Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Dear Excerpts(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Fowler
My Lords, in some humility, I say that I disagree with both my fellow Conservatives who have just spoken, and in particular with the last speech. I do that in the context of paying tribute to the very high standard of the debate that has taken place. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and his colleagues for the way it has been conducted.
It is never ever been our case—those of us who want reform—that opposition is homophobic. That is not remotely the case that we have been putting. There is a central division between us. When opponents of the Government’s legislation have said, “Remember what people outside are saying”, that goes two ways. We might remember also what many tens of thousands of gay and lesbian people outside are saying. It is important to them, as the noble Lord, Lord Alli, so movingly said, in personal terms. I am struck and touched by the numbers of people who have been in touch with me to say what an important decision this is. It is, of course, after years and years of discrimination. That is what makes their support so moving.
The second point is that it is important in another way. During the passage of the Bill, I have been, as it happens, to a range of countries where discrimination against gay and lesbian people is not only an underlying feeling, but it is set out either in legislation or in official attitudes of those countries. I think in particular of a country I am recently back from—Russia. I think of Ukraine and Uganda. Personally, I hope that the message of this House of Lords is that there is a better way of doing these things than the way that those countries are doing them. It is a plea for equality and for non-discrimination. That is the hope and the message that I hope goes out from this House. I believe that, very shortly, the Government will have done a great thing here and I congratulate them on it.
Lord Dear
My Lords, I start my brief but sincere comments by thanking very much the Minister for the compliments she just paid me. I am grateful to her. I also thank all of those who have spoken on all sides of the House in the numerous debates that have taken place about the Bill, and especially those who supported me in the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House. All of us from my side were more than a little surprised at the level of support that the Bill has attracted within the House. If one looks at the opinion polls taken outside among the general public, it runs at about 57% in favour of the Bill. The votes in your Lordships’ House ran 20% or so ahead of that. I make no comment about that except that it surprises, and others will take considerable pleasure from that.
All I say, very sincerely, is that despite the serious doubts that some parts of our society harbour about the wisdom of the Bill, I—and I am sure I can speak on behalf of my supporters—fully recognise the parliamentary process and willingly accede to it. We all hope very sincerely that if passed by the House of Commons, the Bill will prove to be a success.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
Earlier today in your Lordships’ House, there was a reference to grandchildren being able to teach those of us who are grandparents about information technology. I have also found through listening to children out in the country that, unlike some of us from our generation, we are not actually changing what is happening in the country, we are recognising it. As a 12 year-old said to me, “What is the problem with that? Two people love each other”. Our grandchildren’s generation, and many of our children’s generation, live in what the Japanese call the house of tomorrow. I thank all my colleagues around the House who have been involved in steering the Bill through, but in particular the Minister, who, if she does not get George Clooney, perhaps could be on her way to sainthood because of the patience she has shown during the passage of the Bill.
My only worry comes from my experience in the education service, where stories appear which say that a school is going to ban Christmas or going to do this or that. I am proud of this House for the trust it is putting in trustees, governors, local vicars, parents, communities and teachers through the passage of the Bill and make a plea to all concerned for when the stories start appearing, as they will. Fortunately, in August, which is known as the funny month, most schools are not sitting—with the exception, I believe, of those in Scotland—so the press stories will not start just yet. However, my plea to anybody who reads a critical story connected with the passage of the Bill, such as one saying, “We told you so” or that it is not working, is to remember the story of the local vicar in Lancashire who was castigated in the press for saying that you could not put “gran” on a monument in the churchyard because it was not serious enough. That turned out not to be true and the poor man spent the rest of his clergyman’s life being castigated for something he had never done. When the stories start, as they will, please wait to hear the outcome of the due process and whether somebody is found guilty of something by the governors through appeals and the disciplinary procedure. Do not get caught out by the knee-jerk reaction that the media will try to create in certain circumstances. Let us make certain that this Bill is a success and that this House has done a good thing. Yes, there are people who do not want change—there are always people, of course, who do not want change—but we have recognised change and we should be proud of it.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Dear Excerpts(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Dear
My Lords, as somebody who once drove teams of horses with wagons behind them at a competitive level, may I be allowed to make a very small interjection? Although my name is not on the Marshalled List, as there was no room for it, I support my noble friend Lady Deech. I cannot add anything to the power of her argument or to the impeccable logic that she showed when she advanced the amendment.
The words “equity” and “decency” have already been used in support of this amendment. I would add “generosity”, “compassion” and certainly “appropriateness”. As she has already said, this amendment seeks to correct a prior-acknowledged discrimination. It asks the Government only to consider this within the terms of a review—not to change the Bill but simply to cause the review panel, the review body, to look at this issue. I was not in your Lordships’ House when the matter was debated eight or nine years ago. However, I have been told by many noble Lords whom I respect that there have been many attempts to try to couple this issue on to the appropriate wagon or stagecoach, and it has not been found. Here is an opportunity for us to do that. It will not get in the way of the current Bill. I certainly do not intend to do that, and I am quite sure that my noble friend does not, either. The time is right for a review, and if my noble friend presses her amendment, I will vote in favour of it.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, when discussing previous amendments in Committee and on Report, much was said about teachers being required to teach the law of the land. I do not envy their task, as the law regarding different personal relationships has become rather complex. That was best exhibited by the exchange just now between the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Alli, about whether civil partnerships are a sexual union. I have friends in civil partnerships who, when they went to the register office, were separated and asked questions to ensure that their relationship was sexual. Although these matters need clarifying, I shall state my understanding of the situation.
Opposite-sex marriage is understood to be a sexual relationship because it can be ended by annulment and by divorce on the grounds of adultery with a member of the opposite sex. Civil partnerships are same-sex and, for the reason I outlined, treated as sexual, but there is no annulment. Platonic friends can marry if they are of opposite sexes or of the same sex, but the lack of annulment for same-sex marriage may lead the institution to develop very differently. I agree with the right reverend Prelate, who stated what the position is in modern Britain. The demographics of our country are changing rapidly. In the 2011 census, 29% of UK households were single-person—not single-parent—households. The fact that two people can live more cheaply than one is becoming increasingly important with rising living costs, poor returns on private pensions, and high housing costs.
We could end up seeing someone who wants to say to their best friend, with whom they share a house, “You can depend on me. I am your first port of call”. The commitment would be not merely financial, or about inheritance tax, or being one household for the purpose of benefits. With an ageing population, the Government should be pleased if this kind of development occurred under the same-sex marriage Bill.
Of course, that analysis means that carers, as outlined in the amendment, can already marry and gain the financial benefits outlined. If we were to see such a cultural development, the injustice to family members would be even more apparent. One might even see deeply religious people of the same sex who currently oppose the Bill getting married, if same-sex marriage develops in our culture in the way I outlined. That kind of development might even make it easier for marriage to be used mischievously for immigration purposes. We just do not know.
The amendment would give clarity and direction to this review. The review would give the Government time, which they have not had with such a speedy legislative process, to look at the whole legal relationship landscape.
I noted the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, that it feels wrong to him. It was a very subjective, post-modern comment. It feels wrong to me to close down the area of discussion that a review would enable. If it was so wrong to put this wagon or coach on these horses, the amendment would not have been allowed on to the Marshalled List.
I support the amendment, because it would be unjust if everyone—and I mean everyone—except family members would be able under our law to promise a lifelong, non-sexual commitment or dependency.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Dear Excerpts(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
“Protection of teachers
(1) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing under or in consequence of this Act shall—
(a) affect the right of teachers to express their personal views about marriage in an appropriate way, or(b) mean that any teacher will be under any obligation to endorse a particular view of marriage.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a school designated as having a religious character by an order made by the Secretary of State under section 69(3) of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998.”
Lord Dear
My Lords, in moving the amendment, which seeks to protect the rights to conscientious exclusion for schoolteachers, I draw attention to the fact that teachers who have a conscientious objection to same-sex marriage are prevented from endorsing same-sex marriage, just as they are not required to give religious education or attend religious worship.
A ComRes poll conducted in January this year found that a quarter, 26%, of teachers said that they would either probably refuse to teach children about the importance of same-sex marriage or do so only reluctantly. More than half, 56%, were concerned that colleagues who expressed support for traditional marriage could harm their career prospects. The Government’s response to concerns expressed in this House about teachers’ concerns in this regard has so far been somewhat less than enthusiastic, despite being encouraged by the Joint Committee on Human Rights to,
“to consider whether specific protections are required for faith schools and for individual teachers who hold a religious belief about same sex marriage”.
The Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, said in Committee that,
“no teacher is under any obligation to endorse a particular view of marriage or would be in the future as a result of the Bill. Teachers are and will continue to be free to express their personal views”.—[Official Report, 19/6/13; col. 351.]
Amendment 46 simply seeks to place those promises in the Bill.
It is vital that teachers know that their freedom is protected. They are particularly concerned that they may be asked by senior staff or head teachers to promote same-sex marriage against their conscience. As Mr John Bowers QC, a leading counsel in this field of law, has indicated, a refusal to obey a lawful instruction could, in his opinion, be grounds for dismissal of that member of staff.
In Committee, I referred to a current case, the circumstances of which were set out briefly in Hansard on 19 June at column 336, in which a long-serving teacher at a girls’ school in south London is facing disciplinary proceedings for refusing to teach a presentation which stated, in effect, that any disagreement with same-sex marriage is homophobia. The Government have said:
“There is a significant difference between expecting a teacher to explain something and expecting them to endorse it”.—[Official Report, 19/6/13; col. 351.]
I ask Members of your Lordships’ House to put themselves into the position where a classroom of 13 year-olds are being taught about same-sex marriage and ask whether the line can be drawn between endorsement on the one hand and a pure explanation on the other. It is easy to imagine that class of 13 year-olds pressing their teacher to give his or her personal opinion.
That is particularly the case when the issue of same-sex marriage arises in contexts which are outside sex education. For example, should a primary school teacher with a conscientious objection to same-sex marriage be expected a read a book such as King and King, which is well known and endorsed and published by Stonewall, about two princes who get married? The teacher could well consider such a book to be an endorsement of same-sex marriage. She should have the freedom to decline to read the book without suffering detriment, a freedom that has already been denied to one such teacher who stopped reading a book about two male penguins raising a chick because she felt it conflicted with her beliefs. She was subsequently restricted from having her own class.
