Future of Seaside Towns
Lord McNally Excerpts(4 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord McNally (LD)
My Lords, my full title is Lord McNally of Blackpool and I am a member of the Blackpool Pride national advisory board and chairman of the Fleetwood Trust. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, both for his introduction to this debate and for the collegiate and constructive way in which he chaired our committee. I think that we sometimes think of the noble Lord rather as parliamentary enforcer from his days as Chief Whip in the Labour Party, but he led us with great good humour and only a minimal tendency to remind us of what he termed Brighton’s “golden age”, which seemed to coincide with his own leadership of Brighton council in the 1990s. I echo the thanks offered by both the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Smith, to our clerks and advisers as well as to Nick Ewbank, our specialist adviser, Beth Hooper, our policy analyst, and Robert Cocks, the committee assistant.
Sarah O’Connor, writing in the Financial Times in November 2017, stated:
“Blackpool exports healthy skilled people and imports the unskilled, the unemployed and the unwell”.
Our report shows that that could have been written about many of our seaside towns. They faced a collapse of the old seaside holiday industry based on boarding houses for the families of the workers of industrial Britain. That collapse was compounded by a straitjacket of a benefits and housing policy which almost incentivised the slum landlord and burdened seaside towns with a concentration of social problems which, by their very nature, accentuated the spiral of decline.
Our report makes strong recommendations about the need for flexibility in national policy so that local authorities could offer bespoke solutions to the social and economic challenges they face. We also call for longer, more strategic assistance rather than a series of short-term, small-impact, penny-packet initiatives.
During our travels, we saw some bold and successful regeneration initiatives, often based on cultural investment, such as the Turner Contemporary at Margate and the Tate at St Ives. At Clacton and Skegness, we saw how investment in sea defences could be used to enhance the tourism offer. We received a wide range of evidence about the importance of transport links and investment in high-quality education and training as well as better digital connectivity. It was encouraging to see on our visit to Skegness how Butlin’s was prospering by providing themed weeks and weekends for specific target audiences —something that could be imitated by other resorts. It was also good to see the Butlin’s company fully committed to a training programme for people wanting to make a career in the leisure industries.
Our report gives the opportunity for a well-co-ordinated, focused approach to the problems facing our seaside towns. As an example of the collegiate approach fostered by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, when the committee started, the noble Lord, Lord Smith, and I were rather at opposite ends of the spectrum, with me looking to public intervention and him espousing private initiative. By the end, I think we were in close agreement that the partnership he mentioned in his speech is necessary for success, as, too, is the kind of initiative he cited in respect of New Brighton, where an individual with a commitment to the locality and a vision for the future can make an enormous difference.
Given its previous success, changes in holiday patterns together with the decline of the historical industrial base meant that Blackpool had a harder fall and was left with bigger problems. It is the very severity of Blackpool’s problems which caused me to argue that giving Blackpool specific and concentrated help was not special pleading. Success in Blackpool could provide the template for dealing with similar problems in other coastal areas. Nor is Blackpool simply holding out the begging bowl. As we found when the committee visited the town, a strong partnership between the private and public sectors is having a major impact on investment and facilities. I look forward to the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Valentine, whom the Prince’s Responsible Business Network drafted in to give help and advice. She has just finished her term there having had a tremendous impact on local attitudes.
We have seen in Blackpool new hotels, a new conference centre and new leisure attractions, including a new museum to celebrate Blackpool’s unique place in the history of our entertainment industry. This morning, I heard about a plan for a national entertainment academy in partnership with Blackpool and The Fylde College and Lancaster University’s creative arts department. That kind of vision means that Blackpool is very close to the tipping point between being part of the problem of our seaside towns and providing a template for their success.
At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th in Blackpool, a partnership between a progressive local authority and far-sighted entrepreneurs created 20th century Blackpool, with the building of the tower, the tramway, the Pleasure Beach and the illuminations. I believe a similar partnership now exists. That is why the committee supported the suggestion of a town deal for Blackpool. By blending existing work with new commitments from partners and government, a town deal for Blackpool would deliver a strong, holistic response to the town’s needs.
As well as a positive Whitehall response, we must also ensure that government really is joined up, so that one department is not undoing the good work being done by another. For example, will the Minister press the Ministry of Justice to make an early decision on relocating Blackpool courts? MoJ delay is delaying the release of £300 million of private sector investment and the creation of 1,000 new jobs via the Blackpool Central leisure development, in which the courts still squat. Can we have an early decision from the Cabinet Office, the DWP and the Ministry of Defence about the consolidation of Civil Service jobs in a new Civil Service hub in Blackpool town centre? That consolidation should include retention by the Ministry of Defence of the Norcross-based Veterans UK unit, which has been serving the social and medical needs of veterans for three generations. Individual departments have to look at the social implications of what they are doing, not just do a tick-box exercise. That will bring civil servants together in what looks like a logical suggestion but will have a devastating effect on an area such as Blackpool, which had and still has a massive concentration of civil servants’ departments. I think I have told the House before that the first job I was ever offered, when I was 16, was in the land registry in St Annes. Who knows where I might have ended up if I had joined then? Probably at the land registry in St Annes.
One of things the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, did, in his collegiate way, was to offer us all an opportunity to write a little block in the report. Noble Lords will have seen that my piece is not about Blackpool but about Fleetwood. That is in part because, during our deliberations, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, convinced me that the well-being of our ports should also be of concern. In my piece, and in the evidence we received when visiting Fleetwood Dock, we outline the problems that have hit Fleetwood over the past 40 years: the loss of the deep-sea fishing industry, the rail link and the ferry services to Ireland and the Isle of Man. These came on top of the other factors hitting seaside towns, already identified. Following the committee’s visit to Fleetwood, I accepted the chairmanship of the Fleetwood Trust, a charity formed by local church, community and business leaders to restore the old and derelict Fleetwood Hospital as a community hub meeting social, health and community needs. It is a good example of a community making its own weather, and I put on record my thanks for the advice the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, gave us, drawing on his own vast experience, not least in Bromley-by-Bow. Associated British Ports owns a large expanse of derelict land around the old dock area and it is essential that the company shows social and corporate responsibility, as well as its profit motive, in discharging its responsibilities in determining how that land is developed.
Joined-up government and good private and public partnership, are the essentials of regeneration success, which is why I worry about the plethora of bodies one has to negotiate with. Is this a matter for Whitehall or the LEP, for the county council or the local council? In the 1960s there was talk of a city of the Fylde between the Ribble and the Wyre. Certainly, it will need a sense of vision and a certain generosity of spirit between the Fylde coastal bodies to maximise the benefits of any central government initiative. I put on record here my thanks to the Prince’s Trust and the Prince’s Responsible Business Network for the help they have given both Blackpool and Fleetwood in this respect. I was less impressed, on our visit, by the Duchy of Cornwall. We were shown a very impressive housing estate, but I did not leave Cornwall with the feeling that the Duchy was showing the kind of leadership I had expected in the area. Likewise, the Crown Estate could show a lot more responsibility, considering its interests in seaside assets.
I give the last word, however, to the estimable Sarah O’Connor of the Financial Times. Following our report she wrote a second article, reflecting on what we had said, in which she said:
“Real solutions to the problems would include more long-term funding for health, education and social care in seaside towns that reflect the complex needs of living there; physical and digital infrastructure investment; and power and resources for local people to reform their economy and housing markets”.
I could not agree more. We are about to have a new Prime Minister. The Duke of Wellington, when he became Prime Minister, came out of his first Cabinet meeting and said that it was all “Talk, talk, talk”. I think we need a little more from the new Administration. I prefer Churchill’s “Action this day”.
Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Lord McNally Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
I draw the attention of noble Lords to the Companion which says that,
“frequent interventions should not be made, even with the consent of the member speaking”.
