Queen’s Speech

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. I join others in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, on her maiden speech. I much look forward to further contributions from her—and that is not just politeness.

I shall assume that we leave the European Union on 31 January and that—no doubt with a bit of turbulence towards the end of the year—we end the transition period more or less on time. The question is what Britain’s role in the world will be beyond that and how, to quote the previous gracious Speech, the UK is to

“play a leading role in global affairs … alongside international partners to solve the most pressing global challenges.”

The aim is admirable; achieving it is far more difficult, especially in a world increasingly dominated by an oscillating relationship between the US and China and by an irascible and unpredictable US President capable of taking unilateral and dangerous decisions, as with the assassination in Baghdad of Qasem Suleimani.

There are two precepts that we need to follow. The first is that we need a clear sense of our own interests and values. We should not associate ourselves with the United States if it is wrong and we should not distance ourselves from other Europeans if they are right. For example, the Government have been absolutely right not to condone the US action in assassinating Qasem Suleimani and to work with the French and Germans to try to defuse tension now. The Government have also been absolutely right to oppose any attacks on cultural sites.

The second precept, difficult though it may be now, is to work with others to strengthen the multilateral system and the role of international organisations. That will be tough for two reasons: first, because the tendency at the moment is away from multilateralism and away from respect and support for international organisations—and I greatly regret that—and, secondly, because it is not cost-free. Playing the active and leading role in global affairs envisaged in the gracious Speech will require, as well as active diplomacy and a properly funded Diplomatic Service, on which I greatly welcomed the remarks made by the Minister in his opening speech, maintaining or exceeding the 2% of GDP contributed to NATO, maintaining or exceeding the 0.7% of GDP allocated to international development, and—for which all these are necessary preconditions—playing an active and effective role in the UN Security Council and in equally important but often neglected other aspects of the UN’s work, particularly in the developing world.

Finally, and closer to home, I would be grateful for the Minister’s assurance that the integrity of DfID will be preserved. It makes sense, as others have said, to look at how foreign policy, defence policy and aid policy can be better integrated, complementing and not conflicting with one another, through a stronger role for the National Security Council or closer links between DfID and the FCO, or both. However, the FCO, despite its many strengths, is not good at managing very large sums of money, and foreign policy often has short-term objectives, while effective aid requires a long-term perspective. Whatever new foreign policy governance arrangements emerge from the review, DfID needs to remain responsible for managing its own budget. I hope, as others have asked, too, that the Minister will assure us that that will be the case.

Reconciliation: Role of British Foreign, Defence and International Development Policy

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Friday 14th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Fall, with whose speech I agree and with whose father, whom she mentioned, I worked for many years. It is a great pleasure, too, to take part in this debate, which gives us an opportunity to consider some of the more difficult issues that face Governments and our societies. I want to focus mainly on conflict, in particular the need to think carefully about the prospect of peace and reconciliation after conflict before entering into it in the first place.

I do not want to get into the long-standing debate about what constitutes a just war, which goes back at least until ancient Egypt and later exercised the minds of some of Christianity’s greatest theologians. However, I agree that war can in certain circumstances be justified. The UN’s endorsement in 2005 of the principle of the responsibility to protect recognised this. Military intervention, as a last resort, can be the only way to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. But saying that is the easy bit; the hard bit for Ministers, the military and civil servants, as I know only too well, is how to be as satisfied as one can before intervening—one can never be certain—that the planned intervention is likely to make things better, not worse, and that the prospects for peace and reconciliation after conflict will be advanced and not put back.

If we look at recent conflicts in which this country has been involved, I think we will conclude that this was the case in Sierra Leone, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and just in Kosovo. With hindsight, the case for intervention in Rwanda looks strong. Well-planned military intervention could have prevented genocide and the international community was wrong not to intervene in Rwanda. The intervention in Iraq was by common consent a mistake. The atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein were appalling and should not be airbrushed out of history, as now sometimes seems to happen, but there was no hard-headed analysis of whether getting rid of him was going to make things better or of whether reconciliation within a divided community was likely to succeed.

Then there is Syria. I argued in this House against intervention in Syria in 2013, despite the use of chemical weapons by Assad, because I could not see how intervention would help resolve the conflict or advance the cause of reconciliation that would, and indeed will, be necessary after the conflict. None of this is easy, but the conclusion I reach is that before any military intervention there needs to be a hard-headed analysis about whether the chance that there will be genuine reconciliation afterwards will be enhanced. That requires, among other things, real Whitehall togetherness and a readiness to listen to others, not least the faith communities. The creation of the National Security Council—it has been mentioned a number of times in this debate—with representatives of all Whitehall departments, including DfID, is a positive development, but it needs to listen to those outside the Government, as the most reverend Primate said. Perhaps the Minister can confirm when summing up this debate that that is the case and that the National Security Council listens to those outside government as well as to those within it, and that there is—if I may quote the most reverend Primate—what management consultants might call a supervariable crunchy bucket at work here.

