Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Katz Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in R v ABJ and R v BDN has thrown the law of public protest into even greater confusion. That case relates to two protesters prosecuted under Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 for expressing public support for Hamas, a proscribed organisation. The appellants claimed that their charges under the Act represented a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court unanimously dismissed this appeal and, in doing so, ruled that the Section 12(1A) offence in the Terrorism Act does not represent a disproportionate interference with the convention rights.

I raise this ruling because it highlights the confusion around protest law ever since the Supreme Court delivered a different ruling in the case of DPP v Ziegler in 2021. We have discussed the implications of the Ziegler ruling in this House on a number of occasions. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has again reminded us of the details in that case. There is a clear tension between the court’s ruling in Ziegler and its ruling last week.

The court has made it clear that the Ziegler logic does not apply to the Terrorism Act defence but has not yet rectified the damaging consequences of the Ziegler decision. The basis of the court’s reasoning in Ziegler was the lawful excuse defence in Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and I tabled amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences from a number of Acts that are used to prosecute highly disruptive protesters, including the Highways Act and the Public Order Act 2023, and from this Bill.

When I spoke to those amendments, the Minister said that,

“the reasonable excuse defence is necessary in these instances to ensure an appropriate balance between protecting the wider community and the right to protest”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1633.]

It is clear that the balance has not been made. I have not tabled those amendments to remove the reasonable excuse defences again, apart from Amendment 377B, which would remove the reasonable excuse defence from Section 137 of the Highways Act. I can think of no possible excuse for anyone purposefully to block the highway unless they are authorised to do so, such as the police or officers of National Highways. Removing that defence would render the issue in Ziegler null and void since that defence was the issue under consideration by the court.

However, I accept that the problem has now grown. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Ziegler case means there is now judicial precedent, and defence lawyers up and down the country have been lining up to utilise that argument so their clients can get off scot free. That is why I will be supporting Amendment 377 from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. While I would prefer to remove those defences entirely, it would be better that the clarity in the law provided by Amendment 377 was made. His amendment would apply more widely than mine and therefore, I am happy to admit, provides a more substantial solution to the problem.

I would like to pick up on something that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in Committee:

“much of the criticism of Ziegler fails to recognise that the courts themselves have understood that Ziegler went too far, and that what Parliament has determined in relation to the law is the governing law”.—[Official Report, 13/1/26; col. 1623.]

I accept his interpretation that the courts by subsequent decisions have recognised the issue of Ziegler, but the decision in Ziegler still stands as case law. It has not yet been overturned. I think that serves as one of the strongest arguments for Parliament to pass Amendment 377 and rectify the error that the courts have themselves acknowledged.

If the European Convention on Human Rights prevents the application of the law as passed by Parliament or prevents the conviction of those who should be convicted, that demonstrates that we should leave the ECHR, but while we remain within the purview of the Strasbourg court and while the Human Rights Act remains on the statute book, the decision in Ziegler needs to be reversed. Therefore, if the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, wishes to divide the House on Amendment 377, he will have our full support.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in this short but important debate, and I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling these amendments which seek to narrow the existing lawful or reasonable excuse defences that may be used for public order offences.

It may be helpful to set out how a lawful excuse works in practice. A person is automatically treated as having a lawful excuse only under two specific circumstances. The first is if the defendant honestly believes that the person who is entitled to consent to the damage has given consent or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances—for example, an honest belief that the owner of a car in which a child was locked on a hot day consented, or would have consented, to the defendant smashing the window to get the child out. The second is if the defendant acts to protect their own or someone else’s property and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable—for example, a person damages one person’s property while accessing the property of another to prevent a fire. It does not matter whether a person’s belief in those circumstances is reasonable or justified; it just needs to be honest.

Whatever the failings of, or, indeed, one’s views on, the Ziegler judgment, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in his sagacious contribution, case law has moved on and the Supreme Court has made subsequent rulings which chart a clearer path. It is the case that the right to private property will always need to be balanced with other convention rights, such as the right to protest and freedom of expression. This will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but leading case law has set out the parameters, and the Court of Appeal did not say that the exercise of a person’s convention rights could never form the basis of lawful excuse for criminal damage.

While I acknowledge the concerns of noble Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy for the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide what may constitute lawful or reasonable excuse in individual cases. Further, the current scope of the defence allows the CPS the necessary flexibility to consider the full circumstances of each case on its merits. The types of behaviour that noble Lords have suggested, such as intimidating or harming members of the public or the risk of damaging property, are unlikely to be considered a reasonable excuse. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am grateful to all those who took part in this debate. I think the issues have rather narrowed between those who have taken part in it. For the first time during the course of these debates on this issue, we had some drafting points from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. They have come late, but none the less I will deal with them.

The first point is that the noble Lord did not like my proposed provision that says that it is not an excuse if you intend

“to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.

That does not seem to be a very reasonable excuse to me, so it seems a very sensible thing to put in the amendment.

Secondly, the noble Lord did not like subsection (3), where it says that it is immaterial that there may be other purposes. If the defendant does not have a good excuse, it is no good saying, “My overall excuse, because I happen to support Just Stop Oil, is a good one”. You cannot rely on that.

In his final point, the noble Lord stuck to his argument that this was an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act 1998. I repeat the point that it is not that. Whatever the future may hold, we are still part of the European Convention on Human Rights. But the convention requires the balancing of rights, including that they have to be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This provision reflects all those factors in a perfectly appropriate balance. Therefore, it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.

I come finally to this point. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, quite rightly said, pointing to a recent judgment of the President of the Supreme Court, that the courts are backing away from Ziegler. I am not surprised. It sits very uneasily with the jurisprudence in this area generally. The decision is almost moribund. But it is time to give it a decent burial. It is time to conclude that the law should be clear, that we can understand what it means and that the police can understand what it means, so that the whole business of putting forward spurious excuses will cease and we can have a proper and sensible law in relation to protest. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I do not accept that that is the same as 50 million innocent drivers being put on a database. However, I have given all the arguments and we have had this debate twice. The noble Lord is gesturing. I am sorry; what does that mean?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I was simply saying that, as the noble Baroness has already indicated that she is going to divide the House and given the hour, it would probably be quite useful just to go to that stage.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I think that is very unfair, because my speeches are probably shorter than those of anybody in this House. The noble Lord should not pick on me because he does not like what I am saying. I do not like being bullied.

I do not believe that what the Government are doing is right and I would like to test the opinion of the House.