South Africa: Money Laundering and Corruption

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, following on from the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, can the Minister tell us when there is going to be a verified register of beneficial ownership in the United Kingdom?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

A public register is already operational, and because of it we have already seen certain illicit flows of finance being tackled directly. The noble Lord shakes his head; I disagree with him. He will also know that the Government have prioritised this whole issue of tackling corruption and illicit finance. There are further proposals that will come forward, but public registers in themselves are not the only solution. It requires work across the piece, including tackling money laundering and having an effective sanctions policy. We are working on those proposals, as I told the noble Lord, Lord Collins.

European Council Decision: EUC Report

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Liddle]

Of course I accept what the noble Lord says, but the implication was that the euro would come tumbling down, and I think that the economic consequences for us, with our trade and economic links to Europe, would be very serious. Further, the instability that would be created by a German mark soaring and a Greek drachma plunging would be too horrendous to contemplate.

What I want to do in my brief remarks is to declare that I support what is being proposed, but with two qualifications. First, what we have seen tonight is an excellent example of parliamentary accountability. This motion has been put to the House and, before it is approved by the European Council, we have an opportunity to say whether we agree with it or not. If I may anticipate the debate tomorrow on the EU Bill, this is in sharp contrast to what will be proposed under the new arrangements. What we are going to have there is a requirement for the Government somehow to argue that, under the proposed criteria, a referendum would not be justified for this measure. I am totally opposed to multiple referenda and will be arguing that tomorrow, but on the basis that the Government are arguing, it seems extraordinary to suggest that what we have before us with the European stability mechanism is somehow not a big extension of competence and is not significant. It is extremely significant.

Indeed, I would argue that what is happening in the eurozone at the moment is as significant a development for the strengthening of its governance as we have had since the establishment of the single currency and the single market in the 1980s. It is a far more significant development than the Treaty of Lisbon or the constitutional treaty that preceded it. It is for European integration very significant.

One cannot argue that this is of no relevance to Britain. For one thing, the ESM will be one pillar of a new regime of economic governance that includes macroeconomic surveillance and a competiveness pact. I do not argue that these measures are perfect; in fact, they are far less than ideal and this should be very much work in progress. However, integration of economic governance is certainly proceeding.

The Government make the crucial error of thinking of this question in terms of a transfer of power to Brussels from the United Kingdom. They argue that, because Britain is not in the eurozone, there is no transfer of power. However, what in fact is going on within the whole of the European Union at the moment is a very big shift in the balance of power, with the likely creation of a eurozone bloc that has a much bigger influence on the economic policies of the whole of the EU. It is about this important change in the balance of power that we should really be concerned, instead of going on about transfers of power.

Perhaps I may cite one example that is directly related to the subject of the ESM: the issue of financial regulation. If we have a sovereign debt crisis in a eurozone member country and it is necessary for there to be a restructuring of the debt, it will logically lead to problems in the banks which own the bonds that have lost much of their face value. That will in turn require new rules on the capital adequacy of banks and on banking mergers. If there are to be in future stages restructurings of Greek and Irish sovereign debt, there will also be grave consequences for financial regulation and the banking system. We are exposing ourselves to real loss of influence on these matters, because it will be a eurozone bloc that decides in terms of its own interests what those regulations should be. We will turn up at the Council of Finance Ministers with that decision in practice having been taken, with majority voting there in the Council of Finance Ministers, and with very little opportunity for us to influence it. When one thinks that the City of London is one of our key interests, one realises that this is quite a serious threat to us.

Of course, the new regime is not ideal and it is work in progress—I dare say that my noble friend Lord Eatwell will say something about this. My strong view is that if something is not ideal we should use our maximum influence to try to change it. Obviously, there is no immediate prospect of us joining the euro and becoming part of the ESM, but we should try to involve ourselves intimately in the discussions that are taking place. I am worried that the Government, as far as I can see, are not doing that. Mrs Merkel, as I understand it, made an offer to the British Government whereby they could be part of the competitiveness pact that she was trying to negotiate. Apparently the British Government have said that they do not wish to be part of that pact, whereas Poland, which is equally not a member of the euro area, is anxious not to be excluded from these decisions on economic governance questions which go wider than the eurozone.

There is a significant problem here for the United Kingdom and the Government ought to recognise this. They should also recognise that something of fundamental importance to our economic future and, indeed, to our sovereignty is happening here.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, as noble Lords will be aware, this is the first time that a Motion of this sort has been debated in your Lordships’ House. We are, as the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, said, creating a precedent, although I am not entirely clear how long the precedent will last with respect to the discussion that we will have tomorrow. However, it clearly is important that we should define the criterion that we ought to apply to our assessment of the Motion.

The Government’s Explanatory Memorandum suggests that they have clearly applied the criterion of the “UK national interest”. In support of this Motion to give the green light to the establishment of the ESM, the memorandum states emphatically:

“We therefore support this draft proposal to amend the Treaty to make clear that the euro area Member States can establish a permanent ESM. The UK will directly benefit”—

directly benefit—

“from increased stability of the euro area brought about by the ESM, without being part of the new mechanism or having any obligations under it”.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, repeated at some length the idea that this is directly in Britain’s benefit. Indeed, so important is the ESM deemed to be to the UK that, as the Explanatory Memorandum tells us, and as the Minister confirmed, the Chancellor of the Exchequer eagerly proposed UK participation in the design of the mechanism—participation which has apparently taken place.

