Defamation Bill
Lord Garnier Excerpts(11 years, 8 months ago)
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Mr Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)
It is a pleasure to speak in the debate because it gives me the opportunity to congratulate my hon. Friends the Members for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) and for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant) on their promotion to the Government. I cannot think of two finer people to receive such an honour. I served on several Public Bill Committees with my hon. Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam when we were in opposition, and I could not think why he was not made a Minister as soon as we came into government. At least he got there in the end, however, and I sincerely trust that he will stay in his post for a good long time, not least because the Bill is of considerable public importance and interest.
I must disclose a form of interest in the Bill because there was a time when I knew quite a lot about the law of defamation, although I then spent two years as a Law Officer during which I forgot all the law I ever knew. While I was listening to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello), I was reminded of our debates during the passage of the Bill that became the Access to Justice Act 1999. At that time, it was apparent that the then Labour Government were not terribly interested in providing access to justice, and I said that that Bill would more properly be called the Denial of Access to Justice Bill. However, that was a long time ago.
I come to our debate on the new clause untrammelled by any knowledge of sections 44 and 46 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, but I did listen to the hon. Gentleman’s speech. I do not think that my hon. Friend the Minister will have to look very hard to find the references that the hon. Gentleman was after, but if the situation is as it has been described, that would be a pity, to say the least.
If the words of my noble Friend Lord McNally that were cited are to mean anything, I trust that the Government will do something about the problem, because a failure to provide access to justice for people without deep pockets should not be encouraged. Conditional fee arrangements—I have benefited from one or two—do not cost the Government any money. They are not an ideal system of achieving access to justice, but they are a way of allowing those without access to funds from trade unions, companies, employers or others to bring or resist actions for defamation. I therefore hope that the Government will consider carefully—if not today, during the gap between the Bill leaving this House and its consideration in the other place—arrangements whereby those without funds can defend either their reputation or a defamation claim.
That said, I hope that the Minister’s speech will persuade the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South that it is not necessary to press new clause 2 to a Division. I hope that we can take the Minister’s word that the matter will be given a lot more thought before the Bill reappears in the other place. Knowing my hon. Friend, I think that we can be reasonably sure that that will be the case.
Paul Farrelly
I support the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr Garnier), who I see is still plain “Mr Garnier” on the monitors.
It has been a long road to libel reform. For newspapers and other media, the real issue is cost. Responsible newspapers have been concerned about conditional fee agreements with 100% success fees and the sheer costs involved in such cases, especially as it seemed to be a case of “always win, double the fee”. Of course, we have heard examples where that is not the case: my hon. Friend cited the case of Dr Peter Wilmshurst, consultant cardiologist at Royal Shrewsbury hospital and our local University hospital of North Staffordshire, who needed that measure to be able to defend himself and give some certainty in a fraught situation to his family that, if he were to lose his case, all their worldly goods would not be forfeit.
Over time, proposals have been made, including by Lord Justice Jackson and my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), who laid a statutory instrument which was—almost uniquely—defeated by a cross-party ambush in Committee, because Members felt so strongly about the issues involved. In addition, the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, of which I am a member, produced proposals to limit the uplift in fees to 10%, rather than 100%, and not to recover after-the-event premiums—often, there is a false market in those premiums. I will put on the record now my belief that, in that report, we went too far, but our proposal was not to abolish an uplift, which would encourage lawyers to take on difficult cases, in their entirety. On the one hand, we are reforming libel law to protect responsible journalism, but on the other hand, we are potentially denying people access to justice, and I think the whole environment has become unbalanced.
What we have to remember, with phone hacking and Lord Leveson soon to report, is that we have a macho media world and some highly aggressive corporations. If we remove people’s ability to fight to restore their reputation, we risk giving a carte blanche to libel and going back to the bad old days when the only questions a newspaper asked were, “How much have they got? Can they afford to sue us?”
Paul Farrelly
The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a fine point. The purpose of my amendment, which I shall not press to a Division, is to probe the Government’s thinking. Other suggestions for amendments were made in Committee and some of those might reflect the judgments given in Reynolds more closely than paragraph (g).
Any decisions by lower courts can be appealed, but going all the way to the Supreme Court is very time-consuming and expensive. The purpose of my amendment 10 is therefore to get the Government to clarify what they mean by paragraph (g) and whether they have fully taken into account the most up-to-date case law, and to give them the opportunity to state to the House that there is no intention that the clause should be at odds in any way with how the “responsible journalism” defence has been developed by the courts over the years.
Amendment 11, which relates to subsection (2)(h), simply reflects the actual wording used by Lord Nicholls in his list in the Reynolds case, in which the court considered whether a newspaper might reasonably have delayed publication—for instance, to wait longer for a comment from the subject of an article—rather than going to press when it did. The concern in the legal profession about the current wording of sub-section (2)(h) is that it is neutral and does not capture the essence of the urge, or the urgency, to publish. It is a concern for weekly, fortnightly or monthly publications, for example, that withholding a comment can be used to try to ensure that a story does not appear in a particular edition. I shall pray the noble Lord Lester in aid again. Urgency appears explicitly in his list of factors that the courts may take into account. In his private Member’s Bill, he proposed that they may consider
“whether there were any factors supporting urgent publication”.
Amendment 12 is lifted word for word from Lord Lester. It is intentionally broader than amendment 3, which my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) will speak to shortly. It also seeks to address a concern that was not addressed in Committee. Following the phone-hacking affair and the failure, yet again, by certain aggressive tabloids to put their own house in order, there is now a crisis of confidence in the press in this country. The Press Complaints Commission palpably failed over phone hacking, and in cases such as that of the McCanns. It is broken, and the “son of PCC” advanced by the industry to replace it looks all too much like the PCC itself. The mantra in the industry often seems to have been never to let the editors’ code of practice get in the way of a good story or good business. I am sure that, when Lord Justice Leveson reports next month, he will make similar damning judgments about the practices of the press, or certain parts of it.
The amendment seeks to give statutory recognition, if that is the right word, when newspapers are seeking to rely on qualified privilege, to the importance of journalists following a relevant code of practice—be it their own publication’s code, the editors’ code, one from a regulator or that of the profession. It also seeks to bolster the position of journalists. They are frequently asked by editors to do things that breach those codes: “Leave your morals at home or you’ll be colouring in the black squares on the crossword before we sack you” can instil genuine fear in many parts of the industry. Only editors and proprietors have been consulted on the proposals for the reform of the PCC; journalists have not. I believe that in striving for better quality journalism, we should give good codes of practice more weight. The amendment seeks to do that.
