Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, my name is on Amendment 96, along with those of my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss, who spoke earlier and with whom I agree, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It attempts to remove Clause 21(5) and (6). Those subsections mean that a person will be removed from this country unless it is “necessary” and there are “compelling circumstances” to show that it is necessary for the person to be present in this country for the dreadful crimes that we are talking about to be prosecuted. Was the Director of Public Prosecutions asked about the effect of this provision on the likely success of prosecutions? If this clause required it to be advisable for the person to be present for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution, I would be in favour of it, but it goes much further than that and is contrary to all good prosecution practice.

I confess that I have met a lot of organised criminals in my time—as a barrister. I have also met an awful lot of victims in my time, as a barrister and occasionally as a Member of this House and the other place. It is not a level playing field. If the Crown Prosecution Service were asked what was advisable, like anybody who has ever prosecuted a semi-serious case and done cases where some witnesses were abroad, as I have, it would say that it is always advisable to have the witness in court, on a local screen or interviewed in a statutory way if at all possible, not to have them on the other side of the globe somewhere—they are unlikely to turn up and will be intimidated by the process.

Let me briefly compare the criminal we are talking about with the victim. The criminal is familiar with the legal system. He—it is usually a he—is often charming. He is often wealthy and can hire lawyers who may even be Members of your Lordships’ House. He is malign, lethal and cocky in the face of the legal system. Those are the characteristics of serious organised criminals. As for the victim, what is she going to be like? She will be frightened. She is likely to be poor. She will be vulnerable and terrified of the legal system and, to use an Orwellian word, will feel like an “unperson”. Do we really want that?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, throughout the passage of the Bill here and in the other place, many people have raised serious concerns about it, and about its impact on victims of modern slavery. I fear sounding like a broken record, but I said at Second Reading and in Committee that the Bill should exclude those who are subject to abuse through the heinous crime of modern slavery. I echo the words of the former Prime Minister, Theresa May. When discussing the Bill in the other place, she said that it has always been important to separate modern slavery from immigration status. My position remains unchanged.

I would prefer that modern slavery was out of this Bill entirely. For that reason, I shall support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. They get right to the heart of the matter as they seek to amend the Bill to ensure that potential and recognised victims of human trafficking will not be detained or removed before they can apply to the NRM and have their application considered. In the spirit of those amendments, I have tabled Amendments 102A and 105A to remove Clauses 23 and 24 respectively.

In Committee, the Minister tried to reassure us that the agreement with Rwanda covers ensuring that

“any special needs that may arise as a result of a relocated person being a victim of modern slavery are accommodated”.—[Official Report, 12/6/23; col. 1704.]

The impact assessment published on Monday was more tentative, saying there could be

“a perceived welfare loss for the individuals relocated to a third country who would otherwise be granted support in the UK although this may be mitigated to the extent that the support provided in a third country is comparable”.

This is classic British understatement. We all know that there will be loss of support. The Salvation Army has described the Bill as “potentially devastating”. The US State Department’s 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report, published since Committee, lists Rwanda as a tier 2 country, whereas the UK is a tier 1 country, and said that Rwanda did not refer any victims to services. So, I am far from reassured.

The impact assessment says that one of the strategic objectives of the Bill is “to protect the vulnerable”, but it is proposing mass detention of modern slavery victims under Clause 10 and removing their rights, under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, to a recovery period and support. I find myself in agreement once more with the former Prime Minister Theresa May, who described the Bill as

“a slap in the face for those of us who actually care about the victims of modern slavery”. —[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23; col. 808.]

The Government are arguing that this is a Bill of short-term pain for long-term gain. For victims, it will be short-term and long-term pain. The JCHR’s Legislative Scrutiny: Illegal Migration Bill concluded that the Bill not only breaches international obligations but

“may also result in the increase in trafficking and slavery”.

With this in mind, I find myself extremely disappointed that an analysis of the potential number of victims affected by the Bill was not covered in the impact assessment. Particularly at such a late stage in the passage of such significant, flagship legislation, it is troubling that we do not have to hand the most basic information in order to make reasonable determinations, based on the evidence, about the efficacy of the Government’s proposals.

As I said in the previous debate in this House, as someone who introduced a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly to reduce trafficking and slavery, I cannot support the inclusion of modern slavery victims in this Bill, so I shall be supporting the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt.

However, your Lordships are wise enough to take a belt-and-braces approach to this Bill, so I am also supporting the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall. They would mitigate some of the concerns about the lack of support by ensuring that victims of modern slavery exploited in the UK will still be able to access the support they need to recover. Why? It is simply the right thing to do.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I rise to support not only Amendment 103 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Morrow, but any and all the amendments in this group. This is for two principal reasons. First, the approach we need to take to the victims of the heinous evil of human trafficking must be compassionate, sympathetic and supportive. When the Government produced its now sadly shelved Bill on kept animals, it contained a clause which sought to outlaw the transporting of live animals for slaughter. But that approach—treating human beings as a commodity; as raw meat, effectively—is precisely what human traffickers are doing to their victims. We should show that same level of compassion to victims of human trafficking.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

I rise with great sadness to speak against the wrecking proposals in this group that Clauses 1, 2 and 3 should not stand part of the Bill. I regret it very much. If we were effectively to turn our backs on this Bill, as those championing this group would, what would we be left with? The prospect would be carrying on failed talks with the EU for another two, three or four years. We have had two years of it, and we know where it took us to. I am not opposed to talks, and I believe this Bill does not stand in the way of those talks continuing, but let us get on with this business too.

I have studied the EU’s proposals, and I have to say that even if it conceded ground in the areas it is suggesting, we would have no solution. The only thing it is talking about pertains to the difficulties surrounding the economic disruption caused by the protocol. In the first instance, its proposals do not in any way address the present economic difficulties. The noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, has already referred to that, and my noble friend Lord Browne will refer to that as well, so I shall not say anything on that.

Right up until the final day of the Brexit transition period, the people of Northern Ireland enjoyed parity with the rest of the United Kingdom in having the right to stand for election and input directly into legislation or to elect others from across our communities to make laws to which people in Northern Ireland would be subject.

However, on 1 January 2021, that all changed. At that point, the right democratically reserved to Northern Ireland citizens to make laws effective in Northern Ireland was usurped in an instant, and the bulk of that power transferred to representatives in another jurisdiction for whom nobody in the Province voted. There are Members of this House concerned about the loss of some delegated powers to Ministers, despite an appropriate role being afforded to Parliament to scrutinise eventual regulations. Yet they demonstrate little in the way of concern for the loss of sovereignty associated with the surrender of law-making powers in Northern Ireland in perpetuity under the protocol governing hundreds of areas of policy.

This would be bad enough in itself, but in order to understand the difficulty, we need to see it in the context of Brexit. The UK was never relaxed about its membership of the EU. According to Professor Vernon Bogdanor, the reason for this was the sovereignty problem: the fact that the UK could be overruled and was not completely in charge of its own legislative fate. We could be overruled in the European Parliament in the context of majority voting. We could be overruled in the Council of Ministers in the context of qualified majority voting. We could be overruled by the European Court of Justice. Of course, we were a part of European governance acting through the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, and, in this context, worked hard to defend our national interest. Many times, we were not overruled, but on occasion we were, and there was ultimately nothing that we could do about it. The fact that, notwithstanding our representation within European governance, we could nevertheless be overruled, informed our lack of sense of being part of the European demos—the problem of the democratic deficit.

Thus, the deficit was not about a complete absence of democracy, but about a shortfall of democracy arising from being overruled in a context where the absence of a sense of being part of the European demos meant that people increasingly felt that government was something that was being done to them rather than something that they were part of. In this context, one of the chief benefits of Brexit was the end of the democratic deficit. We would make our own laws. What then was the implication of the protocol for the democratic deficit? It very properly completely removed the democratic deficit in relation to the EU for England, for Wales and for Scotland, and rightly so.

