Policing of Marches and Demonstrations

Lord Hain Excerpts

Monday 13th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am happy to reflect my noble friend’s opinion to the new Home Secretary when I speak to him.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, that the examples she gave are completely unacceptable and should be met with a firm response. The degree of anti-Semitism in the country at the moment is deeply shocking, as is the degree of racism and Islamophobia. That is something we should commonly confront, but I urge the Government to be very careful about curbing protests and the right to march through London. In 1936, when anti-fascists confronted Mosley’s mob swaggering through Jewish communities, many of the actions of those anti-fascists could have been regarded as disorderly, but they stopped them and they stopped that wave of anti-Semitism. Similarly, many of the actions I helped organise through the Anti-Nazi League in the late 1970s saved local Jewish communities and black communities from assault. Be very careful about curbing the right to march peacefully.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord.

Corruption

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 26th April 2023 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Hain]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the United Kingdom’s record in combating corruption.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are committed to the fight against corruption. Corruption and illicit finance undermine national security and global stability. They impede global prosperity and erode trust in institutions while harming their victims. Since 2010, the Government have led international efforts to combat corruption through the delivery of the United Kingdom Anti-corruption Strategy 2017-2022, and we will continue to build on this with the new anti- corruption strategy that is currently under development.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, in that case, why has the UK slumped to its lowest ever score in Transparency International’s latest global corruption index, falling sharply to number 73—a 10-place tumble from eighth to 18th over the last 10 years in its global rankings? Is it because of a collapse in government standards, or the recent scandalous government reversal of their previous admirable decision to suspend Bain & Company from UK Government contracts after Bain was found by a judicial commission to have been up to its neck in state corruption in South Africa? Are corruption and money laundering not now a real UK problem, and should not Ministers be utterly ashamed?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot improve on the words of the Prime Minister when he was asked about this subject. He pointed out that there has been

“widespread recognition and support for the UK’s approach to transparency and tackling corruption. … the most recent report from the Financial Action Task Force commended the UK for the steps it had taken”,—[Official Report, Commons, 1/2/23; col. 334.]

and those steps are significant. Obviously, a number of Bills going through your Lordships’ House and the other place at the moment deal with some of these issues. As for the specific question about Bain, I note that Bain has agreed to a period of rigorous monitoring for a minimum of two years during which its continuing compliance will be assessed. The UK arm of Bain has agreed that it will engage further with the Cabinet Office to provide evidence that its governance, organisation and internal processes are now working. I could go on, but I think that is enough.

Public Order Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 2 and 4 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to which I have added my name.

Amendment 2 is designed to raise the threshold required for the committing of the offence of causing a disruption. The clause leaves what is capable of causing disruption to purely subjective judgment, which is not satisfactory. I do not think that I have ever made a speech that insults members of the audience; I hope I never have. But such a speech may be reasonably deemed to be capable of causing a serious disruption—at least maybe in the other place, if not here. In other words, an event has to happen that is provocative in order to make it reasonable for the police to come to that conclusion. Whether it is provocative is the test of whether it is capable of causing disruption. Perhaps I can make a constructive suggestion here: every time the words “capable of causing disruption” appear, why do not the Government put in front of them “It is reasonable to believe that it is”?

On Amendment 4, the purpose is to make the intention to cause serious disruption the test of an offence. I strongly support that. I have become increasingly suspicious of the growing tendency to treat reckless speech—and suspicious, in fact, of the word “reckless” —or action as a criminal offence in itself, regardless of the intention of the speaker or actor. Of course I should consider the consequences of my words and actions—everyone should—but the line between reckless speech and free speech is a delicate one, and I would prefer to err on the side of free speech and peaceful protest.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I support most, if not all, of the amendments in this group seeking to circumscribe the new powers over “serious disruption”, especially Amendment 23. I do so not to offer the kind of forensic advice and analysis that many much more eminent noble Lords have already given today, but to offer a general and a more personal view, because I think the Bill takes the state’s power to restrict the right to protest to unprecedented levels. Many of the clauses in the legislation bear a striking resemblance to anti-terror laws. Surely, this is no way to treat those exercising their fundamental rights to dissent in the liberal democracy that the Government claim the UK to be. It is more like a police state Bill, in my view, than a liberal democracy one; more something that Beijing’s autocracy would favour, as opposed to London’s democracy.

Noble Lords need not take my word for it. Please read the recent Financial Times article by the noble Baroness, Lady Cavendish of Little Venice, who elegantly but devastatingly demolishes the case for the Bill and its many clauses, including those we are discussing right now. The noble Baroness is no leftie: she was a policy adviser to Prime Minister David Cameron. Under this Government, the trajectory of public order legislation has slowly chipped away at people’s fundamental rights, weighting the balance of power heavily towards the state and its agencies. These amendments are trying to redress that a bit, but the legislation advances that trajectory, despite the ink barely being dry on the recently passed Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act. It is a constant ratcheting up of restrictions at the expense of our freedoms and the health of our democracy.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. At this late hour I will not go into everything I said in Committee, but I live on the border and see it every day. I deal with and know people who cross the border every day. I know of many people who do not have Irish or British passports. They are not citizens of either country. Many of them are eastern Europeans who have remained and who work on both sides of the border, sometimes at the same time.

We heard about healthcare from the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie. The whole healthcare drive has been an all-Ireland drive to provide services of the best quality in Ireland. Your Lordships will be well aware in GB that, because of the land mass, it is sometimes better to have centres of excellence. There are therefore health staff and, just as in Great Britain, many of them are not British—and we are now trying to inhibit their crossing the border.

