Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord German Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord German]

116: After Clause 39, insert the following new Clause—
“Repeal of certain provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022The following provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 are repealed—(a) sections 12 to 65;(b) sections 68 and 69.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would repeal specified provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 116 and 118 in my name. This is a bit of a reversal, because it is looking not at what is happening but at what is left behind. I am asking the Government to consider this in some detail, so I am worried that the Minister may have some difficulty answering all the questions. If it is not possible, I am hopeful that we will get the answers in writing later.

The position is this. We support the repeal of the provisions in the Illegal Migration Act. What I am concerned about is what policy is left behind when you take those out. As it stands, in several places the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 will become the default directive, even though this was not regarded as being something of satisfaction when that Bill went through this House, so there are concerns about what is left in that area. This amendment brings together a range of issues, presenting the Government with the opportunity to explain the continuing concerns about the aspects of the Nationality and Borders Act that they have chosen to not repeal in this Bill but to rely on in sections where the IMA has been taken out from it.

There are sections of the Nationality and Borders Act which worsen the risk of violations of human rights, build further delays into the asylum system and increase the likelihood of legal challenges and judicial reviews in the future. I will dwell on several sections, but there are more than I am speaking about in the whole of this area. Section 12 of the Nationality and Borders Act is officially paused, but it allows for differential treatment between different groups of refugees, dependent on how they arrived in the United Kingdom. Can the Minister explain why the Government wish to retain that ability, even though it has not been brought in yet? Why are the Government retaining this section? If it is for operational benefit again, it would be useful to know what the operational benefit is.

The main issue of concern with Section 13 of the Nationality and Borders Act is that subsection (9) could lead to people being held in accommodation centres, including at such large sites as Wethersfield, for lengthy periods of time. Before the Nationality and Borders Act, there was a limit of a continuous period of six months, which could be extended to nine months by the Secretary of State. This section of the NaBA enables the Secretary of State to increase the time. There are ongoing concerns about the conditions of asylum accommodation, particularly the large sites such as Napier and Wethersfield, and there seems to be a pattern of repeating mistakes rather than learning from them. Safeguards are therefore important and it is concerning that this section, which we will fall back on, would enable people to be accommodated at such sites with no indication of how long they will be there for. My personal experience when I visited Wethersfield was that it was quite clear that, when people understood that they were going to be there for a maximum of nine months, it reduced the concerns and increased the well-being of residents. So, having a time limit is very important.

Section 14 is about safe countries, but we have already debated that. Section 18, which is not in force, creates a requirement to provide evidence. The argument about this is that it can only lead to additional bureaucracy for the Home Office. Providing evidence is part of the existing process for applying for asylum. If evidence is provided at appeal which could have been provided at the initial decision stage, the immigration judge will seek an explanation for this, and that could impact an individual’s credibility. With very tight deadlines, it could be a short window of time to provide the evidence. Also, it might be difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to provide the necessary evidence if they are unrepresented, and more than half of asylum claimants are currently without legal representation owing to the legal aid shortage.

Section 19, which is not in force, amends the assessment of whether to treat a person as truthful. That may be a straightforward assessment, but I do not know how it might work. Sections 20 to 25—also not in force, but the Government are retaining them—relate to priority removal notices, which warn people that they are being prioritised for removal. The person then needs to respond in the cut-off period. If they respond late, it will damage their credibility unless they have a good reason.

The concern about this is that a late claim is not necessarily without merit. It can take time for people to make a claim, because they are suffering from trauma relating to torture or sexual violence. It is unclear whether these reasons could be included in the good reason element of the priority removal notice, but it builds on a culture of disbelief in a decision-making process that already exists and is widely relied on. The inference is that not providing responses in time indicates the poor credibility of a person, which could result in improper refusal of protection claims.