What about Northern Ireland? Did it result in the removal of the democratic deficit in Northern Ireland, as in the rest of the United Kingdom? No. Did it result in the partial correction of the democratic deficit in Northern Ireland, while it was fully corrected for the rest of the United Kingdom? No. Did it result in the democratic deficit problem in Northern Ireland remaining unchanged but its correction in the rest of the United Kingdom? No. Did it result in the further deterioration of the democratic deficit in Northern Ireland, while it was fixed in the rest of the United Kingdom? No. Any of these outcomes would have had a progressively more and more damaging impact on our politics, as we go down the list—but what actually happened was infinitely worse.

In some 300 areas of law-making—this has been mentioned before—the democratic shortfall that was the deficit was replaced by a complete absence of democracy. In this context, we need to be very clear that attempts to describe the democracy problem with the protocol as a democracy shortfall or a democratic deficit radically understate and obscure the problem. The democracy shortfall or deficit was the problem we all had when we were in the EU. The problem that Northern Ireland now faces is both qualitatively and quantitatively completely different. Far from constituting a shortfall in democracy, it actually presents us with its complete negation, with all that this means for our defaced citizenship.

As my colleague and noble friend Lord Dodds of Duncairn rightly articulated to the House at Second Reading, the perverse and intolerable situation in which Northern Ireland now finds itself is akin to the UN category of non-self-governing territory—a colony of the 21st century. The United Nations charter was very clear in 1945 that countries should be self-governing, and it subjected countries that continued to make the laws of other countries to special scrutiny, requiring that they submitted regular reports to the UN on the state of the jurisdiction in their care.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Before the noble Lord leaves the problem of the democratic deficit, I would like to say that I have considerable sympathy for his points. It was the principal reason why I was against the protocol when it was first produced. I would like to ask him: has he considered the mitigations that are possible—for example, the two suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, earlier this afternoon? Would he also consider whether, unpleasant though it is to see this democratic deficit, it has an upside for Northern Ireland—what the then First Minister described as the “best of both worlds”? Finally, would he consider why the right solution to the democratic deficit could possibly be the destruction of the Northern Ireland protocol, given that it is an integral part of a treaty that we signed? We may like it or dislike it—the noble Lord dislikes it intensely and so do I—but we did sign up to it.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

I thank the noble Lord for his comments. I did listen very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said and I want to read Hansard tomorrow to get better into my head exactly what he was saying, but I was struck by some of the things he said. Like the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I voted against the protocol, as did every unionist in Northern Ireland—so it has no support among one section of the community.

We have long moved away from majoritism. As a matter of fact, I do not remember majoritism in Northern Ireland. That age has long gone and we were told that it would never return. Politics in Northern Ireland would be by consensus; that is what we were told. We were not only told it—they put it down in law. But I have yet to hear from many who berate this Bill that they are concerned about how the Belfast agreement has been kicked right, left and centre. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to suppose for a second that this border was where it should be and not in the Irish Sea. Does anybody—but anybody—feel for a moment that that would not have caused the complete collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly?

We have not collapsed the Northern Ireland Assembly as such. The Ministers are still in place, doing their tasks and getting on with it, because we did it in such a way. When Sinn Féin did it, they wrapped everything up. I have never heard one Member from either the Lib Dems or Labour—which surprises me—say that Sinn Féin has done wrong here. I did not hear it. Maybe it was said when I was not here, but I have never heard that said. I find that there is pick and choose. If unionists do something, they are a nasty lot, they are nasty people, but with Sinn Féin it is, “Oh no, they have a reason; they have a cause.” Well, we have a cause and we want to defend that cause.

In 1960 the UN went further and passed its decolonisation declaration, basically shifting its position to one of actively encouraging imperial powers to decolonise. Today, the UN still has a committee dedicated to the decolonisation of the small remaining colonies. If you examine its work, the UN is very clear that an NSGT is not a jurisdiction that is governed entirely by another country. Most NSGTs are largely self-governing. They remain classified as NSGTs because they are not entirely self-governing. Now, of course, I recognise that, in order to be formally classified as an NSGT by the UN, you not only have to meet the definition of an NSGT; you also have to persuade the Assembly to vote an agreement that a jurisdiction should be so defined.

I am not about to start a campaign for the UN to vote to classify Northern Ireland as an EU NSGT. However, it is clear, on the basis of the UN definition of an NSGT and the level of self-government enjoyed by existing NSGTs, that Northern Ireland not only meets the UN definition of an NSGT, but one in relation to which the colonial power—in our case the EU—controls more of the governance of Northern Ireland than do many officially recognised colonial powers in relation to their NSGTs.

The story of colonisation since 1960 has been the story of decolonisation. The actions of the EU arguably amount to the first example of new colonisation, as opposed to annexation by military force, since 1960. I find it quite extraordinary that the EU should have even dreamt of seeking this agreement. It does not reflect well on the EU at all that it should have requested this, and the fact that the UK Government had to fight it for even the most ridiculous four years, after the fact, is quite extraordinary. Of course, its justification was allegedly defending the Good Friday agreement—or Belfast agreement, whichever you choose—but this is utterly absurd.

The citizens of Northern Ireland deserve the full rigour of protection under international law in respect of their democratic right to political participation as our counterparts have in each of the other constituent parts of the United Kingdom or indeed any other country. However, that protection has been patently undermined by the protocol.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I am concerned about his argument when it comes to the position of the new—again—Home Secretary. She said in July:

“The Northern Ireland Protocol Bill needs to be changed so that it actually solves the problem. … The bill’s ‘dual regulatory regime’ lets EU law flow into Northern Ireland in perpetuity … I’ve been fighting for while in government. Without them, the bill treats people living in Northern Ireland as second-class citizens.”


Does the noble Lord agree with Suella Braverman? If he does, will he be bringing an amendment to Bill to make sure it does not have a dual regulatory regime that allows EU law to flow into Northern Ireland?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

If the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is asking me if I agree that Northern Ireland citizens are now treated as second-class citizens, yes, I do. Some people in Northern Ireland seem to be content to be treated as second-class citizens, because, like the noble Lord, they want to pull this Bill apart and the protocol to remain. I hear, in the debate today, some noble Lords saying that there are problems with the protocol, but in time that will be sorted out. Where will our economy and industry be? My noble friend Lord Browne will be making some reference to that a little later.

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, among other provisions, states:

“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. … Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.”


This has plainly been violated by the protocol, which has partly removed our right to take part in the Government of our country as it relates to 300 areas of law, both in terms of engaging in public service as a candidate and in terms of voting.

Of greatest importance, however, is that the plundering of aspects of our right to vote violates the Good Friday agreement. I hear many champions in this House of the Belfast agreement, and I have to admit that I would not be the best advocate of the Belfast agreement, and I am prepared to say that. But let those who are stand up, and then they will run into problems with their debate and where they are going. Specifically, the Good Friday agreement affords the people of Northern Ireland the right

“to pursue democratically national and political aspirations.”

Moreover, in the case of the Good Friday agreement, there is the additional international constraint arising from a foundational provision of the protocol, in Article 2, which specifically obliges the UK Government to ensure that there is no diminishment of any of the Good Friday agreement rights following Brexit. Article 2(1) states:

“The United Kingdom shall ensure that no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity, as set out in that part of the 1998 Agreement entitled Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity results from its withdrawal from the Union”.


So now we confront the central absurdity: the EU pretended that an obligation that did not exist in the protocol existed, and that an obligation in the protocol that did exist in fact did not. There is nothing anywhere in the text of the Good Friday agreement saying that there cannot be a customs border, and there is something that plainly states you cannot erode the political democratic rights of the people of Northern Ireland, which was the plain consequence of placing a border down the Irish Sea.