Mr Edward Garnier
I listened with the greatest possible care to what the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) said in moving his new clause, but I confess that I was either unconvinced or did not entirely understand the thrust of his argument. I am sure that that is entirely my fault. I also listened with care to the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly), and I found him a little easier to follow. Both those contributions have persuaded me, however, that the amendments are not helpful to the wider debate. They have further persuaded me that, if we are to legislate, clause 4 is the way to do it.
Clause 4(2) proposes that, when determining whether a publisher has acted responsibly, the court may have regard to a list of factors, “amongst other matters”. The phrase “amongst other matters” reminds us of the words of Lord Nicholls in the case of Reynolds. His list of factors was non-exhaustive. In an ideal world, however, legislation is not the right way to go about this. The proposals in clause 4 are better to be found in the common law and in the development of case law. I appreciate that if courts are to develop the common law, that leads to a need for litigants to litigate, but such an approach provides necessary flexibility. By setting in stone clause 4, or another version of it, we will face the problem that it might not always be fit to deal with future circumstances. We are probably unwise to be doing that, albeit not so unwise that I would suggest removing clause 4 from the Bill. I do not think that we should have started from where we are, but I did not draft the Bill, and in so far as I had any influence on the people who did so, they sensibly ignored my opinion.
Sir Peter Bottomley
Clause 4(6) states:
“The common law defence known as the Reynolds defence is abolished.”
My hon. and learned Friend rightly reminds us that the judge in that case made the statement about “amongst other matters”. Does he interpret subsection (6) as meaning that no other matter may be brought up by any judge, and that we are left only with what will be the statutory law?
Mr Garnier
Yes and no. Subsection (2) includes the phrase “amongst other matters”, so it puts what Lord Nicholls said in the Reynolds case into statutory form. I think that it is more sensible to leave this in the form of developing common law, but if we are to set something in stone, clause 4 is better than the somewhat confusing provision tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark.
Bad points are never improved by repetition, but it is a pity that we are doing away with the common law. Although I have lost that battle, I might as well wear my black in mourning at its passing.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
It is entertaining to be following the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr Garnier), not least because he was a junior in a libel action that was taken against me some years ago, which almost cost me my home. I think that it was one of the cases when Carter-Ruck was roving wildly.
John McDonnell
Let us not go into it now; we can discuss it another time.
I am the secretary of the parliamentary group of the National Union of Journalists, which obviously has taken an interest in the Bill. The right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) said that this is something of a dress rehearsal for what comes out of Leveson and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) said, there is real concern about the Bill’s practical implications and what might arise from Leveson.
It is clear, as hon. Members have said, that good journalism is essential for a healthy democracy and that investigative journalism plays a vital role. As the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark said, we have heard today about the worst journalism, in the form of the performance of The Sun on Hillsborough, but there are examples from recent years of the best journalism, such as the exposure of corruption in the House with MPs’ expenses and of ministerial relationships. For me and the NUJ, it is critical that the Bill does nothing to undermine the vital role of good journalism and the contribution that it makes to our society. Of course, it is also important to ensure that journalists uphold decent standards of behaviour, so we must get the balance right, and I have tabled amendments to deal with the Bill’s practical implications on the basis of the way in which journalism operates and the pressures and pace of journalistic practice.
Although I welcome the context of clause 4 and the range of factors of which a court must take account when reaching a decision about the protections of privilege, the measure raises questions about practice on the ground. Subsection (2)(f) deals with the court taking account of
“whether the defendant sought the claimant’s views on the statement before publishing it and whether an account of any views the claimant expressed was published with the statement”.
Amendment 1 inserts a reasonableness test with the words
“within…a reasonable amount of time following initial publication”.
The aim is to broaden the potential for journalists to claim the defence of having contacted the claimant within a reasonable time frame, not necessarily before publication.
We all agree that it is good practice for a journalist to contact the claimant before publication, but that is not always possible for a variety of reasons, some of which relate to the way in which the courts have been used—the threat of a lawsuit or the triggering of an injunction or a super-injunction, and, in some cases, the threat of physical force. Often injunctions are sought by the rich and powerful, who are keen to prevent the publication of a detrimental story, or to delay its publication until they have had time either to hide the damaging evidence, or develop an appropriate public relations strategy to limit the damage. I believe that it should be a defence that the claimant’s views were published either concurrently with or within a reasonable time after initial publication, as existing journalistic codes already demand.
Amendment 2 is designed to acknowledge the fact that, yes, journalists should take all reasonable steps to check the accuracy of facts, but to recognise also the pressures of a news environment. While rushing to print is no excuse for poor journalism, journalism is part of a commercial operation and getting the story first is often crucial for a newspaper or broadcaster’s commercial viability.
Mr Edward Garnier
I will not follow the same acerbic path as the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane).
Chris Grayling
I am not sure whether this is the appropriate time, but I am sure that the whole House would like to join me in congratulating my hon. and learned Friend on his knighthood.
Mr Garnier
In parenthesis to what I was saying about the right hon. Member for Rotherham, I thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Justice for his kind remarks and congratulate him on his new position. I congratulated the new Under-Secretaries of State, my hon. Friends the Members for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) and for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant) earlier this afternoon. If my right hon. Friend maintains the tone that he adopted during his speech, this Bill will not only be improved, but markedly so. I am grateful for the stance that he took, which was in marked contrast to that taken by the right hon. Member for Rotherham, who thought it amusing, no doubt, to make personal remarks about others who cannot protect themselves here; but let us leave that there.
I also thank the right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan), the shadow Secretary of State for his words and the approach that he and his Front-Bench team will take as the Bill goes to the other place. There is now an opportunity to develop a new defamation Act that will meet some apparent needs, such as how the law is applied and libels dealt with in relation to the internet. It is time to deal with such things.
