Ukraine: Defence Relationships

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the timely, multi-headed debate of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, so well introduced by him a few minutes ago, surely requires us not only to recall but to act on Keynes’s dictum: “When the facts change, I change my views.” This is because an awful lot of facts have changed in the last few months which fundamentally affect our national security interests, and it is no good ignoring the need to change the conclusions we may previously have drawn. To recognise the need for change does not require us to admit that we were wrong before; it is just common sense.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has quite simply torn up the post-Cold War rule book on European security we all agreed to in Paris in 1990, as well as some of the basic precepts of the UN charter. The new Cold War is not going to be over any time soon; the war in Ukraine is going to require much determination and unity with our NATO and EU allies, if it is to be brought to a conclusion that does not reward Russia for its aggression and does not merely represent a prelude to further hostilities. That will require hard thought about what we ourselves are prepared to contribute to a newly shaped European security order; it will require more resources, both military and economic. It is not a beauty contest between allies. Evidently, there are consequences and reordered priorities for those—at the time, I believed they were quite well marshalled—in the integrated defence review. There should be no shame or defensiveness about admitting that. Every one of our partners is having to reorder its priorities, and some—Germany in particular—are doing so already in a much more substantial way than we have yet done.

The Indo-Pacific tilt, of which the Government are so proud, is not rendered inoperable; China’s rise and ambitions warn against that. However, the European theatre, and countering Russia’s actions, have again become our top priority. I suggest that we need to pay more attention to Africa, where we should be working in close concert with our European partners and where, together, we could make a real difference. That brings any analysis to our relationships with the EU, its member states and within NATO. Instead of working ourselves up into a frenzy about a European army, or the supposed threat from President Macron’s strategic autonomy, we should recognise that the rise in defence spending right across Europe is precisely what we have been calling for over decades. We need, as a crucial player in European security—and, with France, one of Europe’s two nuclear powers—to be there shaping its form and content, contributing constructive thinking and co-operation, not barracking from the side of the pitch.

That sort of constructive approach is what our principal ally, the United States, would like to see us making. We really should not, yet again, fall into the trap of thinking that we know better than it does what is in the US interest; we have done that quite often in the past, and it has proved pretty painful. The reality is that these fundamental shifts in the security structures around us present us with both opportunities as well as risks and costs. However, those opportunities will be realised only if we show a decent respect for other people’s priorities and not just for our own. That was how NATO was successfully fashioned in the late 1940s by Ernest Bevin, and that is how the NATO of the 2020s will be strengthened if we have the wisdom to throw our weight behind it.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, any contribution to this debate must surely begin with Ukraine because that crisis is transforming radically so many of the parameters which previously defined the international scene in which we lived and operated. I will make three points on Ukraine.

First, we outsiders should, I suggest, avoid two extremes—both now and when the warfare ceases and diplomacy and negotiations begin, as they must sooner or later. We must not bully Ukraine into agreeing to terms which they believe to be unacceptable. That was the mortal sin of the 1938 Munich agreement and of Yalta. The other is to bid up those terms from afar with talk of engagement with Russia having ended, and with sweeping definitions of the geographical scope of any settlement. Secondly, we need to realise that the strongest card the Euro-Atlantic community has in its hand is its unity. This is not a beauty contest between its members; we and Ukraine need to recognise that. Thirdly, we need to do better on admitting Ukrainians who are fleeing for their lives. The Government’s response in that respect still falls well short; in particular, short of that of our continental neighbours.

If Ukraine has changed so much, how then does it affect our still excessively fraught relationship with the EU? It surely demonstrates the need for much closer and more structured co-operation on crisis management, economic sanctions and other aspects. This is not the time to drift into a confrontation over the implementation of the Northern Ireland protocol or to threaten to take unilateral action to set aside explicit provisions in the withdrawal agreement. That is the height of irresponsibility.

A better course would be to negotiate in good faith and with flexibility on both sides, with the aim of agreement on the protocol’s implementation by the summer break but with any wider governance issues, such as the role of the European Court of Justice, to be reconsidered at the time of the 2024 review of the protocol—when it will be possible to do that on the basis of solid evidence about what, if any, changes need to be made. There are so many ways in which the UK-EU relationship could be improved that are currently being blocked, in some cases unjustifiably, by this frozen negotiation over the protocol.

