Wales: Devolution

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Thursday 19th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I start with an apology. I am desperately anxious to catch an early train that will get me back to mid-Wales by this evening. I have asked the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, for her permission and she has graciously granted it. I hope that the House will accept my apology. I, too, warmly congratulate the noble Baroness on having secured this debate.

It is essential not only that there should be a commission of this nature looking at the situation as it now exists and reporting in two parts—the second part, if I remember rightly, by the middle of 2013—but that the monitoring process should be a permanent process and not a temporary act. Devolution, after all, in my submission, is a progressive process and endeavour, and one should never regard it as something that is limited to a single act or collection of acts and frozen in time. I hope, therefore, that thought will be given to having some sort of monitoring body of this nature that will continue to monitor and survey the situation from time to time.

I take the point that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, about the sequence of the two parts of the report. Logically, it would have been much better the other way around: first, ascertain what powers the Welsh Assembly should have and, secondly, decide exactly how they should be paid for and who should be accountable in that regard. However, that is not the end of the world. I make the point, though, that whatever the report might say about powers, it will be wholly essential to look at the situation post-October 2014 when the Scots, in their referendum, will come to a decision about independence and possibly one or two other matters. Whatever the Scottish nation decides or does not decide will certainly having a knock-on effect and a substantial impact on Wales.

I turn to the question of powers. The first matter I will mention is of a cosmetic nature, which is that the Assembly should be referred to as a parliament, and should no longer be called “the Assembly”, because, with the referendum in March last year, the last vestiges of that sort of subsidiary body disappeared. We have a full, legislative, home rule parliament. Remembering Gertrude Stein’s line that,

“a rose is a rose is a rose”,

we should say that a parliament is a parliament is a parliament. It would be nonsense to call it anything else.

On the question of the totality of powers that have been devolved to Wales, as more than one contributor to this debate commented, the situation is completely impossible for those who practise the great vocation of the law. In Scotland or Northern Ireland, there is a complete block transfer of each subject heading, subject to some very specific and easily ascertainable exceptions. In the case of Wales, I do not know what the exact figure is, but I would guess that, by now, there are more than 700 different pieces of legislation that have to be traced, all of them like needles in haystacks. Although of course I accept that tracing them is a monumental task—I am sure that the Minister, who will be replying to this debate, will accept that—it is one that has to be tackled some day, by way of consolidation. In carrying it out one will discover various odd bits and pieces that one has assumed have been devolved but in fact have not been. It will at one and the same time be a very important and significant tidying-up exercise.

I turn for a moment to the question of finances. I believe that it is not merely one question, but, essentially, two. The first is, what powers should a Welsh parliament have over finances? The second, and perhaps even more important, question is, should it use all or any of them? It is my respectful submission that there is no earthly reason why those powers should not belong to the Welsh parliament immediately. When the debates about the establishment of the Assembly took place at the end of the 1990s, a great deal of evidence was tendered on the fiscal powers granted to some regional parliaments, and how, in western Europe, it was almost inevitably the rule that they were never used. Dozens of bodies, in fact, have those powers, but for one reason or another have decided not to use them. I am not an economist but I am a Cardiganshire man, and in Cardiganshire we are very careful about any decisions that concern money. I can well imagine that there are various pros and cons: there are possibilities and pitfalls. All I would wish would be that those powers should be in the hands of a Welsh parliament, and that we, the Welsh people, should determine whether we want to use all or any of them.

With regard to the Barnett formula, it is central to the whole situation. Whether the actual loss would be £300 million or £550 million, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has calculated—and I have every reason to believe that his calculation is a valid and proper one—there is no doubt but that a vast treasure of finances has been lost to Wales over the years. If there is an adjustment that would on the face of it justify a docking of the block grant to make up for it, I would argue very strongly that one should, at the same time, take into account what one would call the proper, restituted claim of Wales in this regard. Those who belong to the great vocation of the law will know that in civil law the adage is restitutio in integrum—restitution in full. That would mean that the money that Wales has had squeezed out of it in the past 13 or 14 years should be taken fully into account.

I turn now to opinion polls. We have had scripture quoted by the noble Lords, Lord Roberts of Conwy and Lord Roberts of Llandudno. I will add the advice from the psalmist:

“Put not your trust in princes”.

I am talking about the princes of the 21st century, the pollsters, who tell us exactly what we think, or should think or wish, in relation to everything on earth. Polls can change. There has been reference to the ill fated vote of 1979. I had the responsibility of being the president of the campaign for a yes vote. I remember that, some nine months before the vote itself, the two voices were almost equal. Then, of course, as far as the yes campaign was concerned, it went steadily downhill.

I very much welcome the Silk commission. It could be a path to a more wholesome and more complete Wales. Let us hope that it will not be a silk road—that institution of massive length in ages past.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord and I apologise for the fact that I missed the opening skirmishes of this debate. May I put a point to him which is utterly fundamental? The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, said that we would know national security when we came across it. To put a judge in that position would mean that we would give them a legislative function as opposed to an interpretative function? That should be avoided, should it not? I do not expect an immediate answer from the Minister, but could I leave him to mull over this thought? It may be that a different approach could settle the matter in this way. If there was a definition of national security—something of the order of dealing with a situation that jeopardises, or has the potential to jeopardise, a fundamental function of the state—might that be not unacceptable?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will certainly mull over that point. However, in coming up with any definition, we would want to be very careful that it did not exclude things that should be included or include things that perhaps should be excluded. We will look very carefully at what he has said. The intention is that the concept should be a narrow one that will come into play in a very small number of cases. However, the definition set out in the amendment would not cover everything that is damaging to national security. Factors that are damaging to national security can change in accordance with assessments about the threat to the country. That was reflected in the contributions we have had, not least from the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. If the definition is too narrow, we take the risk of legislation becoming unfit for the purpose for which it is intended. Sensitive intelligence and security material which security intelligence agencies hold and which is so vital to the discharge of their important statutory functions will have been acquired by them in a variety of ways and from a variety of different sources. Not all national security-sensitive material held by the security and intelligence agencies will by any means relate to, or be the result of, operations.

In view of this, we believe that the amendment is unduly limiting. For example, if information has been shared with United Kingdom agencies in confidence by foreign intelligence agencies, or has been disclosed to them in confidence by human sources, the amendment would not enable such information to be used within a CMP, however sensitive the provenance of the information and however confidential the relationship. There could also be a situation where the agencies have undertaken preliminary research and analysis before deciding whether there is a sufficient national security case to justify embarking on an intelligence operation. Information generated during the course of that preliminary work, whether or not an actual operation ensued, could well be highly sensitive in security terms and of significant relevance in a particular case. However, if the amendment was accepted, it would not be possible to use the information.

