Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(1 week, 1 day ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
“Review of the Act(1) The Secretary of State must—(a) carry out a review of the operation and effect of this Act,(b) set out the conclusions of the review in a report,(c) publish the report, and(d) lay a copy of the report before Parliament.(2) The report must be published before the end of the period of five years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.(3) The report must, in particular—(a) assess the extent to which the objectives intended to be achieved by this Act have been achieved, and(b) assess whether those objectives remain appropriate and, if so, the extent to which they could be achieved more effectively in any other way.(4) In carrying out the review, the Secretary of State must publish an invitation for interested parties to make submissions on the operation of the Act.”
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, on my count, almost 20 amendments have been tabled to the Bill requiring the Secretary of State within six or 12 months of the Act being passed to promulgate some regulations or undertake a review of a particular provision of the Act. My amendment is more comprehensive and adopts a longer timeframe. It would require the Secretary of State within five years of the passage of the Act to undertake a review of its operation and effect. The wording is the same as that of an amendment I tabled to the Employment Rights Bill and has the same justification.
Post-legislative scrutiny is essential for ensuring that the law we enact meets the various criteria of good law. We cannot know that it does without undertaking a thorough review and, in effect, completing a legislative feedback loop. There is no point in enacting legislation that then fails to deliver what it is intended to deliver and for us to proceed, in essence, in ignorance of its effects.
The case for post-legislative review has been accepted by government since 2008, with a commitment to reviewing most Acts three to five years after enactment. Ministers have variously reiterated that commitment. However, not all departments are rigorous in complying with it. The Government have also introduced a get-out clause saying that there may not be a review if, following correspondence with the chair of the relevant departmental Select Committee, it is agreed that a review may not be necessary. As I pointed out when the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, reported this, it is not clear how a chair will know that a review is not necessary without undertaking some initial review. It is also not clear why this House is excluded from the process.
As I argued on the Employment Rights Bill, there is a case for putting on the face of a measure provision for post-legislative scrutiny where
“the Bill is large, is complex, makes substantial changes to the law, is contested and has not been subject to pre-legislative scrutiny”.—[Official Report, 24/6/25; col. 223.]
This Bill is clearly substantial, both in length and content, and it makes a major change to educational law in this country—it has been characterised by my noble friend Lord Lucas as striking
“at the heart of the relationship between parents and the Government”.—[Official Report, 20/5/25; col. 173.]
It has clearly engendered strong opinions; we have had extensive debate, with 12 days in Committee, as to its likely effects. It has also been introduced without pre-legislative scrutiny.
Making provision in the Bill for post-legislative scrutiny would enable all the claims made as to the effects of the Bill to be tested. Including such a provision would also help reassure critics of the Bill that there will be such a review. That may help the process of getting the Bill through.
The Minister may say that the amendment is unnecessary given that the Bill will qualify automatically for review three to five years after enactment. Making a clear commitment at the Dispatch Box, putting on the official record that the Bill will be subject to post-legislative review, is obviously valuable; we got such a commitment on the Employment Rights Bill. However, as I pointed out in debate on that Bill, the wording of my amendment derives from the Government’s own amendment to the then Football Governance Bill. The Government, to their credit, accepted the argument for putting provision for post-legislative scrutiny in that Bill and brought forward their own amendment. The grounds for doing so apply in the case of this Bill.
As I say, it would be welcome to have a commitment at the Dispatch Box that there will be post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, but it will be even better to enshrine it in the Bill. Putting it in the Bill will demonstrate that the Government are confident that they will deliver on what it is intended to deliver. If the Minister resists the amendment, it will be helpful to hear from her how she distinguishes this Bill from the Football Governance Bill in terms of the merits of putting post-legislative scrutiny in the Bill. Does she or does she not accept that good law is a public good? I beg to move.
Lord Wei (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 502YN and 502YR, which stand in my name. These amendments are bound by a common theme: that the powers we create in this Bill must be effective, proportionate and accountable, not only in ordinary times but in moments of crisis, when authoritarian temptations grow stronger.
Amendment 502YN would establish an annual review of all measures introduced by the Bill. Each year, the Secretary of State would be required to test whether those measures are achieving their stated purpose, and whether they are doing so without imposing unnecessary or disproportionate burdens on parents, children, schools, providers, local authorities or the department itself. Where a measure fails, it should be amended or repealed. If no action is taken, within two years it must lapse. This is about accountability cutting both ways. Families, schools and community groups—huge numbers of stakeholders—are being asked in this Bill to account for children’s education. It is only fair that the Government should account for the laws they pass.
