Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord German
Main Page: Lord German (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord German's debates with the Home Office
(2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, what we have just heard is not unexpected. I understand that the Conservative Benches really want to stop everyone from coming across and making those dangerous crossings, which everyone would want to do, but it is quite surprising that we are debating how these matters will work between ourselves and France when the man holding the reins of the other half of this continent is in the next room to us, telling Members what he thinks on these matters. So I ask the Minister what he has heard so far about the issue of the exchange mechanism that has been trailed in our newspapers so strongly.
Secondly, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for acting as what the Minister called the “super-prop” or the “super-sub” last week when some of us were away working in the Council of Europe.
On these very particular amendments, it is my reading of the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights that these two amendments were agreed unanimously by all committee members, including the Conservatives. If that is the case, it is not just simply a matter of people saying, “We want to try and stop this happening in broader terms”, but there are Conservative members who have looked very closely at this particular part of the legislation, are trying to work out what is most appropriate and have committed themselves to it, both in this House and in the other House as well.
First of all, the noble Lord, Lord Harper, raised the issue that having to prove yourself not guilty is not something we do in this country. You have to be charged, but you do not have to go into the case from the other end of it. The issue here before us is what it will capture in that state between people who might or might not be guilty of what they are being charged with.
For example, two weeks ago, I was lucky enough to go to the northern coast of France and meet all the French authorities, from the préfecture downwards right through to on the beaches. One of the things pointed out to me was a Catholic centre where people were being helped because of normal life. They were being helped with food and trying to get appropriate clothing, and they were also being given SIM cards. If the Catholic priest who was giving out the SIM cards is going to be caught by this legislation, we ought to be very careful about the words that we use.
The change is in the words “intends that” from “knows or suspects that”. Though the cases we are going to discuss later are very proper and important offences, they are really focused on the smugglers and not the smuggled, and the smugglers getting 15 years in prison, which is the maximum sentence before us, yet the only test of getting into that process is whether somebody knows or suspects that a relevant article will be used by a person in connection to an offence.
So it is not that simple to simply say there is no link between the nature of the offence and the target for it. I am rather hoping that the Minister will tell us that this is a very tricky issue, it is something in respect of human rights that has been reflected throughout our law—international law as well as the law of our own country, both put together—and in the international conventions: not just those we were a signatory to but those we signed up to and those we created, and not just the ECHR but others as well.
Will the noble Lord give way? I am listening with great care. If I can direct him back to the issue of reverse burden of proof, he will know that this is not unusual—it is not common, but it is not unprecedented. Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states that, if someone is found with a blade in a public place and the prosecution proves possession, the defendant must prove they had a good reason for possessing it. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 places a reverse burden on the defendant to prove that they took all reasonable steps to avoid the offence. These things are not unusual. For such an important public safety issue, surely the noble Lord will concede that it is not unusual or unprecedented for the Government to seek to take these matters in the legislation in the way they will.
I thank the noble Lord— I knew there was a word for it. We do not deny that there are examples on the statute book, but we objected to them at the time.
I think the answer is related to the nature of the offence which is before us. An offence which is punishable by a 15-year maximum jail sentence is a very serious and big crime to have committed. To put it simply, the suspicion threshold is seldom applied in our criminal law because such a low threshold —the noble Lord was saying that there are examples—is a disproportionate response to where someone has not been intending to commit a crime and with such a disproportionate sense of what harm they might be doing. The balance between the nature of the offence and the nature of the judgment which creates that offence is what is disproportionate.
In this discussion about reverse burden of proof, something is being missed here, which is why the knife example the noble Lord gave was not a good one. There are two parts to the test in Clause 13, which is that you have to have supplied the article but also have to know or suspect the use to which it is going to be put. So it is not just enough for somebody to show that you did the thing; the prosecution has to prove that you knew or suspected something as well. So that is not a good example, and therefore it does not flip the burden of proof around. It still lies with the prosecution.
