply offering hollow words of condolence. Thoughts and prayers do not revive a grieving wife’s husband, do not prevent future attacks and do not save lives. These attacks happen again and again.

Beyond expressing our condolences, it is our duty as legislators to work together to tackle the evil that lay behind this attack. We must be clear that this terror attack and the rise of Islamic extremism and increasing antisemitism are inexplicably linked. This year has seen the second-highest number of antisemitic incidents ever recorded in this country. Hate-filled marches, ostensibly in the name of the pro-Palestine movement but frequently entering the territory of being anti-Jew, have filled our streets. For as long as we fail to tackle the growth of radical and violent Islamic extremism, both at home and abroad, attacks such as these are likely to continue. We must not shy away from calling this what it is—an extremist ideology linked to Islam—and we must ensure that we are always able to call out such an ideology.

Unfortunately, the Government’s working group on Islamophobia could serve to actively stifle free debate on the nature and prevalence of Islamic fundamentalism. This has been criticised by the National Secular Society, the Free Speech Union and the Network of Sikh Organisations, which is planning to bring a judicial review against the Government if the new definition goes ahead. So will the Minister implore his ministerial colleagues to drop these plans and ensure that free and open discussion about the dangers we face as a society from Islamic extremism is never curtailed?

I appreciate that this is a live legal investigation, and as such there is a limit on what the Minister can tell us. However, several questions arise from the particulars of these events. First, the attacker in question, Jihad al-Shamie, was a Syrian-born male who arrived in the United Kingdom as a child. He begged a woman to become his second wife, claiming that in Islam it is permissible for a man to have up to four wives, and then abused her mentally and sexually. At the time he carried out his attack, he was on bail for a rape he allegedly committed earlier this year. When he committed the Manchester attack, he called 999 and pledged allegiance to Islamic State. Despite all this, he was apparently not known to counterterror police. Does the Minister agree that more needs to be done to plug the gaps in the Government’s terrorism prevention programme? If so, are the Government looking into how they might do so?

Secondly, the Home Secretary, in her Statement, said she was looking to bring forward legislative changes to the Public Order Act 1986 to allow police forces to consider the cumulative impact of protest marches when deciding to impose those conditions. Indeed, we have seen the Government claim that they did not have sufficient powers to prevent the hate-filled marches across the country on the day after the 2 October attack in Manchester. However, Section 12 of the Public Order Act already permits senior police officers to place conditions on a public procession if it is held to cause intimidation to others. Is it the Government’s view that this existing test would not have been enough to place restrictions on those marches? Does the Minister think that the proposed new cumulative impact test will be sufficient? I look forward to his response.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the appalling attack on the Manchester synagogue is a stark warning of the persistent threat of antisemitic hate and the urgent need to unify against those who seek to divide us. Attacks based on race or religion are totally unacceptable and this attack is a chilling testament to the rising tide of division in our society, which has left many in the Jewish community frightened even to go to their synagogue. Antisemitic hate, or hate in any form, has no place in Britain. We must never allow the heat of public debate to legitimise, excuse, encourage or embolden such cowardly acts of terrorism. Anyone who incites hatred, or spreads it, against any faith or background must be held accountable under the law.

This crime was not a political statement but an act of pure violence designed to spread fear and drive communities apart. Nevertheless, all of us, across all political parties, share a responsibility to seek consensus and reduce division when addressing issues that provoke strong passions. As a society, we are becoming more polarised with public debate, whether about events in the Middle East, immigration or indeed any other difficult subject, too frequently descending into hostility and suspicion. We all must reject the language and the policies of division and commit to trying to rebuild a sense of common purpose.

As we mourn the victims of this atrocity, we must also guard against overreaction. The temptation can be to reach for more powers and more controls, even at the expense of our fundamental freedoms. The Prime Minister’s pledge to review public order powers in the wake of Manchester is understandable, but I urge the Government to approach with caution, because incremental curbs on protest will not stop antisemitic hate, but a “drip, drip” approach to legislation risks us becoming a society where people of all backgrounds and beliefs no longer feel safe or free to express their views. That would, in my view, hand victory to those who want to divide us, because the restriction of protest rights will not defeat antisemitism but risks damaging our democracy.

The best way to respond to hate is to defend everyone’s right to live, worship and speak freely, within the law, while refusing to compromise our commitment to an open and plural democracy. We must learn from this tragedy, so I ask the Minister what action are the Government taking to work more closely with grass-roots faith leaders, not only through funding and policing but through genuine, community-led, early warning and education work with Jewish and interfaith groups to strengthen local resilience, encourage reporting and tackle radicalisation at its roots?

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as always, it is a pleasure to follow the Minister in opening the Second Reading of this short but highly important Bill. There is a lot that we disagree on in this House—indeed, in politics in general, it would be fair to say that the Minister and I have differing views on a number of issues—but we all have the same end goal: we want to see this country thrive and, to do that, it must be as safe and secure as possible. To that end, I fully support the Bill.

The Minister has given a detailed account of the events that led the Government to seek this change to Section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981. As he said, it arises out of a Supreme Court case earlier this year. In that ruling, the court held that were an appeal against a deprivation order successful, the order is considered to have had no effect. That means that while the Home Secretary’s further appeals are pending, the person would be able to enjoy their full rights of citizenship. The point here is that the power to deprive is used as a last resort. There was some talk in the other place that this power has not been used sparingly. That is not the case, because between 2010 and 2024, 222 orders were made on the grounds that deprivation was conducive to the public good—that is an average of 15.8 per year—and 858 orders were made for fraud. For context, there were 269,621 grants of British citizenship in 2024 alone, and since 2010, there have been at least 100,000 grants of citizenship every single year. We are therefore talking about a very small proportion of people who have their citizenship deprived when compared to the number of new citizenship grants that have been made. It is evident that the power is indeed used sparingly, in cases of the utmost seriousness.

Is it not wholly right, therefore, that in cases of such gravity the deprivation order should continue to have effect during the period of appeals? Of particular importance here is where a person whom the Home Secretary rightly deems to be a national security risk is currently abroad. The deprivation order would prevent that person returning to the United Kingdom. Under the Supreme Court’s new interpretation of the law, if that person were to successfully appeal in absentia, their right to enter the country unhindered would be reinstated automatically, with no regard to the potential risk they presented to the British public. That is surely an untenable situation.

This new interpretation is also legally inconsistent with asylum and immigration decisions. With asylum claims, a refusal continues to have effect until all legal processes are completed. Asylum status is not simply automatically granted by a court upon the first successful appeal. The process requires one to exhaust the full spectrum of legal challenges first.

This Bill is not about attempting to subvert judges or to amend the appeals process, nor does it make it easier to deprive a person of their citizenship. Rather, it is about reasserting the simple fact that it is for Parliament to decide what British citizenship means and the expectations we place on those who are granted it. Citizenship is a privilege, one that demonstrates a bond of trust. Those who violate that trust and openly threaten our society, or who utilise fraudulent means to gain it, should have that privilege revoked. The Government are right to ensure that deprivation can continue during the appeals process and are right to bring forward this Bill.

Refugee Family Reunion Scheme

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As my noble friend will guess from the questions I have had to date, we paused the family reunion scheme on 4 September pending a review, and we expect to bring forward proposals by April of next year. I am not in a position to give my noble friend a foretaste of what those proposals will be, because the purpose of us pausing the scheme is to examine the reasons why the increase has happened; to look at the pressures that have brought, potentially, 18% of reunion visas from Syria, 17% from Iran and 12% from Afghanistan; to look at what the drivers of that are and at how we can provide an appropriate level of family reunion—but in a context whereby we put some more strictures on what family reunion means.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

The Government have rightly suspended the refugee family reunion route while they draft new rules for the scheme. The Prime Minister has said that this was because he wanted to end the

“golden ticket to settling in the UK”.

Surely, the Minister must accept that the Government’s inability to implement any meaningful policies to stop illegal migration and their failure to deter the recent small boat crossings is indeed a golden ticket?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord and I have had much discussion on this issue in the last weeks and months. He knows that we have an honest disagreement about how we control some of those issues. He is conflating family reunion and asylum claims with individuals who are potentially coming here through irregular migration by small boats, funded by criminal gangs. He knows we are putting a border command in place to tackle those gangs. He knows we are putting in place measures to criminalise that activity. He knows we are putting in measures to try to stop that, including a scheme with France and scrapping the failed Rwanda scheme. There is an honest disagreement between us, but I hope he will recognise that the Government are acting responsibly in looking at the drivers of family reunion to see if we can make an honest assessment, rather than letting the figures rise uncontrollably, as happened under the last year of the previous Government.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I do not want to repeat all that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, but I agree with every word. If we wish people to become full citizens of, or to integrate into, our country, looking back at the way in which they came into the country actually damages that process. People who could have been working here for years, and brought families up together, are being denied that opportunity.

It is quite clear that this is a case of one step forward, one step back. The repeal of some of the provisions of the Illegal Migration Act, in Clauses 38 and 39 of the Bill, was absolutely the right thing to do. But then the Secretary of State overturned that by stating simply that, from 10 February 2025, individuals applying for citizenship who arrived by “a dangerous journey”, or who entered the UK irregularly, “will normally be refused” British citizenship, with no carve-out for refugees, stateless persons, victims of trafficking or children—and it is retrospective to people already in the United Kingdom.

Because it is such an important issue, I managed to ask whether Britain was standing alone on this matter. I have arranged, through a system in this Parliament that I did not know about, to ask all 46 Parliaments of the Council of Europe a question. When considering a citizenship application from an individual who is legally recognised as a refugee, to what extent does the method by which they entered the country impact their eligibility for citizenship? For example, does entering national territory without permission normally make an applicant ineligible for citizenship, including if they are later recognised as a refugee?

That was dealt with by the Parliaments of the Council of Europe, and we received responses from 31 member countries. Not one of them has the rule that the Secretary of State has just applied to this system. I will read out the names of those countries, because they ought to be on record: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada—which is an associate of the Council of Europe—Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. None of them carries out this policy.

Why are we standing alone? Why are we the ones who are marching out of step with everybody else? Why is it that we do not want these people, who are coming here and spending their lifespan here, to be integrated fully and granted citizenship? They have worked their way through our society. It is absolutely shameful and the Government ought to rescind the Secretary of State’s statement and fall back on what is done in this Bill. In the Bill, we have done the right thing. By contrast, the Secretary of State’s statement needs to be re-dealt with, so that we can fall in line with every other country in Europe that decided to respond to this. Incidentally, it was only the small countries that did not respond, such as San Marino and Andorra; all the big countries of Europe are in there.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly about the first amendment in this group, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford and moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, before moving on to those in my name and those of my noble friends.

The “good character” assessment may, in the view of some noble Lords, have a slightly antiquated name, but let me take a moment to go into some more detail. A person will not normally be considered to be of good character if there is information to suggest that any of the following apply: if they are a criminal, if they are a terrorist, if they have failed to pay tax, if they are dishonest or if they have breached immigration laws. That is not an exhaustive list, but those are the main points set out by the Government.

I know that the amendment is well intentioned, but we on these Benches believe that the requirements currently set out to be considered a person of “good character” are not only valid but important for maintaining national security and the safety and well-being of our citizens. For us to say that a person should not be a threat to national security, that they should be honest and that they should seek to nurture our community rather than harm it, as a prerequisite, is, I am sure all noble Lords will agree, an entirely valid principle. I therefore cannot support any measures that threaten the watering down of this principle and cannot back the amendment.

I turn to the amendments in this group in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Cameron and Lord Jackson of Peterborough. We need to acknowledge in this debate that, despite our various disagreements on the Bill and, to some extent, on how we approach the issue of migration more widely, we share the same fundamental ambition to see our country succeed. We all want a country in which everyone contributes, in which communities thrive and work together, and in which our economy and public services are properly supported. But, if we are to get closer to achieving this ambition, we must face up to the reality that our social security and welfare systems are not limitless. They exist to protect the vulnerable here at home and to support those who fall on hard times. That is why these amendments are so vital.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

189: After Clause 48, insert the following new Clause—
“Disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998 for immigration legislation(1) For the purposes of any provision made by virtue of this Act or the relevant immigration legislation, and for any decision, action or policy made under this Act or the relevant immigration legislation, the Human Rights Act 1998 does not apply.(2) Where a court or tribunal is considering any decision under the relevant immigration legislation, the court or tribunal must disregard the Human Rights Act 1998.(3) For the purposes of this section “the relevant immigration legislation” means—(a) the Immigration Acts as defined by section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007, and(b) the Immigration Rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971.(4) In the Human Rights Act 1998—(a) in section 3, after subsection (2), insert—“(3) This section does not apply to any provision made by or by virtue of the relevant immigration legislation as defined by section (Disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998 for immigration legislation) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.”;(b) in section 6— (i) in subsection (2)(a) omit the last “or”(ii) after subsection (2)(b) insert—“(c) the authority was exercising powers or fulfilling functions conferred on the authority by the relevant immigration legislation as defined by section (Disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998 for Immigration Legislation) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.”(5) In the Immigration Act 1971—(a) in section 8AA—(i) in subsection (2), omit “Subject to subsections (3) to (5)”,(ii) in subsection (2)(a)(i) omit “, or”;(iii) omit subsection (2)(a)(ii), and(iv) omit subsections (3) to (6), and(b) in section 8B, omit subsection (5A).(6) In the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, omit section 2.(7) In section 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002—(a) in subsection (1) after “must” insert “not”,(b) in subsection (2) after “must” insert “not”,(c) in subsection (2) for “section 6” substitute “any section”, and(d) in subsection (3) after “must” insert “not”.(8) In the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 in section 2 (offences relating to entering the United Kingdom without a passport), in subsection (12) for the definition of “leave or asylum interview” substitute—“leave interview” means an interview with an immigration officer or an official of the Secretary of State at which a person seeks leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.(9) Where the European Court of Human Rights indicates an interim measure relating to the exercise of any function under the legislation identified in subsection (1)—(a) it is only for a Minister of the Crown to decide whether the United Kingdom will comply with the interim measure under this section, and(b) an immigration officer or court or tribunal must not have regard to the interim measure.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we now turn, in my submission, to probably one of the most important groups of amendments on the Bill, which I am sure will promote some discussion and likely much disagreement. That is perhaps something to be welcomed.