I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who said that there was a danger that the amendment was both too broad and too narrow at the same time. It could also go wider, in that not all matters—including operations by the military—would relate to national security. In fairness, my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts accepted that the terms of the amendment might not be ideal. It is perhaps illustrative of the fact that any attempt to make a definition can often be either too limiting or too broad. The Bill recognises that national security is very much an issue for the Secretary of State.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I fully understand the concerns that have been expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, however, for the reasons principally given by my noble friend Lord Faulks, I disagree with this proposal. It does scant justice to the judges who have shown great independence in the control order and TPIM cases that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned. I do not understand the substance of this proposed amendment to be a complaint made by the special advocates at all. My view is that the way in which judges are trained and apply themselves to their cases does not require an elaborate amendment of this kind.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, the motivations behind this amendment are, I have no doubt, noble, honourable and sensitive. I greatly respect, therefore, the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I respectfully tend to agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, that it may well be that there is a case for having what is almost a jury situation. In such a situation—again, bearing in mind that juries very seldom operate in civil cases—we would not normally have a jury in any event, but the real problem is, I think, a much deeper one.

Imagine a judge having to determine the fundamental issue of whether this matter is to be dealt with by way of a secret hearing. Does he look at the prose of the application by the Secretary of State or the affidavits? Does he look into the eyes of learned counsel to see whether there is a burning sincerity in the face of the counsel for the claimant or whether there are doubts genuinely registered in the face of the counsel for the defendant? Is the judge not placed in a situation that is virtually impossible?

To a large extent the question of a special advocate under Clause 5 and, I would say, to a limited extent the appointment of a special counsel under Clause 8, will deal with part of that. There will be a totally independent advocate, but an advocate, however brilliant, forensically skilled and eloquent, can be only as effective as the ammunition that he has at his disposal, which is the correctitude of certain facts that are relied on by a party. If that estimate, however genuine, is wrong, then the decision of the learned judge must be utterly fallacious. How do you deal with that situation? I harken back to debates that we had some years ago in relation to a criminal situation and PII. It seems to me that there is a very strong and unanswerable case for a special investigator operating under the special advocate. It does not seem from my reading of Clause 8 that there is any power for the special advocate to appoint such a person. However, the fairness of the situation will depend entirely on the assiduity with which some other person or body would be able to examine these sensitive facts. That person must be someone in whom the community has total confidence in terms of confidentiality and secrecy but also their competence to bring to the attention of the court that vital element of the correctitude or otherwise of those facts.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, in later amendments, we will be considering ways of making what at the moment is an unfair procedure fair, or less unfair. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the procedure as it stands is not fair and also that it does not become any more fair by adding assessors or advisors to help the judge who has to decide whether to grant a declaration under Clause 6(1).

My experience of assessors or others—whether in an employment tribunal or in a county court for example—in dealing with discrimination cases, which are difficult and often involve weighing proportionality issues, has been an unhappy one. Along with others who have spoken, I have huge admiration for, and confidence in, the ability of our senior judiciary and agree with the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile of Berriew, that our judges have displayed a very good ability to weigh competing interests in difficult cases.

It will be important to look later at ways of making the procedure fairer, but with all respect to county court judges, whether serving or retired, and to retired judges of the senior courts, I simply do not think that having more of them is going to make it easier. This is not a question of deciding facts, like a jury; it is a question of striking a balance between competing interests. That seems something that our senior judiciary are well able to do without being bolstered by any outside support.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Dubs, who has served with great distinction on the Joint Committee on Human Rights and of course has a long record of interest in matters of justice generally. However, I indicated to him during a conversation beforehand that I was not persuaded by his argument. I was persuaded, albeit temporarily, by the arguments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, but in the end I share the views of other noble Lords who have indicated that this is perhaps an overelaborate and unnecessary addition to the framework that would otherwise exist. One point that struck me is that it is a little invidious for a serving High Court judge to sit with current or retired county court judges. I do not mean any disrespect to county court judges, but am not sure—

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

There are no county court judges. There have not been any since the Courts Act 1971. They are now circuit judges.

[Lord Beecham]

It is a while since I appeared before any judge whether county court or circuit. I meant the equivalent position. The noble Lord is clearly aiming at that tier in the judicial system and it strikes me as a little excessive. Equally, the provision for majority verdicts and so on would be somewhat invidious. Regretfully, I cannot support my noble friend’s amendment and I dare say that the noble and learned Lord will join the majority of those who have spoken in saying that the amendment would not be acceptable.

Wales: National Assembly Elections

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for allowing me to intervene. Am I right in thinking that the five-year term does not mean a period of exactly five years, because the date for the election can be brought forward or delayed by 28 days on either side of the date? In other words, although it is inevitable that if nothing is done, the next Welsh election will take place at about the same time as the general election, it need not take place on the same day. I apologise if I am wrong about this, but I do not think I am.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am trying desperately to think back to the debates that we had. I think I am right—and I am sure that by the end of this debate I will be corrected if I am not—that the Bill was amended in its passage through your Lordships’ House. It removed the earlier provision but maintained the possibility for a later provision. I think it is also the case that the Assembly has some power under the relevant legislation to vary the date. I have no doubt that the former Presiding Officer will be able to correct me if I have got it wrong, but I think I am right that the Assembly itself has some leeway.

The Government are seeking views on whether this temporary move to a five-year fixed term should be made permanent. Moving the Assembly to permanent five-year terms would mean it is less likely—although not guaranteed, as we have been discussing—that parliamentary and Assembly elections would be held on the same day in future, so there would be less chance of a parliamentary election overshadowing an Assembly election and of voters being confused by voting in two elections, using two different electoral systems, on the same day. To clarify the point I made a moment ago, it is in fact the Secretary of State who can vary the date of an Assembly poll by one month—but I think that even with one month there would still be the possibility of overshadowing.

However, combining elections can be beneficial by reducing costs—that is the other side of the coin. Holding the 2011 Assembly elections and the referendum on the alternative vote electoral system on the same day is estimated to have saved around £1 million in Wales. Holding elections on the same day may also help to increase turnout. The Government do not have a fixed view on whether the Assembly should have a four- or five-year term, but we believe that the potential impact on the elector is the most important thing to consider in deciding the length of the term.

