National Security Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I share the view that I think is being proposed, at least implicitly, by those who tabled the amendment that nobody should be prosecuted if a prosecution would be contrary to the public interest. Indeed, I share the view that nobody should be prosecuted if their belief, however unreasonable, was that something was in the public interest. I would hate to see a wholly unreasonable person prosecuted for something that they believed was in the national interest if, for example, they suffered from a psychiatric condition that made their belief totally irrational.

I have to say that I believe that this clause does not achieve the purpose which it is purported to achieve. The noble Lord who opened this debate did say—I recognise this—that he is not claiming this is a perfect clause, but I suggest that, if we are to have a clause anything like this, it needs an awful lot of work done on it. As drawn, subsection (3) in effect means that a jury would have to decide, in part at least, whether what the defendant had done was or was not in the public interest and then go on to decide whether the belief that they had that it was in the public interest was reasonable. I think it is very difficult to draft a credible and usable clause that achieves the end that is aimed for.

Indeed, my belief is that the target of this amendment is wrong. The target should be that people are not prosecuted for offences that should not be offences. We should try to remove from this Bill those parts which tend to criminalise, for example, journalists, rather than using a clause of dubious validity and coherence such as this.

There are criminal charges, mostly regulatory offences and often strict liability offences, in which there is a defence of reasonable excuse. A defendant can raise the evidential burden that they had a reasonable excuse for certain activities, and the prosecution then has to disprove the claim of reasonable excuse. There are torts, for example in defamation, where a public interest defence is specifically provided for, and that has been heavily litigated, including a very important judgment that was given by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope in one relatively recent case.

However, so far as I am aware—and I am sure I will be corrected if I am wrong—I do not know of a criminal offence where a jury has to decide what was in the public interest, and I would urge those who believe that this is something that could be placed before a jury to have sympathy with the courts that would have to deal with this provision, because judges in every case have the very important responsibility of summing up the law to the jury, and they would have to describe to the jury a reasonable definition of the public interest. That would have to be done, under current practice, by judges in writing, handing a document, a route to verdict, to the jury—and I apprehend that this provision would create impossible difficulty.

I return with an apology to something that I said in an earlier debate this evening about the public interest. Subsection (3) actually does set out tests which I imagine are habitually applied by the Director of Public Prosecutions if he—it is he at the moment—is determining whether it is in the public interest for a prosecution to take place. That is the right location for this decision to lie. What is set out here is the responsibility of the Director of Public Prosecutions. I apprehend that, in the sort of case that those tabling this amendment have in mind, it would be extremely rare for the DPP to decide that it was in the public interest for a prosecution to take place. That is not the role of the jury, and in my view it would be a serious mistake to make the judgment of the public interest the role of a jury.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have very little to add to that brilliant exposition of the difficulties with this amendment. As I said in relation to a previous amendment, I am of course very concerned with any threat to public interest journalism, and therefore I have some initial sympathy with the idea of a public interest defence. But I am afraid that, the more I looked at it and thought about it, the more I was convinced that this was not the answer. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, pointed out so cogently, Article 10 is not an issue here. Article 10 has always been a qualified right. There is no violation of the convention by the absence of a public interest defence.

I am particularly concerned about proposed new subsection (2). It seems to me that what is contemplated is that, if a defendant raises some prima facie case that they disagree with government policy, or whatever their general justification is for being in breach of one of the very serious offences to which this would apply, the prosecution will have to prove that the conduct was not in the public interest. It is difficult to know how that can be done without potentially disclosing matters that, in the interests of national security, it might be most unwise to disclose. In fact, it might even result in the prosecution not going ahead because the prosecution might take the view that it would be too damaging to disclose this. That itself would not be in the public interest in appropriate cases.

I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said. A jury would be given a complex direction in writing. I can then only anticipate—I have had this experience myself, but not in this sort of case—that the jurors, who may be bewildered by a direction such as this, would ask a series of supplementary questions. What is meant by this? How do we respond to this? What if we agree with the defendant but do not think this? Et cetera, et cetera. It is difficult to conceive of this being a very satisfactory procedure, or indeed in the public interest.

So, although I sympathise with what lies behind this, I am concerned that the Bill could be altered more satisfactorily to protect journalists and whistleblowers. I am afraid that this is not the answer.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak primarily to my diffident amendment, which is none the less an important one. I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said and what he seeks to achieve in his amendment. As he said, it is based very much on what Kevan Jones MP said on new Clause 5 in the debate in the other place.

I am going to leave to one side the notes I had written for this, because it is such an important debate and discussion. The amendment I put down was just a probing amendment to see that it was debated, but now I can see the sense of it, because in the remaining time for the Bill we will not have the opportunity for hours of debate about what a public interest defence should or should not be. But it is not going to go away.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, eloquently told us—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and others—there is a view that a public interest defence, if you are not careful, will compromise national security in the ways that were outlined. We cannot ignore that, but neither can we ignore the fact that many respected organisations fundamentally believe that the Bill as drafted will both cause a problem with respect to those who wish to act as investigative journalists, which none of us would wish to see compromised—I know that this will be debated later on the amendment on whistleblowing from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer —and prevent somebody who works in a service exposing serious wrongdoing. The wrongdoing going on might be so serious that, on reflection, we would be pleased that they had brought it to the public’s attention. There is a real conflict here between those two points of view.

Nobody wishes to compromise national security or to curtail the opportunity for people to reveal things which are in the public’s interest. But having put a probing amendment down, it seems that my amendment is one way to try to wrestle with this problem in slower time, while we reflect on how we bring all this together. As I say, we cannot just dismiss all the institutions and organisations, including very respected people, who want a public interest defence. They include the Law Commission and many others such as Mishcon de Reya, who have sent us all a really informative argument for why there should be a public interest defence. They have pointed to various cases, some historic and some not so historic, to give examples of where a public interest defence may have helped.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will be asking for leave to withdraw this amendment, not on the basis that it will go away but on the basis that, first, there is room for further discussion, even though only a chink has opened up in what the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has had to say; and, secondly, on the basis that I accept that the amendment is not perfectly drafted and we would like to take further advice and further consider a number of matters in the drafting of the Bill. What I will say, very briefly if I can, about the amendment and the response of the Minister and the other speeches we have heard, is that this question has to be taken in the context of the introduction of the Bill.

There can be no doubt that the Bill will manifestly broaden the ambit of national security and protection legislation: first, because it is targeted not at individuals who have an obligation to the state but generally at citizens; and, secondly, in the way that the Bill is drafted. We talked about this a great deal last week, when we noted the inclusion of expressions such as, “know or reasonably ought to have known”, “conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service” and all those peripheral expressions. Indeed, we note the use of the phrase “prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom” when we know “the interests of the United Kingdom” are determined by what the Government of the day believe those interests to be. All those broaden the ambit of these criminal offences.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that this issue is not going to go away. All the briefings we have had from journalists and organisations tell us how important a public interest defence is. I completely take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and by the Minister, that Article 10 on freedom of expression is a qualified right. Of course, people of legal distinction can disagree, but it is entirely wrong to suggest that the Law Commission does not contain people of legal distinction.

If it were translated into a consideration of this Bill, because there is no material distinction on the disclosure points, I feel confident that the Law Commission would come out with the same recommendation as it did in 2020. We also have the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in relation to a public interest defence. It is very difficult to argue that the fact that it is a qualified right under Article 10 does not mean that it would apply. Of course, we, the Law Commission and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have read the whole of Article 10 and understand the qualification, but the overwhelming point is the phrase

“necessary in a democratic society”.

Everything else is subject to that in the qualification.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

Just so that I understand, is the noble Lord saying that the absence of a public interest defence, whether framed in the manner of this amendment or in a similar or a different way, means that the Bill would automatically be a violation of Article 10 of the European convention?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

As drafted, I fear that it would. Since we have had absolutely no indication that concessions will be made to all the amendments we discussed last week—I rather doubt that we will get them—it seems to me that investigative journalism will be seriously affected in a way that risks being a serious breach of Article 10. It might be saved by the qualification suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, but I do not accept that that case is made out.

I entirely accept the noble Baroness’s point that the damage of publication cannot be recalled, but a balance must be struck which takes into account the interest in disclosure against the interest in secrecy. We emphasise the importance not just of free investigative journalism in a democratic society but of the control of wrongdoing. For my part, I cannot see anything in what the Minister said which comprehensively puts paid to the idea that there could be a cover-up of wrongdoing not possible for citizens to redress by disclosure without being subject to criminal proceedings under this Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I accept entirely that this is a very difficult issue and that the balance to be struck is very difficult. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned the case of Clive Ponting, where there was undoubtedly government misinformation and wrongdoing. Clive Ponting was not a journalist; he was a former civil servant. In fact, he wrote books as well, including one on the truth about the “Belgrano”. Nevertheless, what he did was important. It is vital to our democracy that juries have the right—as one did in that case against the direction of the judge, because there was not a public interest defence—to say, “No, we will not convict because there has been wrongdoing.” A jury should not have to defy a judge and misapply the law because of the absence of such a defence to avoid covering up wrongdoing.

Of course I accept the point about drafting from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and that this amendment is not perfect. Indeed, it was he brought up the Ponting case at the very first instance in these proceedings. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, we cannot run away from drafting a public interest defence, if that is necessary, because the drafting is difficult. It is a different topic, but in Section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 we have a defence of reasonable comment on a matter of public interest. I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee for that Act, and we considered very carefully how that would work. However, at that stage—although they are rarer now as a result of that Act—these were matters for determination by a jury, and a jury can determine such a public interest defence.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

First, with great respect, jury trial was effectively abolished by the Act that the noble Lord is talking about. Secondly, it put into statutory form a so-called Reynolds defence in a civil claim. Here we are talking about prosecutions of criminal offences of the most serious sort. The analogy is not appropriate.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I disagree—a fortiori, if such a defence is appropriate in a defence to a civil claim, it is appropriate in a defence to criminal proceedings that carry maxima of 14 years and life imprisonment. We may differ on that; nevertheless, of course I note that jury trial was abolished for defamation by that legislation. However, when we were considering the public interest defence, the abolition of jury trial was not then in mind; we had always had jury trials, and still can do in rare cases.