I have noted on my copy of the Bill something that my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) said earlier about clause 1. As drafted, the clause confuses what is defamatory and the consequences of a defamatory statement. I hope that by the time the Bill becomes an Act, the clause will read: “A defamatory statement is not actionable unless its publication has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the reputation of the claimant”. Many things are defamatory that might not cause much damage, and many things are not very defamatory but can cause disproportionate damage. The wording that my hon. Friend and I have coincidently come up with deals with that point. I dare say that others will think more carefully about that as the Bill moves forward.
On the issue of truth and honest opinion, the way the Bill is constructed is sensible. In my opinion, the law did not need changing but, if it is to be changed, clauses 2 and 3 deal with it.
I have said what I had to say about clause 4 and the Reynolds defence. I want briefly to talk about clause 6. There has been a huge amount of campaigning from various groups, such as PEN, Sense about Science and so forth, largely based on the case of the chiropractors against Simon Singh. I will not go into the facts of the case. Much of it was misunderstood, but the nub of the case was this: did the words complained about constitute allegations of fact or comment? That does not matter, because the argument and the campaign decided that academic criticism should almost be free from the law of libel.
Once we have got over that concern, we need to think more carefully about whether learned societies, which are not corporate bodies or profit-making companies, should have a right to sue in damages. We no longer allow local authorities to sue for damage to their governing reputation. Thirty five years ago, I used to get injunctions, for goodness’ sake, on behalf of local authorities, as corporate bodies that felt that they had been defamed by the local paper. Looking back, it is ridiculous to think that the Derbyshire county council case was not decided earlier, but it was not. For some decades now, it has not been possible for local authorities to sue in defamation. I rather suspect that the royal college of this, that or the other should not be allowed to sue either, although I must distinguish between that and the right of presidents and other officers of those associations to bring a personal action, if they are defamed.
Sir Peter Bottomley
There is one obvious problem with putting into statute things decided by judges and juries, which is common law. Would such a judgment be possible were the Bill to become law? Would the judges—juries would not be involved—be able to make a decision saying that a body corporate, whether charitable, non-profit or commercial, would be barred from taking out an action, even if it had more merit than the ludicrous one of the chiropractors against Simon Singh?
Mr Garnier
It is probably unwise to give cocktail advice across the Chamber, even to my hon. Friend.
Mr Garnier
Yes, especially for free.
The Derbyshire county council case was a development of the common law. The judges decided that it was no longer appropriate for a local authority to bring an action for damages in defamation. As it happened, it was against our right hon. Friend Lord Tebbit—but I am sure that that had no influence on the judges. As I understand it, nothing in the Bill has any bearing on whether the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court can reach a similar decision based on argument in respect of a learned society. Since we have a Bill and if we are to do that, however, we might as well think about it between now and October or November—whenever the Bill moves to the other place—and deal with it in legislation, not least because the issue is hot and strong following the Simon Singh case.
The Bill has good intentions and contains some good, defensible and sensible clauses. It also probably promises more than it can deliver, particularly in relation to libel tourism. I disagree with the right hon. Member for Rotherham about its being a bad thing that people want to come to London to litigate. Nobody seemed to complain the other day when Abramovich sued Berezovsky were in this jurisdiction. That demonstrates that in the United Kingdom people can find uncorrupted judges who will deal fairly with difficult cases. If foreigners want to sue other foreigners in our courts, I see no problem with that. Before the right hon. Gentleman rises again to defame others under the cloak of absolute privilege, he might consider that if the courts find that there is no real connection between the litigants and the jurisdiction, they can strike out the claim under the Spiliada principles, with which I am sure he is familiar. They essentially mean that that court is not the appropriate forum in which to bring an action.
Mr Garnier
I have clearly puzzled the right hon. Gentleman so I will let him intervene.
Mr MacShane
The concept of forum non conveniens—I think that is the Latin phrase—is quite well known. An employee of the Russian state has been accused in this House by a Commons resolution of being linked to the murder of someone employed by a British firm. He earns $600 a month but is hiring the most expensive QC, lawyer and media company to sue a British citizen in connection with a huge international scandal. This week, the United Congress will pass its “Justice for Magnitsky Act”, banning Mr Karpov and 59 other named people. That has nothing to do with protecting reputation; it is a cynical abuse of London’s reputation in which any lawyer can be brought to defend anybody on any cause.
Mr Garnier
I do not want to descend into the right hon. Gentleman’s difficulties with lawyers and he will have to sort out his own problems. If the courts find that the claimant referred to by the right hon. Gentleman has no proper basis for bringing a case in this country, they will knock the case out. That applies to contract, privacy, defamation and any other cause of action. I am looking for a proper assessment of the dangers and damage that could be caused to our integrity as a jurisdiction by the use of our courts by overseas litigants. I think such danger is wildly exaggerated and that the ability of our courts to discipline those hopeless cases is underestimated, so I hope we can deal with the issue in a calm and sensible way between now and Third Reading in the other place.
I wish the Bill well as far as it goes. I hope that tonight’s proceedings are not controversial and that we do not have a Division, as that would be unnecessary and unhelpful. I look forward to listening to or reading the debates in the other place, and trust that when the Bill is returned to this House—if it is returned—it will be improved. Surely that is what we expect of the parliamentary process. This is not a politically controversial piece of legislation; it is deeply technical and, some would say, rather tedious. I wish the Bill well, however, and I repeat my congratulations to the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice and his two colleagues.
Transparency and Consistency of Sentencing
Lord Garnier Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)
Order. Telepathy is difficult for Hansard to pick up and it is not easy for other Members in the Chamber. It would help if we made that sequence a little clearer.
The Solicitor-General (Mr Edward Garnier)
To make it clear, the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) meant that I, not Lord Justice Leveson, was his parliamentary neighbour. I say that in case that does not appear clearly on the record either.
Keith Vaz
In football terms, that was an instant replay. I am glad that Lord Leveson now chairs the important inquiry into the media. After that is completed, he will start the next inquiry. He must be an incredible chap to be able to chair the Sentencing Council and conduct all these other inquiries. I am glad that he is still there; continuity is important.
Let me go back to the intervention I made at the start of the Lord Chancellor’s speech. He said that the Government would be able to give us more information at the end of the debate on the case that I raised, which has been concluded in the courts. It concerns a group of four al-Qaeda-inspired fundamentalists who admitted planning to send mail bombs to their targets during the run-up to Christmas 2010. Their targets included the Palace of Westminster, the home of the Mayor of London, the Stock Exchange, and other buildings of that kind.
