Turkey

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 13th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, Turkey, which in the last quarter of the 20th century had often seemed set to requalify for the title of,

“the sick man of Europe”,

has now gained its place in the new G20 group—the primary co-ordinator of global economic issues—and is developing a new, active foreign policy in place of its vulnerable immobility in the front line of the Cold War. The case, therefore, for us to take stock of this major strategic shift and to try to draw some conclusions for our own policies in Europe and beyond is therefore compelling, and a reason for congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, on having provided the opportunity for this House to do so.

I suggest that the first thing to be clear about is that Turkey’s enviable economic growth record, barely dented by the recession which began in 2008, is good news for other European countries, including Britain. It provides a major market for our capital and consumer goods and an attractive pole for foreign investment. The fact that the European Union already has a customs union with Turkey has done much to create and now underpin this advantage, but the fact that Turkey is growing considerably faster than other European countries is more than that. It means that the frequently evoked nightmare of excessive Turkish emigration to the rest of Europe in the context of Turkey as a member of the European Union becomes steadily less likely. It also means that the gap between Turkey and the more prosperous members of the European Union is steadily narrowing—well ahead of any realistic date for accession. Already, Turkey is more prosperous than a number of the newer member states.

The new foreign policies pursued by the trio of Prime Minister Erdogan, President Gul and their hyperactive and imaginative Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also have many good features. It is surely in the general interest that Turkey should pursue the so far rather tentative rapprochement with Armenia and should play an active role in stabilising the Caucasus and searching for solutions to its territorial disputes. Similarly, a Turkey which has developed a good relationship with Syria has potential to lend a hand in the Middle East peace process and the better relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds, taken together with continued efforts at reconciliation with its own ethnic Kurdish population, serves wider western interests in the region.

Is everything in the garden perfect? Not quite, I would suggest; there are some risks ahead. Turkey has yet to demonstrate that it can undergo a transfer of power from one party to another, or to a coalition of parties, without putting at risk the economic and political gains of the past 10 years. That could be put to the test following this year’s general election or perhaps later, but it certainly cannot be postponed for ever. Turkey surely needs to put its rising self-confidence to good use by tolerating press criticism and religious minorities in a much better way than it has done up to now. And an electoral law that excludes from its parliament any party that does not get 10 per cent of the vote is surely a European oddity.

In the foreign policy field, too, there are risks. A Turkey that sustains a dialogue with Iran is highly desirable, but a Turkey that appears to acquiesce in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as seemed to be the case at the time of the Security Council vote on sanctions last year, would surely be putting at risk its own interests as well as those of the wider world. Mr Davutoglu’s precept of “zero problems with the neighbours” is a fine policy slogan, but Cyprus is a neighbour and so too is Greece. The present impasse in the United Nations-led negotiations for a settlement on the Cyprus problem, although far from being solely the responsibility of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, will remain a pebble in their shoe for as long as it is not definitely removed.

What conclusions should Britain be drawing from these positive developments, and can it contribute in any way to reducing the risks? First, the development of a strong, confident bilateral relationship with Turkey such as the coalition Government have already embarked upon must make sense. Secondly, I believe that we are right to maintain unwavering support for Turkey’s EU membership bid. The auguries may not look particularly promising in the short term, but a country like our own, which took “We will not take no for an answer” as its own motto when vetoed by General de Gaulle for the second time in 1967, is well placed to argue that if Turkey does likewise, it too will succeed over time. We should be pushing strenuously for the freeing up of some of the blocked chapters in the negotiations so that they can continue to move forward, while still leaving those opposed to Turkish entry the possibility of blocking it at a later stage. I doubt myself whether an impasse in the negotiations later this year, when the chapters available run out, is in anyone’s interest—least of all, I suggest, in the interest of Cyprus, since decisive progress in Turkey’s accession bid is surely the key that will unlock the door to a solution of the Cyprus problem. Thirdly, we should be doing all that we can to help move those Cyprus negotiations forward. The United Nations faces the usual Sisyphean task and needs all the help it can get; unaided, it will not succeed.

