Deaths in Police Custody

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the House of Commons. I agree with the Statement’s acknowledgement of the tremendous efforts of our police forces and officers.

The independent review by Dame Elish Angiolini QC into deaths and serious incidents in police custody was commissioned by the then Home Secretary in July 2015 to alleviate the pain and suffering of families still looking for answers. We thank Dame Elish for her comprehensive report and all those who contributed to it. However, will the Minister say when that report was received by the Home Secretary, as there appears to have been a lengthy delay between the report being received and the independent report being placed in the public arena—a delay which does not seem entirely consistent with the objective of alleviating the pain and suffering of families still looking for answers? What parts of the report, bearing in mind the delay, would have caused the Government a problem if the report had been placed in the public arena much earlier? Remarkably, after all the delay, the Government still do not intend to give their response to the recommendations, including the ones on healthcare in police custody, inquests and support for families. I hope the words “kicking” and “long grass” do not prove to be all too accurate.

The report is critical of the current processes, protocols and procedures for investigating deaths in police custody and of the role and approach of the agencies and organisations involved. It makes a considerable number of recommendations for speeding up the process of investigating deaths in police custody, including following contact with the police, in the light of the lengthy delays that currently occur, in contrast to the urgency, haste and mindset that is normally associated with potential and actual murder investigations. The delay in the current process leads to frustration, anger and suspicion that justice is not being done, and does not exactly enhance confidence and trust in the police, particularly among and within the families and communities most directly affected. The campaigning group Inquest has, I believe, said that more than 1,000 people have died in police custody or following contact with the police since 1990. No police officer apparently has been convicted in a criminal court in connection with any of those deaths.

The report makes a number of recommendations. For example, it states:

“For the state to fulfil its legal obligations of allowing effective participation of families in the process that is meaningful and not ‘empty and rhetorical’ there should be access for the immediate family to free, non-means tested legal advice, assistance and representation immediately following the death and throughout the Inquest hearing”.


I would have to say that, from the Statement, the Government appear to be a little lukewarm on implementing this recommendation in full. The Statement says, for example, that legal aid may be necessary in some circumstances. There is reference later on to “considering” the issue of publicly funded legal advice and representation at inquests.

The recommendations also include the comment that NHS commissioning of healthcare in police custody was due to have commenced in April 2016 but was halted by the Government earlier in the year. This report strongly recommends that this policy is reinstated and implemented. Perhaps the Minister can say why the commissioning of healthcare in police custody was halted by the Government, particularly since the report seems to have commented somewhat adversely on it.

The report also addresses the extent to which police use of restraints against detainees was identified as a cause of death by post-mortem reports in 10% of deaths in police custody between 2004-05 and 2014-15. It also says that a significant proportion of deaths involved people with mental health needs, and the report makes specific recommendations providing for change in how such people are treated, as indeed it does for those who have issues with drugs and/or alcohol. Drugs and/or alcohol featured as causes in around half of deaths, and an even higher proportion of those who died had an association with drugs or alcohol—namely, 82%.

The Statement indicates exactly what actions the Home Secretary now intends to take—and, I would have to say, not take—in the light of the report’s recommendations. By when do the Government expect to see a considerable improvement in the practices, procedures and mindsets identified in the independent review as contributing to and exacerbating the impact of the current delays in investigations into deaths in police custody? Against what criteria will the Government assess the effectiveness or otherwise of the actions that they are announcing today in light of the review? What are the specific goals that the Government expect their actions announced today to deliver? Who will be responsible for ensuring that those goals are delivered? What, if any, additional resources will be made available to implement even the actions announced today in the Statement, let alone if we implemented all the recommendations set out in the report?

In the light of the recommendation in the report, can the Government say any more—since I have questioned them—about the arrangements that will be introduced to make sure that there is proper legal representation for the families of those who have died in police custody at coroners’ court inquest hearings? Surely, the Government can be a bit more specific than they have been, because this report was submitted many months ago. Indeed, that applies to most of the recommendations in the report, bearing in mind that they have said that they do not intend to give a detailed response to all the recommendations today—and, indeed, they have not.

The report states that its recommendations are necessary to minimise as far as possible the risk of deaths and serious incidents in police custody occurring in future and to ensure that, when they do, procedures are in place that are efficient, effective, humane and command public confidence. It is now principally, although I accept not solely, up to the Government to make sure that those objectives are achieved within the shortest possible timescale. So far, the Government will appear to many to have dragged and still be dragging their feet. To allay those fears, will the Government report back to this House within no more than six months on the progress being made on the implementation of the recommendations in this comprehensive and valuable independent report?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and express our sympathy to all those who have lost loved ones as a result of deaths in police custody. I declare an interest in that, when I was borough commander in Lambeth in south London, there were a number of deaths in custody. It is important to express that to the House, because the impact that it can have on the officers involved is also something that needs to be taken into account—particularly those officers who have acted in good faith and have done nothing wrong.

There are 120 recommendations, and it would be impossible to cover the whole ground, but there are a couple of issues that I want to highlight. The Minister has said, and the report talks about the fact that inquests are intended to be inquisitorial and should not be adversarial. When I represented the family of somebody whose son died as a result of a police action, it was the most adversarial court appearance that I have ever appeared in, bearing in mind that the overall majority of my experience had been in adversarial criminal courts. Surely, in those circumstances, and unless and until that situation is changed, families of those who have lost loved ones at the hands of the police should receive equality of arms in terms of legal representation with the police as recommended in this review—no ifs, no buts and no conditions.