The amendment does not apply to schools designated as having a religious character in order to ensure respect for the values that underpin those schools. Schools with a religious ethos may well want to endorse the particular view of marriage upheld by the tenets of that relevant religion and should be left free to do so.
A further related issue is how the Bill, once enacted, will interact with sex education. Under the Education Act 1996, pupils are taught that the importance of marriage and family life should be encouraged. That is set down in Section 403. It applies to all state schools, both with and without a religious character. Church schools have a special protection but there are concerns for teachers and pupils across the state system. Clause 11 of the Bill redefines marriage for the purposes of all legislation, as we know, so teaching about the importance of same-sex marriage will be inherent in Section 403. As John Bowers QC stated in a legal opinion on Section 403 that the section,
“provides no exception for conscientious beliefs. Unless this were amended I envisage that there will be a duty on the teacher to promote marriage as newly defined”.
He went on to say:
“If the Marriage Bill becomes law, schools could lawfully discipline a teacher who refused to teach materials endorsing same sex marriage”.
He added:
“The stark position in my view is that a Christian teacher (or indeed any teacher with a conscientious objection) may have to teach about (and positively portray) a notion of marriage (and its importance for family life) which they may find deeply offensive”.
He goes on:
“Section 403(1A) of the Education Act would also in my view provide a legitimate basis for schools or LEAs which wish to promote a particular vision of equality to require all teachers to teach materials which endorse same sex marriage. The position of teachers who manifest a conscientious objection to doing so is not enviable”.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, for moving Amendment 46. This amendment obviously reflects the concerns he expressed about the potential effect of the Bill on teachers’ ability to express personal views about marriage, their employment rights and how they are expected to approach this topic in class. Noble Lords who have followed the passage of the Bill will know that these issues have been discussed at length in Committee, not only in this House but also in another place.
Before I respond to those three separate issues, I make the point that the way in which some contributions have been made to the debate this evening suggests that we are starting to confuse these three issues. I think it is important to see them as separate points. I start by addressing the point about freedom of expression generally. On this point I can be absolutely clear in response to my noble friend Baroness Barker, who asked about whether anything had changed in this Bill. Teachers are and will continue to be free to express a personal view about marriage or any other matter, provided they do so in a balanced and sensitive way. There is nothing in the Bill which will restrict anyone’s right to express the view that marriage should be between a man and a woman.
Amendment 46, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, aims to offer additional protections in this regard. This is unnecessary for exactly the same reasons that I spelled out in response to debates earlier this evening. I will not repeat them, but I just signpost for noble Lords Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Equality Act 2010. Everything I have said previously applies here. People, including teachers, have the right to believe whatever they wish to believe, and nothing about this is changed.
The noble Lord, Lord Dear, referred to the specific case of a teacher whom he said had been told that it is homophobic to disagree with the belief that same-sex couples should be able to marry. Obviously I do not know the details of that case, but I can be absolutely clear, because of everything that is in the Bill and what we are legislating to bring about, that it is absolutely legitimate to have a belief that marriage should only be between a man and a woman. I can say categorically that, if somebody holds that belief, it is not homophobic.
I move on to how the Bill affects teachers’ employment rights. Like any other employee, teachers are protected from being discriminated against or harassed because of their religion or belief. Discriminating against someone because they hold or express a belief about marriage is unlawful under the Equality Act. I add that the noble Lord’s amendment risks casting doubt on that existing protection by discriminating against a teacher applying for a job in a non-faith school, because his or her belief about marriage would already be unlawful under the Equality Act. The point, which I have made in other debates, is that, if we start being specific on the face of the Bill about such things, we dilute the protections to which teachers, as indeed any other employee, have the right, and we put them at risk.
Subsection (2) of the noble Lord’s amendment would also cast doubt on the ability of teachers in faith schools who are not covered by this provision to express their personal views about marriage in an appropriate way. I am sure that he would agree that such an outcome would be undesirable, and harmful to the ability of teachers in faith schools to present their own views in an appropriate manner and in the broader context of that school’s faith ethos.
The noble Lord, Lord Curry of Kirkharle, referred to the Government’s response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the point it makes about considering an amendment which relates directly to faith schools. I point out to the noble Lord that that is very different to the amendments we are discussing right now. That particular amendment, which the Government refer to in their response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, is a very specific one, which we will debate on Wednesday. It is not this amendment.
Then we move on to the issue of the requirements and demands on teachers in the classroom and the content of their lessons. First, I must remind the House again that, although I know that this is not just related specifically to sex and relationship education, none the less sex and relationship education is not compulsory for primary schools. It is compulsory only for secondary schools. When the noble Lord referred to particular materials and the effect they may have on younger children, there is no demand or requirement on primary schools to teach sex and relationship education.
No teacher is under any obligation to endorse a particular view of marriage, or would be as a result of the Bill once it is in force. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, quoted me from earlier stages of the Bill. I will repeat myself briefly again because I am afraid there is no other way for me to make this point. I said:
“There is a significant difference between expecting a teacher to explain something and expecting them to endorse it”.
Those are two separate things, and by expecting a teacher to explain something, there is no requirement for them to say that what is the law of the land is something they personally support. They are at liberty to have their own personal views. As I said—and as the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, made clear in her contribution in Committee and as my noble friend Lord Deben said in his contribution tonight—teachers,
“are required to explain the world around them in a way that is appropriate to the age and level of understanding of their pupils. This includes explaining some things which may be controversial and with which they may not necessarily agree”—
such as divorce and contraception. Teachers,
“are already very experienced in dealing with such issues and do so admirably and professionally”.—[Official Report, 19/6/13; col. 351.]
We would expect them to be able to handle this kind of change in the law as they already have done in the past with changes, for instance, that allowed civil partnerships.
The noble Lord, Lord Dear, referred to some specific material. I make the point to him that the Government do not specify the materials that any school should use to support teaching. The main point I make is that schools are required to maintain a policy on their approach to sex and relationship education and to make that available to parents because it is important that they consult with parents about their approach to education in this context.
The noble Lord, Lord Dear, and my noble friend Lord Eden asked about guidance. The Equality and Human Rights Commission guidance that we have talked about in the context of other debates includes technical guidance for schools in England dealing with the areas of the Equality Act 2010 which deal with the provision of education in schools. That will be reviewed as part of the work that the EHRC has committed to do to review its guidance in the context of this Bill when enacted. We are working with the EHRC to agree the plans and timetable for this work.
I understand the concerns behind the noble Lord’s amendment and the strength of his feeling in this area. I can only reassure him as clearly as I can that the protections are there for teachers in the context of their own employment rights, their own personal beliefs and their ability to express them, and also the requirement for them to teach the law of the land: they are under no obligation to promote or endorse anything that they do not agree with. As we have said at earlier stages in the passage of the Bill, to achieve the kind of tolerance, courtesy and generosity that we all talk about as being so important, it is incumbent upon teachers to be able to explain very clearly that there are many types of families and that same-sex couples will be able to marry in future. We want our children to be able to learn about the whole difference of views that there are in this country so that they can themselves ensure that we have the kind of society that we all feel strongly and passionately about. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment. If he decides to press it to a Division, I will of course be voting not-Content.
Lord Dear
My Lords, first, I thank the Members of your Lordships' House who have spoken in favour of the amendment. I must say that I am a little confused by the statements made by the Minister.
I beg your Lordships’ indulgence to read very quickly what the amendment sets out. It states that,
“nothing under or in consequence of this Act shall … affect the right of teachers to express their personal views about marriage … or … mean that any teacher will be under any obligation to endorse a particular view of marriage”.
That sets out exactly what the Minister said in Committee. She also said:
“Teachers are and will continue to be free to express their personal views”.—[Official Report, 19/6/13; col. 351.]
That is fine, but 40,000 of them—more than 10% in the ComRes poll, when extrapolated, means 40,000 teachers in this country—have said that they would probably refuse to teach children about same-sex marriage, and 56% have said that they fear that this will lead to teachers being disciplined if they find themselves in that position.
I also beg the indulgence of the House in drawing attention to the fact that I have quoted extensively from John Bowers QC, leading counsel. I repeat:
“If the Marriage Bill becomes law, schools could lawfully discipline a teacher who refused to teach materials endorsing same sex marriage”.
That is from leading counsel eminent in this field. His view has not been challenged by either of the noble Lords, Lord Lester of Herne Hill or Lord Pannick, so I take it—
Lord Pannick
I made a speech in Committee. I have not repeated the points I made in Committee because I did not think that it would help the House.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
My Lords, I have not repeated any of the comments that I made in Committee, but I am concerned whether leading counsel was asked whether teachers would be against endorsing same-sex marriage, because that has not been the tenor of any of the contributions, including those from the Minister. We are not talking about endorsement, we are talking about teaching the facts. I have been in politics a long time, and I have to tell the noble Lord, Lord Dear, that I know how to phrase a question to get the answer that I want.
Lord Dear
With the greatest of respect, I am not too sure what that point is set out to achieve.
The amendment states in paragraph (a) that nothing affects,
“the right of teachers to express their personal views about marriage in an appropriate way”.
That means that, if the amendment were carried, teachers can say what they like. The noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, made very much the same point: teachers, when pressed, can say “I do” or “I do not” endorse it under that protection. Under the clause, if teachers say, “I do not agree with it”, according to the opinion by John Bowers QC and others, they lay themselves open to disciplinary action or disadvantage. He continues:
“The stark position in my view is that a Christian teacher (or indeed any teacher with a conscientious objection) may have to teach about (and positively portray) a notion of marriage (and its importance for family life) which they may find deeply offensive”.
I am not going to weary the House by speaking any longer. However, if one believes the ComRes poll, 10% of teachers, which if extrapolated is 40,000 teachers in this country, are deeply concerned about this and have said that they will either refuse to teach it or find to do so abhorrent—that is my word, not theirs. It seems that there is so much doubt in that 10% of the teaching staff that we need to cover this. All that we are asking is simply to take the words that the Minister expressed on 19 June:
“Teachers are and will continue to be free to express their personal views”.—[Official Report, 19/6/13; col. 351.]