On this analysis, Turkey’s emergence as a rising power has plenty of positive factors for us as well as for Turkey. That country’s success in avoiding the inevitable traps that we face is very much in this country’s interest and something that we should be doing our best to help it to achieve.

Africa: Ivory Coast

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 21st December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My noble friend may well be right to say that pressures do not go far enough. Indeed, the EU is now moving on from the proposed targeted travel ban, which includes Mr Gbagbo, his wives and others associated with him, and is considering much more targeted sanctions and freezing assets. On the EU side, more proposals are being put forward, with the active involvement of British officials and colleagues.

At the UN level, the Security Council has expressed very deep concern. There are further problems about trying to get UN sanctions in place, not least because it is supposed that some countries, certainly among the permanent five members of the Security Council, would oppose them. However, the United Nations has rightly insisted, with our full support, that the UN operation in the Côte d’Ivoire—the so-called UNOCI—stays there, despite the fact that ex-President Gbagbo has insisted that it goes. UNOCI is embedded there; it intends to stay there and does not intend to leave. Further pressures will certainly be considered and may well be necessary.

As for Liberia and Senegal becoming involved in other areas, there are difficulties and it is not quite clear what their remit would be. For the moment, the French troops are still there, although they have been told to leave, and the UN troops are there. That is the position at the moment.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Does the Minister not agree that the United Nations force may need something more muscular than what is available to it in the Côte d’Ivoire now? Does not the experience of Sierra Leone show that having an over-the-horizon capability, which can be provided only by countries with fairly sophisticated military forces, is often the best way of deterring the outbreak of fighting?

Indonesia

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 16th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

In instances such as the one that my noble friend has mentioned, mediators and facilitators can play a part. We have not been asked to play such a role ourselves, but I would not question the proposition that in very difficult and intense situations of the kind that we are discussing, this kind of mediation can undoubtedly play a part. However, we have not been asked to play that part.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Will the Minister confirm that the Indonesian Government are maintaining their ban on foreign journalists going to Papua? If that is so, does he not agree that the ban is entirely counterproductive, because it nurtures the view that there is something going on there that has to be concealed? Will he therefore say whether the Government will follow up the intervention by the Deputy Prime Minister at the Asia-EU summit and press the point on the Indonesian Government in their own best interests?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Certainly what has been raised by the Deputy Prime Minister will be followed up. The noble Lord mentioned concealment. If he has visited websites, as I have, to look at reports of what is going on there, he will have seen enough to realise that horrific and dreadful things have occurred. While the case for greater access for journalists is always strong and we will pursue it, we can already see what is happening there.

UN: Security Council Composition

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 24th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

On the noble Lord’s second point, of course I agree totally. That is indeed the central requirement and concern. With regard to the selection of Secretaries-General, the noble Lord probably knows better than I do that this is a Security Council-dominated process. We believe that the Secretary-General should have the broadest possible support from the UN membership, which of course includes support from the Security Council and the five permanent members. The matter is not entirely in our gift and hands; nevertheless, the noble Lord’s points are very valid and we will bear them very much in mind in this process.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, will the Minister elaborate slightly on what the Foreign Secretary said at Georgetown? Are the British Government prepared to contemplate an interim step towards reform of the Security Council by having a longer-term category of members who are not yet permanent members—that would make the Security Council more representative—rather than trying endlessly to solve the Rubik’s Cube of new permanent members?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

That is a possibility. The noble Lord was a member of the high-level panel—a very eminent member of a very eminent panel—which put forward various models. We would like to go forward with reform but, as he knows, first, there is resistance from some existing permanent members, who do not want any change at all, and, secondly, there is resistance from another group of members, who are not on the Security Council but who are opposed to any change for other reasons. It is therefore difficult to advance even to the interim arrangements that he so expertly described. Anything that can unblock the system and move forward to a modern and—dare I say?—fit-for-purpose United Nations structure, rather than the one that we inherited from the 1940s, would be a great improvement.