Before I go any further and talk about other areas, I must declare my interests in that, first, I am involved in tourism and, secondly, my brother is chairman of the organisation mentioned, Tourism Ireland. Nobody has lobbied me on this at all, not even him. When I rang him about it, he was not quite able to give me the figures I wanted, so this is not an “I’m telling you what I’ve been told” scenario at all.

I want to look at what the Minister said in reply, because we have heard that a lot of it was perhaps slightly muddled. I think it is worse than that. It was contradictory. First, in talking about the costs in tourism the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, ventured to say:

“I looked that up this morning in anticipation of this, and it is currently $14”,


so to him it was “not overwhelming”. People will be well aware that air passenger duty has been a bone of contention in this country and in Ireland, especially because in the Republic it was always lower than in the United Kingdom. I am aware that the Chancellor announced that because of the stress on tourism, he was going to lower it for internal travel throughout the United Kingdom but also, I believe, that it would be devolved to Northern Ireland for international travel.

If the Government attach so much importance to that and consider it significant—I think it was being lowered from something like £10 or £12 to £6 or £7—why did the Minister tell us that this is not significant? Is it or is it not? If it is not, why did they change it? I will tell the House why. In effect, the Government have just resurrected it by doubling it in order to bring this measure in. So, it does matter, which is not what the Minister said.

I then looked at the next paragraph. The Minister said:

“There will be no controls whatever on the Northern Ireland land border. Individuals will be able to continue to pass through border control at first point of entry to the common travel area.”


In many cases, the first point of entry is in the Republic of Ireland, so is the Republic going to administer this visa? I suggest that it will not, so this does not tie up.

Next, the Minister said the following:

“As is currently the case, individuals arriving in the UK, including those crossing the land border into Northern Ireland”.


I hesitate to say this, and correct me if I am wrong, as the Minister may have walked up and down our border many times without my noticing it, but I suggest that he would not have a clue where the border was. That is not me laughing at this. He would not have a clue, as there are no markings on the road. He might stop at a shop on either side, which takes euros or pounds. There is nothing else, but I will give him a lead: the telephone boxes in the Republic are yellow. If you see one of those, you know you have “crossed the border”. However, there is no border, so who are these visas for? It is absolutely clear that there is nobody to inspect them, so what are the Government going to do?

The Minister also said that the Government are going to use

“a variety of communication channels”.—[Official Report, 10/2/22; col. 1935.]

Excuse me, but it is almost laughable to say there would be communication in the Republic of Ireland to tell people that they cannot come north and vice versa if they do not have Irish passports.

I am sorry, but the reason for having legislation is to enforce it. This provision is not unenforceable because people refuse to have it enforced, but because it is totally unenforceable under those circumstances. This amendment is therefore not that logical—I think it is getting them out of a hole, but the Government are not prepared to look at the hole they are in. This may not be the most vital thing in the world, even if it is to us; it is a tiny thing.

The noble Baroness also mentioned the protocol. I am not talking about the protocol, because clearly, the Government have not used it as the excuse for not doing this. This is therefore basically outside the protocol, which has no bearing.

However, on the protocol, we all know, and we agree with them, that the Government put in place an incredibly bad arrangement, depending on which way you look at it. They are trying to alleviate it on the one hand, and they have brought out something to dump on top of it on the other. We have a saying in Lough Erne in Fermanagh: “I didn’t come up Lough Erne in a bubble.” It looks as if the Government did, because it seriously is unworkable.

That is all I am going to say, except perhaps ask the Minister to define the hard border. He says in his script: “There is no hard border; there is no hard border; there will never be a hard border.” What is a hard border? I do not know what the definition is, but it is where documents are checked or people have to stop. He is absolutely right that there is no hard border. Therefore, there is no border to make these checks. I suggest that the Government agree to this amendment.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I appeal to the Minister, especially as I hope he has received some expert advice from his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Caine, who, as a Northern Ireland Minister, is respected on all sides of the House. He knows his stuff, and that is a big plus. The noble Viscount has explained in practical detail why it is essential either to accept this amendment or to withdraw the provision and come back at Third Reading without it. My noble friend Lady Ritchie has underlined that with an eloquent speech, which I really hope the Minister has listened to carefully.

This is not a party issue or an Opposition versus Government issue; this is a Northern Ireland issue. I worry that in the construction of this Bill and this particular provision, Ministers have been thinking about everybody except Northern Ireland. That, I am afraid, is far too often the case. Their whole approach to Brexit has neglected Northern Ireland and deeply offended unionists for reasons I completely understand, including the former Government supporters who kept the Conservatives in power for a couple of years—the DUP. In Whitehall, there seems to be a default position in which Northern Ireland does not register when Bills are framed. I am afraid this is a very good example.

May I underline the points of my noble friend Lady Ritchie and the noble Viscount, made with a great deal of practical advice, about the operation across the border? The border, in everyday life for those who live either side, does not exist. People cross the border all the time and work, receive healthcare, get blood transfusions and receive educational opportunities and provision from either jurisdiction. I could go on, but time is short. It is terribly important to keep momentum going following the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, knowing that is the case. These unhappy residents, who are entitled to all these provisions by their residency rather than their nationality—they may be Polish, Lithuanian or all sorts of nationalities—and who provide essential services to people on both sides of the island of Ireland could be caught by this. This is a practical issue.