This has the taste of a House of Commons debate about it. The convention of this House is not for frequent interventions.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Maybe it is an old habit from the House of Commons that is making me reply.
Lord Martin of Springburn
I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord is upset about this interruption—
Lord Martin of Springburn
Yes, me of all people, but I am entitled to seek information. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the Freedom of Information Act and people seeking access through that Act. Is it the case that someone living abroad can make an application under the Freedom of Information Act to information officers over here, including those in Parliament? I hope that I have been brief enough for the noble and learned Lord.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Faulks
My Lords, perhaps I might intervene briefly on this matter. I have experienced quite a number of cases involving educational law and I notice that this amendment is very widely drawn, potentially embracing all sorts of disputes.
It has to be said that the support of legal aid for educational law disputes has not been the finest hour of the LSC. In particular, I can speak from experience of three cases in the Supreme Court and a whole rash of cases alleging educational negligence, almost none of which were successful, which cost the taxpayer an enormous amount of money. Although well intentioned on the part of the claimants, these cases turned out to be expensive, unsuccessful and, quite frankly, misconceived.
I am very concerned about the width of this amendment, notwithstanding the fact that there are some areas, which I think are covered by the government amendment, where it is plainly appropriate that there should be support.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, Amendment 20 would bring back into scope all education matters not already covered by Schedule 1. We have retained legal aid for any educational case that involves a contravention of the Equality Act 2010, such as cases concerning disability discrimination. We have also retained current legal aid funding for appeals on special educational needs matters and for educational judicial reviews. In practice, this amendment would retain legal aid for all education matters. The judgment we have made in prioritising funding is that SEN, discrimination and judicial review are of the highest priority and that advice on such matters as exclusions and damages claims are not.
Where parents are not satisfied with an admissions refusal, they can appeal to an independent panel. This requires them to set out in writing why they disagree with the admissions decision and why they think that the admissions arrangements have not been followed correctly. These are not usually legal arguments. Parents who wish to challenge a temporary or permanent exclusion may do so by writing a letter to the school governors setting out their reasons for challenging the exclusion. If parents are unhappy with the decision to permanently exclude their child, they will be able to appeal.
From September 2012, such an appeal will be to the independent review panel. The Department for Education will fund the children’s legal centre to provide advice to parents on appeals to the independent review panel both online and through a telephone advice line. Parents can also appeal to the First-tier Tribunal if the appeal concerns disability discrimination and legal aid is being retained for advice and assistance in such cases.
Advice is also available on admission and exclusion matters from the Advisory Centre for Education and the Children’s Legal Centre. Education negligence claims have been excluded from scope, along with most other damages claims, because we do not consider that claims for money will generally be of the highest priority. We have therefore focused legal aid on only those money claims which concern a significant breach of human rights, an abuse of a position of power by a public authority, an abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or sexual assault. The vast majority of education negligence claims will not fall under one of these three headings. For many meritorious cases, a conditional fee agreement will provide a suitable alternative funding arrangement. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that we have focused resources on education cases of the highest priority and that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
The two technical government amendments in this group fulfil the promise we made in Committee concerning SEN provisions. These amendments ensure that SEN matters are fully within the scope of the Bill and, specifically, that learning difficulty assessments are captured by our provisions on scope. As we stated in Committee, the Government accept that the existing wording in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 does not cover the provision of advice and assistance in relation to the making of learning difficulty assessments under the Learning and Skills Act 2000 for 16 to 25 year-olds. These amendments ensure that these services are brought within the Bill’s scope.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has made a valid point about education negligence cases. I think the consultation revealed that some respondents were quite supportive of excluding that, which I quite accept would be a sensible measure. The Government’s report on the key issues raised referred to suggestions by others that often difficult admission cases arose where clients were, for example, Travellers. The exclusion of education admission matters could prevent discrimination claims from being brought because it would take legal advice to identify that the clients had grounds for discrimination claims. Equally, lack of early advice could ultimately lead to the more expensive procedures of judicial review.
It is unfortunate that the Government do not at this stage wish to move. I clearly will not press the matter and hope that it can be kept under review perhaps, more particularly, in conjunction with the department rather than simply by the Ministry of Justice. As I understand it, there has been a little disconnection between the two on these issues thus far. For the future, I hope that that is something that could be repaired. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
I am always delighted to see the noble Baroness and I will certainly meet her to discuss this further, but with the rather grim caveats that I gave when we considered it earlier. In the circumstances, I hope that she will withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
(a) ”
Lord McNally
“(ja) section 2 of the Carers and Disabled Children Act 2000 (services for carers);”
Lord McNally
My Lords, stakeholders have drawn it to our attention that the definition of community care service in the Bill is incomplete. We are expanding it to ensure that currently funded legal services in relation to community care remain eligible for funding under the new regime. These amendments will bring within the scope of civil legal aid services provided in relation to Section 2 of the Carers and Disabled Children Act 2000, which covers community care services to carers, and Part 1 of the Housing Grants, Constructions and Regeneration Act 1996, which covers facilities grants to enable disabled people to live independently in their homes. I beg to move.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, we welcome the Minister’s amendments and are glad that an error has been repaired.
Lord McNally
“Facilities for disabled persons6A (1) Civil legal services provided in relation to grants under Part 1 of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 for the provision of facilities for disabled persons.
Exclusions(2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
Definitions(3) In this paragraph “disabled person” has the meaning given in section 100 of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996.”
Lord McNally
(a) there has been, or is a risk of, domestic violence between A and B, and(b) A was, or is at risk of being, the victim of that domestic violence.”
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
““domestic violence” means threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other;”
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I supported the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in Committee, and I do so again now. As I said then, I had experience, at one time, of trying the majority of permanent vegetative state cases. I fear that there will be a small number of cases that are extraordinarily difficult to decide, where the families are placed in an agonising position. They really ought to have the opportunity to be heard in the court and to deal with this matter. Such cases are rare but very important. I very much support the proposal that something should be done about this.
Lord McNally
My Lords, the amendment seeks to insert a paragraph to provide legal aid for cases concerning whether medical treatment is in the best interests of those incapable of giving or withholding consent. As my noble friend Lord Thomas explained, he also tabled this amendment in Committee, where I think it was established that the matters envisaged by the amendment would in fact already fall within the scope of paragraph 5 of Schedule 1.
However, my noble friend also took the opportunity to speak about the wider issues and asked that I consider the observations made by the judge in the case of W against M and others—in particular, whether an exception could be made to provide free legal aid for mental incapacity cases which concerned the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from a family member. Although it would not be right to comment on the specifics of any particular case, I understand the concern that such a case can raise. However, we do not plan to abolish means-testing for cases involving the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. The means test for legal aid is intended to focus our limited resources on those who need them most and takes into account the applicant’s income and any capital they may hold. Those who fall outside the financial eligibility limits are expected to rely on their resources to fund their case. However, if an applicant's circumstances change, they can apply for legal aid funding. I therefore urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
On the specific point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, if he would like to send me the briefing that he has received, I will certainly check on it, write to him and put the letter in the Library of the House.
In the mean time, although I know that my noble friend will be disappointed by my reply, means-testing for legal aid is intended to focus our limited resources on those who need them most.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in support of the amendment. I am indeed disappointed by the Minister’s response, but it seems to me that he has accepted that applications of this sort fall within paragraph 5, and that is on the record. I am disappointed that means tests come into a case of this nature; it seems to me utterly heartless that it should be like that, particularly when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has pointed out how difficult those cases are. They are heart-rending for the people concerned and for the judge who has to try such issues, not to mention all those who are involved in presenting evidence.