At the moment, it seems to John Bowers QC and others that if they express their own personal views on this, they are open to discipline and action. I therefore beg leave to seek the opinion of the House.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Dear Excerpts(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
“School Standards and Framework Act 1998: consciences of teachers
After section 60 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 insert—“60A Teaching about marriage
(1) This section applies to a maintained school.
(2) No teacher shall be required to endorse same sex marriage if he has a conscientious objection to so doing based on his religious or other beliefs.
(3) No teacher at the school shall receive any less remuneration or be deprived of, or disqualified for, any promotion or other advantage by reason of the fact that he relies on subsection (2) above.””
Lord Dear
My Lords, I see that Amendments 23 and 24 are grouped together. I had discussions earlier with the Front Bench that in my opinion it would have been better to have split these and discussed them separately. As will become clear very quickly, the only common ground in these two amendments is the classroom. One amendment deals with the position of teachers and the other with parents, but in the interests of time I have had a further discussion with the Front Bench and am more than happy to run these two together and speak to them both one after the other, if that would help. I am looking at the Front Bench and they are nodding so, with the approval of the House, I will do that.
Amendment 23, which seeks to protect schoolteachers, would preserve the position of a teacher so that no teacher was required to endorse same-sex marriage if there was a conscientious objection to so doing, and the same teacher would not be deprived or disqualified by the same action. Under the amendment, teachers with a conscientious objection to same-sex marriage would be protected from being forced to actively endorse it. The amendment would also seek to protect them from being disadvantaged as a result. It offers a conscientious protection similar to that enjoyed by, for example, atheist teachers, who have a legal right not to have to teach religious education. I contend that, unless explicit protection like this is included, the same-sex marriage legislation would jeopardise the civil liberty of teachers holding the traditional mainstream view of marriage.
Discussion about marriage comes up routinely as part of the school curriculum—for example, in English or in history—and there will be pressure, I fear, to ensure that any such discussion includes same-sex marriage. As for sex education, Section 403 of the Education Act 1996 requires sex education to include teaching pupils about the importance of marriage in family life, and will require teaching about the importance of same-sex marriage in that context.
I refer, as I did at Second Reading, to the opinion given by John Bowers QC, a leading barrister in the field of employment law. He stated that Section 403,
“provides no exception for conscientious beliefs”.
He goes on to say:
“Unless this were amended I envisage that there would be a duty on the teacher to promote marriage as newly defined”.
Many teachers undoubtedly will feel unable, in all good conscience, to express such an endorsement. A representative poll, taken earlier this year among teachers, found that 10%—which equates to more than 40,000 teachers in this country—would probably refuse to teach children about the importance of same-sex marriage if required to do so. In the same poll, 17% would teach about its importance but would not be happy in doing so, and 56% expressed concerns that colleagues who take a stance supporting traditional marriage could find their professional careers damaged.
In fairness, the Government have repeatedly sought to allay these fears by insisting that teachers will not be forced to endorse anything that is contrary to their conscience. In fact, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, told the House at Second Reading:
“Teachers will be expected to teach the factual and legal position when teaching about marriage, as with any area of the curriculum, but they will not be expected to promote or endorse views that go against their own beliefs. It will be unlawful to dismiss a teacher purely for doing so”.—[Official Report, 3/6/13; col. 940.]
Setting on one side the factual and legal position, and distinguishing it from the promotion or endorsement of views about that same subject, I would think that it is almost a knife-edge position.
In contrast to that view, John Bowers QC, whose opinion I have just quoted from, has suggested that teachers could be required to promote same-sex marriage and be disciplined and even dismissed if they refuse to do so. He states in his opinion:
“If the Marriage Bill becomes law, schools could lawfully discipline a teacher who refused to teach materials endorsing same sex marriage”.
Earlier in the document he states:
“The stark position in my view is that a Christian teacher (or indeed any teacher with a conscientious objection) may have to teach about (and positively portray) a notion of marriage (and its importance for family life) which they may find deeply offensive”.
He goes on to say:
“Section 403(1A) of the Education Act 1996 would also in my view provide a legitimate basis for schools or LEAs which wish to promote a particular vision of equality to require all teachers to teach materials which endorse same sex marriage. The position of the teacher who manifests a conscientious objection to doing so is not enviable”.
I will quote from a letter that was sent to me at the end of last week by a firm of solicitors in Witney in Oxfordshire. It stated:
“I am happy to confirm the attached letter, addressed to you by Mrs X, in relation to an investigation against her in her school, which is an honest summary of a genuine incident. I am aware of the facts of the case. I am also aware that Mrs X wishes to remain anonymous at this stage because an investigation is ongoing”.
The letter from Mrs X is illustrative of this problem, and I quote from it directly:
“I am a teacher at a … girls’ school in South London. I have been employed by the school for 17 years. During March … I was instructed to deliver a presentation, which included material stating, in effect, that any disagreement with same-sex marriage was de facto homophobia. I felt this was not a fair characterisation of the debate and it was one that conflicted with my own deeply held religious beliefs. I raised my concerns with the teacher in charge”.
I will shorthand the next bit. She complained to the teacher in charge, who allowed her her position and let her teach elsewhere. However, another colleague raised a complaint:
“The head teacher investigated the incident and concluded there was no case to answer. Another colleague, who is also a union rep, then followed up the complaint, and has formally raised additional concerns about my Christian beliefs and my membership of a church. The union rep has demanded an investigation of my beliefs and my membership of the church, and whether it had any negative impact on my job as a teacher. That investigation process is currently underway, and at the time of writing I do not yet know the outcome”.
The nub of that was on whether any disagreement with same-sex marriage was de facto homophobia.
I could cite other examples, but I will not take up too much of the House’s time. I will say simply that other teachers have come under similar pressure. One situation involved a primary school teacher who stopped reading the book And Tango Makes Three to her class because it endorsed same-sex relationships in a way that conflicted with her beliefs. When the head teacher discovered that, the teacher was restricted from having her own class because school policy required teachers to promote homosexuality in the classroom. In Scotland, a secondary school teacher was told that he would have to teach a relationships course, promoting same-sex marriage “without exceptions or safeguards”, despite that contradicting his beliefs.
We have a tangle. We have leading counsel on one side saying that the law will not protect teachers, and we have the view from the Front Bench, very obviously, earnestly and faithfully put forward, that the factual and legal position can be distinguished from the promotion and endorsement of views. We then turn to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is as divided on this as it was on other matters we heard of earlier in connection with another amendment. On this particular issue the Joint Committee said:
“We have heard significant arguments about whether existing employment and equality law provisions provide sufficient protection for employees who may wish to manifest their belief about same-sex marriage in the workplace. We note the particular concern for the position of teachers and civil registrars … We welcome the Government’s commitment to review the protections that may be required in relation to the teaching of Sex and Relationship Education. In particular, we encourage the Government to consider whether specific protections are required for faith schools and for individual teachers who hold a religious belief about same sex marriage”.
That sums up the reasoning behind this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Waddington
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Dear, brought to the attention of the House certain remarks made by my noble friend in her speech at Second Reading. I will remind the House of some of her words. In particular, she said:
“Teachers will be expected to teach the factual and legal position when teaching about marriage … but they will not be expected to promote or endorse views that go against their own beliefs”.—[Official Report, 3/6/13; col. 940.]
That surely means that the teacher must teach the new definition of marriage and must explain the significance of the change. That may be very difficult for some teachers. The Minister says that the teacher does not have to endorse the new definition, and by that I think she means to accept it as right.
Lord Dear
I wonder whether the noble Baroness could apply that reasoning to the letter that I quoted. I will read out the pertinent point again. The lady in question is currently under investigation in the south of England. She says in her letter, which is endorsed by the solicitor as being an accurate reflection of what went on:
“I was instructed to deliver a presentation which included material stating, in effect, that any disagreement with same-sex marriage was de facto homophobia”.
In other words, if you agree with it, it is not homophobia; if you disagree, it is. I understand that the lady is suspended and is currently the subject of an investigation. It seems to me that the difference between disagreement, agreement and endorsement is a very fine line indeed. I hope the noble Baroness will answer a further question at the same time. What about the 40,000 teachers—10%—who said that they would not be able to teach this matter in good conscience and would probably refuse to do so?
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
My Lords, my experience in my political career is that it is unwise to comment on individual cases. I would need to know the detail. I cannot believe—however, the noble Lord tells me it is a fact—that any head teacher or governing body has insisted on that wording. However, I do not doubt that the noble Lord has evidence which seems to support that.
I am slightly more dubious about opinion polls. I think that the opinions depend on the exact question that is asked. If noble Lords were asked as they left the Chamber whether they agreed with indoctrinating pupils into believing that same-sex marriage was right or wrong, we would probably all say that we do not believe in indoctrination. If we were asked a slightly different question, we might answer it differently. As someone who is very committed to political life, I am saddened that out there a variety of groups of people hold a variety of views, many of which I totally oppose personally. Nevertheless, I defend their right to hold them. That is the issue we are dealing with. I do not want my grandsons to be told that anything is right or wrong in regard to the law. They will be told by their parents and teachers and occasionally by their grandmother—although, as they grow up, they may not listen—about certain things of which we do or do not approve. However, I think it is very unwise for us to start assuming that teachers will be told they have to indoctrinate or put forward a particular point of view. For 10 years I chaired the education committee on Lancashire County Council. I once said to somebody, “If I wanted the whole teaching profession in Lancashire, which I respect and admire, to do something, the best way would be for me to ban it”.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, we all recognise the strength of feeling that these issues command, and pleas for tolerance, such as that from the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, always command considerable respect and attention. However, we really need to look at the principle behind the proposed amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Dear. As I see it, the teacher’s role is not simply to promote same-sex marriage or propagate his or her views. Surely the only role of the teacher in relation to same-sex marriage is to explain to pupils, where this is relevant, that the law allows same-sex marriage, and to explain that some religions do not recognise it and therefore the law does not recognise same-sex marriage of a religious nature in those circumstances.