As surveys have shown, most Northern Ireland tourists who leave Northern Ireland to go to Europe, America or the rest of the world go via Dublin. Equally, most incoming tourists to Northern Ireland come via Dublin. If, in addition to the other issues involved, they will have to pay a fee—nominal, you may argue, but it is an additional hurdle—to benefit from Northern Ireland’s beauty and opportunities and bring much-needed income to Northern Ireland, especially to businesses suffering from an absence of tourists because of Covid, this is really damaging.

Can I also bring to the Minister’s attention the proposal, with cross-party support, to have Rally Ireland, which crosses the border, in the international FIA calendar for the world rally championships? The proposal put this year did not succeed but it is being strongly and widely backed for next year. This will affect Rally Ireland and the practical implications have not been thought through.

I refer to the detailed 1,000-word letter of the noble Lord, Lord Jay, who is chair of the Lords protocol committee, on which I sit, along with my noble friend Lady Ritchie. I have it in front of me, but I will not read it out this evening because the hour is late. It asks all sorts of questions about the reply from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, to the series of questions that our committee asked. I am afraid that, given her normal standards, it was a very unsatisfactory reply, which reinforces my concern that Northern Ireland has not really been thought of.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, for explaining her amendment so powerfully. I appreciate the intention behind it but the amendment would undermine the Government’s efforts to strengthen UK border control. The Government are clear: there will continue to be no routine immigration controls on journeys to the UK from within the common travel area and none at all on the land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. I am very familiar with the land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and I appreciate that you often do not know whether you have crossed it. Individuals will not be required to carry or present any documents when crossing the land border, nor will British or Irish citizens require an ETA.

To protect both the UK immigration system and the common travel area from abuse it is important that, as now, all individuals arriving in the UK, including those crossing the land border into Northern Ireland, continue to enter in line with the UK’s immigration framework. This is a well-established principle of the operation of the common travel area, and it applies when travelling in all directions. Visa nationals are required to obtain a visa for the UK when travelling via Ireland, including when they are crossing the land border. Otherwise, they are entering illegally. That includes UK visa nationals resident in Ireland. This is a well-established requirement and we are simply extending the same principle to individuals requiring an ETA.

The amendment would result in an unacceptable gap in UK border security that would allow persons of interest or risk, who would be refused an ETA, to enter the UK legally, undermining the very purpose of the ETA scheme, which is to prevent the travel of those who pose a threat to the UK. It would also provide an opening for those looking to abuse our current CTA arrangements, which is obviously in no one’s interests.

Some noble Lords are concerned about the impact on tourism and the economy. The Government are committed to developing a clear communications strategy to tackle any misunderstandings about the requirements to travel to Northern Ireland. As has been pointed out, over the last decade Northern Ireland has been transformed and is now very much considered a “must see” tourism destination. We will continue to support tourism in Northern Ireland and to Northern Ireland by ensuring that the process for obtaining an ETA is quick and light touch. Successful applications will be approved within minutes of submission.

Regarding the impact on frequent cross-border travel, I want to first make clear that those with any form of existing UK immigration status, such as frontier worker permit holders, will not be required to obtain an ETA. For those who do require an ETA, the application process will be quick and, as I said, light touch, and the majority of applications will be approved within minutes. Once granted, an ETA will be valid for multiple journeys over an extended period, minimising the burden on those making frequent trips, including those across the Ireland-Northern Ireland border. As now, it will not require those crossing the land border to hold any particular physical documentation, as ETAs will be issued electronically.

In answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, I was not comparing this with other forms of charge when I spoke on this previously at the Dispatch Box, and I certainly did not say that it did not matter. It obviously does matter, and I hope I did not sound as though I thought it was a trivial amount of money, because I do not.

The Government consider the scheme compliant with our commitments under the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and the protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland.

I have been talking to my noble friend Lord Caine; I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, that he would have been much better at doing this than me. We have been having discussions with the Irish Government, as he is well aware. The UK has a close exchange with Ireland on all matters of bilateral interest, including this one, and we will continue to engage with Ireland as we develop this scheme. My noble friend assures me that he has been in contact with the Home Office. Having said all that, I appreciate that I will probably not have satisfied anybody in this House, but I nevertheless ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, could I ask him about the potential impact on Rally Ireland, which is competing with other countries where this requirement will not be present? About 20 teams compete, with lots of non-British and non-Irish nationals in them, and they will each require multiple applications.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I asked my noble friend whether he was familiar with Rally Ireland, and he is not either. I will come back to the noble Lord with a specific answer. I had not heard of Rally Ireland before.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 17th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Could I just mention to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that these are ordinary people who protest? These are people who quite often just do not agree with the Government. I support a lot of protests that happen at the moment; there are sometimes protests that I do not support, but I support those people’s right to protest. On noise, I agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. How do the Government seriously think that protest is going to happen without noise? That is a fundamental part of it, whether it is drums, chanting or singing, or just talking through a megaphone. These provisions really are so oppressive. I have attached my name to Amendments 122, 133 and 147. These clauses should be deleted from the Bill. They are repressive and plain nasty, and they really have to go.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the amendments in this group standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, particularly those related to striking out Clauses 56, 57, 58 and 62. Briefly, in my view the Bill represents the biggest threat to the right to dissent and non-violent protest in my lifetime. It is deeply reactionary. It is an authoritarian attack on the fundamental liberties of our citizens.