As I have indicated, the Green Paper also seeks views on two further electoral issues in Wales. Since the 2007 Assembly elections, it has been prohibited for a candidate at an Assembly election to stand for both a constituency and a regional seat. This impacts disproportionately on smaller parties, whose candidates must choose whether to risk everything by standing as a constituency candidate when they could potentially be elected via the regional list instead. Conversely, it also affects parties who have done better than expected in a constituency election. In time, it is possible that high-quality candidates could be lost to the Assembly through this ban. The Government do not think that this situation is satisfactory, and believe the ban on dual candidacy should be removed.

The Green Paper also considers the issue of “double-jobbing”. The Government note concerns that have been raised over whether elected representatives who sit in more than one elected legislature at a time are able adequately to represent both sets of constituents. Double-jobbing is already prohibited in the European Parliament, as well as countries such as Canada and Australia, and the Government are seeking views on whether Assembly Members should be prevented from standing as Members of the Westminster Parliament simultaneously.

This Green Paper has not come out of the blue. It provides a structure to the debate that has been ongoing for more than a year about the make-up of the Assembly in light of the reforms that the Government have put in place nationally. It seeks to bring this debate out into the open. The consultation runs until 13 August and we are seeking the views of everyone—not least your Lordships—with an interest in the electoral arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales. I hope that this debate will help to explain and put forward ideas and views on these issues. Therefore, in encouraging noble Lords to make their views known, I beg to move.

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[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, perhaps I may say two fairly generous things to start with. The first is how much I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Ely, whom I congratulate on her Front-Bench status. This is the first time that I have had the opportunity of listening to her, and it is clear that she speaks with great authority and immense lucidity. The other not ungenerous thing that I should like to say is that I am delighted that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, is leading for the Opposition.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

He’s the Government!

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

The coalition Government. Old habits die hard. I remember when I was a student, a very long time ago, reading something to the effect that the surname Wallace derives from “Wallish”. Wallish, in Scots Gaelic, meant “Welsh”—so it may well be that some millennium and a half ago we had common ancestors.

Having spoken, I hope not ungenerously, on those two matters, perhaps I may say that the Green Paper has come about because of a massive blunder by Her Majesty’s Government 18 months ago. I refer to the fact that a decision was made without any empirical evidence or research to the effect that the number of Members in the House of Commons should be reduced from 650 to 600—a perfectly arbitrary judgment. It may very well be that there were elements of self-interest in that decision, but I am prepared to accept that that was probably not the case.

It was a slavish pandering to vulgar populism. It you were to put this to an audience in the front bar of most public houses in the United Kingdom, many people would say, “Yes, certainly. Do away with half the so and sos”. It was that motivation that brought about one of the most massive errors of judgment in relation to parliamentary democracy of the past 100 years. The effect was that ancient constituencies—representing very old communities that had been hammered out on the anvil of time—disappeared. Natural boundaries—rivers, mountains, bridges, old county boundaries—melted away. All this was done, according to the Government, to bring greater fairness, greater cohesion and greater certitude. I do not believe that one could have been more destructive of those elements if one had really tried.

Tacitus speaks of generals who laid waste huge areas of land, saying that where they create a desert they call it peace. Here, the Government create chaos and they call it electoral reform. That is what has brought this Green Paper into existence and the necessity of making judgments in relation to these matters.

The Government speak as if they are now stepping in nobly to deal with some sort of crisis created by some utterly external and independent agency—something that has come about without any responsibility on the part of the Government. I remember a report of a case in the assizes about 100 years ago. A person had been found guilty of murdering his mother and father. The allocutor asked him, “Have you anything to say on why judgment according to law should not be passed upon you?”. He said, “My Lord, I throw myself on the mercy of the court. I am an orphan now”. The crisis is entirely of the Government’s own making.

I do not apologise for my short preamble, but I now turn to the Green Paper. I will confine myself to whether there should be 30 or 40 constituencies for the purposes of election to the Welsh Assembly. I agree with my noble friend Lord Wigley and others that there is an overwhelming case for concentrating on 30. It comes about for all the wrong reasons, but I believe it is a fait accompli that one should accept. All the alternatives would be infinitely worse. There would be a lack of cohesion, nightmarish conflicts, unnecessary cost and hassle. One should build on the 30 in any event, but one should go much further than that. The real issue today is not the number of constituencies or any of the other questions raised by the Green Paper; it is the question that is dismissed in one sentence in paragraph 1.1, where the Government state that the number of Members of the Welsh Assembly should remain at 60. That is a massive and utterly existential question.

I believe in my very bones that 60 was a ludicrously small number to begin with and made it impossible for the Assembly to have any real future or viability and promise. That was the situation when the Assembly was created and it is now infinitely more acute since the referendum in March of last year. What we have now, whether or not we call it an Assembly, is a Parliament—a legislature with responsibility for substantial areas of primary legislation. If that Assembly is to be shackled and emasculated to the degree of having only 60 Members, we will deny it the real prospect of life and growth. It does not give me any pleasure to make that point because people in many parties have been saying all along, “For goodness’ sake, don’t talk about adding to the number of Members in the Assembly”. It is about the most unpopular subject that you could raise. To some extent all of us, including Assembly Members, are guilty of that mentality, but leadership must be conducted in an honest and statesmanlike way.

I do not know exactly how many of the 60 will be left to deal with scrutiny, something which has come about in the Assembly for the first time so far as primary legislation is concerned. Unless the Assembly can scrutinise in a detailed, honest and comprehensive way, it might as well not be there. This House and the other place have exercised that privilege and responsibility for centuries, and they earned it the hard way. But at all times they have had an adequate number of people to allow them to do it. By my rough calculation, having taken into account the Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Chairmen of Committees and one or two other functionaries who would be exempt from the exercise of scrutiny, only around 30 Members would be left. Indeed, from what I have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, who I think will deal with the exact numbers, that is a gross underestimate. What noble Lords hear from me is advocacy, but what they will hear from him is testimony.

The situation is this. If we want the Assembly to be a real legislature, it has to move away from the shackle of 60 Members. The Richard commission said eight years ago, before the referendum last year, that 60 Members were too few. Noble Lords will remember that the noble Lord, Lord Richard, recommended 80. In my view, 90 would be a perfectly reasonable and adequate figure, and of course it has the blessing of being able to be divided by three. I suggest that 60 should be elected by first past the post, but I would not go to the stake if it were the other way around, with 30 elected by first past the post and 60 under the additional member system. I think it would be wrong, but rather than see the Assembly emasculated and turned into a little puppet government, I would prefer to see that.