I cannot understand why a teacher needs or should have a statutory immunity from performing that educative role. Nor can I understand why parents should be able to prevent their children being so informed about the laws of the society in which they live. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, also referred, in the context of the legal opinion from Mr John Bowers QC, to Section 403 of the Education Act 1996, which was said to cause great concern. I remind noble Lords that Section 403(1A) is about giving guidance in the context of sex education. It requires children in that context to,
“learn the nature of marriage and its importance for family life and the bringing up of children”.
The purpose of that statutory provision, as I understand it, is so that when children learn about sex education, they learn that it is highly desirable that sexual intercourse takes place within the context of marriage. I cannot understand why those noble Lords who are concerned about the Bill should wish in any way to prevent children learning—if and when they do—about homosexual sexual relations in that context, as well as about heterosexual sexual relations and the importance of marriage and family life.
Lord Pannick
An atheist may have good reason for not teaching religious education, because by definition religious education is teaching matters relating to religion. However we are not concerned here with teaching religion, but with the role of the teacher in teaching children, so far as it is relevant, about the society in which they live. If and when the Bill is passed, part of the society in which children live will include same-sex marriage.
Lord Dear
With the greatest possible respect, that is dancing on a pin. I am sorry to put it that way, because I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord. Surely it is exactly the same reasoning which gives protection—if one can use that phrase—for the atheist to fall out of teaching religion and the teacher who has a rooted objection to teaching about sex education and same-sex marriage on religious or conscientious grounds. I see no difference.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
My Lords, would the noble Lord, Lord Dear, please accept that he is referring to two separate issues? One is teaching religious education. Perhaps in some schools this is taught as fact by people who believe, particularly in church schools. As for the other, I do not know if other noble Lords have my experience of children, particularly grandchildren, asking people questions at the most inappropriate moments to get information.
Even if the noble Lord’s suggestion in the amendment was agreed, parents could say, “I do not wish my child to be in the classroom when X is being discussed”. However, then the child at the back of the class suddenly asks a question that the teacher has to answer. It is not formal sex education. “Where did I come from?” is the question that a child is most likely to ask at the checkout in the supermarket, rather than at the appropriate moment at home. Therefore, one cannot subdivide the process of education. Education goes on all the time. The teacher may be asked such questions in the classroom. It may be a scout leader who is asked—it could be anyone; it may occasionally be the grandmother. Then you have the problem of working out not only what you think but what the parents concerned would like you to say.
Baroness Thornton
I will address both Amendment 23 and Amendment 24, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, himself said—
Lord Dear
I am so sorry. Perhaps I may directly address the Front Bench. We agreed that we would try to hurry this through—and of course we have failed in that. I certainly do want to speak to Amendment 24, having moved Amendment 23. I thought that we agreed that I would then go straight on to Amendment 24 and take that as well. I want to discuss it. However, I am also conscious of the time. It is fast coming up to half past 10. I am in the hands of the Committee as to how we handle this.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I apologise to the noble Lord if I was in any way unclear when we discussed this. I thought, from our last conversation, that we were going to debate both amendments together as a single group, and that is what I was intending to do in responding to this debate. I think that there is real merit in doing so because there are things relevant to the noble Lord’s second amendment which help me to address some of the points that have been raised by my noble friends, particularly points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eden. My intention is to cover both amendments in my response.
Lord Dear
If it is the will of the Committee I will move on to Amendment 24. Yes, the Front Bench is nodding.
Amendment 24 stands in my name as well and I will try to be fairly brief; I can certainly be briefer than I was before. Because of their religious or other convictions, many parents will not want their children to learn about same-sex marriage before a certain age, fearing that they will find it confusing. Others may be concerned that teaching on the subject will not be balanced or might not respect their own convictions on the matter.
Parents, as we all know, have the right to withdraw their children from sex education. However, same-sex marriage could be included in a range of other subjects, across the curriculum, to which the right of withdrawal does not apply. For example, there is no right of withdrawal from history lessons and there has been a growth of schools taking part in LGBT History Month lessons within the last few months.
Stonewall, the leading gay rights group, promotes an extensive list of materials on same-sex marriage for use in primary schools. These resources cover subjects much wider than just sex education. A teacher training guide, also produced by Stonewall, suggests that primary school children could perform some of Stonewall’s recommended story books as school plays. An accompanying teacher training DVD, which was produced with the support of the Training and Development Agency for Schools, suggests that pupils must become “resilient”—and that word is lifted directly from its literature—to the values of their parents and grandparents. This is quite clearly an indirect reference to some parents and grandparents who may have objections to issues such as gay marriage.
There is a danger that without an extension of the right of withdrawal, the deeply held beliefs of parents will be undermined, as will their ability to have their children educated in accordance with their own convictions. Article 2, as some of us know, of the first protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights will be weakened. I could give a number of examples where this sort of thing has happened—I am conscious of the time and of the fact that the House wants to progress—but suffice it to say that there are already examples in this country, and abroad, where children have sought to be removed from school because of this sort of thing, and the council has told the parents that action would be taken against them unless the children were returned to school. It has happened in Waltham Forest in east London and it has happened abroad in Massachusetts.
I am galloping through very fast, and I would have liked to develop the argument to greater effect, but Amendment 24 gives a parent the right to withdraw a child from any lesson that includes teaching about same-sex marriage. It also requires the school to notify the parent a week in advance of those lessons, because being informed in that way is obviously crucial to the effective operation of the right of withdrawal.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, third time lucky. Amendments 23 and 24 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, address various aspects concerning teaching in schools. I recognise that this is a sensitive issue and of importance to many people. However, we believe that both these amendments go too far.
The obligations of schools, particularly faith schools, in relation to teaching about same-sex marriage were extensively debated in the other place. I will repeat what I said at Second Reading: I think that the Secretary of State, Michael Gove, got it just about right when he gave his evidence to the committee in the Commons. These are not new issues. Current requirements on faith schools around the teaching of PSHE and subjects such as abortion have required schools and DFE guidance to forge a sensitive path between teaching pupils about the facts of life and the law of this country, while still informing them of their faith’s views on these issues.
Noble Lords need to understand that teachers have succeeded in navigating these sensitive issues. We understand the concern of faith schools that they will be required to advocate to their pupils something that their faith does not endorse. However, there is a fundamental difference between teaching and advocacy, which is why the noble Lord’s Amendment 23 is confusing. By providing for an explicit protection for teachers who refuse to “endorse” same-sex marriage, the amendment misconceives the nature of teaching. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained that extremely well and I will not repeat those arguments.
The Education Act 1996 requires that pupils,
“learn the nature of marriage and its importance for family life and the bringing up of children”.
It is not the job of teachers to endorse or not endorse a particular opinion, no more than teaching about a subject amounts to their personal endorsement of it. Just as currently all schools are required to teach about the importance of marriage for family life—while being sensitive,
“so as not to stigmatise children on the basis of their home circumstances,
which is what the statutory guidance says on this issue—I put it to those who are concerned about this that schools have already found a way to navigate the sensitive path of teaching children about the importance of marriage without implying that children who come from other arrangements or set-ups, be they single, same-sex or unmarried parent homes, have any less important a family life.
Amendment 24 would allow parents to remove their children from any lesson in addition to PSHE, where they already have such a right, which might involve teaching about same-sex marriage, and would require teachers to give advance notice to parents of any lessons in which this may be of relevance. Disregarding for a moment the complete impracticality of a teacher having to inform parents before any likelihood of a discussion on same-sex marriage—my noble friend Lady Farrington made that point completely clear: you cannot predict what a teacher will be asked by a pupil—will the teacher be forced not to answer that question?
I suggest that the amendment comes close to wishful thinking on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, in hoping that some individuals might go through their entire young lives without ever knowing that same-sex marriage was the law of this country and that it would be wrong to go down such a path.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I am happy to confirm to my noble friend that parents are indeed allowed to withdraw their children from sex and relationship education. They can do so now and they will be able to do so in future, if that is what they decide.
Lord Dear
I am very grateful to the Minister for the way in which she has summed up and the way in which she has handled these difficult issues. I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. It has been very illuminating. We have covered a lot of ground, and I take the point that we will be covering educative issues later in Committee.
I will very quickly make four points. First, I ask the Minister to take on board the very considerable concern that the ComRes poll showed among teachers. I ask her to reflect on her words, which were said, of course, in an effort to be helpful when she spoke at Second Reading, distinguishing the factual and legal position on the one hand and promoting and endorsing views on the other. I still maintain that is a very fine balance in the classroom and may be very difficult to disentangle. In fact, I unashamedly lifted the word “endorse” from the Minister’s speech and put it into the amendment. It may be that we can find a different word, but the issue is still there, balanced, as I said, on something of a knife edge. One has to take into account the opinion of leading counsel on this, and that runs straight into the opinion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which stated,
“we encourage the Government to consider whether specific protections are required”,
and so on.
From what I have heard in the Chamber tonight there is sufficient doubt and concern on these issues for us to carry those forward into later debates on the whole business of the classroom, teaching and parents. I hope that at the end of that debate, between Committee and Report stages, the Government will be involved in discussions. I would be very happy to join in those discussions, if that was thought to be helpful. We may be able to bring something forward that would give a degree of satisfaction to those who are involved.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Dear Excerpts(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Viscount Astor
My Lords, it seems to me that we are trying to find a form of words that does not increase the level of discrimination. The amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay offers that and I shall be most interested to hear what my noble friend on the Front Bench has to say about it. It seems to me that it could provide a way forward without producing further discrimination. I believe that if we added the words “traditional marriage” to the Bill, we would be going down entirely the wrong route. What is the definition of “traditional marriage”? How do we describe it? Is it when the bride wears white? Is it a traditional marriage when the bride goes up the aisle with two children whom she has already had out of wedlock? We would be going down a road that, as legislators, we should not follow, and I believe that it would be a grave mistake. We should find a form of words that both sides can live with.
Lord Dear
My Lords, Amendment 9 in this group is in my name and I should like to speak to it now. I have a great deal of sympathy with what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said. She really focused, as did the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York, on the blurring of the wording before us in the Bill.