The Ukraine conflict has accentuated and brought into sharper focus the existential challenge to the rules-based international order which has been under way for some time now. The Government, quite rightly in my view, regard the preservation and strengthening of that order as being in this country’s fundamental national interest. But how much credibility does that policy position have in the outside world when legislation is brought forward and enacted which is inconsistent with our international obligations? That was the case with the internal market Bill, with the original version of the external operations Act, with the Nationality and Borders Act, and with our resiling from the UN target of 0.7% GNI for overseas aid, enshrined still in our domestic law but not being honoured. Now there is the threat unilaterally to set aside parts of the Northern Ireland protocol. I suggest there is very little credibility if we cannot close the gap between what we say and what we actually do.

Many aspects of last year’s integrated review need careful consideration in the light of the Ukraine, Covid and climate crises. Is the balance unchanged between the weight we give to European security on our doorstep and the Indo-Pacific tilt which the review proclaimed? I doubt it. Are we paying enough attention to our relations with the countries of Africa, where this country really could make a difference with trade, investment, aid and peacekeeping support, or are we taking our eye off that ball? Are we allowing the main instruments of our soft power—the BBC World Service, the British Council and the worldwide contribution of our universities—to wither on the bough for lack of resources? Are we doing enough to prepare for the next global health pandemic that comes along, as it surely will? Are we shaping an energy policy which will both reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas and effectively combat climate change?

We are living now through a period when our foreign and security policy decisions really matter, in a way they perhaps have not to the same extent since the end of the Cold War some 30 years ago. I wish I was more confident that we were getting them right.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 7th April 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is a convention to congratulate the noble Lord in whose name a debate is being held. On this occasion it is more than a convention, since the noble Lord, Lord Polak, has carefully drafted the title of the debate so as to recognise that, however much we may deplore and indeed condemn some of Iran’s regional activities, to have linked those issues with the resumption of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear programmes would have doomed the venture from the outset. That trap has been avoided—although I noticed that the noble Lord managed to slip back into it several times—and that is welcome. Resumption of the JCPOA is a matter of the highest priority and remains so despite the distractions of the crisis in Ukraine. With negotiations in Vienna at a delicate stage, I do not intend to say any more on that matter, except to point out that the JCPOA is so far the only way that has been put forward of avoiding Iran acquiring the capacity to make weapons-grade material, without the use of force.

The “regional issues” in which Iran is deeply involved are numerous—far too numerous, I would say. They include Yemen, where the announcement of a two-month truce is obviously welcome but does not take us very far, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, Gulf security and Afghanistan—quite a list. In some, that involvement is clearly contrary to our own interests and to the overall peace and security of the whole Middle East region; in others, Iran’s role is ambiguous and in some, such as Afghanistan, it has the potential to be positive. The one common feature is that we need to engage in a continuing dialogue with Iran on all of them. In recent years we have not done that, but the hard fact is that none of those trouble spots can be calmed down or resolved without the involvement of Iran, the most populous, and one of the most powerful, states in the region. Nor can they conceivably be resolved singlehandedly by Iran on its own terms. So the case for more active regional diplomacy on our part is a compelling one, and I would welcome it if the Minister would recognise that.

However, I hope that we will look beyond the individual problems, if we engage in a dialogue with Iran on these issues, and take a broader regional approach, an approach that recognises one, perhaps unwelcome, truth—that there will not be peace and stability in the Gulf and the wider regions of the Middle East and central Asia if Iran is not encouraged to play a constructive role commensurate with its size, geographical situation and long historical and cultural record. The most ambitious form that such an approach might take would be the establishment of a regional grouping which would commit all its members to respect the independence and territorial integrity of their neighbours, refrain from meddling in their domestic affairs and build up much closer economic co-operation between them. That may sound a trifle ambitious in present circumstances, but without some overarching set of rules and objectives, individual disputes will be all the more difficult to resolve peacefully. It is better surely than to see the region slip further towards chaotic turmoil—and better, above all, than to see it become the focus of a nuclear arms race.

Can the Minister say, at the end of the debate, whether what I have said bears any resemblance to the Government’s views and objectives?