The stated aim of the Human Rights Act, when it was introduced, was to bring rights home. It incorporates 16 rights derived from the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law and was itself enacted to satisfy the obligations placed on the British Government by Article 1 of the ECHR. This was all to satisfy a noble purpose: to make sure that human rights in the United Kingdom were protected and upheld. But we have seen the corruption of this noble purpose no more keenly than when we see how it has been applied to matters of immigration and deportation.

To give an example, noble Lords will no doubt be familiar with the horrific abuses inflicted on girls by the Rochdale grooming gangs. Two of the Rochdale grooming gang ringleaders, Adil Khan and Qari Abdul Rauf, fought deportation by claiming their right to a family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is also Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. Rauf even gave up his Pakistani citizenship just to make sure that we could not deport him. He lost his appeals, yet he is still here: still in Rochdale, still living among the people whose lives he destroyed.

It is clear that, under the straitjacket imposed on us by the Human Rights Act, our country has lost control of the asylum system. Hundreds of thousands of people have come here claiming to be refugees—far more than politicians before us ever imagined—almost all passing through neighbouring countries which are perfectly safe. Tens of thousands of them will receive taxpayer-funded legal aid, which is spent on lawyers competing to devise ever more ingenious legal arguments to keep them in the country.

Let me give your Lordships some more examples. One woman, who was refused leave to remain, deliberately joined a terrorist organisation to manufacture a claim that she risked imprisonment back home. A convicted paedophile evaded deportation by claiming he was gay and that his life would be at risk in his home country. And let us not forget the Albanian criminal who claimed in February that he could not be deported because of his son’s sensitivity around food, the sole example given in court being his aversion to foreign chicken nuggets. The immigration tribunal ruled that his deportation would breach his Article 8 rights, as it would apparently have an “unduly harsh” impact on his son.

Every day we see these kinds of cases reported, and tens of thousands of illegal immigrants, mainly adult men, take the risk of crossing the channel in small boats because they know that we cannot remove even criminals and terrorists. Indeed, we pay their legal fees to help them stay. We have seen this unjust situation unfold further with the Government’s returns deal with France. The week before Parliament broke for recess saw the first two flights leave with no migrants on board. Those who were due to be deported on those flights had their deportation orders halted by the High Court due to concerns about human trafficking and torture. The new Home Secretary herself admonished those trying to use the Human Rights Act and the ECHR to prevent their deportation as

“making a mockery of our laws”.

How can this situation be a reflection of the laudable aims that heralded the incorporation of the ECHR into our statute book in 1998? The simple answer is that it is not. The dream has become a nightmare, and the time has come for us to do something about it. That is why I and my noble friends on these Benches have tabled this amendment.

There is a point I wish to clarify here. After the excellent, thorough report of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, the Conservative Party has committed itself to repealing the Human Rights Act and leaving the ECHR. While it is no longer the policy of the Official Opposition simply to disapply the Human Rights Act for immigration cases, this Bill does not present us with the opportunity to repeal the HRA. To do so would require a Bill of its own. This amendment is therefore the avenue through which we are able at this stage to facilitate discussion on the impact of our continued membership of the ECHR.

I know that some noble Lords in your Lordships’ House today will disagree with me. As I have already said, the debate is welcome, but I ask those who disagree whether our situation now, this minute, is one that the Human Rights Act is working to improve. Has the Human Rights Act protected the victims, their families and communities in Rochdale? Has it protected our people from the paedophiles who continue to languish in the United Kingdom because we cannot deport them? Does it help or hinder people smugglers who use it to reassure the people they are transporting that they will not be removed? The answer is clear: the Human Rights Act in this context does not uphold human rights. It aids and abets abusers in their abuse. Trauma is continued and renewed because of the Act. The rights of our people come second to the rights of child abusers and terrorists, who hide behind the Act to remain on our shores, to remain a threat to our people and to remain a source of terror and pain for the people they have already harmed. We are prevented from deporting those who show flagrant disrespect for the laws passed by our sovereign Parliament, but even more fundamentally it prevents us enacting the wishes of the British people. This is an untenable situation that we must swiftly seek to remedy.

I further welcome the amendments to Amendment 189 tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth; they perform an important function in strengthening its purpose. While that amendment would disapply the Human Rights Act from immigration legislation, my noble friend’s additions would ensure that the mechanisms contained in Sections 4 and 10 of the Human Rights Act are also expressly excluded. In practice, this means that the courts would not be able to issue declarations of incompatibility in relation to immigration law; nor would Ministers be able to use remedial orders to alter such legislation on human rights grounds. That would close off any backdoor reintroduction of Human Rights Act challenges into this field, and it would provide the clarity and certainty that are essential if this policy is to be delivered effectively. I therefore strongly support these amendments as a logical and necessary reinforcement of the central principle of Amendment 189.

As has been said in the other place, now is the time for radical decisions. This is an amendment the Government should welcome if we are to stand up for the rights and well-being of the British people. I beg to move.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as foreshadowed by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, I have two amendments in this group that seek to amend the Front Bench disapplication provision for the Human Rights Act. Of course, disapplication feels rather “yesterday”; the Overton window on the question of human rights law is now clearly swinging in favour of repeal of the Human Rights Act, following the excellent report produced by my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and the announcement of the party’s new policy. Be that as it may, for the purposes of this Bill, the correct approach, which I suggest the Minister should grasp with both hands, is to disapply the effect of the convention and the operation of the Act in the sphere of immigration decisions.

Disapplying the Human Rights Act from this area is not unprecedented. As the Minister will recall, this provision was incorporated, in a slightly different form, in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act, and it was clearly a matter that passed both Houses of Parliament. It is both a precedented and a necessary step.

I turn briefly to the context for my amendment. The amendment itself would add two further provisions to the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Davies: that is, to include in the operation Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, which is the court power to make a declaration of incompatibility, and Section 10, which is a power to remedy any incompatibility by means of a statutory instrument. As Policy Exchange observed in its paper on the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act in December 2023, that disapplication provision did not mention Sections 4 and 10 and was the worse for it, because the experience has been that, where a court can make a declaration of incompatibility, those matters are taken almost automatically by the Government as warranting some sort of remedial step.

No Government so far have ignored a declaration of incompatibility, to my knowledge. For example, in the recent case where the Northern Irish High Court found an incompatibility in the legacy Act, the decision of the Government was to bring forward a remedial order to have the effect of suspending the operation of the provisions of that Act without waiting for primary legislation, itself a controversial move. To avoid that situation recurring, I have tabled these amendments to exclude from any potential challenge to immigration-related decisions a decision by a court to make a declaration of incompatibility, or a decision by a Government to attempt to remedy it by making a remedial order under Section 10 of the Human Rights Act.

It is clearly time that we took back control of the United Kingdom’s borders. This Government, and particularly this Home Office, know the difficulties that trying to operate within the constraints of the Human Rights Act has generated as it has evolved. I encourage the Minister to accept a provision similar to this so that he can implement the policies of his Government.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I suggest that the noble Lord tests me on these matters when we have, as I have said, undertaken the work, reviewed potential legislation, brought forward proposals and put them before both this House and the House of Commons. Either I or a Minister in the House of Commons will have signed the Bill at that stage, in terms of those issues, but we are a number of steps away from that.

At the moment, we have assessed—this goes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, mentioned—that Articles 3 and 8 have some challenges, but the principle is not to do what the Opposition seek, which is to withdraw from this in its entirety and, in doing so, withdraw from a range of international obligations that we share with many countries and which underpin the work of this United Kingdom in so many areas. That is not my natural approach to this challenge. With due respect to noble Lords, let us have that debate and, if need be, let us have that vote at some point. We will be on different sides of that argument.

To the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I say this: bear with us. We will bring forward the points that I have tried to make in tonight’s debate on Articles 3 and 8. They will be examined when the Government have had an opportunity both to examine them in detail—now that we are in government, as opposed to being outside the tent in opposition—and to bring forward proposals that will help in a way that builds consensus with our partners on what ECHR reform could look like. At the recent European Political Community Summit, 17 nations, including the UK, agreed to work together to ensure that the ECHR and other international frameworks are implemented in a way that safeguards against abuse so that Governments can tackle modern challenges.

The UK is committed to complying with international law. If we accepted the amendments from those opposite, we would not be, in my view, complying with international law. That includes implementing judgments of the European court and complying when it indicates binding interim measures in pending cases; when the court has reformed and improved its approach to interim measures, which I currently welcome, we will abide by those also.

In summary, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, can be patient. To the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Murray, I say this: I am sorry that we are not going to agree, but I hope that I have explained the reasons why.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as expected, that created a good discussion on the amendments in this group; I am thankful to the noble Lords who took part in it. I am disappointed that, after all the legitimate deportations that have been blocked, the Government are still resisting these sensible proposals—if not, perhaps, a little confused by the Government’s variety of views as to where they are going with this.

I shall not detain the Committee for much longer, but I must stress that the Human Rights Act is not supporting or upholding the rights and freedoms that it was meant to enshrine. The Human Rights Act has become a shield behind which criminals, terrorists and abusers hide. We are clear that this is not at all right.

Let us not forget that varying degrees of this policy are supported by many of those on the Government’s own Benches. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, has publicly called for the Government to suspend parts of the ECHR to allow for more illegal migrants and foreign criminals to be deported. Another former Labour Home Secretary, Jack Straw, has proposed decoupling human rights laws from the ECHR to permit more deportations. I note that the Government have committed to reforming how Article 8 is interpreted under UK law and we have heard that commitment again from the Minister. But the simple fact is that this is not sufficient. If we reinterpret Article 8, crafty defence lawyers will find a workaround for the new interpretation or will start using other provisions of the Human Rights Act to block deportation. We say that only a wholesale repeal will resolve the issue of vexatious legal challenges and allow us to regain control of our asylum system.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

204: Clause 49, page 47, line 14, leave out “5” and insert “14”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to standardise the punishment for offences relating to articles used in serious crime in this clause with the punishment for offences relating to articles used in immigration crime in clauses 13 and 14.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a simple group with some simple amendments. As we are close to reaching the end of six rather long days of Committee on this Bill, I will be brief. Amendment 204 seeks to standardise the punishment for offences relating to articles used in serious crime in Clause 49 with the punishment for offences relating to articles used in immigration crime in Clauses 13 and 14.

It is slightly strange that Part 3 has found its way into this Bill. The provisions around serious crime prevention orders and articles for use in serious crime were part of the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, which unfortunately fell due to the election. Although it is welcome that this Government are taking these provisions forward, it would have made more sense to include them in the upcoming Crime and Policing Bill, which we will consider later this week, rather than in an immigration and border security Bill. But, since these clauses have found their way into this Bill, there is good reason to consider them holistically as part of the general measures aimed at deterring immigration offences. That is what the amendments in this group aim to achieve.

Amendment 204 therefore changes the maximum period of imprisonment for possession of an article for use in a serious crime from five years to 14 years. This would be the same as the maximum imprisonment for the new offences of supplying or handling an article for use in immigration crime. Similarly, Amendments 204A and 204B would expand the class of applicants for a serious crime prevention order to include the directors-general of Border Force and Immigration Enforcement, as well as the Border Security Commander. This would permit those senior officials to apply for these prevention orders as part of their duties in protecting our border security and enforcing immigration laws.

Amendment 208B would expand the definition of a “serious crime” for the purposes of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Currently, the only crime under any of the immigration Acts considered to be a serious crime is the offence of assisting unlawful immigration and helping an asylum seeker enter the United Kingdom. If a serious crime prevention order can be given for these offences, why can one not be given for all offences under Sections 24 and 24A of the Immigration Act 1971? Certainly, why can one not be given under the new immigration offences in Clauses 13 and 14 of this Bill?