On another issue, 15 or more years ago I was the Association of Chief Police Officers lead on mental health issues in policing. Following a number of deaths in police custody, training was introduced on the safe restraint of those suffering from mental illness. That was 15 years ago. Why does this report say that:

“National policing policy, practice and training must reflect the now widely evident position that the use of force and restraint against anyone in mental health crisis … poses a life threatening risk”?


This has been evident for decades, yet people are still dying in those circumstances at the hands of the police. What are the Government going to do differently this time to make a real difference?

[Noble Lords]

My Lords—

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2017

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Since I, too, was caught out by the earlier than anticipated start of this debate, I can thank the Minister for only that part of her explanation of the reasons for and purpose of the draft order that I actually heard. The purpose of the draft order, as has been said, is to make it an offence to possess, import, export, produce, supply or offer to supply the drug methiopropamine, or MPA, without a Home Office licence. MPA is a stimulant, psychoactive substance that has been subject to temporary control orders, the latest of which is about to expire—at the end of next month, if memory serves me right. There is evidence of MPA having adverse effects when taken, including abnormally fast heart rate, anxiety, nausea and breathing difficulties. I have to say that my list is more abbreviated than that given by the Minister when she introduced the order.

MPA has been associated with a number of deaths in the last five years and, as the Minister said, there were 46 cases where MPA was found in post-mortem toxicology, with MPA being implicated in the actual cause of death in 33 of those cases between 2012 and 2017.

MPA has not infrequently been marketed as a legal alternative to cocaine. In June of this year the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, the ACMD, indicated that MPA continued to be misused and, as a result, was having harmful effects that could constitute a social problem. The ACMD recommended that MPA should now be permanently controlled as a class B drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971—which means, as I understand it, that among other things, including higher maximum sentences, possession of MPA also becomes an offence, which is not the case for substances controlled under the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016.

The ACMD also found that MPA had no recognised medicinal use, or industrial or commercial benefits other than potentially for research. I simply conclude by saying that we support the decision to accept the ACMD’s recommendation, and hence we support this order.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Newby made the point last week, when the Leader of the House asked for this House to suspend its Standing Orders in order to consider this matter today, that this legislation has not been scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments because of the Government’s failure to appoint their Commons members of that committee. This is clearly unacceptable and must be resolved as soon as possible.

In this particular case, the order is the result of a recommendation, as we have heard, by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs to permanently classify the drug MPA as a class B drug. I am therefore confident in supporting this order as the recommendations of the ACMD are evidence based.

However, the comments of the parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office to the first Delegated Legislation Committee in the other place yesterday, which presumably were a repetition of what the Minister said this evening to the House—again, I apologise for being slightly caught out by the early start of this particular debate—draw questions around bigger issues about the Government’s approach to controlling drug misuse.

MPA is a synthetic drug designed to replicate the effects of cocaine or MDMA. MPA started off life as a legal replacement for these class A controlled drugs. Prior to the Psychoactive Substances Act and the temporary class drug order, MPA would have been legal to both supply and possess. As we have heard, the Psychoactive Substances Act permanently made manufacture and supply of the drug illegal, but not possession, while the TCDO and this measure make possession as well as manufacture and supply illegal. Whether it sends a message to users about how dangerous the drug is is questionable.

The development of synthetic alternatives to existing controlled drugs—and in this case I am thinking in particular of things such as spice, the synthetic alternative to cannabis—runs the risk of creating even more toxic, and far more dangerous, drugs than the drugs they are designed to replace. The risk of continuing with a prohibition-based strategy of controlling the misuse of drugs is likely to increase the number of drug-related deaths.

Can the Minister tell the House, or write to me subsequently to tell me, how many deaths have resulted from the misuse of cocaine and MDMA between 2012 and 2017, compared with the 46 cases where post-mortem toxicology showed traces of MPA, and the 33 cases where MPA was implicated in the actual cause of death, as a proportion of arrests for possession of each type of drug—which we can assume is a proxy for how much cocaine, MDMA and MPA is being used? Can the Minister also tell the House how many deaths have resulted from the misuse of cannabis between 2012 and 2017?

If MPA is as dangerous, or more dangerous, than cocaine or MDMA, the question must be: why is it being classified as a class B drug while the others are classified as class A drugs? If MPA is, as I suspect, more dangerous than cannabis, at least in terms of fatalities, why is it in the same class of drugs as cannabis? Assuming, as I do, that the ACMD has made the right evidence-based decision in terms of its recommendations as to which class MPA should be placed in, what does this say about the classification of cocaine, MDMA and cannabis?

The point I am trying to make is that the current classification of drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act lacks credibility, certainly with users. No one I know who misuses drugs starts from a point of asking, “What class is it in?” when deciding which drug to take.

We should be taking a harm reduction-based approach to the misuse of drugs, which should be treated as a health issue and not a criminal justice issue. That having been said, just because the classification of drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act lacks credibility and other drugs may be wrongly classified, this does not mean that this evidence-based recommendation from the ACMD is wrong. On that basis, we support the order.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made reference to the unusual circumstances in which this order comes to the House this evening. It has not been scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments because that committee has not been re-established because of the failure of the other place to provide its members to the committee. I was a member of the Joint Committee in the last Parliament, and I am looking forward to resuming work, I hope, at an early point in this Parliament.