Section 27 creates, although it has not yet happened, an accelerated detained appeal system in the First-tier Tribunal, which can be used for any detained appeal if it is considered that the appeal is likely to be disposed of expeditiously using the fast-track procedure. At the time, of course, it was an attempt by the Government to revive the detained fast-track scheme, but the Court of Appeal ruled it unlawful in 2015, and it described the timetable for such appeals as so tight that it was inevitable that a significant number of appellants would be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases. So what is the operational reason for retaining the ability to have an accelerated detained appeals system? If there is an operational reason for it, perhaps the Minister could tell us.

Section 29 makes it possible to move someone to a safe third country when their asylum claim is pending—not when it has been determined but when it is pending. In other words, while there is an appeal going on or a claim is being determined by the Home Office, you could deport someone in that process. That removes important rights of appeal. Members of this Committee will remember that, when we discussed the difficulty with the Rwanda scheme, people were going to have to make appeals from another country, and it would have been very difficult to maintain any means of correct procedure in that respect.

I am sorry this speech is quite long, but these are very important issues. Each one of them is about what the Bill does in making this the fall-back position that we are falling on.

Sections 30 to 38 require decision-makers to interpret the refugee convention in ways that do not accord with the long-settled meaning of that convention. We may already have had that discussion earlier today, and most of the interpretations concern Article 1A(2), which of course we have talked about, and we will further exhaust that when I talk about Amendment 118 in a moment.

Sections 40 to 41 relate to the criminalisation of asylum seekers. Those who arrive outside official routes in the UK, and people who facilitate arrivals, are committing an offence under this Act and are liable to prosecution. I understand the difficulties that there are with that one, but it is one that the Government need to describe so we have it on the record as to why that is important.

Sections 42 to 47 significantly expand maritime enforcement powers for pushbacks in international waters, removing the requirement to consider the duty of rescue. That is a fundamental in international maritime law; although it may not have been used yet, this is what the law will now say and it is important to understand why the Government want to retain that.

Sections 49 to 57 deal with age assessments, which we have just dealt with in the previous group, and Sections 58 to 63 exclude people, including children, from modern slavery protections if they have received a prison sentence of 12 months or more, even if the offence was committed as a result of their exploitation. The Government have distanced themselves in that respect from some, or indeed many, of these issues, so the question is why they are being kept.

I turn to Amendment 118, which is really an exploration of changes in the rates of refusal of asylum, which is particularly marked in in relation to Afghans, Iranians and Eritrean people claiming asylum. There has been a dramatic decline in the initial grant rate of asylum applications from those three countries. In the last two years of the previous Government, the grant rate of Afghan asylum claims stood at 98%. In the first year of this Government, that grant rate more than halved to 44%; the average grant rate for Afghans across the EU as a whole was 72% in Q1 of 2025. Eritrean grant rates are down by 13%; those of Iranians reduced by 26%. I do not observe any positive changes inside those countries during the relevant periods—certainly no change in Eritrea. The Taliban rule has been more oppressive and the human rights situation in Iran remains dire.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his detailed questions. At 10.19 pm, it is a great test of stamina to examine those issues in some detail. The noble Lord is proposing that numerous sections of the 2022 Act be repealed. I should start by making it very clear that we are determined to restore order to the asylum system, as I have mentioned before. We want it to operate swiftly, fairly and firmly, and to ensure that the rules are properly enforced. That means we need to deal with the backlog of issues that are before the House as a whole.

The noble Lord raised a number of particular issues. I am very happy to go through the detail I have on inadmissibility of asylum claims, the UK’s interpretation of key concepts of the refugee convention, and Sections 30 to 39. If he wants me to do that now, I can. If he wants me to write to him so he can reflect on it more slowly, before Report, I can do that. I am happy to take his advice on how he wishes me to respond.

