Shamima and Jarrah Begum

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend is absolutely right that the interests of a child should be paramount for local authorities. However, if that child is not in this country and is, for example, in Syria, they are—it is sad to say—beyond our help.

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister rightly said that this case involves a highly complex set of issues—Britain’s security, the need for effective justice and the possibility of human rights abuse. But would she not agree that the tragic death of little Jarrah illustrates a much wider issue: that the British Government have a responsibility to British citizens, whoever they are, wherever they are and whatever they have done, and that the right thing is to bring them back to face justice, which we believe in and which surely has the right combination of fairness and robustness?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord raises a very important question. Of course, if British people who go to Syria return, they face the full force of the law as to why they travelled to that country when the Government had given every advice against doing so. The noble Lord will know of many cases where citizens return. However, to go into a war zone and retrieve someone is beyond what the Home Secretary is willing to do. Of course, the other point is that the Government put a huge amount of money into the region in humanitarian assistance, but the Home Secretary has rightly said that he will not risk the lives of British officials to go to retrieve foreign fighters—or, indeed, the children they have brought with them.

Brexit: Proposed UK–EU Security Treaty (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Wednesday 16th January 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

To move that this House takes note of the Report from the European Union Committee Brexit: the proposed UK–EU security treaty (18th Report, HL Paper 164).

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be speaking in the calm and thoughtful end of the Palace of Westminster. As chair of the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, which prepared this report, I thank the members and staff of the sub-committee, and our specialist adviser, Professor Steve Peers, for their support and advice.

This report was published on 11 July last year, six months ago, and we received the Government’s response in September. But much has happened in those six months, and many of the issues we covered in our report, such as the Government’s ambition to negotiate an overarching security treaty with the EU, have been largely overtaken by events. So I will not rehearse those issues at length this evening. Instead, I will focus on the key issue of UK-EU security co-operation, and reflect on one or two more recent events.

Of course, much has happened in the last 24 hours, too. But none of it, alas, makes the future any less opaque; nor, at least at this stage, does it greatly change the options before us. The analysis and recommendations in our report remain valid. In our report, we supported the Government’s three principal areas for future UK-EU security co-operation—extradition, partnerships with EU agencies such as Europol, and access to law enforcement databases—and considered how the UK’s engagement with the EU in each of these areas may be affected during the transition period and under the future UK-EU security relationship.

We emphasised:

“The UK and the EU share a deep interest in maintaining the closest possible police and security cooperation after Brexit: protecting the safety of millions of UK and EU citizens must be the over-riding objective”.


We further stressed:

“Negotiations on security are not a ‘zero sum game’: we all stand to gain from agreement, and we all stand to lose if negotiations fail”.


The EU Commissioner for Security Union, Sir Julian King, told the committee that,

“security cooperation should be unconditional”,

and I agree with that. I pay tribute to the excellent work carried out by Sir Julian King as our commissioner, and to President Juncker, who does not always get much of a mention, for giving the British commissioner a portfolio of real substance at a time when he could easily have made him a cypher.

As noble Lords will know, the withdrawal agreement and political declaration were agreed by negotiators in the closing weeks of last year. Let us assume that they remain valid, although I suspect the political declaration, at least, may change in the weeks ahead. First, I will say a word about the transition period. Under the terms of the November 2018 withdrawal agreement, the UK would continue to participate in EU agencies, mutual recognition instruments and information-sharing mechanisms until the end of the transition period. The UK would not, however, be able to participate in the management bodies of EU agencies or opt in to new measures in the areas of freedom, security and justice, although the EU may invite the UK to co-operate in such measures under the conditions set out for co-operation with third countries.

Extradition arrangements could also be disrupted. Article 185 of the withdrawal agreement would authorise EU 27 states such as Germany to refuse to extradite their nationals to the UK during the transition period in accordance with their domestic constitutional requirements. Germany apart, we do not know how many will do so. While the practical impact of that change remains unclear, including on cases pending on the date of the UK’s withdrawal, the Government must surely publish a contingency plan that addresses any disruption to UK extradition arrangements. We urge them to do so.

As for the future relationship, the political declaration envisages,

“a broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership”,

for law enforcement and judicial co-operation. However, as the European Union Select Committee’s report on the withdrawal agreement and political declaration noted,

“this may fall short of the Government’s ambition for a single comprehensive treaty”.

In any case, as our report concluded, it is unlikely that an overarching internal security treaty can be agreed before the end of 2020.

The Select Committee’s report also noted that:

“The depth of the future relationship in law enforcement and judicial cooperation … will depend on ‘an appropriate balance between rights and obligations’ and on the UK’s willingness to continue to follow EU rules and to accept that the CJEU, as the sole interpreter of EU law, will have continuing influence over the application of those rules”.


