Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Walney (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to commend the noble Lords who have brought this amendment. I add my praise and gratitude for Policy Exchange in having led the charge on this. I benefited greatly from Richard Ekins’s report in producing my own review, which was published in May last year. One of the recommendations of my review was for the then Government—it falls now to this Government—to set out a clear plan to move on and clarify after the Ziegler judgment. There have been a number of pertinent cases since then. The Court of Appeal’s ruling on the Colston statue case has, in my understanding, made it clear that this is not an unqualified defence. Nevertheless, it has left a level of confusion, for magistrates and for the police, over more minor but still significant criminal damage, such as spraying paint on statues or throwing soup over a painting. This situation is highly complex and difficult for the police and the courts to navigate now. Leadership from the Government and Parliament is needed to put the matter right.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I find myself in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and in particular I draw attention to the excellent work of Professor Ekins and Policy Exchange in this area.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, observed in his opening remarks in respect of Amendment 382H, it is plain that the Supreme Court took a wrong turn in the Ziegler case. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, notes that a number of subsequent cases have touched on the finding in Ziegler and come to an apparently inconsistent conclusion, the most notable of those being DPP v Cuciurean and the Bristol Colston statue case. As the noble Lord, Lord Walney, observes, the Court of Appeal in that case found that the Ziegler judgment had prominently spilled over into trials concerning criminal damage. The Court of Appeal, in its criminal context, made it clear that the defence of lawful excuse was not available in that context, and that sits uneasily with the Supreme Court’s findings in Ziegler.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pre-eminent member of the Bar that he is, says that the law is tolerably clear and should survive with the embellishments of the subsequent cases. I am afraid that, in this context, for the reasons so ably set out by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, that is not adequate for the purposes of either the protesters or the police.

In my submission, Amendment 382H is a model amendment, in that it is clear and brief, and sets out with admirable clarity what it is seeking to do. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that it would apply, across the gamut of all offences which contain a lawful excuse provision, the words,

“the excuse must be a lawful excuse or … must be a reasonable one”.

There are many areas across the canon of criminal law that can be engaged with protest that may give rise to this, thus the application of this amendment would be wide-ranging and provide considerable clarity.

Amendment 382H sets out, in proposed new subsection (2), when it is no excuse, and does so with great clarity. I submit that the various judges trying these cases would be greatly aided when making decisions in summary offences and when giving directions to juries on this area in the light of this amendment.

Finally, in proposed new subsection (5), the amendment directly addresses the provision in the Human Rights Act, which takes into account whether or not this is the exercise of a qualified right and provides that this provision is necessary in a democratic society. It therefore sits happily with the human rights arrangements, so ably highlighted by the Minister in his closing speech on the last group. For those reasons, I hope that this amendment is brought back on Report. I, for one, will heartily support it.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the War Memorials Trust. I am grateful to the Government for including Clause 122 in the Bill and what I have to say goes to my noble friends’ Amendments 369A and 369B.

I have some quick questions for the Minister. First, where can I find the Government’s definition of a war memorial? It is clearly important that there is one. Secondly, I make the point that certain war memorials are specifically designed as immersive experiences or paths people can walk or even climb on—examples are the Carnoustie war memorial and the tomb of the unknown warrior. Can I assume that the walker or climber will have to rely on the defence that he or she had the consent of the owner or occupier of the war memorial? Thirdly, on Clause 122, I ask the Minister— I know we will come to this in more detail in due course—why Schedule 12 is confined to 24 war memorials, which I think are simply the top 24 from the national heritage list. He will know that there are tens of thousands of war memorials across the UK and that many more than 24 are very important and in prominent positions, and therefore arguably just as vulnerable as those listed in Schedule 12.