[Lord German (LD)]

I thank the Minister. As I said at the beginning, it would be very helpful to have it in writing so that, as he rightly says, we can reflect on it in the greater time we will have available to us.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have before me in my notes a full encyclopaedia of responses to the many points the noble Lord made, and I am very happy to go through them. However, it may be more sensible—given the hour and the fact that the noble Lord will not, I suspect, be pushing these amendments to a Division this evening—if I reflect on what he said in Hansard and respond to those points with clarity, using this document. I will place a copy of that letter in the Library, so that other Members can see the detail. In my view, this would speed up the response and give some clarity to the noble Lord, so he can reflect on whether he wishes to return to these matters on Report. If that is satisfactory, it would seem to be a useful way of progressing.

With that assurance, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment, pending any discussion and response to the letter I will send him.

[Lord German (LD)]

I thank the Minister for that. That is exactly what we were hoping for from this amendment: to understand the Government’s intention in these various areas. I am grateful for his response, and I therefore withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 116 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord German]

119: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“A three-month service standard for asylum casework(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, implement a three-month service standard for asylum casework.(2) The service standard must specify that 98% of initial decisions on all asylum claims should be made before the end of three months after the date of claim.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require UK Visas and Immigration to reintroduce a three-month service standard for decisions on asylum cases.

[Lord German (LD)]

I will be as brief as I possibly can, given the hour. What is important in this amendment is to try to return to having a service standard. The amendment proposes a three-month service standard to determine asylum decisions. I know that the Minister, and others in the past, have looked at the issue and whether it might be six months. The important question here is whether there should be a service standard for dealing with these matters.

The history of this is that a service standard to decide 98% of straightforward asylum applications within six months was introduced in 2014 after a report which criticised delays in asylum decision-making. Of the claims that were submitted from March 2014 to the end of the year, only 8% received a decision within six months. In the second quarter of 2018, 56% of decisions were received within six months. In the third quarter of 2018, 25% received a decision within six months. Subsequent to that, the service standard was abandoned.

The reasons given by the Government at that time were:

“We have moved away from the six-month service standard to concentrate on cases with acute vulnerability and those in receipt of the greatest level of support, including unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. … Additionally, we will prioritise cases where an individual has already received a decision but a reconsideration is required. … the current service standard does not always allow us to prioritise applications from the most vulnerable people in the system if their claim is ‘non-straightforward’”.


That told me that there is a sort of on-off switch and a whole range of categories, and the Home Office would move the arrow to whichever one it thought was the most concerning at the time. I know that, in the context of things such as accident and emergency departments in the health services around this country, having a service standard is an important way—though it may not be kept—of having that focus.

Therefore, this seems to be an issue of prioritisation. The Home Office says that it can prioritise different targets or different circumstances rather than having a service standard. There was a large backlog of 91,000 at the end of 2024, with the associated costs to the taxpayer and slow decision-making hampering integration. Of those waiting for an initial decision, around 50,000 people had been waiting for more than six months. Arguing for a new service standard means that we could speed things up, because people would have a standard in mind.

I know that the Minister has dealt with this in the past in response to questions, but I would be grateful if he could say whether the Government have reviewed the potential benefits of reintroducing a service standard, what the current prioritisation is for asylum decision-making, and, of course, what the Government are doing to reduce the backlog.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend’s amendment. I was not proposing to speak to it until recently. I may well have it wrong, but I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm the position. I think I read that arrangements have been put in place for bonuses for caseworkers who meet a standard. As I recall it, it was a very small amount of money, but if the Minister could tell the Committee what the standard is for asylum applications and say something about that bonus, it would be helpful. I am trying to ask that in a very neutral fashion.

I have Amendment 195, to which my noble friend has his name, relating to the use of artificial intelligence in the system. Obviously, artificial intelligence is going to be used. Asking whether it is used is probably like asking whether electricity is going to be used—of course it is these days. As this is about data as well, we start from the position that migrants are not criminals, and they should not be treated as criminals. Immigration, asylum seeking and refugee matters are civil matters, and any interference with privacy must be proportionate and subject to safeguards. I think we would all agree that our data is valuable, it is very precious, and that generally it needs regulation and oversight, and transparency is hugely important.