The committee receives advice from a formidable array of legal experts. They invariably find points that need correction—sometimes smaller, sometimes larger. I have just one question for my noble friend. In the absence of the committee, is she satisfied that this order has been subjected to sufficiently rigorous scrutiny by legal experts?

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 10th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting, and for me at times a rather confusing, debate on the issues associated with the Bill. The Bill is complex, but I understand that it is necessarily complex. For example, under European law it is not allowed to reproduce the GDPR in domestic legislation. The incorporation of the GDPR into British law is happening under the repeal Bill, not under this legislation. Therefore, the elephant and the prints are in the other place rather than here.

We on these Benches welcome the Bill. It provides the technical underpinnings that will allow the GDPR to operate in the UK both before and after Brexit, together with the permitted derogations from the GDPR available to all EU member states. For that reason it is an enabling piece of legislation, together with the GDPR, which is absolutely necessary to allow the UK to continue to exchange data, whether it is done by businesses for commercial purposes or by law enforcement or for other reasons, once we are considered to be a third-party nation rather than a member of the European Union.

We also welcome the extension of the effect of the GDPR—the rules and regulations that the GDPR provides—to other areas that are currently covered by the Data Protection Act 1998 but which are outside the scope of the GDPR, thus, as far as I understand it, providing a consistent approach to data protection across the piece. This leaves law enforcement and national security issues outside of the scope of GDPR and the “applied GDPR”, which are covered in Parts 3 and 4.

The enforcement regime, the Information Commissioner, is covered in Part 5, because we will repeal the Data Protection Act 1998 and so we need to restate the role of the Information Commissioner as the person who will enforce, and we will need to explore concerns that we have in each part of the Bill as we go through Committee. However, generally speaking, we welcome the Bill and its provisions.

Of course, what the Government, very sensibly, are trying to do but do not want to admit, is to ensure that the UK complies with EU laws and regulations—in this case in relation to data protection—so that it can continue to exchange data with the EU both before and after Brexit. All this government hype about no longer being subject to EU law after Brexit is merely the difference between having to be subject to EU law because we are a member of the EU and having to be subject to EU law because, if we do not, we will not be able to trade freely with the EU or exchange crime prevention and detection intelligence, and counterterrorism intelligence, with the EU. That is the only difference.

For most aspects of data exchange, compliance with the GDPR is required. The GDPR is directly applicable, so it cannot simply be transposed into this Bill. Coupled with the derogations and applying the GDPR to other aspects of data processing not covered by the GDPR makes this part of the Bill complex—and, as I suggest, probably necessarily so.

For law enforcement purposes, data exchange is covered by an EU law enforcement directive, which can be, and has been, transposed to form Part 3 of the Bill as far as I understand it. A data protection regime for the processing of personal data by the intelligence services—in the case of the UK, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ —is covered by Council of Europe Convention 108. Part 4 of the Bill is based on a modernised draft of Convention 108, which has yet to be formally agreed, but this puts the UK in effect slightly ahead of the curve on that aspect of regulation.

Clearly, we need to probe and test the derogations allowed under the GDPR that are proposed in the Bill, particularly when hearing about the potential consequences, as outlined by, for example, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. We also need to examine whether applying GDPR rules and regulations to other areas of data processing provides equivalent or enhanced safeguards compared with those provided by the Data Protection Act, and we need to ensure that the safeguards provided by the law enforcement directive and Council of Europe Convention 108 are provided by the Bill.

As regards our specific concerns, as my noble friend Lord McNally mentioned in his opening remarks and as reinforced by my noble friend Lady Ludford, if the Bill results in a refusal to allow not-for-profit bodies to exercise Articles 77 to 79 to pursue data protection infringements on their own accord, we will have to challenge that, but perhaps the Minister can clarify whether that is the case.

As my noble friend Lady Ludford also mentioned, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, various provisions to allow Ministers to alter the application of the GDPR by regulation is something that we need much further scrutiny of, albeit that Ministers’ hands are likely to be tied by the requirement to comply with changing EU law after Brexit—de facto even if not de jure. Could it be—perhaps the Minister can help us here—that the purpose of these powers, put into secondary legislation, is to enable the UK to keep pace with changes in EU law after Brexit?

Although we welcome the ability of individuals to challenge important wholly automated decisions, requiring human intervention at the request of the data subject, research shows that the application of algorithms and artificial intelligence, even in machine learning of language, can result in unfair discrimination. Even when human decision-making is informed by automated processes, safeguards still need to be in place to ensure fairness, such as transparency around what the automated processes involve. While decisions around personal finance, such as credit scoring and the assessment of insurance risk, are important, in the United States the application of algorithms in the criminal justice arena has resulted in unfair discrimination that has even more serious consequences for individuals. Even if such automated processes are yet to apply to the UK criminal justice system, the Bill must safeguard against future developments that may have unintended negative consequences.

As other noble Lords have said, we have concerns about the creation of a criminal offence of re-identification of individuals. As the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom, said, criminalising re-identification could allow businesses to relax the methods that they use to try to anonymise data on the basis that people will not try to re-identify individuals because it is a criminal offence.