Those defendants participated in what is known as a Goodyear direction, which, as the Lord Chancellor and other Members will know, enables a trial judge to indicate the sentence that will be given if a defendant pleads guilty. I understand that the sentence that is indicated cannot be increased by the judge at the time when the defendants are sentenced.
Keith Vaz
The hon. Gentleman is a very experienced prosecutor, and he knows much more about these matters than I do. Perhaps, given the charges that were levelled against the individuals in the case that I mentioned, the judge ought to have refused the application, but the fact remains that two of the defendants, Mohammed Chowdhury and Shah Rahman, were effectively told by Mr Justice Wilkie that they would be out in six years, because that was what was indicated by the sentence of twelve and a half years that he proposed to give them.
I have raised that case because it came before the court yesterday, because we are debating this issue today, and because I think we should consider the severity of what would have occurred had the matter been brought to fruition.
The Solicitor-General
I do not want to rain on my right hon. neighbour’s parade, but I am afraid that I will not be answering questions of the kind that he has put to me when I wind up the debate. The matter is ongoing. It may well be that the judge has given a Goodyear indication, but he will be sentencing next week, and nothing that I shall say today, or that the right hon. Gentleman will say today, should in any way impinge on the judge’s discretion. The Goodyear direction system is there, and its conduct is circumscribed by fairly strict rules. While the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly entitled to make any point that he wishes to make about particular sentences, I think that—as my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor said earlier—we would be better advised to leave that particular issue until the sentence has been promulgated. All sorts of implications may flow from that.
Keith Vaz
I am very happy to take the Solicitor-General’s advice. What I have sought to do is ensure that the issue is looked at, as I hope it will be in future when the sentence is finally determined.
Let me move from the specific to the general. I do not want us to reach a point at which we have plea bargaining in criminal justice, because I think that that would be wholly wrong. The hon. Member for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) mentioned the riots. I pay tribute to the way in which the criminal justice system operated throughout that period. I well remember going to Horseferry Road magistrates court at midnight and receiving a call from the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt), who welcomed me. I do not know how he knew that I was going to be there, but somehow he knew that I was looking at the 24-hour courts. Although there was something of a gap because both the practitioners and the defendants had to be brought from police stations, the courts moved very quickly at a time when it was necessary for that to happen.
Although politicians are very wary of trampling on the jurisdiction of the judiciary, the public, and even the Prime Minister, made known their views on sentencing during the riots. The result was that the courts issued sentences that were, on average, more severe than for similar offences committed outside the period of the riots.
I also pay tribute to the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice for providing my Committee with so much information. I do not think that we have had so much transparency before, as regards figures relating to the riots being made available. I think it was the Lord Chancellor who told us, in a Select Committee evidence session, that 76% of people who appeared before the courts for offences committed during the riots had a previous conviction. He also told us that for adults, the figure was 80%, and for juveniles it was 62%. It is important, as we look at sentencing and transparency, that figures are made available to Select Committees and Parliament, so that we can have informed views on the issues that we are deliberating.
The hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood), who has left the Chamber, raised the issue of rehabilitation in her intervention on the Lord Chancellor. One of the most important issues that the Lord Chancellor has raised during his time in office is that of rehabilitation. As the Chairman of the Justice Committee has said, there is no point in just sending people to jail; if one convicted criminal in four reoffends soon after completing their sentence, something is wrong with the way we deal with rehabilitation. Of course people have to go to prison to be punished in certain circumstances, but the prison authorities need the time and space to start the process of rehabilitation.
We have been looking at the roots of radicalisation and will publish a report on the subject on Monday next week. We feel it is very important that when people are incarcerated, those who are able to detoxify—that was the word used in the evidence given to us, and I use it again today—people who have been radicalised have time to do that. One cannot do that in a short period, or without resources; it has to be done over a period of time. We need to ensure that when those people come out, the experience has made a difference to their lives, because at the end of the day it is our constituents who suffer if that is not the case.
This is a good debate, and I hope very much that it will not just be about tougher sentences, because as we all know, 83 of the 134 prisons in this country are classified as overcrowded. If we are to make sure that when people come out, they do not reoffend, we need a criminal justice system that is fit for purpose and able, in the end, to do the one thing that we want it to do: help in the reduction of crime.
Anna Soubry
Absolutely. If I may say so, there was so much I agreed with in the right hon. Gentleman’s speech. From my short time on the Select Committee, I know he brings a huge weight of experience and plain, good common sense to his chairing of the Committee. I absolutely agree with what he says.
To be frank, I would never stand up and say we definitely want to keep the Sentencing Council. I know some of us disagree about this, but I always thought the Court of Appeal was a good place to determine the issues we are discussing, and I could see no good reason why that should not continue. However, we are where we are.
What we do know—this has already been mentioned—is that the sentencing judge will look at the aggravating and mitigating features in relation to every offence. It is therefore important that when the police go out and take witness statements, they make sure everything that should be in them is in them so the judge can pass the right sentence. If items of great sentimental value are stolen in dwelling-house burglaries, for example, that is an aggravating feature.
The same is true of trashing or ransacking the property, and of inducing fear in a particularly vulnerable person. One of the burglaries I suffered was at night-time, and my children were of an age where they were very frightened. They thought—this is common among children who have the misfortune to have their homes burgled at night—that the person would come back, and they were in fear of that. Such things must be in the witness statements so the judge can pass the right sentence. That will give us the consistency we want.
One of the things that is extremely annoying for somebody who has been the victim of a car crime is the fact that they lose their no claims bonus. There is also the huge inconvenience caused by the fact that their car has a broken window and that they will not be able to use it because it has to go off to the garage. Again, those are important aggravating features.
In offences of violence, there can be an assessment of the physical scarring that might remain, and of the pain and suffering the victim might have been caused, but their mental anguish must also be set out in detail so that the proper sentence can be passed.
I would go further and say that when police officers go out to get statements from witnesses, they should include in them the effect of a particular crime on the witness. The classic example is somebody who witnesses a fight in the street, which might be a particularly violent and unpleasant incident. That will have an effect on the witness, and if it does, it should be in the witness statement.