The only other point I wish to make is in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. Of course, in the case of whistleblowers, there are other avenues to pursue for those employed by the security services, but there are two answers to that point. The first is that we are not just concerned with those employed by the security services, or those employed by anybody in particular. We are concerned with offences designed to be used and prosecuted against ordinary citizens. Secondly, we have included in our amendment—it is one of the best drafted parts—that one of the factors to be taken into account would be

“the availability of any other effective authorised procedures for achieving the purpose of the alleged conduct and whether those procedures were exercised”.

That will always be an important point, because it answers the point that you could have gone to an authorised body for the protection of whistleblowers.

This issue is not going to go away. I suspect we shall come back to it on Report, and that there will be a vote on it. The amendment may be in a very different form, but nevertheless, with these very serious criminal offences, I cannot accept that a public interest defence is not in the interests of the public and the nation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

National Security Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

I think that this is too complicated and far too bureaucratic, and we need to think carefully how we tighten and narrow it, in order to win and hold public consent and produce an Act which will last for 10 to 20 years, and not just until the next Government come in.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will not be disclosing quite as much as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, did, but I will disclose that I am the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, and it is in that context that I want to add a few remarks. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for her amendment giving those of us who are concerned—I am sure that I speak for the whole Committee—about the potential effect, no doubt unintended, that the Bill might have on press freedom. I do not want to rehearse all that has been very well set out by the noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. What is vital, of course, is to think what potential chilling effect this might have on journalism, particularly public interest journalism.

One point that is perhaps worth emphasising is how expensive public interest journalism is, how heavy it is on resources and how easy it is for editors to say: “Look, this is far too difficult; you may not get what you want, it is expensive, and what is more it may be unlawful.” If you look at Clause 3(2) of the Bill, and are thinking about running a story to do with armaments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, said—I think that she was probably referring to the Snatch Land Rover issue; she confirms that that was the case—then you might well say to yourself that this is highly risky, because we are going to run a story about something which would be of interest to a foreign power with which we might be in conflict. It is just that sort of thing which this, in the absence of some sort of tailored amendment to the Bill, would have the unintended consequence of not just putting a journalist at risk but of somebody simply saying that they are not going to do the story or spend money on this.

So I hope that the Minister, who is otherwise preoccupied at the moment, may be able to consider these matters carefully, knowing how important public interest journalism is. I should say that I received some briefing from the Guardian. Although IPSO regulates 97% of those publications that we receive, it does not regulate the Guardian, so this does not in any way influence the job that I have.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I share the concerns which have been expressed in this debate about the breadth of Clauses 29 and 30, particularly in relation to public interest journalism, as expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell.

One of the problems is that Clause 29(2)(c) ensures that the foreign power condition applies merely because there is

“other assistance provided by a foreign power”.

That is an incredibly broad definition. The provision of information would potentially fall within the scope of that definition. There is also the concern, which has been explained by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Wallace, that the foreign power definition in Clause 30(1)(e) extends to a political party—not just to political parties generally but, as Clause 30(2) makes clear, to any party which has any member of the Government in a coalition. So it extends very broadly, particularly in Europe, to any number of political parties.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, made the point that one of the mischiefs here is that there is no attempt to exclude governing parties in our allies—NATO countries, Australia, New Zealand and Five Eyes countries—which is quite extraordinary. The anomaly is even greater, because if the Committee looks at Clause 30(3)(a) there is a specific exclusion for any political party which is

“a governing political party of the government of the Republic of Ireland”.

I would be very grateful if the Minister could explain why there is that specific exclusion —not that I have anything against the Irish—but not for any political party that operates in our other allies, particularly NATO allies. The anomaly is even greater, because it is not beyond the realms of possibility that, in the next few years, Sinn Féin may be a political party that is part of the Government of the Republic of Ireland, possibly in a coalition.

None of this makes any sense. Could the Minister please clarify, explain and reflect on whether this is really a sensible way to proceed?

National Security Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very important group of amendments which in many ways goes to the heart of much of the debate that will take place on a number of amendments. It reminds the Committee that the heart of the issue is Clause 1(1)(b), which says that to commit an offence

“the person’s conduct is for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Fundamental to that is that what we are discussing here, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, ably set out, is what we actually mean by the interests and safety of the United Kingdom. It is to the great credit of our country that we can debate that here to try to decide what it should be.

I agree with the majority of noble Lords who have said that it is important that we try to understand how to make sure that defending the interests and safety of our country is about national security and defence. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, reminded us that there are grey areas in that respect. That is not a criticism of having the debate, but it means that we have to decide where we want to draw the line. I have mentioned this to the noble and learned Lord Hope, and I pray him in aid. He mentioned it with respect to the Public Order Bill, and again with this one. It is an abrogation of this Parliament’s responsibility if it does not seek to answer these difficult questions and just leaves it to the courts, saying that it is for the courts to decide and determine. We ourselves should try to give greater clarity to what we as legislators think that phrase actually means.

It is incumbent on the Government to say what they will do to try to define this, as Amendment 2 moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my Amendment 3 seek to do. Either they should say “We don’t need to do that”, lay out why it is not necessary for Parliament to determine it and why they think we should leave it to the courts, or say how we will get some sort of definition that makes sense and gives greater clarity. To be frank, that is a real problem for the Bill.

As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, pointed out in his interesting and incisive remarks, along with other noble Lords, the Government say at paragraph 62 of the Explanatory Notes:

“The term safety or interests of the UK is not defined”.


They have already made up their mind that they do not need to define it. The basis of these amendments is that we think they do. We do not oppose the Bill or think it is not important that we protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom, but somewhere along the line our Parliament should try to say what that means. The Government say in the Explanatory Notes that it is not defined and, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned,

“case-law has interpreted it as meaning, in summary, the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers (see the Court’s view in Chandler v Director Public Prosecutions (1964)”.

I remind noble Lords that in that judgment, the House of Lords—constitutional arrangements were different then—essentially rejected the idea that it was for a jury to determine or decide whether something was in the interests of the state. As Lord Pearce’s judgment stated,

“the interests of the State must in my judgment mean the interests of the State according to the policies laid down for it by its recognised organs of government and authority, the policies of the State as they are, not as they ought, in the opinion of a jury, to be.”

I am not a lawyer—I have been a politician all my life—but I would argue with that. It may be quite correct from a legal point of view, but sometimes Parliament has not caught up with public opinion or where people are. Often, juries are an important way of determining what the public think, and they work.

We have seen recent examples of that. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, reminded us well of all the different issues that have arisen with protests. They are irrelevant to the Bill, but let me give another example: assisted dying. Time and again, juries have refused to convict on assisted dying, because they will not convict somebody in those terrible circumstances and do not believe that Parliament has caught up with the reality of where we are.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I entirely understand why the noble Lord is concerned about any uncertainty in these provisions, given the significant penalty, but is he at all reassured by the fact that it would be necessary for a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a defendant knew or ought reasonably to have known? That is quite a high threshold to be crossed before you even get on to this definition.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I agree; I am just making the point that a definition would also help and give us certainty and clarity. It is important for a Bill that seeks to address issues of national security that it seeks to define that. The debate has already taken place in Parliament; the noble Lord takes the view that it is unnecessary, but I think a definition would be helpful. A number of noble Lords have said that, in the Bill as drafted, it appears that not only national security or defence issues will fall under the Bill but a whole range of other potential offences which have nothing to do with national security or the defence of the realm.

That is the clarity we seek, and it is right to explore it in Committee. It will be interesting to hear what the Minister says as to why my amendment or those of the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, are unnecessary. Maybe he will use the argument the noble Lord put forward to say that that is what makes it unnecessary—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I had two points to make, the first of which, about foreign power, has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, so I will not repeat it. The second is more of a question. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked, “Why not charge theft?” I have no doubt that I will be advised by the Minister, but is there not a requirement that you have to deprive somebody permanently of something to constitute the offence of theft? I can see some potential argument that somebody charged under that offence would say that they had no intention to deprive that person permanently of that information.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not yet spoken to Amendments 9 and 10, which I was proposing to do before my noble friend spoke for us. Before doing so, I join my noble friend Lady Ludford in opposing the protection of all trade secrets without any requirement for there to be prejudice to the interests of the United Kingdom. That amendment, which has been proposed on behalf of the JCHR, seems to me to be sensible. I also share her bemusement, and that of others, that trade secrets are included in the Bill, because the way in which they are included is extremely wide.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out that Clause 2(2)(b)—he read it aloud, but I will not repeat doing so—is so wide that it effectively covers any information which has any commercial value of any significance. Of course, that information is important, and, to that extent, I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, state actors may also steal, or act nefariously in respect of, trade secrets—as may others, be they state actors or not. They may be from the United Kingdom or abroad. They may be connected to national security, but if the Bill will deal with trade secrets, they need to be defined in such a way that it is confined to trade secrets that present a threat to national security. The Bill goes far too wide if we include wide threats to trade secrets in the criminal proceedings—which, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, carry very heavy sentences—without the need to prove the threat to national security as an element of the criminal offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, threats to trade secrets are normally dealt with in the civil courts, where the protection to intellectual property is customarily and very frequently dealt with every day.

It is absolutely right, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, pointed out, that there is a requirement that the foreign power condition must be met. However, the foreign power condition in Clause 29 is not a very difficult hurdle to surmount. The present drafting does not require any prejudice to the security, defence or other interests of the United Kingdom. It is met if conduct is carried out not by a state Government but by any entity controlled or financially assisted by a foreign power—so that could be a commercial organisation that happened to be state-controlled. For “foreign power”, we have to read that as any power or any other state, including any friendly Government from anywhere in the world.

Our Amendments 9 and 10 tighten up the wording on trade secrets in Clause 2, but only in a limited way: by requiring that a trade secret must be subject to measures to prevent it becoming generally known or available to rival experts in the field. We suggest that it is simply not satisfactory—

Public Order Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, really was excellent, and I hope it gets a wide hearing beyond this place and the numbers here.

When I have discussed this, I always hear the argument from people who are opposed to Just Stop Oil that the people we are talking about are not real journalists. There is something about the concentration on Charlotte Lynch from LBC that somehow says that the other people who were arrested on the same day did not really count, and I want to address that briefly.

