Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Frost and Baroness Lawlor

Committee stage
Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 72 and 80 in my name. I will not say anything about autonomy other than to mention to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that although it is a philosophical concept which was drafted in recent centuries, academic philosophy is very divided on how worthwhile it is as a concept.

I begin with my Amendment 80, which would substitute some detail for the very vague requirement that death within six months can reasonably be expected. We have already heard in the Committee, from everybody—not only today but on other days—that certain diagnosis is a very inexact science, and that diagnosing someone as having six months is very inexact.

We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, in opening, that conditions can differ, patterns can differ and patients can differ—we also heard that from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. Therefore, each patient must be assessed on an individual basis.

Against that, my Amendment 80 proposes that the difficult job of assessment is done by two consultants specialising in the relevant area, and it pins down that the expectation should instead be an 80% probability. If the sponsors are in earnest that those eligible really should be those who are within six months of death, they should be pleased to accept an amendment that tries to overcome the inexactness of such judgments by requiring confirmation by two of the most qualified experts in the area, and they should accept that an 80% likelihood is what, in this context, can reasonably be expected.

I move on briefly to Amendment 72. The Bill already refuses eligibility for assisted suicide when a condition that in itself is diagnosed to lead to death within six months can be reversed. My amendment takes the next logical step by limiting eligibility to cases where the condition not only cannot be reversed but cannot be relieved, controlled or ameliorated; I am adding to what has already been proposed in that group. The amendment aims to substitute a constructive, optimistic approach to treating illness, rather than one that writes off the patient and points them on the path to suicide.

That requirement—that, when steps can be taken to relieve, control or ameliorate a disease, the patient can no longer be considered for assisted suicide—will remove many otherwise difficult cases from this murky area and allow the mechanisms to operate as best they can for those for whom the Bill, on its face, intends them: people whose deterioration is inevitable.

There is an even more pressing reason than those two to accept this amendment: unless we positively exclude from eligibility patients whose condition could be relieved, controlled or ameliorated, we set up the conditions in which the relief, control and amelioration of terminal illnesses will become increasingly rare. We have heard of some remarkable instances today, not least from the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton—whom I am delighted to see back. Why would an overburdened health service try to give some extra months of life, give a higher degree of relief of pain, or ameliorate or arrest the progression of the disease, when it is so much easier to direct the patient, either implicitly or by expectation, towards assisted suicide?

What about relatives—even no more than ordinarily unscrupulous or greedy ones, or merely selfish ones—for whom the speedy death of their loved one is likely to seem desirable? We may also reasonably fear an overzealous state service committed to the task of accelerating the pathways of such unfortunate cases to their ends. My amendment guards against those consequences—some of the worst of a Bill so rich and varied in its capacity for harm.

[Lord Frost (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to introduce Amendment 84, which has already been touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer. I am grateful to, and thank, the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, for his support.

This group, as we have heard, is primarily about the definition of terminal illness. My amendment in this group touches on a somewhat different but related and important point, which is whether the terminal illness criterion—the existence of terminal illness—is in itself sufficient as a criterion. I am doubtful that it is, and that is why I have proposed this amendment.

As your Lordships know, there are two different models around the world for the kind of law that we are considering. Both include a terminal illness criterion. One type also has a suffering criterion, and that is the model used, as has been said, in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere. The second type does not; it rests entirely on the concept of autonomy—the belief that if you know or have been told that you are going to die soon, you have the right to ask the state to allow you access to assisted suicide. I will say more about this autonomy point in a moment.

To state the obvious, the Bill is based on the second of those two models, but one of the problems is that much of the campaign for it is based on the first model—the assumption of a suffering criterion. Hence my amendment would introduce the concept of unbearable suffering that could not be relieved by treatment. It is probing; it aims to test the reasoning behind the preference of the Bill’s supporters for that type of model.

My amendment would do four things, and some of what I am about to say has already been touched on, so I will be brief. First, it would align the legal test in the Bill with the public justification for the Bill. It is clear that the campaign around the Bill bases much of its work on the need to deal with suffering and, if suffering is the moral foundation offered to the public, it should be in any eventual statute. It is clear from all the discussion around the Bill that many voters believe it already is in the Bill, and it should be.

Secondly, it would stop drift and the slippery slope. The problem here is that, if the real justification for access to assisted suicide is autonomy, what is the justification for the robustness of the six-month limit? We have heard that provisions in the Bill are vulnerable to court rulings, judicial review and the existence of the ECHR—although there is, of course, a way of resolving that particular problem—other broader principles and specific legislation such as the Equality Act. A suffering-led criterion would help Parliament to draw and defend a clear and principled line.

Thirdly, it is relatively—not totally, but relatively—easy to identify unbearable suffering. As has been noted, it is usually obvious from demeanour and body language when there is frequent and unbearable pain. This helps distinguish between qualifying and non-qualifying reasons for access to assisted dying, such as social pressures. This is vital given that we have already heard from the sponsor how widely drawn some of those criteria might ultimately be.