EU: Defence Pact with Russia

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 18th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right and I expected that kind of profound comment from him. We are under no illusions about the human rights situation in Russia and in relation to the various operations of the kind to which he referred. Human rights and the progress of Russian democracy are high on our agenda, and we certainly do not shy away from making our concerns known on all these aspects at every opportunity.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, does the Minister not agree that the key point in this area is that the autonomy of decision-making by NATO and the EU should not be impaired by any agreements or arrangements made with Russia? It is highly desirable to consult more with Russia and it may be highly desirable to work with it on missile defence, but it would be a great mistake if we allowed the autonomy of decision-making of those two organisations, on which our security depends, to be impaired.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I agree with the noble Lord, and indeed that was the implication of my first Answer. We do not look for an actual defence pact or any kind of development which would, as the noble Lord says, impair the integrity of NATO operations. Nevertheless, there are all sorts of strands of increased co-operation. I have mentioned the NATO-Russia Council. There is also the Meseberg initiative and the modernisation pact, and there are other opportunities in fora where we can carry forward good relations with regard to that part of Russian policy with which we can work in a positive way.

Burma

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 18th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

As the noble Baroness knows, because she follows these things closely, we support the idea of a commission of inquiry, but we are anxious not to rush into it and have an early failure. We also note the view of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is slightly cautious about the pace of such an inquiry; but that there should be such an inquiry is, in principle, right and is, indeed, government policy. It is the pace and the approach that we have to watch. As for EU policy on sanctions, the EU has expressed its very serious concern about the elections and has made it clear that sanctions should be eased only in response to tangible progress, which we have not really seen yet. So there is an agreed EU position on Burma: the sanctions are tough and we are totally in support of them. On the noble Baroness’s middle point about the role of the UN, I will look further into it, but we are broadly in support of the activities that she mentioned. I shall elaborate on that in a letter to her.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Does not the Minister agree that one thing that we could do is to increase our aid projects in Burma to non-governmental organisations and those who work for humanitarian purposes in medical and educational areas? That would be a good way to show that there is an alternative to the sort of regime that Burma has now.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I agree; indeed, the UK is one of the largest bilateral donors to Burma. We have significantly increased our humanitarian assistance from £9 million in 2007-08 to £28 million in the current year. Our aid focuses on health, basic education, rural livelihood, civil society and helping the refugees. I add as a personal observation that China is deeply involved in Myanmar, getting more involved all the time, pouring in vast sums of money for schools, infrastructure, and so on. We have a real problem considering aid—which is right—against the apparent determination of the People's Republic of China to have a massive involvement in Myanmar in every conceivable way.

Diplomacy

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 11th November 2010 Lords Chamber

Moved By

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

To call attention to the case for Britain to have a properly resourced and active diplomacy; and to move for papers.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, the timing of this debate on the case for Britain to have an active and well resourced diplomacy is fortunate, not just fortuitous. If we had been holding this debate in advance of the comprehensive spending review, it could easily have been dismissed as a piece of special pleading on behalf of one of many government departments about to face deep cuts—all the more so since I have to declare an interest as a former member of the Diplomatic Service. But now that the comprehensive spending review is out on the table, the opportunity is there to focus not on the overall quantum but on how best to put it to good and effective use in the national interest—how to ensure that doing more with less is not just one of those meaningless and infuriating mantras but is a reality.

It was well over a century ago that Lord Salisbury gave his often repeated prescription for British foreign policy—that it should be like floating down a river, fending off the bank from time to time. In fact, this classical description of a passive, purely reactive foreign policy was out of date even when it was coined. As the country found at the time of the Boer War, it could well lead to splendid, or rather not so splendid, isolation; and that discovery led to a hasty scramble to acquire allies in the failed attempt to stabilise Europe, which culminated in two world wars. Out of date then, any such prescription is a great deal more out of date now.