On that basis, therefore, I appeal to the speakers in this debate and to all who are concerned about politics in Wales to see to it that that reform is brought about. The Government have made a great error and committed a massive blunder, but the situation is not irredeemable. They can use that blunder to bring about an utterly necessary reform—that of increasing the number to a viable level of 90 or thereabouts. We have been told that Scotland has 129 Members, which is one Member for each 39,000 of its population. Northern Ireland has 108 Members, one for each 15,700 of its population. Wales has 60 Members, which is one for every 48,000 of its population. I hope that those who cry for equality, equity and justice will accept the case.

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[Lord Roberts of Conwy]

Yes, of course there is a case to be made along those lines. At the same time, I urge the noble Lord to consider the low turnout at Assembly elections. The fact that there is a higher turnout for parliamentary elections could be combined and taken advantage of in order to secure more consideration by the individual elector when he gets to the ballot box of what else there is for him to choose. In practical terms, it may well be that United Kingdom politics would get more attention than local Assembly politics. However, I am not so sure that electors might not have a different view in each case. The fact is that they would be attracted to vote, which is what concerns me, and would make their decisions in the privacy of the voting booth.

I will return to my first principle: that we should endeavour to bring the National Assembly and Parliament closer together. Both institutions are, after all, part of the same democratic state, and one derives its power from the other. I said in the debate on the Queen’s Speech that there had been a strong tendency for the institutions to drift apart. Some would say that that divide has been deliberately promoted and a wedge driven, largely from the National Assembly side, but I would say that wouldn’t I? If so, it has not been particularly beneficial to Parliament, the Assembly or Welsh electors—quite the opposite.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

Would the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, not agree that it may be that a wedge was driven from the other side too? The Prime Minister said, in the first instance, that there would be no question of carrying through proposals for retracing the boundaries of the Welsh Assembly without the agreement—that was the word—of the Welsh Assembly. That was an undertaking given to Mr Carwyn Jones. He said later that it would be done after consultation—a very different matter and a far more colonial prospect.

[Lord Roberts of Conwy]

The Opposition, as always, put forward their own independent case and I would have to consider what the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, has just said. The main drive towards separation has come from the National Assembly. I do not think it has been particularly beneficial to Parliament, the Assembly or Welsh electors. The Assembly has gained more powers following a positive referendum—provided, after all, by central government and on a low turnout with little or no opposition to speak of. Most of us now recognise that, whatever our earlier views, the Assembly is here to stay and our duty is to make the best of it.

There is much more to be gained by collaboration between the National Assembly and this Parliament than from the mock tug of war for more powers than has been the feature of the past. The willing establishment by the Secretary of State of the Silk commission, its membership and remit proves that there is a new, pro-devolutionary spirit abroad and the National Assembly should welcome it. It could begin to reciprocate by improving its communication with this place. I give just one example: last month, the Assembly Government published their first annual report for the Assembly term 2011-16 with a foreword by the First Minister. I obtained a 19-page summary of the report entitled Programme for Government. I was not able to get the full 600-page document: it was not available to us here in the Library or the Printed Paper Office, although I am glad to say that it is available today thanks to the indefatigable industry of Mr Quin at the Printed Paper Office. When I have finished perusing this somewhat substantial document, I shall make sure that it is in the Library for other Members.

Even the summary refers to a number of White Papers, draft measures and strategy documents. They were not available either and I doubt whether they are available now. They may be on the web but they should be as available—and in the same form—as the Green Paper we are discussing now. The least we should have is a list of Assembly publications and their whereabouts.

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[Baroness Gale]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his opening remarks and I thank all those who have spoken. We have had a good typical Welsh debate, and a welcome contribution from my noble friend from Scotland, for which I thank him very much. The speeches set out the often different views of the political parties in Wales, and those of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan. I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, mentioned the remarks of Peter Hain, who said that there could be confusion about the different boundaries. He said that in relation to having elections on the same day, rather than about the confusion of having permanently different boundaries for Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, praised my noble friend Lady Morgan of Ely for being on the Front Bench. However, I think he elevated her a little too soon. I have absolutely no doubt that one day she will be on our Front Bench. I asked her if she would like to sit with me to keep me company. Obviously, her great speech made one think that she was on the Front Bench.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

I do not want to elevate myself too high, but sometimes I have the eye of the prophet.

[Baroness Gale]

I can agree with that. I thank my noble friend for her great speech in which she mentioned that the Green Paper expressed hope that there would be no advantage to any party. The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, mentioned the voting figures and how things were working out, and raised the issue of party-political advantage. I welcome the Secretary of State saying that there should be no advantage to any political party. However, when one looks at the voting figures and the regional list results that my noble friend Lord Touhig mentioned, one sees that on an all-Wales basis Labour got 36.9% of the vote—the highest percentage—and two seats. The Liberal Democrats got 8% of the vote and four seats.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble Lord is my kinsman.

A number of noble Lords raised questions about the voting system and the size of the Assembly, so I should perhaps say at the outset what this consultation paper does not try to do. It was never the intention that it should open up these far more fundamental issues. It was clear from the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that there is no consensus on the size of the Assembly. Although this is not an issue for this consultation paper, the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, on the need for scrutiny, and the presidency—or vice-presidency—of the organisation to promote an Assembly of 80 Members elected by STV, to which my noble friend Lord German has recently been appointed, lead me to suspect that it will not go away.

When the Silk commission moves on to Part 2 there will be an opportunity for representations to be made, not on the voting system but on where the responsibility for that may lie. I may want to come back to this issue. It would have been wrong, in this consultation, to have gone into the much wider issues of the size of the Assembly or the voting system. It is intended to address mechanisms because of a situation that has arisen as a result of the two pieces of UK legislation to which I referred.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I was seeking to make the point that there is an inexorable nexus between the issue of a possible 90-Member Assembly and the question of the need for a minimum number of persons available to scrutinise legislation. I was unwilling to nail my argument to any particular number. My understanding is—and my noble friend Lord Elis-Thomas may be able to confirm it—that on one count the number of persons available to scrutinise would possibly be as low as 18. If that is true, one is talking not about the efficiency of an Assembly but about the very existence of an Assembly.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble Lord raises an important point about scrutiny, which was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, when he spoke about unicameral situations. However, that goes far wider than what we seek to do in this Green Paper. That does not mean to say that the debate will not continue. The matter must be addressed in the Green Paper as a consequence of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. There may have been a slight misunderstanding by my noble friend Lord German. Both the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006 stated that individual constituencies for the National Assembly of Wales would be the same as Westminster constituencies. That link was broken under Section 13 of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act, so the status quo would be to have the existing 40 Welsh Assembly constituencies plus the 20 regional seats and, as is widely anticipated, the 30 Westminster seats.