At the heart of good, consistent and transparent sentencing is an overriding and underlying belief in the fact that we should trust our judges. I say that with absolute certainty in one respect: if I had not come to this place, I would undoubtedly never have been made a judge. I am not, therefore, making these comments to curry favour with any judge. Hon. Members may not find this surprising, but the reason I would not have become a judge is that I fell out with so many judges.
Anna Soubry
The Solicitor-General makes an unfortunate intervention, because I did indeed have the great pleasure of appearing in front of him—I was going to reference him slightly later—and we certainly did not fall out. No doubt, though, some of his brother and sister judges would say that that was because I appeared in front of him only twice, and that had I done so several times, perhaps the outcome would have been different.
One of the problems that occurred under the previous Administration was that they began not to trust judges enough, which was a terrible mistake. My attitude is this: I would give the judges the powers that they need and then leave them to exercise their discretion. At the end of the day, most judges come to the bench after many years in practice—usually in the discipline in which they sit in judgment. I said that I was going to mention the Solicitor-General, and I know that he has sat as a recorder in the criminal division, even though that was not his area of practice. I am not trying to curry favour with him, but the fact is that many recorders do not come from the criminal Bar and did not work as criminal solicitors but nevertheless have the great ability and skills required to act in just as brilliant a way as any other judge who was at the Bar for 15 or 20 years. [Interruption.] I am glad to see him nodding in approval.
The point is that with few exceptions our judges are outstanding, having practised at the highest level and coming to the position after years of experience on the basis that they have the ability to exercise good and wise judgment. That is why, with few exceptions, I trust them, and those of us who have practised know that if a judge makes a mistake, the case can be referred to the Court of Appeal.
Our judges have training, and I give full credit to the previous Government for something that I noticed at the criminal Bar: a huge shift in judges’ attitude towards what we call domestic violence—an unfortunate term, because it is normally violence against women by somebody with whom they are either in a relationship or have been in a relationship. Undoubtedly, when I returned to the Bar about 18 or 19 years ago, some senior members of the Bar and judges just saw domestic violence as a bit of a domestic scuffle and not something to be dealt with or viewed as seriously as it is now. I give full credit to the work undertaken by the previous Government in that respect. I certainly saw a sea change among the judiciary, which was no longer going to tolerate any man even slapping his partner or previous partner. I saw that on a regular basis in the Crown courts in which I had the great pleasure to appear, and I give the previous Government full credit for that. That should give us confidence that our judges are properly trained and are more than able to pass the right sentences, as long as we trust them and enable them to use their discretion.
That, of course, was one of the great failings of IPPs. These sentences, introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to deal with defendants deemed to be dangerous, sounded like, and were, a very good idea. What could be more sensible than providing that a paedophile who had sexually assaulted a child and who had done the same thing previously would not only be sentenced for the outrage that they had committed against a child but that there would be a report on him—invariably it was a “him” as opposed to a “her”—specifically looking at whether he would pose a danger even after completing the determinate part of his sentence? If the report revealed that he had delusions and fantasies of a particularly vile and alarming nature, it was thought only right and proper that he be in custody, in prison, not just for the offence that he had committed but for the protection of the public—in this case, children—at large, because he posed a clear and obvious danger to those children.
In theory, therefore, the idea was wonderful. Many of us approved and agreed with the theory; however, I do not think that the legislation was ever properly looked at—I fear I am criticising both sides of the House for that. Indeed, we talked about the idea in robing rooms at the criminal Bar, and as we thought about it more, and then as it was rolled out, we could see its profound shortcomings. Because it was overly prescriptive, judges effectively had no discretion, so people were sent to prison—quite properly, because they had committed a serious offence—but then found themselves in custody with no time limit on their sentences and no idea when they might be released, on the basis that they were supposedly dangerous. However, that was often because the judge had no alternative but to making that finding, when the offender was clearly not dangerous in the terms that they have should been, as the sort of offender that I have described. Not only did those in custody not know when they were going to be released, but there were no courses and no proper treatment available for them. None of the things that should have been done to drill down into their offending were done, so people were literally—and still are—languishing in prison. With great respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley, I find it perverse that Opposition Front Benchers should agree with that aspect. For a party that has always prided itself on the liberty of the individual and the rights of the prisoner, it is absolutely wrong to support a system that has people languishing in prison, year after year, without the treatment that they need.
Mr Leigh
I agree with my hon. Friend. I do not want to weary the House with too many figures, because then I will be accused of quoting statistics, which do not give the whole story. However, these figures are alarming and it is up to the Government to reply to them. As I have said, 48% of all burglars do not receive an immediate custodial sentence. Some 37% of burglars of private dwelling houses—the worst form of violation of our fellow citizens’ rights—do not receive a custodial sentence. Approximately 87% of custodial sentences for domestic burglary are for less than three years. In 2010, only 16% of those convicted of burglary were sentenced to more than 18 months in prison. In other words, only 16% were sent to prison, and a lot of them were out within nine months. We know that a house that has been burgled has a 20% chance of being burgled at least once more within a year.
Apart from the trauma and the violation of people’s rights and privacy, burglary costs insurers a staggering £370 million per annum. Members should not believe all those insurance adverts in which the kind insurance company comes in the next day and mends everything—that does not happen. As I and our fellow citizens know, it is hard going every inch of the way with these insurance companies.
What about the clear-up rate? The British crime survey shows that approximately 659,000 domestic burglaries were committed in 2009-10. Given that only 9,670 such offenders were convicted, the clear-up rate was a mere 1.4%. So, not only are many of the punishments derisory—someone who is convicted, if indeed they are convicted, will not go to prison for very long—but the clear-up rate is incredibly low and the police are obviously struggling to deal with the problem. As my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley said—the point he made bears repeating—according to Ministry of Justice figures for a particular year, 2,980 burglars with 15 previous convictions were not sent to prison. I hope the Minister will reply to that point when he sums up the debate.
We had an argument earlier about current sentencing guidelines. I quoted various figures to the Secretary of State during interventions, saying that only 48% of burglars go to prison, and he said, “I’m sorry, but my position is absolutely clear: I believe that if you burgle a private dwelling house, you should go to prison.” The purpose of my speaking in this debate is to try, in my own small way, to convince the Secretary of State, the judges and the whole system that there is a widespread and strong belief and understanding among our fellow citizens that someone who breaks into and steals from a private dwelling house will go to prison, and I want to drive that message home. However, I was told that sentencing guidelines—my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe spoke with great authority on this issue—suggest a community sentence for first-time offenders. They may have been convicted for the first time, but how many burglaries have they actually committed? We have no idea. We are talking about a community sentence—no prison sentence at all.
