English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Freyberg (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a visual artist. Amendment 4 in my name is a small but important clarifying amendment. It simply adds the words “including through tourism” to paragraph (d) of Clause 2, which already defines “economic development and regeneration” as a core “area of competence” for strategic authorities. This reflects the Local Government Association’s view that tourism should be explicitly recognised in the Bill rather than left implicit.

Tourism is not a marginal activity; it is one of the principal ways in which economic development and regeneration happen in practice. It supports local jobs, sustains town centres, underpins cultural and heritage assets and brings external spending directly into communities. In many places, particularly outside the large cities, it is the economic driver.

I have deliberately not proposed tourism as a stand-alone category nor sought to incorporate it into the important Amendment 6 tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, to which I have added my name. His amendment rightly strengthens the strategic recognition of the arts, heritage and creative industries. My amendment is narrower and more operational. It simply makes it clear that tourism sits within economic development and regeneration, which is how local authorities already understand and deliver it in practice.

Too often, tourism is grouped alongside the arts and creative industries in local authority structures, where its scale and commercial focus can unintentionally shape priorities and funding conversations that are not directly about culture itself. Placing tourism clearly within economic development helps to maintain that distinction while allowing cultural policy to retain its own strategic clarity. This matters particularly in the context of the Government’s emerging work on a visitor or tourism levy. Even at modest levels, published estimates suggest that such a levy could raise hundreds of millions of pounds a year in England and potentially over £1 billion annually if applied more widely—sums that would exceed Arts Council England’s entire annual capital budget and be comparable in scale to a decade of lost local authority cultural investment.

In the Cultural Policy Unit’s helpful paper A City Tourism Charge—the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, will no doubt develop this point further on Amendment 6, with which I entirely agree—there is a strong and well-evidenced case that a significant proportion of any such levy should be invested directly in cultural and heritage assets, which are often the very reason that people visit in the first place. For strategic authorities to play a meaningful role in shaping and deploying such tools, tourism needs to be clearly within scope. Without explicit inclusion, there is a risk that tourism falls between stools—assumed but not quite owned. This amendment provides clarity, not prescription, and I hope that the Minister will see it as a proportionate and helpful addition.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak on Amendment 8 in my name, which would have the effect of adding to the list of areas of competence in Clause 2 an additional paragraph (h), “community engagement and empowerment”. Noble Lords would not be surprised by the suggestion that this should be designated as one of the areas of competence of strategic authorities and mayors, as the clue is in the Title: the Bill is about community empowerment, and community engagement is instrumental to the achievement of community empowerment. It is therefore one of the areas of competence for mayors.

This led me to thinking about what the Government are trying to achieve by listing the areas of competence—let us understand that and then we can decide what it is sensible to put into the list. As it happens, the White Paper was somewhat more helpful than the Bill itself in this respect, since quite clearly what is intended, as the White Paper puts it, is that this list should comprise

“areas where Strategic Authorities should have a mandate to act strategically to drive growth as well as support the shaping of public services, where strategic level coordination adds value”.

I am looking at that and thinking that “competence” is not necessarily the right word for this; perhaps it is “responsibility”. Let us not worry about the word, but let us at least understand what the Government are trying to achieve. Then I realised that, of course, the point is that they have listed seven because subsequently there is an intention to have up to seven commissioners. Is the answer, “Well, there just has to be seven”? I do not think we need constrain ourselves in that regard.

I then thought that perhaps these are listed because they are the areas of functional responsibility where additional functions are provided by the Bill at a later stage, but when one looks at the functions of mayors, six are the subject of additional functional responsibilities and powers itemised later in the Bill. Environment and climate change is left out but is none the less an area of competence, so we are clearly not talking just about what the Bill adds to mayors by way of responsibilities; we are talking about what mayoral strategic authorities should be engaged with to drive growth, to create social cohesion and to shape public services.

It seems to me, therefore, that there are a number of additions and no problem about how many, as long as they are genuinely representative of the areas of competence—meaning, responsibility and functional powers that are available to mayoral strategic authorities. It seems to me—this will save me getting up and saying anything more on the next two groups—that both Amendments 6 and 7 have merit, in that respect, in adding arts, cultural and creative industries on the one hand and definitely adding rural affairs on the other.

The number of commissioners should be determined in their own right, rather than by reference to the number of areas of competence. If there are more areas of competence than there are commissioners, that is not a problem. Interestingly, while listing the seven areas of competence as we have them in Clause 2, the devolution White Paper said:

“We are interested in where this list could be expanded now or in the future”.