There has been some comment about the difference between equality and sameness, and we touched on that at Second Reading. What we have heard today has, very largely, been two alternative points of view. One is that out of civil partnership might have arisen something which itself would grow into the dignification of something similar to marriage, and the other is a fusion—which is what the Bill is really talking about—of two completely different strands into the one nomenclature of marriage. It is that point that I wanted to mention in introducing Amendment 9 and to offer a way forward—a compromise to where we are now.
The Government say that the Bill is about ensuring equality, fairness and respect for same-sex couples who wish to have their relationship recognised in marriage, and I agree with that. I hope the Government will also accept that there also needs to be equality, fairness and respect for those who hold a different opinion. Much has been said about protecting churches and individual clergy from being forced to officiate at same-sex marriages. I believe I am right in saying that there is nearly universal agreement in your Lordships’ House on the important principle of protecting religious liberty in that regard.
Lord Dear
First, I hope that the noble Lord will clear up the point about whether I am being mischievous. I hope that he will say in the Chamber that I am not. Secondly, subsection (2) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 9 states simply:
“A ‘traditional marriage’ is one where the basis of the marriage is the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life, to the exclusion of all others”.
Lord Alli
My Lords, I think I am right—I hope that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey, will correct me if I am wrong—that in an e-mail purporting to come from the noble and right reverend Lord, he described his own amendment as mischievous and dangerous. It was not I who used those words.
Attempts to create inequality in the Bill seem to be the sole object of these amendments. To create a separate term or register would be both divisive and unnecessary. I hope that noble Lords will think again and not press their amendments. I suspect that there is no appetite for them in the House.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I think my noble and learned friend referred to this point in an earlier intervention. I will probably cover it a little later, but I think he is referring to Clause 11(1), which states:
“In the law of England and Wales, marriage has the same effect in relation to same sex couples as it has in relation to opposite sex couples”.
That does not introduce a distinction between two different kinds of marriage.
As I understood the noble Lord, Lord Dear, to say, Amendment 9 in his name is intended to define the marriage of a man and a woman as a traditional marriage, and have that marriage registered as such by the Registrar General in a separate register. Traditional marriage of the type he is putting forward could be formed only by opposite-sex couples. Therefore, this amendment would create an unwelcome distinction in the institution of marriage. As I stated at Second Reading, the introduction of same-sex marriage does not redefine any existing or future marriage of a man and a woman. It is not necessary to protect that status.
Lord Dear
Does the noble Baroness agree that what I propose is, in very simple terms, a purely permissive provision that would retain the new legal definition of marriage as introduced by the Bill? It goes very much with the Government’s line on this and does not seek to change it at all. It would simply set up within that new definition the possibility of the couple getting married declaring their marriage in a form which is acceptable to them and having that registered in a register—a side register, if you like—that the registrar can keep. As I say, the provision would work permissively within the Bill and not upset it at all, but would satisfy the 98%, shall we say, who want the comfort of staying with what they understand to be traditional marriage.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
Although I understand perfectly what the noble Lord is saying, the amendment would still create that separation and distinction that somehow one group is different from another and, therefore, we have to keep them apart. That is what we are trying to avoid. That is what we do not want to do.
Amendments 33 and 34 give us an opportunity to discuss—
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I wish to speak briefly to Amendment 54, which is in my name, and, obviously, to government Amendment 53. Much has been said in your Lordships’ House of the need to preserve free speech but, as I outlined in my Second Reading speech, the role of the state goes beyond that. To ensure free speech, there has to be an encouragement and a protection of dissent in the public space. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for bringing forward Amendment 53, which was promised in the other place on Report, and was a concern outlined in the recent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that was published last Friday. I am a member of that committee, and there were very divergent opinions on the principle of the Bill, but we managed to come up with a report of the whole committee about the concerns that remain about the Bill.
I am grateful that the Government have brought forward this amendment to deal with some of the concerns around free speech. It is particularly important when on our statute book there are crimes that can be committed, with the force of criminal law being brought to bear on them, when there is hate speech with a particular mens rea of intending to stir up hatred against, for instance, somebody on the grounds of sexual orientation. I draw attention to what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, outlined: this is a necessary safeguard when we look at what people on the ground are actually doing. Members of the other place have already referred to an incident a few weeks ago, when the police were called to a heated exchange around the matters that we are considering. We have to bear in mind that the effect of this legislation, and the potential effect on free speech, has to be policed on our streets by ordinary police constables. Amendment 53 ensures that they have clear guidance around what is and is not a criminal offence. It specifically states the caveat that it is not just about stating your belief that marriage is between one man and one woman. It is allowing that criticism to take place and thereby not breaching criminal law once the criticism is made. That dissent in the public space is to be welcomed.
In my speech at Second Reading I drew attention to the exchanges that took place between David Lammy MP and David Burrowes MP on these issues. One of the things that are becoming very difficult in speaking on this issue is the analogy, which was the cause of the dispute in the other place, around sexual orientation, same-sex marriage and racism. I am surprised to see the nature of the exchanges we are having today. If that is what ends up taking place in this debating Chamber, what will be happening on our streets when passions get inflamed around this issue? I welcome the Government’s amendment and believe that it brings in an important safeguard.
Lord Dear
I shall speak to Amendments 7 and 8, which stand in my name in this grouping. I ask noble Lords to consider the words which case law has held to be paramount in this, that beliefs must be,
“worthy of respect in a democratic society and not incompatible with human dignity”.
They are words protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, and they cover both religious and philosophical beliefs. There are a clutch of cases which I could quote here, but I will refer briefly to only two of them.
The first is Grainger plc & Others v Nicholson in 2009. The court held that strong philosophical belief about climate change, for example, affected how the claimant lived. It went beyond mere opinion. It was setting out that opinion is one thing, which is not protected by the law, but that serious beliefs which stand above that should be so protected. That case really became the bedrock of this particular set of cases. In a 2005 case in the House of Lords, Regina v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, said that:
“A free and plural society must expect to tolerate all sorts of views which many, even most, find completely unacceptable”.
Agreeing with that judgment, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, in accepting pacifism, vegetarianism, and teetotalism as beliefs, went on to say that they are not just religious beliefs,
“but equally … may be based on ethical convictions which are not religious but humanist”.
I galloped through that just to say that the words,
“worthy of respect in a democratic society”,
have a solid bedrock in both European law and the law of this country.
The reason for tabling these two amendments is to focus on the fact that the Government have repeatedly insisted that this legislation before us will not penalise those who believe that marriage is only between a man and a woman. As the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, has already said, the obvious case to cite at that juncture is that of Adrian Smith and the housing trust. That has been mentioned several times in previous debates on this subject. I will not go into it again but that case, and others, indicate the fragility of the position of those who seek to express a firmly held view, without any intent of causing any disruption beyond—
Baroness Barker
I wonder if the noble Lord, Lord Dear, would care to acknowledge that Adrian Smith actually won his case. The reason why he did not win substantial damages was because he did not take the case within the time limit. But he did win his case.
Lord Dear
Adrian Smith won his case under contract law. He was awarded only £98 for loss of earnings. I understand that he was advised by his lawyers that he would not have succeeded on a religious or belief discrimination claim.
Having mentioned the Adrian Smith case and the fragility which I think most would accept is there at present, my Amendments 7 and 8 are paving amendments, as much as anything, for Amendments 10, 12 and 14, which also stand in my name. They are put forward to your Lordships for consideration as alternatives, to put the Government’s assurances on a statutory footing. The amendments expressly state that,
“marriage was the union of one man and one woman”,
as a belief, and here I quote again,
“worthy of respect in a democratic society”.
As I say, that is the key test used by the European Court of Human Rights. The amendments go on to say “that no person” holding that belief “should suffer any detriment”, and ensure an ongoing recognition that there are different views on the issue and that the many who hold to a long-standing definition of marriage should not be disadvantaged.
Briefly, Amendment 7 requires that:
“Any person, in exercising functions under or in consequence of this Act”,
should have regard to the principle of not causing detriment to those who believe in “traditional marriage”. That would put, as an example, the Secretary of State under an obligation to have regard to this principle when making orders under the Act. It would apply to anyone involved in the registration of marriages, including staff handling applications from churches.
Amendment 8, as an alternative, tightens the focus down to:
“A public authority, or any person exercising a public function”,
having regard to the same principle. That would apply to public sector employers, including housing trusts, which might treat employees unfairly because of their beliefs about marriage. The amendment would also extend to all that is done, for example, by Ministers of the Crown, the National Health Service, local authorities, schools, police forces and so on. Individuals in all walks of life would be protected, from doctors to road sweepers, from nurses to government advisers, and from teachers to police officers.
Baroness Thornton
Is the noble Lord aware that the Equality Act 2010 does all of this? I recommend that he reads the guidance that accompanies that Act. The legislation received cross-party support in this House. It is a carefully balanced Act that already offers all the protections that the noble Lord mentioned.
Lord Dear
The point I would make is that the Equality Act is shot through—I am sorry, I shall retract that. The Equality Act attracts a mass of legislation in which actions are taken against individuals who are said to be in breach of the Act. These amendments will put into statutory form the words,
“worthy of respect in a democratic society”.
I suggest that they will cap off a large number of those actions. Putting it in simple terms, the Equality Act is not proving to be as watertight as it was first imagined to be.
Lord Elton
My Lords, am I not right in thinking that the case that was brought to the attention of the Committee a few moments ago by my noble friend Lady Cumberlege should have been protected by the Equality Act? However, that Act failed to provide any protection.
Baroness Turner of Camden
My Lords, perhaps I may say a word about Amendment 8 because I have some doubts about it. The first line of the proposed new clause states:
“A public authority, or any person exercising a public function, shall have regard to the following”.
That is followed by a list to which he should have regard. What does “shall have regard” mean? Does he have any enforcement powers? For example, could he so construct his activities that he was, in fact, forcing on people who did not want to receive it the belief in subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c), which state,
“that belief in traditional marriage is a belief worthy of respect”,
and,
“that no person should suffer any detriment because of their belief”?