I shall not press the matter, but I register my view that the Government ought to have taken a more generous view on this small number of cases.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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“Definitions( ) In this paragraph “previous discrimination enactment” means—
(a) the Equal Pay Act 1970;(b) the Sex Discrimination Act 1975;(c) the Race Relations Act 1976;(d) the Disability Discrimination Act 1995;(e) the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003/1660);(f) the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003/1661);(g) the Equality Act 2006;(h) the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 (S.I. 2006/1031);(i) the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/1263).( ) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to contravention of the Equality Act 2010 or a previous discrimination enactment includes—
(a) breach of a term modified by, or included by virtue of, a provision that is an equality clause or equality rule for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act 1970 or the Equality Act 2010, and(b) breach of a provision that is a non-discrimination rule for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.”
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Beecham
My Lords, in the interests of life, liberty and the pursuit of nourishment, I will be uncharacteristically brief in moving these amendments which relate to Clause 10 and the qualifications for civil legal aid.
Amendment 93 seeks to delete subsection (4):
“In setting the criteria, the Lord Chancellor must seek to secure that, in cases in which there is more than one description of service that could be provided for an individual, the individual qualifies under this Part for the service which in all the circumstances is the most appropriate having regard to the criteria”.
What that means and how significant it is escapes me. Perhaps in replying the noble Lord, Lord McNally, could amplify the meaning of it. In addition, another curious subsection states:
“The criteria must reflect the principle that, in many disputes, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution are more appropriate than legal proceedings”.
It may be a fact but it can hardly be a principle—but that may be me being pedantic again. I have already been rebuked by my noble friend Lord Bach for correcting his use of the word “decimate”. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, may wish to rebuke me in this context.
Amendment 95 is simply designed to ensure that, if regulations are made, draft regulations should be laid before and approved by an affirmative resolution in each House of Parliament. We have had this amendment moved in respect of other regulations. It seems appropriate in this case that we should follow that course. I beg to move.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I would not dare to try to correct the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on his English. I am still recovering from being corrected by the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, earlier in the Bill. I move in these circles with due caution.
I will address Amendment 95 first, which echoes the recommendation by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee to subject changes to the merits criteria to the affirmative resolution procedure. We have given careful consideration to what the committee said in its report about the procedure for the regulations under Clause 10(1)(b) and it is our intention to bring forward an amendment at a later stage to provide for regulations under Clause 10(1)(b) to generally be subject to the affirmative procedure. However, the amendment will also need to provide for a procedure along the lines of but not necessarily identical to that in Section 9(7) and (8) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 to allow for changes to be made quickly if necessary. With that explanation and assurance, I hope the noble Lord will not press his amendment.
Amendment 93 seeks to remove Clause 10(4) from the Bill. Clause 10(4) is based firmly on Section 8(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which also contains an equivalent provision about the merits criteria. The funding code criteria made pursuant to Section 8 of the Access to Justice Act enshrine this principle. The purpose of Clause 10(4) is clear. It ensures that, where more than one level of service might be available, the merits criteria in the regulations under Clause 10 should be sure that the individual qualifies for the services which in all circumstances are the most appropriate having regard to the criteria. Often, one level of service will be most appropriate at the beginning of a case but the need of the applicant will change over time as the case progresses. Section 8(4) of the Access to Justice Act accounts for this.
The benefits of the provisions in Clause 10(4) are twofold. First, we can avoid unnecessary spending by ensuring that the appropriate level of service is funded. Secondly, applicants will benefit by receiving the level of service most appropriate to their needs. This is not a one-way street. There are likely to be instances where it would clearly be more appropriate for representation rather than help to be provided. The assessment will be an objective one, based on the criteria and all the circumstances of the individual case. In those circumstances, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendments.
Lord Beecham
I am grateful to the noble Lord for confirming that changes will be made with respect to the regulation. I am happy to accept his explanation of what seemed beyond my limited intellectual grasp in that subsection. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Scotland of Asthal
My Lords, that is right. We tend to think of familial violence as violence within a family group and people living together in partnership. Regrettably, the right reverend Prelate is right in saying that age does not prohibit violence—domestic violence is no respecter of persons, irrespective of age, ethnicity, economic background or any dividing issue one can think of. Regrettably, domestic violence affects everyone, and this definition, which has been used, continues to be efficacious and would include those issues.
I should also say that of course the Government themselves have been undertaking a review of domestic violence strategy. In part of that strategy, the definition is being considered and, from what I understand of the consultation, they are seeking to widen the net and not restrict it. That is why these provisions are so concerning and—I have to say—utterly surprising. If there was one area in which I did not believe that there would be any dissent at all among the parties or any of our Benches, it would have been this. So there is deep concern and surprise but also bitter disappointment that we are having this debate.
Lord McNally
My Lords, the other evening I said that a smile always came to my face when the noble and learned Baroness reached the Dispatch Box. I think there is usually an exception, and that is when you are in the firing line from her formidable advocacy.
The noble and learned Baroness put her finger on it when she said that domestic violence has its impact on every index of dysfunction in our society. I think that we all accept and understand that. My noble friend Lord Macdonald made the point in acknowledging that the Government have from the very beginning, as the noble and learned Baroness said in quoting my honourable friend Jonathan Djanogly, intended to put domestic violence within scope.
This debate is about whether we have got the definition right. Obviously in discussing that, I have to take into account the comments of a former President of the Family Division, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, a former Attorney-General with considerable lateral experience as well in these matters, and even my noble friend Lord Carlile, who in this case is just an honest jobbing barrister. Obviously, if one gets that weight of evidence, we go back and look carefully at what has been said. I did not realise that this Government were so radical, as was suggested by the query of the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis. Of course, I have talked to my noble friends and have tried in the course of the Bill to be available to Members on all sides of the House. However, as I said at an earlier stage, I am trying to use this Committee stage to listen and to take on board and match our aspirations for the Bill with the experience and wisdom that we receive in Committee to see whether there are areas in which we will make changes when we get to Report, or areas where we simply say to the House that we simply disagree. The spirit is one of listening.
I agree with the noble and learned Baroness that it should be a matter of cross-party co-operation to deal with this scourge of domestic violence. I visited Holloway Prison and was taken to see an ongoing programme of training and educational skills for girls. I went around talking to a number of them. The lady who showed me round suddenly said something that really chilled me. I said, “This seems to be working very well”. She said, “Yes, of course, but you know these girls are probably in the safest place that they have ever been in their lives”. So please do not think that our approach is either frivolous or without concern for the very real problems that domestic violence causes. Again, in a phrase that was used by my noble friend Lord Macdonald, it is certainly not our intention to roll back the decades of progress.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
Before my noble friend moves on from that point, can he go a little further in answering the issue raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about cross-examination? Yes, of course the judge has power to limit inappropriate cross-examination, but the judge cannot prevent the person concerned putting their case, and putting it fully and properly. That is the issue that the noble and learned Baroness is trying to deal with. It is in that situation that the allegedly abused person faces real anguish, and in which the protection of the judge is but a very small instrument.
Lord McNally
I will take this back but, again, I am speaking as a layman to professionals. As far as I understand it, there are increasingly ways in the courts of preventing that kind of face-to-face, aggressive cross-examination. I think that there was a case recently which caused a good deal of public comment and distress. I will take the matter away and take further advice but, as I say, both my impression as a layman and the advice that I have are that there are safeguards to prevent that kind of brutal, face-to-face, intimidating cross-examination. I hear what my noble friend says and I will take further advice on the matter.
I turn to Amendments 43, 44, 45, 46 and 48 and start by reiterating why we are taking most private family law cases out of the scope of legal aid. The cost of legal aid as it stands is, we believe, simply unsustainable, and legal aid resources need to be focused on those cases where legal aid is most needed. Accordingly, for most divorces, child contact applications or ancillary relief applications to divide family assets, legal aid will no longer be available. We believe that it is right to encourage families, where appropriate, to resolve their disputes without going to court. We want to prioritise mediation, which can be cheaper, quicker and less acrimonious than contested court proceedings. Legal aid will therefore remain available for mediation in private law family cases. We estimate that we will spend some extra £10 million a year on mediation, taking the total to £25 million a year.