Despite what is contained in this Bill, we have serious concerns that there are likely to be delays to being granted data adequacy status by the European Commission when we leave the EU. That means that there would not be a seamless continuation of data exchange with the EU 27 after Brexit. We also have serious concerns, as does the Information Commissioner, that there are likely to be objections to being granted data adequacy status because of the bulk collection of data allowed for under the Investigatory Powers Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, said in his opening remarks. We also intend to revisit the issue of the requirement under international human rights law, and upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 2007, that as soon as notification can be made without prejudicing the purpose of surveillance after its termination, information should be provided to the persons concerned.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, mentioned, it is essential that the Information Commissioner is provided with adequate resources. My understanding is that there has been a considerable loss of staff in recent times, not least because commercial organisations want to recruit knowledgeable staff to help them with the implementation of GDPR, plus the 1% cap on public sector pay has diminished the number of people working for the Information Commissioner. It is absolutely essential that she has the resources she needs, bearing in mind the additional responsibilities that will be placed upon her.

The age of consent will clearly be an interesting topic for discussion. What we are talking about here is at what age young people should be allowed to sign up to Facebook or other social media. Most of us would acknowledge that children have a greater knowledge and are more computer literate than their parents and grandparents. As one of the surveys mentioned this evening showed, it would be very easy for young people to circumvent rules around the age of consent as set in legislation. For example, any teenager would know how to make the internet believe that they were in the United States when they were physically in the United Kingdom, and therefore they would have to comply only with any age of consent set in America. While I understand the burning desire for people to protect children and ensure that they are not exploited through social media, one has to live in the real world and look for solutions that are actually going to work: for example, educating young people on how to avoid being groomed online and the dangers of social media, and informing parents about how they can keep an eye on their children’s activities, rather than trying to set an unrealistic target for the age at which someone could sign up.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, talked about the data privately stored on iPhones, which was informative. Last week, I was rather shocked when, in California, I went to a gym that was rather busy. I looked on Google Maps, which very helpfully informed me when the busiest times were in that particular gym on that particular day. I found that very useful, but I found it very frightening that it also told me that I had been at that gym three hours before.

Child Sexual Abuse

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 13th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend makes the crucial point that where people are falsely accused and have their names in the media, their lives can literally be ruined. Noble Lords may have seen things in the paper over the weekend. The College of Policing guidance provides that, where an investigation identifies a false allegation, it may be appropriate to support a prosecution for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Steps should be taken to test the validity of statements and corroborative accounts and to establish an accurate picture. The decision to support a prosecution would be an operational matter for the relevant chief officer.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Sir Richard Henriques did an independent review of the Metropolitan Police’s conduct in these matters. His conclusion was that:

“Until anonymity is enforced by statute, it is inevitable that many accused will lose their anonymity at an early stage of an investigation”.


Why will the Government not legislate?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, we touched on that extensively on the then Policing and Crime Bill; the noble Lord was part of that debate. The police’s decision on whether to name a suspect is a matter for the chief officer, who must authorise any such disclosure. Following some of the debate, and ongoing with the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice guidance on relationships with the media, the College of Policing recently undertook a consultation on a fresh iteration of the guidance. That guidance is clear that the rationale for naming an arrested person before they are charged must be authorised by the chief officer, and that the authorising officer must also consult the Crown Prosecution Service if considering the release of a name.

Prevent Strategy

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 6th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is extremely unhelpful and can be divisive when such stories hit the media. With regard to how that might fit into Prevent, the Prevent programme is fundamentally about supporting vulnerable individuals and safeguarding them from being drawn into terrorism. It is safeguarding in a similar way to how we would safeguard people from drug abuse or physical and sexual abuse. I will not comment on individual cases, but that would be the clear distinction between the two.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, can the Minister remind the House why the Government refuse to allow an independent review of Prevent, as recommended by the former reviewer of terrorism legislation, and why they refuse to publish their own review? At the moment, we have criticism of Prevent which the Government say is without foundation, but that assertion is in itself without foundation.

Security in the UK

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Monday 10th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I will concentrate on the issue of terrorism. I guess that if we had not had the attacks in Westminster, Manchester, on London Bridge and in Finsbury Park, we would not be having this debate today. I also want to acknowledge the significant experience among noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, who is a police and crime commissioner, has perhaps the most up-to-date experience. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is a former director-general of the security services, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is not just the former chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority but the author of a recent report on London’s preparedness for a terrorist attack. I noticed some non-verbal reactions to what the noble Lord was saying. However, the fact is that among his 127 recommendations were that the authorities should consider barriers to protect pedestrians from the sort of attacks we saw in Nice and Berlin—a recommendation that was made prior to the London Bridge and Westminster attacks.

However, on a positive note, the noble Lord will be pleased to see that at the Pride in London event on Saturday, significant changes had been made to ensure the safety and security of those who participated, including—I noticed in particular—police vehicles parked across all the side-roads leading to the event to prevent a vehicle attack. So, some of the lessons from that report have clearly been learned.