The hard fact is that a country that is a global superpower, as Britain was then, needs an active diplomacy less than a middle-ranking power with worldwide interests, such as we are now. Everyone beats a path to the door of a superpower, which can take its time in responding because it is so indispensable. But a middle-ranking power has to work actively to further and protect its interests if they are not to go by default, and it needs to have strong alliances and networks in good working order for when they are needed. That is a lesson which was very clearly drawn in the recent national security strategy and in the defence and security review.

Such networks and allies do not simply drop effortlessly into our lap; nor can their policies be shaped to fit our as well as others’ interests without ceaseless diplomatic work. Add to this the fact that multilateral diplomacy, which now makes up so much of the foreign policy mix, is a labour-intensive industry necessitating work not just where a particular organisation is headquartered but in the capitals of each of the members of that organisation, and you have a lot on your hands. It was considerations such as those which led the Callaghan Government, some 30 years ago in the midst of an earlier period of cuts and austerity, to reject the view of the Berrill report that Britain could no longer afford what was charmingly described as the luxury of a first-class diplomatic service. Those considerations are even more compelling today than they were then.

If we are successfully to do more with less then we will have to increase the coherence of the foreign policy instruments at our disposal and the way they are deployed. We will need to marry our hard power—now considerably diminished—to our soft power and ensure, as we have not always done in the recent past, that together they are up to the demands we are putting on them. We will need to break down the stovepipes in which policy is formulated at home and executed abroad—security, diplomacy, development, energy, climate change and so on. We must also ensure that the practitioners—the diplomats, the military and the development aid experts—understand each other’s work much better and gain experience of each other’s work and how to work together and not in competition with each other.

We will need, too, to make the best possible use of the new European External Action Service, which is gradually taking shape in Brussels and around the world. To treat it as, at best, a tiresome and duplicative nonsense and, at worst, a competitor would be to miss a golden opportunity. We surely need to be thinking imaginatively about what the European External Action Service can do collectively for us and for the rest of the EU and what we should therefore no longer be trying to do individually ourselves. We need to second good people to the EEAS and support its efforts to reduce turf fighting between the European institutions, to achieve greater policy coherence among the EU’s external policies, to increase its own professionalism and to extend its outreach so that less time and effort are spent on cobbling together tortuous internal European compromises, and more time is spent on persuading third countries of the value of the EU’s policies and on public diplomacy.

Let me turn to the issue of resources, without which all that I have said previously in general terms could just remain empty words. Here are a few suggestions. First, I hope that we will avoid falling into the false dichotomy of thinking that there is a choice to be made between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. One does occasionally hear echoes of that sort of approach in ministerial statements and briefing. But this is surely not an either/or matter but, rather, one of both/and. The two forms of diplomacy are now inextricably linked and need to be mutually supporting if we are to further our interests successfully.

Secondly, on the exchange rate risk to British diplomacy’s overseas expenditure—that is, most of it—I do not wish to delve too deeply into the background to the decision a few years ago to remove the existing policy of compensating losses as a result of exchange rate fluctuations. It reflects credit on neither the Treasury, which imposed it, nor the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which accepted it. The result when sterling dropped sharply in 2008 was a double whammy for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of external and internal cuts. Can the Minister tell the House that this will not happen again?

Thirdly, I hope the temptation to save by closing more diplomatic posts will be resisted. Multiple accreditation—having a mission in another country that serves the country in which you have closed down on a very random basis, visiting once or twice a year—is not a viable alternative to a presence, however small, on the spot. I still remember the helplessness I felt as ambassador at the UN when we had no post in Kigali when the Rwandan genocide broke, no post in Kabul in the years after the Soviet withdrawal and no post in Mogadishu through the UN’s troubled experience there. If very small posts have to operate somewhat differently from larger ones, and we have to accept that we can get fewer services from them, I would say “So be it”. We will just have to get used to that, but let us avoid ending up with a diplomatic cloak full of holes. I hope the Minister can say something on that aspect too.