Currently, for a category 3, lesser harm or lower culpability domestic burglary—I do not accept this language, which is that of the Sentencing Council—the sentencing starting point is a high-level community order. Our fellow citizens will be astonished to hear that somebody can commit a domestic burglary and get a high-level community order. The suggested range goes from a low-level community order to a mere 26 weeks' imprisonment, which, as we all know, is nothing like 26 weeks' imprisonment. On top of that, criminals receive a guilty plea discount. I am sorry to have to say that we are simply not doing enough to grip this.
Mr Leigh
I shall give way in a moment, and I hope that the Minister will reply to this point. There are far too many domestic burglaries and people do not feel safe in their homes. The punishments are not sufficient and neither is the clear-up rate, and that has a major effect on the quality of life in this country.
The Solicitor-General
On my hon. Friend’s point about category 3 burglaries, is he suggesting that public policy should not allow any differentiation between domestic burglaries? For example, if in broad daylight the burglar puts his hand through an open window, steals a paperweight from the windowsill and walks off, should that be treated in the same way as a night-time domestic burglary in which an elderly couple are traumatised and frightened or—as happened in his case—the house is trashed? Is he saying that there should be just one category, burglary, and that the sentence should be prison full stop?
Mr Leigh
Of course I am not saying that and of course judges should have some discretion. There is a range of burglaries. It is not for me to lay down the law and to say that there should be a minimum sentence or what it should be. I want to drive home the point that there should be a general understanding among the law-abiding public that their homes will be protected, as there should be a general understanding among them and among the criminal classes of what will happen if someone commits any kind of domestic burglary. I do not accept the language, by the way. We have heard descriptions of burglaries before in which somebody puts their hand through a window and takes a paperweight, and we have to ask how many people are going around taking paperweights—I do not know. The language suggests that it does not really matter very much, but it does matter and it is important.
Of course, there must be differentiation, but my point is very important: I want a general understanding of what will happen if a person violates someone’s privacy and causes them trauma. I suspect that a lot of the time what is being stolen is not just a paperweight but something that is very personal and precious. It goes back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe said about her grandmother’s wedding ring. It might not be worth much, but the experience was traumatising. I want to drive home the point that if someone goes into somebody’s private house and takes something, they should end up in prison.
The Solicitor-General
My hon. Friend has sat down already, so that is all right. I am trying to extract clarity from him. I want him to make the best case he can, but unless he speaks clearly it is difficult to respond in a way that does his argument justice. That was why I asked him the question and he has provided me with an answer.
Mr Leigh
I thank the Minister. We are at idem and I hope that the Government will now make an announcement in accordance with what I have been arguing for the past 10 minutes or so.
I want to drive home the point that it is the poor and vulnerable who suffer. A family with a household income of less than £10,000 is more than twice as likely to be burgled as one with a household income of £40,000 to £50,000. As a House of Commons, we are right to have this debate today and to raise this issue. I understand that the Government will make an announcement this afternoon on spent convictions—I have been told by the media that that will happen, but I do not know whether that is right. At the end of this debate and over the next few weeks and months, I want to elicit a response from the Government that shows that they are seized of the problem and are prepared to put sufficient resources into clearing up domestic burglaries through the policing system and to encourage the courts to take seriously the crime of burglary, of all crimes, because that is one thing that our fellow citizens want more than anything else.
Stephen Phillips
This is a rare area in which I might disagree with my hon. Friend. Before the Sentencing Guidelines Council was established, as my hon. Friend will know and as the House heard in the Front-Bench speeches, the Court of Appeal used to issue guidance in the form of judgments in particular cases on how judges should proceed in sentencing. That was worth while, and, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State made clear in his speech, the Court of Appeal retains that role. We saw it, as an intervention revealed earlier in the debate, in the riots last year. The Court of Appeal, essentially, was able to establish that as a matter of English law the context in which otherwise minor offences had taken place required much stiffer sentences to be imposed than would otherwise have been required either by previous guidance from the Court of Appeal or by guidance from the Sentencing Guidelines Council.
I can agree with my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon to the extent that it does seem important that the Court of Appeal should retain that overarching ability to exercise its right to indicate to lower court judges what would be an appropriate sentence in particular circumstances. What the Court of Appeal never had and still does not have the opportunity to do is consult more widely, whereas the Sentencing Guidelines Council did have that opportunity, as does the Sentencing Council, which consults much more widely than the Court of Appeal ever could in a criminal case. In any case in which the Court of Appeal was handing down guidelines, it would receive submissions only from the parties to the case—and perhaps from the Attorney-General; I know not—but it would not be able to consult extensively with the public as the Sentencing Council can and does. If we are to encourage public confidence in the sentencing regime, it is very important that the public are consulted.
The only respect in which I might criticise the Sentencing Council—perhaps I am going slightly off the topic here—is in relation to its consultations on mandatory or discretionary guidelines on sentencing, which are not well publicised or well known. The representations it receives usually come from the Criminal Bar Association, other specialist associations and those who are particularly interested in the criminal justice system.
The Solicitor-General
Is there not another point to bear in mind? The Court of Appeal’s criminal division can look only at past cases and must have cases brought to its attention either singly or in groups in order to introduce thematic judgments on particular areas of criminal activity. The Sentencing Council, however, can proactively look at burglary, sexual assault and other areas of crime and give forward, rather than retrospective, guidance.
Stephen Phillips
My hon. and learned Friend makes an excellent point, as usual, which I had not thought of. No doubt that is why he is the Solicitor-General and I am two Benches behind him. He is absolutely right and I entirely agree with him.
I differ from my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon only inasmuch as although I think the Court of Appeal should indeed retain the overarching ability to indicate to lower court judges the framework within which sentencing must take place, I also consider the existence of the Sentencing Council to be important for the reasons I have indicated. The council’s guidelines ensure a large measure of consistency between sentences that are handed down for similar, if not identical, crimes across the entirety of England and Wales. For that reason, although I understand that there is a cost implication with the maintenance of that body and that it can be described, as it always is, as a quango—indeed, some would say it is a quango we should dispense with—it is a body that should continue to exist if we are to encourage confidence in the sentencing regime in England and Wales.