When I chaired the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, every Home Secretary we questioned assured us that the human would remain in the loop. Frankly, we were sceptical about what that really meant and the efficacy of it. The data subject must know what the authorities know, or think they know, about him. There is a lot more public discourse now about training of AI, but I doubt that we are all completely reassured about that. Immigration decisions are hugely impactful; they are life changing. The amendment would ensure that no machine alone may determine a person’s immigration fate, and that personal data remained insulated from algorithmic training.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope that we can agree that we will examine Hansard tomorrow to determine the information required from each of us and provide it in the fullness of time.

On Amendment 202, I thank noble Lords for their interest in ensuring transparency in the Government’s approach to third-country removal centres. I think the amendment is unnecessary. On 15 May, the Prime Minister set out that we are actively exploring the establishment of return hubs with international partners. Our approach will be guided by what is workable and what reduces the impact of migration on the British public. The hubs could facilitate the swift and dignified removal of failed asylum seekers. It is not the Rwanda model; the return hub proposal is fundamentally different. It does not outsource asylum decision-making but targets those whose claims have already been fully considered by the Home Office and the courts. Details of any agreements and associated policy would be made publicly available when the time is right. I hope that, at that stage, in the event of any schemes progressing, we could have some scrutiny and take decisions accordingly. I give him a commitment that we will publish such details in the event of any scheme progressing. In the light of those assurances, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I think I heard the Minister say on the service standard that he would take that into consideration or look at the matter. I also heard him say that there is a standard already, upon which appeals would be completed. In a sense, that is what a service standard is: you are setting targets for what you want to happen. If that is the case and both those things are factually accurate—we can look at Hansard—then I think that starts to satisfy what we are looking at here. Obviously there will be some more questions on the detail, but it seems to me that it is therefore appropriate for me to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 119 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord German]

131: Clause 41, page 36, line 8, leave out subsection (17)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the retrospective element of the changes made by this clause.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 131, I will also speak to Amendments 132 to 135 and Amendment 210 in my name. First, this amendment would provide a time limit of 28 days’ detention for persons detained for immigration purposes; secondly, it would introduce general criteria for detention to ensure that detention for the purpose of removal would be used only when strictly necessary and proportionate, and when the person can be shortly removed; thirdly, it would ensure effective judicial oversight of detention via the First-tier Tribunal, with automatic bail hearings after 96 hours of detention.

I tabled this amendment because, having engaged with the findings of the Brook House Inquiry, visited immigration detention centres and spoken to current and ex-detainees, I believe that it is a change that needs to happen. When I visited an immigration removal centre last year and spoke to detainees and staff, it was made clear to me that case progression for immigration detainees is slow and hampered by staff shortages. Further to this, detainees were unaware of the progress on their cases and when they could expect to leave detention or be removed. Communication to them was minimal and this clearly led to despair and frustration with the lack of hope for the future.

In its 2025 report on the progress of Harmondsworth IRC, the inspectorate noted that case progression was poor in six of the eight cases reviewed. The inspectorate reports common reasons for excessive periods of detention as including

“poor case progression; delays obtaining travel documentation; delays in securing appropriate release accommodation; and failures or delays in recognising high levels of vulnerability.”

With no limit on how long someone can be detained and no set time for their detention, there is no incentive for or pressure on the Home Office to make swift, accurate decisions.

A time limit set at 28 days, together with automatic bail hearings, would ensure sufficient time for the Home Office to proceed with removal in circumstances where impediments to these processes, such as outstanding legal appeals or unavailability of travel documents, have already been resolved.

In 2024, more than 50% of people held in immigration detention by the Home Office were later released back into the community under some form of immigration bail—a clear indication that the detention was likely unnecessary or even unlawful. According to the most recent Home Office annual report and accounts published on 17 July, from 2024 to 2025 the Government paid out compensation for unlawful wrongful detention in 334 cases, totalling £10.4 million. In 2023-24, there were 838 cases, totalling £11.8 million. This is clear evidence that significant numbers of people are detained wrongly or unlawfully each year. Without their having access to appropriate legal appeals or processes, the Home Office could have continued to detain them.