I did not use the example of a knife. I can refer the Member to the Hansard of the previous day in Committee, which I have already apologised for not being at it because I was working with colleagues on immigration matters in another parliament at which this Parliament is represented. It would be unwise to try and deal with arguments that we had last week, of which I was not a part, but I simply say that the relationship between the offence in this case and the threshold which is being put before it is not significant. I suspect that we will treat and think about this throughout the course of the debate on the whole Bill today when we relate ourselves to the fact that this is meant to be aimed at the smugglers.
One of the things in common to all the people on the north coast of France, who represent so many different parts of the structure that is trying to stop the people taking these dangerous routes, was that they were concentrating on the smugglers. Everything was determined in terms of how they could get at the smugglers, and protecting human life and being humane in what they do as well.
The challenge in the Bill as we go through, and to the Minister, who I hope will give me a hopeful reply on what the man in the next room is saying, is the fact that this is a distinction between making very powerful offences for challenging those who are guilty of this horrible crime of taking people in terrible conditions on what are very dangerous routes indeed.
I have just one final point about the messages which smugglers send to the people who are going to be smuggled. I am sure they will not be saying, “You’d better be careful: the British are changing their laws in these directions”. As we were told by those who intercept their telephones in France, it is much more about where they should go and what they should avoid going to, what they should avoid doing and what they should do in terms of getting their journey. That is really the whole challenge from the smugglers. I welcome the response from the JCHR on the reason why, unanimously, it posed and passed these resolutions.
My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I am grateful that he ended on that note, because I just want, for the sake of the record, to say that although paragraphs 1 to 52 were agreed unanimously, the entire report was not—two members voted against and one abstained—but it was a very thorough report, conducted, I might say, on all sides with a great deal of diligence and thoroughness. All my colleagues participated in that in a robust way, as the noble Lord might imagine.
My Lords, I make just one technical point. We are here to discuss whether or not these amendments are going to work if they are passed.
Amendment 35, for example, deals with the defence of reasonable excuse by reference to a number of international conventions. I am a bit concerned as to how a court is going to direct a jury in respect to that. Certainly, it is arguable that they should reflect those conventions. As the amendment is currently framed, that is going to be legally very difficult. It is not normally the way these things are done. There should perhaps be some definition which embodies what is contained in those conventions, rather than simply reciting them as a list, because I do not think a court is going to find that very easy to interpret.
Incidentally, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the insertion of the word “reckless” does not help in terms of clarity. It is one of the most difficult words in the legal context. Courts of all levels have struggled to find any clarity with the word “reckless”.
My Lords, the debate has obviously spanned beyond the amendments before us, but it is worth stating at the outset that the focus of these amendments is to determine that the provisions are aimed at the particular people who are breaking the law—the smugglers. The focus has to be that it helps law enforcement and the judiciary to focus their resources on the people that the Government really want to apprehend in order to tackle the criminal gangs. There are words—which I will come to in a moment—on which I agree a different definition might be more helpful, but it is worth while repeating the words of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the international regulations and rules that guide us and we put around ourselves and the importance of those.
I am reluctant to go into this field of the reinterpretation of the ECHR, but one mistake relates to the fact that some countries signed an unaddressed letter which gave no indication whatever of what changes to the ECHR they were looking for. The person who was supposed to receive it read about it in the newspapers. I contrast that arrangement, where nothing could be made of the letter because it gave no sense of what was to be changed, to the approach of the British Secretary of State for Justice, who approached the matter in a proper manner and spoke to the people concerned, the right Committee of Ministers, who are responsible for any review of the ECHR. There is already a set of motions in place to enable that discussion to occur. It would be worth while trying to understand what people in other countries want to do and what they need to happen in order to change, but those discussions are under way because, essentially, this is a living document that needs to be changed, interpreted and looked at as time goes by, and that is happening at present.
We should be clear that these amendments would simply treat the people who are coming here with a deal of compassion. I absolutely agree that we have to separate genuine asylum seekers from the rest. We cannot do that by our own legislation until they arrive here. There are no routes by which people can arrive here, apart from the few which would not affect the people from the countries who are most affected in this matter. What makes sense with these amendments—maybe not entirely in the words they use—is that they are trying to distinguish who we are going for and who we are gunning at, as it were.