These amendments, taken together, are intended to strengthen the ability of the authorities to tackle immigration crimes by giving them the necessary legal tools. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 207 in this group. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that it is rather odd that the serious crime prevention provisions are in this Bill. I wondered whether it is because the Crime and Policing Bill was “overloaded”—would that be the term to use? But that is the extent to which I agree with the noble Lord.

I am not alone on these Benches: the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I have raised a number of times over the years our concern about civil orders morphing into crime without any finding of guilt. The Bill extends serious crime prevention orders with the inclusion of electronic monitoring and the creation of interim orders, extends the list of parties who can apply for an order—the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would extend it further—and gives the Crown Court jurisdiction in this area. So it will be no surprise to anyone who has heard us before to see this amendment.

It is not only the extensions that make the need for a review all the more important. There is very little evidence or data, if any, to show that the orders work. They overlap with other orders, so there is some confusion. There is inconsistency in their use, which I have become very aware of in the context of modern slavery and human trafficking, where it became clear that some police forces were not even aware that they could pursue equivalent orders. There is a lack of resourcing and infrastructure to monitor and enforce orders. Breaches are common, which is not surprising, because individuals do not have adequate support to comply with the restrictions and requirements that orders can contain and so, as has been put to us, they are set up to fail.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights made recommendations with regard to these provisions:

“Given the severe infringement on the right to privacy posed by the imposition of electronic monitoring, the test should be one of ‘necessity and proportionality’, not whether it is ‘appropriate’”,


and,

“To ensure respect for Convention rights, the prosecuting authorities and the courts must be careful to only seek and impose these interim orders where risks are imminent”.


Rather than proposing those provisions specifically, we on these Benches feel that it would be helpful and important for there to be a review of prevention orders in the round before we make piecemeal additions to them, and a review would certainly extend to the issues of necessity and proportionality.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I am very happy to write on that point but, speaking as a practitioner of the dark arts of evaluation, I am generally in favour of its publication.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his response and will be very brief in closing this group. The amendments considered here all focus on provisions drafted by the previous Government and continued by this one, so it is not surprising that I support them. My amendments in this group do not signify my opposition to these clauses of the Bill. Rather, they serve as suggestions to further improve and expand the ability of immigration authorities to combat immigration crime—although I perhaps take issue with what the noble Lord said in respect of Amendment 204B. Perhaps that is a debate for another time. I understand his view on this and I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 204 withdrawn.

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I am not expecting the Minister when he responds to say, “Yes, it is a wonderful idea and we will do it tomorrow”, but I hope he will at least consider it and see if it is a way of saving lives. I do not care whose lives they are; that is something completely separate, but you still have a duty to save lives. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will deal with Amendments 208 and 208A tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Dubs. I begin by saying that we on these Benches agree very much with the underlying principle: the importance of taking action against those who endanger lives at sea.

We appreciate the passion behind this amendment. Indeed, I fully appreciate it, having been a maritime Minister. That is a principle that we have strongly supported. Indeed, it is one already reflected in the amendments we have tabled to this Bill. There can be no doubt that the small boat crossings in the channel are dangerous, reckless and exploitative. Time and again we have seen the devastating consequences of criminal gangs putting men, women and children into overcrowded and unseaworthy boats, knowing full well the risks to life that this involves.

However, this amendment as drafted, we believe, is flawed. It appears to rest on an assumption that some of the vessels are safe and some are not, and that it is the task of enforcement authorities to distinguish between the two. That is not a distinction that exists in reality. The simple truth is that one endangers lives at sea purely in the act of getting into one of these boats in the first place. Every single vessel making an illegal crossing of the channel is, by definition, dangerously unsafe. Everyone involved in launching or boating those vessels, from the organisers to the passengers, is participating in an inherently perilous act which should be treated as such under the law.

We cannot afford a situation in which authorities must first determine whether a vessel is dangerously unsafe before intervening. We cannot wait for tragedy to occur before action can be taken. The legal position must be absolutely clear: all such crossings are unsafe, unlawful and unacceptable. That is the principle that underpins the approach that we have advocated throughout this Bill and the one that we believe that the Government must continue to uphold.

On Amendment 208A, I appreciate the noble Lord’s intention to ensure effective co-operation between the Border Force’s maritime command and His Majesty’s Coastguard. However, it is not clear that the creation of an additional co-ordinating body, as this amendment proposes, would make any practical difference on the ground. The Border Force and the coastguard already operate under well-established protocols for joint working through the Joint Maritime Security Centre. We must trust the professionals on the front line, the experts in the Border Force and the coastguard, to exercise the powers granted to them safely, responsibly and in the national interest.

The answer to the challenges in the channel lies not in expanding bureaucracy or creating new administrative structures but in ensuring that the powers and resources that we have already legislated for are used effectively. Both these amendments proceed from understandable and serious concerns, but in our view the right way forward is not to introduce new uncertainty into the law nor to create additional layers of oversight but to maintain clear, firm principles—that all small boat crossings are inherently unsafe and that those charged with policing them must be trusted to act decisively and professionally to prevent loss of life and secure our borders.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I was intrigued to know what points the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, was going to raise. After listening to him, it occurs to me to ask the Minister whether HM Coastguard is a partner authority under Clause 3 of the Bill:

“a public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”.

Of course, partner authorities have a duty to co-operate with the Border Force commander—so I am asking about context.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

We need to know what the Government’s direction of travel is: otherwise, it becomes very tricky for us to amend the Bill in a way which makes sense of it for the future. But then, if we do manage to amend it, that means, of course, that the Government will have to recognise that this House has taken a decision and follow that with their own regulations. So I am looking forward to some very concrete answers from a very important man who is sitting right opposite me as the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group brings us to a very topical and significant point of contention. Amendments 165, 166 and 177 all seek in their own way to expand refugee family reunion provisions, in some cases dramatically.

I begin by acknowledging the sincerity of those who support these amendments. We all recognise the tragic circumstances that force families apart due to conflict and persecution. But we must equally recognise that compassion, if not tempered by realism and control, risks undermining both the integrity of our immigration system and the public’s confidence in its fairness. Each of these amendments, though well intentioned, risks undermining the very principles that underpin a sustainable, fair and secure asylum system.

Amendments 165 and 166, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have made the argument that those granted refugee status in this country should be able to apply to bring their spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner, their children, grandchildren, sister, brother, nephew or nieces to the UK; and, for a child, they should be able to sponsor their parents, grandparents, sisters, brothers, aunts and uncles. This is a fundamental shift in the architecture of our immigration policy. It creates wide-ranging entitlements without the necessary safeguards, verification mechanisms or limits. It also risks creating perverse incentives, in particular the possibility that families might send unaccompanied children on dangerous journeys in the hope of opening a pathway for broader reunification. Such unintended consequences which risk perverse incentives are not compassionate: they are, to put it mildly, reckless.

Amendment 166 would require the Secretary of State to rewrite the immigration rules within six months to provide an expansive new framework for refugee family reunion—one that far exceeds the scope of existing policy, international norms and operational capacity. Subsection (5) of its proposed new clause includes, as of right, not only spouses and dependent children but siblings up to age 25, unmarried partners and, potentially, a wide range of others where there is dependency or concern for well-being. In that regard, my noble friend Lord Jackson is right to raise the issue of unmarried partners via his Amendment 169. Crucially, it would also open the door to almost unlimited discretion under its subsection (5)(e). This would empower the Secretary of State to admit other persons based on subjective criteria, including emotional or psychological dependency, with no practical limiting principle.

This is not a measured enhancement of our current rules. It is an open-ended expansion that risks transforming refugee protection into a de facto right to extended family migration, far removed from the original purpose of asylum law. It would not only increase pressure on our asylum system, already under significant strain, but risk distorting the principle of individual refuge into a system of family-by-family resettlement through the back door.

The current refugee family reunion framework already allows for spouses and children under 18 to join those granted protection, recognising both humanitarian concern and practical enforceability. What is proposed here goes far beyond that: it would create a prescriptive and permanent legal duty to change immigration rules, backed by statutory timetables, without proper democratic scrutiny or flexibility to adapt to changing geopolitical conditions.

This raises several concerns, the first about security and verification. How will we reliably establish family links, particularly when documentation is scarce or unreliable? The broader we cast the net of eligibility, the more vulnerable our system becomes to fraud, abuse and trafficking. A second concern is about the operational consequences. The Home Office is already processing record numbers of applications, with finite resources. Imposing a statutory obligation to widen the criteria, potentially by tens of thousands of additional claimants, would undermine our capacity to deal swiftly and justly with the most urgent cases. This amendment, with its wide eligibility, statutory rigidity and lack of safeguards, risks sending precisely that signal.

I must ask: what is the end point? If we legislate to allow adult siblings, adult children up to 25, unmarried partners and those in psychological dependency, where does it end? We risk normalising a model where refuge is no longer about the individual at risk but an entitlement for entire extended families, however genuine their desire to reunite. That is not what the refugee convention envisages and it is not something we can responsibly support.

Amendment 177 proposes a statutory family reunion right for asylum-seeking children overseas to join relatives already granted protection in the UK. The amendment would remove virtually every safeguard, with no maintenance or accommodation requirements, no fees and no health surcharge. It would also oblige the Secretary of State to facilitate travel arrangements and co-ordinate with foreign authorities, regardless of the complexities or security conditions on the ground. In effect, this would create a state-sponsored international reunification scheme for extended relatives, with no meaningful eligibility checks or financial thresholds.

The idea may be noble in sentiment, but it is completely divorced from operational reality. We already offer safe and legal routes for those in greatest need. The resettlement schemes for Syrians, Afghans and Ukrainians, not to mention the Hong Kong BNO route, demonstrate that, when this country chooses to act, we do so with generosity and resolve. But that generosity must be targeted, managed and sustainable.

At the heart of all three amendments is a belief that compassion must override control, but compassion without control is not kindness but chaos. The British people expect an asylum system that is firm but fair, not one that is open-ended, unverified and vulnerable to abuse. We must not confuse individual acts of empathy with a systematic rewriting of our immigration obligations. Nor should we allow our policies to be shaped by emotional pressure alone. A functioning asylum system must serve those in greatest need first and foremost, but it must do so within the bounds of national sovereignty, operational capacity and public trust. I fully respect those who have tabled these amendments, but I urge the Committee to reflect seriously on the risks they pose. We cannot allow emotion to drive policy at the expense of security, sustainability and the long-term integrity of our borders.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am genuinely grateful to noble Lords who have tabled these amendments. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones, the noble Lords, Lord German, Lord Jackson and Lord Kerr, and my noble friends Lord Dubs and Lady Lister for their proposed amendments. They have generated a debate and discussion that we need to have. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Empey, for his recognition of the difficult job we face in the Home Office. This week alone, it is immigration today, deprivation of citizenship tomorrow and crime and policing on Thursday, and there may be a repeat Statement on the Manchester incident as well. It is a full agenda for the Home Office to deal with.

I start by responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I am not right-wing; I am not pandering to right-wing tendencies. I am trying to ensure, with my colleagues in the Home Office, that we manage some important issues in an effective way, for the response that is required by the public but also for the management of this system.

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I think the sentiment behind Amendment 175 is correct—the link between wages and migration—but it has got the causality round the wrong way. We should have a tough immigration system, which is what puts the incentive on employers to train and hire people from the domestic labour force.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the two amendments in this group in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord German, raise two slightly different, yet interlinked, points. I have just a few observations. There is often much talk about the necessity of immigration because people are unwilling to do certain jobs, and therefore, to prevent understaffing, we must fill vacancies with workers from abroad. This is evident in the social care sector, which undoubtedly does suffer from a workforce shortage and low wages. Although not guaranteed, there is the possibility that, if wages in the care sector were higher, we might see more British people willing to enter carers’ roles and thus end the reliance on importing labour for the sector.

There is the obvious caveat, of course. This amendment asks for a report to assess the effect of introducing a sector-specific minimum wage for carers on net migration, and we must be careful about setting wages via statutory intervention in a highly selective manner. If we begin carving out bespoke wage floors sector by sector, we risk distorting the labour market and undermining the effectiveness of our broader immigration and wage policy framework. Nevertheless, Amendment 175 raises an interesting point and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

I am far more sceptical about Amendment 176, which seeks to exempt NHS workers from the immigration skills charge. The NHS currently relies on talented professionals from around the world. They are a credit to our country and an integral part of our public services. However, I would suggest that there is a fallacy inherent in this debate. For far too long, our solution to the problem of labour shortages in the health and care sector has been to simply import workers from abroad. That is the easy solution. I have no issue with admitting that, in the past, my party has been all too complicit in this as well. But just because this has been the prevailing policy for some time does not mean it is right.

The immigration skills charge exists for a reason: to ensure that businesses and public services invest in domestic training and workforce development. Staffing shortfalls in the NHS have been filled by migration, but what that demonstrates is a fundamental weakness in our healthcare training and education system. As it stands, we are clearly not doing enough to hire British doctors, nurses and care workers, and that is why we are having to rely on immigration to fill those gaps. This is precisely the inverted logic that has been applied to healthcare hiring and immigration for far too long.

