Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

377: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Lawful or reasonable excuse defence for public order offences(1) This section applies to any offence that makes conduct unlawful unless there is an excuse for it and specifies either that the excuse must be a lawful excuse or that it must be a reasonable one.(2) A person has no excuse for the conduct if—(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or(b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage.(3) It is immaterial that there are or may be other excuses or reasons for the conduct or that its main purpose may be different.(4) In this section “conduct” includes any act or omission.(5) For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies when a person has a lawful or reasonable excuse to a public order offence.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, this group of amendments was due to be heard last Wednesday. We were sent away just before midnight but reassured that they would be heard first thing on Monday. Well, it is 9.30 pm; I suppose that is first thing.

Amendment 377 is an important amendment, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Godson, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies. It is about lawful or reasonable excuse for public order offences. It is not particularly easy for a legislature to say what could constitute a reasonable excuse. However, the law is currently in a mess. The culprit is the Ziegler case, in which the Supreme Court, by a majority, said that whatever Parliament might say, it was necessary for a court to decide for itself, using the vexed issue of proportionality as a separate assessment, it would seem. Paragraph 59 of the leading judgment describes the process of proportionality as a

“fact-specific inquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.

There has been widespread criticism of the Ziegler case. The courts have been backing away from it—for example, the Colston statue case in the Court of Appeal and last week in two cases, R v ABJ and R v BDN. Policy Exchange, the think tank, has mounted a long-standing campaign against the incoherence that the Ziegler decision has generated. There is absolutely no reason, from Strasbourg’s point of view, why national Governments should not decide on the sensible and appropriate limits on the law in relation to protest. Many noble Lords will remember the 2023 legislation and the provisions concerning tunnelling, major obstruction to transport networks and interfering with key national infrastructure. I was always concerned that superimposing on all these very specific offences the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse without giving any definition was, in effect, simply asking courts, “Do you think that there was a reasonable excuse?” but not saying how they were to approach that issue. I tabled amendments, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, without success, to clarify the issue so that courts could know what questions they should ask of themselves other than whether they liked the protest.

During the debate on this provision in Committee, no noble Lord from any party seemed to agree with the Ziegler decision or seek to defend it. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, seemed to dislike the amendment on one particular ground—that it purported to oust the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. I understand his loyalty towards the European Court of Human Rights, but the amendment does not seek to do that. It seeks to confirm that, in our view—I think that it is pretty uncontroversial—this amendment complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. It respects a balance of the various rights, and the House will know only too well that Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights. It is clearly important that the law in relation to protests should take into account not only the rights of protesters but those of all those parties whose lives could be completely upset by the exercise of those rights and, of course, the police, who have to interpret the law and administrate the law, so coherence is most important.

I then looked again at what the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, had to say in response to this group. I want to be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who has been indefatigable in the course of this Bill, dealing with any number of amendments, and often with large groups. I do not blame him altogether for not seizing on the Ziegler point with any great detail, but I fear that his answer was simply not good enough. He merely said

“the Government are not persuaded that this amendment is needed. Public order offences have been developed to ensure that those reasonable excuse defences apply only when appropriate and respect the need to balance”,—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/26; col. 1634.]

et cetera. It was a perfectly fair statement of what the aims of any Government are but not an answer to the inadequacy of the Ziegler case. Therefore, I ask the Minister directly—sorry, it is not going to be the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, replying, as he is getting a well-earned rest, but the noble Lord, Lord Katz—whether he says, on behalf of the Government, that the Ziegler decision was correct, or does he accept, like almost any other legal commentator, that the decision was unfortunately wrong, as other judges seem now to accept? If that is the case, the law is incoherent, and it must be changed.

I fear I must join my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who is not currently in his place, in saying that it is simply not good enough to say that we must wait until the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, speaks on the subject—if he were to speak on the subject, because, of course, that may be some time in the future. Then there is the vexed question of legislative time.

We need to sort out the law in relation to protest. This amendment, whose drafting has not been criticised in any way, states what could or should constitute a reasonable excuse or lawful excuse. The time has come to clarify the law for everybody’s sake. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.

My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.

I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in this short but important debate, and I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling these amendments which seek to narrow the existing lawful or reasonable excuse defences that may be used for public order offences.

It may be helpful to set out how a lawful excuse works in practice. A person is automatically treated as having a lawful excuse only under two specific circumstances. The first is if the defendant honestly believes that the person who is entitled to consent to the damage has given consent or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances—for example, an honest belief that the owner of a car in which a child was locked on a hot day consented, or would have consented, to the defendant smashing the window to get the child out. The second is if the defendant acts to protect their own or someone else’s property and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable—for example, a person damages one person’s property while accessing the property of another to prevent a fire. It does not matter whether a person’s belief in those circumstances is reasonable or justified; it just needs to be honest.

Whatever the failings of, or, indeed, one’s views on, the Ziegler judgment, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in his sagacious contribution, case law has moved on and the Supreme Court has made subsequent rulings which chart a clearer path. It is the case that the right to private property will always need to be balanced with other convention rights, such as the right to protest and freedom of expression. This will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but leading case law has set out the parameters, and the Court of Appeal did not say that the exercise of a person’s convention rights could never form the basis of lawful excuse for criminal damage.

While I acknowledge the concerns of noble Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy for the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide what may constitute lawful or reasonable excuse in individual cases. Further, the current scope of the defence allows the CPS the necessary flexibility to consider the full circumstances of each case on its merits. The types of behaviour that noble Lords have suggested, such as intimidating or harming members of the public or the risk of damaging property, are unlikely to be considered a reasonable excuse. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am grateful to all those who took part in this debate. I think the issues have rather narrowed between those who have taken part in it. For the first time during the course of these debates on this issue, we had some drafting points from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. They have come late, but none the less I will deal with them.

The first point is that the noble Lord did not like my proposed provision that says that it is not an excuse if you intend

“to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.

That does not seem to be a very reasonable excuse to me, so it seems a very sensible thing to put in the amendment.

Secondly, the noble Lord did not like subsection (3), where it says that it is immaterial that there may be other purposes. If the defendant does not have a good excuse, it is no good saying, “My overall excuse, because I happen to support Just Stop Oil, is a good one”. You cannot rely on that.

In his final point, the noble Lord stuck to his argument that this was an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act 1998. I repeat the point that it is not that. Whatever the future may hold, we are still part of the European Convention on Human Rights. But the convention requires the balancing of rights, including that they have to be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This provision reflects all those factors in a perfectly appropriate balance. Therefore, it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.

I come finally to this point. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, quite rightly said, pointing to a recent judgment of the President of the Supreme Court, that the courts are backing away from Ziegler. I am not surprised. It sits very uneasily with the jurisprudence in this area generally. The decision is almost moribund. But it is time to give it a decent burial. It is time to conclude that the law should be clear, that we can understand what it means and that the police can understand what it means, so that the whole business of putting forward spurious excuses will cease and we can have a proper and sensible law in relation to protest. I wish to test the opinion of the House.