We are bringing forward this Green Paper because two choices must be addressed. The status quo is not an option because, under the present arrangements with 40 Members, the constituency of Arfon—which I think the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, represented in the previous Assembly—has an electorate of some 40,000, and Cardiff South and Penarth has an electorate of between 76,000 and 78,000. That is a disparity within Wales and therefore a boundary commission would look at the size of the constituencies even if the number remained at 40. One way or t’other, we are either going to have a boundary commission to look at the 40 constituencies or move to the 30:30 system, as indicated in the Green Paper. It is in that context that we must look at these proposals. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, that this is why it needs to be done and why we are consulting on it now.

Devolution: Wales

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Tuesday 28th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not in a position to agree with that, not having read that particular report. Clearly the economy of Wales is a matter in which your Lordships’ House has a legitimate interest, concerning, as it does, both devolved and non-devolved matters. I understand that on St David’s Day later this week the House of Commons will be debating Welsh affairs generally, and I strongly expect the economy to dominate and not least the Welsh Development Agency and the point made by my noble friend.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

Does the noble and learned Lord accept that, although as a constitutional precept this Westminster Parliament can, even in relation to any matter delegated to any one of the constituent parliaments, still legislate as it would wish in relation to any devolved area, in relation to Scotland some 14 years ago a convention was kindly agreed to the effect that this House would not dream of doing that unless so specifically requested by the Scottish Parliament? Particularly now in the context of the added powers enjoyed by Wales since the referendum, will such a convention be considered by Her Majesty’s Government in relation to Wales?

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Turner of Camden]

My Lords, I support the case that has been made so well by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and my noble friend Lady Whitaker. It is well known that the Gypsy and Traveller communities are among the most vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in England and Wales in terms of health, education and discrimination. It is almost universally accepted that these disadvantages and problems would be addressed if there was adequate site provision. Of course, that does not really happen, because it looks to me as though local authorities fail to follow government guidance on encampments, to take into account human rights considerations and to follow a proper and reasonable process in relation to sites for Travellers. If Gypsies and Travellers get involved in county court and High Court planning cases without the assistance of legal aid, they will eventually end up homeless. That is surely to be avoided and a distinct worsening of the situation. It is something that we should not be prepared to countenance. I therefore hope that the Government will give due consideration to the excellent case which has been made by my noble friends with a view to accepting it. These people deserve our support and consideration.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I find myself in total agreement with everything that has been said so far by all noble Lords who have spoken to this amendment. The arguments have been put fully, lucidly and with great force, and certainly do not need me to underline them. However, I would say two things. Many years ago, I felt that there was an equitable balance between the interests of Travellers and those of the community at large, a balance which had been brought about by the legislation for which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, fought so valiantly over the years. It was necessary under that legislation for local authorities to provide certain basic facilities for Travellers. That balance was maintained by a flagship judgment by the late Mr Justice Peter Pain, a most humane and pioneering judge, who said to a county council in Wales: “You are seeking injunction to remove these Travellers from a lay-by whose freehold is vested in your good selves. On the other hand, you have, I think in a cavalier way, done nothing at all to implement the obligations which were placed upon you to provide for Travellers. An injunction is an equitable remedy. I exercise my judicial discretion not to grant it until I am convinced that you, too, will carry out your statutory obligation”. Unfortunately, the law has now been changed and that balance no longer remains, which makes this group of amendments all the more relevant.

The other thing that I would say, as one who exercised a family jurisdiction for some years, is how obvious it was to me that insecurity ate like acid into the lives of children of Traveller families, particularly in the context of education.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I support the amendments. I was a member of the National Equality Panel, and one of the most shocking of our findings was the degree of educational disadvantage among Gypsy and Traveller communities. Reading the very helpful briefing that we have had from Community Law Partnership reminded me of the importance of this. A number of noble Lords have made the point about educational disadvantage and children’s need for education and security. Of course, access to justice is that much more important for a community which suffers high levels of illiteracy and educational disadvantage. As Community Law Partnership points out, we are talking about some very complex areas of law. I therefore hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on the amendments, which would protect one of the most vulnerable minority-ethnic groups in this country.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Wednesday 14th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

I cannot understand why the Government could not have done the simple thing for this House, and for the integrity of our constitution, and simply said yes to this amendment. What on earth would the Government have lost by saying yes? They would have had the five-year Parliament that they, for whatever motives—we will not go into those—want for this Parliament. If there is a Conservative or a Liberal Democrat Government or a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government elected in five years’ time, they could ensure that this legislation remained on the statute book and that there was another five-year Parliament after that. It would have cost the Government nothing. The Government would have lost nothing and they would at least have shown that they were listening to some of the advice from this House.

I am not thrilled by this amendment, although I thought it was very ably moved, because I just do not like five-year Parliaments, and I do not like acknowledging that the Government, with a relatively flaky coalition, should be able to legislate for themselves to survive for five years in this way. But the reason I very much hope that the House sticks to its position, requiring any future Government or Parliament to look again at this issue, is that I am convinced that, should this Bill go without any amendment now and become an Act, we will have five-year Parliaments ad infinitum and no future Government will repeal this legislation. This gives the lie to the oft-repeated argument that somehow or other this is a Government giving something away. Why on earth would any future Government want to give up the security of a five-year term of office? Of course they would not; it is very convenient to Governments; it is very convenient to the Executive. This is the last chance. I hope that my own party will win the election, and I hope that it will have in its manifesto the decision to repeal this legislation, but I rather fear that it would be as attracted to the idea of remaining in office for five years as this Government. This is the safety net—that it requires Governments to make that decision.

