Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Lucas and Lord Strasburger

Tuesday 19th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I have Amendments 141 and 143 in this group. I very much share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the request filter. It is an exceptionally powerful system because it will make life so easy. A casual request for data on someone who might possibly be of interest can be done in a moment—you do not have to think about it—rather than tying up resources to such an extent that you probably do not do it.

We are all familiar with the fact that those in the police service are human; doubtless, the people who run this resource will be human. The potential for casual misuse or misuse suborned by journalists will be considerable. On top of that is potential misuse by government. Given that at the moment we do not have an effective Opposition and I suspect that the Bill will effectively pass on the nod, I very much hope that my noble friend will reassure us that not only will there be exact and complete record-keeping for the filter but that those records will be independently inspected, that the results of those inspections will be publicly available and that people who find themselves tied up in nastiness as a result of information which may well have come from the filter will be able to find out whether that has happened.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly on the amendments on the request filter. Along with internet connection records, the request filter is another power that first appeared in the draft Communications Data Bill and which died along with that ill-fated Bill. The view of the pre-legislative Joint Committee on that Bill, on which I sat, was that,

“the Request Filter introduces new risks, most obviously the temptation to go on ‘fishing expeditions’. New safeguards should be introduced to minimise these risks”.

The request filter was described as,

“essentially a federated database of all UK citizens’ communications data”.

I dare say that the committee would be even more worried when it said that in 2012 if it had seen how this Bill expanded the range of data to which the request filter can be applied. That expansion comes from the proposed introduction of internet connection records, which would reveal every detail of a person’s digital life and a very large part of their life in the real world. The effect of the request filter will be to multiply up the effect of intrusion into those data by allowing public authorities to make complex automated searches across the retained data from all telecoms operators. This has the potential for population profiling and composite fishing trips. It is bulk surveillance without the bulk label.

Use of the request filter would be self-authorised by the public authority without any judicial authorisation at all. The concept that the Government promote for bulk data is that they are passive retained records, which they say sit there unexamined until someone comes to the attention of the authorities. That concept is negated by the request filter. The data become an actively checked resource and are no longer passive. Will the Minister confirm that the request filter is not yet in existence and is not yet being used?

The request filter is a bulk power masquerading as an innocuous safeguard to reduce collateral intrusion. Unless and until the Government come forward with proposals to strictly limit use of the request filter through tighter rules and judicial approval for warrants, as is the case with other bulk powers, Clauses 63, 64 and 65 should not stand part of the Bill.