Fourthly, my view is that the decision to shift the funding of the BBC World Service from the Foreign Office budget to that of the BBC should be a plus, at least in presentational terms. I have to admit that I never managed to persuade a single foreign interlocutor of the BBC World Service’s total editorial independence every time I had to admit that it was in fact being financed from the Foreign Office budget. That should be easier to achieve now. But how are we to be sure, under the new arrangements, that the World Service is not being bled to meet the BBC’s domestic demands? How, too, is the World Service’s coverage and editorial autonomy to be protected from interference by the BBC’s management, as it was from interference by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office? I wonder whether the Minister could give us a bit more detail on this; not very much has been said so far about this really important aspect of our foreign policy and our soft power. Could he also say something about that other crucial part of Britain’s projection of soft power, the British Council?

Of course, the resources that really matter in diplomacy are the Diplomatic Service’s human resources. I have the impression that in recent years those resources and their morale have been under considerable stress. Recent losses through early retirement, while perhaps unavoidable, have resulted in the departure of many top-class diplomats whom Britain could hardly afford to do without. I am, however, struck when travelling abroad by how well the morale and quality of our diplomats is holding up. But it is surely time that a bit more effort was put into reducing the stresses on them. We often speak, quite rightly, in this House about our admiration for Britain’s Armed Forces; not so often about our admiration for our diplomats, who also run very considerable risks. We should not forget what the Duke of Wellington said when asked, towards the end of his life, what he would have done differently. He replied, “I should have given more praise”.

I hope I have managed, in opening this debate, to set out a compelling case for Britain having an active and well resourced diplomacy. If we are successfully to meet the challenges of the increasingly multi-polar world in which we now live, that is what we will need. If we are to work effectively for an increasingly rules-based world, which I believe it is in our interests to achieve, that, too, is what we will need.

I conclude with a perhaps slightly eccentric plea for less frequent use of the phrase, “Britain punches above its weight”. I admit that I may have been partly responsible for its entry into our diplomatic lexicon but it tends to play to a strain of post-imperial nostalgia which I believe we must now leave behind us. Like courage, it is surely one of those characteristics which are better noted by others and not bestowed on ourselves. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this excellent debate. I have served long enough in your Lordships' House to know that it is not my place at this moment to mention everyone who spoke. If I did, I would be way outside the limits. I have also learnt that it is not wise to refer selectively, so I will simply congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Monks, on his maiden speech and say what pleasure it gave me personally to know that the UK permanent representation in Brussels is still the best team in town, as I hope it was when I left it 20 years ago.

One thing that startled me most about this debate was the absence of any reference to that phantom beloved by newspapers—the special relationship. Not one single Member who debated mentioned it. I do not say that as someone who believes that our relationship with the United States should be downplayed—quite the contrary—but I have fought all my life against what I call the false choice between Europe and the United States. Having a debate today in which we were able to look at the whole world in the round and not obsess and agonise about the special relationship shows a great deal of wisdom and a healthy approach.

On a final point, a lot of noble Lords spoke about realism. I am sure that we must have it, but we must not confuse it with that dreadful concept, declinism. There is no reason for us to think that we cannot look after our interests in the world we now live in, if we are ingenious about it and apply the resources we have in an effective way. I hope that when we talk about realism we will mean seizing new opportunities, not retreating into ourselves. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion in my name on the Order Paper.

Motion withdrawn.

Afghanistan

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 27th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My Lords, I can certainly assure the noble Lord on that. We would watch that very carefully indeed. It is difficult to separate the history from the view of post-Soviet Russia today. Russia is our friend, with whom we seek to have good relations, but the invasion of Afghanistan was a very brutal affair. Although some techniques used by the Russians were apparently rather good on the ground, there were brutalities as well. That is why many of the mothers of Russian soldiers demanded that their sons came home and got out of Afghanistan, which led to many other consequences.