My final point is closer to home. It is of course possible to conduct a foreign policy purely on the grounds of perceived self-interest without any moral imperative behind it—at the moment, look at Russia in Syria or China’s detention of Canadian citizens—but if, as I think we should, we seek to incorporate moral values into our foreign and security policy, we need to follow, and be seen to follow, those values at home. That is especially challenging just now, but we need to remember that our authority and our influence abroad would be weakened by, for example, reports of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and lack of tolerance and generosity. The role of the faith communities will be crucial in showing that we are at least striving for real tolerance in our own society, which is why I welcome this debate.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a challenge to follow the trenchant words of the noble Lord, Lord Jopling.

I strongly supported the setting up of the inquiry into Iraq, as I thought it important to learn the lessons for British involvement in future conflicts. I said in the past in your Lordships’ House that I regretted that the report had not been published much earlier. Having now read it—or much of it—and seen the responses to it, I think it was right for the inquiry to take the time needed for a full and proper investigation.

I want to focus on three issues. First, the inquiry is critical of the Government and, among others, of the Foreign Office, for the degree of preparation for the aftermath of conflict. As Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Office at the time, I accept that criticism. As I said when I gave evidence to the inquiry, we could and should have carried out a more thorough assessment ourselves of the possible consequences of the invasion than we did. We should not have relied as heavily as we did on our ability to persuade the Americans, as leaders of the coalition, to do the preparation themselves.

But we must be realistic about this. The Chilcot report itself says that,

“better planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would not necessarily have prevented the events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and 2009”.

As the Prime Minister said in the Commons last week:

“We should not be naive to think that just because we have the best prepared plans, in the real world things cannot go wrong”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/7/16; col. 888.]

In the real world, things do go wrong—as they did in Iraq and as they did in Libya.

That leads on to my second point. Many have said in this debate that it would be wrong to conclude from the conflict in Iraq that Britain should never again get involved in conflicts abroad. Of course this is right. We can all think of successful British involvement in conflicts—in Sierra Leone and in Kosovo. There are conflicts in which we should have intervened but did not, such as Rwanda or Bosnia. But there are also conflicts in which, with hindsight, British intervention looks either wrong, such as Iraq, or at least questionable, such as Libya and, perhaps, Afghanistan.

The difficult question is: when is intervention justified? In my view, there needs to be, first, agreement that all diplomatic avenues are effectively closed—although, as the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, said, that may be a matter of judgment. Secondly, there needs to be a convincing argument that intervention will leave things better than if there is no intervention: that intervention will succeed—which, as I said, was not the case in Iraq nor, as I argued at the time, when the Government sought authority for a bombing campaign in Syria in 2013. Thirdly, there needs to be unambiguous UN Security Council authority: or, if that is impossible—I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Soley, said about the difficulties of getting it—there needs to be a powerful humanitarian justification, as in Kosovo. Finally, Britain needs to be acting as part of a strong international coalition, such as a NATO intervention—again, as in Kosovo.

Decisions to intervene are never easy, but I believe that criteria such as these can provide a necessary and coherent justification for intervention and avoid the easy but naive conclusion that intervention that succeeds is always right and intervention that fails is always wrong.

My last point is in some ways the most important, at least for me. Much has rightly been said about the bravery of our soldiers in Iraq. Less has been said about the courage and professionalism of the many members of the civil and diplomatic services, men and women from many departments, who volunteered for service in Iraq out of a commitment to help rebuild the country. In early 2004, I visited them in Basra and Baghdad, where many British civil servants lived in containers on the ground floor of a concrete multi-storey car park. I witnessed the good humour, professionalism and bravery with which they worked every day in the most difficult and often dangerous circumstances. They, too, deserve our gratitude.

UK Armed Forces in Iraq

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the other place. Could he say something about the effect of the assistance given so far to the Iraqi Government in deterring or curbing the activities of ISIS?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, we are confident that it is working. We have a very active training programme, which I can tell the noble Lord about. We are carrying out training on heavy machine-guns and combat infantry training. We feel that any training of this sort will help the Iraqi security forces to train up to combat ISIL.

Somalia: Piracy (EUC Report)

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

My Lords, I, too, greatly welcome the opportunity to discuss this report by Sub-Committee C. As I am about to be rotated—perhaps in this context I should say helicoptered—off the committee, perhaps I may also pay tribute to the stewardship of the committee by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I say “stewardship” because I am not sure that Liberal Democrats accept the concept of chairmanship. I also welcome the chance to comment—as did the noble Lord, Lord Davies—on a European Union activity that is working well, and to which the UK has made an important and perhaps even determining contribution. I will come back to that general point at the end of my speech.