Of course, I am not saying for a minute that the UK and the Republic of Ireland could not agree to avoid a hard land border, only that it is not required in the Good Friday agreement. In a context, however, where the Good Friday agreement prohibits—

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

The noble Lord might like to be reminded of what the Companion says about length of speeches. Fifteen minutes is indicated as the acceptable length of a speech. Might I suggest that the noble Lord concludes his speech?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

Yes, I will conclude, but it is remarkable that, earlier in the evening, I noted speeches going to more than 20 minutes. I have just come in at the wrong time, I suppose, but I will draw my remarks to a conclusion and make way for some others.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I support this proposal and do so conscious of the fact that, listening to some of the voices from Northern Ireland we have heard today, I am being asked to decide how I should approach the issue on the basis of sympathy for the way in which some of the citizens of Northern Ireland—those represented here—feel they have been dealt with by the British Government in the context of the whole negotiation relating to the EU, the GB and Brexit. I remind myself, though, that this is not a matter of sympathy. I spent a lot of my professional life having to decide cases where, if I could, I would have found the other way. But if the law required me to find a particular way, whether I liked it or not I was required to do so, so I did. What we are dealing with here is a treaty between the United Kingdom and the EU, not between the EU and Northern Ireland. I am sorry to say that, but the issue I am addressing is the treaty between our country and the EU.

Can I just get rid of Clause 1? It is a modern and unwelcome phenomenon. If you look at it, it says nothing. It is just a piece of PR, not legislation at all. We have too many Bills that include pieces of PR which do not take the legislation any further, and that is why I object to it. We should not have clauses in Bills that say, “This is a jolly good idea. This is what we’re going to do”, but more important are Clauses 2 and 3.

There have been criticisms made by the Advocate-General of the necessity argument that has been so thrown at him by, among others, the Constitution Committee. I know this has been said before, but I remind the House that necessity is not available, as it

“may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if”

the state in question has contributed to—not caused—“the situation of necessity”. Well, we have. We march into the negotiation and sign the agreement. We broadcast the agreement as having got Brexit done, for political reasons. We do not look at the consequences to, among other places, Northern Ireland—and we have not looked at it. There were voices in Northern Ireland who, to my memory, were saying, “This is a very dangerous step to be taking.” We either did not look at it or, worse, looked at it and thought “It doesn’t matter; we will get Brexit done.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, if the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is so powerful, why has he failed to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who started his remarks by saying that he has no faith in any of these talks resulting in any agreement for two or three years at least? If the noble Lord, Lord Bew, cannot even persuade the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, he may struggle to persuade others who may be a bit more sympathetic to his arguments.

The noble Lord, Lord Bew, knows that I like and respect him, but let me scotch this point about Article 16. The Government insisted that they were working in the joint committee when others on the Conservative Benches were saying they should dump that work and trigger Article 16. We on these Benches said, “Let the joint committee process do its work, because that is what the Government negotiated in the agreement.” Now we have heard in Committee in the Commons that talks have been exhausted—no more on the joint committee; instead, we are bringing unilateral legislation. So the noble Lord will forgive me for being a bit cynical about the Government’s position. On the one hand, they are saying that they are using the joint committee and therefore will not trigger Article 16, and on the other that they are no longer in the joint committee and need unilateral legislation. I am afraid it does not match. That is perhaps at the heart of why there is still uncertainty over the Government’s proposals.

At the outset, I say that I am a borderer and live in Scotland—I was going to say that therefore I sympathise, but that sounds deeply patronising. I understand many of the arguments, as I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, because I raised them in the debates. We opposed the Government because we could see the situation was not only going to be detrimental but would effectively remove rights. But that is not something that our Benches or this Bill can resolve.

I respect both noble Lords who spoke with passion about this, but I put it to them that they and Suella Braverman cannot both be right. The new Home Secretary is on the record saying that this Bill will make citizens in Northern Ireland “second-class citizens” —this Bill, not the protocol. She is arguing for this Bill to be amended. She said in her article in the Times that she had argued that while in government. She is now back in government, so I do not know what will happen with the Government’s position in this Bill on a dual regulatory system, but maybe the noble Lords can inform me later on.

If the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, is arguing so strongly that this Bill will not have Northern Ireland operating under two systems, it is incumbent on him to bring amendments to it to remove the dual regulatory system and Clause 11 when we get to it. I look forward to debating those amendments, because he surely cannot support measures in this Bill which would allow Ministers to enforce EU rules on traders within Northern Ireland.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. All I wanted to say is that I am encouraged that I can get his support if we do that. Is that what he is saying?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I will match his “Get rid of Clause 11” with “Get rid of them all”, because that is our position.

The Advocate-General said at Second Reading:

“the peril … was not inherent in the protocol’s provision.” —[Official Report, 11/10/22; col. 764.]

But he then said today that the “problem lies in the protocol”, which the Government themselves negotiated. So, we are back to the situation regarding the Government’s proposals, and it seems that the Government are going to rest on an assertion of necessity, with an assumption that it is not going to be tested. It surely is not welcome for us, in passing legislation, that the Government are effectively asking people to challenge it in the international courts—I can only imagine that it would be the ICJ.

The ICJ has stated in clear terms that invoking necessity on wrongfulness and not adhering to a treaty commitment cannot be a permanent solution. So I ask the Advocate-General, if he responds to any of the points that I am going to make, whether the Government agree with that. The ICJ has stated on a number of occasions that, even if invoking necessity was upheld, it is only temporary in order to remove the grave and imminent peril; it is not permanent, because it still means that that party is in breach of the treaty.

So if long-term, permanent changes are required to be made, that will require protocol changes and treaty changes, and the Government have not said that. They cannot invoke necessity if they believe that this is a permanent solution. The reason why I say that with confidence is—the Advocate-General, in schooling the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and me as non-lawyers, said we were “less wrong” on this—that, customarily in international law, we have to look at the record of the ICJ. I asked the Library of the House to provide me with information on when the ICJ has upheld parties who have invoked necessity. It has never been upheld, for the very good reason that it has to be limited, and “grave and immanent peril” on a cumulative basis is considered an exceptionally high bar. The Advocate-General must know that.

Of the two cases that the Advocate-General cited, the one involving Hungary and Slovakia—which was referred to by my noble friend—I found fascinating, as I mentioned before, when I read the judgment. The Advocate-General said that necessity

“was recognised by the International Court of Justice in 1997 in a case between Slovakia and Hungary regarding a dam on the Danube.”—[Official Report, 11/10/22; col. 765]

As I referred to before, the Government seem to be relying on one case regarding communist Hungary in 1989 which the ICJ threw out.

The second case mentioned, involving Canada and fisheries, could refer to two cases. In one, the ICJ was asked by Spain to adjudicate because Canada had seized a vessel, invoking necessity, but the ICJ said that it could not look into it because Canada had passed legislation at that time to have a reservation from the ICJ, so the case could not even be heard. The other case relating to the Grand Banks should worry the Minister, as it was about imposing licence fees. Canada invoked necessity; the US responded saying that it would pay the fees of the fishermen and then claim reimbursement from Canada; then Canada amended its laws, which brought in all other aspects, and it was resolved by Canada removing the licence fees. Now, if that is a precedent, it is a worrying one, because I can see that there will be consequences with the EU as a result of this legislation. There will be reciprocal action and the UK will pay for it.

So can the Minister confirm what the Library told me, that there has never been a successful invocation of necessity? Can he tell me if there has ever been a case where any party has invoked necessity for framework legislation? I could not find it, so presumably the Minister will be able to help me.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 11th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I was really fascinated when I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, asserting that no one really understands international law. I noticed that there was no challenge when he said that. The noble Lord is someone for whom I have a high regard and high respect. He does not always agree with me and I certainly do not always agree with him, but that does not diminish my respect for him in any way.

When this Bill was in another place, the right honourable Hilary Benn MP said:

“Let us not forget that Northern Ireland is in a unique and favourable position compared with my constituents, precisely because it has access to both the market of the United Kingdom and the market of the European Union”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/7/21; col. 1014.]