I hesitate, particularly given the time, to say very much about the hon. Member for Hammersmith’s spirited defence from the Front Bench of the sentencing regime and the way in which sentencing was treated by the previous Government, but it is right to point out that a large number of criminal justice Acts were passed under the previous Administration. If he were to go, as I recommend he should—perhaps he already has—and talk to those who had to use that legislation and were bound by it in their sentencing exercises, he would find a universal, or near-universal, level of criticism, particularly regarding the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Many of the measures that the previous Government introduced, such as custody plus, which was the example given by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon, were never brought into being or had to be changed in subsequent Acts. The difficulty with the previous Government’s approach was that it sought to micro-manage the judiciary and to remove large elements of discretion so that the sentences that were passed did not necessarily reflect the offences of which the accused had been convicted or for which a guilty plea had been entered. Sentencing became, to a large extent, a tick-box exercise, which as the hon. Gentleman acknowledged, at least by implication, and as other Members acknowledged, is a most unsatisfactory way of proceeding. I listened to the spirited defence from the Opposition Front Bench, although I sought not to intervene, but I have to tell the hon. Gentleman that the approach the Government are taking in their reforms is the right one and I commend it to the House, as indeed I commend the motion.
The Solicitor-General (Mr Edward Garnier)
I think that I am the 16th contributor to the debate, and it is not surprising—indeed, it is welcome—that although the debate is entitled “Transparency and consistency of sentencing”, and we are required by the motion to have
“considered the work of the Sentencing Council and the transparency and consistency of sentencing”,
contributions from right hon. and hon. Members have dealt with a number of wider issues within the criminal justice system. I congratulate the two Deputy Speakers who have chaired our debate on permitting such a liberal approach to the terms of the motion, which has allowed a number of informed and informative contributions.
I confess I thought that at some stages in the debate, the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) who, at least this afternoon, speaks for the Opposition on such matters, had been sentenced to a period of solitary confinement. For considerable periods he was the only Labour Member who thought it appropriate to remain in the Chamber. He, poor fellow, had no liberty and no discretion about whether to sentence himself to time in the Tea Room or somewhere else. It was a pleasure to see him sitting there silently for much of this afternoon. He has assisted us greatly with two contributions. Many people will no doubt find assistance from reading, with great care, what he had to say, in tomorrow’s Hansard. His praise for our judiciary and the criminal justice system was of considerable value, and the sentiment was shared across the House. I think he said that there was no room for complacency. If he did say that, he was right to do so.
From listening to the speeches of Government Back Benchers, I think it is fair to say that while there is universal acceptance of the high quality of our judiciary, from the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court, to the lay magistracy, there is no room for complacency and plenty of room for public comment. There is plenty of room for Members of Parliament—indeed, there is a duty on them, when it is appropriate—to make stinging comment, often in offensive terms. It is the right and duty of a Member of Parliament to speak up for his constituents or for a particular group of citizens who have strong views. It is right that my hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) and for Shipley (Philip Davies) come to this place not to agree with everything that goes on, but to disagree and explain why they disagree. The Government and the Opposition can make judgments about their contributions and reach a rational conclusion about whether to agree or disagree with them. I am grateful to both of them, and indeed to all Members who have taken part in the debate.
As I said, it is not surprising that our debate has been spread widely. We have considered the work of the Sentencing Council and whether it is a constitutional abomination that is interfering with the freedom of Englishmen. I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) that in some senses I hope it is interfering with the freedom of Englishmen who commit crimes and deserve to be sentenced to terms of imprisonment or, if their offences are not so hideous, to non-custodial disposals.
I know that my hon. Friend is a man who thinks a great deal about a great many things, and it is clear that he has thought a great deal about the difficult constitutional issues that are revealed in any discussion of the separate roles of Parliament, judges, juries and the Sentencing Council. None the less, I disagree with his conclusion if it genuinely is that the Sentencing Council is an affront to the liberty of Englishmen.
During the passage of the legislation that the last Government introduced setting up first the Sentencing Guidelines Council and then the Sentencing Council, I expressed the view that there was a danger that those bodies would interfere with the discretion of the judiciary. I said that both as a Member of Parliament and as someone who has sentenced people—until I came into government in 2010, I used to sit as a Crown court recorder, like my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips). I think if my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border were to sit either as a spectator in the public gallery or alongside the judge—or even, dare I say it, if he were to imagine what it must be like to sit in the dock and hear a judge promulgate a sentence—I do not think he would be in any doubt whatever that our judiciary is not fettered in the way that I feared it might be, and the way he perhaps implied it was, by the guidance of the Sentencing Council.
Time and time again as Solicitor-General, I have appeared in the Court of Appeal criminal division referring what I consider to be unduly lenient sentences to the Court for review. I remind the House that I do that not as a member of the Government but as an independent Law Officer protecting the public interest. When I do so, I am constantly reassured that the Court of Appeal reminds the judiciary and the public who are in court that the sentencing guidelines are simply that—guidelines. When it is just to depart from them, the judiciary must do so. When it is just to show mercy, it is right and proper that the court should do that.
In cases such as the riots, to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State referred, it is right that sentencing judges in London, Birmingham, Liverpool or Manchester can go beyond the range of sentences recommended in the guidelines for affray, robbery, burglary of shops, arson or whatever it may be. The Court of Appeal and the Lord Chief Justice have said that given the context in which the crimes were committed, it was entirely proper that the sentencing judge should go beyond the sentence that might normally be expected for, let us say, the theft of three bottles of water, a cardigan or a pair of trainers from a shop.
It seems to me that we need to bear in mind the context in which the Sentencing Council does its work. Yes, the situation has changed from what happened 20, 30 or 40 years ago, when we relied only on the Court of Appeal to set out guidelines. However, now that we have the council I am, if not an enthusiastic convert, a convert who is prepared to say that its work, and previously that of the Sentencing Guidelines Council, has demonstrated its worth.