To exempt NHS employees outright risks setting a precedent that could ultimately weaken the incentive for long-term workforce planning in our health system. Applying exceptions to the charge will therefore not solve the problem we have; it may very well exacerbate it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord German, for speaking to the amendments on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. They have raised two specific issues, as the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Davies of Gower, have mentioned. First, the Government recognise the vital contribution which international care workers have made to both the NHS and adult social care. However, the immigration White Paper, published in May, sets out the Government’s general position that we should be trying to encourage greater use and greater support for opportunities within the United Kingdom for those levels of skills, training and engagement for those who are economically inactive in the resident UK labour market. The purpose of the Government’s White Paper—and, indeed, the announcements on 30 September on the fair pay agreement for the adult care sector—is to ensure that professionals are recognised and rewarded for the important work they do. It is a manifesto commitment that we will commit to extensively engage with the care sector on the design and implementation of a fair pay agreement, with the process and objective of, along with the immigration White Paper, increasing the use of UK-based residents in the social care sector.

I am grateful for the introductory comments from the noble Lord, Lord German, because in those comments he clarified for me what he meant about the minimum wage. Obviously, there is no specific minimum wage for carers as a whole, although there is a national minimum wage, which I was proud to stay up over several days to vote for back in 1998 in another place. It is a very important piece of legislation. However, people looking to recruit international care workers and senior care workers must now pay at least £25,000 per year based on a 37.5 hour week. This equates to £12.82 per hour. Noble Lords will be aware that the Government changed the immigration rules in July to remove the right to recruit care workers internationally. Therefore, the amendment as drafted is unclear as to what minimum wage would be reported on, although I did get the sense that it is the living wage that the noble Lord, Lord German, was speaking about.

However, I do not believe that it is necessary to lay a report in Parliament, given that the Government publish details on migration on a quarterly basis which will show the impact of changes on inward migration and, in due course, once we have had an opportunity to consult further, the impact of the fair pay agreement on adult social care as a whole.

More broadly, in light of changes to the immigration system, the Government have commissioned the Migration Advisory Committee to review salary thresholds across the skilled worker route, to ensure that international recruitment is never a cheap alternative to fair pay and must reflect the new changes to our immigration system. I think this is a very positive development by the Government to ensure that foreign workers are not undercutting wages for people based in the United Kingdom—something I had experience of in my former constituency when I was a Member of Parliament. So I say with due respect, as ever, to the noble Lord, Lord German, that the amendment is not necessary and misses the target on this point.

On Amendment 176, I hope the Committee will bear with me when I say that I agreed with almost every word of the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Harper—it is a novel experience, but one I welcome—as he made the arguments that I would have made and will make on this amendment. Removing the immigration skills charge would send the wrong message. It would remove an important tool in encouraging employers to look first at the domestic labour market and what more can be done to train and improve the skills of those in the UK, rather than simply looking outside it to import individuals who may accordingly be employed on a lower rate of pay. Following the arguments we made in the immigration White Paper, we want to ensure that we both reduce reliance on overseas-trained workers to support our public services and upskill and support the development of local talent to fulfil those roles.

Also—I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on this point—by seeking to exempt the NHS, this amendment would allow the NHS to benefit from cheaper recruitment for non-clinical roles, such as health service and public health managers or people working in IT occupations. The amendment would not cater for health and care professionals who are not employed by the NHS. For example, it would not cover nurses working in private hospitals or health professionals who may work in private organisations that support the wider health sector.

So, for once in this Committee, I agree with two noble Lords from the Official Opposition Benches. Hopefully, I can rely on their support to ensure that the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord German, if he chooses to bring them back on Report later this month or early in November, are defeated. I hope that, with the explanation I have given him, the noble Lord will not press these amendments and will reflect on them with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, whom I hope to see back in her place shortly, so that we do not need to discuss this issue again on Report in a couple of weeks’ time.

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[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I absolutely support the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, in this matter. I draw upon my own experience of 11 years in a bilingual Parliament, the Senedd Cymru: without accuracy or professional translators, it would undoubtedly have been difficult to create the laws we passed during those 11 years.

Accuracy and clarity are critical. There is of course a cost to doing it properly, as the noble Lord, Lord Harper, rightly says. However, if it is not done properly, it will end up in the courts, and legal aid and various other factors will be involved. I do not agree with the noble Lord that you should not face the cost, because that cost may be displaced over the time.

I will wait for the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, to reply on AI assistance, but there is a big difference between people hearing what is said exactly and reproducing it in exactly the same way it is being spoken. When someone speaks, the interpreter and translator translate those words exactly as they were said. That is the important issue here.

I want to tempt the Minister to talk about the learning of the English language, which is of course associated with this. There is undoubtedly a real problem in providing sufficient language courses to help people get an experience of the English language. Do the Government have any ambitions to improve the teaching of English to people coming here on the migration route?

As for the reason for this amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, we should not be putting ourselves at risk by not having it.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak only briefly on this amendment. The intention behind it is obviously very welcome. We need to make sure that those going through this process can understand what is happening and what is being asked of them. It is of course a duty of the Government to make sure that this can happen. To that end, I hope the Minister can take this opportunity to set out to the Committee that the Government are already working to make sure that the Home Office and other agencies have the capacity to provide these services, and how they plan to manage any increase in demand.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and, to an extent, the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord German, for raising this matter of both practical importance and human dignity: the provision of translation and interpretation services within the Home Office.

The Government’s immigration White Paper rightly underscores the importance of English language proficiency as a cornerstone of successful integration into British society. We believe, as I am sure not only the noble Baroness but all noble Lords will agree, that the ability to speak English empowers individuals to participate fully in our communities, to contribute economically and to build meaningful lives in the United Kingdom.

However, obviously, there are circumstances where the needs of both protection and expediency trump this proposal. As we have already heard from noble Lords, particularly from the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, there are individuals for whom translation and interpretation services are essential to enable them to access care and to begin the long journey of recovery and justice—for example, dealing with young women who have been trafficked to the UK against their will, suffering abuse and exploitation. The Home Office has a duty to uphold the high standards of delivery of these services. It is not merely a matter of administrative efficiency but of moral and legal obligation.

Paragraph 339ND of the Immigration Rules already makes it clear that the Home Secretary must provide, at public expense, an interpreter wherever necessary to allow an applicant to submit their case. This includes the substantive asylum interview, a moment that can determine the course of a person’s life.

Noble Lords may be aware that, in the other place, an MP elected on the Reform ticket asked a number of His Majesty’s Government’s departments not to provide such translation services. I, for one, believe that the Government regret that approach. Both natural justice and respect for the rule of law are essential characteristics of our system and our society, and we will not undermine these principles. As I said, we understand the importance of providing proper interpretation services, not simply so that asylum seekers can access the system adequately but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out, so that the system makes the right call the first time round.

Moreover, in the context of criminal investigations undertaken by Immigration Enforcement, the principle of common law and the European Convention on Human Rights both affirm that a defendant must understand the charges against them and be able to mount a proper defence. This is not optional extra, and we do not treat it as such. As I said, the current Immigration Rules make clear the need to provide interpretation services. For instances where we do not provide translation services within the asylum process, claimants can utilise legal representatives to support them. Furthermore, Migrant Help’s asylum services, which are available 24 hours a day, offer free, independent advice, guidance and information, including full interpretation services.

We have had some discussion about funding, and noble Lords will appreciate that value for money remains a guiding principle for this Government in public service delivery. We must therefore ensure that language services are cost effective, and the Home Office is committed to assessing language service needs and spend to ensure we deliver both fiscal responsibility and a compassionate, practical approach to translation. We understand well the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about penny-pinching undermining the integrity of the system. The noble Lord, Lord Harper, asked about the cost gap in the sense, I suppose, of a counterfactual situation. I am not sure that any assessment has been made of that additional cost gap, but I will go back and ask officials whether that has been the case.

Asylum Claims: Religious Conversion

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. He gives me the opportunity to repeat the fact that the Government have recruited an extra 1,000 individuals to work on speeding up asylum claims, because the key issue is making sure that we determine very speedily whether individuals have a right to stay in the United Kingdom. If they do, they can; if they do not, they should be removed after subsequent appeals have been unsuccessful.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister may be aware that in March last year, the Home Affairs Select Committee heard oral evidence from a former Anglican reverend that his church had been used as a conveyor belt for an industry of asylum baptism. He raised concerns that asylum seekers were deliberately converting to Christianity in order to claim that they would be persecuted if they were sent back to their home country. Given the unease within the Church of England about those comments, what discussions has the Home Office had with the Church of England regarding such conversions for asylum purposes?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Home Office continues to have discussions with Church leaders on a range of matters, including asylum. I say to the noble Lord—I hope this is helpful—that if he is asking, “Does the Home Office accept every conversion claim?”, we do not. All claims are assessed on an individual basis. Someone simply saying that they are converting to Christianity does not mean that they will have their asylum claim accepted. That asylum claim will be tested against both their performance and whether they attend church, along with advice given by Church leaders and others, but it does not guarantee an acceptance of an asylum claim.

Undocumented Migrants

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 16th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for reminding me that, when I was last a Minister in the Home Office, we had an identity card scheme in place that was scrapped by the then-incoming Coalition Government of 2010-2015. It is an expensive business to re-jig ID cards, but all options are always being examined by this Government. I am genuinely sorry that the Coalition Government took the decision at the time to scrap that deal.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, leading on from the question from my noble friend Lord Massey, this week we were due to see the start of the Government’s much-vaunted one-in, one-out returns deal with France. However, due to the ongoing human rights claims and last-minute legal challenges, no one has yet returned to France, on the flights that left yesterday or today. Does the Minister not think that now is the time to endorse Conservative proposals to disapply the Human Rights Act from immigration and asylum matters to prevent this very issue occurring in the future?

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we on these Benches agree that detained persons should, of course, have access to good legal representation when they are detained. This amendment pertains to legal aid for those detained persons. As noble Lords are aware, legal aid is already provided for those who bring asylum cases or other matters such as immigration bail, certain applications by victims of domestic abuse or trafficking, proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, asylum support applications and applications made by separated children. Put simply, this support is already clearly in place. It is our position that extensive provision is already made and at significant cost.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Bach for his amendment and for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on behalf of her noble friend Lady Ludford. I have also heard contributions from the Floor of the Committee from the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard and Lord Pannick, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, all of which were broadly in support of my noble friend Lord Bach’s Amendment 137.

This amendment would impose a duty to make civil legal aid available to detained persons within 48 hours. I am going to repeat what noble Lords have said already, because it is important to put it on the record. People detained under immigration powers in prisons and in immigration removal centres are provided initially with 30 minutes of free legal aid advice through the detained duty advice scheme—DDAS. This is a triaged appointment which supports people to meet with a legal provider who may provide further advice, subject to the matter being within scope of legal aid and the detained person’s eligibility. I want to be clear that there is this 30-minute availability, as noble Lords have mentioned. It is important to re-emphasise that, following that DDAS assessment, whether a legal representative accepts or takes on a case is subject to a merit test and to a decision about independent legal representation, in line with legal aid. There is already some scope for reassurance. I hope that the Committee can accept that this well-established service is in place to provide people with quick and easy access to legal provision.

I am conscious that my noble friend Lord Bach mentioned the take-up. I fully accept that this is an important matter for him, and for the Committee and the Government to consider. Take-up is monitored by officials from the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice. It will be examined in detail. I am happy to look at how we can improve take-up of the initial provision, but the initial provision is there.

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I began my life as a historian at Cambridge. I know the contribution that overseas students make, but, ultimately, we need to look for other solutions for the cash-strapped universities. Many of them have already started to build overseas campuses, where students can be educated locally at far less cost to themselves and at far greater benefit to their own countries. It is for these reasons we need to start addressing the numbers here.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for his amendment, which seeks to collect and publish data about overseas students who have committed criminal offences leading to the revocation of their student visas.

When immigrants commit crimes, we need to understand whether there are patterns that suggest wider or systemic abuses of the system. Data of this kind has immense practical importance. It allows us to identify risks, ensure accountability and take informed decisions about how to strengthen our Immigration Rules. When we talk about borders, we must do so with an eye to safety, fairness and national interest. The British people rightly expect that those who come to this country will contribute to it through our economy, workplace, communities and civic life. The vast majority of overseas students do just that, enriching our universities and our society. But when a small minority commit offences, we must have the tools to know about it, track it and respond effectively.

As my noble friend Lord Jackson mentioned, he has tried time and again, unfortunately in vain, to get the Home Office to release these statistics. The Answer my noble friend received to his Written Question on 7 April, that official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review, is not particularly helpful. I hope the Minister will be able to finally give my noble friend the answer that he deserves. This amendment seeks to provide that clarity.

Amendments 198 and 199, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, go to the heart of what it means to exercise control over our borders in a way that serves our national interest. The first amendment makes it clear that family migration through spouse and civil partner visas must be subject to sensible limits and rigorous criteria. This is about making sure that those who come here are ready to contribute, not to extract; to work, not to remain idle; and to build, not to burden.