I think that we can help the Government by expanding the list. I personally think that all three that I mentioned could be added without any demerits. They would then be more comprehensively illustrative of the range of functional activities that strategic authorities should be engaged in, in order to achieve maximum growth, as the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, quite rightly illustrated by reference to tourism—how they can promote growth, shape public services and improve the circumstances for the populations that they serve.

From my point of view, community engagement and empowerment is central to the delivery of many of these. I have no intention that community engagement and empowerment should be the responsibility of a commissioner. It should be the responsibility of the mayor and, of course, it is a cross-cutting area of competence. I can see no reason why one would leave it out, since it is instrumental to the achievement of the objectives.

I shall finish with just one question to the Minister, which I am perfectly happy to take up with her at a later stage. If it is indeed the Government’s belief that this list may be expanded, either

“now or in the future”,

as the White Paper said, where is the power to add to this list? I cannot find such a power. It seems to me that on the face of it there should be such a power. Even if the Government are not persuaded today, clearly in the future, if, for example, using later powers, the mayors of established mayoral strategic authorities were to make proposals for changes to the Secretary of State and acquire additional functional responsibilities, this may be in a new area of competence, but where is the ability to put that into the legislation? I hope that the Minister may, at this or a later stage, agree that we should add an order-making power at that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I will finish what I am saying, then I will see whether I can answer the noble Baroness’s question.

Including public safety within the areas of competence is important for several reasons. First, it enables devolution of further public safety functions. For example, consideration is currently being given to the role of strategic authorities in resilience as part of the post-implementation review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, due to be completed by March next year.

Secondly, it allows mayors to delegate certain existing functions relating to public safety to a commissioner; where the mayor is responsible for policing, they must appoint a deputy mayor for policing to whom policing functions are delegated. Additionally, the inclusion of public safety within the areas of competence allows a mayor who is responsible for fire services, but not for policing, to delegate certain fire-related functions to a public safety commissioner.

Thirdly, it enables the mayor to convene local partners and collaborate with other mayors to tackle questions of public safety—something all residents would expect them to do. There is a wide range of activity in which we would expect mayors to participate.

Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seeks to clarify how strategic authorities will seek and assume powers within their area of competence and then be held to account. One of the central aims of the Bill is to move away from the current patchwork of powers and piecemeal devolution of functions. To that end, the Government’s ambitious new devolution framework will set out a coherent and consistent set of functions.

Part 2 of the Bill sets out specific functions and the voting and governance arrangements that strategic authorities will automatically receive at each level of the devolution framework, categorised under the relevant area of competence. For example, the duty to produce a local growth plan is categorised under the “economic development and regeneration” area of competence. The Bill allows for new powers and duties to be added to the devolution framework over time, ensuring that it remains adaptive and responsive to future needs and policy developments. Mayors of established mayoral strategic authorities will also be able to request and pilot new functions so it will be possible to test and evaluate outcomes ahead of adding new functions to the framework.

Finally, I turn to accountability. Combined authorities and combined county authorities—

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, while the Bill clearly allows for additional functions and powers to be given to mayoral strategic authorities, the specific question was whether the Bill has a power to enable the areas of competence list to be amended.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I heard the noble Lord’s question. I responded earlier that I will come back to him on how this works within the Bill, so if that is okay, I will do it in writing and share it with other Members of the Committee.

Combined authorities and combined county authorities are required in law to establish both an overview and scrutiny committee and an audit committee. Also, all strategic authorities are expected to follow the principles and processes in the English devolution accountability framework and scrutiny protocol. The Government remain committed to strengthening local accountability and scrutiny, and we are exploring models such as local public accounts committees; we will provide an update on our proposals in that regard in due course.

I hope that, with these reassurances and explanations, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Wilson, and my noble friend Lady Scott have stolen my first line about the size of this group; that is largely down to the structure of the Bill, which has numerous schedules. Consequently, we have tabled a vast number of amendments to make a relatively simple change.

I thank all noble Lords who tabled amendments on these issues. They are not merely technical adjustments; they are amendments that go to the heart of our concerns about the true purpose and direction of the Bill and the sweeping powers that the Secretary of State is taking in it. As my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook has made clear, we on these Benches firmly believe that devolution must be locally led, rooted in local identities and local democracy, and not imposed by central government. Genuine community empowerment cannot be handed down by central diktat, which imposes structures that override locally elected representatives and residents. If devolution is imposed from Whitehall, it ceases to be devolution in any meaningful sense.

The amendments we have tabled seek to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot exercise powers affecting the governance, composition or boundaries of local authorities without their explicit consent. That consent is not an administrative hurdle; it is a democratic safeguard. Such changes must be based on local identities and local wishes to truly reflect the meaning of community. They should not be abstract or managerial plans drawn up at a distance in Whitehall, however well intentioned.