Can the Minister confirm the Government’s view of the role of the CJEU after we leave the European Union?

Extradition arrangements after the end of the transition period look increasingly insecure. The Government aim, rightly in our view, to retain all the benefits of the European arrest warrant. The alternative is to fall back on the 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition, which would lead to delay, higher cost and potential political interference. This would be a bad outcome for both the UK and the EU. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as no non-EU member state is currently a participant, the political declaration does not mention the European arrest warrant. The declaration states simply that “effective arrangements” on extradition will be established. We urge the Government to bring forward detailed proposals as soon as possible.

It would be in the interests of both the UK and the EU to secure a future relationship with Europol that as far as possible maintains the operational status quo. We were hugely impressed by the evidence we received on the sheer volume of data exchanged between the UK and Europol on transnational crimes. It makes early agreement necessary.

The committee is concerned by the Government’s “transactional approach” to Europol negotiations. Simply because the UK is a major contributor of data to Europol, the Government should not underestimate the impact of Brexit on the UK’s role and influence within Europol. The political declaration states that the UK and EU will identify how the UK will co-operate with Europol and Eurojust. That is good as far as it goes, but it does not go very far. Both agencies are essential for UK law enforcement; I hope that the Minister will confirm that.

Future UK-EU security co-operation will be underpinned by an agreement on data. If the UK loses access to EU security databases, information that can be retrieved almost instantaneously may take days or weeks to access, creating a hurdle for policing and a threat to public safety. The political declaration suggests that the UK and EU seek reciprocal arrangements for exchanging passenger name record—PNR—data and DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data through the Prüm system. These are extremely valuable to UK law enforcement. We welcome that.

The declaration also contains commitments to consider other arrangements for data exchange that could “approximate” EU mechanisms, but there is no mention of either the SIS—Schengen Information System—II or the European Criminal Records Information System, or ECRIS, database, to which no non-EU country currently has access. This is worrying and I would welcome the Minister’s comments.

I will say a word about Ireland. Close co-operation between the United Kingdom and Ireland on security matters is fundamental. The appointment last year of the deputy chief constable of the PSNI as Garda Commissioner is welcome and imaginative. I hope that the Minister can assure us that, whatever happens, this essential close co-operation between the United Kingdom and Ireland on security matters will continue.

In their response to the committee’s report, the Government agreed with our conclusions about the importance of maintaining UK involvement in JHA measures during the transition period and our assertion that security is not a zero-sum game. The Government also agreed that existing third-country relationships with agencies such as Europol are an inadequate model for the UK’s security needs and that falling back on pre-EAW extradition arrangements would not be desirable. The Government disagreed, however, that a comprehensive security treaty would be too difficult to agree before the end of the transition period. In November 2018, we wrote to the Government asking for further clarity on the basis for their assertion that a comprehensive treaty could be negotiated more quickly and provide more flexibility than a series of ad hoc agreements. We also asked what planning the Government had done to avoid an operational cliff edge at the end of the transition period. I much look forward to a reply to that letter.

We cannot, alas, rule out leaving the European Union without a deal, although, as I have said in other debates in your Lordships’ House, I believe that that would be a disastrous outcome. As the European Union Select Committee highlighted in its Brexit: Deal or No Deal report:

“A complete ‘no deal’ outcome would be deeply damaging for the UK. It would bring UK-EU cooperation on matters vital to the national interest, such as counter-terrorism, police, justice and security matters, nuclear safeguards, data exchange and aviation, to a sudden halt”.


None the less, on all these matters, it is essential that internal security practitioners prepare for an operational cliff edge in the event of no deal or at the end of the transition period. We therefore commend the contingency work undertaken by the Crown Prosecution Service, National Crime Agency, Metropolitan Police and others in planning for these possibilities.

Much of the debate about the implications of Brexit is arcane, but the potential implications of Brexit for security are only too clear. The security of our citizens here, and indeed in the EU, is at stake. Brexit risks dismantling agreements and arrangements that have been built up over a generation, and which work. It is no wonder that so many of those who gave evidence to us—the police, members of the legal profession and the Director of Public Prosecutions—were genuinely and seriously concerned about the possible implications of Brexit not only for their work but for the security of our citizens.

I hope that the Minister can give us a convincing assurance that she and the department recognise the challenges that Brexit poses for the security of our citizens and will do their utmost to meet them, whatever the future holds. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

I too thank noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. It has been a serious one on a serious subject. I am struck by the widespread view that the security aspects of Brexit, which really do matter to our citizens, have been underplayed, have not been given enough attention and need more attention, including from debates in this House, as the Minister said. Finally, I thank her for her calm, thoughtful, helpful and full reply.