I make an appeal to the Minister. It really is worth listening to what this House has to say on constitutional issues. We are just seeing the first fruits—I should say the second fruits—of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act, which was so strongly opposed in this House. It was strongly opposed on the ground of the unnecessary nature of a referendum on the alternative vote system, which, incidentally, I have just discovered in a reply from the noble Lord, Lord McNally, cost us £97 million in total, at a time when we are supposed not to have two pennies to rub together. I was very pleased with the result, but it was not worth £97 million for a few of us in this House and a few million people in the country to be pleased. We told the Government that it was a waste of time and a waste of money—we were right. We also said that reducing the number of MPs by 50 would not bring an advantage to our democracy and that it would be deeply destabilising. I would love the Minister to give me his assessment of what he thinks Members of the House of Commons would have to say now on a free vote in a secret ballot. Would they think that a Bill that has destabilised every constituency in Britain was a terrific one? If I were to write the Government a little resumé or memoir, which I will not, of the activities in which some of us have indulged in the past 12 months or so, I would have to call it “I Told You So” or “It’s Boring Being Right” or something along those lines. On constitutional matters—let me put it modestly—we are at least worth listening to. I do wish that the Government would listen to us on this one.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, very wisely did not mention among his justifications for five-year fixed Parliaments, or Parliaments of any fixed period, that they enable Governments sensibly to introduce legislative programmes over their period of office. I would like to challenge him to state that the Government are on course for doing that. Here we have five years, which is a year longer than any Government normally have for certain, and a two-year Session, but I would not say—again, I shall put it as kindly as I can—that we see a Rolls-Royce legislative planned operation going through. So I ask him not to use that as a defence of security of tenure and security of planning. But, above all, I ask the Minister, not with great hope or expectation, to acknowledge that we were not completely unworthy of being listened to over previous constitutional legislation and, even at this late date, not to commit the country to five-year fixed-term Parliaments ad infinitum as this legislation assuredly will—because that is precisely what any Government would want.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I wish simply to make one point which I consider, very humbly, to be a pertinent matter and one which constitutes a backcloth to the issue before the House. The point was tangentially mentioned in earlier debates that this was not a matter which could be made the subject of the operation of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, but no one has argued in full as to its constitutional significance.

That Parliament saw fit in 1911 to make that so, and decided not to change the situation in 1949, is highly relevant to this issue. I would go so far as to suggest that it changes the whole balance of the relationship between the two Houses. I of course agree absolutely with what the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, said about the general primacy of the House of Commons as the elected Chamber over this place. My submission is that, in relation to this matter, all such conventions and all such inhibitions are totally removed. Section 1 of the Parliament Act 1911 excludes two matters from its operation. The first was money Bills, which of course did not come into it in the first instance, and the second was a Bill which prolonged to any degree the maximum life of Parliament. Clause 1(5) of this Bill does exactly that. It enables the Prime Minister of the day either to reduce the period of five years by up to two months or to add to it by two months. It does not matter, therefore, whether it is two months, two years or 20 years; a wall has been breached, a wall created by the House of Commons in protection of its own position and the position of democratic government altogether. It made this House the sentinel of that boundary. In other words, when we disagree with regard to this matter, it is utterly exceptional as compared with any other disagreement. We are far from challenging the authority of the House of Commons; we are abiding by it and making it real and entrusted.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

My Lords, several noble Lords this evening have referred—somewhat kindly, I must say—to the report of the Constitution Committee, which I have the privilege to chair, on the process of constitutional change. The Minister was kind enough to refer to it in his opening remarks. I look forward to the Government’s formal response to the report. It will enable the House to have a proper debate on the report, to which I equally look forward.

I suspect that the committee will be very surprised, as am I in immediate response to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, to hear the content of the exchanges during the Summer Recess between the Government and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in support of his original amendment. That seems to illustrate precisely, when we hear what the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, said, the inadequacy of process within the Government as related to constitutional matters. If it is the case that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, as he suggested and as was confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, came forward with what sounded like rather appropriate substitutions and amendments to his original amendment, particularly regarding the question of when such a sunset clause could be introduced in the new Parliament as well as the other questions which he mentioned, I am very surprised that the Government did not respond to them in the way that has been suggested and, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said, simply put down the amendment in lieu that we have before us tonight. This is another illustration of precisely the problems about constitutional process to which the Constitution Committee’s full report tried to draw attention. As I have said, I hope that the report will be fully debated in the House.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

As I said in Committee, when we talked about the length of Parliaments being either four or five years, I really do not think that that is the issue. People are not looking for more general elections. They are looking for a system that gives them the confidence that we want to work in their interest.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I believe that the issues that we are concerned with turn upon three very simple matters. First, the argument against the amendment is seen to be founded on the idea that in some way or another it brings about a revolutionary change in our constitutional situation. It does not. The point has already been made—and due to a late train I am sorry that I was not here when the noble and learned Lord dealt with this matter—that the flexibility is still there, because no Parliament can bind its successor. If this Bill were passed and within three months Parliament, in its wisdom, sought by a majority of one in each House to repeal it, that would be the end of it. No constitutional impediment to that exists at all. So the flexibility is there. Well, you may ask, if that is so, why have the amendment? The argument for it, it seems to me, is not tenuous and indeed it has some merit. It concentrates the mind. It enables a new Parliament in a new situation to look at the circumstances prevailing at that particular time.

My second point—and I hope that I am not making a Second Reading argument now, because I think that is very much the backcloth to this very amendment—is what I would call the William Lovett point. Do you remember the last point in Lovett’s charter—annual general elections? God forbid. But the reason for it was that Lovett and other brave people of his day were convinced that the more you defended a Parliament and a Government from the will of the people, the greater the disservice to humanity and to democracy. If you gave them a certain five-year term rather than a much shorter term, that as far as Lovett was concerned would be a betrayal of democracy. Therefore, one should approach the idea of a five-year full term with very great reservation on that point alone.

My last point is the question where the onus of proof lies. This is a major constitutional change from any point of view—nobody would dispute that. Where is the evidence in support of it? It comes either from an idealistic direction or from a cynical direction. If it comes from an idealistic direction—and I can see that that may be so—it is based upon the theory that there is evidence within, say, the last half century of Prime Ministers beating the gun and going to the country when it was wholly unnecessary to do so. It certainly did not happen in 1935. It did not happen in 1945. There were elections in 1951, 1966 and 1974 that have already been referred to. In each case, the country was crying out for the chance to decide the matter there and then. If there is any criticism to be made about the abuse of the privilege of a Prime Minister to decide the exact date, it is against those Prime Ministers, of more than one party, who have stayed too long rather than against those who have gone to the country too soon. Where then is the case for this amending legislation? Therefore, one doubts whether there might not indeed be some faint cynical reasons for it.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, I shall not delay the House long. I supported the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for a sunset clause when it first came in front of us. I totally accept the rationale to which my noble friend Lord Cormack referred: this was part of the coalition agreement. Whether, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, this was written on the back of an envelope or a fag packet, I do not quite know, but it was certainly cobbled together to try to cement the coalition together. I always took the view that it was quite legitimate for the coalition Government to decide, if they wanted to, that they wanted to go the full five years. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made the point that that undertaking could be made by the Prime Minister because it did not need legislation. One rather suspects the reason why the coalition Government have decided that this should go into future Parliaments is to give that agreement a bit of respectability, but I cannot see why it should bind future Parliaments.