Our economy, jobs market, public services and national identity all depend on a social contract: that people pay in before they take out. That is the foundation of our tax system, the National Health Service, schools, housing and every element of our welfare state. Introducing a salary threshold of £38,700 is not a punitive measure; it is common sense. It would ensure that new arrivals will be net contributors to this country, helping us to strengthen our economy at a time when the Government’s mismanagement has left us in a dreadful state. It would reassure the British people that migration is working for them, not against them, and it would help to rebuild the trust that is so essential if public confidence in our immigration system is to endure.

The second amendment addresses an equally important issue: the question of sovereignty. Put simply, we cannot allow this country’s ability to remove those with no right to remain to be dictated by the whims of foreign Governments. Our domestic policy must never be determined by third countries which frustrate deportations by refusing to co-operate with basic verification of identity. This amendment would strengthen the Government’s hand by making visa penalties mandatory when other countries refuse to play their part.

The link between border control and national well-being could not be clearer. Our economy, our jobs market, our communities and our state services depend on a system that is fair, firm and respected. The British people are generous, but they are not fools; they want an immigration system that supports growth, rewards contribution and protects our national autonomy. These amendments deliver on those principles; they are proportionate, robust and urgently needed. I urge the Government to recognise their merit and adopt them.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I will say something about Amendments 198 and 199, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Amendment 198 would, as I understand it, specify a maximum number of persons who may enter the United Kingdom annually as a spouse or civil partner of another. If I were not already married, I would be exceptionally aggrieved to be told that my spouse, from whatever country she may come, would not be permitted to join me in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that I am a British citizen, because too many spouses or civil partners had already entered this country in the last year or because, looking at proposed new subsection (5), the country concerned cannot exceed 7% of the maximum number specified in the regulations. I do not know where 7% comes from rather than 6% or 8%, but that is what it provides.

It is not difficult to see that such arbitrary restrictions on spouses or civil partners coming to this country would be a manifest breach of this country’s international obligations under Article 8 in relation to family rights. It is also not difficult to see what the reaction of our closest allies—the United States, Australia, New Zealand and many other countries—would be to being told that their citizens cannot join their spouse in this country. Reciprocal measures of this nature would be highly likely to be adopted, to the detriment of everybody. It is also plain from this amendment that these arbitrary restrictions on numbers would apply irrespective of whether the person coming from abroad is to work here and irrespective of whether the spouse in this country, the British citizen, is able to accommodate and provide for them. I am afraid that this is simply not well thought out.

It also requires in proposed new subsection (10)(b) that the applicant in this country provides evidence that the happy couple were married or formed a civil partnership at least two years prior to the application. So, my beloved and I are to be arbitrarily prevented from living in this country together for at least two years. I cannot begin to understand the logic, the rationality or the justification of such a measure. I hope the Minister will tell the Committee that Amendment 198 is unacceptable.

Amendment 199 is equally unacceptable. It would impose, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, a mandatory obligation on the Government to impose visa penalties on unco-operative countries. The Government already have ample powers in their discretion to impose visa penalties on unco-operative countries. It makes no sense whatever to impose a mandatory duty on the Government to impose visa penalties. For this reason, the Government may well take the view that it is far more productive and effective to inform the country concerned of its failures, to negotiate with it and to seek to secure a resolution to the problem. A mandatory duty simply serves no sensible purpose.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

146: Clause 43, page 38, line 30, at end insert—
“(2A) After section 3(1) insert—“(1A) The Secretary of State must, where a person breaches any of the conditions of their leave to enter or remain under subsection (1)(c), make a deportation order against the person.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that anyone who breached a condition of their leave to enter or remain would be deported from the United Kingdom.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 146 and 147, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel.

At the heart of these amendments is the principle of conditionality. Where an individual is granted conditional leave to enter or remain in this country, that permission is given on very clear terms. We need to be clear that these conditions are not arbitrary or frivolous. They are carefully set out to protect the fundamental interests of our economy, the integrity of our communities and the sustainability of our public funds. If those conditions are broken then the privilege of remaining in the United Kingdom should be forfeited. To do otherwise would render the entire conditionality regime meaningless. Rules that cannot be enforced are not rules at all; they are invitations to abuse and exploitation, and they undermine the trust of the British people in our immigration system.

The amendments before us are common sense. They would require that, where an individual breached the conditions of their leave, a deportation order must follow. That is a proportionate consequence, one that would reinforce the principle that with the right to stay comes the responsibility to comply. This is also about fairness to those who abide by the rules—fairness to the taxpayer who shoulders the cost of our public services, and fairness to our communities who deserve confidence that immigration is properly managed.

These are key aspects of government administration. Without robust enforcement, our borders cannot be effectively controlled and our laws risk becoming toothless. Through these amendments, we are providing the Government with the tools they need to deliver on their own stated objective of a firm but fair immigration system. The amendments are practical, enforceable and just. They would ensure that our conditionality regime had meaning, that our rules had effect and that the British people could have confidence that their borders were being properly secured.

On the question that Clause 43 does not stand part of the Bill, we on these Benches must disagree with the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I do not need to go into great detail on the point. Clause 43 pertains to conditions on limited leave to enter or remain, but we on these Benches are clear that, where this status is granted, it is vital that strict conditions are both met and enforced, and that anyone found to have broken those conditions should be deported. The Government have a duty to control and manage immigration in the interests of our country. We say that removing those conditions undermines the Government’s ability to do that, so I cannot support it.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, raises an interesting point in reference to the Immigration Act 2016 on the process of being granted bail accommodation. I too would be grateful, alongside the noble Lord, to hear from the Minister what the Government’s assessment of this is, whether it is a problem that they have identified and what plans they have to mitigate it. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have tabled a notice to oppose Clause 43, which has been signed by a former immigration Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

I have listened with great attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has just said, so I shall make it clear what the amendment is about. We are not trying to stop the Government doing what they say they need to do, but we are objecting to a means of doing it that is arguably unnecessary and which is certainly exorbitant—indeed, dangerously so.

The provision that Clause 43 would amend is Section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, under the title:

“General provisions for regulation and control”.


Section 3(1) is indeed general in its scope. It provides for conditions to be imposed on any person who is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. That includes those who are here on a student visa, a business visa or a spousal visa. The conditions that can currently be imposed on the grant of such visas do not appear in the amendment. I remind noble Lords what they are: they include the power to issue visas for certain types of work only, and the power to require visa holders to maintain themselves and their dependants without recourse to public funds. They are fair conditions, and they are well understood by those who are subject to them. Those people include—and I declare an interest—one of my sons-in-law, who is on the five-year pathway to indefinite leave to remain. The happy couple have settled in Norwich, but I try not to hold that against them.

Clause 43, if we were to pass it into law, would allow the Secretary of State to impose on any of these visa holders such conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit. No limit of any kind is placed on this power, and its potential severity is shown by the illustrative restrictions given in Clause 43(2): electronic tagging, a curfew to operate in a place specified by the Secretary of State for unlimited periods of day or night, and requirements on individuals not to enter a specified area—exclusion zones—and not to leave a specified area, so-called inclusion zones.

Such conditions are not entirely without precedent in our law. They will be familiar to your Lordships from the terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs, introduced in the TPIM Act 2011 and echoed in Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023, for those believed to be involved in foreign power threat activity. It might be thought extraordinary enough if this clause allowed individuals whose only crime is to have studied here or married a British citizen to be treated like terrorist suspects, but it is worse than that. Clause 43 would introduce a materially harsher regime than TPIMs in at least three respects.

First, there is the threshold for their use. TPIMs require a reasonable belief on the part of the Secretary of State that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Clause 43, by contrast, is universal in its application. There is no threshold. Even the most blameless of migrants, whose only crime is to have come here for a wholly legitimate purpose, may in law be subject to its full rigour.

Secondly, there is the scope. The measures that appear in Clause 43(2) are all familiar from Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, but the range of possible TPIMs is at least finite. Not even in respect of those believed to be terrorists did Parliament trust the Government with the unlimited power to impose, in the words of Clause 43,

“such other conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit”.

Thirdly, there are the safeguards. TPIMs can be imposed only after the Home Secretary has obtained both the permission of the High Court and the confirmation of the CPS that it is not feasible to prosecute the subject for any criminal offence. No such safeguard exists in Clause 43, which would allow the severest restrictions on personal liberty to be imposed by the Executive without the intervention of a court on a potentially vast range of people, without any requirement for consultation, authorisation, automatic judicial review of the kind that exists for TPIMs, or oversight.

Clause 43 came late to this Bill. It was introduced in Committee in the Commons. No attempt was made to defend its breadth of application, but the Minister for Border Security and Asylum, Angela Eagle, did explain the limited circumstances in which the Government proposed to use the new powers for which they were asking. It was intended for use, she said:

“Where a person does not qualify for asylum or protection under the refugee convention but cannot be removed from the UK because of our obligations under domestic and international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 265.]


It was intended to allow the same conditions to be placed on such persons as they might have been subjected to under immigration bail. She said:

“The powers will be used only in cases involving conduct such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, extremism or serious crime, or where the person poses a threat to national security or public safety”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 268.]


Speaking for myself, that objective is entirely understandable, indeed defensible, though I pause to say that the definition of extremism is worryingly uncertain. Given the Government’s limited ambitions for the use of this clause, can the Minister explain why the existing powers to issue TPIMs, serious crime prevention orders and measures under Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023 are considered insufficient? They contain better safeguards and seem to meet precisely the cases that the Minister has in mind. Indeed, serious crime prevention orders are to be extended further by Part 3 of this Bill. If I am right about that, there is no need for Clause 43, but I am sure the Minister will explain.

Even if these existing powers are not sufficient, any new power must surely be tailored to its intended target, rather than to the vast range of innocent visa holders covered by Clause 43 in its current form. That is what the Constitution Committee had in mind when we recommended that the power be narrowed and that safeguards on its use be included in the Bill. The Joint Committee on Human Rights reported in similar terms. For anyone who is interested in more detail, I can recommend the useful briefings from Amnesty and the Public Law Project.

No one doubts for a moment the good faith of the Minister or his colleagues, but to legislate for unlimited powers and trust to assurances from the Dispatch Box about the narrow scope of their intended use would not just be poor legislative practice but an abandonment of parliamentary scrutiny at the very time when that scrutiny is most needed. The courts have no regard to ministerial assurances, save when the terms of an Act are ambiguous. That, as noble Lords know, is a rare eventuality.

No one who looks at the opinion polls can be confident that all possible future Governments would apply Clause 43 with the restraint to which this Government have committed. To enact Clause 43 would be a gift-wrapped present to any future Government who wished to threaten or erode the rights of immigrants across the board, without thresholds or oversight. If this clause is needed at all, I hope the Minister will agree that it should at least be confined in the Bill to the circumstances where that need arises.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That point has been made, and I will discuss that with my colleagues in government. Clause 43 as drafted is before the Committee today, but there are opportunities to discuss it further if the noble Lord is not happy with any assurances that we can give outside the Committee to table amendments that can be debated and voted upon in due course. I will leave it at that.

Amendment 148 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bach seeks to clarify the eligibility criteria for bail accommodation under Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016. Under this provision, the Secretary of State has the power to provide accommodation to someone in exceptional circumstances only when they have been granted immigration bail and are subject to a residence condition that requires them to live at an address specified in that condition. The Home Office recognises that, where the Secretary of State is required to provide a person with accommodation to enable them to meet their bail conditions, a specified address cannot always be known at the time of the bail grant. Accordingly, it has been a long-standing policy position that bail can be granted with a residence condition to an address that is known at the time of the grant of immigration bail, or an address that is yet to be specified. In 2024, this was also set out explicitly in the relevant guidance. The policy is clear, and operational teams are already operating the legislation in this way, to ensure that someone can apply to the Home Office for bail accommodation without having been granted bail to a specific address. Therefore, the amendment—with its good intention—would make no material difference to the current operation of the legislation and is not necessary. I am happy to hear further from the noble Lord, but I invite him not to move his amendment.

On the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, Amendment 146 would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against persons who breach the conditions attached to their leave in the UK. Such breaches of conditions may already be addressed by cancelling that leave and removing the person from the UK without the need to seek a deportation order. Mandating deportation in such cases is not therefore necessary. It will provide no guarantee that a person’s removal from the UK could be enforced if they were to make a human rights or protection claim against their removal.

Finally, Amendment 147 would replace existing criminal sanctions for offences under Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 with a penalty of deportation. Overstayers and illegal entrants are already liable to removal from the UK. Where a person is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of imprisonment, consideration will be given to their deportation. With respect to the noble Lord, the amendment risks encouraging offending behaviour and would not result in an increase in removals from the UK.

This has been a serious debate that has raised a number of points. But I hope, given what I have said, that the noble Lord will not press his objection to Clause 43. I will meet noble Lords to discuss their objections further to understand their concerns better. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments so that we can examine the clause together.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke on this group for their contributions to this debate. This has been a group that clearly reflects several different views, and I welcome that we have been able to have a debate on these issues.