There is no doubt that, when the protests that we are seeing at the moment are so performative, activists may well film what is going on, often because they want records of what they are doing to put out on social media. It is tempting, therefore, to treat them differently from journalists. However, I would urge against that and have argued against that. In the end, who decides who is the journalist and who is not? As the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, said, the whole act of bearing witness and truth has nothing to do with views on the protest. Whether you are enthusiastic about the protest or hostile about it is irrelevant to those of us who want to know what has happened on the protest. Sometimes, even activists with a film camera are valuable for truth. The argument that it will incite more protest is misguided, because it treats those who are viewing these films as though they are just automatons who will see them and immediately rush out and protest. You might well see the film intended to illicit your support and think what idiots they are. That is not the point. The truth is what we should be concerned with.

I just say to the Government that I am concerned in particular about the serious disruption prevention orders. I have said throughout the discussions on the Bill that there are so many unintended consequences. I have no doubt that the Government are not intending to use serious disruption prevention orders to stop journalism in its tracks. I think the orders are a terrible blight, by the way, and should be removed from the Bill, but that is not the point I am making. The consequences of them could well be that they thwart journalism. That is the point. I urge the Government to consider that they can support their own Bill and accept these amendments in good faith—I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, explained this well—because they are trying to ensure that what they do not intend to happen, which is that journalistic freedom is compromised, will not happen and that journalists will not get caught up in this. We know that they will. That is the reality. It is a danger and a threat that the Government should get rid of.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have been following this Bill carefully but have not been able to take an active part in it so far. It is difficult not to agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, said about the importance of journalism, and I am sure the whole House agrees. I declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation.

Of course, a good and accurate record or recording of what takes place at a demonstration is important for all parties, whether they be demonstrators, the police or the public. What concerns me a bit about the amendment is what it actually does, apart from sending a very important message. That may be enough; I do not know. It seems to me that in fact it would not be lawful for a constable to arrest anybody anyway for observing, recording or reporting a protest, and nor would the exercise of police powers in relation to those matters or indeed any other matter, but I will listen carefully to what the Minister says.

I would also be grateful for some clarification of how this might interrelate to the reasonable excuse defence that exists in various parts of the Bill. I know that there is some uncertainty at the moment about its scope, where it features in terms of the definition of the offence and whether simply saying—understandably, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said—that this an incredibly serious cause, ie, climate change, and therefore justifies all the potential offences here. This is a fascinating and important amendment, and I seek clarification in due course from the Minister as to its scope.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we wholeheartedly support Amendment 117 in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, and signed by me for the reason so effectively introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott.

We have seen some very worrying developments. I remember that when I was serving, the police, following criticism, made strenuous efforts to work with journalists, in particular photographers, to ensure that their work was facilitated during protests. A colleague of mine who became chief constable of British Transport Police, Andy Trotter, made great strides in building a good rapport between journalists and the police. Recently, however, there is evidence of disregard for press cards—for example in a briefing from the National Union of Journalists on the arrests of journalists by Hertfordshire Police and other police forces. This seems to be going completely in the opposite direction to the progress made when I was serving.

As others have said, if journalists and photographers are afraid to do their jobs of being at protests and reporting on them, that is very dangerous for our democracy and the right to protest, having a chilling effect, as the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, put it, on journalism in relation to protests.

As other noble Lords, such as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, said, it points to the overly wide offences in the other parts of the Bill, for example,

“being present in a tunnel”.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, said, journalists have reported from inside these tunnels and could be guilty of those offences. It points not only to the importance of these amendments in protecting journalists but to the overreach of the offences in other parts of the Bill.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said, Amendment 127A is an important extension of the original Amendment 117, extending the protections beyond journalists to legal observers, academics and even innocent members of the public watching what is happening and recording it on their smartphones.

However, other noble Lords have not mentioned that it is also damaging to the police. The noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, talked about a dispute where the police asked journalists to turn off their lights and, under cover of the darkness that ensued, engaged in violence towards the protesters. In the situation the police service now faces of ever-diminishing public trust and confidence in it, stories of the police arresting journalists at protests could easily be hijacked and used by anti-police activists further to undermine public trust and confidence in the police.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 183 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, which I am cosponsoring along with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I do not always agree with the Lib Dems, but I think the noble Lord’s arguments were very powerful and need to be listened to. The effect of this route is to sell permanent residence in the UK, and later even citizenship, to anyone who turns up with a couple of million to spare, with no questions asked about where that money came from. It is an extraordinary outcome. I can see why one might have thought this was a good idea initially, but it has turned into a nonsense.

As the Committee may know, this route is for individuals able to make an investment of £2 million. The applicant does not need a job offer or sponsor, and the visa includes all immediate family members. The tier 1 investor visa is initially granted for three years and four months and can then be extended for another two years by providing evidence of an investment of the required amount. The funds must be invested in UK gilts, bonds and equities only—of course, the money can be taken out of those afterwards, so it is a very convenient little entry for your money.

Currently, if you invest—so called—£2 million, you will get your permanent residence in five years; if you have £5 million to spare, it is three years; and if you have £10 million in your pockets, it is two years. The whole thing is just absolutely absurd, frankly. Indeed, between 2008 and 2020 it has led to a total of more than 12,000 such visas being issued. There is not even any economic benefit to the UK in this. According to Sir David Metcalf, a former chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, in 2014,

“the main beneficiaries are the migrants. Investors benefit from, for example, rule of law, property rights and access to efficient markets. Second, at present, the investment is a loan, not a gift.”

A MAC report from 2015 noted that the main proponents of this type of visas are—guess what—law firms, accountants and consultancies that help organise the affairs of such extraordinarily wealthy investors. There are also speculative concerns around whether this investor visa is being used by criminals. In an October 2015 report, Transparency International UK argued that it was highly likely that substantial amounts of corrupt wealth stolen in China and Russia had been laundered into the UK via this visa programme.

It is not clear what will happen to the tier 1 investor visa under the new points-based system—at least, it is not clear to me—but it seems that it will remain in place. I suggest that a thorough review is in order and, meanwhile, the route should be closed, as set out in this amendment.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am happy to join the noble Lords, Lord Green and Lord Wallace, and others who have brought this amendment. I may not agree with all that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, says, but I share with him a passion for the rule of law and a real concern for our reputation for protecting the rule of law. It is a real irony that our reputation for protecting the rule of law is one of the things that attracts people who have very little regard for the rule of law themselves and come from countries which ignore it almost altogether. I am afraid that this Government and their predecessor have a very inadequate record in responding to the threat of corruption of all sorts, and of course I support the proposals in this amendment.

In 2016, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron made a seminal speech about the importance of stamping out corruption. The Minister will remember the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and what a nuisance I was during its passage. I found it inadequate in a number of respects, including unexplained wealth orders, which I did not consider were nearly tough enough. I also put down amendments to try to persuade the Government to establish a register of overseas entities’ property, in order to try to reveal a great deal more about who actually owns vast parts of London. The noble Baroness was emollient and responded that as soon as parliamentary time allowed, there would be an appropriate response. I was slightly reassured by that. I continued to harry the Government. I asked the noble Lord, Lord Young, when he was a Minister, about the progress of matters. He was reassuring—none more reassuring than he—and said good progress was being made.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

On another requirement, that of presenting directly to the authorities, I think the right reverend Prelate already referred to the fact that in many of these cases—for example, wives who have fled from abusive marriages in a conservative religious country such as Pakistan—people have to flee in a clandestine way. That was the word used before. The idea that they can present themselves straightaway—for example, to a male representative of authority—and describe their situation seems unrealistic in many of these cases. Yes, it is true that we welcome large numbers of people under resettlement schemes—Afghanistan and Hong Kong are examples of those—but when we are talking about these other refugees, whom I would describe as the genuine refugees seeking one by one to escape from persecution, it seems to me that Clauses 11 and 36 as currently worded are inconsistent with the convention. For that reason, like my noble and learned friend Lord Brown, I would object to them.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, and I agree with his analysis entirely. I just wanted to ask him this question, which the Committee might want to know the answer to: if his view, and the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, is right, what would be the consequences of some of these cases—were the Bill to become enacted as it is—if they reached the courts?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Strictly speaking, the legal position is that there is no basis for individuals to enforce the convention, but it is enforceable by other member states, which can complain that this country is not complying with its obligations. I would expect that that may well happen. So far as coming here illegally is concerned, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown referred to the Adimi case, which was about whether there was an illegal entry. He held that there was not, because although these refugees passed through intermediate states, they did in fact come directly. So, the individual is placed in a not very satisfactory situation, but the state can certainly be held accountable in the International Court of Justice, and that may well happen.

If I may now descend from the wider view to the narrower, I want to deal with a point I have raised in relation to Clause 11(3) and other similar clauses which impose a requirement on a refugee. The requirement, as it were, or even a breach of it can be overcome if

“they can show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence”,

and there are other provisions saying that this can happen where there is a “reasonable” expectation of something happening or where something is “reasonably practicable”. In all those cases, I have sought to table an amendment which says that, in deciding what is good cause, practicable or reasonable, the immigration officer should take into account any protected characteristic of the refugee within the meaning of the Equality Act which is innate or immutable. I do not want to get too involved in the legality of those terms; basically, that is relevant under decisions in our law to people who claim to be a member of a particular social group. Being a member of particular social group that is being persecuted is one of the categories of refugee in Article 1 of the convention, so I do not want to spend too much time on that. There are nine protected characteristics in the Equality Act, but only some of those will be innate or immutable.

That expression, “innate”, is used in the Bill itself in describing the meaning of a particular social group. Your Lordships will find it in Clause 32, which also expressly states that a

“social group may include a group based on a common characteristic of sexual orientation”.

I want to take up that point to explain why I suggest it is necessary that wherever there is a reference to reasonable cause, reasonable expectation or what is practicable—as I have said—there is an express statement in the Bill that the fact that the refugee has a protected characteristic which is innate or immutable should be taken into account.