We have been warned many times in these debates about the dangers of excessive bureaucracy and mission creep. Clause 31, the proposed register of children not in school, illustrates this risk. In principle, such a register may help identify who is being educated outside mainstream settings. In practice, the Bill demands far more data than is needed. In Portsmouth, more than 70% of home-educated children have already been served notices or orders annually, compared with a national average closer to 1%. That is not proportional oversight; it is overreach.
The effects ripple outward. Children suffer when teachers, social workers and SEND staff are forced to spend more time filling in forms than supporting them, and parents are treated with suspicion, not because of evidence of harm but because they made a lawful choice to educate differently. Schools themselves may be dragged down by compliance checks that drain morale and resources. Providers and tutors may be chilled by one size fits all rules designed for large institutions but applied indiscriminately. Community groups and charities—often the lifeline for struggling families and children—will find scarce volunteer time consumed by licensing and paperwork.
We have seen where such unchecked bureaucracy leads. The contact point database was launched with the best of intentions to safeguard children. It collapsed under its own weight: disproportionate, unworkable and ultimately abandoned. Scotland’s named person scheme likewise promised protection but in practice extended excessive authority and intrusive data collection before being struck down. These are cautionary tales of what happens when there is no obligation to review and no sunset clause to cut away what does not work.
Yet the risks are not only of inefficiency; there is something deeper. Bureaucracy when excessive is not neutral. It becomes a means of control. It erodes freedom, not by open coercion but by endless demands that exhaust and intimidate until families, schools and communities yield.
That is why Amendment 502YR is so important: it recognises that powers created in good faith can one day be misused. It would require that, within six months of Royal Assent, the Secretary of State ensures that a mechanism is ready so that, in any national emergency or period of authoritarian governance, the courts, not Ministers, retain the final authority to uphold the primacy of parental rights in their children’s education.
We cannot ignore the geopolitical context. Across Europe and beyond, we see the rise of extremes on both left and right. Authoritarian Governments rarely declare themselves at the outset; they grow by increments, often beginning with education. They use registers and guidance powers, not to support families but to control them. They impose ideological curricula, marginalise communities of faith and stifle innovation and dissent in the classroom. Disturbingly, elements of this Bill draw inspiration, whether knowingly or not, from an unlikely and troubling source. The original departmental human rights justification cited to justify state intervention in home education here arose from a case in Germany where a home-educating parent was prosecuted under laws dating back to the 1930s. These laws, introduced under Hitler’s regime, continue today to ban home education outright in Germany. It is sobering that our own debates now echo arguments first made to defend a system designed not to protect children but to eliminate educational pluralism—one that our own national wartime Government in the 1940s sought to fight by giving parents the ultimate say over their children’s education.
We must not follow that path. We must not allow powers framed as safeguards to evolve into machinery that stifles freedom. This is not to deny the state its proper role in protecting children. Safeguarding is vital, but safeguarding fails when systems chase compliance instead of risk: when form filling replaces human judgment, when bureaucracy itself becomes the end rather than the means. In such a climate, children most in need are overlooked while families acting responsibly, and schools, are burdened and alienated.
The two amendments before us are modest disciplines against such outcomes. The first creates a feedback loop: Parliament learns from the real-world impact of its laws and corrects course where necessary. The second ensures that, when times grow dark, there is a constitutional anchor, that courts can guard against authoritarian misuse, ensuring that parental primacy in education is never extinguished by bureaucratic or dictatorial creep.
Baroness Smith of Malvern (Lab)
I am more than happy to meet my noble friend and to bring those legal minds with me that I hope will enable him to be reassured. Given that this is the last group that I will be responding to today, I also thank him for what he has said about this Committee stage. It has been lengthy, but usually carried out in a respectful, amicable and constructive way. For that, I particularly thank the opposition Front Benches and, obviously, my excellent Whip and co-responder my noble friend Lady Blake. I agree with my noble friend that I do not think anybody could say that we have not done our jobs as legislators in this place in well and truly giving this a good going over, and I thank all those who have been involved in that.
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, given that, as the Minister said, she is just bringing to a conclusion her 12 days in Committee on the Bill, I was rather hoping that she may be a little demob happy and put aside her brief and accept the amendment.
I naturally welcome the commitment that the Bill will be reviewed within five years. For the reasons I developed, I believe that putting the commitment in the Bill is the preferable option. As I trust was clear from what I said, I do not believe putting such a provision in the Bill should apply to all or even most Bills, but only those that meet the criteria I detailed. Providing for such a scrutiny imposes a valuable discipline in drafting the measure, stimulating Ministers to think about the criteria by which one would know whether an Act had actually achieved what it was intended to achieve. That is not always clear. It would also demonstrate the Government’s confidence in the Bill to achieve its purpose.