The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, with his experience in Northern Ireland, is of course a former chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee; the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, is a former chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee; and the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, is another member of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

With regard to my own experience, I was the police spokesman in press conferences following the 7 July bombings in 2005, and I was the Metropolitan Police’s community relations lead after the failed attacks on 21 July 2005. I visited the officers at different police stations around London who were involved in the body recovery of the victims of the 7/7 bombings, and, with other noble Lords who have spoken today, I was in the Palace of Westminster when Keith Palmer was murdered and others lost their lives. I have been talking to the officers around the estate every day since to ensure that the response from the authorities has been appropriate. I was at home, 10 minutes’ walk away from Borough Market, when the attack happened there. So I have professional experience of and personal involvement in these issues. However, I do not have any inside knowledge, nor have I had any briefings from the police or the security services on the most recent attacks.

This is a debate, and on some points I have to acknowledge that what I will say is no more than an educated guess, albeit one informed by experience, research and analysis. I would welcome a challenge from the Minister in her response should she not agree with anything I am about to say.

Many noble Lords have given their assessment of the security situation. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, most powerfully described the contrast between the situation now and the challenges she faced 10 years ago. Eighty plots have been disrupted in the last four years, and there are 3,000 subjects of interest and 500 active investigations. The key here is of course to try to differentiate between people who espouse extremism and those who are prepared to carry that through with a violent attack. My noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem talked about the attack on Lee Rigby and the fact that a Facebook entry was found subsequently in which the attacker said that he wanted to kill a soldier. The fact is that there are probably hundreds, if not thousands, of similar threats in posts made by people who had no intention of carrying out, or the ability to carry out, such an attack, but how do you differentiate between the different apparent warning signs?

The most important message that I want to deliver today is that we need a mature and considered response to what we have experienced. Although the situations may be different, we may be able to take some comfort from what has happened in the past. I have already referred to 7 July 2005, when four suicide bombers set out to detonate their devices on four Underground trains. One appeared to lose his nerve and ended up on a bus rather than an Underground train, and then detonated his device. Fifty-two innocent people lost their lives.

Two weeks later, a copycat group of would-be bombers tried to repeat what happened on 7 July. Even though it was apparently not in the original plan to explode a bomb on a bus, they tried to detonate three devices on the Underground and one on a bus. Thankfully, all failed to explode. Those responsible were quickly tracked down, prosecuted and convicted, including one who was returned to the UK very swiftly as a result of the European arrest warrant. There were no further attacks of that nature. Even though at the time it looked as though there would be a series of such attacks, in reality they never materialised.

On 22 March this year, Khalid Masood drove a car along the pavement on Westminster Bridge, killing four pedestrians, and then abandoned the car and fatally stabbed PC Keith Palmer. My personal view is that, if the fixed-point armed officers who had been in place until recently had been in place immediately behind the unarmed officers at the entrance to the Palace, that attacker could have been stopped even sooner and potentially Keith Palmer’s life could have been saved. Unfortunately, that fixed post of two armed officers standing immediately behind the unarmed officers was replaced by a patrol. The patrol, understandably, went to see what had happened on the bridge because they heard screaming and the sound of the car crashing, leaving those unarmed officers exposed.

On 3 June, three attackers drove a van along the pavement of London Bridge and then abandoned the van and fatally stabbed people in Borough Market. Eight innocent people lost their lives. It appeared to me to be a copycat attack of the 22 March incident.

In April 1999, David Copeland, a right-wing extremist, waged a 13-day terror campaign against minorities in Brixton, Brick Lane and Soho. He exploded three sophisticated nail bombs, killing three and injuring 162. He made the bombs himself. He was diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia but was none the less convicted of murder.

On 22 May this year, Salman Ramadan Abedi exploded a bomb packed with nuts and bolts in Manchester, killing 22 innocent people and injuring hundreds more. He made the bomb himself. We do not know what his mental state was at the time but it appears to have been an attack similar to that carried out by Copeland.

The point I am trying to make is that we may not be living in unprecedented times as far as successful terrorist attacks are concerned, but the picture painted by open-source material of the activity of people suspected of terrorism, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, set out, clearly shows that an unprecedented number of plots have been thwarted. Nor must we forget the attack on Jo Cox and on the Finsbury Park mosque—both, again, apparently from the right.

I am afraid that I cannot move on without taking issue with the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater—it has become a bit of a tradition between the two of us. If I recorded correctly what he said, he described Daesh or ISIS as a “religious sect” and he talked about “Islamic extremism”. My belief is that Islamism, as opposed to Islam, is a violent political ideology that looks to overthrow democracy and liberal values using a corruption of Islam as an excuse. As the noble Lord, Lord Desai, said—I see he has returned to the Chamber right on cue—it is probably more to do with politics and history than religion. It is a political ideology, not a religion or a religious sect, and I believe that “Islamic terrorism” is a contradiction in terms. I said that in a press conference following the 7 July 2005 bombings, and I stand by what I said.

What should the Government’s response be? The noble Baroness, Lady Vere of Norbiton, talked about reviewing the counterterrorism strategy and the length of sentences for terrorism offences. However, as the noble Lord, Lord King, pointed out, the nature of terrorism has changed, certainly since the time of Irish republican terrorism—we did not have suicide bombers in those days. One has to ask: how many suicide bombers would be deterred by longer prison sentences for terrorist offences?