Fourthly, it has to be noted that, with a small number of exceptions, most other jurisdictions that use these laws have a suffering criterion: Australia, the proposed legislation in France, now happily stalled for the time being, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, the rejected legislation in Slovenia, New Zealand, Colombia and so on all have a suffering criterion, and for a good reason.

He has touched on it before, but when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, responds to the debate on this group, perhaps he could explain in greater depth why he is so insistent on an autonomy-only Bill, whether he recognises any limits on autonomy, and whether and why he is content to rest on autonomy as a justification while allowing campaigners to make a case based on suffering.

I want to say a few words on the justification of autonomy because it is so crucial and the Bill’s sponsors have been clear on the importance they attach to it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has been quoted before but it needs repeating:

“the essence of the Bill is autonomy. You have a choice … Once you satisfy that requirement—obviously, the safeguards have to be complied with—that is the essence of the Bill. It is autonomy”.

We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is not in his place, about the importance of choice in this area. That is really another way of expressing the same issue.

Proponents of the Bill have, at times, been perhaps a little dismissive of those of us who have religious convictions and suggest that we should not bring them to this debate. But I suggest that the belief in autonomy is also an a priori conviction with no more or no less right be heard unchallenged. It is surprising perhaps to find Ayn Rand-like views of the importance of individual autonomy emanating from the Labour Benches. It is a view that one can have, but I suggest that very few people do in fact have such views in practice.

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Frost and Baroness Lawlor

Report stage
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, in moving my Amendment 43A, I of course support the amendments from my noble friends Lord Sharpe and Lord Frost in this group, to one of which I have added my name. My amendment would require the Government to place before Parliament a report on whether scientific—which includes technical—evidence supports a regulation covered by the Bill, because assessment of risk and for safety should be based on objective evidence, technical and scientific.

The regulations for sanitary and phytosanitary, SPS, explicitly mention scientific evidence, whereas reference to science is not typically found in regulations on technical barriers to trade, or in the chapters in FTAs. They are often implied by wording: for example, a requirement that regulations on risk are based on documented and objective evidence. For international trade agreements, such evidence is assumed. Either our goods conform with internationally agreed standards or, if they derogate, they should draw on scientific and technical evidence to show that they conform to an agreed standard. There are good reasons for this.

Such objective evidence and assessment is not only needed to assess risk objectively but is implied in the WTO framework, on which many trade agreements are based. They have to be WTO-compliant. The WTO’s own Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, TBT, requires that, where appropriate, parties

“specify technical regulations based on product requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics”,

one aim being to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures followed by WTO members do not create “unnecessary obstacles” to trade. That is certainly one of this country’s enduring free trade objects.

My amendment would promote a number of benefits and aims. It would help to focus attention on real risk, on the basis of provable evidence and that alone. It would make for transparency: those who produce, market or buy a product could know where they stand and trust the measures assessing risk. It would avoid saddling producers and consumers with costs for unnecessary, overburdensome obligations that result from the political attempt to tie the UK to unproven regulations, which may flout WTO international trade law, to protect their own products against competition from another trading partner.

In products, the contents of which may include some agricultural content, it will help the UK to keep its eye on the evidence and purpose. I commend my noble friend Lord Sharpe’s amendment, which would specifically require that a statement on the need and purpose for such regulations be made. I have already mentioned one example in Committee, which is the difference between UK REACH and EU REACH regulations. The stated purpose is vital to the difference in how one is more burdensome than the other.

My amendment would also reflect the way the UK has moved to make the most of international trade opportunities in our trade treaties, with, for example, the CPTPP. The UK can help shape these, as a leader of the oldest rules-based international trade order, while trading globally as one of the world’s oldest and most successful free-trade economies. Above all, it would avoid obliging businesses to follow the EU’s code-based precautionary principle. That may be unrelated to evidence and often driven by officials, while being costly to producers and raising prices sky-high for consumers, making some countries uncompetitive in world markets and the product not safer but, in many instances, less safe. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 56 stands in my name. As it is, I guess, the last time that I will speak on this Bill, perhaps I may use the opportunity to join others in saying thank you to the Ministers for the willingness they have shown to meet us and to show flexibility on parts of the Bill, even if that flexibility has possibly been more evident on its more marginal and peripheral aspects than on the core provisions, which matter so much to us. I thank them anyway for it.

One of those core provisions, which we have debated at length, is of course Clause 2(7), which creates the power to align UK legislation with EU law. My Amendment 56 would ensure that the affirmative parliamentary procedure applied to such secondary legislation under that provision. This is important, as the procedure of legislating by cross-reference to the laws of another entity is certainly, to borrow terminology from another sphere, novel and contentious. Therefore, if it happens—I am sure it is going to happen and probably quite a lot, I fear—it really ought to do so only consciously and according to a procedure that gives both of this Parliament’s Houses the maximum powers to be aware that it is happening and to influence it to the maximum possible. Of course, that is what the affirmative procedure is about. I hope that, even at this late stage, the Ministers might look favourably on this amendment in the interests of respecting the rights and powers of this Parliament.