Ukraine: War Crimes Allegations

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

Of course I will be pleased to meet the noble Lord. As I have said right from the start of this conflict, we are working across parties and across your Lordships’ House to bring forward whatever is required. I pay tribute to everyone across both Houses for the speed of the legislation and the reform that was required when it came to sanctions policy. I look forward to engaging with the noble Lord. I am delighted that the Minister of State for the Home Office, my noble friend Lady Williams, is still here; she and I are keeping in very close contact, and if there is further legislation that we can consider, we will be pleased to consider it.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, could the Minister say a little more about what the Government are doing to resource the very welcome appointment of Sir Howard Morrison to assist the Ukrainian Government in pursuing this appalling evidence of crimes? If he cannot say this at the Dispatch Box, could he write a letter, setting out what resources Sir Howard will have and how he will be able to help? Could the Minister also say what progress the prosecutor at the court appears to be making in amassing evidence and what we are doing to provide him with evidence, if we have any?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, there is a lot of detail to be shared in answering the noble Lord’s questions. We are certainly working very closely with Sir Howard Morrison, who was appointed by my right honourable friend the Attorney-General in conjunction with the Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney-General of Ukraine. We are working very closely in resourcing and supporting, including with technical and financial support. On the ICC prosecution, we have already allocated an initial £1 million to the ICC investigation to cover some set-up costs. We are meeting the ICC prosecutor regularly in establishing the technical support, and are looking at IT support. The offer that we have given also ranges from police and military analysis to specialist IT help, which is all helping the ICC to collect and preserve evidence. Of course, in the UK, the Met police has set up access and channel points to collect evidence from Ukrainians who are arriving here.

Ukraine: NATO Membership

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord. He and I spoke earlier this morning, when I updated him on key parts of the situation as it unravels. He is of course correct; I believe that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister will be addressing the country as I speak. There will be further opportunities during the day to raise questions on elements of our response to this unwarranted, unnecessary and unprovoked aggression of the Russian state against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, would the Minister not agree that this demonstrates what some of us have said all along: that the question of Ukraine’s NATO status has always been a smokescreen and a pretence by Russia, which is in fact determined to destabilise Ukraine and prevent it becoming a stable democratic country? If that is the case, I hope that we will hear tomorrow from him and other Ministers how we will respond to what is after all a war of choice and a war of aggression, and thus a war crime.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

The noble Lord speaks with great insight and experience. I assure him—indeed, all in your Lordships’ House—that the whole purpose of my being at the United Nations yesterday as part of the General Assembly debate was, again, because of the brinkmanship that was being shown by President Putin. He went to the brink and has now stepped over the line. We will of course outline further action and further details during the course of today. I understand from my right honourable friend the Chief Whip that a debate on Ukraine is also scheduled for tomorrow, and I am sure that we will be discussing further details of statements that will be made during the course of today.

Ukraine: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

I did not hear the first part of the question, which I think related to other countries and their reactions to the threat. If I am wrong, I apologise. A number of participating states are taking a similar decision to us, including the US, Canada, Ireland, Denmark and Albania. On the noble Lord’s broader point, we fully recognise the critically important role of the mission in reducing tensions and helping to foster peace, stability and security, and that our withdrawal will have an impact. There is no argument there. We continue strongly to support the SMM and its mandate. We will continue to work with the mission to support its ongoing delivery of that mandate, including calling for the SMM to have free, safe, unconditional access throughout Ukraine, including in non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk. The mission continues to face unprecedented restrictions on its freedom overwhelmingly in those non-government-controlled areas, as well as targeting of its technological capabilities.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the OSCE monitors provide the best and possibly the only totally objective means of telling the rest of the world if the Russians add to what is already an incursion into Ukraine by crossing the ceasefire line? Is it not therefore extraordinarily unhelpful that we have withdrawn our observers from that? Are there not still some NATO allies who have observers with the mission? Surely it is necessary, if we are to muster a worldwide condemnation and reaction to any further Russian incursion, for that mission to be effective?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, the UK had the third largest number of monitors and is the leading financial contributor to the mission. Because of the rising threat from Russia and our duty of care responsibilities to those taking part, the UK made a difficult decision to withdraw. However, our secondees remain on contract and we are ready to deploy them as soon as the situation allows. That is of course what we want to do.

Europe: Foreign Policy and Defence Co-operation

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, European security is clearly directly linked to UK security, and I do not think anyone questions this. We share many security and defence interests with our European allies, from addressing climate change to tackling malign actors. As one of only two European nations with truly global military reach and the largest European spend in NATO, we remain an essential ally on foreign policy, security and defence for the wider European Union.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise—I pay tribute to what the Government are doing on this—that the key aspect of this crisis, in our hands and those of our European and NATO allies, is a tough sanctions response, if there is any invasion of Ukraine? Therefore, would it not have been rather more useful in the last few weeks if we had been part of the dialogue within the European Union—which we could have been if we had put that into the TCA—instead of having to operate purely from the outside on sanctions, which is an EU matter, not a NATO matter?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

The UK will continue to work with the EU and other international partners to tackle this shared global challenge. For example, on 2 December, alongside the US, Canada and the EU, the UK imposed fresh sanctions on eight Belarussian individuals responsible for repression and human rights violations. Our departure from the EU has meant that we are able to move more quickly than we could through multilateral channels, where it is in our interests to do so. Only a week ago, the UK Government laid legislation in Parliament to toughen and expand the UK sanctions regime, specifically in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. These powers will go further than ever before.