I want to take the case of LGBTQI+ people to illustrate the reasons why. First, experience has shown that, all too often, difficulties arising from a characteristic such as that have not been taken sufficiently into account. The approach to LGBTQI+ refugees has often been woefully inadequate and misguided. It was not until the 2010 decision of the Appellate Committee of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) that it was established that the Home Office could not refuse an asylum claim from a gay man or lesbian simply on the basis that if they could reasonably be expected to act discreetly in their home country, rather than live openly with their sexuality, they would not suffer persecution. Therefore, it was only some 12 years ago that the Home Office, which fought HJ (Iran) right up to the highest court in the land, was obliged to accept that its approach to LGBTQI+ refugees, in the words of then Supreme Court Justice Sir John Dyson—later Lord Dyson and Master of the Rolls—frustrated

“the humanitarian objective of the Convention and”

denied LGBTQI+ people

“the enjoyment of their fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.”

Secondly, it is well known that LGBTQI+ refugees face a large number of practical difficulties in claiming asylum. I will address these in due course, when we come to the relevant clauses in the Bill, to show why there has been a failure to satisfy a particular requirement. In the case of Clause 11(2)(b), the issue is whether they presented themselves without delay to the authorities and can show good cause for their unlawful entry. This is the question of clandestine exit. As I have said, it applies also to abused women in abusive relationships coming from a conservative religious community. They cannot go and buy a plane ticket. They cannot indicate in any way in these countries what the reason for their seeking asylum is. The result could be honour killings, stoning or being thrown off a wall, so they keep their characteristics as far as possible to themselves. It is not surprising that they are slow to report themselves or that their routes here are clandestine.

Finally, on this point, the Home Office’s own statistics show the extent to which claims by LGBTQ+ asylum seekers have been wrongly rejected by immigration officers. Experimental statistics published by the Government in August 2019 on lesbian, gay and bisexual asylum claims show there was an initial decision grant rate of 29% in 2018. However, 38% of appeals relating to LGBT asylum applications were allowed in respect of applications made in 2015-18. These published statistics are qualified in some respects but, in broad terms, they reflect the reality of a substantial proportion of successful appeals. That is why, in my suggestion, wherever we see in this Bill as currently framed any reference to good cause, those with protected characteristics that are innate or immutable must be protected by an express reference on the face of the Bill.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meyer (Con)]

My Lords, I support this amendment, and the first thing I want to say is that we are talking only about men who have not transitioned to women, which is quite different.

Although we have come a long way since the 2007 Corston report to improve conditions for women in prisons, we are now failing them. Indeed, something has recently gone badly wrong. Women prisoners have a right to the security of a single-sex space. By definition, women are deprived of this security if men are admitted to their prison, including trans women prisoners of male sex, whether or not they have the benefit of a GRC. By the same token, a women’s prison is no place for vulnerable at-risk males. Prison policy must provide for the protection of everybody, and this amendment makes that clear.

How then have we allowed prison policy to be captured by a concern for the protection of trans prisoners at the cost of imprisoned women’s most fundamental rights? There is no balance or fairness in that. The answer of course is that government departments have allowed themselves to be influenced, even intimidated, by noisy and modish pressure groups, whose wilful ignorance of basic science has all the features of a cult.

I have never visited or been to a prison, but as a woman I can imagine how it must be to be incarcerated and threatened. On this note, I very much support this amendment and thank my noble friends Lord Blencathra, Lord Farmer and Lord Cormack for tabling it.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have visited a number of prisons, both women’s prisons and male prisons. I have also sat where the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, sits and answered a number of difficult questions about where you house those who have transitioned, or purport to transition, usually from the male gender to the female gender. It is an incredibly difficult task that the Ministry has to perform, and it requires assessment and nuance. As a young barrister, I had the privilege of representing April Ashley, a pioneer in this field who died about three weeks ago. She changed from a man to a woman after pioneering surgery in north Africa and had lived successfully as a woman for 30 years when she was arrested by the police and thrown into a male jail. She was philosophical about the unfair charge, but less philosophical about the desperately inconsiderate approach that was shown by the police.

Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 25th April 2017 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

1: Clause 1, page 2, line 26, at end insert “, or to answer questions on oath”

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, the Bill, which has been welcomed across the House, has been the Government’s response to the undoubted need to give law enforcement agencies the necessary capabilities and powers to recover the proceeds of crime, tackle money laundering and corruption and counter terrorist financing. No one could doubt that these are very real problems, and we must ensure that we respond adequately to the threats posed by corruption in its many guises. Throughout the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House, the Minister and the Bill team have been very helpful in providing information and explanations in respect of this quite complex legislation. The Government have also tabled some useful amendments as the Bill has progressed.

I am particularly enthusiastic about the potential use that could be made of unexplained wealth orders, which are featured in Chapter 1. There has been precedent for this, provided principally by Ireland and Australia. By and large those orders have been useful, and they have the potential to provide the basis for investigating criminal offences and recovering the proceeds of criminal activity. My concern has always been to ensure that the provisions are as effective as they can be. The opportunities for further legislation in the next few years are going to be very limited, for reasons that the House is only too well aware of. I hope UWOs will be used much more than was suggested. The revised impact assessment indicated that only about 20 UWOs a year might be obtained. The Minister assured me that that was only an estimate, and I hope it was a very conservative one.

Until last Friday we had not seen the promised code of practice relating to UWOs and other provisions in the Bill. Somewhat at the 11th hour, after I had tabled a number of amendments, it arrived. I am grateful to the Minister for providing it, and I will of course factor its contents into my remarks on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hodgson.

We had a number of debates about the safeguards in the Bill. I feel confident that the House is satisfied that they are perfectly adequate, particularly now that there is even a provision for compensation for a respondent whose assets have been wrongly frozen. In addition, there are of course restrictions on the freezing orders that would normally accompany a UWO, and any orders can be varied and discharged.

My concern, however, remains how easy it will be for respondents to deal inadequately with a UWO and render ineffective the Bill’s provisions. It has to be accepted that UWO respondents who have invested the proceeds of tax evasion and/or bribery in specific property will be unlikely to want to be frank about their conduct if they can possibly avoid doing so. Why, then, can it not be appropriate for there to be a power to make an order to compel a respondent to give evidence on oath? It would be only a power, and in many circumstances I concede that a court might be satisfied with a statement, but if the statement is inadequate the very existence of the power, which could be exercised only by a High Court judge, would in my view be extremely salutary.

The Bill sets out the requirements that must be met before an unexplained wealth order is made, and allows a respondent a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with any order. I invite my noble friend to explain to the House why she still thinks it is inappropriate for this power to exist. Nothing in the code of practice gives any answer to that.

The remainder of the amendments with which I am concerned in this group—apart from that which relates to property, particularly in central London—are about provisions in respect of non-compliance. My no doubt simplistic view is that you either comply with an order or you do not. The references to purported compliance seem to leave open the possibility that a respondent could simply go through the motions of providing information and say that they have purported to comply with the order. I take the point that the Bill contains the proviso that a misleading or reckless statement can constitute an offence, but it is not so much the deliberately misleading statement that I am worried about; rather more I fear the short, uninformative, heavily lawyered response which will provide no useful information but may still technically be a purported compliance with the order.

I looked for assistance on this point on the recently provided code of practice. Paragraph 20 states that a respondent will be treated as having failed to comply with a UWO if, without reasonable excuse, he fails to comply with all the requirements imposed by the order. The paragraph continues by stating that it is important to note that where a response is provided to a particular requirement in the UWO but that response is considered unsatisfactory, this does not mean that the respondent has failed to comply with the order; this would amount to purported compliance. That was precisely the point that I was making in the original amendment. A footnote states that an example of this would be where an individual provides nothing more than the bare minimum of information necessary to address each requirement in the order and as a result the agency is not satisfied by his explanation as to the derivation of the property. The footnote goes on to state that, in those circumstances, the rebuttable presumption that the property is recoverable does not arise, but the enforcement agency may elect to take further civil recovery action against the property in the light of evidence or lack of evidence provided by the individual. I should be grateful if the Minister could set out why the Government think it so important, in a number of areas identified in the amendments, to have these provisions about purporting.

Amendment 2 in this group and Amendment 24, which we will debate in the next group, concern a substantial problem: in central London, property—often extremely valuable property—is being bought by overseas companies and then left either empty and dark or occupied for only short periods. Parts of central London are entirely dark at night and, although London is the most obvious example, there is plenty of evidence of buying-up of property in other major cities and in some rural areas. Apart from the fact that it cannot be desirable that property is owned by those whose money has often come from illegal activities, there is the knock-on effect that it is having on the property market in general. Noble Lords are only too well aware of the intense difficulty faced by young people in buying property anywhere remotely near where they work, particularly in London, or indeed buying property at all. There are a number of reasons for this, but the situation is hardly helped when, according to the Land Registry figures, 100,000 properties are registered in the name of overseas companies. Unlike some countries, there is no restriction on foreign ownership of real property, and at the moment there is no sign of any decrease in the enthusiasm with which foreign investors are approaching the possibility of buying property here. Because of our respect for the rule of law and the independence of our judiciary, among other reasons, we are an attractive country in which to invest—particularly, I am afraid, to those who have ill-gotten gains for which they want to find a safe haven.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that my noble—and noble and learned—friends are satisfied and will not be inclined to press their points any further.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend and all noble Lords who spoke in this debate, and to the Minister for her response. It is a pity that the Government did not respond to these amendments in Committee. They have received support today and the code of practice does not seem to me to deal with them. On the simple question of purporting to comply, a number of speakers have said that one either complies or does not, and I say with respect that I fail to understand the response to those points. I think it was said that, even if there were purported compliance and not much information was obtained, it would still be technically successful as a UWO. That sounds very much like saying that the operation was a great success but the patient died. However, my noble friend the Minister seems convinced that this is sufficient and I bear in mind the fact that the agencies have no doubt had input into the provisions contained in the Bill.

Likewise, I am disappointed that there is no provision for a requirement to give evidence on oath. The mere existence of that power is likely to inhibit those who might otherwise wish to mislead the court. Of course, if they then came to give evidence, quite apart from the question of contempt of court, they could be prosecuted for perjury. That might give some more teeth to these provisions. I am, however, reassured that it will still be possible to feed some of these ideas into an improved code of practice, and I hope that these debates may have affected the minds of those who seek to improve that code of practice.

On the question of the London property market, I am afraid that I am still in the dark about the envelope tax. The existence of that tax does not seem to be consistent with the overall thrust behind the Bill. Its continued existence is an embarrassment, frankly, to the Government—but there it is. As to the amendment in relation to London property, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, suggested that I had been a little timid in respect of that amendment. In some ways she is right, but the attempt was to tie it specifically to the register that we were told was to come into existence. My noble and learned friend was quite right about the date of commencement—but, for reasons that will be apparent, I do not think that we need to trouble ourselves too much with that.