If enacted in past generations, it would have throttled the suffragettes and blocked their ability to rattle Parliament’s cage to secure votes for women. It would have prevented antifascists stopping Mosley’s bullying, anti-Semitic blackshirts at Cable Street in the East End of London in 1936. It would have thwarted anti-apartheid protests that I led, in 1969 and 1970, which successfully stopped all white South African sports tours—a success which Nelson Mandela, then on Robben Island, hailed as a vital stepping stone in the ultimate defeat of apartheid. It would have prevented the Anti-Nazi League protests that stopped a resurgent and anti-Semitic, Islamophobic and fascist National Front in its tracks between 1977 and 1980, and in the early 1990s, similarly, the BNP. If Boris Johnson and Priti Patel want to be on the wrong side of history, the Bill is certainly the way to do it. I hope that this House will resist them.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

This is not to say that any particular technology is offensive per se—some of it may be very useful to criminal investigations and crime prevention in the public interest, but, goodness me, it needs to be on a statutory footing. Look at the way in which the extraction of mobile phone data developed and was not, for a considerable periods of time, on a statutory footing, what happened and how the Government then had to respond, even in this Bill. I am asking for a broader response to all of this kit—all of this technology. I beg to move.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

I speak in support of Amendment 132B, in the name of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, to which I have added my name, and which provides for a new clause in the Bill. I ask the Minister to listen quite carefully and consider bringing back a government amendment on Report to address the issues that we have raised. There is a really important issue about the accountability and scrutiny of these developing technologies of surveillance and weapons.

The purpose of the proposed new clause is to ensure that drones and other new surveillance or weapons technology can be deployed by the police only within parameters and regulations set by the Secretary of State; in other words, it seeks to ensure proper parliamentary accountability and scrutiny rather than leaving it as a matter of exclusive police discretion. As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has pointed out, when, in the past, other forms of technological surveillance, and indeed digital technology, were not properly regulated, they started to encroach on privacy in a major way. We have all seen examples of that or experienced it ourselves.

Police in England and Wales are considering using drone-mounted cameras that could film high-quality live footage from 1,500 feet—457 metres—away, which raises concerns among civil liberties campaigners. The National Police Air Service—NPAS—which provides air support to 46 police forces, has asked private companies for information about systems that offer both airborne imaging and air-to-ground communication. A government website stated on 21 September:

“The imaging systems are intended for use on BVLOS (Beyond Visual Line of Sight) remotely-piloted aircraft systems: ‘Drones’.”


The NPAS told potential bidders that the systems should be capable of transmitting live, high-quality images even in low light, using electro-optical or infra-red systems. It said that this would enable officers to pick out detail such as facial features, as well as clothing and vehicle registration plates, at a distance of between 500 feet and 1,500 feet. The NPAS added that the cameras should be able to operate on a drone that stays in the air for up to four hours and flies up to 30 miles from the base station from which it is controlled.

Drones have been used by various English and Welsh police forces, including the Metropolitan Police, which has explained that they have been deployed to survey crime scenes and provide live footage of operations. That is all to the good as a response to serious crime. It seems, however, that the NPAS may plan a national rollout of drone technology, which raises all manner of civil liberty issues, including privacy, how much autonomy will be granted to private companies operating such drone technology for surveillance by the state, and whether it will target legitimate protesters as opposed to criminals and terrorists.

I ask these questions because these important issues cannot simply be a matter for operational police decision-making. They should be placed within an accountable regulatory environment that can be scrutinised by Parliament. CCTV is already ubiquitous and operated by private companies able to watch whatever we do, certainly in urban areas. Surveillance of the vehicles we drive is also universal. Big tech companies are increasingly monitoring almost our every move.

Deployment of police drones with algorithmic and facial recognition technology should be properly regulated. This is the essence of what I am asking the Minister to respond to. Drone surveillance has even been used to stalk dog walkers during lockdown. It is not acceptable for a Home Office spokesperson simply to say, recently:

“Use of drones is an operational matter for police forces.”


Nor is it sufficient for Ministers to say that the police are already subject to the Air Navigation Order and the general data protection regulation. Although it was reported in the Guardian that the Home Office says increased use of drones would allow police forces to replace helicopters, reducing noise and carbon emissions, that should not be a reason to duck the necessity for proper accountability and scrutiny. I stress, to the Minister and to your Lordships’ House, that this amendment does not seek to block police deployment of drones for legitimate purposes such as to tackle criminals, drug or people traffickers, terrorists, or racist or fascist demonstrations targeting black, Jewish or Muslims citizens.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry, to which I gave evidence earlier this year, has already revealed stark injustices and abuses of liberty and privacy. The High Court has recognised this in its recent judgment finding against the Metropolitan Police in a case brought by environmental protestor Kate Wilson, who was intimately and improperly befriended by undercover police officer Mark Kennedy. Other example like this were revealed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry. I mention these because they relate to accountability, scrutiny and proper regulation. One undercover police officer told the inquiry that she did not know why she was infiltrating one feminist group, as only four people attended a meeting she went to. But she was deployed in this way, instead of on serious undercover police work, such as what I saw and approved as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. That was legitimate undercover police work.

This amendment is about ensuring drone technology is used to put serious crime under proper surveillance, is accountable and does not get out of control, as undercover police officers did. I have spoken previously in this House, on another Bill, about the improper use of undercover police officers to monitor and put under surveillance anti-Apartheid demonstrators, instead of pursuing the South African security services who were bombing Nelson Mandela’s headquarters in London. I will not go on about this, but my point is that the deployment of undercover police officers should have been more properly regulated. I hope that the current inquiry, headed by Judge Mitting, will produce recommendation to that effect, given that it was set up by the Government, which I welcome. The question is how deployment is regulated and who makes the ultimate decisions. I believe it should be based on a warrant—which I signed hundreds of, as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and when substituting for the Home Secretary or Foreign Secretary—to deal with serious crime.