Autocrats, Kleptocrats and Populists

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 3rd February 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the last century, the one in which many Members of your Lordships’ House spent most of their lives, opened with a world dominated by empires and autocracies, and with true democracies very much in a minority. The century closed with democracies in the ascendant, the empires largely gone and something close to a rules-based international order having emerged from the ashes of two world wars and one long Cold War. Any complacency that that progress might have engendered has long since dissipated, with several autocracies or quasi-autocracies prominent, and with the rules-based order under threat, from within as well as from outside, as supporters of unfettered national sovereignty espouse policies that are inconsistent with their countries’ obligations under international law. So, today’s debate is timely and I warmly welcome the initiative of the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, in securing it, and his excellent introductory speech.

What needs to be done to check the trends of the last few years and to secure what was once described as

“a world safe for democracy”?

First, we need to ensure that our own democracies are in good working order and that they are promoting, in practice as well as in rhetoric, policies that strengthen other democracies worldwide and further respect for human rights, as laid out in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. We also need to ensure that our democracies encourage effective international co-operation to address the great challenges of our time: climate change, pandemics, the risks of nuclear proliferation and war, and trade protectionism. That will not be the work of one year or of one Government. It will require concerted effort over decades, and it is not happening—yet, at least.

Should this effort involve a more or less formal grouping of democracies? I rather doubt whether that is the right direction in which we or others should be moving. Such a grouping would raise plenty of problems—first, what is described as the “sheep and goats” problem. How do you decide, and who decides, which countries are truly democratic sheep and which are undemocratic goats? It is not easy, and certain to lead to many difficulties over borderline cases. Moreover, while such a grouping can apply policies and make rules for its own members, it cannot hope to make such policies and rules binding on others. Where globally applicable rules are needed, as with the global challenges that I mentioned earlier, this grouping will simply not be able to deliver the goods.

So, while it is right for democracies to work very closely together, I also suggest that they would best do so within global institutions, many of which already exist, even if their efforts are so far inadequate. Yes, we ourselves should be working to strengthen other democracies and working with regional bodies such as the European Union and the African Union, which are mandated by their founding charters to uphold democracy; but we should not regard democracy as something to be imposed by force nor, conversely, as in the case of Taiwan, to be reversed by force.

Those global institutions I referred to may not be working very effectively, but should they be replaced by something different? In my view, that would be an act of folly. Is there really any likelihood that they would be replaced by something better? Just read the UN charter, if you want an example, and ask yourself whether that document could be negotiated today. More likely, the world would slip back into the law of the jungle which prevailed in the first half of the 20th century and from which it had to be rescued by the democracies, with the expenditure of much blood and treasure and massive human suffering. What is needed, surely, are policies of incremental reform, which will make those global institutions more fit for purpose. I hope that our own country will play a prominent role in shaping the reforms needed, as we did with honour in the past, and that we will act by example and not just by assertion.

I have to say that some of the legislation that has come before your Lordships’ House in recent years—the internal market Act, the external operations Act and the Bill before the House this afternoon on frontiers and border protection—is inconsistent with our obligations under international law. The Minister can stand at the Dispatch Box and say that this Parliament is sovereign and can change these things if it wishes, and that is correct—but another Minister cannot succeed that Minister at the Dispatch Box and say that we are the great supporters of the rules-based international order.

Afghanistan (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 24th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, few individuals and no organisations emerge unscathed from last August’s debacle in Afghanistan, and I regret to say that our House is among those institutions, having failed to find time to debate our committee’s report, so ably introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, for more than year—a momentous and tragic year for Afghanistan and for Britain’s involvement in that country. If our conventions are responsible for that delay, there is something seriously wrong with the way they are being operated. It is beyond parody. I make the rather unusual request to the Minister that he convey to the usual channels the unanimous view so far in this debate that this sort of thing should not be allowed to happen again.