As my noble friend the Minister quite rightly said, the position is that we are against a time limit. It is important that the Bill becomes law, and any attempt to prevent that would not be helpful since there is all-party support for this. It is very much a step in the right direction and I do not wish to spoil the party. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support very much what the noble Lord, Lord Luce, has just said and respectfully associate myself with it. I strongly support Amendment 8. If I may put it this way, I think the Government, and particularly the Minister, have been extremely shrewd in taking the sting out of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, who has very wisely brought these issues to this House. The Government have picked them up and produced what seems to me to be the right approach to dealing with the overseas territories. The amendment provides a useful nudge to the overseas territories that the Government are looking at what they are doing, without imposing what is unacceptable upon these independent countries with their own constitutions and parliaments.

I do not agree with Amendment 14. I was at the meeting this morning where representatives from a number of overseas territories explained to us what they were doing. We have already heard about Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, which are doing very good work, and from Anguilla and Montserrat about the efforts they are making. We have heard from the Minister about the Turks and Caicos Islands, which with their new Government are now working to get this through. So the areas contained within Amendment 14 are already on the way, if not ahead of us in some cases, and it is not necessary that they should be referred to specifically in it. I do not want to hold everyone up. I support Amendment 8 and I do not think Amendment 14 is really necessary now.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 24 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts in this group. It concerns the setting up of a public register of beneficial ownership of UK property by companies and other legal entities registered outside the UK. Those are more or less the words that are the subject of a call for evidence issued by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in April this year. I do not know but I assume that the Home Office did a great deal to bring forward the publication of that report in the light of the debates which took place in Committee about the concern that was generally expressed about corruption and the acquisition of property in central London by overseas companies hiding behind anonymity.

The establishment of a public register was indeed a commitment made by the Government. Why do we need a register of this sort? I can do no better than quote briefly from the call for evidence, which says,

“the government is concerned about the potential for illegal activity to take place through overseas companies investing in the property sector. Some properties are owned through off-shore companies in order to obscure their true owners. This can make it difficult for regulators, legitimate businesses and the general public to know who the true owners are and can make it very difficult for law enforcement agencies to carry out effective investigations … Greater transparency of property ownership will make the job … easier and will discourage criminals and the corrupt from choosing the UK to hide or launder their money”.

It is made quite clear that the Government intend to introduce a register of beneficial owners of overseas companies but, as it is a call for evidence, it does not seek to prescribe the nature of that register but calls for advice and information to assist it in formulating the register. It may well be influenced by what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said about verification to make any such register particularly useful.

The amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hodgson simply asks the Government to do that and make it a part of the Bill. If we do not, there is real feeling that there will not be legislative time even in the Parliament that may start in June. I ask the Minister to reassure us that the register will be set up in short order.

Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 3rd April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Peterborough reminded us that corruption in the modern world is a moral issue—and so it is; perhaps one of the greatest moral issues that we face. I was reminded by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, that the great moral issue of the late 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century was slavery. It was the judgment of Lord Mansfield in the 1780s that put an end to slavery in this country.

The anti-slavery movement then began to campaign on the basis that if slavery is abolished in this country, how can it be that we permit it in our colonies, so that when a slave from the colonies comes to this country, the shackles fall away? It took until 1833 for William Wilberforce to lead a movement to pass the anti-slavery Act. Even then, it did not abolish slavery in the East India Company territories or in Ceylon.

However, at that time slavery continued in the United States; it took a civil war to put an end to slavery in the United States. The arguments advanced then were that if we abolished slavery in the colonies and the West Indies, it would undermine the economies of those territories. The same argument again was used: how will those colonies in the West Indies be able to compete with the United States in the production of sugar and cotton if slavery is abolished there?

The important point is that this country laid down the standard. We did not wait for global standards to be brought about; we took the lead. I urge the Government to take the lead, along the lines that have been advanced today by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, who sees not only the importance of having registers in the overseas territories but that there should be something behind it—the possibility of an Order in Council to deal with that moral issue if they do not take up the cudgels in the way that they should.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

I have a very short and slightly less theatrical point than the noble Lord’s—although the point he made was good. It relates to Amendment 169, which concerns the Crown dependencies. As at Second Reading, I declare an interest as the former Minister with responsibility for the constitutional relationship between the Crown and the Crown dependencies. It is a relationship of considerable importance to all parties involved, and of particular importance now with the prospect of Brexit. It is important that we maintain the competence of the Crown dependencies and it is also important that we do not exceed our constitutional role, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, in seeking to make laws that in my view are not consistent with the specific constitutional relationship that we have with the Crown dependencies.

I notice that the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, eschewed any reference to the Crown dependencies. Amendment 169 does not, however. Quite apart from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, in relation to subsection (4), I invite the Minister to accept that there is a real problem legally with this amendment and to endorse what I said at Second Reading: that all the Crown dependencies have made very real progress in co-operating to produce a register which is available to all law enforcement agencies.

[Lord Borwick (Con)]

My Lords, I became alarmed when I saw Amendment 167, and I then received a joint briefing on this specific amendment from groups such as Christian Aid, Oxfam and Save the Children—all great charities doing tremendously important work around the world.

What is clear is that this group of NGOs believes that countries like Bermuda cannot be trusted to run their own affairs and need orders from legislators in Britain. Noble Lords will know that Bermuda started its central register of beneficial ownership some 70 years ago—long before it was started in Britain. It is therefore offensive to believe that it is only the great parties here, and a bunch of patronising charities, that can help them. In fact, according to the IFC Forum, information on beneficial ownership of companies will be centrally held by all overseas territories from next year.

Data can be provided to the relevant authorities on the same day that it is requested. So Bermuda is actually ahead of other jurisdictions in this area. Targeting them, as has been done in this amendment, is especially misguided. In fact, the UK is the outlier. International standards do not require that we adopt a public register—and, unsurprisingly, most other countries are not adopting public registers. Our competitors in the US, Hong Kong and elsewhere will not be doing so.

We should consider what we risk losing. Reinsurance provision from Bermuda covered over 20% of flooding losses from the 2015 winter. It supports around 70,000 jobs in the UK and has provided our economy with £10 billion of capital since 2008. Forcing the overseas territories to go beyond what is required will simply mean that business moves elsewhere. It will move to financial centres that are less well regulated than ours—centres that will not co-operate with UK authorities—which is surely the opposite of what noble Lords are trying to achieve with this amendment.

Most politicians and civil servants simply do not understand the rule of unintended consequences. They think in straight lines, but the real world works differently. There are a large number of urgent problems in the world to be solved, and the efforts of these NGOs to create the ability for self-selecting, worldwide tax collectors to examine registers is unwise. Have these charities really decided that they have not got anything better to do?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in an excellent debate. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, along with others who have spoken with passion and given considered contributions on a crucial issue.

I have addressed much of what has been raised in correspondence with noble Lords, but I hope that the House will allow me to put certain points on the record. As David Cameron said last year, international corruption,

“is the cancer at the heart of so many of the world’s problems”.

The Panama papers revealed the extent to which anonymous shell companies are used to hide large sums of wealth and circumvent sanctions. The UK is a global leader in the fight against corruption, and we are proud to be at the forefront of international efforts to increase corporate transparency. This includes working with all UK overseas territories with financial centres, and with the Crown dependencies, to tackle money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption and fraud. The territories and dependencies are, in turn, committed to fully meeting international standards, and in some respects are going beyond them, and to working with us to ensure that they do not act as a hiding place for illicit financial flows.

Last year, the UK signed an exchange of notes with all overseas territories with significant financial centres and with the Crown dependencies, setting out new arrangements on law enforcement access to beneficial ownership data. The exchange of notes provides that, when they have not already done so, overseas territories and Crown dependencies must all set up central registers or similarly effective systems of beneficial ownership information. It also provides that UK law enforcement authorities should have the automatic right to access this information, which means that beneficial ownership information will be available within 24 hours, or within one hour in urgent cases. Ensuring that law enforcement authorities are able to establish who is the ultimate owner of companies registered in the overseas territories and Crown dependencies is a crucial part of tackling the complex criminal networks that can exploit the system.

These arrangements are due to be implemented no later than June this year and will put them well ahead of most jurisdictions in terms of transparency, including many of our G20 partners and other major corporate and financial centres, including some states in the United States. Once in place, these arrangements will bring significant law enforcement benefits. They will prevent criminals hiding behind anonymous shell companies and mark a significant increase in UK law enforcement authorities’ ability to investigate bribery and corruption, money laundering and tax evasion.

The noble Baroness and other noble Lords started off by asking for a global standard definition, and I thought that I might address that up front. There is no single definition of a global standard for reach and coverage, but organisations such as the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force are key to the development of international standards in this area. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, the UK believes that a public register is a powerful tool, and we will continue to make that point in international fora. However, the OECD has focused on accurate, independently verifiable data as an important standard, which all the overseas territories are looking to implement.

The EU has also played an important role in advocating transparency, but the fourth anti-money laundering directive does not require EU states to make their registers public. In this context, I reiterate that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies are actually ahead of the current standard in implementing the exchange of notes. I will come back to this when I address the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We are not saying that the global standard means that every country must have a public register, but we would certainly expect it to reflect the recommendations of groups like the OECD and FATF. The UK is leading the way in this area and we are, of course, working on transparency issues with international partners through these groups. I make it clear that the UK firmly believes that public registers are the gold standard. Our position has not changed, but putting a timeline on this work simply does not reflect the scale and complexity of these issues. The OTs and Crown dependencies will be significantly ahead of the global standard as it stands. They have their existing commitments and this, in itself, is moving the standard in the right direction.

Many noble Lords have asked about progress to date and I am pleased to be able to talk about that. We have been working closely with both the overseas territories and the Crown dependencies on implementation by the deadline. I can confirm that significant progress has been made and I will briefly share some highlights with noble Lords. The British Virgin Islands, one of the overseas territories, has already completed the technical construction and testing of its new cloud-based platform. It is now taking forward engagement with corporate service providers to ensure that data formatting is fully standardised in order to enable beneficial ownership data to be uploaded on to the system in advance of the deadline.