On the negotiations and how they are handled, the noble Lord speaks with great experience of such situations. It is absolutely right that we have to achieve a balancing act in any negotiations of this kind as we come out of the violent phase and into the peace phase. My noble friend behind me has reminded us of the concerns of the northern peoples, particularly the Tajiks, and of the ancient jealousies between the different groups. All those things have to be balanced in any talks with the Taliban if they come about and if President Karzai is able to fulfil his willingness to reach out to all his countrymen, as he says.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the Statement and for the regularity of Statements to come. Does he agree that the Statement said not one word about the regional dimension of the Afghan problem and that that dimension—the attitude of the neighbours of Afghanistan—will become increasingly important as we move towards 2015? The willingness of the neighbours to commit themselves in binding legal obligations not to interfere will be one part of securing a future Afghanistan that is not prey to its neighbours, whether Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan or the other neighbours. Could he say something on that aspect and whether he agrees that, in future reports on Afghanistan, it would be helpful if the Government could say something about the effort that they are putting in to building up a structure around Afghanistan in which a post-NATO Afghanistan could live in tranquillity?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My Lords, I must agree with the experienced noble Lord about the regional significance. On how you get that into a Statement on the regular reports on Afghanistan, I am not so sure. I can certainly say, here and now, that we recognise that the region has an important role to play in supporting Afghanistan and in facing all sorts of major challenges, including combating extremism, terrorism, illegal migration, narcotics and many other things. We welcome the fact that Afghanistan is actively seeking to support its bilateral relations in the region; indeed, regional co-operation was a major theme of the London and Kabul conferences. I cannot for a moment disagree with the noble Lord’s point that this is part of the jigsaw. We must have effective regional support. The problems that are encountered across the Durand line—the Pashtun do not even recognise some of the international boundaries—the problems that Pakistan, which we need to give all the help that we can, has faced and the continuing malign policies of Iran are all very much part of the situation and all need to be examined. I will suggest to my right honourable friends that they elaborate on that in future Statements, although it would make these Statements even longer than they are already.

Education: Marshall Scholarships

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 18th October 2010 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what financial commitment they will make to support the Marshall scholarships scheme.

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)]

We strongly support the aims of the Marshall scholarships programme and we kept our funding at £2.2 million this year. We certainly intend to maintain the scholarships programme. We are discussing with the Marshall Aid Commemoration Commission what level of financial support would sustain the programme. The commission is planning around a number of scenarios to prepare for candidate selection interviews in November. I cannot confirm the figure now, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has not yet decided its own allocations between programmes, but we will do so as soon as possible after the 20 October announcement of the comprehensive spending review outcome.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer as far as it goes, which is not terribly far. Will he confirm that the HMG-funded scholarships under the Marshall scheme have been in steady decline in the past few years and are set to decline further? Does he not believe that that is an odd way for the British state to express its gratitude for a major act of generosity by the United States, which was, of course, the purpose for which the scheme was set up in the first place?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I wonder whether the noble Lord is right to take quite such a gloomy view. It is perfectly true that the numbers are down because the sums available have not covered so many scholars. However, there is no reason why in the longer term, as we cease to have to cut our cloth as sharply and as the nation becomes more prosperous, we should not return to a more expansive programme. On top of that, it is worth remembering that, outside such scholarships, there are many other forms of support. I am advised that, in British universities generally, the numbers of postgraduate Commonwealth and US students have been rising rapidly in recent years. That is one thing that the previous Government got right.

Foreign Policy

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 1st July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, from time to time it is necessary to stand back from the rush of international developments, get away from a purely reactive response to events that are often outside our control, and try to take an overall look at this country’s foreign policy objectives and at the methods and resources at our disposal to articulate them.

