(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is well aware that the Strasbourg court has decided to pass various reforms and the anonymity of the judge is a thing of the past. I am not an expert on the Strasbourg court. However, I am a believer that if we maintain that we believe in the rule of law, we cannot pick and choose which bits of international law we comply with. That is a point I put forward at Second Reading and one I feel very strongly about. I do not see how we can, in good conscience, pass Clauses 5(2) and 5(3), which is why I added my name to Amendments 57 and 59 as moved by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven.
My Lords, the words that I am about to utter are largely not mine. They are the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, who I am delighted to see in his place, in the preface he wrote to a paper on Rule 39 written by Professor Richard Ekins, professor of law and constitutional government at Oxford, and published by Policy Exchange last year.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann said:
“A ruling of a court such as the European Court of Justice”—
though I think he probably meant, if noble Lords will forgive me, the European Court of Human Rights as his words certainly apply to it—
“is binding upon the parties only if the court had jurisdiction to make it. If it did, a party must comply and cannot complain that it was wrong. If the court did not have jurisdiction, the parties can ignore it.
The European Convention on Human Rights confers upon the Strasbourg Court jurisdiction in all matters ‘concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention’: article 32. It exercises this jurisdiction by the judgments of its Chambers, which, after submissions and argument by the parties, become final in accordance with articles 42 and 44. In this paper, Professor Ekins demonstrates that the Convention does not confer upon the Court, still less upon one of its judges, a power to make orders binding upon a Member State which require it to do or refrain from doing something on the ground that it might at a later stage be held to have been an infringement of the Convention. Not only is there nothing in the language of the Convention which expressly confers such a power but the usual aids to the construction of a treaty – the travaux preparatoires, the subsequent practice of the court – reflect a clear understanding that no such power exists.
What has happened is that one of the rules which the Court has itself made to regulate its own procedures has included a power to ‘bring to the attention of the Parties any interim measure the adoption of which seems desirable’ to avoid a violation of the Convention. The existence of a power to fire such a shot across the bows is practical and sensible. It does not involve the assertion of any jurisdiction to impose a legal obligation. But what has happened in the court’s recent jurisprudence is that this advisory power has been assumed to be a power to grant legally binding interlocutory relief. As Professor Ekins demonstrates, a court cannot in this way enlarge its jurisdiction by its own bootstraps. And if the Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order, Member States are free to ignore it”.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, referred to Article 32, which gives the court the power to interpret and apply the convention. It does not, however, give the court the power to add something to the convention which simply is not there. As Professor Ekins said in the concluding words of his paper:
“In rejecting the Strasbourg Court’s actions in excess of jurisdiction, the UK … would not be failing to honour its international legal obligations; it would be inviting the Court to honour its own legal obligations”.
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I must begin by apologising for the fact that I was abroad at the time of Second Reading and was therefore not in my place at that time. Much was made at Second Reading of the notion that the Bill in some way contravenes our constitutional principles, is an affront to the separation of powers, and infringes on the power of the judiciary. Those allegations are thoroughly misconceived but they are highly relevant to this amendment.
The plain fact is that we are a parliamentary democracy. That means that Parliament is sovereign and the reason why so many of us cherish that overarching principle is that we attach high importance to something called accountability. Accountability was not a word which featured very large in your Lordships’ debate at Second Reading. The courts are accountable to no one; they proudly proclaim that fact. Many of the bodies to which Parliament has in recent years outsourced some of its responsibilities have little, if any, accountability. But Parliament itself, or at least the other place—the House of Commons, in which I was privileged to serve for 27 years—is truly accountable. It is answerable to the British people at regular intervals and its Members can be summarily dismissed.
There are those who seem uncomfortable with our system and it is indeed true that there has been something of a whittling away at it in recent years. The courts have extended their power. Parliament itself has contributed to it by the outsourcing to which I referred. I often think it is a pity that those who praise these developments failed to come up with some suggested alternatives to parliamentary democracy, but there it is.
These amendments, if passed, would mark a new jump in this process. I ask those who support them to address the question of accountability. To whom is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees accountable? They might say to the General Assembly of the United Nations, perhaps. To whom is that body accountable? Neither the high commissioner nor the General Assembly have any responsibility for securing our borders. They have no responsibility for the safety of those who make the perilous channel crossing. They have no duty to take into account the resentment felt by so many against the sheer unfairness of illegal immigration and the way in which it gives preference not to the most deserving, but merely to those who can afford to pay the people smugglers.
Our elected Government and this Parliament bear those responsibilities, and the House of Commons is directly accountable to the electorate for the way in which those responsibilities are discharged. These amendments would prevent our Government and Parliament discharging those responsibilities. They seek to outsource those responsibilities to an unelected body with no accountability. The acceptance of these amendments would constitute nothing less than an abdication of the responsibilities of government. I note without surprise—
I do not understand the argument that the noble Lord is making. As I understand the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the responsibility laid on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees would be to advise the Secretary of State. I do not see how that makes him accountable; it would remain the Secretary of State, surely, who was accountable to this Parliament for the decisions that he decided to take in the light of the advice he received.
I fear not. The easiest way of replying to the noble Lord is to read from the Member’s explanatory statement on the amendment:
“The amendments require positive UNHCR advice on the safety of Rwanda to be laid before Parliament before claims for asylum in the UK may be processed in Rwanda”.
If there is no positive advice from the UNHCR, those claims cannot be processed in Rwanda. I think that will aid the noble Lord’s understanding of what I am saying.
I think it is perfectly reasonable, if one wants to know the intention of the amendment, to look at the Member’s explanatory statement. That is, indeed, the purpose of the explanatory statement.