Motion agreed.

Brexit: European Union Police Databases and Extradition Arrangements

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Wednesday 20th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I have on many occasions had debates on certain elements of the issues that the noble Baroness raises. I commend your Lordships’ House for the quality of our debates on such matters. I am sure that the usual channels will, as they are wont to do, make time for such a debate. The issues that she raises are political choices. None of them are insurmountable as a legal barrier. We are not in Schengen now. We operated the EAW without CJEU jurisdiction up to 2014. The charter creates no new rights. EU citizenship matters only for those with constitutional barriers and we are already close to a solution on that in the withdrawal agreement, but I fully support her request for a debate.

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, Michel Barnier said in his speech:

“To negotiate an ambitious new relationship with the UK, which we all want, we need more realism on what is possible and what is not when a country is outside the EU’s area of justice, freedom and security”.


Would the noble Baroness agree that we need much more realism on both sides, on the British side and on the European Union side, if the negotiations, which matter so greatly to the security of all our people, are to succeed? I was also greatly alarmed to hear that these negotiations have “only just” begun.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, these are political choices that will be decided in the course of the negotiations. I think that both sides will be realistic in the final analysis and in what is ultimately agreed. I have full confidence in that.

Brexit: Least Developed Countries

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Thursday 16th November 2017 Grand Committee

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, I too congratulate my noble friend Lord Sandwich on organising this debate. Much debate on Brexit is about what will happen over the next 21 months or so, and it is good to be able to look a bit beyond that. Indeed, it is good to look at some aspects of Brexit that might conceivably even be of some advantage to the United Kingdom, rather unusually.

The size and structure of the British aid programme has been rightly admired around the world, if, alas, not always in this country. The focus on aid to the least developed countries has been a key part of that, together with the very good work of NGOs, which has not been mentioned so far today and which deserves great praise. It has made a real difference to the lives of some very poor people around the world. I hope that the emphasis in the aid programme on the least developed countries will continue after Brexit. I cannot see why it should not; indeed, I can see every reason why it should. It would be good to have confirmation from the Minister that that will be the case.

Less than perfect administrative capacity is inevitable in the least developed countries, which means that the misuse of aid must be minimised. However, it will never be eliminated. We have to accept that, from time to time, there will inevitably be complaints about the way in which aid has been used; alas, that will not always go down well in the papers here, but it is an inevitable consequence of a focus on the least developed countries. There will always be tensions too between the wish to support the poorest people in poor countries and real concerns about supporting countries with questionable political systems.

The key here—I very much agree with what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Chalker—is that the FCO and DfID should work closely together and complement one another. I am sure that they will do that in future, after the adventures of the past few weeks. For the avoidance of doubt, and as a Cross-Bencher, I should say that poor relationships between the FCO and DfID are not new and not a prerogative of any one particular political party. As Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Office, I remember calling on Prime Minister Meles in Addis Ababa to pass on the rather firm message from Prime Minister Blair and the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that locking up the opposition was not the best way to burnish his social democratic credentials—only to find that the DfID representative in Addis Ababa had called on the Financial Minister the very same day and promised him a rather large sum of money. I did not feel that that enhanced the message I was trying to give. However, I am quite sure that that will not happen in the future.

As the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, has said, trade is important. I am glad that the Government have said that after Brexit they will, as a minimum, provide the same level of access to developing countries as the current EU trade preference schemes. That is a very important commitment. The EU has not been as generous as it might have been in its trade policy to developing countries. I hope that the Government, outside the European Union, may be able to devise more generous policies, especially to the poorest countries. I welcome anything the Minister can say about that too.

BBC World Service and British Council

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lord, I have great admiration and respect for both the British Council and the BBC World Service but I want to focus in the few minutes I have today on the BBC World Service. If I may be allowed one small comment on the title of the debate, I would have preferred to talk about the BBC World Service as promoting British interests through promoting British values, which would have guaranteed the independence and objectivity that are so important to it and to which other noble Lords have referred.

The BBC World Service has built up a huge and justified reputation for clear and objective reporting of developments around the world, and it is listened to for that reason. The more closed and controlled the regime abroad to which it is broadcasting, the more important its broadcasts and values are to the people who listen to it. That is why a number of noble Lords who have spoken today, and whose views I share, would very much like the BBC World Service to be broadcasting to North Korea. I know there are difficulties in that but I think it is an aspiration that it should keep.