The more I have thought about his comment, the more troubled I have become, and the more I wonder whether Mr Benn and those making similar assertions have really thought through the full implication of their position. I do not accept for one moment that the protocol is an economic benefit—in a five-minute speech, it will not be possible to go through all that—but to humour Mr Benn, let us assume for a moment that he is right.

What is the effect of encouraging the people of Northern Ireland to be reconciled to sacrificing their vote as it relates to 300 areas of the lawmaking to which they are subject in return for economic gain? The dignity of our politics is based on the fact that people are ends in themselves, not means to an end. The idea that the guarantee of our equal value—our equal citizenship—can be appropriately traded to any degree as a means of becoming rich is about the most disturbing thing I have ever encountered in all my political life, which now extends to about 50 years. It amounts to encouraging us to sell our political souls for economic gain. That we in this Parliament should be brought so low when we regard our historic commitment to political freedom and democracy is, to say the very least, shameful.

I could quote any number of our great political thinkers to illustrate this point but lest anyone suggest I am too parochial, the importance of keeping friendly with France has already been mentioned here today. I will thus quote a French person by the name of Montesquieu, whose celebrated The Spirit of the Laws AJ Carlyle summarised thus: that in a free state every man and woman who is considered to have a free spirit should be governed by himself, or herself, and therefore the people as a body should have the legislative power but as this is impracticable, the people must act through their representatives, chosen by local election.

The right to participate in your Government, rather than being a passive recipient, is of course also provided for by international law—whoever understands that. The right to political participation can be found in provisions such as Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states:

“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his”


or her

“country, directly or through freely chosen representatives … Everyone has the right of equal access to public service”

in their country. The people of Northern Ireland have lost their ability to take part in the government of their country in relation to some 300 areas of law. They can no longer stand for election to become legislators and make laws in these areas or elect a legislator to represent them in this task because, under the Brexit arrangements, these laws are now made for Northern Ireland by the EU—a polity of which it is not a part and in whose Parliament it consequently has no representation whatever.

In Northern Ireland, of course, these points are greatly compounded by the additional protections of the Good Friday or Belfast agreement, which sets out

“the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations”.

This additional protection for the integrity of the vote in Northern Ireland reflects our troubled history, where sadly in the past some have been persuaded to trade the ballot box for the bomb, and the need to ensure that the value of democratic engagement is never demeaned or eroded.

Furthermore, the hands of the UK Government are prevented from acquiescing with the erosion of the value of the vote by reallocating the making of their laws in some 300 areas to a polity of which it is not a part and in which it has no representation at all, courtesy of Article 2 of the protocol, which states:

“The United Kingdom shall ensure that no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity, as set out in that part of the 1998 Agreement entitled Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity results from its withdrawal from the Union”.


The meaning is clear. There can be no diminution of the rights of people in Northern Ireland to pursue democratically national and political aspirations from the 1998 level that the Good Friday agreement protects. Yet every time legislation is placed on Northern Ireland by the EU legislature, in which Northern Ireland is not represented, the Good Friday agreement is violated. That surely should concern us all, not least those who are strong advocates for the Good Friday agreement.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, with his usual clarity, the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has introduced his amendments to Clauses 63 and 64. I regard it as one of the privileges of serving in your Lordships’ House to have become a friend of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, over these last 20 years. I not only deeply admire everything he has done on the issue of human trafficking but have seen first-hand some of the extraordinary work he has done with Mercy Ships, where he has given so much of his life and time as a notable surgeon. I have no hesitation today in echoing the remarks he has made to your Lordships’ Committee. I am not sure I can echo the Zulu remarks he quoted, but I think Nelson Mandela once quoted a Zulu saying about “ubuntu”, meaning “brotherhood”, that

“we are only people because of other people.”

In many respects, that goes to the heart of what we are trying to express in these debates and amendments today.

Statutory support for victims in England and Wales during the time they are in the national referral mechanism—the recovery period—which was the subject of Amendments 156A and 156B, which I spoke to earlier, is long overdue. We are seven years behind Northern Ireland and Scotland, and I welcome the Government catching up with the rest of the UK. I would like to say with the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, in hearing distance that I deeply admire what he managed to achieve in Northern Ireland, and I look forward to hearing what he has to say about his Amendment 171B, which, again, I associate myself with. Indeed, I support all the amendments in this group.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the current version of the statutory guidance on victim support in England and Wales, which says:

“The Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract operates as a bridge, to lift adult victims out of a situation of exploitation and to set them on a pathway to rebuilding their lives. As such, it is important that no support provided through the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract prevents potential victims or victims from accessing support they would otherwise be entitled to receive.”


The statement about what a victim is entitled to receive goes straight to the heart of Amendments 169A and 170A.

Under the Bill, what do the Government intend to provide in terms of support? The noble Lord, Lord McColl, said that without support, the Bill simply becomes a mirage—a good metaphor to use. What are the Government going to do to provide support during the recovery period? Will the support be in line with Article 12 of the European convention? Both Ministers talked earlier about the importance of compatibility in these areas. But, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, we seem to pick and choose what we want to have compatibility with and what we do not.

The frequently referred to and admirable Joint Committee on Human Rights recently published its review of Part 5 and highlighted that

“clause 63 (new section 50A MSA) does not specify details as to what ‘any necessary assistance and support’ should include, leading to some ambiguity”—

a word I referenced earlier in connection with being in good faith—

“as to whether clause 63 (new section 50A MSA) will indeed adequately give effect to the UK’s obligations under Article 12 ECAT to provide the types of assistance specified in that Article.”


It is worth recording in Hansard what the Committee said:

“The Secretary of State should confirm whether ‘necessary assistance and support’ will include all of the types of assistance listed in Article 12 ECAT”.


We will all listen closely to the Minister’s response to these amendments and specifically on that point about whether the support will be in line with Article 12 of the European convention.

I have also co-signed Amendment 170. As I have already said, the stated objective of the Government’s support to victims is

“to lift adult victims out of a situation of exploitation and to set them on a pathway to rebuilding their lives.”

Who could disagree with that? All the evidence from those working with victims is that this goal is far from completed when a person is confirmed as a victim of modern slavery by the Government. To continue on the pathway to recovery, as the Government themselves have acknowledged, a victim needs much longer support.

The noble Lord, Lord McColl, has been making that case for many years in your Lordships’ House and I have been happy on previous occasions to give him support. 1am glad that he has taken the opportunity provided by the Bill today. If the Minister cannot agree to incorporate this now, will he tell the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and Members of your Lordships’ Committee that, when the putative legislation that was referred to earlier in this area is brought forward, it will at least be attended to then? I am glad that the Government have recognised the need, but they should now act to bring their commitment into a concrete reality.

I also want to touch briefly on the amendments to Clause 64 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, which seek to give victims who are eligible for support leave to remain. It is not just the right thing to do for these individuals, it makes policy sense to ensure that we are able to bring perpetrators to justice. It has been said again and again, by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and others who have re-emphasised this throughout today’s debate. Without evidence from victims, cases are much harder to prosecute. Here is an interesting point: it also makes economic sense.

A 2019 report from the University of Nottingham, which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will be well aware of, on an earlier version of the Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, showed that his Bill was “value for money”. I hope that the Minister’s officials have drawn that report to his attention, so I ask him: why would the Government not support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and give this vital support to victims of modern slavery?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his kind remarks. For victims of modern slavery, escaping from their exploitation is only the beginning of their journey towards recovery. I will direct my remarks today to Amendment 171B in my name, which would assist victims on this journey.

I have been astounded by the individuals whom I have come across over the years, particularly those who I had the privilege of meeting during the passage of my Private Member’s Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly who have been victims of modern slavery in this country. These victims have experienced extreme exploitation and abuse in this country yet have shown commendable fortitude and strength in their determination to recover from their ordeal. When I consider Part 5, and in particular Clause 64, it is those individuals I think of. It concerns me that Clause 64, if unamended, will make the leave to remain criteria narrower and, in doing so, make vital support for survivors even more inaccessible.