In December, the Cayman Islands Government passed an amendment to the Police Law, which is necessary for law enforcement co-operation, and have recently successfully amended three key pieces of legislation to underpin the functioning of their new system: the Companies Management Law, the Companies Law and the Limited Liability Companies Law. Bermuda has a long-standing central registry of beneficial ownership data. It is currently moving legislation through its legislature to enhance the register, including a requirement on legal entities in Bermuda to maintain registers of up-to-date information on their beneficial owners, and to file updated beneficial ownership information with the Bermuda Monetary Authority. Gibraltar is already committed to implementing the EU fourth anti-money laundering directive and has prepared legislation to take forward these commitments and the exchange of notes. The technical construction of its system is well advanced and it is now considering steps to populate the registry with data.

All these jurisdictions have also committed to the automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information, along with 50 other countries. This is important progress, but there is more to be done and we are not resting on our laurels. We are committed to following up on these arrangements to ensure that they deliver in practice. The exchanges of notes with all overseas territories and Crown dependencies make explicit provision for the Secretary of State and the Premier or Chief Minister to undertake a review of the arrangements six months after they come into force—that is, on 31 December 2017—and for further reviews to take place annually thereafter. The arrangements also provide for continuous monitoring by both parties. I hope this provides clear assurance that the effectiveness of the arrangements will be kept under careful scrutiny to ensure that they are meeting our law enforcement objectives.

The NCA has confirmed that it is already seeing enhanced co-operation from some overseas territories, and much shorter turnaround times for processing requests for information. We expect to see this further improved to meet the agreed standards by June this year. This progress demonstrates what can be achieved by working consensually with the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. It is reaping benefits and I believe it will continue to do so.

I turn to the amendments. Amendment 167 is similar to one tabled on Report in the Commons, in that it envisages a timetable for the adoption of public registers of beneficial ownership by the overseas territories. If they have not done so by the end of 2019, it would require the Government to force them to do so. The key difference with this amendment is that it does not cover Gibraltar.

Amendment 169 also requires the Government to support the Crown dependencies to establish public registers of beneficial ownership by the end of 2019, and to report to Parliament on the progress made. However, it does not require the Government to impose public registers on them.

A key feature of the Government’s approach is that it creates a level playing field between all of the overseas territories with financial centres and the Crown dependencies. By taking a different approach to the Crown dependencies and territories, these amendments risk disrupting this level playing field, creating weaknesses in certain jurisdictions that could be exploited and damaging the spirit of co-operation we have been able to create between them.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, made the point that Gibraltar need not be covered by Amendment 167 as it is committed to implementing the EU’s fourth anti-money laundering directive. However, it is important to note, as I said earlier, that the fourth anti-money laundering directive does not require member states to establish publicly accessible registers of beneficial ownership information, so to impose such a requirement on the overseas territories and Crown dependencies would go beyond what has been agreed with our neighbours in Europe. The provisions in the exchange of notes also go beyond the fourth anti-money laundering directive in providing UK law enforcement with access to information within 24 hours, and within one hour in certain cases.

Rather than imposing new requirements on the overseas territories, the Government feel strongly that we should continue to work with them and focus our efforts on the implementation of the existing arrangements, including the passage of new primary legislation in the territories and complex technological improvements. I recognise that it is the wish of some noble Lords that a timetable be set for public registers. However, the UK Government respect the constitutional relationship with the overseas territories and the Crown dependencies. My noble friend Lord Faulks queried whether there might be a legal issue. I suspect that he is right but I shall look into that before Report.

As I noted earlier, legislating for the overseas territories is something we have done only very rarely. It is done on issues such as the abolition of the death penalty, which raised issues of compliance with human rights obligations for which the UK retains responsibility. While tackling this kind of complex criminality and its consequences is extremely serious, there is a clear constitutional difference in the fact that financial services is an area that is devolved to territory Governments and, in the case of the Crown dependencies, the UK has never legislated for them without their consent. That may be the point to which my noble friend Lord Faulks referred.

[Lord Faulks]

I confirm that that is precisely the point I was making.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am so glad that I read it right. The UK is directly responsible for the OTs’ and the CDs’ compliance with international obligations, including the European Convention on Human Rights. It is our responsibility in international law, as the overseas territories have no legal personality under international law. That was a key factor in the UK taking the rare step to legislate for the OTs on the issue of, for example, the decriminalisation of homosexuality. While I acknowledge the moral dimension of tackling criminal finances, the same responsibility does not exist for financial services policy, which is OT government responsibility.

Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 28th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, my name is on a number of amendments. I wonder whether the noble Lord will allow me to expand on them a little.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson suggests in his amendment that the High Court should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt in relation to the requirements before making an unexplained wealth order. For reasons that I will come to, I do not support the amendment, but I think my noble friend seeks to provoke, understandably, a debate about the scope of UWOs and to understand how the Government intend to use them and what sort of evidence the agencies will obtain before seeking one.

The Government are absolutely right to bring forward these provisions in relation to unexplained wealth. Indeed, it is an exciting and significant new development. There is a precedent, provided principally by Ireland and Australia. I had the opportunity to read an extremely lengthy worldwide overview of the use of these orders, The Comparative Evaluation of UWOs by Booz Allen Hamilton, and a useful selection of essays from the White Collar Crime Centre dated January 2017 and edited by Jonathan Fisher QC of Bright Line Law Services Ltd. The main questions appear to be: who can UWOs be appropriately aimed at; how effective will they be; and, are there adequate safeguards? The other way of putting the last question is: do they have the potential to be unfair?

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[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 10, 13, 20 and 22 to 25 in this group, all of which are probing amendments. Amendment 10 modifies subsection (4) of the newly inserted Section 362B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The subsection sets out one of the three conditions that must be satisfied before an unexplained wealth order may be made:

“The High Court must be satisfied that … the respondent is a politically exposed person, or …there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that … the respondent is, or has been (whether in a part of the United Kingdom or elsewhere), or … a person connected with the respondent is, or has been, so involved”.


As I read it, it means that simply being a politically exposed person satisfies the condition. That is enough for the High Court: it does not need,

“the reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in serious crime”,

to be satisfied as well. That seems unnecessarily and dangerously broad.

It is probably unnecessary to remind the Committee that we are all PEPs. So are our families and our close associates. As the Government have made clear, and as the FCA is about to say in guidelines, most Back-Benchers, their families and associates should not require additional due diligence. Given that, we or our equivalents abroad should not be exposed to a harsher, more extensive and more intrusive regime. By replacing “or” with “and”, and by qualifying the definition of PEPs by inserting,

“who merits additional due diligence according to Financial Conduct Authority guidelines”,

my amendment removes this harsh, special treatment of non-EEA PEPs. For the condition to be fulfilled, the amendment requires that the PEPs are not ordinary PEPs but merit this additional due diligence and that there should be reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in serious crime.

Amendment 13 removes the exemption of UK and EEA PEPs from the conditions in subsection (4) of new Section 362B, in order to give the Minister the opportunity to explain why UK and EEA PEPs should not be treated exactly as all other PEPs.

Amendment 20 gives the Minister an opportunity to clear up an apparent anomaly. On page 5, subsection (2)(b) of the newly inserted Section 362E sets out the penalty for failure to respond properly to an unexplained wealth order. For summary conviction in England and Wales—and later, we see, in Scotland too—the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both. However, on the very next page, in subsection (2)(c), the penalty on summary conviction in Northern Ireland for exactly the same offence is set at imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine, or both. So in England and Wales and Scotland, you can go to prison for up to 12 months, but in Northern Ireland it is up to six months. Why? I would be grateful if the Minister could explain.

[Lord Faulks]

Before the noble Lord goes on to the next amendments, could he help the Committee with one point? He points to the position of PEPs and describes the potential vulnerability that quite ordinary people might have to these orders, but does he not think that subsection (3) of new Section 362B is a sufficient protection? It provides that the High Court,

“must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient for the purposes of enabling the respondent to obtain the property”.

That provides a hurdle that has to be surmounted, as well as establishing that someone is a PEP.

[Lord Sharkey]

If it were absolutely clear that you cannot obtain an unexplained wealth order without satisfying that condition, I would be happy, but I am not entirely sure that it is, and I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the noble Lord is correct.

Amendments 22 to 25 will allow the Minister to point out—if other noble Lords do not do so beforehand—where I have entirely missed the point. They refer to page 7 and subsections (2), (3) and (4) of new Section 362H. These subsections allow rules of court to provide for the practice and procedure to be followed relating to unexplained wealth orders before the High Court in Northern Ireland. There are similar but not identical subsections later in the Bill dealing with the same matter in Scotland. However, the Bill seems to be silent on how these matters are to be dealt with in the English and Welsh courts. I am sure I have missed something obvious here and would be grateful for enlightenment from the Minister.

There is another apparent anomaly in the sections dealing with the variation or discharge of an unexplained wealth order. I notice that the provision in Scotland is significantly different from that in Northern Ireland. On page 18, line 43, to line 1 on page 19, the Bill allows applications for variation or discharge to be made by “Scottish Ministers” or by,

“any person affected by the order”.

That is not the case for Northern Ireland, where application can be made only by the enforcement authorities or the respondent. Why is there this difference between Scotland and Northern Ireland? My Amendment 24 makes the process in Northern Ireland the same as in Scotland but, again, what about England and Wales? I look to the Minister to put me right on all this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness is right that both ends of the scale should be tackled, so I hope that law enforcement agencies will use the orders in a proportionate way to tackle criminal activity at both ends of the scale. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Baroness. She looks satisfied.

[Lord Faulks]

When questions were raised at Second Reading about the scope of the orders and how many might be issued, I referred to an assessment that was provided—with some difficulty—by the Government that only about 20 might be sought during the year. The Minister understandably said that that was only an estimate, based on general experience of civil recovery. However, does it not indicate that, rather than grasping low-hanging fruit, if anything this will be considerably resource-heavy and will probably be directed only at cases where the amount of wealth is significant enough to make the expenditure of time and money worth while?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend and the noble Baroness have made the case for both ends of the threshold. My noble friend talked about resources generally. One thing that came from the law enforcement agencies was that the issue was not resources but the tools to be able to tackle criminals. Also, law enforcement agencies do benefit from a proportion of the money recovered, so they are incentivised at both ends of the scale—and it will be up to legislators in this House and the other place to decide on the right balance to strike. But that was our rationale for the lower amount—and I know that the Government originally suggested £100,000.