We on these Benches remain firm in our resolve that conditional leave to enter or remain should be just that—conditional on criteria that seek to safeguard our communities, our public services and our economy. These conditions do not undermine our capacity to be compassionate, our capacity to help those who are in need, or our record of supporting those who need our help. They ensure that we have a system that is controlled and protects our country, and over which the Government can exercise their dutiful authority. These are fundamental duties and we have sought to support the Government in meeting their own objectives. I therefore hope the Minister will seriously consider these amendments as a way of empowering him and his colleagues to take action that is needed to ensure that our conditions are not optional. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 146 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this need not, I hope, take anything like as long as the last group of amendments. Clause 46 relates to an appeal when a protection claim has been removed, and Clause 47 relates to protection and other human rights. The issue I am probing is the scope that these clauses give for the Government or Parliament to impose deadlines on the tribunal in determining appeals—in this case, a deadline of 24 weeks from the institution of the appeal. I am not arguing that appeals should not be dealt with as speedily as possible; instead, I would like to understand the scope for the tribunal to say, “Sorry, we can’t meet this timeframe”. In particular, how far can regard be had to other cases? Is it just for particular cases?

The wording is

“where the Tribunal considers that it is not reasonably practicable to do so”.

Is that confined to a particular appeal or is it about the workload in general? I am very uneasy about a statutory deadline on how tribunals of the judiciary operate. I know that we will be given some opportunities to be briefed on and to discuss the new procedures that the Government have in mind, but we must deal with this legislation as it is in front of us now. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, at the heart of Amendment 157, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, is the fundamental principle that we must reduce the backlog, unblock the immigration system and ensure that people are not left waiting endlessly for a decision on their appeal. It is in no one’s interest that asylum seekers should be kept in hotels and HMOs for weeks on end while decisions are being made on their appeal. Delay does not serve anyone.

The present situation is intolerable. Recently reported statistics cited by the Law Society show that the waiting time for an appeal decision is, on average, nearly 50 weeks. There is almost a year of uncertainty, during which applicants remain in taxpayer-funded accommodation and support. It is in precisely this space that vexatious claims can be lodged, with the appeals process used not to seek justice but to delay removal and prolong the benefit of support. This is not acceptable, and it undermines public confidence in the integrity of the system.

Our amendment seeks to require the Secretary of State, first, to publish a clear date by which he expects appeals to be determined within a 24-week period, and then, within 12 months, to provide a report on how many cases have not met that standard; in other words, the Government would have to set out their ambition and then be held to account for whether or not they deliver it.

Amendments 203F and 203G, tabled by my noble friends Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Jackson, and the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Alton, are fundamentally about transparency, requiring that all judgments of the Upper Tribunal in immigration and asylum matters are published promptly and made accessible to the public. Why does this matter? First, it is because transparency allows us to assess the quality of the initial decision-making process. A high rate of successful appeals is a clear signal that something is going wrong further upstream, either with the application of the law or with the evidential standards being applied. Without clear and timely publication of judgments, it is difficult to see where those problems lie.

These amendments are about shining a light on the system. If the Government have nothing to hide, there can be no objection to Parliament and the public being able to see how decisions are being made. Indeed, such transparency will strengthen confidence that our border security is being upheld in the way that Ministers assure us it is. I hope that the Government will seriously consider this principle in light of the points than I and other noble Lords have raised.

[A noble Lord]

That is in the next group.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I know, I just realised that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I know that we will have a full discussion on Amendments 203F and 203G at a later date. I will take that as an hors d’oeuvre from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. It is important that he trails those issues because they are linked. I value that he has done that today. However, I will focus on the amendments before the Committee, Amendments 155 and 156, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. These seek to confirm that the resources of the tribunal and legal aid practitioners are sufficient to ensure that appeals are heard fairly within the 24-week timeframe.

Clauses 46 and 47 already set out that the statutory timeframe should be adhered to unless it is not reasonably practical to do so. This enables the judiciary to take into account any relevant factors when exercising its discretion and responsibility over case management and the listing of appeals. We in the Home Office are working very closely with the Ministry of Justice to ensure that the tribunal has the resources it needs to meet the growing backlog. and we want to ensure that we deliver on that backlog as a matter of some urgency. The tribunal has been given additional funding to boost the number of days it will be sitting in 2025-26 to near maximum capacity, and we are also consulting on uplifts to immigration and asylum legal aid fees to support that capacity.

The period of 24 weeks is carefully chosen, as it balances the importance of resolving cases quickly, while the Government recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to ensure access to justice for all. To provide further reassurance to the noble Baroness, the resources of the tribunal are taken into consideration, and these provisions will not apply immediately following Royal Assent. There will be a period of implementation and operationalisation, during which the Home Office, the MoJ and the Courts & Tribunals Service will ensure the tribunals’ readiness in the coming months. I hope all that will give the noble Baroness some reassurance on those issues.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My noble friend Lady Brinton added her name to all these amendments. I was happy that she did so. I am also happy to have the opportunity —of course, not at her expense—of expressing my support for them this evening. Inevitably, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, has said, there is rather a lot of repetition in this over a period of years.

We touched on visual age assessments—I cannot remember on which day in Committee—and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as she always has done, expressed her clear views about visual assessment being inappropriate. She said she had talked—coming from her cultural and ethnic background; I align myself with her in this—to young males whose looks raised a question in her mind as to what age they were. However hard we try, our own backgrounds leave us with a bias, I suppose—an inbuilt bias, an expectation. We have to put ourselves in other people’s shoes.

I recall being in the education centre of this House, talking to young students who I think were at the top end of primary school. There was one young student who, if you went by facial hair, would have been regarded as twice as old as he actually was. I recall also being very impressed by his presentation; the students were discussing how they would campaign for a change in the law, although I suppose I should not go into that tonight.

My noble friend also has in this group Amendments 180 and 194, supported by, among others, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Sheffield. Amendment 180 deals with criminal proceedings, and my noble friend says that a mandatory referral age for age assessment in those proceedings follows from the basic argument regarding assessment for immigration purposes.

Amendment 194, as the noble Baroness has said, is about accommodation. Some people assume that everyone in asylum accommodation is a criminal and a danger to local residents. It is good that we have the opportunity to recognise that a child in adult accommodation, in adult detention, is a vulnerable child, and I just use the amendment to make that point.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

This is an important set of amendments, but I am sure it will come as no surprise to the noble Lords supporting them that we on these Benches have some disagreements with them.

Amendment 162 proposes that, where there is any doubt as to age, we should simply presume that the individual is a child. I cannot think of a more reckless approach. We all know that children are entitled to greater rights and protections under our law, but those protections exist precisely because children are vulnerable. If we hand them out indiscriminately to anyone who claims to be under 18, we risk creating grave safeguarding failures. There are well-documented cases where individuals who arrived illegally have lied about their age, and as a result adult men were placed in classrooms with teenage girls or in accommodation with vulnerable children. This amendment, whatever its good intentions, would compromise safety, weaken enforcement and put children at risk, and we cannot allow that to happen. Furthermore, Amendment 163 seems to me to be completely impractical in operational terms.

The fundamental point is this: age is one of the characteristics that we need to determine as soon as someone arrives in the UK illegally. This is innately tied to the sort of support they receive, who they are housed with, what services they can access and how they will interact with other migrants and those already in the United Kingdom.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 38 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose the Question that Clauses 38 and 39 stand part of the Bill. It is a curious feature of this Bill that, on the one hand, it purports to take tougher action on illegal migration, yet at the same time it repeals the very Act of Parliament which would tackle that illegal migration in the most robust and effective way.

The Illegal Migration Act was introduced in the other place on 7 March 2023, in response to the crisis along the shorelines of the south-east and in the channel. It was aimed at stopping the boats, defending our borders and preventing those who enter the United Kingdom illegally from being able to remain. As my right honourable friend Suella Braverman, the Home Secretary at the time, said when moving the Second Reading in the other place:

“The British public know that border security is national security, and that illegal migration makes us all less safe”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/3/23; col. 573.]


At the time, the Labour Party did not agree with that sentiment as it consistently opposed all efforts to stop the boats under the previous Government. It was welcome that the current Government began to acknowledge the necessity of stopping the boats, but it is clear from this clause that they have not yet fully appreciated what must be done. If they had, then they would not be pursuing this course of action.

Central to all of this is that this is what the British people want. They want to stop illegal migration, people making the journey across the channel in small boats and people dying in the channel. The way we do that is by having a credible deterrent to end the demand. That deterrent needs to contain both the ability to remove everyone that enters the United Kingdom illegally and a removals policy involving a safe third country.

The Government have spent much time trying to tear down the sensible policies of the previous Government, both the safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act. At the same time, they have announced that they want to follow the Italian approach and pursue third-country removal centres—or, as the Prime Minister calls them, return hubs. In a visit to Albania in May, the Prime Minister said:

“What now we want to do and are having discussions of, talks of, is return hubs, which is where someone has been through the system in the UK, they need to be returned and we have to make sure they’re returned effectively, and we’ll do that, if we can, through return hubs”.


However, we know that Albania does not want to work with this Government in establishing return hubs. The Government have also spent much of the last few months talking up the one-in, one-out returns deal with France, but, as we all know, this returns deal is not much more than smoke and mirrors. It is very clear that EU countries do not want to take third country returns. It is also clear that the only country willing to take third country returns is in fact Rwanda. That is why we pursued the Rwanda policy and why we passed the Illegal Migration Act.

The effect of repealing the Illegal Migration Act and scrapping the Rwanda deterrent is that people who arrive in Calais know that all they have to do is make their way into British territorial waters and they will most likely be able to remain in the United Kingdom. Even if they are not successful in their asylum claim, they may very well be able to remain in the UK because we cannot return them for one reason or another.

The measures in the Illegal Migration Act placed a legal duty on the Secretary of State to remove illegal entrants, thereby sending a strong and unambiguous message to those who would seek to flout our laws and abuse our immigration system. This Act, taken in tandem with the Rwanda scheme, if allowed fully to operate, could have acted as a suitable deterrent. By repealing this Act almost in its entirety, the Government now lack the ability swiftly to remove illegal migrants and will not be able to deter further crossings. This is highly disappointing. It betrays the simple fact that this Government are not truly serious about stopping illegal migration and defending our borders. I beg to move.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for proposing the clause stand part notice. At the outset, I place on record for the House that 35,052 people were returned from 5 July 2024 to 4 July 2025, the first year of this Government. Of those returns, 9,115 were enforced returns of people with no legal right to remain in the UK, a 24% increase over the period of the previous year.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I cannot give the noble Baroness the definitive figure on small boat arrival asylum claims, but roughly 61% to 65% of asylum claims are accepted, and roughly 35% are not. I can reflect on the exact figures, but those are the rough figures. From the Government’s perspective, we then have to speed up the asylum claims so we can make those assessments much more speedily. Part of the reason for the problem of having a large number of people in hotels is that those asylum applications were not speedily assessed. Therefore, people have been left in limbo in asylum hotels.

Those numbers have grown exponentially during the period 2015 to 2024. There was a dip just before the election, which I acknowledge, but further energy needs to be put into that to close the hotels—which we intend to do—and to speed up the asylum claim procedure to determine who has a right to asylum. There are separate issues, which have been raised by a number of noble Lords, such as ECHR obligations, refugee convention obligations, et cetera. But the Government simply believe that we need to speed up those asylum claims, and the measures in the Bill and externally from executive action and the immigration White Paper, along with future proposals, are designed to do that. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his clause stand part notice.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. At this point, I thank my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. I pay tribute to him for the sterling work he did as a Home Office Minister in steering the Illegal Migration Act through this House, and I thank him for his continued, erudite defence of this Act.

The Government have some serious explaining to do to justify how they think they will have a credible system to protect our borders and prevent illegal migration. If they cannot act swiftly and decisively to remove those who illegally enter this country and process their claims offshore, there is no deterrent. Without a deterrent, there is no hope of stopping the boats, and if the Government cannot stop the boats, then I believe this Bill will fail.

I assure the House that we will be returning to this matter in due course, but for now, I will not oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the stand part notice.