These amendments intend to significantly reduce the incidence of unnecessary detention and reduce the considerable suffering and inefficiency inherent in the current detention system. This would help to ensure that immigration detention is used only when a person has exhausted all appeals and removal is imminent and no viable alternatives are available. I appreciate that the Government will state that immigration detention is not indefinite. Indeed, the Minister for Border Security and Asylum recently stated:

“Immigration centres are not used for indefinite detention. We can only keep anyone in detention in an immigration centre if there is a reasonable prospect of their removal. If there is not, they have to be released”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/6/25; col. 18.]


The point here, of course, is that for the individual that experience can be indefinite, but there is certainly no straightforward answer when people ask that question.

The call for a statutory time limit on immigration detention has been made consistently by lots of expert bodies, including, of course, the Home Affairs Select Committee of the other place, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Chief Inspector of Prisons, the Independent Monitoring Boards, the British Medical Association, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Bar Council and, of course, the Brook House Inquiry. So against that, there is a mound of evidence in favour of these amendments.

Even in the most serious criminal cases, judicial oversight of detention is required after 36 hours and individuals must be released from detention after 96 hours if charges are not laid. Those suspected of terrorism offences can be held for a maximum of 14 days. Further to this, the statutory purpose of immigration detention is to effect removal, not to serve as indefinite detention to prevent reoffending.

Conditions in IRCs are often harsh and prison-like, with people routinely locked in cells for up to 12 hours a day. In a recent report on an IRC, the Chief Inspector of Prisons noted:

“A longstanding and fundamental problem was that all immigration detainees at Brook House, who should be held in relaxed conditions with minimal restrictions, were instead in an institution that looked and felt like a prison”.


The centre simply did not have enough space or experienced staff to manage an increasingly vulnerable population. Behind that, of course, we have the Brook House Inquiry, published in 2023, which recorded over a five-month period 19 incidents or acts of omission capable of amounting to mistreatment in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

Reducing the period of detention is therefore important in reducing harm. When this proposal has been debated previously, the concern has been expressed that detainees will run down the clock to frustrate removal and subsequently be granted release. But the amendment permits re-detention beyond the period of 28 days when there has been a material change of circumstances which could, for example, include a situation when an individual’s appeal rights are exhausted or a travel document is issued.

There are, however, a range of criminal sanctions available under Section 26 of the Immigration Act 1971 that enable anyone seeking to frustrate the system to be prosecuted. Under these proposals, the tribunal can refuse to grant bail if removal restrictions are set and removal is to take place within the following 21 days. Further, these proposals do not impact the broad powers of the First-tier Tribunal to set conditions for immigration bail under paragraph 2 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016. These include reporting and residence conditions, financial conditions and such other conditions as it deems fit. These proposals all exempt cases where the Secretary of State has certified that the decision to detain was taken in the interest of national security.

I would like to probe the Minister on another avenue to reducing time in immigration detention. For people serving a sentence of imprisonment who have been issued with a deportation notice in prison, custodial sentences provide sufficient time for immigration cases to be resolved. In this time, the Home Office can obtain the travel documents and make arrangements to facilitate a person’s lawful and efficient deportation on release from prison—in other words, a straight-through process without having to go through the intermediary steps and the time that that takes.

As a way of reducing the cost and harm of immigration detention, will the Minister consider the merits of progressing individuals’ criminal deportation cases while they are serving their sentences? Further to this, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, following his inspection in 2022-23, stated that the Home Office was “not making best use” of the early removal scheme or the facilitated return scheme. These schemes could also reduce numbers entering immigration detention.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

What a note to finish the evening on. I find myself in agreement with the tone of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I find myself not in agreement, I am afraid, with the noble Lord, Lord German, so it is an interesting end to a long day of debate.