The point about compensation is covered in government Amendments 28 and 56, and Amendments 29 and 57, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendments 28 and 56 introduce a compensation scheme in relation to the interim freezing orders that can support a UWO. Other powers to freeze property in POCA have connected compensation provisions. It is absolutely right that a person who has genuinely suffered a loss should have the ability to seek compensation where there has been serious default on the part of the enforcement agency. The “serious default” test is already used in POCA and is applicable here too. I hope that on that basis, the noble Baroness will agree that her amendments probably are superfluous in this instance.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Is the noble Lord talking about the high point with regard to the UWO triggering point? The Government have considered all options; they have suggested £100,000. The point was made that £50,000 was more appropriate, particularly in some of the devolved Administration areas, where property prices are generally lower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has made an argument for setting the bar higher. However, my noble friend also made the point that by setting the bar lower we might end up having more success, reaching not only the low-hanging fruit but the high-hanging fruit as well. I therefore hope that the noble Lord accepts that explanation. It is an objective consideration, but there are obviously many views about where the threshold should be set.

On Amendments 2, 5, 7, 16 and 18, tabled by my noble friend Lord Faulks, Amendments 2 and 7 seek to replace the term “holds” with “has a financial interest in” as the test for the High Court to consider. It is only fair that in serving a UWO the respondent must have some direct connection with the property that is of interest. “Holds” is a well-established concept in civil law, including in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and we believe that requiring a person to “hold” property is a proportionate approach. It is also our view that “holding” property includes holding an interest in that property. I hope that noble Lords are reassured by that assessment.

[Lord Faulks]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. I thought that the answer to this point was provided by the Government’s Amendment 21, therefore there is no need to refer to the provisions of POCA, because there is an internal reference to what “holding” means.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is correct, but I thought I might go through it. I am just being thorough.

Amendment 5 seeks to add the ability to interview a person “under oath” as a possible requirement of a UWO. It would already be a criminal offence for the respondent to knowingly or recklessly provide false or misleading information. We must also remember that this is only an investigative power; if the case leads to criminal proceedings, it would be subject to the usual rules of giving evidence and allow for interviews “under caution”.

Amendments 16 and 18 address the issue of “purported compliance”. If a person does not comply with a UWO, their property is presumed to be recoverable under civil recovery proceedings. Given the severe consequences of not complying, it is right that this rebuttable presumption should not apply to a person who purports to provide a response. This avoids any legal ambiguity as to when the presumption will apply. However, where that individual provides responses that do not satisfy the enforcement agency, he or she then runs the risk that the poor quality of the responses will encourage the agency to take further action, and in those circumstances the burden of proof switches back to law enforcement, as is normal.

Purported compliance applies to a scenario where all the requirements of a UWO have been met but where the response is less than satisfactory. The agency is able to tailor the request for information very specifically, so will have some control over this. We do not want to get into arguments before the courts as to whether the presumption should apply and whether the individual has complied.

Finally, the UWO provisions will allow the enforcement authority to make very specific requests for information, reducing the risk of a low-value response being provided. I hope that my noble friend will feel that this addresses the point he has so expertly raised. He also raised a point about gambling. With regard to the Ladbrokes test or the William Hill defence, we would expect a high level of evidence to prove that, and we would expect it to meet the requirements of the UWO. The UWO will have achieved its purpose by flushing out information.

My noble friend also asked whether we would publish the code of practice before Report. The answer is yes. I undertook to discuss publication of the update to the relevant code of practice with my officials and ministerial colleagues, and it is my intention that the draft code will be available to noble Lords prior to Report.

I now turn to Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. This would require the High Court to be satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt” with regard to each of the requirements before issuing a UWO. This is an investigative power, as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said, so the test of “reasonable suspicion” is quite normal and consistent with existing law, including Part 8 of POCA. The balance of probabilities applies here, as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and my noble friend Lord Faulks said, and I hope that my noble friend will agree that it would not be appropriate to impose a criminal law standard in such cases.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked about the reversal of the burden of proof. We accept that there is a reversal of the burden of proof but it is in very specific and narrow circumstances. There has to be a link to a PEP or a serious criminal. This is a proportionate use of operational need. As an investigation power, there is the opportunity to address this issue in any subsequent proceedings. As my noble friend said, Transparency International has approved this approach.

My noble friend also asked about the use of legal advisers if a client is subject to a UWO, but we do not consider that an amendment is required to the laws on legal privilege. The lawyer role is unchanged, and the lawyer has the same responsibility to file a SAR if he has a relevant suspicion. It will be a question of the facts in each case.

I now turn to Amendments 10, 13, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 35 and 37, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. I think that these broadly separate out into two topics: first, the application of UWOs to PEPs, and, secondly, the court process in Northern Ireland. UWOs can be made either where there is suspicion of involvement in serious crime or in relation to non-EEA politically exposed persons. In that sense, I want to make it clear that politicians and senior officials in the UK and the EEA are covered by the first element of this power where they are suspected of being involved in serious criminality.

The reason for the second limb is to plug a gap experienced by law enforcement agencies when they investigate politically exposed persons. The issue arises in cases where critical evidence is available only in the PEP’s home country, which lacks the capabilities necessary to gather it itself. Conversely, in relation to UK PEPs and those across the European Economic Area, if the evidence exists it will be obtainable, so the same issues do not arise. There is no gap in these cases. That means it should be possible to evidence suspicion of involvement in serious crime.

On the noble Lord’s point about the FCA guidelines, these relate to the regulatory obligations of banks and other institutions. UWOs are not to do with the regulatory burden and responsibilities of the financial industry, so reference to the FCA is not strictly relevant here.

On increasing the sentence on summary conviction in Northern Ireland to 12 months, the current provisions reflect the approach taken to sentencing for other “either way” offences in the Bill, and which also correspond to offences in POCA already. The 12-month point for England and Wales arises from an amendment to the approach to sentencing in the magistrates’ courts which derives from Sections 281 and 282 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those amendments did not extend to Northern Ireland. In relation to the ability to make rules of court and other procedures in the High Court, including the variation or discharge of a UWO, specific provisions are not required in the Bill for England and Wales. However, express provision is required for the High Court in Northern Ireland to put them on the same footing.

The noble Lord also asked about Scotland. There is a constitutional division of powers between Scottish Ministers and the Lord Advocate, which is obviously specific to Scotland. We need to be certain that there is an ability of the Scottish Minister to disclose information onwards. The provisions presume that if a response is made to a UWO, this information could be disclosed onwards for consideration of a criminal investigation and/or prosecution. Therefore, in the Scottish context, Scottish Ministers apply for UWOs so that they will receive any information in response to such. If they consider that this information suggests that a criminal investigation and proceeding may be appropriate, they would need to refer the material to the Lord Advocate. The amendments provide that Scottish Ministers can disclose the information to the Lord Advocate for this very purpose. They also make certain that there is no suggestion that Scottish Ministers are tasking the Lord Advocate, merely that the material can be referred for independent consideration by the Lord Advocate. That is important due to the constitutional structure in Scotland.

Amendment 24 provides for any person affected by a UWO to apply for its variation or discharge, and not just the applicant and respondent. As a specifically focused investigation order, only the applicant and respondent are directly affected by the UWO. This is because the UWO requires the respondent to provide information, but does not itself affect any other interests in the property.

Finally, we reach the other amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendments 26 and 54 would provide that the application to freeze property need not be made at the same time as the application for a UWO. It is right that all matters relating to the person and property should be dealt with in one hearing. This also gives certainty to the respondent. Should the enforcement agency wish to freeze the property at any other time, it will be able to do so under the main freezing order provisions in POCA, provided that the relevant test can be met.

With reference to UWOs, the noble Baroness asked about the need for the ownership register. Open source material that already exists can be of assistance; for example, the Land Registry, public accounts and records at Companies House. Other countries may already have public registers of ownership and income. In these circumstances, our law enforcement agencies would have access to them. We should also note that the UK has public registers of beneficial ownership.

I turn finally to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. He talked about altering the threshold but still having the safeguards. On the threshold, it must be remembered that the High Court has to be satisfied that there is still a link to serious crime or that someone is a PEP. That is a significant test. It focuses the use of the power in relation to the amount, and that is dropped by our amendments. The court has to show not only the value of the property but that the respondent does not have any obvious legitimate income.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

11: Clause 1, page 3, line 5, at end insert—
“(c) the respondent has a financial interest in land or property in England and Wales which is registered in the name of an overseas company.”

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, a walk around the centre of London after dark reveals that large parts of the city are wholly unilluminated. Why are the lights off? Is it that most Londoners are getting an early night? I think not. The fact is that many high-end properties are unoccupied and are used as investment vehicles by those who regard London as a safe haven for their money, often unlawfully acquired. In September 2016 the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, launched an inquiry into the impact of foreign investment flooding into London’s housing market. Lest my submission be considered too London-centric—I declare an interest as a resident of central London—such investment has also been going on in Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, among other cities. Mayor Khan said on launching the inquiry that we all need to be reassured that dirty money is not flooding into the property market.

Property that is the subject of a UWO does not have to be real property, but real property has the advantage of being less easy to dispose of informally and quickly. Your Lordships have already heard me and others discuss the importance of tightening up the provisions in relation to compliance with UWOs to deal with the potential for evading the orders. In this context, I am particularly concerned about property owned by overseas companies. On 17 March 2016, the Land Registry published the fact that it had registered 100,000 freehold and leasehold properties in the name of overseas companies. I should make it clear that the list excludes private individuals, UK companies, UK companies with an overseas address and charities. Noble Lords may be aware that unlike in most countries, there are absolutely no restrictions on foreign ownership of residential property in the United Kingdom.

Do we really think that all this property is being acquired with clean money? Are solicitors and agents complying with anti-money laundering provisions? I know that tightening up those provisions is the subject of later amendments. I read last week in the Times that only five people have been convicted of money laundering in the 10 years since the legislation was apparently tightened. The Law Society is on record as saying:

“Compliance with money laundering obligations is one of the greatest challenges for solicitors in the UK today”.