The arguments for doing this, as I said, are the same as those accepted by the Government on the Football Governance Act. This is an important issue, not least for the health of the statute book. We rather miss the significance of such provisions, along with commencement orders, by sticking them at the end of Bills. I think we need to look at that again, but that is a matter I will pursue on another day. Given the importance of ensuring good law, I may return to the issue on Report, but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, I rise briefly to thank my noble friend for alluding to the research that he did and for his support on my previous amendment. I will look with great interest at the research to which he refers. He also gives me the opportunity to reflect on the Minister’s reply with regard to research in this area. I perhaps should have pointed out that the Loren Marks research was initially a criticism of a conclusion produced by the American Psychological Association two or three years previously. She wrote that particular paper from a critical point of view on its conclusion that all the research so far pointed to there being no problems with same-sex parenting. That was why she wrote that paper. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the American Psychological Association should come back and be very critical of her research, so I would not take the association’s damning criticism too much to heart. I think that Loren Marks is well worth reading and listening to.
I offer my sincerest congratulations to my noble friend on bringing forward this amendment at this late point in the Bill. From a man of faith representing one of the great religions, it is absolutely right that we should be hearing a very conservative point of view regarding the family. It is very important that there are these strong, conservative voices, deeply steeped in religion, to stand up against us modern people, who are much less rooted in tradition and more flexible. It is very important that people such as him stand up on these occasions and put a strongly conservative point of view, even at this late stage in the Bill. I wish that he had been here when we were discussing the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act and that we had heard his comments then on the removal of the assumption that it is in the best interests of children for fathers to be involved in their lives. Again, I recall the Good Childhood Inquiry report, produced by the Children’s Society and the Church of England a few years ago. It highlighted that, with increased rights and freedom of choice for adults in the 20th century, which so many of us welcome, the downside for children has often been that parents’ greater choice has meant that many more children grow up with their father no longer in their family. I think it is very helpful to have my noble friend’s voice here.
Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for her very kind comments. I had forgotten that she made her maiden speech in my first debate, and I appreciated what she said.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, perhaps I may deal briefly with this in bullet form. The point that has just been made about parenting is totally irrelevant to what this Bill seeks to achieve, and it is certainly irrelevant in terms of the amendment before us, to which the noble Lord, Lord Singh, did not really speak. When he does, I think we would be interested to hear why, under subsection (9), on those who would vote in the referendum, he would exclude Members of your Lordships’ House.
We keep hearing about public opinion as if somehow it is divided—no, it is not. Every poll that has put the question in a neutral way has produced a very clear result. What is remarkable about opinion is not that it is divided but how consistent it has been. As Lewis Baston has written in the latest issue of Total Politics:
“A typical result for a neutrally worded question is support somewhere in the low- to mid-50 per cent range and opposition in the mid-30 per cent range”,
before concluding:
“While there may be some legislative twists and turns in the House of Lords, the battle for public opinion has been won by supporters of SSM”.
With that consistency, there is really no need to consult. The position is quite clear.
In terms of holding a referendum anyway, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, at the end of the previous Parliament the Constitution Committee produced a very thorough report on referendums, weighing the arguments for and against, and concluded that if they were going to be held, they should be not only on constitutional issues but fundamental constitutional issues. Not only is this not really a constitutional issue; it certainly does not qualify as a fundamental constitutional matter.
It is essentially a matter of social policy. Parliament has legislated on significant social policy before. This would be on a par with abortion and divorce, which, as I recall, were not manifesto commitments and not issues on which anybody was really suggesting that there should be referendums. So if we are going to start saying that we should have referendums on social issues, there are wider implications. We would need to consider it very thoroughly before we went down that route. There is absolutely no merit in the amendment before us and I hope that we do not pursue it.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, you have to hand it to the people who do not like this Bill. They really do not like this Bill and they are fighting it right to the very end, and that is what this is about. They are perfectly within their rights to do that, and I particularly enjoyed the heartfelt plea of the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, in this debate.
I am not going to repeat all the arguments that have been made. I simply refer your Lordships to the noble Lords, Lord Fowler, Lord Pannick and Lord Norton, my noble friend Lord Alli and my other noble friends who have spoken in this debate. They are absolutely right.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Martin, that actually the votes were free votes. This was not a question of the Government and the Labour Opposition. They were free votes. There were Members on all sides—
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I have sat here listening to every single speech yesterday and today. I sometimes think we should strike campaign medals.
The objections to the Bill have been on grounds of process—that it was not properly scrutinised in the other place and that it was in no party’s manifesto—and because of what the Bill seeks to achieve. The objections in regard to process can be dealt with briefly as they have been addressed by others. As the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, observed, we have frequently complained that Bills arrive here from the House of Commons not having been properly scrutinised. It is a novel doctrine to say that we should reject them, not least given that our principal purpose—although not our only purpose—is to engage in legislative scrutiny. The point about the Bill not being a manifesto commitment was dealt with most effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. Governments have a permissive mandate, not just a prescriptive one, and to reject this Bill because it was not a manifesto commitment would, again, inject a novel doctrine which would lead us to regularly reject a good number of Bills in each Parliament.