I add, with some regret, that the Government do not seem to emerge very well from that debacle. Just look at the bland complacency of their response to the report or the evidence that Ministers gave to the committee before we wrote it. In neither was the slightest sign of awareness of the disasters that lay a few brief months ahead. Could that debacle have been avoided? I rather doubt it, once President Trump signed off on a deal with the Taliban in February 2020, a deal that totally ignored the views of the elected Government of Afghanistan and made withdrawal in no way conditional on the Taliban’s performance. Clearly, the Biden Administration made some major tactical errors, but the die was cast by President Trump. Our own Government have deplored the way this was handled, and I would like the Minister to tell the Committee what representations the Government made over that when the Trump deal was being negotiated in early 2020 and what representations were made to the Biden Administration when they were shaping their Afghan policy in early 2021.

That is enough history. What can be salvaged from this shipwreck? First, we need to help the long-suffering people of Afghanistan—faced with starvation, draconian and inhumane social policies and the loss of much of women’s and girls’ education and job opportunities—as best we can. That means funding UN and other international agencies which are capable of getting food, medicines and development assistance through to those who need it. It also means assisting any of our NGOs which are capable of continuing to operate in Afghanistan and, in particular, assisting them to convey funds to their Afghan employees who are carrying out this essential work. I hope the Minister will have something to say about that. It also means a generous approach to supporting refugees and receiving asylum seekers who are fleeing in well-justified fear for their lives. What are the Government’s policies on the ground and in practice on these three points? I know what has been announced, but it is not always what is happening.

Should we be recognising the Taliban in any way beyond the inevitable extent needed to assist our humanitarian efforts? I do not believe so and I welcome that that also appears to be the view of the Government. What is the case for recognition of a group which has seized power by force, refuses to share power with representatives of many sections of the population and flouts the provisions of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights—itself an integral part of UN membership?

We, in close concert with the US and the EU, surely need to find ways of working with Afghanistan’s neighbours, most obviously Pakistan, but also Iran, China and Afghanistan’s northern neighbours. Whatever our other differences with these countries, we share many broad objectives; for instance, avoiding Afghanistan again becoming a base for terrorist attacks—which could be a serious problem for Pakistan, China and Iran—ensuring that it does not remain contagiously unstable, and reducing the flow of illicit drugs. Again, this is an objective we share with many others.

Even if we have different views on the best road to take to achieve those objectives, we share quite a lot of common ground and should overcome any hesitancy about dealing with these matters in concert with others. The recent UN Security Council resolution on humanitarian aid was very welcome in that respect. What prospect is there of building on that with a wider UN approach which could underpin the pursuit of those objectives?

Clearly, we must not turn a blind eye to the lessons from the debacle in Afghanistan, but nor should we draw too sweeping and unjustified conclusions from it by flinching from the challenges we face around the world—not least from China and Russia—and from the need to address collectively the problems of state failure, of gross abuses of international humanitarian law and of the consequences of climate change.

I hope I may be forgiven for concluding on a rather personal note. It is now a little over 60 years since my wife and I, a recently married couple, drove up to the gates of the British embassy compound in Kabul, whose Curzonesque splendour was more a reminder of Britain’s imperial past than its present state. We had travelled by Land Rover from Tehran. Even in my wildest dreams—let us be honest, nightmares—I could not then have imagined the circumstances in which today’s debate is taking place. The Afghanistan of 1961 was an often overlooked but peaceful backwater in the Cold War—the safest place on earth to be, as I thought a year later during the Cuban missile crisis. The last 40 years have turned Afghanistan into a horrendous reminder of the mayhem and human suffering that can result from political miscalculations—miscalculations by Afghanistan’s own rulers, by its meddling neighbours, and by the two great superpowers of the day, the Soviet Union and the USA. One can only hope that President Putin has that in mind as he ponders his next moves on Ukraine.

EU-UK Partnership Council

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, our relationship with the European Union hinges in many respects on issues yet to be resolved. The noble Lord mentioned two of them. Resolving issues around the Northern Ireland border is an absolute priority for the Government; likewise, issues around friction-free visa travel within the European Union and changes to border requirements are high on the agenda. His priorities are very much in sync with those of the Foreign Secretary.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the experience of the first year of operation of this council has shown that the very passive and rather negative approach to it—doing the least possible and having only the one statutory meeting required—has not so far delivered any very useful outcomes? Would it not be better if the new British chair of the council showed a more proactive policy towards it and, when items are to come up on the Partnership Council, started to shape up what decisions that might come out of it would be to our benefit?

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure I agree that we have taken an insufficiently proactive approach, but I certainly think the new Foreign Secretary has brought a particular level of energy to the task. The first meeting last year saw frank but constructive discussions on the TCA implementation; yes, a number of areas of disagreement were identified, but the process launched the governance and committee structures of the TCA and our commitment to dialogue and co-operation. I think it achieved the first goals that were set out.