To give an example of what I think would have been a legitimate deployment of drone technology if it had existed then—I will describe this generally so as not to give away what was really going on—I witnessed graphic video-based surveillance of paramilitary members with guns seeking to attack fellow citizens in Belfast when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 2005. That was done for entirely legitimate purposes. I will not describe how exactly it was done because I do not think that should be publicly revealed. The operation of a drone in that situation—because drone technology did not exist in the form that it does now—would have been entirely legitimate and I saw at first hand the way it could be legitimately deployed.

However, I can also see how this could be spread, if it is simply an operational decision by police, to target non-violent demonstrators and environmental activists. We may not approve of their methods, but we have already seen members of Extinction Rebellion put on a terrorist list by police forces. When that was revealed they of course said that they should not have been. This is about parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. Without such accountability, how do we know that drone-based surveillance is not being targeted on illegitimate purposes like undercover police officers most certainly were?

If the noble Baroness is willing to look at this, and she might find some technical reasons why our amendment is not acceptable to her, it may be that the same kind of authority should be given as under the warrant procedure for authorising surveillance. As I have just explained, I signed hundreds of those as Northern Ireland Secretary of State and in other capacities. Maybe that is one of the ways in which ultimately the Secretary of State would take the decision and be ultimately accountable under the legislation that Parliament passes. Parliament can therefore scrutinise, if not every decision, then the general pattern of decisions made. We need something similar for drone surveillance and this amendment tabled by my noble friend provides for that. I hope the Government will address this so that we do not have to bring back the same amendment or a similar one on Report, because the Government will have recognised this is an important issue and taken the initiative themselves. I ask her to consider that.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, way back in 2004 I was the Deputy Mayor of London—when there was only one deputy mayor and not a whole host of them. In that role I attended DSEI, the arms fair. What struck me was that there was a terrifying amount of military equipment being sold and repurposed for use by police forces and Governments against their own citizens. That was a few years ago and I imagine the situation has got much worse since.

On another occasion I was outside a kettle in Whitehall chatting to the senior police officer trying to give him some good advice about how to communicate with the crowd. He had a phone call, he stepped away to take it and when he came back, he said “I’ve just been told not to speak to you any more.” I asked, “Who by?” and he pointed at the helicopter that had been flying over us. That was the first time I realised just how powerful the cameras were; they had not only been able to photograph me but also recognise me which, from the top of my head, I would have thought almost impossible.

There is always a great amount of mission creep with this type of technology and people can get carried away with it. Our own Prime Minister infamously wasted hundreds of thousands of pounds of public money buying illegal water cannons when he was Mayor of London. They ended up rotting down in Kent and I am not sure we ever managed to sell them—perhaps we sold them for scrap. As far as I know there is still no oversight or regulation of the facial recognition technology. I would be very interested to hear the Minister tell me about that, because I have been agitating for that for some time.

--- Later in debate ---

I want to address the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the Justice and Home Affairs Committee inquiry into the use of new technologies in law enforcement, which I am sure will touch on many of the issues raised today. We look forward to the report that stems from that and will study any recommendations very carefully.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

Can the Minister say something more about facial recognition technology? She has covered this to some extent, but what is different from the heli-tele era that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, described, or the incident in Belfast I described, when you did not have facial recognition technology? This is going that way if it is not there already, and does that not raise important regulatory questions, or is this being addressed by the committee she has just described? I would be grateful if she could elucidate.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I have not engaged with the committee. The committee could invite me, but I think it spoke to Home Secretary in the past few days. Live facial recognition is the comparison of images against a watchlist, whereas heli-tele seems to be—from what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was describing—aerial CCTV. The two are quite different and are governed under different laws. The LFR is a comparison against a watchlist, and that is why it is different.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 5, I shall speak also to Amendment 23, which is grouped with it. I intend to seek the opinion of the House, unless I get a dramatic concession from the Minister at the end of the debate.

These amendments impose a requirement for prior judicial approval of criminal conduct authorisations, with some provision for urgent cases. I speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Our report, which has been widely applauded in this and previous debates on the Bill, has obviously been very helpful, and I am using a lot of information from it. I am also grateful to Justice, which provided a comprehensive report, with proposals for amendments. I am grateful to the Minister, who arranged for my noble friend Lady Massey and myself to have a briefing with some of the officials and senior police officers. We had a detailed discussion, and although it was directed at amendments relating to children which will be discussed on Wednesday, some of it is nevertheless relevant to the amendments that I am proposing today. I think I may quote from that without pre-empting the discussion about children on Wednesday.

The Government claim that prior judicial authorisation is not necessary because:

“The use of CHIS requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal qualities of that CHIS, which then enables very precise and safe tasking.”—[Official Report, Commons, 5/10/20; col. 662.]


As I understand it, the Government believe that authorisations are better left to public authorities’ delegated authorising officers, who are, supposedly, more equipped to deal with CHIS than judicial commissioners, who are one step away.

However, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, who has been quoted more than once in this debate, said:

“There is no comfort in allowing senior figures in the police or the intelligence agencies the power to sanction lawbreaking, without the need to first obtain independent warrants from judges or some other authority.”


That seems pretty clear.

The use of prior judicial authorisation has, of course, been discussed in the past in relation to RIPA. But in 2016, the European Court of Human Rights held that judicial authorisation

“offers the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and proper procedure.”

This is particularly pertinent to surveillance, which is,

“a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society”.

The court concluded that

“it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge”.

That is part of the basis of this amendment.