This repeated emphasis on the importance of the ESM to the UK and of UK participation in the design process sits rather uncomfortably with the other theme of the Explanatory Memorandum:

“The ESM established by the proposed treaty change will be set up by the euro area countries for euro area countries with no financial liability on the non-euro area Member States or the EU budget. There are therefore no direct financial implications associated with agreeing the draft decisions to amend the TFEU to establish the ESM”.

So on the one hand we have a direct benefit, but on the other hand there are no direct financial implications.

It is, of course, entirely possible to hold these seemingly contradictory positions at the same time. For example, the policies of the United States Government have a direct economic impact on the UK, and yet we have no responsibility for their financial implications. However, the key difference here is that we do have a direct responsibility—we have actually participated in the design of this mechanism. This Government have both a primary and a secondary responsibility for the mechanism agreed: primarily because we participated in its design; and secondarily because, as has frequently been acknowledged, the performance of the ESM is of direct national interest to the UK.

In his introduction the Minister told us nothing whatever about the ESM itself. It really is essential that, when he sums up, he remedy that failure and answer some of the pertinent questions about the impact of the ESM on the UK. He quoted my noble friend Lord Harrison, saying that we should support a stable and prosperous eurozone, which of course we should; but when my noble friend wrote that letter in February he could not have known what we know now. In the early hours of the morning of Saturday, 13 March, eurozone leaders reached agreement on the structure of the ESM, to be ratified by the European Council this week. The assessment of whether the agreement of 13 March is or is not in the best interests of the UK is the key issue and it should be based on one clear criterion: will it work? That is the fundamental question, which the Minister has not even bothered to address this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

Would the Minister explain why he is asking this House to agree to a Motion that he asserts is going to be in the best interests of the UK when he does not even know the mechanism that the Motion will create?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

For the obvious reason that, in order to go ahead with the design of the ESM, there has to be first this Motion and then the alteration of the treaty, which under our new provisions of the EU Bill will also be debated in this House. We have to start the process off. If the proposition is that we cannot start until we know everything and that we are not going to know everything until we start, the noble Lord is asking me to go around in circles. That is often the fate of those in government, but in this case I prefer to begin to proceed on a process. Of course, I cannot stand here and say that what is going to emerge for the ESM and members of the eurozone will all be wonderful and work perfectly and that the eurozone will be happy for ever. The noble Lord could not reasonably expect me to be able to say that. I have no idea, as there are major issues of a geopolitical, political and economic nature lying ahead for the organisation of a financial structure for the eurozone, and none of us can be dead certain how these things will turn out. What one can say is that this is a move in the direction of trying to stabilise the eurozone, which the Government believe is in the interests of the United Kingdom. The noble Lords, Lord Pearson of Rannoch and Lord Stoddart, took different views, but that is what we believe and that is the Government’s position.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, came back to the issue of loss of influence. We dealt with participation in the future design of the ESM. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, also took the view that we are somehow marginal. This is a very familiar theme. I always think that there is an element of defeatism in it. It implies that unless we go along with the mob, move with the crowd and are tucked into the system, we will somehow lose influence. Past experience over many years and future prospects in the totally new international landscape do not point in that direction. It portrays a yesterday view of how blocs such as the European Union or the Atlantic community, or superpowers such as America, operated in the 20th century. We are not in that century any more; we are not within that distribution of power. Different modalities apply and we are in a different paradigm. I shall argue that in much more detail when we come to the EU Bill tomorrow, in Committee and on Report. I have dealt with all the issues, although certainly not to the satisfaction of all.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I want the eurozone to succeed. That is why I was particularly concerned about the structure of the ESM, as agreed last weekend. I asked several rather technical questions about that. I am content if the noble Lord does not feel that it is appropriate to answer those questions this evening, but I wonder if he would undertake to write to me and answer them.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I will undertake to write if I can get hold of the propositions that the noble Lord is asking about. If he is asking me to describe exactly how the ESM will work, I cannot yet do so because it has not been designed. We are taking a step towards the point where design of the ESM can begin. The noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, would rather we did not take that step forward. However, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, who is extremely expert in this field, and his party want this to go ahead. We should take this first step. I know I will not be able to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, in describing the exact design of the ESM system because the mechanism is under construction.

The noble Lord also had some fun—it was rather enjoyable—by asking how we could hold two views that he believed to be contradictory. One is that the ESM would directly benefit the UK or, to put it negatively, that failure to go ahead with the ESM would greatly damage the UK. At the same time, we were not involved in it. The remark of, I think, an American philosopher passed through my mind: the mark of an intelligent mind is to be able to hold two contradictory thoughts at the same time. It may be that it is the mark of an intelligent Government to do the same. It is of course possible to argue, as I have this evening and I stand by it, that standing in the way of this next step is standing in the way of a step that may lead to better things and greater stability for the eurozone. We judge, contrary to the views of the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, that this is an improvement and is good for the British economy, British prosperity and the British people.