Clause 38 agreed.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

106: After Clause 38, insert the following new Clause—
“Unaccompanied children and power to provide for exceptions(1) The duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1) does not require the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom at a time when the person is an unaccompanied child.(2) The Secretary of State may make arrangements for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom at a time when the person is an unaccompanied child.(3) The power in subsection (2) may be exercised only—(a) where the person is to be removed for the purposes of reunion with the person’s parent;(b) where the person is to be removed to a country listed in section 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (safe States for the purposes of section 80A of that Act) which is—(i) a country of which the person is a national, or(ii) a country in which the person has obtained a passport or other document of identity;(c) where the person has not made a protection claim or a human rights claim and the person is to be removed to—(i) a country of which the person is a national,(ii) a country or territory in which the person has obtained a passport or other document of identity, or(iii) a country or territory in which the person embarked for the United Kingdom;(d) in such other circumstances as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(4) Regulations under subsection (3)(d) may confer a discretion on the Secretary of State.(5) For the purposes of this section a person (“C”) is an “unaccompanied child” if—(a) C meets the four conditions in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal),(b) C is under the age of 18, and(c) at the relevant time no individual (whether or not a parent of C) who was aged 18 or over had care of C.(6) In subsection (5) “the relevant time” means the time of C’s entry or arrival in the United Kingdom by virtue of which the duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1) would apply in relation to C apart from this section.(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for other exceptions from the duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1). (8) Regulations under subsection (7) may make provision—(a) for this Act or any other enactment to have effect with modifications, in relation to a person to whom an exception applies, in consequence of the application of the exception to that person;(b) for an exception, or for any provision made by virtue of paragraph (a), to be treated as having had effect from a time before the coming into force of the regulations.(9) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (8)(a) may, in particular, disapply any provision of this Act or any other enactment in relation to a person to whom an exception applies.(10) In subsections (8) and (9) “enactment” includes—(a) an enactment contained in subordinate legislation within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978;(b) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament;(c) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru;(d) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, Northern Ireland legislation.(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (7) must be laid before Parliament after being made.(12) Regulations contained in a statutory instrument laid before Parliament under subsection (11) cease to have effect at the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the instrument is made unless, during that period, the instrument is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(13) In calculating the period of 28 days, no account is to be taken of any whole days that fall within a period during which—(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or(b) either House of Parliament is adjourned for more than four days.(14) If regulations cease to have effect as a result of subsection (12) that does not—(a) affect the validity of anything previously done under the regulations, or(b) prevent the making of new regulations.(15) In this section—“human rights claim” has the meaning given by section 113(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;“national” includes citizen;“protection claim” has the meaning given by section 82(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 107, 108 and 111 standing in my name. They are all linked to the amendments in the previous group and once again are aimed at understanding exactly why the Government are repealing each of these clauses.

First and foremost, Amendment 106 rightly acknowledges the unique vulnerability of unaccompanied children. Unlike adults, these children do not have the benefit of parental guidance, support or protection, which fundamentally changes the context in which any immigration or removal decision should be made. The exemption from removal under proposed new subsection (1) reflects the humane principle that children, especially those who arrive without guardians, require special consideration. At the same time, the amendment incorporates a balanced discretion for the Secretary of State to make exceptions, but, crucially, only in narrowly defined and principled circumstances. This discretion is limited to cases of family reunion or removal to a safe state to which the child has a clear connection, such as nationality or passport holding. This would ensure that the state maintains the ability to act in the best interests of the child and public policy without resorting to indiscriminate removals.

Amendment 107 would bring much-needed clarity and accountability to the handling of European Court of Human Rights interim measures, in relation to the duty to remove under Amendment 105. Interim measures, often issued to prevent irreparable harm while a full hearing is pending, are a critical tool in safeguarding human rights. However, this amendment rightly recognises that these measures must be balanced with national sovereignty and the Government’s responsibility to manage immigration effectively. First, the amendment would establish that the decision to give effect to a European Court of Human Rights interim measure is the discretionary personal responsibility of a Minister of the Crown. This personal involvement emphasises the gravity of the decision, ensuring that it is not delegated lightly or handled bureaucratically. Such a provision would enhance political accountability, requiring Ministers to engage directly with complex legal and humanitarian issues rather than allowing automatic suspension of removal without sovereign consideration.

Furthermore, by restricting the obligation of immigration officials, courts and tribunals to give effect to the interim measure where a Minister has chosen not to recognise it, the amendment would prevent conflicting mandates within the system. This avoids a confusing legal limbo where different authorities might take contradictory positions regarding removal actions that undermine coherence and efficiency in immigration enforcement. This provision strikes a pragmatic balance between respecting international human rights obligations and preserving the Government’s capacity to maintain effective border control. It avoids rigid, automatic enforcement of interim measures that could paralyse immigration functions while still providing a structured framework to engage with the European court’s decisions.

Amendment 108 is a crucial step towards ensuring the duty in Amendment 105 is not needlessly hobbled, and that anyone who enters illegally is removed no matter who they are. It would tackle head-on abuse of asylum and human rights claims, a process that can delay removals and undermine the integrity of the immigration system. The amendment would make it clear that, for individuals meeting the statutory conditions for removal, any protection claim, human rights claim, trafficking or slavery victim claim or application for judicial review cannot be used to delay or frustrate the removal process.

This is vital. Currently, the system is frequently exploited through repeated and sometimes frivolous claims, causing prolonged uncertainty, administrative backlog and resource drain on the Home Office and courts. Declaring claims inadmissible at the outset when conditions for removal are met would significantly reduce abuse. It sends a strong message that these legal routes are not loopholes for indefinite delay. This also enables faster removal decisions, preserving our ability to control our borders effectively.

We have also included a judicial ouster clause in this amendment to prevent courts from setting aside inadmissibility declarations, promoting legal certainty and finality in removal proceedings. This avoids protracted litigation and vexatious legal challenges, which often tie up judicial resources without improving outcomes for genuine claimants.

Finally, Amendment 111 addresses the question of what support, if any, is available to individuals whose asylum or related claims are declared inadmissible under these amendments. By amending the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and related legislation, the proposed clause ensures that the withdrawal or withholding of support aligns consistently with the inadmissibility framework. This is essential for legal clarity and operational coherence. Without these amendments, there would be a disconnect between the removal of rights to remain and the removal of support, potentially creating gaps or confusion in how support is administered. The amendment ensures that, when a person’s claim is declared inadmissible under the new rules, the support framework adjusts accordingly, reflecting that the individual is no longer entitled to certain forms of state assistance. It also protects the integrity of the asylum support system by preventing those whose claims do not meet the admissibility criteria from accessing support intended for genuine asylum seekers. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I know that the Government vigorously opposed the Rwanda Bill, and indeed the Prime Minister described it as a gimmick, or words to that effect. I understand that that is the Government’s position, and I do not expect them to change their mind. But the point worth making is that, although the Rwanda scheme as a whole may not have found favour with the Government, it does not follow that some of the provisions in that Act are not appropriate to whatever policy the Government ultimately may think is appropriate. I know that this is something of a moving picture, as the Minister acknowledged.

I will not repeat what I said in the wrong group in relation to Amendment 107, but I place particular emphasis on that amendment because that issue was a pretty obvious excess of jurisdiction on the part of the European Court of Human Rights. This Government, whatever the final form their policy takes in statutory terms, may find that they have an interim ruling from the European Court of Human Rights that offends natural justice. The fact that—as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, quite rightly said—it needs a Minister before a decision is taken to reject it is an important safeguard. It is not a question of casting it aside and ignoring it; it is considered at an appropriate level, having regard to the unsatisfactory nature of the interim order that the court made under Rule 39. It is important that that provision should be inserted, whatever form the policy takes.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure that the noble Lord has explained fully why the Government are removing these sections of the Illegal Migration Act and why they oppose these amendments. The first amendment sought to protect unaccompanied children from automatic removal, while allowing for carefully defined exceptions. The second amendment aimed to clarify ministerial discretion when it comes to interim measures from the European Court of Human Rights—a safeguard that balances human rights considerations with the practicalities of border control. The third amendment addressed the worrying practice of disregarding outright certain protections, human-rights trafficking claims and judicial review applications—something that risks undermining access to justice. The fourth amendment ensured the coherence of asylum support provisions in cases where claims are declared inadmissible, preventing gaps and confusion around entitlement to state assistance. I make it clear that these concerns remain very much alive with us and may well be brought forward again in the future. But for now I beg to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 106 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

114: After Clause 38, insert the following new Clause—
“Decisions relating to a person’s age(1) This section applies if a relevant authority decides the age of a person (“P”) who meets the four conditions in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal) (duty to make arrangements for removal), whether that decision is for the purposes of this Act or otherwise.(2) If the decision is made on an age assessment under section 50 or 51 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, P may not bring an appeal against the decision under section 54(2) of that Act.(3) Subsections (4) and (5) apply if P makes an application for judicial review of—(a) the decision mentioned in subsection (1), or(b) any decision to make arrangements for the person’s removal from the United Kingdom under this Act which is taken on the basis of that decision.(4) The application does not prevent the exercise of any duty or power under this Act to make arrangements for the person’s removal from the United Kingdom. (5) The court or tribunal must determine the application on the basis that the person’s age is a matter of fact to be determined by the relevant authority; and accordingly the court or tribunal—(a) may grant relief only on the basis that the decision was wrong in law, and(b) may not grant relief on the basis that the court or tribunal considers the decision mentioned in subsection (1) was wrong as a matter of fact.(6) In this section “relevant authority” means—(a) the Secretary of State,(b) an immigration officer,(c) a designated person within the meaning of Part 4 (age assessments) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022,(d) a local authority within the meaning of that Part, subject to subsection (7), or(e) a public authority within the meaning of that Part which is specified in regulations under section 50(1)(b) of that Act (referral of age-disputed person for age assessment).(7) This section applies in relation to a decision of a local authority which is a decision within subsection (1) only if it is for the purposes, or also for the purposes, of the local authority deciding whether or how to exercise any of its functions under relevant children’s legislation within the meaning of Part 4 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.(8) For the purposes of this section, the cases in which a relevant authority decides the age of a person on an age assessment under section 50 or 51 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 include where a relevant authority is treated by virtue of regulations under section (Age assessments: power to make provision about refusal to consent to scientific methods) of this Act as having decided that a person is over the age of 18.(9) This section applies only in relation to a decision which is made after this section comes into force.(10) The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 is amended as follows.(11) In section 54(6) (appeals relating to age assessments)—(a) omit the “and” at the end of paragraph (a), and(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert “, and(c) section (Decisions relating to a person’s age) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 (decisions relating to a person’s age).”(12) In section 56(1) (new information following age assessment or appeal), for paragraph (b) (and the “and” at the end of that paragraph) substitute—“(b) an appeal under section 54(2)—(i) could no longer be brought (ignoring any possibility of an appeal out of time),(ii) has been finally determined, or(iii) may not be brought as a result of section (Decisions relating to a person’s age)(2) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 (age assessments relating to removal under that Act), and”.”

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we all agree that our system must be fair, and that there must be opportunities for proper dialogue and challenge when decisions are made about an individual’s age. That is right, and it is in keeping with our values. However, it is equally clear, and can be argued, that the balance has shifted too far in one direction. We have seen repeated last-minute legal challenges which have little merit but which succeed in frustrating or delaying removals. These are not genuine safeguards; they are tactical devices often deployed to prolong a person’s stay and undermine the integrity of our borders.

Amendment 114 seeks to restore the balance which we identified in government by reintroducing Section 57 of the Illegal Migration Act. It would ensure that factual decisions on age made by the appropriate authority could not be endlessly relitigated as a matter of opinion before the courts. Legal errors could still, rightly, be challenged, but the endless recycling of disputes over fact would no longer come at the cost of our border security. The Government would retain the power they currently have to remove those who they determine should not remain in the United Kingdom.

If we are to reduce the numbers and regain control of this issue, the Government must have the flexibility to act decisively once the facts have been properly determined. That is the balance we strike here: a system that is fair but firm; that is open to genuine challenge but closed to vexatious delay.

Furthermore, Amendment 115 is about ensuring that we have the tools to make accurate, authoritative determinations on the age of those who arrive here illegally. This information is not a minor detail; it shapes the protections a person is entitled to, the facilities in which they may be placed and the level of safeguarding that must be applied. To make decisions that are safe, appropriate and in the best interests of both the individual and the wider community, we must have reliable information.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for our agreement on the answering of the question and I retain my position. I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from noble Lords. That was an informative if not intriguing debate, and I shall be brief in closing our discussion on this group. I return to the central principle that has underpinned all my remarks: our immigration system must be balanced. It must allow for proper dialogue, proper challenge and proper safeguards, but it must also be able to function effectively. The system serves a vital purpose: it protects our borders, it maintains public confidence in our Government’s ability to protect us and it upholds the rule of law. If we allow it to become paralysed by delays, backlogs and spurious challenges, it fails not only in its legal duties but in its duty to the British people.

We on this side of the House are rightly concerned that removing these clauses will jeopardise that balance and that, without them, the Government’s ability to take timely authoritative decisions and to act on them will be weakened—

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not want to break the noble Lord’s chain of thought, but information has just been supplied to me that we now have on the government website the number of age disputes raised, the number of age disputes resolved, the number of adults found to be children, et cetera. That information is available now on GOV.UK, and I will supply further details to the noble Baroness in due course.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

The Government should either reintroduce these provisions or make it clear to this House here and now how they intend to prevent the harm that their removal will cause. Without such assurances, we cannot be confident that our borders will be secure, that our processes will be respected or that the British public can have faith in the system that serves it. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 114 withdrawn.

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I came across another issue regarding transparency related to AI and that is in—I may have mentioned this to the Minister—the initial interviews which are conducted, where the applicant is sitting alone in a room with a screen, not knowing who is on the other end and how many screens that person is looking at. In other words, what is the supervision of interviews and discussions that are going on? How many people are involved? Applicants do not know who is conducting the interview—I know that there are concerns about this—and are not told, generally, that they can request a copy of the interview transcript. Of those who do, who have good English, too many have found significant errors. In a sense, this is an anecdote, but my conclusion from it is of the importance of using AI properly and in a way which is transparent. This is a probing amendment on how the detail of one’s personal information is used, what guidance is given to caseworkers and how the use is monitored and evaluated.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we on these Benches agree to a degree with the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We may not agree on everything, but we are, in this small way, united. I shall speak briefly on the other amendments in this group, before turning to those in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron.