Concerns about whether this is feasible do not carry much weight. There is no reason why judicial commissioners could not review CCAs; they are already well-practised in making complex assessments of sensitive material in an independent, detached manner and at short notice, and they are always very senior judicial figures.

The Select Committee looked at all this. It is very clear that the Bill does not provide for any independent scrutiny of criminal conduct authorisations before they are made and acted upon. The report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights noted that, while the process of granting criminal conduct authorisations would be kept under review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, his

“role in the oversight of CCAs is entirely ‘after the event’ … nor does the Bill provide for the IPC to be informed of authorisations at the time they are made, so that prompt scrutiny can take place.”

The report further noted:

“The lack of prior independent scrutiny for CCAs under the Bill stands in marked contrast to the procedures in place for other investigatory functions”,


such as police search warrants and phone tapping. The former Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald—as he then was—has been quoted several times as saying that:

“Under this bill it will be easier for a police officer to commit a serious crime than to tap a phone or search a shed.”


This has been quoted so often it must go in the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. The argument in favour of judicial approval is there.

I refer to the Pat Finucane case in Northern Ireland—one of a number of cases—which is also mentioned in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. There was a real abuse of powers which under my amendment would, I am pretty sure, have been prevented by a judicial commissioner. That case is very much unfinished business. Indeed, there is a plea, which I fully support, for a full independent review of what happened when Patrick Finucane was murdered by, or with the knowledge of, British agents. That is business for another day but, in the meantime, we have this amendment.

Some of these amendments are so crucial to the working of the Bill that it is difficult not to tread from one into the area of another, but this amendment is fundamental. Prior judicial approval for a CCA is absolutely essential to providing the safeguards which were referred to in the previous debate and which we need before we can allow such a Bill to become law in this country. I beg to move.

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 16 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Blunkett, a former Home Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, to each of whom I am grateful. It is a very straightforward amendment that would add confidence to the deployment of state-employed undercover officers by ensuring that each had to be authorised by a Secretary of State in exactly the same way as existing legislation requires for surveillance operations.

My noble friend Lord Blunkett and I both signed hundreds of warrants for surveillance operations under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which was updated by this Conservative Government in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, at a time when the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, was a government Minister, even if not in her current role. In other words, she and her Conservative Government re-enacted legislation requiring Secretary of State authorisation for surveillance, and so it is a puzzle to me why Ministers have not accepted this amendment.

The amendment endorses the identical principle for CHIS or undercover officer deployment in a way that would add to public confidence, which has been badly damaged by evidence that led to the current inquiry on undercover officers established by Prime Minister Theresa May and chaired by Sir John Mitting, a former High Court judge. It was established because the Conservative Government—in which the noble Baroness was a Home Office Minister at the time—felt undercover policing had got out of control and needed to be made more accountable.

The abuses so far revealed in the inquiry’s proceedings fully justify the Conservative Government’s decision to launch it. I will mention only several. We have learned that the campaign by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and her family to discover the truth about her son Stephen’s brutal racist murder was outrageously infiltrated by undercover officers. Why were they not instead targeting the racist criminals responsible for Stephen’s murder? If that deployment had been subject to authorisation by the Home Secretary, would it have happened? I very much doubt it, because surely a question would have been asked of the operational police decision as to why the innocent victims of a vicious racist murder were being targeted and not the criminals responsible.

There are many other examples, including my own personal experience. As confirmed by evidence given to the Mitting inquiry, from 1969 to 1970, a British police or security service officer was at almost every anti-apartheid and anti-racist meeting that I attended, private or public, innocuous and routine, or serious and strategic, such as stopping all white apartheid sports tours and combatting pro-Nazi activity. Why were they not targeting Nazi groups responsible for attacks on black people, Jewish citizens and Muslims?

Why were they not targeting the criminal actions of the apartheid state responsible for, among other things, fire-bombing the London offices of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress in March 1982 and, in 1970, murdering South African journalist Keith Wallace, who had threatened to expose the apartheid security service operations in the UK? In June 1972, why did they show no interest whatever in discovering who in South Africa’s Bureau of State Security sent me a letter bomb capable of killing me, similar to those that had killed anti-apartheid leaders across the world?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

While I have the opportunity, I thank the noble Lord for the conversation we had the other day—it was very helpful in allowing me to know exactly what both noble Lords required. I cannot give that undertaking at the Dispatch Box but I can go back and ascertain just how often the Home Secretary receives these reports and whether the Investigatory Powers Commissioner might be thinking of making more regular reports in future if necessary, or indeed spot reports as and when required. I can certainly undertake to do that.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

I too thank the Minister for her reply and for her engagement. It is clear from the balance of the debate that there is no point in my pressing Amendment 16, and therefore when the time comes, I will not seek to divide the House on it.

However, to follow up on the question of my noble friend Lord Blunkett, will the Minister give an assurance that the Home Secretary will take a particular interest in the most politically sensitive deployment of a CHIS, which is the area that has given rise to real worry? Whether that is in the form of a quarterly report or regular interactions with the head of the Metropolitan Police, other chief constables and the head of the security services is a matter for consideration, but there should be some hands-on authority by the Home Secretary and regular interest in deployments in politically sensitive areas.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

It was very good for us to have a chat the other day because we could discuss things that clearly we cannot discuss on the Floor of the House. I completely understood the sensitivity between some very nuanced situations and the purely operational role of the deployment of CHIS for criminal conduct. I will most certainly go back and put those points. Again, I thank the noble Lord for the time he took to discuss his concerns with me.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)]

My Lords, I have had six requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Blunkett, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I call the noble Lord, Lord Hain.