Communities are not interchangeable units on a map. They have histories, relationships and ways of working that cannot simply be redrawn by statutory instrument. Any restructuring must have a demonstrative benefit for local people, not just for the administrative convenience of central government. Crucially, it is local councils, through elected councillors accountable to their residents, who are best placed to judge what will or will not work for their area. This is a particular concern given the Government’s decision to cancel local elections this year, denying the vote to potentially 4 million people. I look forward to hearing other noble Lords’ thoughts on these timely issues and the other amendments in this group.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group: Amendments 21 and 24. My noble friends on the Front Bench have pretty much all the other amendments, with the exception of Amendment 28 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock. It is a pity that she cannot be here, but I join in sending her our very best wishes and look forward to her return to the Committee.

Amendments 21 and 24 are in the same area of where proposals can be brought forward for the establishment of new combined authorities. Before I go on, I could have tabled—I neglected to table—two further amendments about county combined authorities in exactly the same terms as Amendments 21 and 24, which relate to combined authorities. Therefore, perhaps the arguments I am making on combined authorities can be taken as read-across.

The purpose of my Amendments 21 and 24 is to challenge the process by which the Secretary of State would make a decision on a proposal for a combined authority or a combined county authority that is brought forward by the constituent councils in an area. As things stand under the existing legislation, which was set up in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act but, for the purposes of combined authorities, is in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009—LuRA 2023 has the same for combined county authorities—the way it works is that those proposals come forward for an area and are subjected to tests.

I am interested, in terms of how the tests are currently applied, in whether they are likely to improve

“the economic, social or environmental wellbeing of some or all of the people of the area”.

Additionally, I suggest that the proposal should be required to include the purposes that are intended to be achieved by the establishment of this combined authority or combined county authority. The Secretary of State would have to look at and assess—these are the tests—whether those improvements in economic, social and environmental well-being as well as the purposes included in the proposal are likely to be met.

To me, these are two elements of the test of whether a proposal coming forward from an area should be accepted. The first is an objective test: will it improve the well-being in the area in various ways? The second is more subjective but none the less purposive: the people in this area and the constituent councils have said why they want to have this authority, so the Secretary of State should look at those purposes and say whether they are likely to be met. In this Bill, the question put to a relevant proposal—what purposes are you trying to achieve?—is simply swept away. There is no requirement for such a proposal to have those purposes any more.

Amendment 21 would remove the requirement to have purposes so that they cannot form part of a subsequent test. The test that is to be applied would no longer be the test of economic, social or environmental well-being, which is an objective test related to the benefit to the people living in that area, and would be replaced by a statutory test: is it appropriate to make the order in relation to the area, having regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to the areas of competence? In those words, “convenient” leaps out in particular. It makes one think that what my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook was just saying about the desirability of having conformity is what is actually driving these decisions now, rather than, “What is going to happen to benefit the people who live in this area?”, which should be the objective test.

That question did not escape the notice of the Lords Constitution Committee. In its 16th report, published on 13 January, it stated:

“We draw this provision to the attention of the House. It should satisfy itself that it is content to grant the Secretary of State this power within Schedule 1 to subject the new arrangements for a combined authority to such a broad and potentially subjective test”.


Of course, in the text at which the committee looked, what the committee means by “broad and potentially subjective” is, by implication, a bureaucratic test—“Is it convenient for us to have a combined authority?”—whereas what we have at the moment, which is what the committee is referring to, is, in essence, a test of the benefit. It is intended to be able to be determined more objectively, and it is certainly more relevant to the people who live in an area whether a combined authority is or is not in their interests.

When we go on with this Bill, I hope that the Government will in each of these respects think whether the statutory test should have perhaps both the bureaucratic element of whether it is convenient and the objective element of whether it can demonstrate that it will bring benefit to the people who live in this area.

My noble friends have two amendments in this group, Amendments 22 and 36, the purpose of which, as far as I can see, is to remove the power for the Secretary of State to direct the establishment of combined authorities and county combined authorities. It seems to me that although the Minister said this is an exceptional power, there is a risk that once this power is available—again, because it will be convenient to do so—we will be instructed to have combined authorities according to the Secretary of State’s proposals rather than the ones brought forward from within the area itself.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I am very happy with the amendments spoken to so far, so I will not repeat what has been said. Amendment 28 in the name of my noble friend Lady Pinnock relates to whether the Secretary of State determines local boundaries and whether decisions on local authority boundaries within a combined authority area are a matter for central or local government. In the spirit of this Bill, which is about devolution, I can see no reason why central government has to be involved. It ought to be a matter for local councils to decide on. Perhaps the Minister might explain why my noble friend Lady Pinnock has got this wrong; it seems to me that she has got this right.