Amendment 33 seeks to ensure that the scope of the offences in Clauses 13 and 14 apply only to the smugglers. The amendments seek to link the offences to financial and material gain. If there is another way of explaining the financial and material gain as being the method by which you determine a smuggler, then obviously it would be worth noting.
In that respect, I took note of what the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said about how to deal effectively with the migrants situation. Fortunately, I went to visit the site of the Jungle in Calais two weeks ago. It is now fields; there is nothing there but fields, grass and animals grazing, and that is because the French authorities dealt with groups of people to make sure that they fit with the strategy they are adopting. They had no complaints about the way that was working at the present time. Maybe times have changed, and maybe people need to be thinking differently.
Amendment 35 proposes that the defence excuse in Clause 13 should ensure the protection of
“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”—
and that is the question. In mentioning “certain circumstances”, one needs to define what those circumstances are; otherwise, the courts would not be able to make the appropriate case work.
Amendment 38 suggests that the scope of offence of Clause 14 should include for financial or material gain. That is the distinguishing factor between those who are smuggled and those who are not.
Amendment 44 suggests that the defence excuse in Clause 14 should ensure protection of
“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”.
Again, one has to define the words “certain circumstances”, because otherwise it becomes too general.
Amendment 57 suggests that the reasonable excuse defence in Clause 16 should ensure the protection of
“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”.
Again, that wording needs to be tightened up.
Finally, Amendment 203 would provide
“a statutory defence for refugees in certain circumstances”
for the offences in Clauses 13, 14 and 16. Obviously, there is a need for tightening up in this matter to ensure that we can separate out the people for whom the Bill is intended to deal with: those who are causing the misery, those who are trafficking and those who are smuggling and those who are spread around Europe to make sure that these schemes work. These are the people whom the Bill should be aimed at and is aimed at. All these amendments would do is make sure that we entirely focus our efforts on those people who are causing these criminal acts.
Therefore, I suggest that these amendments have a right sense of direction in what they intend. They enshrine the international regulations which we sit within. It is not just one convention; it is quite clear from the opening speech of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that there are a raft of international conventions, laws and rules that we sit behind. We are part of that international way of dealing with matters, and if we lose that way of dealing with it and do not follow it through, we will never be able to solve something which is so international in its nature.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their speeches in this group. Again, I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the rationale behind these amendments. The general thrust of all noble Lords’ amendments, however, is to seek to impose further limits on the exercise of legal powers designed to tackle people-smuggling gangs and their supply chains.
On all these new offences, we need to be both clear and bold in providing our law enforcement agencies and our courts with the legal tools and powers they need to be robust in tackling the gangs, who are both the root cause of and the major beneficiaries from this problem. We on these Benches have rightly criticised the Government for the rhetoric around smashing the gangs—which in our view, at least at the moment, is empty rhetoric—but it is a clear fact that we need to tackle the criminal gangs, and it is right that we use this as an opportunity to shape our legislative framework so that we can do that as effectively as possible.
Amendments 33 and 38 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, would add an additional demand: for the person to have committed an offence, it must be demonstrated as well that they have financially benefited from the supply of a relevant article for use in connection with an offence. Again, I understand the rationale and the intentions behind the amendment, but I put myself against it and support the current Government—again, a slightly rare position to be in. Unlike other aspects of the Bill, it seems clear to us on these Benches that, as it stands, the text of Clauses 13, 14 and 16, which create these offences, is adequate, clear and sufficient.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 46 and 55 in my name. We are again back to this issue of ensuring that refugees, victims of modern slavery, are not unfairly prosecuted for behaviour committed due to coercion or exploitation. I am very grateful to the Minister for saying that the focus of the Bill is the smugglers. The problem is that there is no stipulation in the Bill that to be guilty, the person must be a trafficker or a smuggler. We want to ensure that refugees, victims of modern slavery, cannot be unfairly prosecuted for behaviour committed in the course of their actions.