I also take issue with what the noble Baroness said about bilateral agreements with European partners. I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, will correct me, but counterterrorism intelligence exchange tends to be on a bilateral basis, whether it is with the “Five Eyes” countries or individual European countries. However, when it comes to law enforcement and prosecuting people for terrorism offences, the structures tend to be EU-wide: Eurojust, the European arrest warrant and the European Court of Justice all play a central role in bringing people to justice. Those are two separate issues. In exiting the EU we will have a real problem in the prosecution of people, even if we do not have as much of a problem on intelligence exchange, as the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, pointed out.

Of course people expect the Government to respond to such outrages, and it is important that the Government review their strategy and tactics and the emergency response to such events. However, this needs to be done carefully and in a considered way. We need to look at the nature of the threat. As I have just said, it is not like Irish republican terrorism, which used to be based on a formal, hierarchical organisation that could be infiltrated, planning logistically sophisticated attacks. Islamism is a violent political ideology that wants to overthrow democracy and liberal values, and is perhaps more akin to the Red Army Faction, conducting guerrilla tactics against society.

Rather than a conventional organisation, ISIS is more a political idea that inspires people. There are two types of extremists: the first, intellectuals who have a corrupt and distorted view of Islam, which drives them to recruit the second, the foot soldiers. These are usually vulnerable, impressionable young men with a criminal past, who are encouraged to continue their previous criminal and violent behaviour in the name of Islamism. I draw the probably imperfect parallel between sophisticated, organised drug dealers who import and distribute illegal drugs but never leave their fingerprints on the packages, and the street dealers—petty criminals who are seen as disposable and easy to replace if they get arrested, leaving the masterminds unaffected.

Many suicide attackers are people who can get together on one day and carry out an attack the next. Even more sophisticated attacks can involve only person, and so communications between people are not necessarily helpful. What was helpful in every one of these attacks were changes in behaviour of those involved, as noticed by friends, relatives and neighbours. We heard that in the London Bridge attack, where a neighbour who was interviewed said that they were suspicious of the way that one of the people involved was behaving on the day of the attack by asking about how to hire a van and so forth. That is why many noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Bach, Lord Trefgarne and Lord Judd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, all mentioned the importance of community policing. If we are to encourage people from communities to come forward with information about changes in behaviour in those to whom they are close, those communities must have trust and confidence in the authorities. They have concerns about passing information to the security services because they do not know what the security services will do with it. A familiar and trusted face in the community to act as a conduit and provide reassurance is what community policing provides. That is why in our manifesto we had £300 million extra a year that could have been used to recruit an additional 8,000 community officers.

I have mentioned to the Minister before the fact that since 2010 we have lost almost 20,000 police officers and 24,000 support staff. When I mentioned that in an Oral Question, the Minister said that she did not recognise the figures. I hope that she can now say whether mine are correct. If not, perhaps she could write to me with the real figures as far as the fall in policing resources is concerned. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has said, some cuts were clearly necessary. All public services had to tighten their belts to try to balance the books. But these cuts have now gone too far. It is not just cuts to community policing, but resilience in the face of terrorist attacks and the increased security that is required. We now have officers outside here whose days off are being cancelled—they are only getting one day off a week instead of two. They are working 12-hour shifts and becoming exhausted because there is not the capacity and resilience to be able to respond in these sorts of emergency situations.

As far as the internet is concerned, the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, talked about the German approach of fining social media companies if they fail to act in taking down terrorist material. We know from our exploration of the issues around imposing age verification on adult websites that fining overseas-based tech companies is impractical. The only way that it can be done is to ask UK-based internet service providers to block websites that fail to comply with age verification, but that would not be a proportionate response to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and similar internet giants. We need international co-operation, particularly with the United States. An initiative started by Nick Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister to appoint the Prime Minister’s special envoy on intelligence and law enforcement data sharing, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, is an example of the sort of international co-operation required. The new Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Max Hill QC, said that the suggestion of punishing technology companies such as Facebook and Google for not acting on unacceptable content was not the best course of action because they needed to be “brought firmly onside”. Pushing material on to the dark web where counternarratives cannot be set alongside the violent political ideology of Islamism is not the way to go. We are very fortunate to have the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, in the House. We should listen very carefully to what she says from her position of expert knowledge.

Weakening encryption makes us all, including the Government and business, open to exploitation by criminals and hostile foreign Governments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, said. Even end-to-end encryption does not prevent the tracking of useful metadata: who is communicating with whom, even if the content is not readily accessible? Equipment interference, where individuals who are suspected of serious crime or terrorism are known, provides a solution to accessing the content of end-to-end encrypted messages.

What about the question of more legislation? In the light of the spate of recent attacks, it is understandable that we should review the current situation in terms of practices and legislation. We have set out our position in a policy paper entitled Safe and Free which was approved at the party conference last autumn. It states that we believe that there is no need to change our position in the light of the recent attacks. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 goes too far in terms of some blanket surveillance, and we are not alone in saying that. The pressure group Liberty has been given permission by the High Court to challenge the legality of some of the measures in the Act.

On the question of more legislation, Max Hill QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, told the BBC less than a month ago:

“It’s perfectly natural that we should all feel that we must do more, we must do something to combat what we are facing. My view coming into the scrutiny which we are told the prime minister wants to conduct is that we do have the appropriate laws in place, and that essentially the police and security services, and those whose job it is to keep us safe, do have the powers at their disposal.”