As far as I am concerned, people can believe what they like. What I object to is an intention to impose those beliefs on people who do not accept them. I certainly would not be happy to accept that, because in subsection (1)(a) there is a provision about marriage being,
“the union of one man and one woman … to the exclusion of all others (‘traditional marriage’)”.
As I said before on the previous amendment we discussed, what about the position of people who divorce? A lot of people in this country get married, go through a divorce and then, perhaps, marry again. Is their second marriage traditional or not traditional? There are a number of questions raised by the wording here which make the proposed clause quite unacceptable, particularly to those who hold a fairly secular view so far as marriage is concerned. The wording is not really acceptable because, in my view, it could lead to the position where those who hold these beliefs could, in their capacity as public officials, seek to impose them on people who do not hold them at all.
Lord Dear
Perhaps I may respond to that. I refer the noble Baroness to the judgment in the case of Williamson. I shall quote rather more extensively from what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, said:
“Many would believe it to be wrong even if it was proven to work. Both are essentially moral beliefs, although they may be underpinned with other beliefs about what works best in bringing up children. Both are entitled to respect. A free and plural society must expect to tolerate all sorts of views which many, even most, find completely unacceptable”.
I rest my case.
Lord Cormack
My Lords, perhaps I may ask my noble friend a specific question, which has already been referred to by my noble friend Lady Cumberlege. A number of us received a letter from a clergyman of the Church of Scotland who, not in his official duties as a chaplain to the police but in, I believe, his blog, referred to his own personal belief in marriage as being the union of a man and a woman. He was subsequently dismissed from his post as a chaplain. What I want to know is this: are the provisions that the Government are putting forward in this Bill sufficient to prevent that sort of unseemly episode happening in the future?
Lord Dear
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I specifically did not say that. My amendment, if adopted, would certainly not lead to the sort of conduct whereby a housing manager could decide that he did not much like single-sex marriages and therefore would not allocate a house. That was quite specifically not what I had in mind. It was that the housing manager should not be punished or be at detriment for holding those views when he stood back and said, “I don’t want to get involved in this. Somebody else should make this allocation”. That is the point I was making.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Before the Minister answers that, I should like to be clear on whether the noble Lord, Lord Dear, is suggesting that it is open to a registrar who objects to same-sex marriages to desist from performing a same-sex marriage.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
I am afraid that it is not possible for me to respond directly to that question because the case is still live and subject to litigation. I hope that my noble friend will forgive me.
Amendment 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, seems to be aimed at addressing concerns aired here and in the other place that public authorities might overreact to expressions of belief in traditional marriage. This was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Not only would the amendment require public authorities to treat people fairly but it would impose a specific duty in respect of this one belief, which could result in the marriage of same-sex couples being placed on a lower tier or being considered as somehow not of the same status as marriage of opposite-sex couples.
Together, Amendments 7 and 8 would allow the owner of a hotel approved for the solemnisation of marriages to refuse to host marriages of same-sex couples, and the registration authorities and even the courts would have to allow him to do so. We believe that that would be both confusing and wrong.
Amendment 9 would also require those exercising public functions to consider a particular belief about marriage, regardless of the function being exercised. This would be overburdensome and unnecessary. How would this be relevant for a person exercising parking or traffic enforcement functions or a person exercising functions relating to rubbish collection?
Another difficulty arising from both these amendments is that, by focusing on protecting a particular belief about marriage, they could cast doubt about the protection afforded to people who hold similar views on other issues, such as civil partnerships or same-sex relationships generally. Such a focus could suggest that such views were not protected by the Equality Act. The point there is basically that, if we are specific about this but not specific about other things, arguably we are then putting other beliefs in doubt.
We believe that the proper way to consider issues of protection of conscience in relation to people who exercise functions connected to marriage is to do so in each particular context: civil registration, employment, religious organisations and so on. That is what we have done. We will shortly debate the amendment from my noble friend Lady Cumberlege, which would introduce a conscience clause for civil registrars.
In the preparation of the Bill and during the debates here and in the other place, we have listened to concerns about whether the protections could be strengthened. One thing that we have done is to amend the Bill to provide additional protection for employed chaplains—for example, hospital or university chaplains—who do not wish to carry out or participate in the religious marriage ceremony of a same-sex couple.
Amendment 19 from the noble Lord, Lord Singh, seeks to amend the religion or belief provisions in the Equality Act to make explicit that a belief that marriage should be between a man and a woman is included within it. I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is no need to change the Equality Act in the terms set out in the amendment. Amending the protected characteristic of religion or belief by specifying a particular belief about marriage would cast doubt, as I have just said, on other religious or philosophical beliefs that are also protected by the Equality Act, and could therefore lead to confusion about how the protected characteristic of religion or belief is generally protected.
Moving to Amendments 53 and 54, Amendment 53 is a government amendment, similar to one debated in the other place in Committee and on Report. The Government gave a commitment on Report in the other place that we would come back with our own amendment, and I am happy to do so now. This amendment is intended simply to put beyond doubt that the Public Order Act 1986 offences regarding stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation do not outlaw the reasonable expression of the view that marriage should be between a man and a woman, which remains a perfectly legitimate view. It is appropriate to make this amendment because there is already a similar provision in Section 29JA of that Act concerning discussions about sexual conduct or practices. The current wording of Section 29JA would not however cover discussion of same-sex marriage, and that is why we are making the amendment. It is conceivable that some people might be in doubt as to whether discussions of same-sex marriage were to be treated differently from discussions of sexual conduct and practices, in so far as those two topics are linked. For example, my noble friend Lady Barker referred to the demonstration in Brighton by a church on the day of the Gay Pride march. If the church wanted to demonstrate against same-sex marriage, it would be perfectly lawful. This amendment makes that clear. However, let me at the same time be absolutely clear and reassure the House that this amendment does not allow hate speech. If the manner in which something is expressed is threatening and intended to stir up hatred, that would still be an offence. The amendment refers to the content of what is said, not the manner in which it is said. It makes clear that that subject matter is a legitimate one for discussion and it is right to do that only because there is an existing provision covering discussion of sexual conduct or practices.
I turn briefly to Amendment 54 in the name of my noble friend Lady Berridge.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston
Yes, I can confirm that it relates only to criminal law.
Returning to Amendment 54 from my noble friend Lady Berridge—
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Dear Excerpts(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Dear
My Lords, this has been a long and tiring debate, and one that has been a privilege in which to participate. I thank all Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken, and in particular those who have offered such steadfast support to me, both before and during the debate. I am very grateful. As has just been confirmed, this is a free vote, and Peers across the House have supported my amendment. All of them recognise that it should not be a matter for party politics but a matter of principle.
It is interesting how in the course of this fascinating debate, over two days, the thrust of the debate, or the tide for and against, flowed backwards and forwards. Last night, the first half of that session was more or less in balance, while the second half of last night was discernibly running in my favour, as it were, and today the tide has turned and is running the other way. I make no criticism of that; it is the random way in which the speakers list is put together. Certainly, all of us agree that this is an issue of profound interest and importance and one that will affect every member of our society. We cannot escape the fact that the Bill will completely alter the concept of marriage as we know it. The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and the right reverend Prelates, the Bishop of Leicester, the Bishop of Chester and the Bishop of Exeter, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey of Clifton, and the noble Lord, Lord Singh of Wimbledon, all explained their opposition to the Bill and the detailed practical and theological reasons that underpin their stance.
In the debate over the past two days, it appears to be an accepted fact that the process of the Bill was seriously and unusually flawed. Nobody has really challenged those facts, and I comment very briefly on them because they have been repeated several times already. It is useful to remember that there was no proper consultation or Green or White Paper. There was no manifesto or pre-legislative scrutiny. The Government consultation procedure was, frankly, a mockery, and the result was rigged, because whichever way you look at it the vote was 83% against the Bill. It was heavily constrained in its passage through the House of Commons, with some serious doubts about the process.
Here in your Lordships’ House our debate strangely never came to real grips with the consequences of the Bill should it become law. There was very little examination or comment about the major issues of employment, education, freedom of conscience or the rights and well-being of children, save the one intervention that I noted from the noble Lord, Lord Eden of Winton. Neither was very much time spent on the inevitable impact on the existing legal framework. All we knew for sure was that the Government had admitted that the impact on existing legislation would require at least 8,000 amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has just tried to put that into context.
I hope noble Lords will agree with my very unusual procedure of quoting five lines from my opening remarks yesterday, which can be found in col. 947 of Hansard. I reflected on the fact that the last country to change the law as we seek to do was Argentina, two years ago, and the results are just becoming apparent. A valued commentator in that country said this:
“It quickly became clear that legalising same-sex marriage required a revolution to our internal law. It impacted laws regulating public order, identity, gender, rules of kinship, filiation, marriage, names, marital property arrangements, divorce, alimony, parental rights, succession, domestic violence, adoption, artificial reproductive techniques, surrogate motherhood, liberty of conscience, criminal law, tax law and employment law, among other topics”.—[Official Report, 3/6/13; col. 947.]
Whether there are 8,000 or 800 amendments, that is the sort of change that we must expect as a result of the change in this law.
The major part of the debate that we have had here focused, perhaps unsurprisingly, on aspects of love and acceptance—and who, really, can deny the importance of that? The homosexual community is very small numerically but is none the less just as important and seeks society’s affirmation and social acceptability, which it claims would come from access to, and inclusion in, marriage as we know it. Civil partnerships already give legal equality, as we know; what is now being sought is social inclusivity. I, like many others in your Lordships’ House, was moved by the speeches of, for example, the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Belmont, Lord Smith of Finsbury, and Lord Black of Brentwood, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. Their ability to speak as they did, and that those views can be accepted in public, was refreshing and commendable.
I have been one of many who have helped in some small way to further the steady growth of full integration of homosexuals into society from a position of illegality, through a phase of tolerance, if you like, into full recognition and acceptability. I am also aware of the very large number of others in society who recognise the huge change that is being sought by this Bill. Balancing the understandable fears and wishes of the majority against the understandable demands of a small minority is a difficult task, but in their haste to force this Bill through Parliament the Government will not satisfy either group. The noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, spoke convincingly of the dangers of forcing legislation on to the statute book without wide consultation and carrying all shades of public opinion with it. I wholeheartedly agree and have cited the current situation in France as one example.
