Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
Main Page: Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts's debates with the Department for Energy Security & Net Zero
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in case anyone is thinking of voting against Amendment 2—even the Minister—it is worth remembering that Jacob Rees-Mogg said today that this Government gerrymandered the ID vote because they want to corrupt the voting system here in Britain. They wanted a government advantage from the voter ID and they found that they did not have it. We cannot trust this Government on any level on any issue, so Amendment 2 is vital.
My Lords, I put my name to this amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I will address the question—or possibly accusation—from the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, head-on: I voted for Brexit, because I support policies designed to give the UK more freedom to operate in the world without the inhibitions that came with our membership of the European Union.
One of the reasons for my voting for Brexit was that I wanted to make some attempt to reduce what I saw as the marginalisation of the UK Parliament—that it was, under the system then prevailing, more or less reduced to a cipher, as my noble friend Lord Hamilton pointed out. My noble friend the Minister has made some significant changes. I, like other Members of the House, thank him for that. A lot has happened in the last few days and it might be that I have not understood fully what he is proposing and its implications, but as I read it at present it does not seem significantly to enhance Parliament’s power.
I have one more reason why the House needs to be extremely careful about this matter. We are entering a brave new world in which, for better or for worse, we have greater control over our legislative process. This Bill could create a dangerous precedent as to how, in this brave new world, the Executive feel able to treat the legislature—the two Houses of Parliament.
For the rest of my remarks, I will briefly probe a little deeper the thinking behind the Government’s approach and the level of parliamentary scrutiny of and involvement in the Bill. One of my last tasks before I handed over the chairmanship of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral at the end of January was to sign off the committee’s report on this Bill, which the House may recall was entitled Losing Control?: The Implications for Parliament of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill. The Government are required to provide a response to the recommendations made in reports from your Lordships’ House, and they have done so. I am extremely grateful to my noble friend and his officials for the extensive and detailed 10-page reply. However, it is dated 10 May—last Wednesday—so again, if I have not been able to absorb the full implications of what he is saying, I stand ready to be corrected when he comes to reply.
There are two specific points that I would like to draw to the House’s attention. The first is in paragraph 31 of our report and touches on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews. We lay out a reason as to why, even if
“a definitive list of the relevant law were eventually compiled in time”,
the House would be insufficiently informed unless something was said about the “individual piece” of legislation; to produce a list is not the same.
The Government’s response was:
“The Schedule approach means that a definitive list of REUL to be sunset has, in fact, been compiled. This Schedule is subject to parliamentary debate and approval”.
My concern is that the House approving the schedule—the long list of 600 or so SIs—is affording only the most tangential level of parliamentary involvement and approval. Do I assume that in giving my approval to the schedule I am automatically endorsing every one of the constituent SIs, or do the Government intend to bring forward an explanatory note on the reason for including each individual regulation on the schedule, many of which I agree are probably quite trivial, to be considered by both Houses? Without this, Parliament has no real understanding of what it is approving, and it is this uncertainty that makes the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, so important.
My second and final point relates to the recommendation made in paragraph 33. Our report said:
“It is generally acknowledged that the scrutiny of secondary legislation falls very far short of the scrutiny afforded primary legislation. Downgrading the status of direct principal retained EU legislation so that it can be amended by ‘ordinary powers to amend secondary legislation’ … means therefore a corresponding downgrading of effective parliamentary scrutiny. Suggesting that this will have the advantage of saving parliamentary time does not make the Government’s justification for this change any more persuasive. It is a matter for Parliament to decide how it should use its time”.
The Government’s response is:
“The Government disagrees that the scrutiny of secondary legislation falls short of the scrutiny of primary legislation. The scrutiny procedures for secondary legislation are long standing and are endorsed by Parliament during the passage of legislation”.
I find this continuing government assertion that the scrutiny of secondary legislation is equivalent to that of primary legislation astonishing—jaw-dropping, to be frank. My noble friend’s letter says that the scrutiny procedures for secondary legislation are long-standing, and he is right, but those long-standing procedures were designed for an earlier age when Governments used secondary legislation for what it says on the tin: to deal with issues of secondary importance and avoid gumming up the legislative machine. But successive Governments have used secondary legislation to pass into law—law that applies to every one of us—decisions too important to be left to secondary procedures with their “take it or leave it” unamendable approach. As I have said before, if the Government want to take a little they have to give a little, and so far the Government appear unable or unwilling to do this.