We accept, however, that mediation might not be suitable in every case—particularly, as we made clear, in cases involving domestic violence. It is important to remember that the inclusion of this provision is to ensure that legal aid remains available for private family law cases where there is evidence of domestic violence, creating a disadvantage for one party, and cases where a child is at risk of abuse.
Amendments 44 and 45 would put in paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 to the Bill, in place of the existing definition of abuse, parts of the definition of domestic violence first used by the Association of Chief Police Officers but subsequently more widely adopted for operational purposes—although not, it should be noted, by the courts. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, having been drafted deliberately and explicitly so as not to be limited to physical violence. It should be noted that it is used elsewhere in Schedule 1: in paragraph 3, which provides for legal aid to be available in relation to the abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, and paragraph 11, which provides for legal aid to be available for a person seeking an order to protect a child at risk of abuse.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
I hope that the Minister will forgive me for interrupting him. Can he explain what is wrong with the ACPO definition and why it is preferred to have a different definition, twice to be found in the Bill but not to be found elsewhere? As far as I know, there has been no broad definition by the judges of domestic abuse, which has been referred to in all its various forms. I am absolutely certain that the courts accept the ACPO definition.
Lord McNally
I will write on this matter, but I think that here the noble and learned Baroness is wrong. As far as I understand it, the Supreme Court did not accept the ACPO definition of domestic violence. If the noble and learned Baroness will bear with me, I will come to that point in the brief—there is a part that deals with this.
Any consideration of the definition in one paragraph should not be undertaken entirely in isolation from the others, lest confusion should result. The definition should also be seen in the light of the Bill’s structure and the purpose of the paragraph where it appears.
I want to know—“like most normal people”, I was going to say—why on earth, if there is a perfectly good ACPO definition, we do not use it. The Supreme Court held that domestic violence could extend to psychological abuse but did not adopt the ACPO definition. However, the majority of the court indicated approval of the approach of what is now Practice Direction 12J, supporting the Family Procedure Rules 2010. For its purposes, it defines domestic violence as,
“physical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may have caused harm to the other party or to the child or which may give rise to the risk of harm”.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
Was that not a case in which the Supreme Court was being asked to determine whether a specific aspect of emotional abuse was to be included so that someone could get relief and, in so doing, referring to that aspect rather than any other? Could the noble Lord tell the Committee to which case he is referring?
Lord McNally
If I am misleading the Committee in any way in this exchange, I will of course write and correct it. The Supreme Court did not adopt the ACPO definition of domestic violence in the Yemshaw case. If the noble and learned Baroness questions me any more, she will go way above my pay grade in terms of the law.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
One of my colleagues has just suggested that maybe the noble Lord is in need of a little legal aid.
Lord McNally
Every time I look up, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is speaking somewhere in the Chamber. The Opposition are overworking the man—give him the night off.
The definition should also be seen in the light of the Bill’s structure and purpose. Paragraph 10 reflects the underlying policy of ensuring that a party to private law family proceedings who has been subject to domestic violence by the other party to those proceedings and is likely, as a result of that abuse, to be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in presenting his or her case, should have access to legal aid. It does not provide that any individual who has been the subject of, or is at risk of being the subject of, abuse—as defined in that paragraph—will qualify regardless of what evidence of abuse might exist. Not every such individual will be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in the way that the paragraph is intended to address.
The paragraph establishes a description of legal services. Whether an individual qualifies for them in any specific case requires not only that the individual falls within the categories in paragraph 10 but that the individual meets the criteria to be established in regulations made under Clause 10. As has been explained in the Government’s response to consultation and in debates on the Bill, those criteria will set out the specific requirements as to the evidence of the fact or risk of abuse. Therefore, the definition of abuse itself is only a preliminary part of the picture. However, it is important that we get it right. I suspect that the Committee will say “hear, hear” to that.
The definition of abuse presently in the Bill embraces mental as well as physical abuse, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation. These references would cover, for example, abusive behaviour relating to family finances—a point that was raised earlier. The definition in the Bill would not exclude from scope any of the types of abuse covered by the definition used by the Association of Chief Police Officers, so this part of the amendment is unnecessary. This could lead to the understandable question of why we do not simply adopt the ACPO definition, given its general recognition. However, the ACPO definition is not set in legislation anywhere and is therefore not permanent, as demonstrated by the recent consultation announced by the Home Office. It could change but legislation would not change with it, at least not without subsequent primary legislation.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord but can he help me on a point about legal aid being withdrawn from private law cases? He will know that one of the main ways of there being a finding of fact is through those private law situations. If there is an impecunious litigant, can he help me as to how that litigant—normally a woman—is going to get those findings of fact if she does not have legal aid to do so? That is one issue.
Secondly, has the noble Lord seen or read the recent survey by Women’s Aid, Rights of Women and Welsh Women’s Aid that found that the majority of respondents did not report abuse the first time it occurred but typically did so after being assaulted between three and five times? Although 99 per cent had reported at least one incident to the police and/or the police had attended an incident, only 8.3 per cent would be able to prove that they had had an ongoing criminal proceeding in the previous 12 months. There seem to be a lot of practical difficulties and I wonder whether the noble Lord can help the Committee in relation to those matters.
Lord McNally
The Welsh Women’s Aid report has been published very recently and we will look carefully at it. I should point out that the organisation surveyed women who are in receipt of domestic violence services rather than women who are seeking legal aid for private family matters. It is a distinction but it means that the survey may not fully square with the issues that we are looking it. We know that this latter group will often, for example, seek a domestic violence injunction at the same time as they take their private family law action, and thereby will qualify for legal aid. None the less, we will look closely at this matter and I will perhaps write to the noble and learned Baroness on her other point.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
My Lords, I do not by any means want to harry the noble Lord but, given what he said about the need for flexibility and certainty, will he consider putting all the evidential issues into the schedule and providing us with an amendment we can look at? Perhaps we could have something such as an affirmative resolution in relation to these issues, which would give us flexibility—if that is what the Government think would be necessary—and clarity as to what evidence would acceptable. I am making a suggestion to the noble Lord that I will not necessarily be bound by, but I just want him to think about it.
Lord McNally
I will very happily think about it and I naturally assume that the noble and learned Baroness is trying to help me. I am very grateful for that. This reply and this whole debate will need to be looked at to see whether we are achieving our real objectives of getting something that is fit for purpose—although I hate using that phrase—in terms of addressing a matter of genuine concern right across the House. There are no differences on this and I freely admit that I do not have the noble and learned Baroness’s detailed experience of these matters. I hope that she will accept that I share her commitment that we get this right.
It may be helpful to give some idea of the prevalence of those forms of evidence. About 24,100 domestic violence orders were made in 2010; about 74,000 domestic violence crimes were prosecuted in 2009-10; and there were 53,000 domestic violence convictions. About 43,000 victims of domestic violence were referred to multi-risk assessment conferences in the 12 months up to June 2010. Clearly, those numbers will overlap to a certain extent but, to compare, the Legal Services Commission funded legal representation in about 69,000 private family law cases in 2009-10, not including legal aid for protective injunctions. The forms of evidence we intend to accept will meet a very high standard of objectivity. We are concerned that many of the additional forms of evidence suggested in the amendments would rely on the word of those involved and provide an incentive to make allegations where none presently exists. However, I also heard what both the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and the noble and learned Baroness said.
Let me be clear. We are not questioning the integrity of genuine victims. However, during the legal aid consultation, concerns were expressed about providing an incentive for unfounded allegations. Accepting self-reporting without objective evidence would prevent us from focusing assistance on those victims of domestic violence who would be unable effectively to present their case against the other party because of the history or risk of abuse by that party. Both amendments referred to evidence from professionals in a variety of roles. We have widened our criteria, so that legal aid will be available where the victim has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence, and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party. Those referrals can be made by a range of professionals. Further, a finding of fact in the court that domestic violence has occurred will trigger legal aid and the court will be able to assess any relevant evidence.