I welcome, too, the way in which the effectiveness of Operation Atalanta today draws on the lessons from its own operations at the start. I think that there is a lesson here perhaps for other European Union operations and policies too—that there needs to be a constant rethinking in the light of experience. The first example which strikes me in particular is the stronger co-operation between Atalanta and NATO and others including India and China. I think that the way in which this has become a much more international anti-piracy operation is very impressive. The second example is the inclusion of security teams on board ships. The committee did indeed have reservations about this at first but, in the light of experience, it, too, changed its mind. It is clear that having security operations on board has proved itself in the past couple of years or so. Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, pointed out, persuading the World Food Programme to provide larger and quicker ships to reduce their vulnerability to piracy, which has had a very marked effect on the ability of the programme to deliver food to populations in Somalia and elsewhere who really need it, is something which I greatly welcome, too. However, I welcome in particular the realisation that piracy is largely the result of chaos and instability within Somalia, which has effectively for the past 20 years or so, with a slight improvement recently, been a failed state.

We need to see Atalanta as part of a broader EU approach to the Horn of Africa, not just an operation in its own right. The Horn of Africa strategy adopted at the end of 2011, including the training mission in Uganda for Somali security sector training and the mission to strengthen coastal defence capabilities through the region—the horribly named EUCAP NESTOR—have not only been very worth while but add up to an overall approach by the EU to the Horn of Africa that is admirable. At the same time, it is encouraging that some economic and political stability is emerging at least in and around Mogadishu and that the influence of al-Shabaab is at least for now—and let us hope for longer than now—on the decline. Ensuring that that continues must be the main aim of EU and our own policy from now on. This should largely be an African task, not just an EU or western task, although it is very hard to see how EU and western help will not be necessary in the foreseeable future.

It seems to me that the African Union will have a key role to play here. It has huge challenges at present, and it has weaknesses, but it is far more effective than it has been in the past. I hope that the European Union and the UK will continue to do what they can to strengthen it. It would be very helpful if the Minister could say something about that.

At the same time the EU must focus its development on capacity building in Somalia. I declare an interest here as the chair of a medical aid charity, Merlin, which operates in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia itself. Britain, like the EU, has an important role to play in helping with education and medical aid both through its own funds and through the help that it gives to non-governmental organisations.

I should like to branch out just slightly from Somalia and look at two other African issues that have arisen since our report was produced—as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, said—some months ago. The first is Mali and the second is piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Sub-Committee C has expressed great concern about the destabilisation of Mali and the impact that that could have on Britain and on wider European interests since the break-up of the country two years ago. The attack on the oil refinery in southern Algeria and the recently—alas—proven murder of hostages, including a British hostage in northern Nigeria, show only too clearly how developments apparently remote from us can affect us and damage us directly.

I would not accept the argument that these attacks are the result of western action. We have a role to play in supporting west African countries in countering al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, but I do not underestimate the difficulties in doing it. I greatly welcome the help that we are giving the French in what could still be a long and unpredictable campaign in Mali. I believe that our contribution there really matters and is important.

More related perhaps to the debate on Somali piracy is the growth of piracy in west Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea. In some ways this seems to be of a different kind of piracy from that in Somalia, including attacks in port—for example, in Abidjan in the Ivory Coast—and it is centred more on stealing cargo for money than on kidnapping ships and crews for ransom. The effect of piracy in west Africa can be particularly dramatic on fragile economies, increasing insurance rates but, much more than that, reducing revenue—by up to 70% in the case of Cotonou, the only port in Benin. That has had a pretty dramatic impact on the state of a fragile economy.

From the recent Parliamentary Statement in another place by the Foreign Office Minister, Alistair Burt, I am glad to see that the Government are taking the growth of west African piracy seriously. I am also glad that the Royal Navy is deploying at least one ship in the Gulf of Guinea and is working closely there with the French. When the Minister responds could he say whether that deployment has been stepped up in the light of the growth of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea?

I would make one final point in drawing some of these threads together. We see a mixture of piracy, conflict and terrorism in Somalia, Mali and the Gulf of Guinea—all of these seem a long way off but this can affect our interests directly. As a nation with global interests and, as a member of the UN Security Council, of NATO and of the European Union, with global responsibilities too, we cannot stand aside from nor ignore instability of this sort. Nor, given budgetary pressures of which I am sure the Minister is only too aware, can we respond to them on our own. We also need to recognise that political influence, development and military intervention where necessary need to be looked at together—as has been the case in Somalia—and not as separate activities. As we have seen in Somalia, the European Union is uniquely able to do this, by bringing together actions through its defence policy and its common foreign and security policy. All those are important for the African countries themselves, for the EU and, I would argue, for Britain as well. None of those policies is perfect; all would be better with the full engagement of the United Kingdom, and British interests would be well served too. In the context of common foreign and security policy and of bringing together policies in Somalia, that argument is relevant to our policy towards the European Union in a wider sense where critical, constructive engagement can be in our interests and can make a real difference to the policies of the European Union itself.