Amendment 46 seeks to set out in Clause 14 that those involved in organised immigration crime, rather than those seeking asylum, are the ones who are to be prosecuted, by strengthening the statutory defence, which we have already heard from the Minister concerns finance. I am always open to suggestions on how else you might distinguish between an asylum seeker and a smuggler, in which case one could extend the definition.
The offences this Bill creates are very substantial, and rightly so. We support them. In Clause 14, on handling articles for use in immigration crime, there is a 14-year maximum prison sentence. It is the same for Clause 16, with five years’ imprisonment in Clause 18 and six years’ and five years’ imprisonment in further clauses. These are substantial periods of imprisonment, and these are substantial cases, so it is very important that nothing happens that allows people to slip through the net. Given the severity of those four sentences, it is critical that we take a very careful approach to drafting the new offences, in order to safeguard against any unintended consequences such as the criminalisation of those seeking asylum.
The Bill, of course, as we now know, is widely drafted for prosecution to try to deliberately catch those acting at a distance from, as well as close to, the acts of smuggling. The broad construction of these offences as currently drafted could unintentionally catch vulnerable individuals such as asylum seekers and victims of trafficking. We have already heard the case of the young man who was forced to drive one of these very unsafe boats across the channel and was prosecuted as a result of that.
I am grateful again for the amendments that have been tabled and for the approach of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition in relation to them. Again, I think there will be many areas of agreement between the Opposition and the Government on these issues. I am grateful for the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has responded to the debate today.
I reassure noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lord Dubs, that care has been taken to ensure that these offences have the flexibility to target the smuggling gangs and do not unjustly impact or endanger those who are exploited by them. I have said that in other groups, I may say it again in further groups, and I am saying it again in this group: that is the target for government action.
Amendment 46 seeks to amend Clause 14 to ensure that individuals are not criminalised for handling items relating to their own journey, provided they did so solely for personal use and received no financial gain. I say to the noble Lord, Lord German, that Clause 14 already provides a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses; cases can be assessed individually; and prosecutors will consider the public interest as well as specific guidance relating to immigration crimes, including whether there is clear evidence of a credible common-law defence of duress or duress of circumstances, and whether the immigration offence was committed as a necessary part of a refugee’s journey to the United Kingdom. That will all be done before pursuing charges, with the clear intent—going back to my noble friend Lord Dubs—of targeting smugglers and not those who are exploited by them.
There is a list of humanitarian items that are carved out from these provisions. Items outside this list that facilitate organised immigration crime are easily shared, taken or given to others to hold, further risking creating loopholes, as items used in organising immigration crime can easily be transferred or misrepresented as for personal use. That again goes to the very heart of the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, which is that enforcement would be significantly more difficult if the proposed amendments were accepted. These offences are designed to enable law enforcement to act earlier and faster at the preparatory stages of an offence, potentially saving lives at sea and in the back of lorries. Therefore, I find it difficult to accept the amendment, which would hamper that objective.
Amendments 46 and 55 aim to add a financial gain element to the “reasonable excuse” defence. Again, I respectfully oppose the amendments. These offences target criminal gangs at an early planning stage when financial gain is not necessarily yet evident. Introducing a requirement in the clauses for financial gain would significantly constrain law enforcement’s ability to intervene early and disrupt organised gangs before a crossing occurs and before money changes hands.
Again, there is complexity in cash flows in these criminal cases, and it is impossible and impractical to exempt those without clear financial gain. Doing so would shift undue burden on to law enforcement to prove gain and would undermine effective prosecution. That would not be appropriate or proportionate, particularly given the life-threatening risks we have seen in the channel, where people smuggling is present. It would also undermine the opportunity for early intervention that the offences are designed to facilitate. Where there is evidence of involvement in organised criminal activity, such as facilitating illegal crossings, through the commission of these offences, prosecution should be possible regardless of whether financial gain can be shown.
I turn to Amendment 51, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Again, I share common ground with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on these matters. Amendment 51 proposes adding phones and chargers to the list of exempt items in Clause 15. Clauses 13 and 14 do not criminalise specific items; they target the supply or handling of items with knowledge or suspicion that they will be used in immigration crime.