I should like to echo those who thanked Lord Justice Leveson—I am thinking particularly of the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), the Chairman of the Justice Committee. Lord Leveson’s work on sentencing is in addition to his ongoing inquiry into the press and his work as an ordinary member of the Court of Appeal. He has to fit in sitting days in the Court of Appeal and deal with the work of the Sentencing Council in addition to his work on the Leveson inquiry, so I hope it will not be suggested that that judge, let alone any other judge at that level, shirks in his public responsibilities. He is working extremely hard and producing good work.
However, the fact that the council produces those guidelines does not mean that we must agree with them. Members of Parliament can disagree with them, as can members of the public who read about sentences in their local or national newspapers. We can form our own views, but as my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor said at the outset, Members of Parliament must be a little careful when we express such views, because the public expect us to have opinions based on fact, not simply on conjecture or rumour, or on a bad report of a case that we read in the newspaper. When Members of Parliament disagree with a sentence that a Crown Court judge has arrived at, we are under rather more of a duty than the young reporter or the ordinary member of the public to do our best to find out the facts.
One good way of finding out the facts is to ask the House of Commons Library to do the research for us. Another good way of increasing our knowledge of what the Crown Courts and other sentencing courts do is to go and sit in them, which I did in opposition. I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends and the few Labour Members in the Chamber to go to their local Crown court to see what happens. Friday is a very good day to do so because it is often the day when the sentencing lists are dealt with.
I take what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said about cases sometimes being dealt with by one judge at one instance and then being referred to another judge, but by and large, I like to think that happens only when they are dealing with cases in which there is a guilty plea followed by a sentence. The sentencing judge on a guilty plea is in just as good a position as the judge that received the plea. The important thing to bear in mind—this is a piece of advice that the Court of Appeal constantly gives, and my right hon. and learned Friend and I constantly give it to the Crown Prosecution Service, which we superintend—is that the factual basis on which the plea is made is established. Sentencers cannot sentence in a vacuum. It is essential that the facts of the case as admitted or as found by the jury are clear, so that the sentencer knows precisely on what basis he is sentencing.
Mr Buckland
Will the Solicitor-General reassure the House that the basis of pleas are reduced into writing—that they are court documents? Transparency is an important part of that process, as has been emphasised by all courts, including the Court of Appeal, for some years now.
The Solicitor-General
I am sure my hon. Friend is right about that—he will know that from his experience both as an advocate and as a sentencer. It is utterly frustrating to have to analyse sentencing remarks that are based if not on conjecture, then on a total lack of knowledge of the facts. Advocates—those who appear for the Crown and the defendant—have a duty to ensure that the court is given the facts.
Advocates also have a duty to ensure that the court is advised about the relevant sentencing law and powers. One of the problems, or unintended consequences, of the raft—I was going to say the flood—of legislation passed by the Labour Government was that those Acts had something to do with amending the criminal justice system. The previous Government were not so silly as to call every one of those 64 Acts of Parliament a criminal justice Act, but I can assure the hon. Member for Hammersmith that 64 pieces of legislation passed between 1997 and 2010 affected the way the criminal justice system worked. It is completely—I will not use an unparliamentary expression—confusing to have to sit there and try to work out which piece of legislation deals with which type of offence and whether that legislation is in force, not yet in force or out of force.
Let me take the example of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which is almost as thick as this great tome—the wonderful “Vacher’s Parliamentary Companion”—in my hand. Before this Government came into office, I asked a parliamentary question of the previous Government, and it was quite clear that they had simply mismanaged the conduct of that piece of legislation. About a third of it was repealed before it even came into force. Another third was not in force by the time the previous Government left office. Individual bits of the remaining third were brought into effect, and we are now having to repeal them—I am talking, for example, about the IPP legislation. Other bits were also brought into force by the previous Government, but they then realised they needed to repeal them.
What we require from the House, therefore, is an understanding that legislation needs to be thought about. We need, of course, to consult—this is what the Sentencing Council does—the people who have to apply it and the people it will affect. We need to work out what we will get if we pass what I call early-day motion legislation—expensive appeals; judges telling my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor that statutory construction is hell; and a huge lack of public confidence and satisfaction in the justice system.
Stephen Phillips
My hon. and learned Friend may remember—I wonder whether he agrees with this—that, in March 2006, Lord Justice Rose, speaking of the 2003 Act, which most of the judiciary consider to be the worst criminal justice Act of all time, said:
“Time and again during the last 14 months, this Court has striven to give sensible practical effect to provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a considerable number of which are, at best, obscure and, at worst, impenetrable.”
Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that it was not the high point of Labour’s justice policy?
The Solicitor-General
My hon. and learned Friend is too kind. I will also say this: Lord Justice Rose is a very great man.
Rehman Chishti
On that point, does my hon. and learned Friend agree that the 3,000 new offences brought in by the Labour Government had little effect in reducing crime? It was simply a case of legislation being made for the sake of making legislation, rather than making a real difference to people’s quality of life.
The Solicitor-General
I do agree. We made the same points during the passage of the 2003 Bill, as it then was, and subsequently.
The Solicitor-General
The hon. Gentleman has been very lucky—he has been allowed two goes. I have two more minutes, so he will just have to sit there and wait.
In the final minutes remaining to me, I want to thank the hon. Member for Hammersmith for his contributions, which were utterly valuable. My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed contributed thoughtfully and with all the experience he has gained as the Chairman of the Select Committee. The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) has now gone. I am afraid that I had to cut him short because I thought his remarks were straying into an area we should not stray into until the case he wanted to talk about is completed. I mentioned the remarks of my hon. Friends the Members for Shipley and for Gainsborough. I am sorry I do not have time to deal in detail with the points they made, but I commend them on the forceful way in which they put them across. It is important that Members of Parliament do not just sit there like lemons, but get up and speak for their constituents.
Furthermore, if Members have particular experience —my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and I have both been victims of several burglaries, as has my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry)—we should use that personal experience. However, we should also use our professional experience, and a number of lawyers have brought to the House their experience as lawyers and as Members of Parliament. Their work as Members of Parliament is all the better for it. I am thinking of my hon. Friends the Members for Dartford (Gareth Johnson), for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) and for South Swindon, and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. I apologise for not commenting in detail on the contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Neil Carmichael). I also wanted to comment on the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool North and Cleveleys (Paul Maynard)—