However, I will not be supporting the concept of a sunset clause this time round because the whole idea of a fixed-term Parliament is completely nonsensical and is not even worth the paper the Bill is written on. The reasons for that are those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong. I think the Prime Minister of the day could organise things so that a vote of no confidence was achieved which would bring down his own Government even if his own Back-Benchers voted against the Government. Therefore, we could well end up with a four-year Parliament if the Liberals decide no longer to support the coalition. Indeed, four-year Parliaments could happen in the future with this Bill existing. That is the real flaw in the whole thing. There would obviously be an amazing row and accusations of bad will if the Prime Minister organised things that way but, on the other hand, knowing the way that elections kick in, that row would last 24 hours and then we would all be campaigning on the election and who we wanted as the next Government so we would all forget about how the election was brought about in the beginning.

Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

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Wednesday 15th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben]

I would not like it to be thought by your Lordships that those who were not lawyers disagreed with the lawyers. As a non-lawyer, it seems to me to be very clear that there is a good reason why we should not have the additional parts: it is misleading to have them. It suggests that the additional parts have the same validity and strength as the central issue of the 1972 Act. I would account it as the proudest moment of my parliamentary history when I voted for that Act—it was the moment when we achieved the thing that in all my young life I longed to achieve, which was the beginning of closer European unity, for which I have always stood. I do not want that Act to be removed from its pedestal place. It is the Act that says, very clearly, that the United Kingdom is a sovereign state, and from its sovereignty it grants this particular place for European legislation. Should at some future time a Government, in foolishness almost unimaginable, decide that they did not wish to continue with that Act this sovereign Parliament could, by repealing that Act, change the circumstances—and change them of its own strength, volition and powers.

This is a declaratory statement. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Richard, that it is not necessary but given that it has been raised, it becomes necessary. Now that it is necessary it is crucial that it should be extremely clear. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has given a great opportunity to this House to unite around something which should not divide those on either side of the European divide, or indeed those in the general mishmash in the middle. The worry which I have—this is why I have become less happy in the mean time—is the question which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, raised earlier: if the Government do not accept this as a reasonable matter, what is it that is hidden in that alternative? For this must be right and if it is not, the rest is wrong.

I shall say one thing to the noble Lord, Lord Waddington. If his worry is a real one, he is worried by either of the statements before us. If his worry is a real one and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, got it wrong, the fact is that he would be wrong about the Government’s formulation as well. Although I therefore have sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, he cannot defeat his problem by preferring the one against the other. To defeat his problem, he would have to initiate some extra bit to the Act to make it clear. I do not believe that is necessary but his intervention, although admirable, is really not about the division between these two formulations, so I pray that your Lordships’ House will support the amendment.

However, I would like it even more if the Government were to say that they thought, on balance, it would be better to go with what is clearly a widely held feeling in all parts of the House and with those who are in favour and those who are against our membership of the European Union.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, it does not matter a great deal whether the submission made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, or that made by the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, is correct. At the end of the day, it means not only that the European Communities Act 1972 made great inroads into our independence but that other Acts of Parliament have done exactly the same. However, through the machinery of Section 3 of the 1972 Act, the inroads are not permanent. They are as permanent as we wish them to be. It is very much the same as if we made a lease of part of our sovereignty, but a lease that we can recall and cancel at any time we so decide.

The only other matter that I would like to mention is the modesty with which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, disassociated himself from the triumph of the 1972 legislation passing through the House of Commons. It is true that he did not draft the Bill, but he steered it with magnificent competence through the House. I remember the back-handed compliment which he had from the late Michael Foot, who said words exactly like these: “The honourable and learned gentleman the Solicitor-General has shown such nimbleness and adroitness as would make the great Houdini look like a helpless arthritic”.

Privacy Injunctions

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I would certainly agree with the noble Lord. No doubt when the Joint Committee comes to take evidence, the professional bodies, the Law Society and Bar Council, will be bodies that it will want to seek evidence from—as well, no doubt, as from individuals who have much experience to bring to bear on these important matters.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

Does the Minister accept that the Bill of Rights and the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 were passed in ages very different from our own and dealt with circumstances very different from those now relevant? Does he accept that the effect of those Acts very often is to make it possible for a statement to be made in Parliament that would be utterly contumelious of a decision of the courts were it not for the particular privilege thereby conferred? Will he encourage those who sit on the Joint Committee to be bold and imaginative in these circumstances and to see to it that the law of the land is not flouted, save in those rare, almost unique, circumstances where parliamentary privilege should be allowed to cloak such an action?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as I have already made clear, it is almost self-evident that the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 were promulgated in times very different from today. Notwithstanding that, there are clearly some important principles enshrined in them. Indeed, on numerous occasions, even in recent times, we in this House have sought to emphasise their importance and how much we cherish them. In terms of the Joint Committee and in the opportunity to look much more broadly at parliamentary privilege, that will be an opportunity to consider in detail some of these issues. The Master of the Rolls’ report published last week has a chapter devoted to parliamentary privilege and identifies some of the tensions that are there. All of those elected to the other House and Members of this House take parliamentary privilege very seriously, and if we wish to say anything on matters that are sub judice it should be done only with the greatest of forethought.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I feel privileged to join all those who have tendered their congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. I think it was 41 years ago when he joined me in the House of Commons. He was then a callow youth, but I remember that within a very short time he had made a considerable impact upon that august body. I am very proud indeed to follow the address of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. I agree with everything he says, but putting it that way would almost make it seem as though we are speaking as equals; we are not. He has given a scholarly and professional analysis of the situation and a most magisterial and utterly justified rebuke to the massive, porcupinal difficulties with which this piece of legislation bristles.

Somebody asked the Abbé Sieyès at the end of the French Revolution, “What did you do, Father Abbé, during the great upheaval?”. He said, “I survived, my son”. That is the great thing, in politics and in life; survival. I have no doubt but that, in those heady hours and days after the election of May last year, survival must have been foremost in the minds of Conservatives, who realised that they could not govern, certainly not govern credibly or effectively, for any period of time without some form of alliance. The Liberal Democrats suddenly found themselves, for the first time since December 1917, in Government—that excludes the rather artificial period of coalition during the Second World War. One can well understand, therefore, that flashing like a light in the minds of the two parties would have been the question of survival. There is nothing disgraceful in that; nothing wrong at all.