Defence Capabilities: EUC Report

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this debate for a number of reasons, not least for the chance it has given us to listen to the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. It is not all that long ago that it used to be argued that to develop European defence was dangerous because it would duplicate NATO and cause the Americans to weaken their commitment to Europe. That is very clearly yesterday’s argument. NATO has changed greatly and so has America’s perception of its self-interest, which is focusing increasingly on the Asia-Pacific region and, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it sometimes prefers to follow not lead where its own interests are not perceived to be directly engaged, as we saw in Libya.

The EU has changed too. It is larger, more diverse and more variegated, due in good part to the policies of successive British Governments over the past 20 years or so. There is now an acceptance that inner groups sometimes need to act together, even if not all the others join in. We see that in the common foreign and security policy and most notably in Iran where Britain, France, Germany and the EU High Representative in effect represent the EU in the negotiations. We saw it in Libya, where the UK, France, Italy and, importantly, some smaller EU states, although not Germany, worked with the US and under a UN Security Council resolution to prevent a pretty devastating civil war.

So the question is not whether there should be more effective European defence arrangements but how they should best be organised. Importantly, they must be consistent with NATO but recognise that there are tensions and conflicts in the world that will not attract US or NATO intervention. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, they must also recognise that the EU’s ability to combine diplomacy, economic aid and different degrees of military involvement—from training, as in Somalia; to intervention, as in Libya; or in combating piracy, as in the Indian Ocean—gives the EU a role distinct from that of NATO. There is no question of the one diminishing or replacing the other. The question is how they can reinforce each other to the advantage of both, and very much to the advantage of Britain’s interest.

I do not want to cover all the ground in the report this afternoon. I support the concept of pooling and sharing. I hope that we do not let the issue of an operational headquarters distract us from the real need for effective defence co-operation. The arrangements to support the Atalanta operation in Somalia are a good model that could be built on.

However, I want to mention two issues. The first, which some others have mentioned already, is Franco-British co-operation, which must be at the heart of any effective European defence co-operation. France and Britain share a tradition of global reach. We are both permanent members of the UN Security Council. We both face acute budgetary pressures, and France is of course back in the integrated military structure. So the logic of working more closely together seems to be unanswerable, with the aim, as the report says, of improving interoperability between Europe’s two most capable military nations.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, will forgive me if I do not follow her down the nuclear road, except to agree entirely with her that the chances of France giving up its nuclear deterrent are zero at best. None the less, there will be a French tendency to work more closely with Germany. If one effect of that is to prevent another division, as there was over Libya, so much the better. However, I do not see that closer Franco-German defence co-operation should in any way affect the case for strong, continuing and developing Franco-British co-operation.

At the risk of repeating what I have said in other debates in your Lordships’ House, one of the clearest examples of the need for strong Franco-British co-operation is over Mali. There may be a tendency— I have heard it said from time to time—to ask what our interest is in a part of Africa which the French know a great deal better than we do. However, the establishment in northern Mali of an al-Qaeda/Boko Haram/radical Tuareg state can have or will have a direct and destabilising effect on our interests in the region, in north Africa and, through support for terrorism, much closer to home. Perhaps the Minister can assure us that we indeed see this as a potential threat to our interests and will work with the French to try to resolve it and participate actively in an EU mission, if there is to be one.

I should say a word about defence procurement and industrial collaboration. I have to say that I regret the breakdown of negotiations between EADS and BAE Systems on a merger. This seems to be a case where the commercial logic for a merger was compelling, but the political difficulty is great and the issue, I fear, became public—for whatever reason—before the political issues had been sorted out. I do not at present clearly see BAE’s alternative strategy. I hope that the Minister was right in saying yesterday that it would continue to thrive on its own. Does he think that that is really the only option now before British Aerospace?

Finally, on defence procurement, I believe, as others have said, that the European Defence Agency has a role to play, as the report argues, in greater co-ordination and the development of capability, particularly at a time of budgetary constraint. I know that the Government are considering their position in the EDA, and I noted carefully what the Minister said yesterday. Still, towards the end of a—how shall I put it?—characteristically thoughtful speech on the European Union yesterday, the Foreign Secretary said that the British felt that,

“in too many ways the EU is something that is done to them, not something over which they have a say”.

However, it is very difficult to have a say and to make your voice heard if you are not in the room. That is an important point to bear in mind when reflecting on our role in the EDA and indeed on broader European Union issues.