The key issue remains intent. Everybody in the Committee today will recognise that phones are commonly used by smuggling gangs to co-ordinate crossings. Law enforcement agencies must retain the ability to act when such items are knowingly supplied for criminal purposes. A blanket exemption would create a significant loophole and weaken our ability to disrupt smuggling operations. Mobile phones are used to organise criminal gangs and therefore it is not practical or feasible to exempt them from the proposals in the Bill.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Dubs for speaking to Amendments 50 and 62 tabled by my noble friend Lord Browne. The amendments aim to exclude the offences from being considered a “particularly serious crime” under the 1951 refugee convention. The offences would be considered as particularly serious crimes—this is an important point for my noble friend—only if the sentence reaches the 12-month threshold. A court would have to consider all the circumstances of the offence in detail. If it imposed a sentence of more than 12 months, it is right that that is treated as particularly serious. The individual can still show that they are not a danger to the community.
This year alone—this goes to the heart of all the amendments—there have been 14 deaths at sea. I cannot agree that taking part in and providing means and methods for vulnerable people to risk their lives at sea in increasingly overloaded and poor-quality vessels and in the back of transit lorries should not be considered a serious crime. Amendments 50 and 62 in the name of my noble friend Lord Browne aim to exclude those offences as being considered particularly serious under the 1951 refugee convention.
I reassure my noble friend that there is a minimum sentencing requirement for the offence to be categorised as a particularly serious crime. It is right that this offence be treated as a particularly serious crime if the sentence imposed by the court is of at least 12 months, as I just mentioned, as provided by Section 62 of the Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002. The court will be able to consider carefully whether the offence is appropriate when imposing such a sentence. Also, it is still open to an individual to demonstrate that they did not constitute a danger to the community for the purposes of Article 33(2), thereby retaining protection against the matter being brought before them.
Amendment 56 proposes a statutory defence for those researching a journey for a close family member. Proving close family relationships is very complex and, I contend, is handled best on a case-by-case basis. Clause 16 already includes a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, and each case is assessed individually. Prosecutors—this is key and we have discussed it in earlier groups—will consider the public interest before pursuing charges, with the clear intent of targeting smugglers, not those exploited by them. This is a common theme running through all my responses to the groups of amendments to date—the aim of the UK Government, in co-operation now with authorities from other nations, is to target the smugglers, not those exploited by them.
Amendment 51B would require the Secretary of State to consult organisations assisting asylum seekers before making additions to the list of carved-out articles under this legislation. I know that this is a well-meaning and well-intentioned proposal, but it is not necessary or appropriate in the context of this clause. The articles for use in immigration crime offences concern the prevention of immigration crime and provide the opportunity to act quickly before lives are lost at sea and in the back of refrigerated lorries.
Clause 15 provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to designate certain items as carved out from this offence and the option for the Secretary of State to add to this list, but not to remove them without going through full parliamentary process. If we had formal consultation with external organisations before decisions could be made to add an item to the carve-out, that could introduce additional bureaucracy that would delay urgent action.
As noble Lords will know, immigration crime is dynamic and moving. We have seen this weekend how that dynamic movement can take place. The methods used by those who seek to exploit vulnerable individuals are evolving rapidly and the Government must retain the ability and flexibility to respond swiftly and decisively. I assure the Committee that there will be circumstances where, timing and circumstances permitting, we will always want to engage with charitable and voluntary organisations on these changes as appropriate. However, where lives are at stake and time is of the essence, I want to ensure that the objective of saving lives is paramount.
I hope I have answered the points raised by the Committee. I look forward to the noble Lord’s response but hope he will withdraw his amendment, and that noble Lords will reflect on what has been said.
I thank the Minister. I understand the ambition he is setting out: that we are going for the smugglers, not the refugees. The problem is that the Bill, as we have been discussing, does not give us that definition clearly up front. In other words, what the Minister has been saying and his intention—I absolutely agree with him—need to be clearly somewhere or other in the Bill.
I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that he read out the first part of my amendment and then skipped over the second part, which is connected.