We have no objection to the complete surveillance of suspects where there is reasonable cause to suspect that they are involved in terrorism. What we object to is the storing of vast amounts of data on every member of the UK population on databases vulnerable to being accessed by criminals and hostile foreign powers, just in case less than 1% of those records comes in handy in future prosecutions. The security services have consistently maintained, as they did when the former Labour Government tried to introduce 90 days’ detention of terrorist suspects without charge, that the internet connection records of every UK citizen are not necessary for them to keep us safe.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, talked about the Prevent strategy and the definition of extremism. The definition as set out in the Government’s counterterrorism strategy is too broad. By their definition the DUP would be included, so clearly something somewhere is not right. There are serious concerns about the Government’s Prevent programme. Indeed, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation shares our views on it. He wrote in the Evening Standard that many in the Muslim community felt unjustifiably targeted by Prevent and asked, if there is evidence that their concerns are not justified, why the Government will not produce it; they refuse to publish the results of their own internal review and refuse to allow an independent review of Prevent. He goes on:

“Prevent is controversial, to the point where reputable community organisations refuse to engage with it … Significant reform is required”.


We agree.

We need a mature and proportionate response to the threat we face. We have the best police and security services in the world, which are doing everything they possibly can to keep us safe. The recent spate of terrorist outrages are not a sign of failure; the many more plots that have been thwarted in recent years are a sign of success. The police and the security services deserve our respect, our admiration and our wholehearted support, but they can succeed only with the help and support of all communities in the UK. To do that, our laws and the way we use them must win their trust and confidence.

Immigration Centre Detainees: Pay

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 4th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is important to recognise that the work undertaken is entirely voluntary. It is not to supplement the work of the contractors. Contractually, the IRC providers must make a minimum number of opportunities available for detainees to participate voluntarily in this paid activity. As I explained to the noble Baroness, detainees’ position regarding pay rights is not the same as for those who are not in detention.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I can give the Minister another opportunity to answer the Labour Front Bench question. Can she confirm that most of the immigration centres are run by private companies, in which case, what happens to the additional profit that these companies make from employing inmates at £1 an hour instead of employing someone on at least the minimum wage to do the same tasks?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I have to repeat myself: people are not compelled to work; it is entirely voluntary. The money that they are paid is not in line with rates of pay for the non-detention population and therefore is entirely different. The work is not there to prop up these private companies’ profits, but they are obliged to make these opportunities available should detainees wish to avail themselves of them.

Police: Senior Posts

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 29th June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, this country has seen some unprecedented events during the past three months in terms of the terrorist attacks and the terrible incident at Grenfell Tower. The police and emergency services not only have stepped up to the plate but have been under a lot of pressure in that time, both mental and physical. In the light of the recent attacks, we are engaging with the police about the demands that they face, to ensure that they continue to have the resources that they need to keep us safe.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I do not believe that the Minister answered the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, so perhaps I may rephrase it. If the Government are not considering appointing admirals of the fleet who have never commanded a warship or field marshals who have never led troops into battle, why are they considering appointing chief constables who have no experience of policing?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the direct entry scheme would not apply to chief constables or the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police; the senior officer roles I talked about do not include them under current legislation. I hope that that helps to answer the noble Lord’s question. I will address one aspect of the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that we talked about in our meeting, which was the pipeline of suitable people coming through. Recruitment is now under way for the 2017 cohort of the direct entrant inspectors and superintendents, with demand considerably increased compared to 2016. This direct entry scheme will see the recruitment of 19 superintendents across the nine forces as well as 56 inspectors, bringing people with fresh ideas and experience, but that does not deny the need for those skills which will have to be brought to the force, or the need for these people to complete the PNAC and the SCC.

Terrorist and Extremist Propaganda: Online Sources

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 28th June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord, as always, makes insightful points. Of course there is a big difference between religion and culture and it is often in the attempt to conflate the two that we come up against such horrible types of terrorist activity. The Prime Minister said the other day that we must be prepared to have difficult conversations and I totally agree. Just because conversations are difficult does not mean that we should not have them, and they may lead to a much smoother way forward.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Government realise that the only effective sanction against overseas pornographic websites that refuse to implement age verification is to ask UK internet service providers to block those sites. Bearing it in mind that it would be disproportionate to block sites such as Facebook and YouTube, how do the Government intend to deal with terrorist and extremist propaganda if technology companies do not do enough?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. I pay tribute to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, who has spent an extensive amount of time over the past few weeks and months talking to communications service providers. Only on Monday, Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft and YouTube announced the formation of a global internet forum, primarily to counter terrorism but also, through that collaborative way forward, to tackle some of the things that the noble Lord mentioned, such as extreme pornography.

Terrorist Attacks

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Thursday 22nd June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made by the Home Secretary in the other place earlier today. I first pay tribute to the emergency services, the police, the fire brigade, the ambulance service, the doctors, nurses and other staff in our NHS and the other security services which responded with courage, bravery and dedication to duty to preserve life and protect the public. We owe these heroes a great debt of gratitude, and we must never forget that.