That is not the same as saying that we are involved in the powers, competencies and arrangements of the ESM. We are not. We have been in the EFSM and we were liable. We will cease to be liable in the future, once we can get this system in place. The first step is now required and it is one that the Prime Minister wishes to take, quite rightly, in the interests of this nation at the European Council meeting at the end of this week.

There will be, I repeat, a second opportunity to debate this treaty change during ratification, in line with the provisions of the EU Bill once it becomes law. Your Lordships will be addressing their minds to it at Second Reading tomorrow. Under the EU Bill, all treaty changes require primary legislation to be ratified, so this is not the end of the matter by any means. It is a start and it is a good start—the right start in the interests of this nation.

Queen's Speech

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, a few months ago, we all hoped that the financial crisis that engulfed the western world in 2008 and 2009 was at last fading into history. That hope was, sadly, misplaced. The past few weeks have witnessed growing economic turmoil in Europe, and Britain is suffering from that turmoil. It is in Britain’s fundamental economic interests that the difficulties in the eurozone are resolved. However, instead of expressing concern, the Government bask in self-satisfied complacency, crowing that because Britain has not adopted the euro the eurozone’s problems are not our problems. Nothing could be further from the truth, for three fundamental reasons.

First, the economic health of our economy is inextricably tied to the economic health of the rest of the European Union. It is obviously in our interest that those to whom we sell more than 60 per cent of our exports should be prosperous, providing a growing market for British goods. But perhaps of even greater importance is the financial stability of Europe. If the eurozone were to collapse, the resultant financial apocalypse would engulf us all. Europe’s financial stability should be a major goal of British foreign policy.

Secondly, it has become evident over the past few weeks that the economic institutions of the European Union in general and of the eurozone in particular require fundamental reform. Without major changes to the institutions of monetary and fiscal management, the persistent weaknesses of the past decade will persist, and we will all be buffeted by recurrent storms.

This need for reform is the third reason why we in Britain have such pressing concerns. The necessary reforms will require at the very least treaty revision and perhaps a new treaty to strengthen European institutions—a treaty that will require Britain’s active participation.

The shape of necessary reforms has been defined by the emerging difficulties of the past few months. The mismanagement of the Greek economy, exacerbated by the collapse of world trade and hence the collapse of shipping revenues, led to cumulative severe pressures on the bond sales necessary to fund the Greek government deficit. Since Greek government bonds are denominated in euros, investors faced no currency risk. However, they did face increasing fears of default.

The reaction in European capitals was to initiate a protracted, indecisive debate on raising the funds for a Greek “bail-out”. As vague pronouncements were piled on indecision, the fear of default increased, so that when the €40 billion bail-out was at last agreed, it proved inadequate as a defence against the rising tide of default pessimism.

The incompetent handling of the Greek crisis stands in stark contrast to the rapid and effective measures taken by the United States Government in the Mexican crisis of December 1994, which was very similar. In the latter case, investors in Mexican government tesobonos faced a complex mixture of currency risk and default risk. Yet the $50 billion package assembled by the Clinton Administration in a few days, predominantly in the form of guarantees, stemmed the run and rapidly restored confidence. As Alan Greenspan recounts in his autobiography:

“Mexico ended up using only a fraction of the credit. The minute confidence was restored, it paid the money back—the United States actually profited $500 million on the deal”.

If a credible eurozone institution had guaranteed Greek bonds at the outset, the immediate crisis would be over, at negligible cost. In the face of continued European paralysis, it took a telephone call from President Obama to avert disaster, if only temporarily. At last a €750 billion guarantee fund has been established, with the assistance of the IMF. However, delay has fed the flames of volatility and it is now not clear that even this sum will be enough. A more damaging sequence of events would be difficult to imagine, but worse is to come.

Having at last chosen to follow a sensible guarantee strategy, the eurozone Governments, led by Germany, plan to resuscitate the growth and stability pact—an Orwellian label if ever there were one for a pact that has delivered neither growth nor stability. The eurozone has been gripped, as has the coalition, by deficit hysteria, with all Governments being forced to commit to massive precipitate cuts in public expenditure. The path to recovery is to be paved with unemployment and bankruptcy. As the Financial Times leader argued yesterday,

“growth is a precondition for stability, not something to be traded off against it. Putting countries on the rack of debt deflation will not stabilise their economies, only destabilise their politics”.

To avoid these disasters for Britain, fundamental European reform is required. It therefore serves Britain ill that on his first visit to Berlin since assuming office, Mr Cameron chose to wave around his veto like a virility symbol. He said that,

“any treaty, even one that just applied to the euro area, needs unanimous agreement of all 27 EU states, including the UK, which of course has a veto”.

How proud and grand. I am sure that Mrs Merkel did not need to be reminded of the coalition’s customary negative approach.

Britain must make a positive and substantial contribution to the institutional and regulatory reform required in Europe. Our financial services industry depends on it. Pretending that it is nothing to do with us, obstructing progress and flaunting the veto will achieve nothing.