Clause 64 will impact victims of modern slavery across the UK, yet there has been no impact assessment published to date—at least, I have not had sight of it—on how many victims will be granted leave to remain under the Bill, compared to the current numbers. I hope the Minister can address why this is the case and provide a timeframe for when we can expect to see one.

Previously, I had the opportunity to meet Anna, a young Romanian girl who was kidnapped here in London, trafficked to Galway and then moved to Belfast to be sold into the sex trade. This young girl was moved from pillar to post, to be exploited in one place then another. The only consistency she knew was exploitation. When victims like Anna escape from their situations of exploitation, they need stability and certainty as they start their recovery and begin to work through their trauma.

I am concerned that whilst Clause 64 puts discretionary leave to remain measures on a statutory footing, in the process of doing so the Government have made the criteria much narrower than current guidance. In particular, Clause 64(4) would prevent leave to remain being granted to a confirmed victim on the grounds of their need for support for their recovery, if they could receive that support elsewhere—even when the alternative country is not a signatory to the European trafficking convention. The Government have also not set out which countries without ECAT would be acceptable. This restriction is likely to affect EU citizens who have recently become entitled to automatic consideration for discretionary leave if they have no other right to remain, since the Secretary of State is likely to argue that these citizens could receive support within the EU. It sounds very much as if the Government are unfairly trying to skirt their moral duties and responsibilities to these victims. This goes to the point that, contrary to what the Government have said, this Bill is not fair for victims of modern slavery.

Amendment 171B in my name would ensure greater stability by removing the criteria of not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided or compensation sought in another country. Without this amendment victims such as Anna, upon exiting their situation of exploitation, could find themselves without leave to remain and instead relocated to another country where they may not know anybody, speak the language or understand the customs. This will be disorientating, unsettling and frightening, and it will compound their vulnerability to re-trafficking.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and Sir lain Duncan Smith MP in the other place on the need for 12 months’ leave to remain to ensure that all confirmed victims can receive support, as proposed in the noble Lord’s Modern Slavery (Victim Support) Bill. I put on record my support for Amendments 170B and 171A in the name of the noble Lord. While Amendment 170 to Clause 63 in the noble Lord’s name applies only to England and Wales, I am pleased to see that steps are being taken to provide statutory support to confirmed victims in Northern Ireland. Through Section 18(9) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015, statutory support is already available to victims with a positive conclusive grounds decision on a discretionary basis.

Power of Attorney

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, new legislation will be required. To put matters into perspective, in 2021 there were more than 5 million LPAs on the OPG register, and only nine have been removed from the register because of concerns about fraud by false representation during their creation.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords—

[Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

In Northern Ireland, the Commissioner for Older People can speak on behalf of older victims of economic abuse. The same role exists in Wales, and the Scottish Government have in place a Minister for Equalities and Older People. Can the Minister identify an equivalent here in England, so we can bring these parties all together?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his question, and I can answer it by saying that in England it is a function of local government to carry out those tasks.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 17th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harries of Pentregarth (CB)]

My Lords, I would suggest that there are two issues behind the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and I am not sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have really addressed them. One is whether there should be a sort of extended time period—“I think the marriage may have broken down”—to allow for reconciliation, while the other is the situation where a woman is pretty certain that her marriage has broken down. She is living apart from her husband with her children, but she still has some hope. Then, out of the blue, a note comes through, perhaps rather late in the day, that her husband has actually petitioned for divorce.

I think that outside of this House there is quite a widespread worry about what the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has called the rights and the dignity of a person in that situation. I accept all the other arguments that have been put forward, but will the Government address the situation where something might come, if not as a total surprise then as rather a bitter blow that it should have reached this stage and the party has heard about it so late?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has intimated that he will not be testing the opinion of the House on this matter, but nevertheless, I rise to support Amendment 1. There are some things worth saying in relation to this important amendment and on this very important issue.

The noble Lord listened carefully to the previous debate and his new amendment now seeks only to avoid use of the term “irretrievable breakdown”—nothing more, nothing less—at the start of a divorce application when it is made by one party to a marriage. Where the couple have decided by mutual agreement, and it is clear that they have discussed the matter in advance and come to a view, this amendment does not propose a different statement at the start of the procedure from that which is made on actually applying for the conditional order. This is positive for two reasons. First, it means that the amendment focuses on the particular group of people who are likely to be disadvantaged by this Bill: namely, the respondents in the case of a unilateral divorce application in the absence of fault.

As the noble Lord explained, under the current system, around 40% of divorces are made in the absence of fault through a prior period of separation of either two years in cases where there is agreement or five years in cases of disagreement. In the context of these divorces, at present the respondent gets at least two years’ warning before the statement of irretrievable breakdown can be made. Under the Bill, they could get no warning at all and they will also lose their right to contest the divorce, which is a double whammy, truncating their rights on two fronts simultaneously.

Before I talk about the important service that Amendment 1 provides in addressing these difficulties, I would like to comment briefly on them, and particularly on their political significance.

The noble Lord, Lord McColl, expressed his worry about the psychological impact of the heightened insecurity that the Bill will visit on some marriages. People in marriages today who judge that it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that their spouse might suggest divorce, although neither party has committed adultery or behaved unreasonably, know that, even if they were unable to persuade their spouse to change their mind, they could not have a declaration of irretrievable breakdown visited on them for at least two years. There is in this a certain security, which this Bill will remove for 40% of current divorces.

It seems strange that the Government should want to associate with such a proposal. Last year, before the general election, the Conservative think tank Onward published its seminal paper The Politics of Belonging, which suggested that if the party was to win the election it must seek to engage with “Workington Man”. One of the central arguments of the report is that, having for many years prioritised freedom, the public now attach greater importance to security. On the basis of its extensive polling, the report stated that,

“by a ratio of 2-to-1, voters want to live in a society that provides greater security not greater freedom.”

It is this realignment of focus away from being primarily about freedom to a far greater emphasis on security that causes the report to argue that what is needed now is the “politics of belonging”—greater togetherness rather than greater separation.

In this context, the Bill before us today, the practical impact of which is to emphasise greater freedom for the petitioner and greater insecurity for the respondent, seems strangely out of place. Amendment 1 restores some dignity and security to the respondent by ensuring that they will not be presented with a statement of irretrievable breakdown right at the start of the process, potentially as a bolt from the blue. This means that, while they will understand that their marriage has been put on notice, they will not be presented with a form of words suggesting that it is all over from the outset.

This has two benefits. First, it treats them more gently and with greater dignity than moving straight to a statement of irretrievable breakdown. Secondly, while not restoring to the respondent a right to contest the divorce, it restores to them the opportunity to have a voice. If you present them with a statement of irretrievable breakdown, you are effectively telling them that it is all over and preventing them having a voice. If, by contrast, they are told that the marriage is on notice and that in 20 weeks a statement of irretrievable breakdown will be made unless they can persuade their spouse that their relationship is worth saving, they will at least have an opportunity to respond constructively.

Another reason this amendment is very positive is that it helps the Government fulfil their stated objective to promote reconciliation in the divorce process. This is significant because, having recognised that the current law makes reconciliation harder, the family test assessment in the new law states:

“We want to create conditions for couples and parents to reconcile if they can.”


Under the current law, which is based on fault, one has to begin the divorce process with a declaration of irretrievable breakdown because it involves citing adultery or unreasonable behaviour.

However, in considering a new system where one does not need to prove fault, that is not necessary. We have the opportunity to bring forward new legislation and therein a new approach. Given the stated commitment to foster better conditions to promote reconciliation than we have at the moment, an obvious place to start is this amendment and its proposal not to make a statement of irretrievable breakdown until after the reflection period when applying for the conditional order.