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her typically courteous and thoughtful response, particularly her offer to talk to a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords about possible oversight that would be acceptable to the Government. Could she look again at Amendment 15? I and my noble friend Lord Blunkett worked very closely with the Security Service, in my case when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—including with the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller—GCHQ, and, when I was in the Foreign Office, with MI6. I have authorised warrants, as I have explained, for vital work in surveillance and interception, and worked with undercover officers.

I appeal to the noble Baroness to meet my noble friend Lord Blunkett and myself informally to discuss the terms of Amendment 15, because it is very practical. It can happen in real time; I have been involved in authorising warrants in real time, including one on Islamist bombers planning to attack London when the operation was live. So, it does deal with her point. It is practical; in some respects, it is the most practical of all these oversight measures. It would give greater legitimacy to and authority for the deployment of undercover officers for the purposes that she is quite properly seeking. They can play vital roles in combating terrorism, for example. I ask her to look again at this and perhaps meet us to discuss it.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord knows how I operate, so he can be absolutely sure I would be happy to meet noble Lords to discuss some of these amendments. I was particularly attracted to the post-facto oversight, because operationally —I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is going to say something about this—prior authorisation could be very difficult. To get that notification as close to real time as possible is, I think, what we are all seeking.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome the Minister to this House. To declare an interest, I am what is described as a “non-police, non-state core participant” in the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and I am due to give evidence early next year. I was targeted by undercover officers for some 30 years, including when I was an MP. But what troubles me most are the clear abuses practised by undercover officers involving people I know well.

Ecological activist Kate Wilson is not a criminal. She is a principled radical activist. She was at primary school in London with my two sons. Our families shared holidays and often visited each other’s homes. She was targeted by undercover officer Mark Kennedy, who formed an intimate and what she described afterwards as abusive relationship with her over seven years. He even reported back to his superiors on contacts with my family when I was a Cabinet Minister. Why were police targeting Kate instead of drug barons, human traffickers, criminals and terrorists?

Doreen Lawrence, now my noble friend Lady Lawrence, was a law-abiding citizen when her family’s campaign to discover the truth about her son Stephen’s brutal racist murder was infiltrated by undercover officers. Why were they not targeting the racist criminals responsible for Stephen’s murder?

Undercover officers attended anti-apartheid meetings in my parents’ living room from 1969 through the early 1970s and reported back that I was a speaker at anti-racist meetings when I was an MP in the early 1990s. Why were they not targeting those responsible for, among other things, crimes in London of fire bombing and murder by the oppressive actions of the apartheid state? Why did they show no interest whatsoever in discovering who in South Africa’s Bureau of State Security was responsible for sending me a letter bomb in June 1972 capable of blowing my family and our south-west London home to smithereens were it not for a technical fault in the trigger mechanism?

In each of these cases, the police were on the wrong side of justice, on the wrong side of the law and on the wrong side of history: infiltrating the family of a climate change activist instead of helping combat climate change; covering up for a racist murder instead of catching the murderers; harassing anti-apartheid activists campaigning for Nelson Mandela’s freedom instead of pursuing crimes by the apartheid state.

Fortunately, Kate Wilson’s early eco-activism helped make climate change an international treaty. We stopped the 1970 all-white South African cricket tour; we helped bring down apartheid; and Nelson Mandela went on to be elected President. The Anti-Nazi League, of which I was a founding national officer, succeeded in destroying the fascist, racist National Front. But why were undercover police officers trying to disrupt us, diverting precious police resources away from catching real criminals?

However, perhaps I differ from other core participants in the inquiry because I do believe there can be a need for undercover officers. When I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from 2005 to 2007, I met undercover officers doing brave work trying to prevent dissident IRA splinter groups from killing and bombing. I also signed surveillance warrants to prevent Islamist terrorists bombing London and was aware of vital undercover work around their cells.

But where to draw the line—if indeed, it is possible to do so? How do you stop that sort of legitimate undercover police or intelligence work sliding over into the illegitimate? Counterterrorism police recently putting non-violent Extinction Rebellion on their list of terrorist groups hardly inspires confidence. Why does this Bill not even begin to answer any of these key questions?

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 14th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support Amendments 49 and 51. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Oates, said in introducing them so cogently and reasonably, and I had the advantage of being able to have had a conversation with him last week where he explained the generalities of the amendments to me. I thought the arguments were compelling; the noble Lord, Lord Polak, put it well when he said this was a practical and sensible option. All three speeches that we have heard so far have underlined why this is not one of those ragged political debates that require us to take positions; it is something about which we can do something useful this evening in Committee.

I will turn, if I may, from the generalities to something specific, a particular case of people who will be especially disadvantaged by the impact of digital-only status: the Roma community. On 2 August, Roma Holocaust Memorial Day commemorated the shocking liquidation of Roma in August 1944 at the so-called Gypsy family camp at Auschwitz- Birkenau. On that infamous day, 2,897 men, women and children of Roma or Sinti origin were murdered by the Nazis. Of around 23,000 Roma taken to Auschwitz—and hundreds of thousands more perished during the Holocaust—an estimated 20,000 were murdered there. At the time of the liberation of Auschwitz, only four Roma remained alive.

Now, 76 years later, Roma people still face discrimination and liquidation. I especially commend the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Roma in ensuring that Parliament understands the horrors that this community has experienced and the special circumstances and challenges which it faces today.

In debates like this, I miss the voice of Lord Avebury, a good and long-standing friend and the author of the Caravan Sites Act 1968. At the memorial event celebrating his life, Damian Le Bas, a Roma who wrote The Stopping Places: A Journey Through Gypsy Britain—a remarkable insight into the world of Travelling people—spoke powerfully about how parliamentarians such as Lord Avebury can act to ensure that the UK’s 200,000 Roma can lead lives of dignity.