Immigration detention is an issue that I know noble Lords feel strongly about. The purpose of Clause 41 is to clarify the existing statutory powers of detention where the Home Office is considering whether deportation is conducive to the public good, and the consequential amendments to existing powers to take biometrics and searches upon being detained for this purpose. It is the Home Office’s position that the current detention power is lawful. This clause provides greater legal clarity regarding its application. Without the retrospective effect of this clause, individuals could challenge the lawfulness of their detention. Such claims risk undermining the integrity of past deportation proceedings and frustrating future deportation proceedings.

Amendment 131 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to remove that retrospective effect. I do not believe that is a productive way forward because, as I mentioned, Clause 41 clarifies these powers. The Home Office already detains individuals at the first stage of deportation. Clause 41 is not expected to increase the use of detention powers but is intended to remove ambiguity and ensure that existing practices are legally robust.

On Amendment 132, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, with support from other noble Lords, it is important to make clear the Government’s position that a statutory time limit on detention will not, in our view, be effective in ensuring that those with no right to be in the UK actually leave the UK. The Government have been clear that we are committed to increasing removals of people who have no right to be here. That is what the public expect and, in that vein, I am on the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Davies.

In the year ending March 2025, there were 8,600 enforced removals—a 22% increase on the previous year—and that would not be possible with a time limit on detention because it would simply not be possible to achieve that level of numbers. It is crucial that we have an immigration system that encourages compliance. Under a 28-day time limit, people who have no legal right to be in the UK—including, as the noble Lord, Lord, Davies, mentioned, some who potentially have committed serious crimes—would be automatically released after 28 days, regardless of whether they have actively obstructed removal efforts or pose a clear risk to the public. We have a duty to protect the British public, and it is simply not safe to have an automatic release date, particularly because foreign national offenders, who may have committed serious criminal offences, would benefit from this amendment equally to anybody else.

Additionally, such a time limit is likely to encourage and reward abuse of the system by allowing those who wish to guarantee their release to frustrate removal processes until they reach that 28-day limit. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made that would potentially push people over the 28-day limit, and this would undermine effective immigration control and potentially place the public at risk.

Amendment 133 requires that, after 96 hours of detention, a person may continue to be detained only if they have been refused bail by the First-tier Tribunal or are awaiting a scheduled bail hearing. This would again, in my view, place significant additional burdens on an already-stretched tribunal service, and the increases would simply be unsustainable.

There are a number of safeguards in the detention process—I hope this will reassure the noble Lord—including access to the courts by judicial review; bail applications, which can be made at any point; and automatic referrals for consideration of bail for those detained for slightly longer periods. With these mechanisms in place, the transfer of these powers to the tribunal is not necessary.

I recognise and understand that there are concerns about prolonged periods of time in detention. The law is currently clear that we have powers to detain people only for a reasonable period to carry out a specific purpose, either to examine a person on their arrival, to remove or to deport. We have a number of safeguards in place, and I assure noble Lords that, where removal cannot be achieved within a reasonable timeframe, these safeguards ensure that people are released. I know that will not satisfy the noble Lord, but I put that for him to consider today in order to withdraw the amendment, which we can return to later.

I know the noble Lord, Lord Swire, has tabled Amendment 140. Sadly, he has not managed to be here this evening, but when he looks at Hansard in the cold light of day tomorrow morning, he will see that we include data which includes illegal entrants. We also produce and publish additional statistics on the number of foreign national offenders subject to removal and deportation, so that amendment is unnecessary. With that, I hope the noble Lord, Lord German, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I am obviously disappointed that the evidence produced by the inspectorate and many other bodies, including the House of Commons Justice Committee and our own committee on human rights, if not exactly thrown out of the window, has not necessarily received the full consideration we are speaking of. I hear what the Minister says, and I will reflect on that. I and the other supporters of this issue may well come back to it later. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 131 withdrawn.