On this point I note that the Nuffield report—which some have quoted selectively to justify not prioritising reconciliation during the divorce process—states that, under a system where one party is notified of the intention to divorce, as proposed by this Bill,

“there is also the possibility that notification would be more facilitative of reconciliation.”

In other words, we should recognise that, in moving to the new system, there is the potential for greater scope for reconciliation than under the current system, because of the notification system.

Finally, it seems that the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has managed through the amendment to identify a means to use non-fault notification that is more facilitative of reconciliation. In this context, to reject the amendment because, up until this point, the divorce process had always started with a statement of irretrievable breakdown would be very odd, given that the whole point of this exercise is to change divorce law. I very much hope that the Government will not dismiss the amendment but give it proper consideration.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Belmont]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. As I noted in my speech in Committee, in all our debates on the Bill we must not forget children. The Family Impact Test assessment affirms the Bill on the basis that it seeks to “reduce conflict”. However, while I fully understand the Government’s desire to reduce conflict in the divorce process, it is telling that the majority of couples who divorce are in low-conflict relationships.

The figure mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, is that 60% of couples that split are in low-conflict relationships. This research comes from Professor Spencer James of Brigham Young University. He states that these low-conflict couples are

“largely indistinguishable before they split from couples that remain together”.

These findings challenge the assumption that the majority of couples that split up are in constant conflict with one another, yet that assumption seems to underpin this legislation. James’s research comes from the UK’s largest household panel survey, Understanding Society. He found that only 9% of married couples in the United Kingdom who split could be described as high-conflict couples. He states:

“Both unhappiness and conflict are far less prevalent among couples who are about to split than one might reasonably expect.”


All of this is important when we return to research on the impact on children of family breakdown. Parents are more likely fall into poverty following separation. Therefore, they need much greater levels of state support. Some 60% of lone parents receive housing benefit, compared to just 10% of couple parents. Even when income and education are taken into account, studies find negative effects on children from divorce. One study, from Lee and McLanahan, looking at 2,952 mothers and children, revealed that instability especially affects children’s socioemotional development.

Yet the impact of divorce on children seems to depend on what came before. Children tend to do better if their parents exit a high-conflict relationship and worse if they exit a low-conflict one. As James notes in the research I mentioned earlier:

“This potentially counterintuitive finding in fact makes great sense. The break-up of a low conflict relationship comes largely out of the blue for the children. They are then left to conclude either that relationships are profoundly unpredictable or that they are somehow responsible. It’s easy to see how either of these conclusions can then undermine and sabotage their own future prospects of a loving committed relationship”.


This amendment would require the Government simply to look further into the impact of no or low-conflict divorce on children. It is a significant failing that the Family Impact Test assessment has not engaged with this. I think there will be a good deal of benefit in gaining greater understanding of why these couples divorce and therefore in investing more effort in helping them. If these married couples are saying they are relatively happy one year before divorce, what pushes them to make that decision? Understanding that would enable targeted support and help.

The research I have talked about should give us hope. If 60% of couples of are low-conflict and many of them are happy one year before they divorce, perhaps those marriages could be saved. Divorce is generally not in the best interests of the children of those families, so keeping them together would be a great benefit to them. I support Amendment 15.

[Lord Morrow]

My Lords, I wish to speak in support of Amendment 17, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McColl. I am aware that he does not intend to test the opinion of the House on it, but nevertheless I think there are some things that merit being said.

The noble Lord noted in Committee that there are no less than 27 references to reconciliation in the Government’s comments setting out their response to their consultation on divorce law reform. They include the statement that,

“the law can – and should – have a role in providing couples with an opportunity to reflect on that momentous decision and to pull back from the brink if they decide that reconciliation is achievable”.

If we look beyond that document there are plenty of other examples, including in the Family Impact Test assessment of this Bill, which states:

“The current law works against reconciliation by incentivising … a spouse to make allegations about the other spouse’s conduct which can create conflict. The alternative option which requires the couple to live apart for a substantial period of time can disincentivise efforts at reconciliation because the separation period can be affected if the couple try living together again. The current law also offers little opportunity for reflection and conciliation, as the initial decree of divorce can come only a matter of weeks after the divorce proceedings have started.”


In promoting a no-fault system, the Family Impact Test states:

“We want to create conditions for couples and parents to reconcile if they can”.


In this context, it seems to me that commissioning research on how reconciliation is best facilitated under the new regime proposed by the Bill compared to the fault-based system that we have now is vital. The Minister might be preparing to tell me that reconciliation rarely happens during the divorce process, as he did in Committee when he said that there was little evidence that divorces that do not proceed do so because the couple have reconciled. If the Government really think that, it seems completely contradictory to all their statements about reconciliation.

I hope the Minister will not try to square this circle by simply saying that the Government’s position is that while it is not worth prioritising reconciliation, of course they support reconciliation when it is possible. Multiple statements of commitment to the promotion of reconciliation in the Government’s response to the consultation, press releases and family test are such that it does not make sense for the Government then to say that, by the time the divorce process starts, it is too late for reconciliation.

I note that when the Minister suggested this argument in Committee, he cited in defence the Newcastle University study of the Family Law Act 1996 pilots. He told the House about the information meetings that were part of the Family Law Act 1996 and said:

“The purpose of that meeting included providing the parties with information about marriage counselling. Academic research into various models of information meetings found that they came too late to save marriages and tended to incline parties who were unsure towards divorce.”—[Official Report, 3/3/20; col. 564.]


He also implied elsewhere in Committee that the information meetings were not effective.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord McColl. I do so because I fear that a fundamental pessimism underpins Clause 1. It is an attitude that we have heard in speeches from Ministers and others to the effect that once a person files for divorce a marriage has by definition broken down. The Minister in the other place said that

“the moment one person decides that the marriage is over, it is indeed over.”—[Official Report, Commons, 25/6/19; col. 602.]

I question that. I do not think it is inevitable that a marriage, even one that has come to that point, is over. I prefer to allow room for reconciliation.

People can change their minds, and often do. Marriages can go through very rocky periods, yet come out the other side stronger than before. I am sure many noble Lords can think of examples. In my view, hope for reconciliation should be maintained for as long as possible, including into the divorce process. I believe reconciliation remains possible. I think that is borne out by the figures showing that each year the number of completed divorces is considerably lower than those applied for. At present, approximately 10% of divorce petitions that start each year are subsequently dropped. Couples do give their marriage another chance. I know that other explanations are offered for the shortfall: cross-petitions, petitions being re-filed on a different basis, and so on. I acknowledge all that, but are we really to believe that there are not some reconciliations within the thousands of divorces that do not complete? If there are any at all, they expose as false the assumption that divorce is inevitable after a divorce application is made. A Bill designed on that false assumption would clearly be flawed, so I am uncomfortable with Clause 1 as it stands.

At the very outset, the divorce process requires a definitive statement by the applicant or applicants that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. As I see it, that can serve only to close minds, inhibit dialogue and reduce the chance of reconciliation. The Minister in the other place described the 20-week period as “a period of reflection” but, under the Bill, the 20-week period starts out with assertion by one or both parties that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. That encourages not reflection but defeatism.

The modest change this amendment seeks to make is to reduce the sense of inevitability ever so slightly. Rather than applicants stating at the outset that the marriage has broken down irretrievably, they would have to state that it “may” have broken down irretrievably. Only at the stage of applying for the conditional order would we get to the assertion that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. This change would make the 20-week period one of genuine reflection in the hope of saving marriages. I believe it deserves noble Lords’ support, so I support the amendment.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the wise words of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and think that Amendment 1 is not helpful. It replaces the proof of irretrievable breakdown on the basis of a sworn statement at the outset, with that being proven only after a second sworn statement has been made after the time has elapsed for the conditional order to be made. I also dislike the wording,

“they think that the marriage may have broken down”.