Amendment 48 would prevent a time limit applying to any evidence. We have already said that a 12-month period, where relevant, will apply, but we consider that 12 months will be an appropriate period to protect victims and enable them to deal with their private law issue. The point made by the noble and learned Baroness about an intervening prison sentence would not interfere with that rule. If the criteria were to rise again—for instance, if a second protective injunction is made—the period would start again. It is also important to remember that legal aid will remain available for exceptional out-of-scope cases where the failure to provide such funding would amount to a breach of an individual’s right under the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular Article 6.
This has been one of the most important debates on the Bill because, as all those who have contributed said, it is essential that we get this right. There have been some very well informed and committed speeches. I have put on record the Government's approach, which is to get it right on domestic violence and the legal aid that we provide to those who are subject to it. With that, I hope that the noble and learned Baroness and others will not press the amendments today but allow me to go away, study the debate and the proposals made, match the commitment that we all share to what is in the Bill and return to the matter on Report.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I thank all those who, with a great deal of knowledge, have contributed to this important and anxious debate. It is obvious that the Government are entirely committed to doing their best to combat domestic violence, so the only issue between the various speakers in the debate has been the best way to achieve it in the legislation before the Committee.
I am very grateful to the Minister for his obvious concern, and I hope that he will go away and think about what those of us with some knowledge of these matters have said. If I may respectfully say so, it is equally important that the Lord Chancellor reads and takes account of what has been said.
Lord McNally
That can be taken as implied. I assure the noble and learned Baroness that when I tell him who has spoken and what they have said, he will listen. Taking up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, it is not that we do not talk to each other; we are following the process of the Bill. I am grateful that the Committee is taking this approach, as we can look at the arguments that have been made and think very hard about the issue before Report. I assure the noble and learned Baroness that when I say that I shall be taking the matter away, I mean that I shall be taking it back to the Lord Chancellor.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
I thank the Minister. I found it absolutely irresistible to say that. Each of the points that we have been dealing with is important but two of them are particularly so. The first is the definition. I think that we might all do more work in looking at the definition—in particular, by accepting the Minister’s invitation to see whether the wording in Schedule 1, as he has explained it, really does meet the ACPO requirements. If it does not, we should ask why not, and to what degree it does not meet them.
The second point is the very important list in Amendment 46. With respect, I would adopt the suggestion of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, that these formulae for triggering legal aid in domestic violence should be in the schedule. As I understand it, the Minister’s alternative suggestion is that they should be in the regulations. It would be enormously helpful, before Report, to have a rough draft of what the regulations are likely to provide so that we may know that what we are all worried about will be found in them. The Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, of which I am a member, is all too well aware that a statutory instrument either comes in or goes out. There is absolutely no possibility of amending it unless the government department is prepared to take it back and rewrite it. It would be much better if we knew in advance what was going to be in the regulations, rather than having to attack a statutory instrument at a later stage, which is always an unhappy situation. However, as I said, I am personally very comforted by what the Minister has said.
I want to make one point about Amendment 42. I suggest that the advice that the Minister receives is theoretical rather than practical and on the ground. I wonder whether any of those who have given him advice about what goes in court appreciates that a defendant always has the right to put his case. That is the point that I made in my preliminary observations and it was a point also made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The judge cannot stop that, but it can be a real extension of the domestic violence. I pursued that matter because one has to bear it in mind. Judges can ameliorate the position but they cannot prevent the defendant having the right to put his case. If he does not have that right before the judge, he can appeal to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to Strasbourg under the articles of the convention. Therefore, human rights apply to the defendant as well as to the victim. That is the problem and it is why legal support for the defendant would be a protection for the victim. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
I support the noble and learned Baroness in this matter. She is absolutely right that these cases are rare, but unfortunately they tend to be the most painful. The opportunity for the judge who is managing such a case to be able, if he or she thinks it appropriate, to invite legal representation for that part of the case, and there being legal aid available for the judge to so invite, may be extremely important. It is very unlikely that this avenue would be used very often, but I respectfully suggest that it would be important, in support of what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, says, for that opportunity to be available for the better protection of the child, whose best interests would in those circumstances of course be paramount.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I do not want to get into a situation where I take things away and give the impression that the case has been made. However, again, I must listen to a former president of the Family Division and a former Attorney-General when they say that there is a problem. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said that my advisers cannot have much experience of what happens in court. I can only say that our position is based on the assumption that judges are able to manage their cases in such a way as to prevent the kind of confrontation that we are concerned with here.
I will go away and take further advice on this. It has been examined in the other place. I do not want to leave a situation where very rare cases are not covered. On the other hand, we do not want automatically to extend funding to alleged perpetrators because that is not our line of travel as we try to focus aid on the most vulnerable and needy. It would be a mistake to assume that the only means of protecting a prospective witness, however vulnerable or young, is to fund representation for the prospective questioner. However, the two noble and learned Baronesses speak from considerable experience. I will test that experience with my advisers. If the noble and learned Baroness will withdraw her amendment, I will either reassure her before Report or we will come back to this then.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
I am very grateful for the support and experience of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland. As a distinguished former family practitioner she knows exactly what I have been talking about. There are only two former family judges in the Chamber at the moment: the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, and me. He has just indicated that he agrees with me, in particular that a judge could not protect a child where the father or mother had the right of cross-examination in order to put his or her case. That is the problem. It is rare. Therefore, dealing with it would be very inexpensive. It might happen once or twice a year at most, and the judge would be required to certify the case. Judges will be well aware that legal aid is not to be easily given. They will be well aware that to certify a case would be very unusual. However, the situation exists and children require protection. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will at least take away the matter and think about it. No doubt he, and all of us, should have great respect for his advisers, but they do not understand the rights of defendants quite as well as those of victims. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Beecham
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. On behalf of all those who have benefited from his wisdom and experience as chair of a mental health trust, perhaps I may express the gratitude that they would wish no doubt to convey to him on this aspect of his very long and very distinguished public service.
Lord McNally
I echo that tribute to my noble friend Lord Newton. I passed him in the corridor the other day and said that he was in grave danger of becoming a national treasure but not necessarily one on whom the Government can rely.
Lord McNally
My Lords, on the treatment issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and others, I am advised that the Bill covers them. The matters covered by the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are covered in paragraph 5 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, which includes treatment issues. Amendment 53 seeks to insert a paragraph to provide legal aid for cases concerning whether medical treatment is in the best interests of those incapable of giving or withholding consent. The amendment is unnecessary.
As I have explained, paragraph 5 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 already provides for legal aid to be available for cases arising under the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005, including cases concerning medical treatment of patients or those who lack capacity. Furthermore, paragraphs 9 and 15 of Part 3 of Schedule 1 provide for legal aid for advocacy for mental health cases before the Mental Health Tribunal. Paragraph 4 provides for advocacy before the Court of Protection where there is to be an oral hearing and the case will determine the vital interests of the individual—for example, medical treatment, including psychological treatment, life, liberty, physical safety, capacity to marry or enter into civil partnerships, capacity to enter into sexual relations, or the right to family life.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Part 3 of Schedule 1 provide legal aid for advocacy for any onward appeals to the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court on mental health or capacity issues concerning medical treatment. Furthermore, public law challenges to the lawfulness of public authority actions could be brought by way of judicial review, which is in scope under paragraph 17 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. We believe therefore that this amendment is unnecessary and I hope that my noble friend will agree to withdraw it.
I am advised that in the particular case to which he referred the issue was the eligibility of the family for legal aid, because of their means. We have continued to emphasise that legal aid is means-tested in these circumstances and that our intention is to focus it on those who are most needy. I hope that, with those references and that explanation, my noble friend will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
I do not think the noble Lord should worry. At this time of night it becomes a bit of a blur for us all.
