Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord McColl of Dulwich Excerpts

Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendment 941. As a medical professional, I know only too well that medical interventions can be driven by financial motives; organ harvesting for a profit is one such example. When medical interventions are financially motivated, the best interests of the patient may be compromised. This amendment would help to prevent such compromise. It would deter the sort of financial abuse that could happen during the course of the assisted suicide process and would protect, in particular, the most vulnerable. I commend it to the Committee.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to 21 amendments in this group. It is my misfortune that they have all been shoved together, giving me around 30 seconds on each one.

It is really important that the powers of the panel are clearly defined and that what we end up with is in accordance with what Parliament wants and intends. Each of the amendments that I have put down comes from either the Law Society or the CLADD group; to this extent, I endorse entirely what my noble friends Lord Murray and Lord McColl just said. The management of evidence gathering in the process is vital. My amendments aim to try to put that into some sort of proper regime that is set out on paper before the Bill becomes statute.

Amendment 929A is aimed simply at panels being able to consider cases with expertise appropriate to the particular nature of the case. It says that

“the Commissioner must have regard to the nature of the expertise required to determine the particular circumstances of the person”

in question. We know that there is a lack of psychiatrists in this country—it is in the public press all the time—so it is important that, when this process kicks off, there are sufficient psychiatrists who are willing and able to sit on these panels and to devote the necessary time, because they will have to make assessments. There is a risk that the commissioner may struggle to find enough of them.

Amendments 922 and 923A ask that there be sufficient people and say that they must be specified in regulations. In particular, they must have expertise in relevant matters as set out in regulations, so the Secretary of State would have to identify what expertise will be required and who is to address it.

Amendment 927A asks that one of the panel’s members

“must be a legal member”.

We cannot possibly have panels that do not have a lawyer on them. There must be a legal member with the expertise to deal with the particular case. Indeed, I note that, in giving evidence to the Select Committee, Sarah Hughes of Mind said that

“it is really clear that the safeguards described in the current Bill are not adequate”.

The British Association of Social Workers has also said that the current safeguards are not enough. Those are disinterested, important bodies with expertise in this area.

Amendment 928 aims at the target of medical expertise. There must be someone on the panel who can take a properly informed view of the diagnosis being given to the applicant.

The point of Amendment 473 is to insert the word “evidence”, which is very important, because it is not clear what the status of these panels and of the material given to them will be. The word “evidence” means that, or will have the effect that, the panel will clearly operate as a formal body. It would not make it a tribunal, but it would make the process formal and the panel act properly.

Amendment 479 would enable the panel to

“require a local authority or an NHS body to arrange for a report to be made dealing with such matters relating to the person as the panel may direct … or … such other person as the authority, or the NHS body, considers appropriate”.

There is more to it. This is the equivalent of Section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which gives the power to the Court of Protection to get reports from the NHS or local authorities in order to allow it to discharge its inquisitorial powers. We need something similar here. It would reinforce the seriousness of the panel.

There are other provisions in this amendment to make it plain that the panel can appoint an expert to test evidence if it does not have its own expertise. It needs to have that power. In an appropriate case, the panel may hear evidence on oath, but it will be under no obligation to. That is in my proposed new paragraph (h). There may be cases where it is very anxious about some of the things it has heard, and it may think that putting someone on oath makes them think very seriously about telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

I will move on. I am trying to take this at a gallop.

Amendment 465 is another Law Society amendment. It would show that, although the panel is not a court, it is a formal body by using the word “evidence” in the provisions. That word will make the panel take it seriously. I am not suggesting that the people on it will be lightweight people, but the process is important. Those of us who are lawyers in particular will know that process is important, and it affects how panels and tribunals conduct themselves. If it is not to be called evidence, it will not have that same effect. The Law Society suggests that it is currently unclear precisely what status the information being received will have. It will not be a court, but it will be a formal body, and that provision occurs in some other amendments—Amendments 470 and 476, and possibly elsewhere.

How does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, understand the panel’s evidence-gathering powers? Will it be exempt from the normal rules of medical confidentiality and data protection? Will it be able to gather evidence from witnesses even if the patient does not want details to be shared? Will it be an executive public authority, subject to the limits that apply to the Government, or will it be a judicial body with unique powers? To say it is quasi-judicial does not answer the question; it is either one or the other. We need to know what powers it will have. Will it be those of an independent tribunal or not? This picks up the observation made by my noble friend Lord Murray.

Amendment 494 would mean that the panel would have to notify relevant bodies if it considers that the person meets the criteria but the request was made because the service provisions had failed in the past. This would be important in monitoring the Bill’s impact on health and social services. It would show whether someone has come for this because provision has not been made. That would be important in looking forward and seeing how we can improve the delivery of health services to the public. It is not a barrier, but it will provide valuable information.

Amendment 934, another Law Society amendment, would require the Secretary of State by regulations to make provision for how the chair of a panel is to decide whether to grant a person’s request that the panel sit in private, including the factors to be taken into account and the processes to be followed. Will it be sitting in private? Will it be sitting in public? How is this to be addressed? These are important practical questions that are bound to arise on the ground.

Amendment 934A, another Law Society amendment, states:

“For purposes of the law of contempt, where a panel determines a referral in public, then unless the panel provides to the contrary, publication of information about the person to whom the referral relates shall be treated as contempt of court, as if (in any relevant legislation) for the word ‘court’ were substituted ‘panel’”.


The panel will not be a court, but it will be hearing very sensitive information in public hearings by default. These amendments seek to ensure that such information about a person is not made public. The late and, I would suggest, great Sir James Munby remarked that

“judges are kept up to the mark by two things—having to comply with proper procedure and being exposed to the public gaze”.

He said that the same thing should apply to panels.

The Law Society told the Select Committee:

“What is unclear at the moment is where the panels will be held and how people would know about them”.


Obviously, consideration about whether the panels are private or public, and then where the powers would come from potentially to restrict the information and then being able to be made—