It is a bit patronising. Leaving a further 20 weeks could make it more difficult for a spouse to leave an abusive relationship: “You only think our marriage is over, dear. Why don’t you come home with me and think again?” I realise that this is not consistent with my remarks at Second Reading when I spoke about periods of reflection, but I have had my own period of reflection in the intervening time. I have listened to the research findings already referred to by the noble and learned Baroness, such as those from the Finding Fault? study, which established that people do not initiate divorce proceedings unless they are sure that, for them, the marriage is over. We from these Benches will not support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Burt of Solihull]

My Lords, I am fully in support of having strong support services for couples but, by the time they decide to divorce, I would suggest that that stage is passed and it is already too late for conciliation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has pointed out.

I totally support Amendment 21 and the comments of my noble friend Lady Tyler. It is just the question of timing that I dispute. Professor Liz Trinder points out that practical help and advice would be of value, and financial help for these services would be most welcome, especially on benefits, housing and child support. In the vast majority of cases, mediation would not only be too late, it could be harmful. The Finding Fault? study found that more than a third of behaviour divorces included allegations of domestic abuse, some of an extremely serious nature. Why would you give the perpetrator a golden opportunity to browbeat—or worse—the victim by suggesting that the marriage may not be over, and present the spectre of having to return to the site of the abuse?

We on these Benches will not support the amendments other than Amendment 21, well intentioned though we believe they are.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 21 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern.

The Bill’s family impact test issued by the Ministry of Justice stresses multiple times that a central policy intention behind the legislation is to promote opportunities for reconciliation where that is possible. I admire the stated aim, but this amendment reflects the view that the Bill as it currently stands lacks ambition in this respect. Without funding for essential marriage support services, this policy goal will mean little to struggling families across the country. Families who desperately want to stay together, but are at a loss as to how to move forward, need support. It is one thing to provide an opportunity for reconciliation, but another thing entirely to provide a means of reconciliation.

According to Relate, the UK’s largest provider of relationship support:

“Evidence suggests that low income families are likely to experience increased strains on their relationships because of financial pressures. Their financial vulnerability also means they are less able to afford relationship support.”


This may well be having a very real bearing on family breakdown statistics. By the age of five, almost half of children in low-income households have seen their families break apart, compared to only 16% of children in higher-income households. Funding for counselling services could make all the difference to families who struggle to get by financially—families like Laura’s, on a household income of £16,000 per year, who told Relate:

“I want my husband and I to stay together because I know we truly love each other, as well as for the sake of the family, but desperate situations push people towards desperate measures, such as contemplating divorce. I am trying to stay strong for my family by blocking things out emotionally, which I know isn’t healthy but I have nowhere to turn. What we need is to speak to somebody objective who can help us to find a way forward. I agree there should be more funding for relationship support—healthy relationships create healthy families which in turn creates healthy citizens.”


Unfortunately, loving someone is not always enough and there may come a time where we all need more support and guidance. In a context where the Government are moving to reduce the time for reconciliation by promoting divorce within six months, it is vital that we invest more in marriage support and focus some of that money specifically on the shortened divorce process. This amendment rises to this challenge and is particularly important because, unbelievably, answers to Parliamentary Questions reveal that the Government are not allocating any funds for marriage support through Section 22. This is extraordinary, especially when we consider previous government undertakings in this regard. On 1 February 2017, for example, the Minister in the other place stated that

“the Department intends to continue to work very hard to ensure that marriage gets the support it needs to continue being a strong bedrock for the families and the children for whom we want to secure the best possible outcomes in the future.”—[Official Report, Commons, 21/02/17; col. 389WH.]

It also makes no sense. The Relationships Foundation’s Cost of Family Failure Index in 2018 estimated the annual cost to the Government of family or relationship breakdown to stand at £51 billion—my colleague and noble friend Lord Browne has already referred to this figure—which is up from £37 billion 10 years ago. The scale of this crisis demonstrates that proper investment in marriage support services is long overdue. The move would also be in line with public opinion. ComRes polling from 2017 showed that 76% of British adults believe that extra money should be spent strengthening families.

In this context, where the Government are proposing to reduce the time for divorce and thus reduce the opportunity for reconciliation within divorce, it is especially vital that they now adopt a new approach to marriage support. Providing funding to parents in conflict, who do not have to be married, is no substitute for marriage support, which should not be limited to those who have children. We need a significant, serious focus on marriage support.

When difficulties arise in relationships, giving up often seems easier than going on. This Bill risks making giving up easier, while doing little to meaningfully support those who want to go on. It communicates the message that marriage breakdown is often a sad inevitability and that, if you get to that point, the law will make it easier for you to “get the relationship over with”. I suggest to noble Lords that we can do better than that. Let us be a country that believes in fighting to rescue relationships, so that when they hit the rocks our response is not simply to mitigate the fallout, but to offer a lifeline of support to families in the form of counselling. Amendment 21, and indeed Amendment 3, will help us rise to this challenge. I very much hope that the Government will support this.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown]

My Lord, I support Amendment 21 and Amendment 3. Amendment 21 speaks about funding for marriage support services, and says:

“In subsection (1)(a), at the end insert ‘, both before and during a marriage’.”


The reality is that many young people are not really prepared for marriage. Many go into it with great expectations: that everything will be rosy, everything is going to be beautiful, and that they are going to have a great life. They do not realise that the reality of life for everyone can be facing difficulties and hardships—not only financially, but in family circumstances.

There are many reasons for family breakdown and, certainly, each one is a tragedy. There used to be an old statement in our home: “a family that prays together, stays together”. It is also true that a family that talks together can stay together. The tragedy today is that families no longer talk together the way that they once did, because they are talking into an iPhone or an iPad. I was raised on a farm, and when I was a child there was a large family table we sat around and talked together. The reality is that, in the homes built today, you could not do this because the kitchen or living room is so small the family could not get around the same table. So where do they go? They go to their rooms. They used to sit before a computer but it is not like that any more; they just sit with an iPad. I sat in a home recently, where a family was gathered for a family bereavement. There was a young person of 17 years of age there. We were having conversations about the grandmother at the home, the background of the family and their upbringing and the day that young person’s mother got married. That young person heard nothing. We sat for 35 minutes. He did not speak, and neither was he listening because he was completely absorbed in his phone.

The Government should do more to encourage families to talk together. Then, I believe, many of them will stay together. The tragedy is, even within relationships, husbands and wives no longer converse as they used to. If you have a problem, the best way is to share it because a problem shared is a problem halved. Therefore, there should be more preparation for young people before marriage, and during marriage they should receive more encouragement. Certainly, when it comes to the possibility of a family breakdown, society should encourage the family unit to stay together—not to make them unhappy, but to build relationships again.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Farmer]

My Lords, this amendment would ensure that there are no discussions about financial settlement for 20 weeks unless both parties agree, or unless there is an application to the court for interim maintenance and financial injunctions.

The 20-week period I refer to is dependent on the longer period argued for in Amendment 4, which was 46 weeks. If the minimum period is only 20 weeks before a conditional order is granted, a shorter legislation-free period would be appropriate. However, as I am arguing with my noble friend for a 46-week minimum period, waiting 20 weeks before even starting to sort out finances allows the genuine pause for reflection the Government say they are committed to.

There are already many divorces initiated which are not pursued to final order. That number might reduce considerably under a legislative framework that has no natural brake pedal. The Law Society supports the concept of a litigation-free period. I beg to move.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 7. It would carve out a specific 12-week period at the beginning of the divorce process where no financial provision proceedings may take place. Of course, this would not include cases where both parties agree to commencement of such proceedings, or where there is an application for maintenance.

This is a vital amendment, as it would act in the interests of vulnerable respondents and improve the chances of reconciliation. It serves to recognise that the parties to a marriage might have very different perceptions of the marriage at the point when a divorce application is made. It may come out of the blue for one party—we have heard that referred to earlier. They will need time, and it is not helpful to be plunged into the heat of battle over finances. Financial provision proceedings are by nature contentious and would serve only to undermine the chances of meaningful conversation between spouses in the initial weeks. I believe that keeping the first 12 weeks free from litigation would increase the possibility of the parties being able to discuss their marriage without having to take up entrenched positions.