Those who listen to the BBC World Service in countries like North Korea know that the broadcasts come from London but what is even more important is knowing that they are independent and unbiased. For that reason I, for one, am glad that the World Service is now funded from the BBC’s budget and not from the FCO’s. When I was in the Foreign Office and travelling, for example, in Moscow, Tehran and Beijing, I found a certain wry scepticism as to whether the BBC World Service could be genuinely independent when funded by the state. The BBC is seen as pretty independent, largely because every Government thinks it is part of the Opposition. That seems to me to be a better place for the BBC World Service to be. I am sure that Members of this House and others will put the necessary pressure on the BBC to ensure that the World Service gets the support and the funding that it needs.

Perhaps this is rather daring in the light of what one or two others have said, but I want to finish by saying a word or two about the values that we hope the BBC World Service and the British Council will promote. The British Council sums those up pretty well in its latest annual report, speaking of our openness and pluralism as a society, to which I would add tolerance. These values come under attack from time to time, sometimes from within, sometimes from without, but they seem to have an enduring quality. They include an openness to ideas; an outward-looking society; a free if, we hope, responsible press; and a plural society, open to and respecting different cultures and faiths as long as they respect us too. We do not always keep to that, of course, and our press and the social media tend to focus on our failings and not our success. I thought it sad last week that more prominence was given to the intemperate remarks of a young Briton in Syria than to the appeal by British imams, Sunni and Shia, for those who want to help those suffering in Syria and Iraq to do so through respectable and responsible charities rather than through fighting. I would add to that list of values a tolerance of others and a respect of others’ views at home and abroad. It seems to me that openness, pluralism and tolerance within a democratic society governed by the rule of law are important values in an unstable and rather dangerous world. The more that the BBC, particularly the World Service, can do to promote those values overseas in its own way, the more it is not just helping those who live in other societies but promoting British interests too.

South Sudan

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

My Lords, like others I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, for initiating this debate and for her constant concern about Sudan. If she will allow me to disagree with one tiny point that she and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, made, I have a slight hesitation about downgrading diplomatic relations. It always seems that it is precisely when relations get bad that you need an ambassador on the spot, exerting the sort of pressure that needs to be exerted. I have no difficulty at all about taking a very tough line with Khartoum, but we may be able to do that rather better if we have an ambassador there to do it.

As others have said, the situation in South Sudan is dire. That was true before the referendum, as I know from visiting South Sudan. I declare an interest as chair of the medical aid charity Merlin, which operates in Darfur and South Sudan, and which also receives funds from DfID. The referendum provided a ray of hope, but that hope is dimming quickly with the conflict in the border areas, of which others have spoken, the failure of the north and the south to agree on the distribution of oil revenues, and the decision by the south to cut off oil to the north—thereby depriving itself of 98 per cent of its revenues. That decision is, alas, likely to hurt the south more, and earlier, than it will hurt the north.

The result of all those factors is that the prospect of a true humanitarian disaster and serious conflict between north and south, dragging in their neighbours too, is very real indeed. Perhaps I might also say that if that happens, we will find that the press will wake up again to Sudan and ask why we did nothing to stop it when the prospect was so great. So what can we do? As others have said, Britain has a real role through historical links, though an understanding of the issues and through a sizeable aid programme. That programme, focused on humanitarian aid, must continue and if necessary intensify for the south. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that that will be the case.

I fear that the old approach built around the comprehensive peace agreement has now had its day and that we need a new approach with new actors. I believe also that the UK’s role, as well as itself helping South Sudan, is to encourage others to do so. For example, the African Union has a role, if not of leadership, at least of providing a neutral forum for negotiations between north and south. The Arab world has a role. The Gulf states have money to help and will not want to see a further disaster in the Arab world. They can exert pressure on the north and I hope that the British Government can encourage them to do so. The EU has a role.

China, in particular, has a real potential influence with both north and south Sudan. Sudan presents a challenge to Chinese diplomacy because it is not quite in the Chinese way of conducting foreign policy to get involved in resolving a dispute such as that between north and south. But China could have a hugely important influence if it did, and I hope very much that the British Government will encourage it to do so and will work with it to do that.

Britain must help with humanitarian aid and must keep up pressure on both the north and the south to avoid a further disaster. But that will work only if it works with and through others, using its influence in the EU, in the UN—particularly at a time when it has the presidency of the UN Security Council—with the Gulf states and, in particular, with China. If, as I say, there is a disaster, the criticism will be that we did not do enough to prevent that disaster when the prospects of that disaster were real.

Finally, I hope very much that Sudan will remain at the top of the Government’s agenda—of their foreign policy agenda and their development agenda—and that the Minister can confirm that that will be the case.