Amendments 72 and 82ZC would bring into scope debt matters that are not covered in Schedule 1 and which we intend no longer to fund. We are faced, as we have said before, with tough choices in this current fiscal climate, but this has allowed us to focus resources on those who need them most in the most serious cases where legal advice and representation are justified. We estimate that we will continue to spend around £50 million on social welfare law overall.
Amendment 72 relates to paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 and appears to be aimed at making legally aided advice, assistance and representation available where a person’s financial difficulties, such as debt problems, could potentially lead to the individual losing their home.
Amendment 82ZC would bring into scope all debt matters not covered in Schedule 1. In our consultation on legal aid reform, we proposed that funding should be prioritised on cases where the individual’s home is at immediate risk. We are therefore retaining legal aid in relation to court orders for possession or sale of the home and in relation to eviction. We generally consider that other debt matters are a lower priority and therefore do not justify public funding for legal advice and representation.
We recognise that early advice can be helpful in a range of contexts. However, what people often need is general advice, for example on welfare benefits, debt or housing, rather than legal advice. There are many alternative sources of help with debt issues, including Credit Action, the National Debtline, the Consumer Credit Counselling Service and local authorities, which also direct people to local sources of advice and assistance on debt matters. In addition, the Money Advice Trust has recently launched My Money Steps, an online tool for providing advice for people with debt problems. The Consumer Credit Counselling Service also offers a free online debt remedy service.
We also recognise the argument that withdrawal of legal aid for any issue could lead, by a chain of events, to serious consequences. We considered this point carefully when formulating our final proposals. However, our view is that the limited public funds for legal advice and representation should be focused on those cases where the client faces serious direct consequences. Therefore, we do not propose to devote these limited public funds to less important cases on the basis that they could indirectly lead to more serious consequences for that person.
It is also important to recognise that the Bill does not require legal proceedings to have been issued before legal aid can be made available. Legal aid will be available where action for repossession or eviction is contemplated—for example, where a person receives a letter threatening repossession action in the absence of payment. Therefore, legal aid will be available to a person threatened with repossession action for mortgage or rent arrears, for example to negotiate with the mortgage lenders. It should also be noted that we will retain funding for the housing possession court duty scheme. It offers free legal advice and representation to anyone in danger of eviction or having property repossessed, on the day of the hearing, regardless of their means. Research shows that 77 per cent of clients who receive this last-minute advice avoid the immediate loss of their home. Under the circumstances, I hope the noble Lord will consider withdrawing his amendment.
Amendment 82D appears to be aimed at bringing into scope debt relief remedies under Part 5 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and, in particular, as the noble Lord said, debt relief orders. As I have already said, we consider certain debt matters to be a high priority for funding. That is why we are retaining legal aid for debt cases where the individual’s home is at immediate risk of repossession because of rent or mortgage arrears or involuntary bankruptcy. We recognise that debt problems can be difficult for the individuals concerned. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that what is often required is practical advice to resolve issues, rather than advice of a legal nature.
It is important to note that debt relief orders are relatively informal procedures. Advisers act as approved intermediaries and assist debtors in applying to the Insolvency Service for a debt relief order. I reiterate that individuals who have debt issues are able to seek advice from alternative routes. For example, the Insolvency Service website provides guidance and leaflets, and information is available through the insolvency inquiry line. Importantly, it should be noted that debt relief orders are used by people who owe limited amounts of money and have no assets. Therefore, they do not involve a person’s home being at immediate risk. They are clearly not analogous to cases in which a home owner is at immediate risk of losing their home as a result of involuntary bankruptcy. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured by what I have said and will not press these amendments.
Lord Howarth of Newport
Can the Minister assure the Committee with complete confidence that every single one of the organisations that he has named in his remarks are confident that they will be in a position to provide debt advice—indeed, sufficient personalised debt advice—to the people who will need it? Has he taken into account that the number of people sinking into the toils of debt is increasing hand over fist as the economy deteriorates?
Lord McNally
No, of course I cannot give that assurance, but neither do I assume the absolute worst case in everything that we discuss, as the noble Lord seems to do in each of his interventions.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Best, for trying to come to my aid. I am sorry that he was not able to continue with that. I am sure that he would have been able to include debt into the case that he was making, skilled orator that he is. However, this is a dialogue and I would like to respond to a few of the points that the Minister made.
We have heard the rhetoric about tough choices a number of times in these debates and no doubt we will hear it again. I wonder whether we might get a second script. Perhaps we could work together on that and enjoy a variation on the theme. We on this side of the House accept that legal aid costs have to go down, and have said so. We understand what the Minister is saying but we think that we have other ways of doing that. However, the same question emerges whichever way you approach this: namely, in saving a cost on an annual basis are the Government providing value for money in the long run? We have severe doubts that that is happening.
As my noble friend Lord Howarth mentioned, debts are increasing although perhaps not quite in the way that he indicated. CCCS, the charity which I chair, receives approximately 500,000 inquiries a year. Our average client owes more than £25,000 to more than eight different lenders. These people have a debt problem. The debts are not necessarily related to housing, to which a different contractual basis often applies, but arise because people overstretch themselves. As I tried to say in my opening address, they also arise because other things happen to these people; for example, they lose their jobs, suffer bereavement or become ill. This is not an easy area to talk about. It is not helpful to be overly simplistic and talk about owner-occupiers whose mortgages are at risk when many of these people will be in rented accommodation. However, the problems arising from losing their homes will be just as bad. I do not see any solution coming forward for those people.
The main point that I was trying to get across in my address concerned the DRO effect. I am afraid that the Minister did not answer the question that I posed: namely, what fee will be necessary to enable this service to be continued? It is presently £90. It seems to me that it will go up to nearer the fee that is charged for a full bankruptcy of £900. What will happen to debt advisers? Will funds be available to keep that generic debt advice going, particularly in the citizens advice area? As we explained, the only reason that the DRO system has continued is that the debt advisers are largely paid for by legal aid funds. If that goes, are we saying that those people who are in severe difficulty with their debts will have to rely on a website, which they probably cannot access because they do not have the necessary equipment, or guidance in leaflets? I do not think that that is a satisfactory solution to what is clearly a very serious problem.
These are very difficult issues that are part of a broader context of social welfare law. We shall probably have to come back to them but in the interim I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, this large group includes a number of government amendments, which I presume are acceptable in their being mainly technical. I am extremely pleased to be sandwiched between my noble friend Lord Shipley and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, as far as this debate is concerned. It is a great tribute to that great city of Newcastle that two of its most pre-eminent city leaders should now be giving such good service in this House and is a reflection of the quality of our civic leadership.
As is obvious, this group of amendments has provided a very useful opportunity to examine our proposals as they affect housing. I do not underestimate the importance of housing as an issue. Like the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, I am old enough to remember Rachmanism and when and how it entered our language. I can still remember the shock that the initial showing of “Cathy Come Home” had on British society in the late 1960s. There is no doubt that housing matters, as this debate has reflected.
As I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, a number of the points that were made either looked at worst-case scenarios or avoided exactly what the Government are providing for in the Bill. For example, when all these measures have gone through, we will still be spending some £35 million on housing-related legal aid.
During the passage of the Bill and in light of respondents’ views in consultation, we decided that legal aid should be available for cases of unlawful eviction. We amended the Bill in Commons Committee to ensure that legal aid continues to be available in cases of unlawful eviction for lawful occupiers without a tenancy agreement. Therefore, those who are unlawfully evicted can get legal aid, not only for the case of the eviction but for claims for damages and damage to their goods. We are also retaining legal aid for housing disrepair where it is alleged that the disrepair poses a serious risk to health or life. This, too, will give some protection to tenants. Legal aid will also remain where a tenant is threatened with eviction for early advice on the merits of their case. The merits test, which applies to all legal aid cases, will help prevent public funds being wasted on hopeless cases brought by tenants—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Best. So we are listening. I shall not repeat the mantra, but we are concentrating limited funds on what we think are the most important cases.