What about the obligations of estate agents? Of these properties owned by overseas companies, how many are polluted by dirty money? I mentioned at Second Reading the envelope tax. This was a reference to the super-rich being prepared to pay something like £218,000 a year in tax rather than identify who owns property. I asked the Minister whether the Government were happy with this state of affairs. Her answer was that UWOs will,

“make it easier for our law enforcement agencies to investigate money laundering in the London property market and recover the proceeds of crime”.—[Official Report, 9/3/17; col. 1519.]

She also mentioned the importance of ensuring that lawyers, estate agents and other professionals comply with their money laundering obligations. Apparently the Treasury will in due course publish its findings in relation to the supervisory regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, referred to his kleptocracy tour in his speech at Second Reading, while the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, cited the report of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Anti-Corruption, which takes the view that more than £4 billion-worth of properties have been bought with suspicious wealth. My noble friend Lord Patten endorsed all the comments that were made at Second Reading about the devastating effect of dirty money on the occupancy of London properties. The Minister said that,

“the Government intend to publish a call for evidence, seeking views on a new register of overseas companies that own property in the UK”.

She said that the Government,

“hope to do so shortly and will then introduce the relevant legislation when parliamentary time allows”.—[Official Report, 9/3/17; col. 1519.]

As I have explained in relation to other amendments, I do not think that parliamentary time is likely to be available in the foreseeable future, so we must seize the legislative opportunity as it now presents itself.

London is in danger of becoming a safe haven for dirty money. This is partly because of our reputation for maintaining the rule of law and because we are generally regarded as a good home for foreign investment. I certainly would not want to deter investment, particularly in the uncertain economic times that lie ahead, but I deprecate this assault on the London property market, the effect it is having on Londoners and how it is adding to the pressure that exists in the London property market, which falls particularly harshly on those seeking to acquire their first properties. We should do everything we can to make these provisions effective.

The legislation currently provides that the court must be satisfied that a respondent is a PEP, has been involved in serious crime, or that there is at least a reasonable suspicion of involvement. The amendment in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, who unfortunately is unwell, would add to that,

“the respondent has a financial interest in land or property in England and Wales … registered in the name of an overseas company”.

This would make it easier for the agencies to obtain a UWO in circumstances where they do not have much evidence of involvement in serious crime or the respondent is not a PEP, but they have suspicions about the source of money used in the acquisition of property. My noble friend Lord Leigh referred to his familiarity with questions being posed by the Revenue. The High Court would still have to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the respondent’s lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient, but this should not be too high a bar to surmount.

Would this create any unfairness? I do not see why. If the property has been acquired with honest money, an explanation could be provided that would comply with the order. I ask the Minister: how, if at all, will UWOs be used to get at the problem that has been identified by me and a number of other noble Lords? Will she explain why she objects, if she does, to this amendment, or at the very least explain what improvements will be made to deal with this very real problem? Her answer may be partially to rely on the very recently proposed government Amendment 21. I am not sure that that does the trick. This a very important point and a real opportunity. I beg to move.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this amendment, but it gives me the opportunity to raise the point that I wanted to raise today anyway following Second Reading. I agree with everything that the noble Lord just said. From memory, I think the figure is that 9.3% of the properties in Westminster are owned by overseas companies from jurisdictions that maintain secrecy. That is a huge percentage of the properties in one local authority area.

The issue I want to raise is that the money comes into this country from somewhere. Basically, it must come through the banks. At Second Reading I made the point:

“As far as I know, no bank has ever been prosecuted in the UK for laundering corrupt wealth from another country”.—[Official Report, 9/3/17; col. 1487.]


The Minister responded by saying:

“The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, talked about fines on banks in the UK. He raised the issue of banks in the UK not being penalised for laundering funds from overseas. I have a huge list of fines, which I will not read out today, because it would take up valuable time in responding … I will send it to him … and place a copy in the Library”.—[Official Report, 9/3/17; cols. 1520-21.]


When the noble Baroness wrote to Members who had participated at Second Reading, she neglected to mention anything about that exchange, so I contacted her office just to remind them. I was sent a letter, which I presume others would have had, dated 21 March. Attached to it were details of some of the most significant fines imposed in recent years on financial institutions with a presence in the UK. They related to tax fraud, money laundering and financial crimes. The vast pile of papers that the Minister said she had at Second Reading amounts to four sheets, but only three banks in the UK are mentioned: Barclays, Deutsche Bank and Sonali. Not one of them has been prosecuted for money laundering. They have had fines levied on them by the Financial Conduct Authority, but not one has been found guilty of money laundering.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I hope the noble Lord does not think that I have ever tried to mislead the House. I talked about fines, but where a bank was found to have committed a criminal offence, a prosecution could be undertaken. Investigations and prosecutions are a matter for law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. I take the point that he is making, but this is open to law enforcement. Last month, a £163 million fine was issued to Deutsche Bank, and I would suggest that hitting them where it hurts probably involves hitting them in their pockets. It is open to law enforcement to prosecute banks, but I take the noble Lord’s point in that, today, I know of no prosecutions of banks. But the fines regime is in place.

I am very grateful for the amendment but hope that my noble friend has been assured that there is not a gap in existing powers that would justify extending UWOs in the way proposed. I hope he will feel content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in the debate and for the general support for what lay behind this amendment, which is a widespread concern about the London property market in particular and the degree to which it is clear that corrupt money has entered it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made a number of important points—particularly that I am not learned. He was also correct to say that the word “or” was missing from the amendment, and made some other drafting suggestions. He was also right to suggest that this is not a panacea, but it was not designed to be. The amendment was intended to provoke the sort of debate we have had and to ask the Government whether they are truly satisfied that the evil we have identified is being answered, and in particular whether anything in the Bill can be used to deal with the problem.

My noble friend the Minister has said that the provision covers those who are PEPs within the definition of the Bill or those suspected of serious criminality. But what, I ask, about those who may not easily be defined as being “suspected of serious criminality” but are in fact gangsters? What of those who have high office but do not come within the definition of PEPs? With many of the properties, it will be difficult to determine precisely who owns them. All that we ask for is an unexplained wealth order—it is not a criminal offence; it is a civil procedure which results, if there is no adequate explanation, in civil recovery. That, I suggest, will help deter the incursion of corrupt money. The provisions contain safeguards on self-incrimination and compensation. Let us not be too pusillanimous about this. My noble friend said that she had received my request for information about the envelope tax at Second Reading and she has again, but she has not yet replied. On the face of it, that is in stark contradiction to the policy that underlies the UWOs.

We will miss a legislative opportunity if we do not do something through the Bill to sort out the problem we have identified. I hope that my noble friend will speak to her officials and be satisfied that there is no gap, no lacuna, in this approach.

[Lord Rooker]

Perhaps through the noble Lord, as the Minister talks to her officials, I can invite her to watch two films: “From Russia with Cash” and “From Ukraine with Cash”. They are on the same CD. If she does not have access to them, I will provide her with a copy. They spell out that there is a serious problem.

[Lord Faulks]

I am very grateful for that intervention, which supports the point that these effective owners may not be PEPs within the definition and it may be difficult to pinpoint serious criminality. We must do something about this. I look to the Minister to provide a better solution than exists at the moment. If not, we will be letting the country down and letting Londoners down, particularly young, aspirant Londoners. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I suggest that whistleblowers need to be both protected and rewarded in order to encourage them. The Mauritian legislation of which I spoke earlier makes provision for rewards to be paid to whistleblowers whose information leads to the confiscation of unexplained wealth. Indeed, the board that I chair has the function of making such awards. In my view this is a salutary provision as one of the weapons in the fight against crime and corruption. Therefore, I support in principle this amendment, but as a starting point because I suggest that it is a principle that should be applied much more widely in the case of action taken that leads to the recovery of the proceeds of crime.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am sure the whole House shares the concern that the noble Baroness has expressed about whistleblowing and its importance generally. However, I respectfully submit that this amendment is a pretty substantial response to that. It seeks to set up a whole department—the office of the whistleblower. I accept that this is something of a probing amendment and therefore bears the standard for what the noble Baroness may hope to come, but it is little short of a job-creation scheme. The proposed functions of the office of the whistleblower are extensive and it would have powers. Of course, if an office is created, those who are given that office will appoint others to work for them and powers will be exercised. If they are not exercised it would be suggested that they were not doing their job. Before we know where we are, we will have a substantial bureaucracy that runs the risk of having the same problems that exist in other areas of bureaucratic supervision of financial institutions.

The question of incentives is interesting. I accept that that they have had some success in the United States and, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, in Mauritius too. But as to the question of “retaliatory action against whistleblowers”, a whistleblower has remedies in civil law in any event. When she comes to respond to the Minister, will the noble Baroness give us some idea what is meant by the provision with regard to “retaliatory action against whistleblowers”? The criminal law exists and civil remedies exist for employees and I wonder whether that is not inviting something rather too much. Of course, she rightly acknowledges that whistleblowers are not entirely based in the financial institutions; they exist in the NHS and have recently been considered by Sir Robert Francis and in all other government departments.

The real question is whether the establishment of this no doubt expensive bureaucracy will deter and whether it will result in the detection of what would otherwise not have been detected. While I applaud the general thrust of the amendment, I wonder whether it is something of an overreaction.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised the issue of whistleblowing in her contribution at Second Reading and now proposes this new clause today with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. As we have heard, it would establish an office of the whistleblower. The purpose would be to offer much-needed protection to whistleblowers who expose criminality, corruption, fraud and other illegal activity. The price that whistleblowers often pay for alerting the authorities to illegal and criminal activity is to lose their jobs and have their careers ruined and destroyed.

The noble Baroness is right to highlight that we need to do more to offer protection and compensation to people who come forward and alert the authorities to the illegal activity. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, supported action and I agree. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that setting up an office may not be the right way to go about that. What is definitely needed is further protection in statute and regulation. It may not need an office to be established. I will be interested to hear the response from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, to this amendment. I entirely accept that it is a probing amendment and I think that we should take the opportunity that this Bill affords us to do something to address the issue of whistleblowers and the precarious position that they can find themselves in, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has highlighted to the House today. I accept that whistleblowing goes across a variety of sectors, but we are dealing with the financial services sector and this would be a good place to start.