Having had the benefit of reading the Foreign Secretary’s speech this morning, I welcome the fact that he seemed to take the point that we should get away from a purely reactive diplomacy. It is surely the time for this, with the new coalition Government conducting a wide-ranging review of national security issues. I agree with my noble friend Lord Butler: we cannot afford a narrow, defence-oriented approach to that review, as has often been the case in the past. Nor, with the Cold War far behind us and a multipolar world gradually emerging, does it make any sense to allow defence issues to be decoupled from the wider foreign policy framework. The two must be matched, as they have often not been hitherto. If this debate can make a parliamentary contribution to that review, it will surely be of real value—and there is no one better to lead it than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, whose opening remarks reminded us why he remains one of the most admired and respected Foreign Secretaries of modern times, and whom I had the honour to serve throughout his tenure in office.

Any foreign policy worthy of the name must be anchored firmly in the national interest. As a great statesman of the 19th century observed, “interest never lies”. However, defining our national interest in any particular matter is no simple question: it requires intellectual rigour and the avoidance of jingoistic hype. There are two sharply contrasting approaches. The first defines the national interest very narrowly and in a reductive manner—the sacro egoismo of an Italian Minister in the First World War. That was the approach that led us to the protectionism and appeasement policies of the 1930s, and the abandonment of the first attempt at collective security, the League of Nations. It is a template to be avoided now, as it should have been then. The other approach is to define the national interest in broader terms, recognising that many threats and challenges that we now face come from outside our immediate neighbourhood, and that all of them require some kind of co-ordinated, collective global action if they are to be effectively mastered. The broader approach surely is the one that Britain should take.

We are currently deeply preoccupied by our own fiscal and economic predicament. Foreign policy practitioners cannot simply dismiss that as if it did not exist and had no implications for our foreign policy, but we need to retain a sense of proportion. Even in our financially weakened state, we remain in single figures in any global league table of capacity, whether we are talking about trade, investment or the ability to project power and influence. We must not go into a pre-emptive cringe. That is why I greatly welcome the Government standing by their commitment to 0.7 per cent of our gross national income going to our aid programme by 2013. We could improve the way in which the money is spent, particularly by better fitting together the foreign policy and developmental objectives to which it is devoted, and by strengthening collective international efforts to deal with failing states and to stop states failing in the first place.

One key conclusion that we must draw is that to achieve our foreign policy objectives in the future, we will need to act even more in concert with other countries than we have done up to now, and that we are now even less able than we have been in the past to defend our interests around the world by acting alone. That implies an active diplomacy and the strengthening of rules-based international organisations. When we look at the instruments for collective action, two stand out: the European Union and the United Nations. The new Government seem to have got off on the right foot in responding to developments in the EU—far better, dare one say, than was predicted only a few weeks ago. However, there is still too much unnecessarily negative language in the Government's presentation of EU discussions—long lists of things that we are not going to allow to happen—and so far an almost complete absence of any overall positive picture of what the Government want the EU to achieve.

There is, after all, no lack of material for painting that picture: free trade, energy policy and security, further enlargement, climate change and the rollback of state subsidies. There are real opportunities to be seized, given the considerable tension between France and Germany over economic policy, a political vacuum in the leadership of European institutions and the new phase in the development of a common foreign and security policy that is being shaped. This is no time to settle for a purely reactive and defensive EU policy just because some parts of one of the coalition partners do not want anything more constructive and positive.

At the UN, too, and in other universal or near-universal organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, there are opportunities to be taken, and risks if we fail to take them. I refer to the climate change negotiations in the run-up to the Cancun meeting at the end of the year; to the complex of multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation talks, where the relative success of last month’s NPT review conference set a new direction of travel, but where there remains a long way to go that is strewn with many obstacles; and to the Doha round of trade negotiations, successful completion of which should be an integral part of any exit strategy from the recent financial and economic crisis. All these policy areas are crying out for determined, well focused action—and all are ones where Britain could make a real contribution.

I conclude with a quick word on resources. One cannot have an active diplomacy, which we need, without a world-class, well resourced Diplomatic Service. If we subject our overseas efforts to the double whammy of a 25 per cent loss of funds following the drop in the sterling exchange rate last year, and then to the same top-slicing that other non-ring-fenced domestic departments face, one will not have that—it is as simple as that.