At this hour, I shall go through the amendments to enable noble Lords to see where we are coming from on the issues raised by them. Amendment 81, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, acknowledged, appears to bring into scope housing law areas that are not covered in Schedule 1 and which we intend no longer to fund. We consider that many housing cases are primarily about money or property, and that these issues are not of importance when compared with such fundamental issues as homelessness or the immediate safety of individuals.
As I have already made clear, we intend to retain housing matters in scope only where the individual’s home is at immediate risk. Accordingly, legal aid will be available in relation to court orders for the possession or sale of an individual’s home and eviction from the home. We are also retaining legal aid for housing disrepair cases where there is a serious risk of harm to the health or safety of the individual or their family, and legal services are provided to ensure that the landlord remedies the disrepair. Legal aid will also be retained for those who are homeless or threatened with homelessness and are seeking homelessness assistance from the local authority.
Amendment 72A is aimed at making legal aid available where a tenant of a private registered provider of social housing, registered social landlord, housing action trust or local housing authority is facing a demotion of their secure or assured tenancy as a result of anti-social behaviour or use of the premises for unlawful purposes.
If an individual’s tenancy is demoted, it is replaced with a less secure form of tenancy. Demotion orders are designed to send clear warnings to tenants who are found to have behaved anti-socially or used their home for unlawful purposes. A court can grant a demotion order only where it is satisfied that the alleged behaviour has occurred and that it is reasonable to make the order.
Demotion orders are sought where there is anti-social behaviour but the landlords want to continue working with the tenants to improve their behaviour rather than evicting them outright. Accordingly, the individual is not at immediate risk of losing their home— as with, for example, an application for a possession order—and the Government therefore consider that the provision of legal aid is not justified in these circumstances.
We acknowledge that where a court demotes the tenancy of an individual, it is easier for the landlord subsequently to seek their eviction. However, the granting of the demotion order does not necessarily mean that possession proceedings will be brought, and the tenancy will revert to secure or assured status after 12 months, provided that the landlord has not issued a notice seeking possession during the demotion period—for example, because of further anti-social behaviour. However, where that is not the case and in consequence a possession order is sought by a landlord, legal aid will be available at that point.
Where a local housing authority or housing action trust decides to seek possession, the demoted tenant has the statutory right to seek an internal review of that decision. Legal help will be available for that under paragraph 28(1)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 1. Legal aid will also be available in possession proceedings against a demoted tenant.
Where the landlord is a public authority and the tenant raises proportionality under Article 8 of the ECHR as a defence to the possession proceedings, case law makes clear that the court must consider proportionality. In addition, where a social landlord obtains a demotion order and subsequently seeks possession of the property, legal aid will be available for the tenant in relation to any judicial review of the landlord’s decision to bring possession proceedings.
Amendments 72B and 72C seek to make legally aided advice available in relation to welfare benefit entitlement where the individual is at immediate risk of losing their home and the benefits in question relate to housing costs—for example, housing benefit or the support for mortgage interest component of income support or pension credit.
Legal aid will continue to be available where the home is at immediate risk through the repossession or sale of the home, or eviction. However, legal aid will not be retained for advice on welfare benefits matters. While we recognise that many people rely on benefits, these cases are primarily about financial entitlement and we generally consider their importance to be lower than cases concerning, for example, the liberty or safety of a person.
For those who need assistance on a welfare benefits matters, factual advice is available from, for example, Jobcentre Plus, the benefits inquiry line and the tribunal itself. Accordingly, where possession action results from mortgage or rent arrears caused by a welfare benefits issue, we do not believe that legal aid should be provided in relation to the welfare benefits matter.
I have already explained the Government’s reasoning for this. We consider that the tribunal for resolving disputes is generally accessible without the need for legal assistance. Where the benefits dispute is ongoing at the point where possession action is taken, legal aid will be available in relation to the possession action, and it can be used to argue for an adjournment of possession proceedings—for example, if it appears that the client may be able to make the necessary payments once their benefits dispute has been resolved.
The Government understand that in cases where private landlords bring possession proceedings against their tenants, they will generally give the tenants reasonable notice that they are being asked to leave. Legal aid will be available to help tenants engage with landlords to try and resolve the actual or threatened possession issue wherever possible, including, if possible, coming to an agreement about delaying the possession matter until the benefit matter is resolved.
Amendment 72D relates to the loss-of-home matters at paragraph 28 of Schedule 1. It appears that the intention, by lifting certain exclusions in Part 2 of Schedule 1, is to make legal aid available for a wide range of potential claims in tort and for welfare benefit matters within the context of eviction and possession. The Government amended paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 at Commons Committee stage to lift certain exclusions in Part 2 of the schedule in order to give effect to the original policy intention that legal aid should continue to be available for counterclaims to possession proceedings. It was important to do so as such counterclaims have the potential to keep clients from becoming homeless. We also lifted those exclusions in relation to unlawful eviction, in order to ensure that our policy that legal aid should continue to be available for such matters was given effect.
The provisions that we introduced, now at paragraph 28(6)(a) and (b), lift the exclusions for trespass to person, to property and to land, and breach of a statutory duty in respect of counterclaims to possession proceedings and unlawful eviction proceedings. We believe that the provisions in paragraph 28 already sufficiently lift relevant exclusions in Part 2 of Schedule 1 as are necessary for the purpose of paragraph 28.
Amendment 72D would go much further and is, we believe, intended potentially to allow legal aid funding for any tort claim that may arise in the context of a loss of home. Indeed, it might even in some circumstances make legal aid funding available to a landlord to bring a damages claim against a tenant within the context of eviction.
In relation to tort claims more broadly, they are being more generally excluded from the scope of legal aid. The Government take the view that these cases are essentially claims for money or damages, which are a lower priority for funding than cases that involve more fundamental issues. Conditional fee agreements may provide a viable alternative means of funding such claims.
We are retaining legal aid for the most serious damages claims against public authorities where the issue is an abuse of position or power or a significant breach of human rights, or for any case concerning alleged abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or alleged sexual offence. We are also retaining funding for claims under the Equality Act 2010.
On welfare benefits, with the exceptions of judicial reviews and claims related to the contravention of the Equality Act 2010, we have decided to remove welfare benefits matters from scope, for the reasons that I gave the House earlier.
Amendment 74C is aimed at ensuring that the provisions of sub-paragraph 28(10) of Schedule 1, which relate to trespassers facing eviction, exclude from legal aid only those who are in occupation as a trespasser and who began their occupation as such. Legal aid will generally be available for possession and eviction matters under paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. However, the Government do not believe that it is justifiable to use taxpayers’ money to provide legal aid funding in circumstances where an individual has unarguably both entered and remained on a property or site as a trespasser and is facing eviction. Such cases are intended to be excluded by paragraph 28(10) of Part 1 of Schedule 1.
The Government agree with the objectives behind this amendment and the concern motivated by it, namely that paragraph 28(10) as drafted could be read as having a different effect from that intended. These provisions could possibly be read as preventing an individual from obtaining legal aid for eviction if they unarguably entered as a trespasser but then regularised their arrangement by, for example, entering into a tenancy. The provision could also be interpreted as excluding cases from legal aid where an individual had initial consent to be present—for example, as a tenant—but no longer has such consent, for example, because of a dispute with their landlord.
As government Amendments 74A, 74B and 74D concern the same point, I will deal with them together. These amendments do not represent a change in policy; rather, they are aimed at giving better effect to our stated policy. They therefore address the same objective as Amendment 74C. The Government’s amendments are more appropriate to meet the concerns that have been expressed because they leave no room for doubt that the provision achieves the effect that I have described and that the Government have always intended. These government amendments put beyond doubt that the exclusion in paragraph 28 of Schedule 1 in relation to trespassers will apply only when the person is both unarguably occupying a property as a trespasser and began their occupation as such. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured by that clarification.