All couples should be given an opportunity, perhaps even be incentivised, to consider the ramifications of divorce carefully and work towards saving their marriage. Some divorcing couples do reconcile and most of those do so in the initial weeks of an application for divorce. This initial 12 weeks is a key period to try to save the marriage.

Ministers in the other place have said that once one party has asked for a divorce, inevitably—in 100% of cases—it means that the marriage is over. But they fail to mention the more than 10,000 divorce proceedings that are dropped each year, while this position is also counter to their own policy objective of making space for reconciliation. I know that we could argue all day about the reasons for that and whether some of them are attributable to cross-petitioning, but no one can deny that some people embark on a divorce and then change their mind because they reconcile with their spouse.

In evidence to a committee in the other place last year, David Hodson OBE, a distinguished family lawyer and spokesman for the Law Society, argued strongly for a 12-week litigation-free zone. He told the committee:

“We are very keen for there to be a period of reflection and consideration, which is what we had in the 1996 legislation in another form, to give an opportunity to pause, reflect, talk, maybe to have counselling, maybe in some cases to have reconciliation and maybe for one party to get up to speed with the other party. It is the constant experience of divorce lawyers that one party may have come to terms with the ending of a marriage before the other, so we are dealing with a very different emotional timetable. This three months will not be of any prejudice. If urgent applications have to be made for interim provision, that is fine. It will not affect children or domestic violence, which are always separate proceedings. It just is a litigation-free zone for three months.”—[Official Report, Commons, Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill Committee, 2/7/19; col. 9.]


Writing into divorce law the concept of a three-month litigation-free period will send a vital signal of hope to divorcing couples that perhaps they can work out their differences. It will give them the time and space to attempt to do so. Most of the debate on the Bill has focused on the barriers to divorce which couples face when their marriage has broken down, but not much time has been spent discussing how many couples reconcile and want to have a strong marriage.

I do not think I need to remind the Committee of the impact of family breakdown in the United Kingdom. We have one of the highest rates of family breakdown in the developed world. Surely this shocking fact places a duty upon us, as legislators, to do something to keep families together if possible. We all recognise that some marriages are unsavable but the Government should not focus on those alone. In addition, we must do all that we can to save marriages which are savable. They exist: why else would we have a proliferation of marriage counselling services? Does our own experience of marriage not tell us that, too? Many marriages go through rocky periods where the spouses, and their family and friends, fear that the writing is on the wall. But then conversations take place, apologies are offered and accepted, and changes are made to behaviour and circumstances—and a few years later, the couple are happier than ever. Let us do something for them, not just the ones where all hope is lost.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Lord Morrow Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Wednesday 5th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, this has been, to put it mildly, a fascinating debate. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, making the case for removing fault from the divorce procedure. I listened equally attentively to the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, arguing that fault should be maintained. On the one hand, I completely understand how removing fault will make divorces less acrimonious, which may be a good thing. On the other hand, I completely understand that if marriage is a lifelong commitment, with all its extensive public policy benefits, there must be constraints on the freedom to exit. It does not make sense that one should be able to walk out of a serious “till death us do part” commitment unless there has been a serious event, such as adultery, to justify doing so.

I very much believe that marriage is a mutual institution, and so I agree that if one party wants to leave, they cannot be compelled to remain. My concern is that if we change the law simply to give one party the power to end the marriage just because he or she wants to, it will have the effect of making divorce very much more accessible. The truth is that, while it would plainly be unwise and quite wrong for the state to try to hold people in marriages against their will, marriages have been saved and made strong again because divorce was not immediately accessible, and in that context it made complete sense for the couple to exhaust all other options before turning to the very difficult process of divorce.

My concern is that this Bill, in making divorce more accessible, is likely to elicit a greater readiness to turn to divorce and will thereby foster a lower dissatisfaction threshold within marriage when previously couples would have exhibited a greater willingness to stay and fight for their marriage.

I have no doubt at all that, from the narrow administrative perspective of the court, removing fault makes sense. My point, however, is that while we are considering a legal process in which the interests of the courts are very important, this process has potentially huge consequences for society at large. Studies certainly suggest that the provision of easier divorce is likely to give rise to a long-term increase in the divorce rate by up to 10% to 20%. Douglas Allen’s survey of no-fault divorce between 1995 and 2006 suggests an increase of up to 10%, while a study by González and Viitanen suggests an increase of up to 20%. This would constitute a social development that we could well do without.

In addition to this concern, I feel very uncomfortable about the impact of the Bill on the standing of the relevant parties. It seems—albeit unintentionally, I am sure—to create a vulnerable party, which I do not think will resonate with Workington’s sense of fair play. On the one hand, we have the person who wants to leave the marriage—the petitioner. Rather than the petitioner being constrained by the serious nature of the commitment he made on entering the marriage, the Bill enables him to call it a day simply because he is bored. The legislation will greatly enhance his autonomy, enabling him to do what he wants to do regardless of any commitment he may have made on his wedding day. For the petitioner, the Bill as currently framed will extend his personal freedom.

On the other hand, we have the person in the marriage who is not initiating divorce proceedings—the respondent. For them, the divorce could well come as a complete bolt from the blue, because there is now no need for it to be preceded by the conflict inherent in adultery and unreasonable behaviour. Their position is also weakened because the Bill proposes removing their right to contest the divorce—something that 83% of responses to the Government’s consultation preceding the Bill opposed.

If the petitioner wants to leave, he can leave, and within just 26 weeks. The salutary thing about this is the insecurity it would bring to marriages; on the passing of this Bill, anyone who is married would become a potential respondent and could be divorced in just 26 weeks simply because their spouse has changed their mind and no longer wants to be married. As if this were not enough, the Bill will also make the respondent vulnerable to being divorced in what is from their perspective a seven-week process, as Professor Hodson has pointed out. There is no mechanism to compel the petitioner to serve notice on the respondent until he wants the first decree of divorce at the end of the 20-week reflection period. Far from removing conflict, it seems to me that the Bill as currently drafted is likely to greatly exacerbate it.

I am also very concerned about the way in which the interests of the petitioner have been prioritised over those of the children. There has been an attempt to argue that this Bill will help children by liberating them more quickly from unhappy marriages, and without as much conflict as they would witness if fault remained. On both grounds I find this problematic. First, there is an extensive body of literature that shows that divorce does not free children from conflict; it makes conflict a permanent feature of their lives as they are split over two households. Secondly, rather than helping children, conflict-free divorces can be the most difficult to process because they come as a bolt from the blue for no apparent reason. As the social scientist Elizabeth Marquardt has observed:

“The children of low-conflict couples fare worse after divorce because the divorce marks their first exposure to a serious problem. One day, without much warning, their world just falls apart.”


Another thing that I find concerning is the way the Bill designs the divorce process to expedite divorce rather than save marriages. The initial consultation document on divorce reform said:

“The need to make allegations can lay the ground for confrontation with the other spouse right from the start of proceedings. It becomes ingrained as the practical need arises to evidence details of the other spouse’s conduct.”


Mindful of this, it seems unfortunate to me that the statement of irretrievable breakdown is made at the start of the 20-week reflection period, given that between 2003 and 2016 on average more than 12,000 more divorce processes were commenced each year than ever concluded. It is very clear that we should seek to promote reconciliation during the divorce process as well as before it. With this in mind, it would make far more sense to commence the divorce process with a 20-week reflection period that culminated in a declaration of irretrievable breakdown if reconciliation could not be secured, rather than beginning with this very stark statement. There is a similar point to be made about a statement of irretrievable breakdown at the start of the proceedings rather than after the 20-week period.

The problems raised in the Bill as currently drafted are of such a serious nature and so far-reaching that there is a good case for remitting it to a Select Committee for an inquiry.