That, of course, could have been done quite simply, as the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, with his vast experience and understanding, made perfectly clear. It would only have needed, possibly, a White Paper—not even that; a solemn undertaking given by the Prime Minister, joined by the Deputy Prime Minister, would have made it perfectly clear that this was an arrangement that would last for five years, unless there were unforeseen circumstances. A binding motion would not have been any more binding than either or both of those two methods. That, I think, is where the problem began. Whereas they could so clearly have declared to the whole world what was a perfectly understandable and, I think, honourable agreement, they nevertheless sought to improve upon it. They sought to elevate what was a perfectly practical piece of day-to-day politics to a principle. They sought to graft what was a political agreement of mutual benefit to them onto principle and when you do that, you sometimes get some very strange fruit. That, I think, is the problem the House faces at the moment with the Bill.

I do not consider that it is either necessary or, indeed, appropriate, that there should be fixed-term Parliaments. They have a superficial attraction, but there are many dangers inherent in the whole principle. I cast this gauntlet down to the Government, both parts of it, if I may do so without impertinence. The case that has been put forward for a fixed-term Parliament is that there is an abuse that has been perpetrated by more than one Prime Minister from time to time in dealing cynically with the British electorate and going to the country when there was no need to go to the county, but in order either to safeguard or, indeed, to further advance his or her political advantage. Where is the evidence? I do not believe that one can properly point to any situation since the Second World War when there has been any clear evidence of such action.

In 1951, Attlee’s Government had, I think, a majority of six or seven, if I remember rightly. On top of that, of course, many Members, especially leading figures of the party were old and ill and, indeed, to cap it all, a very brilliant young Minister by the name of Evan Durbin died tragically in a swimming accident. That was the last straw for Prime Minister Attlee and he went to the country. That was not a case of jumping the gun, or anything like that. It would have been impossible for him to have carried on and it would have done nobody any good, nor would it have served any constitutional principle.

In 1964, Harold Wilson had a majority of three and it was clear that it was only a matter of time before he would have to seek a proper mandate from the people, which he did and which he obtained. In 1974, the situation was even clearer. In February/March of 1974 there was an election which yielded a hung Parliament. What else could he do but to go to the country? He soldiered on for six months and a second election was held. That election gave him a majority of the order of only three, four or five. Then there was an agreement, a very proper agreement, with the Liberal Party for some period of time. It was a brave act, to soldier on until 1979.

Where is the evidence of abuse on the part of a Prime Minister jumping the gun and therefore creating a justification for this legislation? It simply is not there. Of course, one may very well argue that it not just the case of the actual abuse; it is the threat of it and there is some truth in that. The Liberal Democrats have been saying from time to time that it was utterly wrong—as, indeed, did the Conservatives—for there not to have been an election when Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair. There was precedent for an election, as when Anthony Eden took over from Churchill in 1955. There were other situations, as when John Major succeeded the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, when there was no election and there was no great upheaval about that.

It is a fair point, but it is a point which has been totally destroyed by the fact that Mr Cameron blew hot and cold and hot again about it. When the succession took place in June 2007, his first reaction was, “Well, there must be an election”. At the time, Labour was well behind in the polls. Then Labour caught up in the polls and Mr Cameron said there need be no election at all; it would be a waste of time. Then the polls changed, as they have a habit of doing from time to time, and Mr Cameron said, “Come, come—we must have an election, because the polls now point to a possible Conservative victory”. There is no white sheet of purity in which he can clothe himself in relation to this matter.

I believe that the Bill is wholly unnecessary; it comes from pragmatism that has been wrongly grafted onto principle and is creating a situation that is utterly impossible. I need not seek to add to the very erudite speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster. He described the statutory straitjacket that the Bill creates for a Prime Minister. There are situations in which a Prime Minister would wish to go to the country and should go to the country, but will not be able to go to the country because of that impossible straitjacket. I do not need to say any more about that matter.

One matter that I will touch upon is that of how much harm the Bill will do to the whole concept of parliamentary democracy. I put it in this way: generations of schoolchildren are taught that with the Glorious Revolution and the Bill of Rights at the end of the 17th century there was a massive transfer of authority from monarch to people. That is not so. It was a massive transfer of authority from monarch to Parliament. The people were ultimately the beneficiaries of that transfer, if indeed Parliament was acting in a proper trusteeship and holding that authority for the people—something that it has not always done in past centuries. Be that as it may, there was that transfer towards the people. At the same time, Parliament—or, rather, the Executive—was feathering its own nest and arrogating much of that power to itself, yielding it only gradually and reluctantly to the direct arbitrament of the people.

Our situation is not the same as that of a Greek city state or a Roman republic, where there was direct involvement of the public. We do not have that except in general elections, by-elections and, very occasionally, in referendums. However, that is the situation. It is the people who have the sovereignty—not Parliament and not the Executive. Many will remember the book by Quintin Hogg, the late Lord Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship. He was right in most of his submissions. Whether he would have made them in relation to a Conservative Government is arguable, but that was his verdict on the constitutional situation. My point at this stage is this: anything that comes between the sovereignty of the people and Parliament is, of itself, bad. It reneges on and betrays the trusteeship that Parliament owes to the people.

William Lovett, in his charter of 1836, wanted annual general elections. God forbid. However, his heart was in the right place. He realised that the more you place Members of Parliament at the mercy of the electors—the more you expose them to the arbitrament and verdict of the electors—the better it is. The more you cosset them and hide them from the electorate, the worse it is. It is as simple as that.

I make one other point about the situation of the Assembly of Wales and the Scottish Parliament as regards a May 2015 election. I have raised the question before and I do not ask it impertinently of the Minister. Was that a deliberate slur—a deliberate attempt to avoid consultation with those bodies beforehand—or was it mere forgetfulness? Does he not agree that it would be entirely wrong at this stage for the United Kingdom Parliament to say to the Scots, the Welsh and the Northern Irish, “You do this. You rejig your programmes and we will accept that”? No, it should be the other way. It is the United Kingdom Parliament that has created the problem and it is the United Kingdom Parliament that should avoid the duplicity of having both elections on the same day.

The noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, made the point that in America people vote for dozens of different things. I understand that; they vote for a Congressman, a judge, a fire chief, et cetera. However, they do not vote in two general elections on the same day. There would be a general election in Scotland and a general election in Britain; and a general election in Wales and a general election in Britain. That is the issue. It is clear to anybody, bearing in mind that there are different constituencies and different issues altogether, that they simply should not be held on one and the same day.