Lord Avebury would have been the first on his feet to support these amendments, pointing to the lack of awareness within the Roma community of digital immigration status and the way in which digital exclusion simply builds on the other exclusions which Roma historically have experienced. The Roma Support Group says that only 3% of Roma are able independently to complete online applications such as those required by the European Union settlement scheme. Very little data exists about how many Roma have applied to the EUSS so far and been given settled or pre-settled status. As the debate proceeds, I will hand the Minister a copy of the Roma Support Group’s briefing on this so that she can read some of the cases illustrating this point. I would be grateful if the Minister could say how this problem can be addressed, especially as the Home Office data does not include a breakdown of ethnicity.

Enabling those who need it to receive physical evidence of their status in the UK would certainly be a start, and enabling programmes to be developed which could address the issue of digital exclusion, on which this debate has helped us to focus, would be a very good outcome.

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that we all cherish the memory of the much-missed Lord Avebury, who was a champion for human rights globally.

I will speak to Amendments 49 and 51 on the need for documented proof of settled status, and commend the noble Lord, Lord Oates, for his compelling speech, and the crisp speech—notably from the Government Benches—from the noble Lord, Lord Polak. The ending of free movement, which this Bill implements, is nothing less than a tragedy. We should not be severing our links with our nearest neighbours, with whom we have the most in common. This seismic change in our freedom impacts all UK citizens, as we will lose our rights to live, work and study in the EU and EEA countries. For EU nationals living here—many of whom are our family members, friends and colleagues—and for UK citizens living in EU member states, the changes will also be profound, bringing a potential loss of security and life choices in the future.

The aim of the Government’s Brexit project of ending free movement to and from the EU and replacing it with the future global points-based immigration system was supposedly to deliver on their aim of reducing net migration. This policy is not supported by the evidence. In 2019, despite free movement, net migration from the EU fell to less than 50,000, but net migration from outside the EU, where there is no free movement, increased to its highest level for 45 years, above 280,000. Is this what “taking back control” was supposed to be about?

Those EU nationals who for whatever reason do not acquire settled status by the deadline of the end of June 2021 will move from an immigration system that currently works to the same unreformed system that currently applies to non-EU nationals, which is inhumane, dysfunctional and, frankly, chaotic. Even those who succeed in registering under the EU settled status scheme will receive no physical documentation as proof of their status; their rights will not be guaranteed in primary legislation and will potentially be subject to alteration by Ministers under the very considerable Henry VIII powers that this Bill bestows on them.

The Financial Times reported in July that the number of EU migrants who have applied for the right to stay in the UK after Brexit already considerably exceeds official estimates of the Europeans who are eligible to remain, raising further questions over the effectiveness of the Government’s scheme. Home Office statistics up to July show that 3.8 million applications have been made, far more than the official estimate of 3.4 million EU citizens living in the UK that was produced by the Office for National Statistics. In fact, the Financial Times survey of EU embassies discovered that the UK Government might have underestimated the EU-born population of the UK by more than half a million people. By the end of July more than 3.5 million grants of status had been made. However, around 40% of those applicants had been granted only pre-settled status, leaving them in a kind of limbo with their status still unresolved for the long term, while many more applications are still anticipated.

Experts warn that the confusion over the real number of EU citizens living in the UK will make it almost impossible to assess how many eligible people will fail to secure settled status by the time the process closes on 30 June next year. However, it is likely that tens of thousands will suddenly become unlawfully resident in the country that they have legally made their own and be left facing the full force of the Home Office’s “hostile environment”—namely, criminalisation and the threat of deportation.

The groups most affected are likely to include many from the age groups under 18 years and over 65 years, who have had worryingly low application rates. For example, there are 9,000 eligible children and young people in the care system in the UK, for whom only 500 applications have so far been made by local authorities. Non-EU-national family members of EU nationals, rural farm workers, those in isolated communities, those with limited English-language skills, those who are homeless, victims of domestic abuse, those without relevant or up-to-date documents and those who are not digitally literate—often the elderly—are all potentially at risk. That last problem has been exacerbated by the pandemic as the support services normally available to such groups have been forced to move online.

For those groups and others, such as full-time students, full-time parents and those who have previously left the UK temporarily for more than six months, providing the required proof of continuous residence for five years to the Home Office can be very challenging, if not impossible. This means that people with a rightful claim to British residence may lose their legal status overnight. It is another Windrush in the making.

The other main impact of the Bill is of course that, as a direct consequence of the abolition of EEA free movement for UK citizens, we, our children and our grandchildren will from January 2021 lose our rights to live, work and study in the 27 member states of the EU plus the three EEA countries and Switzerland—the biggest diminution in value of a country’s citizenship in history. Therefore, at the same time as the UK Government are opening up higher-paid jobs in the UK to the whole world under the points-based system, the brightest and best UK citizens seeking international career opportunities in the biggest, richest market on our doorstep, the EU, will be second-class citizens in their own country.

In addition, the multiple impacts of the Bill on the estimated 1.5 million UK citizens already resident in European Union member states, who will also become second-class citizens within the EU, should not be forgotten. For example, those with non-British spouses and family members will not have an automatic right to return to the UK with their family after 31 December 2020. Frankly, the Bill is an inhumane, reactionary mess and these amendments try to ameliorate that. I stress that they are not party political; they are simply about humanity. That is why I hope the Minister will accept them when she replies.