I note with interest, but not with surprise, that none of these amendments is signed by any member of the Opposition Front Bench. I am not surprised because no party that aspires to government could support the abdication of the responsibilities of government, which these amendments would achieve.
I will just say a word about Amendment 7 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and others. It asserts that the decision of the Supreme Court was a “finding of fact”. But it was not; it was a finding of opinion—the Supreme Court’s opinion that the removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda would expose them to the risk of refoulement. It is an opinion on which men of good faith and true can disagree. Indeed, it is an opinion on which distinguished judges disagreed.
The Divisional Court, one of whose two members was a Lord Justice of Appeal, came to the conclusion that what the Government were proposing was entirely lawful. The Court of Appeal, by majority, disagreed, but the then Lord Chief Justice dissented. In my view, when the Supreme Court reaches a conclusion on a matter of opinion, it is entirely legitimate and proper constitutionally for Parliament—the House of Commons is democratically accountable to the people, and the Supreme Court is not—to substitute its own opinion. That is what the Bill does, and that is why I support it.
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I oppose this amendment on grounds that are rather different from those advanced by my noble friend. I submit that this amendment is wrong in principle, constitutionally improper and unnecessary. Your Lordships might think that given that it was proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am being rather courageous and perhaps foolhardy in suggesting that it is constitutionally improper but I hope to explain to your Lordships why I take that view.
My view is based in particular on subsection (4) of the new clause. That would make possible—indeed it encourages—a never-ending situation in which the Government reach an agreement with the European Union and brings it to Parliament, Parliament rejects it, sends the Government back to the European Union, the Government come back to Parliament and Parliament rejects it again. The only way that process can be ended is by the Government having the power to bring the negotiations to an end. What would happen if the process envisaged by subsection (4) were to take place is the intrusion of Parliament into the negotiating process. That is why I say this amendment is constitutionally improper.
I wonder if the noble Lord is familiar with Article 50, where it is clear that if no agreement is reached within the two-year period the state that intimated its intention to withdraw, if it has not withdrawn that intimation, leaves the European Union at the end of those two years. The idea of the never-ending negotiation is a fantasy. The article is completely clear.
It is hardly a fantasy if the negotiations are brought to an end speedily, as we all hope they will be. If they are brought to an end six months before the end of the two-year period, the process I identified as being made possible by new subsection (4) could well take place. Parliament should not intrude itself into negotiations. It is not the job of Parliament to negotiate. That may seem self-evident but since this amendment was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I thought I had better look for some authority for the proposition I am advancing and went to the supreme authority on these matters— I went to Dicey. Dicey says that Parliament,
“should neither directly nor indirectly take part in negotiating treaties with foreign powers”.
That is what subsection (4) of this amendment would make possible, which is why I suggest that it is constitutionally improper.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberOn the second point, I have to correct the noble Lord. The sentence is clearly about further integration inside the eurozone without additional powers being passed by member states outside the eurozone. On the first point, I can only apologise. I had myself thought that the former Chancellor, the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, agreed with the present Chancellor that it was in the interests of the UK that the eurozone market should not collapse and that it was in the interests of the UK economy that these arrangements should survive. That is the policy of this Government. I had thought it was a policy supported by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson.
The exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson, did not quite bring out the fact that of course we could trade with other third countries on WTO terms. The terms that we trade on now, which have been secured by the EU, are much better than WTO terms, because they have been secured using the muscle of a market of 500 million people. That is a fairly fundamental point. The key point on trade is that if we leave, we lose.
The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Howard, on the other hand, did seem to contain a lacuna, which I greatly welcomed; this time he did not advance what I call the Maurice Sendak theory. The Sendak argument—I call it that in tribute to that great literary work, Where the Wild Things Are—is one that the noble Lord has advanced in public several times; I heard him explaining it on the radio the other day. I think it is a view held by Mr Cummings—not the cartoonist but the conspirator. The argument is that if the nation votes to leave on 23 June, we should not leave but should stay firmly where we are, saying and doing nothing, not invoking Article 50, and the wild things will all come rushing to us as supplicants, saying, to quote from the great book:
“Oh please don’t go—we’ll eat you up—we love you so!”
This is a theory that Mr Boris Johnson advanced a few months ago and then resiled from a few months ago, and then advanced again a fortnight ago and then resiled from this week; his bicycle wobbles but he remains vertical. Sadly, the wild things are fiction. The fact is that the other member states are fed up with us. To them, this week’s European Council on the refugee crisis is much more important than was the Council, and the conclusions, that we are debating now.
It is surreal that any UK Government could decide not to act on a no referendum. It is even more surreal that the French press, which believes that Mr Cameron got away with murder, could agree that in the event of a no, murder should be followed by massacre.
The noble Lord says that the French Government are furious at what the Prime Minister got away with, but the French Foreign Minister is on the record as saying that the Prime Minister achieved nothing of substance.
I thank the noble Lord for his helpful intervention. I believe that if we were to say no, our decision would be greeted with regret in most EU capitals, but that regret would be accompanied by some relief that all the contingency concessions made to Mr Cameron would automatically fall away—and they would; that is what the European Council’s conclusions text says.
The different argument that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, advanced today is one that I have to take much more seriously. This time it is the rest of the world that comes as supplicants, rather than the EU 27, to a self-confident UK freed of the shackles of the European Union, bestriding the world, trading on our own terms and striking new alliances. The Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, Japanese and Indian Governments have all made clear that they believe it is in their interests and ours that we stay, not go. That is the view of the US Administration, the Government in Beijing and the G20. I do not believe that the rest of the world is waiting to do business with us on our terms.
Despite reservations about the strategy that the Government have followed, I have to say that I warmly endorse and welcome the conclusions of their White Paper: we are better off, safer and stronger in the EU. That is certainly true.