My concluding remarks are these: Parliament will stop this continuing shift in the balance of power towards the Executive and away from the legislature only by constantly explaining how fundamental to the health of our system of government it is, no matter how difficult, embarrassing or controversial it may be to do so. That is why it is essential that the House supports the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for explaining so fully his amendment to the Bill. I am slightly saddened on two counts. First, I wish the list he provided in the schedule was a little more ambitious and extensive in the number of regulations and rules included. Secondly, I am saddened by the response of some Members of your Lordships’ House.
I particularly oppose Amendment 2. The idea that there is an initial committee is hardly more than camouflage, because the committee is charged with putting any but the most negligible changes to both Houses.
The subsequent requirement in the amendment that a majority of both Houses has to approve the removal gives, in effect, the power of veto to an unelected Chamber, in a way that goes contrary to the constitutional arrangements of a democratic country whose voters explicitly chose withdrawal from the EU and its laws, at the referendum and again in 2019. They voted overwhelmingly for a government pledge to carry out that mandate. The Executive have a mandate—a direct mandate—from the electorate to end EU law. That mandate must be respected, and must be respected by this House.
A much more extensive arrangement was put to the House of Commons, which passed at Second Reading by over 60 votes. I am very concerned that this House will, yet again, obstruct the will of the people, expressed in 2016—
I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. I think the noble Viscount will appreciate that we have to deal with this very carefully. On the other hand, I think he will agree that, given the nature of the task being carried out, it would be extremely unfortunate if a flaw were spotted and nothing could be done about it. We are trying to suggest a mechanism by which something that is agreed by the Joint Committee, and indeed by both Houses as necessary, should be capable of being done. I hope I may leave it at that. This is a carefully drafted amendment that is doing its best to address an extremely important and, in some respects, quite delicate task.
When the time comes, if necessary, I shall seek the opinion of the House on Amendment 76. For the time being, because we have before us Amendment 15, that will be my position too, if necessary, when Amendment 15 is called.
My Lords, we have had two significant amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord. I have Amendments 73 and 74 in this group, which are small and technical but significant in the way in which they try to enhance the scrutiny provisions that underlie the noble and learned Lord’s two amendments, which I entirely support. I will not repeat my reasons because I would be largely rehearsing the arguments that I made an hour and a half ago.
It is generally anticipated, though not certain, that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee will be one of the bodies appointed to carry out some scrutiny of the regulations, as and when this particular part of the Bill comes into force. The Bill as drafted envisages a period of 10 working days for a report to be produced by the SLSC that would then come before the House, and the House would make its mind up about its view of that report on the instrument. The Government use the example—the dreaded precedent—of the 10-day period provided under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. In the SLSC report that I referred to earlier, we proposed that the period should be extended from 10 days to 15. We said in paragraph 58:
“We know from our own experience in scrutinising proposed negatives under the 2018 Act that, depending on the day of the week on which a proposed negative has been laid, meeting that 10-day deadline could be challenging”.
Under the Bill, the regulations to be scrutinised are of an entirely different level of policy implication, importance and significance. This view and the proposal for a five-day extension—by no means a huge length of time—have been endorsed by the Hansard Society, which Members of the House will be aware is an academic expert in matters of parliamentary procedure.
In Committee on this Bill on 8 March, at col. 876, my noble friend, having heard the debate on these amendments, was kind enough to offer to go away and reflect. I have no doubt that he did his level best, but I fear that he was rebuffed because the Government said in their response to the SLSC report of 10 May:
“Having considered this carefully and in particular how the existing 10 day sifting practice works, the Government remains of the view that a 10 day sifting period is sufficient for SIs laid using the powers in the Retained EU Law Bill … The retained EU Law programme is a similar challenge”—
to 2018—
“but it is no more complex or demanding”.
I have just two points on that. First, to describe this Bill as no more complex and demanding, compared to that of 2018, is, I am afraid, plain wrong. It is a much more significant piece of legislation than the 2018 Act. Secondly, the members of the SLSC do not come to this view ex cathedra. We think about it, but we also talk and take into account the views of the highly experienced and dedicated staff, who produce excellent reports which come before your Lordships’ House every week.
To conclude, I suppose I could just about have got my mind around my noble friend’s view that it should be 10 days after all when we were under the cosh of the 31 December drop-dead end date. We do not have that now, so the time pressure that was otherwise going to be imposed has now been released and reviewed. I urge my noble friend to go back to the chateau behind the lines and ask the general commanding to think again. If the Government do not think again, it will be yet another example of how they appear intent on marginalising Parliament at every single opportunity.
My Lords, if I might briefly comment on the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about amendments—