On Amendment 119, it is right that asylum casework should be completed as quickly as possible. Delays are costly to the taxpayer and to public confidence in the asylum system. When cases drag on for extended periods, it not only increases the financial burden but undermines the perception that our system is effective, fair and controlled.

However, while I support the principle behind the amendment, I have concerns about the rigidity of imposing a legal service standard. What happens when the limit is breached? Would this create a new legal avenue for challenge, further delaying removals and adding yet more strain to the system? The real solution lies not only in faster processing but in reducing the pressures in the first place. While I support the intention behind the proposal, I believe that our priority must remain on addressing the root causes of the pressure and not just on setting ambitious targets that may ultimately prove counterproductive.

We also have some sympathy for Amendment 195. It concerns a matter that this side has raised in relation to other Bills currently going through the House, such as the fraud, error and recovery Bill. When decisions are being taken that greatly affect the life of another person, we need to have some guarantee of human involvement. I therefore welcome this as an opportunity for the Minister to set out how AI will be used in this process.

I turn to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend. Amendment 201 would compel the Government to produce a report into the cost of providing asylum support. The British people engage with the principle of asylum in good will; they want to see those who are genuinely in need of protection given the support they require. That is a national characteristic of which I am proud. However, part of maintaining that good will is being open and honest about the costs involved. We have all seen what happens when there are information gaps: mistrust grows, narratives fill the space and confidence in the system is undermined; the Government then lose control, and it does not matter what they have done or delivered as it all becomes noise in a vacuum. Our amendment therefore seeks to address that by ensuring that the Government provide a comprehensive report on the cost of providing asylum support. Transparency should not be something that the Government resist; it is a hallmark of good governance.

Finally, Amendment 202 would require the Secretary of State to commission a review of proposals for the establishment of third-country removal centres. We, on this side of the Committee, have been clear that we are facing a massive, escalating and serious problem with illegal entry into the United Kingdom. If Ministers are serious about ending the crisis in the channel, they must be willing to consider the full range of options, and this review will be a vital step towards that.

Taken together, our two amendments are about realism, transparency and ambition: realism in recognising that our current approach is not working; transparency in being honest with the British people about the costs and consequences of our policies; and ambition in being prepared to consider tougher, more effective measures that match the scale of the challenge we face. The public’s patience is wearing thin and their confidence in the system will not be restored by half-measures. These proposals would give the Government the tools, evidence and mandate to act decisively.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Liberal Democrat and His Majesty’s loyal Opposition Front Benches for their amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, tabled an amendment to introduce a new service standard. I want to thank them for the amendment, as it helpful to look at that. We absolutely agree that there needs to be a properly functioning, effective immigration system. Our asylum processes should be not just efficient but robust. We are committed to ensuring that asylum claims are considered without unnecessary delay. We want to ensure that protection is granted as soon as possible so that people can start to integrate and rebuild their lives, including by obtaining employment when they have the right to do so. As such, I want to provide reassurance of the important steps we are already taking to achieve this aim.

As I have said on a number of occasions, during the passage of the Bill as well as in Questions and Statements, we have inherited a very large backlog, which we are trying to clear at pace. We are delivering the removals of people with no right to be in the UK, and we want to ensure that we restore the system very quickly. By transforming the asylum system, we will clear the backlog of claims and appeals. We have taken steps to speed up asylum processing while maintaining the integrity of the system. We have put in resources to ensure that we can do that at pace. That is why we are also looking at the efficiency of appeals and decisions, which we see to be of paramount importance.

The Bill proposes setting up a statutory timeframe of 24 weeks for the First-tier Tribunal to dispose of supported asylum appeals and appeals from non-detained foreign national offenders. The measures aim to speed up the appeal decisions, to ensure that we increase tribunal capacity and have a timely consideration of appeals. I hope that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness agree with me that the work that we are conducting at pace is appropriate and is having a real impact now on the size of the backlog. Although we cannot discuss the three-month time scale proposed in the amendment, I can reassure them that it is certainly on our agenda.

Amendment 195 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, looks particularly at generative AI tools to support caseworkers. I want to emphasise that no immigration decision is made solely by automatic decision-making, for there is still always a human eye on the decision-making. It is important that case summarisation and policy search tools, both of which are designed to help decision-makers, mean that we have improvements and efficiency in that process, which is also helping to reduce the backlog, which we want.

We have had an evaluation of the tools to date. We published that on GOV.UK in May. Therefore, we can demonstrate that the new technologies, such as AI, can potentially save around an hour per case, which is allowing decision-makers to access information more easily and to streamline the asylum process without, I hope, compromising the quality of the decisions.

Ethics and data protection are at the forefront of the considerations—the noble Baroness has mentioned that. The Home Office is taking significant steps to ensure that, where we trial and adopt AI in decision-making, we do so responsibly and in a way that maintains public confidence and that any tools are being trialled and are used to assist Home Office staff. With those assurances, I hope that she will not press her amendment.

The noble Baroness also mentioned other issues, which I will return to in a moment.

Amendment 201 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, addresses ensuring transparency in the asylum system. I hope he will understand that we think the amendment is unnecessary, not because it is not right that he presses us on this, but because, as we have discussed throughout the scrutiny of the Bill, the cost of accommodating and supporting asylum seekers has grown significantly. I have put those proposals before the House as a whole. This is a due in large part to the strain we have had on the asylum system in recent years, including the number of unprocessed claims and a record number of arrivals via small boats. We are taking steps to reduce the cost and ensure public funds are managed responsibly.

I understand the intention behind this amendment; it aims to enhance transparency and provide Parliament with a clear picture of how asylum support is being delivered. But I note that the information that the noble Lord is requesting is published each year in the Home Office’s annual accounts. The figures are publicly available and subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and we remain committed they are as clear and comprehensive as possible.

The amendment seeks a breakdown of the proportion of asylum seekers who have had their claims denied but are still receiving support. It may be helpful to note that failed asylum seekers can, under certain conditions, remain eligible for support, for example if they are taking steps to leave the UK or face temporary barriers. They are all important issues. I appreciate the spirit of the amendment, but that information is already available.

I will touch on this issue briefly, because I have the information on my phone, which will lose its signal and sign out if I do not look at it immediately. On the issue of rewards and bonuses for staff that was mentioned by the noble Baroness, there is a consistent delivery of high-quality work and professional behaviour. We want to ensure that asylum decisions are subject to stringent quality checks, with individual performance targets agreed with managers and reviewed regularly to ensure that the high standards expected are consistently met. I will give her more information about the bonus scheme—as far as I can—after the discussions today.

I should also say, in passing, that all claimants will receive a written transcript of any interview that has taken place, and they can also have an audio recording of that. I hope that reassures the noble Baroness about the issues she has put before me.

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With all that in mind, I hope that these amendments will enable us to understand how the information that has been provided by such a wide range of organisations will enable the Government to look at changing the measures that they currently use and to implement measures, such as those contained in these amendments, both to increase the number of people who voluntarily return to their home who are detained for the purpose of removal and to ensure that we do not have the ins and outs of a continuing cycle of removal and bail in immigration detention, with people going in and out without seeing an end in sight. There is a lot to be dealt with here. A lot of expert independent inspection advice has been given to the Government and made available to both Houses through our Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Home Affairs Committee in the House of Commons. It requires action, which these amendments seek to fulfil in this part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall make my remarks as brief as possible. We on this side of the House oppose Amendment 131 on the grounds that it undermines a key provision of the borders Bill and creates a two-tier system where some people are rightly subject to stricter conditions but others are not. The amendment would, in effect, disapply these provisions from individuals who ought to be subject to them. If these provisions are, as noble Lords rightly recognise, necessary to strengthen our ability to act, then surely they should apply equally to all relevant cases from the moment the Act comes into force.

We on this side also oppose Amendment 132, which would result in the release of people from detention possibly before any determination had been made on them and before we could be assured that it was safe and in the national interest to do so. This would result in the release of people when their identities remained unclear and we did not know why they were here or what threat they might pose to the country. We know of cases where people who arrived here illegally went on to plan and very nearly execute major terrorist attacks sponsored by hostile foreign states, as happened in May last year. It would be deeply irresponsible to allow such individuals to walk free while essential checks were still ongoing.

Amendment 140 in the name of my noble friend Lord Swire, who I note is not present in his place, would require the Secretary of State to make a biannual report on the number of foreign criminals detained awaiting deportation under any authority broken down by nationality, and on the number of illegal entrants detained for any purpose under any authority broken down by nationality. This amendment would provide much-needed clarity on who was being detained and goes to the heart of a point that we on these Benches have raised consistently.

The British people have a right to know who is being detained and where they are from. If we are to foster good will towards those who genuinely need our help, this must be done in a framework of trust and openness between the Government and the public. For these reasons, while we welcome Amendment 140 for the clarity and transparency it brings, we cannot support the majority of the amendments in this group. They would weaken key provisions, create loopholes and make it harder for us to maintain the strength and integrity of our immigration and asylum system.

The challenge we face is significant and demands a robust response. No one will benefit in the long term if we fail to take control now. The British people will lose patience, trust will erode and good will towards migrants who genuinely need our help will diminish. Once that good will is lost, it cannot easily be recovered. We must bring the public with us, not alienate them, and that requires a system that is both strong and fair. These amendments do not achieve that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

What a note to finish the evening on. I find myself in agreement with the tone of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I find myself not in agreement, I am afraid, with the noble Lord, Lord German, so it is an interesting end to a long day of debate.

Immigration detention is an issue that I know noble Lords feel strongly about. The purpose of Clause 41 is to clarify the existing statutory powers of detention where the Home Office is considering whether deportation is conducive to the public good, and the consequential amendments to existing powers to take biometrics and searches upon being detained for this purpose. It is the Home Office’s position that the current detention power is lawful. This clause provides greater legal clarity regarding its application. Without the retrospective effect of this clause, individuals could challenge the lawfulness of their detention. Such claims risk undermining the integrity of past deportation proceedings and frustrating future deportation proceedings.

Amendment 131 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to remove that retrospective effect. I do not believe that is a productive way forward because, as I mentioned, Clause 41 clarifies these powers. The Home Office already detains individuals at the first stage of deportation. Clause 41 is not expected to increase the use of detention powers but is intended to remove ambiguity and ensure that existing practices are legally robust.

On Amendment 132, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, with support from other noble Lords, it is important to make clear the Government’s position that a statutory time limit on detention will not, in our view, be effective in ensuring that those with no right to be in the UK actually leave the UK. The Government have been clear that we are committed to increasing removals of people who have no right to be here. That is what the public expect and, in that vein, I am on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Davies.

In the year ending March 2025, there were 8,600 enforced removals—a 22% increase on the previous year—and that would not be possible with a time limit on detention because it would simply not be possible to achieve that level of numbers. It is crucial that we have an immigration system that encourages compliance. Under a 28-day time limit, people who have no legal right to be in the UK—including, as the noble Lord, Lord, Davies, mentioned, some who potentially have committed serious crimes—would be automatically released after 28 days, regardless of whether they have actively obstructed removal efforts or pose a clear risk to the public. We have a duty to protect the British public, and it is simply not safe to have an automatic release date, particularly because foreign national offenders, who may have committed serious criminal offences, would benefit from this amendment equally to anybody else.

Additionally, such a time limit is likely to encourage and reward abuse of the system by allowing those who wish to guarantee their release to frustrate removal processes until they reach that 28-day limit. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made that would potentially push people over the 28-day limit, and this would undermine effective immigration control and potentially place the public at risk.

Amendment 133 requires that, after 96 hours of detention, a person may continue to be detained only if they have been refused bail by the First-tier Tribunal or are awaiting a scheduled bail hearing. This would again, in my view, place significant additional burdens on an already-stretched tribunal service, and the increases would simply be unsustainable.

There are a number of safeguards in the detention process—I hope this will reassure the noble Lord—including access to the courts by judicial review; bail applications, which can be made at any point; and automatic referrals for consideration of bail for those detained for slightly longer periods. With these mechanisms in place, the transfer of these powers to the tribunal is not necessary.

I recognise and understand that there are concerns about prolonged periods of time in detention. The law is currently clear that we have powers to detain people only for a reasonable period to carry out a specific purpose, either to examine a person on their arrival, to remove or to deport. We have a number of safeguards in place, and I assure noble Lords that, where removal cannot be achieved within a reasonable timeframe, these safeguards ensure that people are released. I know that will not satisfy the noble Lord, but I put that for him to consider today in order to withdraw the amendment, which we can return to later.

I know the noble Lord, Lord Swire, has tabled Amendment 140. Sadly, he has not managed to be here this evening, but when he looks at Hansard in the cold light of day tomorrow morning, he will see that we include data which includes illegal entrants. We also produce and publish additional statistics on the number of foreign national offenders subject to removal and deportation, so that amendment is unnecessary. With that, I hope the noble Lord, Lord German, will withdraw his amendment.