Renters’ Rights Bill

Lord Dobbs Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Rising (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 121 seeks to probe and address the inadequate definition of “pet” in the Bill, which has already been mentioned by a number of noble Lords during this debate. Part 1, Chapter 1, Clause 12(2) inserts the following definition into Section 45(1) of the Housing Act 1988:

“‘pet’ means an animal kept by a person mainly for … personal interest … companionship … ornamental purposes … or any combination”

of those. My Amendment 121 seeks to probe whether pets that are considered dangerous and/or wild animals under the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 or the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 should be counted as pets. This might sound like common sense, but I am not convinced that, under the current drafting of the Bill, landlords would not be forced to consider giving consent for unsuitable and, in this case, dangerous animals. These Acts already govern the keeping of dangerous animals, but it is good practice to ensure legal consistency, and it is not clear how they will interact with the Bill before us today.

For example, the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 requires accommodation to be

“suitable as regards construction, size, temperature, lighting, ventilation, drainage and cleanliness”.

If a landlord’s property happens to fit the definition in that legislation, does that mean that an animal included therein would be considered a pet by the definition of this Bill? As we will hear in the next group, damage insurance is problematical, as it is for standard pets. Will any insurance provider give cover for the damage that could be caused by a dangerous animal? If the fact that an animal is dangerous and wild, or falls outside the definition of a pet, can be a reasonable ground for refusal, would it not be simpler to make that explicit by reference to an existing definition and list already in legislation? Why should landlords be required to make independent assessments to justify their refusal?

The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is another example. It bans the keeping of specific breeds without an exemption certificate and creates offences for dogs that are out of control or that cause injury or death. Again, it is unclear how this existing legislation interacts with the Bill. If the owner of a banned breed has an exemption certificate, would a landlord be able to refuse the animal in their property? Likewise, if a dog had been deemed dangerously out of control or had injured someone, what risk would this pose to the landlord, their property agents and others who need access? What risk would be considered acceptable, if any?

I hope that the Minister can answer these questions and clarify this matter. If she needs to write to me on any of them, I would be very happy to receive her letter, but I would like to be reassured that this amendment and others we will debate today are being considered as they should be. I beg to move.

[Lord Dobbs (Con)]

My Lords, what is a pet? That is a central question to everything that we are discussing. Some noble Lords will remember that there once was a parrot—a Norwegian Blue, to be precise—that was very sick. In fact, he was so sick, he was a deceased parrot—at least, that is how his new owner perceived it—and no amount of nailing that dead polly’s feet to the perch could change that. How we miss Monty Python.

Perceptions, rather like recollections, may differ, yet this Bill’s definition of a pet depends almost entirely on perception, and I suspect it is likely to cause quite a few ruffled feathers. Therefore, I have put down two amendments—Amendment 131 and the consequential Amendment 132—to prod and probe a little.

First, as the Chief Whip instructed, I declare my interest as a pet owner. Percy is our rescue cat—a very happy puss that has trained my family exceptionally well. So well that, if ever I were to ask my family who they love more, me or Percy, I would soon be looking for lodgings.

As the Explanatory Notes set out:

“The Bill requires landlords not to unreasonably withhold consent”


for tenants to have pets. Despite the split infinitive, I would have thought that that was the right target area: legislation based on what is reasonable. But the Bill goes further and howls at the moon in trying to define a pet. It does this in a very peculiar manner, by defining a pet not by what it is, but by how it is perceived. It offers three definitions, as my noble friend has already pointed out. A pet is defined as an animal kept, first, for mainly personal interest, secondly, for companionship, and thirdly—it is this that my amendment mostly concerns—mainly for ornamental purposes. That is a definition we should consider getting rid of.

What is a pet kept for ornamental purposes? I will take a calf as an example. Currently, the beautiful pastures around my home in Wylye are filled with any number of calves. They are so cute and cuddly, and my grandchildren always want to take one home. But I think we can agree that a calf is not really a pet; it is a would-be cow. Except, it would seem to fall directly under the Bill’s definition of a pet: first, it is personally interesting to my grandchildren; secondly, it is companionable, particularly so long as one has a bottle of milk handy; and thirdly, it is ornamental. A triple whammy.

I remember Margaret Thatcher once cuddled a calf. I was with her in Suffolk on the election trail in 1979 when she picked up this terrified young animal and embraced it. Did the fact that she found it personally interesting or exceptionally ornamental—and, as it happened, amazingly photogenic—make it a protected pet? Could she have taken it home? Apparently, the Daily Mirror paid the farmer £50 to let it know if the poor thing died before polling day. Can you imagine the headlines? “Maggie Thatcher, calf basher”—but I digress. The problem is that once we try to define what a pet is or is not in the way the Bill attempts, we start with a cat’s cradle of confusion and end up with a dog’s dinner. People nowadays get very protective about their pets, and very litigious; we need to take care.

Traditionally, working animals and pets have been regarded as separate categories, but it is not always clear cut. Take Larry, the Downing Street cat: is he not a working animal that is supposed to keep the place free of vermin? Good luck with that. Ever since the Prime Minister’s claim at his party conference that his main mission in life was to free the sausages—Remember that? It was a magical moment—I suspect that Larry has been working even harder to try to track down all those missing sausages.

However, it is the third category that really has me wondering. Clause 12 defines a pet as an animal that is kept for “mainly … ornamental purposes”. Forgive me, but what on earth does that mean? I am confused. Does it mean, for instance, an XL bully dog? I am told that many owners regard them as extremely attractive. It must be the way they smile, or drool. But does that give a tenant an unequivocal right to keep them? I ask the Minister: does the landlord have no grounds to refuse—even if keeping such animals might well cause fear for others, such their neighbours who have children or who own a small dog or cat? As my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising so eloquently pointed out, one pet owner’s rights can become another pet owner’s nightmare.

I should perhaps whimsically point out that for, the purposes of the discussion, I have decided this week to self-identify as a Chihuahua. So, hand on heart and paw on prostate, I say: these definitions are barking mad. I really do not want to end up as breakfast for next door’s bully dog, no matter how cute he looks.

Would it not be enough simply to require both tenant and landlord to be reasonable in the specific circumstances? The Minister keeps coming back to the concept of people being reasonable. That is a much stronger concept, it seems to me, than tying ourselves in knots trying to define what a pet is in the ways that the Bill currently attempts.

Our laws should offer clarity, not confusion. But, no matter how hard we try to nail these definitions to the perch, they will make about as much sense as a dead parrot. So their proper place is not in the Bill but in that great parliamentary litter tray in the sky. I request the Minister to go back and have a much closer look at the definition of a pet.