I also send my thoughts and prayers and those of the whole House to the victims of these disgusting terrorist atrocities and to their families and friends. Since the Dissolution of the previous Parliament there have been atrocities in the Manchester Arena, at London Bridge and Borough Market and at Finsbury Park mosque. I support the police and the security services in investigating these matters fully and bringing the perpetrators to justice. I was pleased to see the bravery of PC Keith Palmer, who gave his life protecting us in this palace, recognised with a posthumous George Medal and that pensioner Bernard Kenny, who was stabbed trying to help Jo Cox MP when she was murdered in her constituency last June, also received the George Medal in the Queen’s Birthday Honours List announced on Saturday. There were countless other acts of bravery from the police, the other emergency services and members of the public dealing with the recent atrocities. Civilians stood up and stepped in to help those in need, and we are very grateful to them all. They are true examples of the British spirit and show why no terrorist will ever win.

I am not going to trade figures on the number of police officers and other specialists as they are all in the public view. There were more in 2010, and there are fewer in 2017. We welcome the increase in the number of police officers and other specialists to give the law enforcement agencies the staffing, powers and resourcing to do their job effectively, but we need to look carefully at what is being proposed as we must have sufficient resources in place to have people in post to be able to use the full range of powers to full effect. More powers without staffing and other resourcing is not going to be effective and will not provide the reassurance and protection our citizens need.

I very much welcome moves to get the internet companies to block and take down content promoting terrorism. Every effort must be made for further action in this area. It is just not acceptable. Swift action must be taken by these companies to take this content down. In her response, will the Minister refer to the following matters? What will be the role of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation before any new measures come before Parliament? Are the Government planning any review of the Prevent strategy? What reassurance is being given to the Muslim community and other faith communities? It has been reported that individuals involved in the Manchester and London Bridge terror attacks were reported to the authorities but were no longer thought to be an immediate threat. Can the Minister confirm that an urgent reassessment of any other individuals in this category is being done and that all intelligence that suggests any sort of activity, no matter who the perpetrators are, is constantly reviewed and assessed? We need to stand up to the terrorists wherever they come from—from Islamist terrorists to far-right extremists with their messages of death, destruction and hate. They are all murderers and vile preachers of hate.

Finally, I suggest to Members that if they have a spare moment they pop down to Borough Market. It is a wonderful part of the London Borough of Southwark and somewhere I have known for most of my life. I am a trustee of the United St Saviour’s Charity, and I declare an interest. It owns a number of the affected properties around Borough Market and has been helping businesses get back on their feet over the past few weeks. Borough Market is a wonderful place and well worth a visit.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and express the condolences, thoughts and best wishes of those on these Benches to all those affected by these tragedies. I also express our thanks and admiration to the emergency services involved in each of these incidents, particularly the armed officers who had to take the difficult, split-second decision to shoot the suspected perpetrators of the London Bridge/Borough Market attack. Our thoughts should also be with those officers and their families.

I have four questions. Can the Minister confirm that central government funding for the police service is increasing in real terms? What account has been taken of the additional financial pressures on the police service, such as the apprenticeship levy, and the additional operational pressures, such as the public inquiry into covert policing and the post-event investigations into these terrorist incidents? Is it not time to restore community policing, an invaluable source of community intelligence, after a cut of 20,000 police officers and 24,000 police support staff since 2010? Does the Minister agree with the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis that the Met is struggling because of a lack of resources? We welcome David Anderson’s role in reviewing the handling of recent terror attacks. We welcome the idea of a commission for countering extremism, but we need to understand what that means. We also welcome an independent, evidence-based review of Britain’s counterterrorism strategy, including an independent, evidence-based review of Prevent. Can the Minister give any more detail about the commission and can she confirm that the review will be independent and evidence-based?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for the points they have made. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, made some very constructive points about police numbers and having the resources to meet the needs of the police in the work they do. Since 2010, police forces have increased the proportion of officers working at the front line and proved that you can continue to cut crime with a smaller, more agile workforce. This is going to be important as we consider capabilities going forward. Since 2015—I hope this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—we have protected overall police spending in real terms. We have increased the counterterrorism budget, and we have funded an uplift in the number of armed police officers. We have also increased the budget of our security services. There are more officers and staff involved in counterterrorism policing than ever before. However, the challenge is not simply about maintaining police numbers. As the nature and complexity of the threat changes, as noble Lords have said, so does the nature of the skills needed to tackle that threat. We have all seen that in recent weeks. We are in an ongoing and constructive dialogue with the police, including the Metropolitan Police. I do not recognise the cuts that the noble Lord talked about, but we will be talking to the police about ensuring that the right powers, capabilities and resources are in place.

The noble Lord talked about the David Anderson review, which will look into why the attacks took place and whether further work needs to be done. It will look into the historical aspect; not just things that have happened over the last few weeks but those in the past as well. Going forward, the review will also look at how we protect our citizens and whether any changes, including legislative changes, are needed as we proceed. But of course it is very early days. We want a thorough review, not a quick one, to make sure that we get things right in the future and respond to changing threats and those which might emerge.

The noble Lord also talked about the Manchester attacker and whether he was known. I hope noble Lords will understand that these matters are subject to police inquiry and that it would be wrong of me to start discussing any of these details, but of course the review will look into what the answers are. I think I have answered both noble Lords’ questions, but I might have missed one from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. If he wants to repeat anything, I would be very happy to answer.