Furthermore, as my noble friend Lady Berridge noted, if we reject the Bill it becomes eligible next Session for passage under the Parliament Act. If the other place insists on the Bill, it can ensure that it is enacted in the form in which it left the Commons the first time—in other words, the Bill as is now before us. This House may delay it, but it would have no effect on the content.
I turn to the arguments that focus on the content of the Bill. Many have justified the Bill on grounds of equality; I approach it from a different perspective. For me it is a question of freedom: freedom for those faiths which wish to conduct same-sex marriages, and freedom for those who wish to marry. Given that there are grounds for taking this as an issue of freedom, there would need to be compelling grounds to deny such freedom. What, then, are the arguments? We have heard that we should not favour a small minority against the wishes of the majority. The problems with this are twofold: one factual and the other a basic issue of principle.
The Ipsos MORI polls from early this century demonstrate a clear shift of opinion in support of same-sex marriage. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, that I prefer survey data as being somewhat more reliable than anecdote and assertion. We should regard the letters we receive as political intelligence, not somehow a reflection of public opinion. As my noble friend Lady Noakes has noted, all recent opinion polls where the question has been a simple, straightforward one of being for or against same-sex marriage have shown majority support. The recent YouGov poll is especially revealing. Not only is same-sex marriage supported, overwhelmingly so by those aged under 40, but also by women, by a margin of about two to one. Opposition appears to come predominantly from older males.
Lord Norton of Louth
I am inclined to say that you know who you are, my Lords.
Furthermore, in the poll the percentage strongly in support of same-sex marriage is notably higher than the percentage strongly opposed. As for those who claim that it will cost my party the next election, the poll shows that of those for whom it will be an important issue at the next election, more said that they would be more likely to vote for a party that supports same-sex marriage than those who said that they would be less likely to do so.
The issue of principle relates to writing off minorities because they are minorities, not least those which may not be popular with some sections of society. Homosexuals have been discriminated against and still are, appallingly so in many countries. To discriminate against a category of persons, to deny them freedoms accorded others because of the characteristics which they have not chosen but which set them apart, is fundamentally objectionable in a democratic society.
We are told that it is not up to Parliament to redefine marriage. This demonstrates ignorance of our constitutional arrangements and of our history. Parliament can redefine marriage and, as we have heard, Parliament has redefined marriage. It has done so frequently since the Marriage Act 1541, as illustrated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Indeed, as we have heard, that is just as well, otherwise we should still be treating marriage as the transfer of the property of the woman from the father to the husband.
What are the grounds for saying that Parliament should not exercise its rights to extend the provision of marriage? It is claimed that permitting same-sex marriage devalues marriage. That is not an argument but rather an assertion of moral superiority. It rests in good measure on a rewriting of history—a point well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and indeed the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross—and on biblical text. The Bible has been used to justify all sorts of discrimination that we now regard as morally abhorrent. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Salisbury has noted, the text of the Bible has not changed, but our understanding has. In every sphere of life we are constantly learning, except, apparently, in this one respect, where we cling to a view held 4,000 years ago.
Much of the debate has been conducted as if we were the first nation contemplating the introduction of same-sex marriage. We can learn from what has happened elsewhere. Most of the nations that permit same-sex marriage are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights. Their churches have not been forced to do anything by the European Court of Human Rights that they do not wish to do. We have heard assertions in this debate that the introduction of same-sex marriage has led to a decline in heterosexual marriage. I have the figures here, which are readily available in the briefing paper produced by the House of Commons Library. Some countries have seen a decline in traditional marriage, notably Portugal and Spain, but in Portugal that was happening before the introduction of same-sex marriage. In Belgium the figures for traditional marriages went up, not down. A study of the Netherlands found that trends in marriage and divorce did not change. In nations where it has been introduced, support for same-sex marriage has increased, and none of the dire consequences predicted as a result of the passage of this Bill appear to have been experienced. Of course, if anyone can show otherwise, they can bring it up in Committee.
The noble Lord, Lord Brennan, said, “What next?” Well, nothing, unless we will it. Things will not happen unless Parliament decides that something should happen. That is a key point. Nothing is suddenly going to translate from this action unless Parliament wants any further action to be taken. It is in our gift.
I end with the words of Paul Parker of the Quakers in Britain:
“For us marriage is not a mere civil contract, but a religious act. While we don’t seek to impose this on anyone, for us this is an issue of religious freedom”.
The principled case for supporting the Bill is, to my mind, compelling.