There seems to be, if not general agreement, certainly some agreement that the Bill is in a mess, ill thought through and without proper process or popular mandate. The noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, went so far as to say that the progress of the Bill has to date been tantamount to an abuse of process. He might well be right.
Some argue that it should pass Second Reading and be ameliorated in Committee. We all know that it is constitutionally proper to force a vote at Second Reading. There are precedents for doing so, the most recent being the Health and Social Care Bill only two years ago. We know that such a move was endorsed by the 2006 Joint Committee on Conventions and I recognise and endorse the usual approach in your Lordships’ House to taking care and time to examine a Bill in detail, but not on this occasion. The structure of the Bill is too bad for that and I am certainly not alone in that view. A battery of big guns in your Lordships’ House agreed with me that the Bill is so fatally flawed that it is incapable of sensible amendment and should be voted down now and sent back to the drawing board.
Yesterday, the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, the noble Lords, Lord Naseby, Lord Framlingham, Lord Tebbit, Lord Mawhinney, Lord Waddington, Lord Anderson of Swansea, and others—all parliamentarians widely experienced in both Houses—supported the move to vote the Bill down now. We have heard the same today from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, and—in his short intervention—the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean.
It might be a bold move—it probably is—but it is legitimate, it has a precedent and it is appropriate. Who is prepared to drive a steamroller over the address given by the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, himself at one time chairman of the Bar, who asked a series of questions about what the next factors are, whether we should dwell solely on emotion and avoid questions of law, and particularly the fact that Clause 1 of the Bill gives no room for negotiation or manoeuvre when it gets to Committee. All the might of government has been thrown at this Bill. Every corner has been cut, yet it is ill constructed and does not have the stamp of democratic legitimacy.
Perhaps I may close in posing a few fundamental questions? Are noble Lords sure that the process has been properly handled? Are they sure that the Bill has democratic legitimacy? Are they sure that all the likely consequences have been thought through—remember Argentina? Are they sure that we know everything about the legal effects of the Bill? Are they sure that there will be no later attempts to widen the definition of marriage further, and are they happy for another Government on another occasion to ram a different Bill through in this way? If not this Bill, when would noble Lords vote against a Bill at Second Reading? If some of the answers are in the negative, I suggest that we vote the Bill down now and do not waste further parliamentary time on it. I suggest that we send it back for proper, mature research, consultation and debate about the whole institution of marriage, taking into account, if you like, civil partnerships for both heterosexuals and homosexuals, because the issue is too important for all sections of society, gay or straight, to be introduced on a whim and handled in so cavalier a fashion.
How can we refuse a Second Reading? Rather, I ask noble Lords: how can we allow it to proceed? I ask your Lordships to agree my amendment and, in doing so, I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Dear Excerpts(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Dear
My Lords, I should like to thank the Minister for setting out the Government’s position on what is, by any stretch of the imagination, a contentious Bill.
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’, Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. Of course you don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’ But ‘glory’ doesn't mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’, Alice objected. When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less”.
I would suggest that if we substitute the word “marriage” for “glory” we get somewhere very close to the essence of today’s debate. As Humpty Dumpty might have said: “There’s a nice knock-down argument for you. Marriage means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less”.
If we move away from Lewis Carroll’s Alice and back through the looking glass, we find ourselves in a world where an ill considered Bill seeks to overturn centuries of tradition, heedless of public opinion and the views of religious leaders and blind to the laws of unintended consequences. It seeks to alter totally the concept of marriage as we have always known it, it seeks to divide a nation with an argument that hides behind the concept of equality when in reality it is about sameness, and it stands on its head all considerations of electoral mandate.
I am conscious that around 90 speakers await their turn to speak today and tomorrow so I will deal only very briefly with the essential elements of the arguments against the Bill but take, in turn, four things: the concept of the rule of the majority; the impact of the Bill on society; the flawed process that it has undergone so far; and, last but by no means least, the question of whether it is proper or appropriate to vote the Bill down at Second Reading.
First, I refer to the question of the extent to which a civilised society should accede to the wishes or the desires of a very small minority in its midst. In the debate on the humble Address on 9 May this year, an impassioned reference was made to the plight of homosexuals in Uganda and in other repressive regimes. This seemed to suggest that, if we were to defeat the Bill, this country could quickly regress to a state something approaching that in Uganda and elsewhere where homophobia is prevalent. Nothing could be more fanciful and nothing could be further from the truth. Like many other Members of your Lordships’ House, I have, for many years, championed the extension and the protection of minority rights, including homosexual rights and equality, and I have seen and applauded this country’s change of attitude towards homosexuality, from thinly veiled intolerance 50 years or so ago to a position of understanding and acceptance today.
With the introduction of civil partnerships, we have seen the legal rights of homosexual couples put on a par with those in a conventional marriage, with all the financial benefits available to both groupings. Indeed, those in a homosexual civil partnership are significantly better off in that respect than family members who live together without the benefits of such a partnership. Doubtless, we shall hear more of that as the debate progresses—more about the two sisters living together or the elderly parent and the unmarried daughter in the same household. All those are of course unable to enjoy the same financial benefits available to those in civil partnerships. In that respect, homosexual equality has outstripped equality for those in family relationships.
However, this part of the argument is much more about the lengths to which a society should go in order to embrace the demands from very small minorities. The utilitarian approach of Jeremy Bentham—the greatest good for the greatest number, where a simple majority carries the day—was challenged first by John Stuart Mill and then by other theological and jurisprudential writers in the 19th century. Very sensibly, it has been moderated over the years to a point where any society wishing to be thought of as civilised, tolerant and mature is judged by the degree to which it can accept minority views, even when those views fail to accord absolutely to the norms and views of the majority. However, there must come a point when, provided full equality for all under the law is guaranteed—this, I suggest, is perhaps the nub of this argument—the majority view should prevail, especially when the minority is tiny and the overwhelming majority is affronted. It is all a question of balance, wisely, and not least sensitively, applied.
The present danger of redefining marriage could well turn out to be counterproductive because tolerance can be overstretched. Look to contemporary France for an example. The similarities with this country are numerous. France has much the same population as our own, is still coming to terms with a revised role in the world, has an old and enduring national religion, has financial problems, and its leadership is questioned. Same-sex marriage has recently been forced through the French parliamentary process, with the result that mass demonstrations, and occasionally riots, have taken place in major cities in that country. Worse, the incidence of serious homophobic violence has markedly increased. I do not foresee violent street demonstrations in this country but I fear that the Bill, should it become law, could well create such opposition to homosexuals in general that the climate of tolerance and acceptance in this country that we have all championed, supported and seen flourish over the years could well be set back by decades—certainly for a long time.
Let me move on. In headline form only, let me pose a question or two. What is the impact of the proposed legislation on society? A change in the law would herald uncertainty in a number of areas, rather than certainty, and I will touch only briefly on those aspects now, confident that the other 90 or so speakers who follow me will explore some of these issues in much greater depth. Marriage between a man and a woman has been a part of life for centuries, predating nation, church and law. The lifelong commitment of a man and a woman is part of our history and culture. Evidence abroad, for example in Spain, shows that a redefinition of marriage actually undermines support for marriage in the wider society. There, marriage rates have plummeted. Noble Lords may advance their own theories as to why this has occurred in Spain and elsewhere but the facts are there for all to see and it is reasonable to conclude that redefining marriage is a contributory factor.
In the field of education very real fears exist that teachers who fail to endorse same-sex marriage could be dismissed. The Minister touched on this and other similar issues. Government reassurances that this will not be the case have been challenged as naive by leading counsel. Parents will not have a legal right to withdraw children from lessons that endorse same-sex marriage in the curriculum. The effect on schools will undoubtedly be divisive, and we should reflect on the fact that calls have already been made for children to act out gay weddings in class. I have to hand an opinion by leading counsel, prominent in employment law, who concludes that the Bill would create a duty to promote or endorse and not just to explain the new definition of marriage in sex education. Furthermore, he advises that schools could discipline teachers for failing to teach positively about same-sex marriage alongside opposite sex marriage.
Employment law is not likely to protect those who, as a matter of conscience, refuse to endorse the new law. Some noble Lords from the legal profession will want to expand their opinions on this at length. The fact that matters such as this are so strongly disputed, with leading counsel on both sides of the argument, must show that there is legitimate concern that cannot be shrugged off by mere rhetoric.
The well-being of children within marriage is a matter of very serious concern, certainly for those who accept the view that the best family grouping in which to grow up is a stable environment with two married parents, one of each sex. These and other major factors will be hotly debated today and tomorrow and they will highlight the sharp divisions that exist on almost every aspect of this Bill.
So if divisions exist—and they do—we should ask to what extent the Government have considered the totality of the problem. In a matter as fundamentally important and potentially so contentious as this, one could reasonably have expected any Government with pretentions at governing by consensus to have conducted deep and thoughtful research before drafting legislation. This Bill is hallmarked by the very lack of such an approach. A royal commission, or other similar learned group, might have been expected to call on the very best minds from the fields of theology, philosophy, sociology, jurisprudence and finance in order to take a long look at all the implications, to identify the pros and cons and to make mature recommendations. The Government did nothing of the sort. Instead, they seem to have relied on old, often partial, research and opinion that give only a fragmentary picture of the problem. There was no royal commission; no committee of inquiry; no mention of the Bill in any party manifesto prior to the last general election; no report from any parliamentary Select Committee. The Leader of the Conservative Party, questioned on Sky television only three days before the general election, declared that he had no plans for such a Bill. There was no Green Paper, no White Paper and no pre-legislative scrutiny. It was not included in the Queen’s Speech either last year or this year. However, after its introduction a few months ago, the results in the recent local elections were catastrophic. Around 450 seats were lost by the coalition parties, with all the analysis showing that the Bill was a significant factor in the swing of voters away from the main parties.