The next group of amendments relates to the provisions in paragraph 30 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, concerning housing disrepair cases. Amendments 77A, 77C and 77E relate to legal aid for damages claims by tenants relating to disrepair in rented homes—in particular, ensuring that when legal aid has been granted for a housing disrepair case, if the landlord makes arrangements for the repairs to be carried out, or carries them out, legal aid can continue for the damages aspect of the claim until the conclusion of the case. We have prioritised funding on cases which concern such fundamental issues as homelessness and the safety of the individual or their family. We are therefore retaining legal aid when serious disrepairs threaten the health of the client or their family and the client wishes to bring an action against their landlord to remove or reduce that risk. We are, however, generally excluding damages claims from the scope of legal aid because we take the view that these cases are essentially claims for money, which are a lower priority for funding than cases which involve more fundamental issues. We also consider that conditional fee agreements offer an alternative means of funding such claims.
It may be that the intention of this and related amendments is generally to extend Schedule 1 to cover disrepair damages claims. In this context, we note that Amendment 77G disapplies a range of the exclusions set out in Part 2 of Schedule 1 which concern causes of action which can be used to obtain damages. As I have already said, we do not consider that damages claims for housing disrepair are a sufficient priority for funding and that conditional fee agreements present a viable alternative means to fund such claims. We recognise that, when a housing disrepair claim is funded under paragraph 30 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to remove or reduce the serious risk of harm arising from disrepair, and the claim also includes a damages element, legal aid could be extended to cover the excluded damages aspect of the claim. This could happen under the rules for connected matters made under paragraph 40 of Part 1 of Schedule 1.
Amendment 77F appears to be intended, in such cases, to allow funding for the damages aspect of a claim for disrepair to continue to be funded even where the disrepair itself has been addressed by the landlord. We do not consider this to be appropriate or necessary. I have already explained that we do not consider damages claims to be a high priority. In addition, where a landlord has carried out repairs, or has been ordered to do so, this should remove any doubt as to liability for the disrepair. If there continues to be a meaningful damages claim and a reasonable prospect of recovering damages, the client should be able to continue the damages aspect of the claim under a conditional fee agreement. This amendment may also, in part, be motivated by a concern that failure to fund the damages aspect of the case will prevent the legal aid fund from recovering any unrecouped costs. If so, this amendment is unnecessary. Where the damages aspect of a case continued under a conditional fee agreement, if the client were successful in obtaining damages, the statutory charge would ensure that any unrecouped funds expended at the earlier stages of the case by the legal aid fund would be recouped.
In addition, noble Lords should be aware that legal aid will not in general be withdrawn where it is in the interests of the legal aid fund for it to continue. In an unusual case where the damages aspect of a funded case could not be continued under a conditional fee agreement, legal aid for a housing disrepair case could continue to its conclusion to protect public funds by obtaining a costs order, even when repairs have been carried out.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
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Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, today's date was fixed without consultation. Had we been consulted, we would have said that there was no reason not to comply with the usual interval of three working days between Report and Third Reading, meaning that Third Reading would have taken place tomorrow.
I raise the point not to invite debate or to seek change now but only so that the precedential effect of this is as limited as possible.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord McNally
Lord McNally
My Lords, this series of government amendments seeks to remove any ambiguity about the discretion afforded to the Government over the Boundary Commission reports. The noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, raised these issues in an amendment in Committee, and we thank him for this. As my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace said at the time, it is not the Government’s intention that the Secretary of State should have the discretion whether to accept any modifications that the Boundary Commissions wish to make to their reports. We have always been clear that we are willing to make sensible and reasonable improvements to the Bill that do not compromise on the key principles that underpin it, and this is one such example.
A government amendment in the other place made it clear that the Secretary of State could bring forward modifications only at the request of the Boundary Commission. The amendments are intended to remove any remaining potential for confusion by specifying that if the commission requests modifications, the Order in Council laid by the Secretary of State must give effect to the recommendations with the least modifications. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and all noble Lords who raised this important matter in Committee, and I ask the House to accept the amendments.
Lord McNally
I will not refer to the accessibility argument. Amendment 21B seeks to remove the provision for an exemption for geographically extremely large constituencies provided for by rule 4 in the Bill. As the Government said when the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, raised this issue in Committee, this exemption exists to ensure that constituencies are not created that would be impracticably large, damaging the valuable link between constituent and MP. The noble Lord asked why these numbers have been included in the Bill. We have set a limit roughly the size of the largest existing UK constituency, as the Boundary Commission for Scotland felt able to recommend a constituency of this size at the previous review, and that independent judgment seemed to us to be the best basis for a provision of this kind. The range of 12,000 to 13,000 square kilometres is simply to avoid the Boundary Commission having to draw a line resulting in a constituency at exactly 13,000 square kilometres, which might involve a very unnatural boundary.
As the noble Lord rightly says, the provision is almost uniquely applicable to the Scottish highlands. The consequences of this amendment would not, of course, be fully known until the Boundary Commission had made its report. However, it is inevitable that constituencies in sparsely populated parts of Scotland would be enlarged if rule 4 were removed. The provision at rule 4 would not preserve the boundaries of any particular existing constituency, nor was it ever intended to. Like all the Government's proposals, it is designed to allow sensible reform without departing too far from the existing experience. Some noble Lords claim that the Government are inflexible and yet support the removal of one of the provisions of the Bill designed to allow flexibility to take account of particular local circumstances. They may do so in support of an alternative scheme to deal with the highlands, although that would not be the effect of the amendment. Whatever the merits of alternative schemes, the amendment before us would simply delete sensible and practical flexibility for the Boundary Commission. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Bach
I shall withdraw the amendment; I thank the Minister for his reply. However, it seems a remarkable feature of the Bill that it picks out one constituency or part of the United Kingdom in this way. The figures referred to are those given in the Bill. I understand that the Government are unlikely to give way on this issue, and I do not think that it would be sensible to divide the House on it, so I seek leave to withdraw it.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Lord McNally Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, as we begin Report on the Bill, we believe that it is important that the House is updated on our position on the Bill. We invite no prolonged discussion at this stage on the timing of Report.
The Bill is acknowledged on all sides of the House to be a significant constitutional Bill that has not been the subject of what is regarded as the norm for such a Bill—either public consultation or pre-legislative scrutiny. Report has been brought forward without the 14-day gap that convention requires between Committee and Report. These conventions exist for a reason. That 14-day gap allows consideration and discussion in Committee and then the formulation of amendments for Report and preparation for their debate. There has been one sitting day between the end of Committee and Report. It is for your Lordships to judge whether the many issues raised by the Bill meant that it was never going to be possible to scrutinise it properly in the time sought to be allotted by the Government.
We think it right to register the point about the gap, but the mood of your Lordships’ House has been to encourage the participants to resolve the problem by negotiation. The Opposition have supported and participated in this actively. They have been greatly assisted by the intervention of the Cross-Benchers. We have negotiated at all times in good faith. The Government indicated a basis for agreement on the main issues, to which the Cross-Benchers have responded, with our support, in accordance with the Government’s suggestions. Cross-Benchers have discussed amendments with the Government in accordance with what they believed the Government were indicating, but no agreement has been reached.
Our system of self-regulation works only if the parties are willingly to negotiate honestly and skilfully and can reach agreement. However, we want to help the process and to do so we have agreed today that we will seek to complete Report on Part 1 of the Bill today. There is a way to go, but my sense is that your Lordships want to get on. It is a token of our good faith that we seek to complete Part 1 today. No one could suggest that that was not very reasonable progress. We want this House to consider these matters in a reasoned and reasonable way, and we very much hope that the Government will respond to this. We want this House to be able to consider and, as appropriate, vote on the key issues before us on Report to encourage resolution by agreement.