The Bill’s progress through the House of Commons was inauspicious. Back-Bench contributions at Second Reading were limited to only four minutes. The Government then delegated the Bill to a committee of 19 hand-picked MPs rather than to a Committee of the Whole House. Its membership was stacked 15 to four in favour of the Bill and not a single amendment was accepted by the Government. Committee debates were limited to only five days, in contrast to the Hunting Bill, when the Standing Committee lasted for 14 days.
The main parties announced a free vote, but there is a question mark over the freedom of that vote. In a letter signed by 15 MPs and circulated on 15 May, serious doubts were cast, citing,
“varying degrees of coercion, with threats made, for example, to an MP’s future political career or withdrawal of party support at future elections”.
Therefore, the apparent solid majority for the Bill in the other place must be considered, in part, at least, in that light.
The Government’s consultation exercise was about how to introduce the changes and not whether to do so. To put it bluntly, the results were rigged. The figures given by the Government indicated a total of 228,000 responses, with 53% said to be in agreement with the Bill and 46% against it—about even, tilting slightly towards approval for the Bill. However, that ignored two critical facts. First, the responses in favour were largely collected on the internet—anonymously, with no check as to whether the respondents were resident in the UK and no check on multiple entries from single respondents. Secondly, the Government accepted a signed petition collected by the Coalition for Marriage and arbitrarily counted it as one vote, deliberately ignoring the fact that it contained 509,000 verifiable signatures. That petition has now grown, I am told, to 660,000 signatures, although at the time of its closure there were, as I said, 509,000 verifiable signatures. Had that number of 509,000 been included, as it clearly should have been, it would have shown 83% of respondents against the Bill. That considerable public opposition is borne out by many reliable opinion polls. Some polls of course suggest the opposite but many have failed to make clear the existence of civil partnerships in posing the question to those being polled.
At this stage, I should say that since my name became linked in public with opposition to the Bill and I became something of a lightning conductor in public for all these issues, the number of communications I have received on the matter by e-mail and in my postbag falls just short of 1,000, of which 38—I counted them this morning—are in favour of the Bill and the remaining almost 1,000 are against it. I think that many noble Lords have had very similar results, if not in those numbers, then certainly in proportion.
Opposition from formal religious groups divides on the same lines. Quakers, Unitarians and Liberal Jews of course support the Bill but we should remember that together they represent less than 1% of the religious community. The largest bodies—the Church of England, Roman Catholics, Sikhs, Muslims and others—all adamantly oppose it.
Lastly, I turn to the vote at Second Reading. Understandably, some noble Lords have queried whether it is proper to challenge a Bill in this way at Second Reading in your Lordships’ House. I fully understand that question and I recognise and support the proud and long-standing tradition in this House to take particular care over every aspect of any Bill and to give it a full and fair examination before voting. However, that holds good only in normal circumstances, and the circumstances that we face today are abnormal. I am advised by the clerks that it is perfectly proper to vote on Second Reading. The 2006 Joint Committee on Conventions affirmed that the House of Lords retains the power to reject government Bills in free-vote situations. Votes against a Bill at Second Reading are unusual but they are not unknown. Examples that closely parallel these present circumstances are the War Crimes Bill and the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill, both of which occurred just over 10 years ago but both were free-vote issues without a mandate from a manifesto. The Health and Social Care Bill in October two years ago is the most recent and reliable example.
So if we can do it, and have done it, why oppose the Bill at this stage? Quite simply, I contend that the Bill is in a mess. It is ill thought-through, lacks support in the population as a whole and is likely to antagonise, or even inflame, public opinion. It has nothing to do with equality, which is already in place with civil partnerships, and it attempts to dignify an admittedly very small minority of partnerships with the description “marriage”—a term that has been understood differently for centuries.
If that were not enough, there is more. This House is asked to debate and examine a Bill that has not yet come anywhere near identifying all the consequences of change. The official government estimate of the numbers of amendments to existing legislation that would follow should the Bill become law is, in their words, at least 8,000 and they are still counting. It is no good telling me that there is provision in the Bill to take care of that, because the experience in Argentina, where similar legislation was passed in 2010, is chilling. In a paper provided by Dr Ursula Basset for the Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, she explains the changes now being debated in that country, which passed legislation similar to that which is on the table in front of us, in order to establish a redefined civil code. She said:
“It quickly became clear that legalising same-sex marriage required a revolution to our internal law. It impacted laws regulating public order, identity, gender, rules of kinship, filiation, marriage, names, marital property arrangements, divorce, alimony, parental rights, succession, domestic violence, adoption, artificial reproductive techniques, surrogate motherhood, liberty of conscience, criminal law, tax law and employment law, among other topics. All of these subjects would need to be attuned to the gender-neutral paradigm ... same sex marriage law in Argentina has turned the law upside down—no stone has remained unturned”.
That is what we face. Were we to consider the Bill in Committee, on Report and at Third Reading without at least some of that information at hand, it would frankly be like wandering into the dark blindfold. Hard on the heels of the procedure today at Second Reading, it looks as if we may be denied the chance of properly considering the Bill in Committee, since, to date, only two days have been allocated by the usual channels.
Even worse than that, we know that as the Bill left the House of Commons on the last day before the recess the Government announced their intention to conduct an immediate review of the whole issue of heterosexual civil partnerships. That is in Clause 14, which was introduced as a manuscript amendment. How can we be expected to consider turning the law of marriage on its head without taking full account of the implications of heterosexual civil partnerships as well? If we must consider changing marriage, let it be with all the facts at our disposal, all the consequences identified, all the financial implications worked out, all the social advantages and disadvantages known, and not blunder into a legal, theological, moral and sociological minefield.
I ask that this Bill should be defeated now, and not allowed to take up valuable parliamentary time in the later stages, when so many other pressing matters demand our attention. It should be defeated. The concept should be sent back to the drawing board because this is too serious and too important a matter to be introduced on a whim and handled in such cavalier fashion. The House of Lords is the final check, perhaps the only check, on the power of the Executive. It should use that power sparingly, but, on this occasion, use it positively. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I warmly welcome the Bill for the reasons stated by the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, in their admirable speeches opening the debate.
I much regret that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, should think it appropriate to seek to deny a Second Reading to a Bill which has received overwhelming support in the other place on a free vote. The noble Lord emphasised what he described as the majority view in the country at large. I have to tell him and others who share his views that the world out there has moved on and that for most people, particularly those under 60, the sexuality of their neighbours is neither a concern nor a threat, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said. It bemuses people that any element of unequal treatment should remain in our society simply by reference to people’s sexual orientation.
Many people outside the House listening to the debate or reading it in Hansard in due course will wonder why the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and his supporters, all of whom rightly value the institution of marriage, seek to deny the same happiness, fulfilment and status to other people simply by reference to their sexual orientation. I am a paid-up member of the married club and glad to be so. It is precisely because of the value of marriage that it should not be denied to same-sex couples. There is no question of the Bill being introduced on a whim, as the noble Lord suggested. It is being introduced on a fundamental question of principle to address a wrong that needs to be addressed.
I wish to comment on a theme which appears to drive the Bill’s opponents. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, referred to what he described as centuries of tradition and the concept of marriage as we have always known it, and the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, made similar points. This is to treat the law of marriage like the law of the Medes and the Persians which, according to the Book of Daniel, chapter 6, verse 8—the devil can quote scripture—“altereth not”. The reality is that the law of marriage in this country has altereth a lot. It has altereth a lot from time to time according to changes in social conditions and social attitudes. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made this point in her powerful contribution to the debate.
Prior to legislation in 1907, a man could not marry his deceased wife’s sister. Prior to 1921, a man could not marry his deceased brother’s widow. Other prohibited degrees were removed in 1931. All of this information is in the valuable Halsbury’s Laws of England edited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 allowed a transsexual to marry in his or her acquired sex even though, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, procreation is plainly not possible in such circumstances. The minimum age for marriage has been altered from time to time; the law related to the validity of non-Anglican marriages has developed over time; the law of divorce has been amended from time to time; other incidents of marriage have been the subject of change. Until case law in the 1990s when the first judgment in the modern era was given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, the law proceeded on the basis that a husband could not be criminally liable for raping his wife if he had sexual intercourse with her without her consent.
It is, therefore, simply unsustainable for critics of the Bill to suggest that there is anything unprincipled in Parliament amending the law of marriage in a fundamental manner to recognise social developments and to do it in accordance with basic principle.
I will make one other point if I may. I have provoked the noble Lord.
Lord Dear
As we are both Benchers of Gray’s Inn, the noble Lord would have to go a long way to provoke me. Before we go any further, may I ask the noble Lord if he has taken notice of the fact that at no stage in my address did I say that because the law and custom of marriage were well established we should continue in the same vein? The main thrust of my address was that sufficient research has not been carried out into the laws of unintended consequences. Could he address that?
Lord Pannick
I cannot address every point made by the noble Lord. If he fails, as I hope he does, to prevent the House from debating the detail and the arguments in Committee and on Report, I very much hope that the House will address every point made by him. I focused on his completely unsustainable suggestion that there are “centuries of tradition” and that the concept of marriage as we have always known it is being removed. I am quite happy to try to deal with every point if noble Lords want me to make a speech of 30 or 40 minutes but I will not trespass on the tolerance of the House to do so.
I do not accept that there are unintended consequences. I will deal finally with just one suggestion of an unintended consequence made by the noble Lord and other critics—that the Bill is going to force religious bodies to conduct same-sex marriages contrary to their religious principles. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, mentioned that we both gave oral evidence on this subject to the House of Commons Public Bill Committee. I explained my view that there was no realistic possibility whatever that any court, domestic or European, would compel a church or other religious body to conduct a same-sex marriage ceremony contrary to the doctrines of that religious faith. The reason is very simple: under this Bill, a same-sex couple will be able to enter into a civil marriage. Their only reason for wanting a religious ceremony would be to gain a religious benefit. All, and I mean all, case law confirms that courts will leave religious bodies to decide on the allocation of religious benefits. None of the other legal concerns raised by the opponents of the Bill seems to have any basis whatever.
I am confident that this House will give a Second Reading to the Bill tomorrow and I very much look forward to a reasoned debate in Committee on all questions of detail.