Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 1st February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I refer to my interests on the register. I support Amendments 55, 56 and 154. My main concerns relate to victims of modern slavery and of forced marriage who are from overseas. Some victims of modern slavery suffer from domestic abuse and may not go through the NRM. If they do not, their immigrant status will be not just uncertain but probably not acceptable. It may not be safe for them to be returned to their own country.

I refer particularly to a group of foreign wives who marry men in this country but whose marriages are not registered. An example, but not the only example, is a nikah in a Muslim marriage. If that marriage is not registered, as everyone knows, it is not legal in English law. Consequently, wives will not receive the spousal visa or have the protection of being a wife—although they believe of course that they are wives. This is very serious, and I ask the Minister to look at this group of women, some of whom may be in a forced marriage, while others may be in a perfectly good arranged marriage where the husband has walked out on them or turfed them out and they are completely lost, because they do not have the appropriate immigration status as a wife.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, our Amendments 55 and 56 in this group are designed to prevent information about victims of domestic abuse that could be used for immigration control being disclosed by the domestic abuse commissioner. These amendments go further than Amendment 154, as they talk about information provided to the domestic abuse commissioner whether a request for support has been made or not.

The danger is that the information, supplied by either the domestic abuse commissioner or somebody seeking support, is shared with the police. There have been numerous reported examples where the police have passed the details of victims and witnesses of crime to immigration officials, including a case in 2017 of a woman who alleged she was raped and kidnapped. She was first taken to a haven, a centre for victims of sexual assault, but was subsequently arrested and questioned about her immigration status.

In 2015, the last year for which I can find figures, police tip-offs to the immigration service of the details of crime victims and witnesses occurred on over 3,000 occasions—in one year. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, said, such sharing of information makes genuine victims of domestic abuse less likely to come forward to receive the help and support that they so desperately need. These victims are likely to be even more vulnerable to coercive control than those with regular immigration status.

Amendment 154 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, similarly requires the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that personal data of a victim of domestic abuse that is processed for the purpose of requesting or receiving support is not used for immigration control purposes, along with domestic abuse witness and victim data. We support these attempts to prevent the disclosure of this information for immigration control purposes.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Meacher, for setting out the case for these amendments, which seek to prevent personal information about victims of domestic abuse being shared for the purposes of immigration control. I recognise that the effect of Amendments 55 and 56 is more narrowly focused on the sharing of information under Part 2 but, in responding to these amendments and Amendment 154, I will focus my remarks on the broader issue.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, will understand that I will leave the debate on migrant women, who feature in Amendment 148, until we get to it, because this group is about data sharing. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, I point out that “hostile environment” was of course coined by the Labour Government back in 2007, not under my right honourable friend Theresa May.

The main purpose of these amendments is to make sure that migrant victims of domestic abuse are not deterred from reporting that abuse or seeking support for fear that immigration enforcement action will be taken against them. I want to be absolutely clear: our main priority is to protect the public and all victims of crime, regardless of their immigration status.

A number of noble Lords mentioned guidance on this. In our response to the Joint Committee in July 2019, the Government were clear that all victims of domestic abuse should be treated as victims first and foremost. This is set out in relevant guidance from the National Police Chiefs’ Council—in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox.

In addition, assistant commissioner Louisa Rolfe, the national policing lead on domestic abuse, in giving oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons, was clear that there will be circumstances where information sharing between the police and immigration authorities is in the interests of safeguarding a victim of abuse. There can be many benefits to sharing information, as it can help to resolve a victim’s uncertainty about their immigration status—referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley—but, most importantly, it can remove the desperate situation in which the perpetrator’s controlling and manipulative behaviour continues because of their status: this too was referred to by the noble Baroness. When victims come forward for support, sharing information can help prevent them facing enforcement action, if they are identified by immigration enforcement in an unrelated setting.

To ensure that victims’ needs are put first, the National Police Chiefs’ Council strengthened its guidance in 2020, setting out a clear position on exchanging information about victims of crime with immigration enforcement to encourage a consistent approach across the country. This gives us confidence that data sharing will operate in the interests of the victim.

Alongside our duties to protect victims of crime, the Government are equally duty bound to maintain an effective immigration system, not only to protect our public services but to safeguard the most vulnerable from exploitation because of their insecure immigration status. The public rightly expect that individuals in this country should be subject to our laws, and it is right that, when individuals with an irregular immigration status are identified, they should be supported to come forward under our immigration system and, where possible, to regularise their stay. This data exchange is processed on the basis of public interest, as laid out in Articles 6 and 9 of the general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.

The noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, also referred to the outcome of the super-complaint relating to police data that is shared for immigration purposes. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services published its report into the super-complaint in December last year and made a number of recommendations, which we are carefully considering and to which we will respond in due course. It is right that we properly take account of the recommendations in this report. In response to the report, we have committed to review the current arrangements and to publishing the outcome of the review within the six months set by the inspectorate, which is by June. I expect the outcome of this review to be implemented through further updates to the NPCC guidance or other administrative means, and that primary legislation will not be required. To enable us to complete this review in line with the inspectorate’s recommendations, I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, withdraws her amendment.

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[Baroness Newlove (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I speak in support of the group of amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. I will keep my speech very short, as other noble Lords have made excellent speeches as to why it is essential that the word “workplace” be specified and stipulated when DAPOs are made. As the former Victims’ Commissioner I also met the families of Jane Clough and Hollie Gazzard. Their pain and sorrow have never left me. I have also received many emails about victims being threatened within the estate of their workplace and perpetrators stalking their victims on a daily basis. Their fear and the persecution which means that they have to look over their shoulders are shameful and saddening, as their vulnerabilities are shredded even more to pieces.

I therefore ask the Minister, even though the Government are making strides to recognise this, to look again and maybe accept these amendments. I ask that those who make the DAPOs use their discretion and common sense to specify that the victim’s workplace is protected as well as their home, so that no more lives are brutally taken from loved families. As the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, said, many of these cases do not make the headlines. Our workplace is somewhere we go to do our job, and lives are very stressful as they are. For these victims, who constantly have to watch over their shoulder, please can the Government look at specifying the word “workplace” to give them the safety that they should have in their workplace?

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Clause 21 sets out what provisions can be made in a domestic abuse protection notice. Clause 21(1)(b) allows that a person may not come within a specified distance of where the victim lives. However, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained, this means that the perpetrator could abuse the victim at work, at the school where their child is a pupil or at a place of worship, to give but a few examples. Our Amendment 57 allows for the prevention of coming within a specified distance to apply to any specified premises in England and Wales. As such, I believe that our amendment also covers the circumstances covered by Amendments 58, 59 and 60, which refer to the victim’s place of work. I will return to that in a moment.

The Government’s Amendment 75 makes similar provision to our amendment for domestic abuse protection orders in that our Amendment 21 applies to domestic abuse protection notices and the Government’s amendment applies to domestic abuse protection orders. As such, I believe that the Government’s amendment covers the circumstances addressed by Amendments 74, 76 and 77.

Contrary to the view of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, I am not convinced that specifying “workplace” is stronger than Amendments 75 or 57. It is certainly more restricted than “any specified premises”. I understand trade unions focusing on workplace protections but the issue is wider than workplaces. In future groups we will come to duties being placed on employers. We have to broaden our outlook here. What about unemployed victims, victims in full-time education or victims whose main support comes from a religious community in a church, mosque, synagogue or temple? Protection in the workplace is important but it is not the only place that should be a place of safety for victims of domestic abuse.

Government Amendment 78 means that the requirements imposed by a domestic abuse protection order must, as far as practicable, be such as to avoid interfering with the perpetrator’s work or the person’s attendance at an educational establishment. It will be a fine judgment in some cases whether to make the person covered by the order unemployed or unable to continue a course of education, as well as potentially homeless, but the safety of the victim of domestic abuse must be paramount.

Amendment 79 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, seeks to ensure that this is the case by removing the requirement contained in government Amendment 78 to avoid interference with the perpetrator’s work or education if the victim works at the same place as the perpetrator, or, potentially, works at a place where the perpetrator is studying.

The seriousness of domestic abuse, the impact it can have on the victim, and the very serious consequences for the perpetrator if it is reported, beyond any criminal sanction, need to be made clear to perpetrators. It could result in you losing your job or your place in education, as well as your home.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, the provisions in Clause 33 provide that a domestic abuse protection order—DAPO—may impose any requirements that the court considers necessary to protect the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of domestic abuse, including requirements that prohibit the perpetrator coming within a specified distance of any premises in which the victim lives.

However, as noble Lords have, rightly, pointed out again today, we recognise that perpetrators of domestic abuse commonly target victims outside the home intentionally to cause distress, exercise coercive control and, in some cases, even to harm their victim physically. As has been noted, during the Bill’s passage in another place, the honourable Member for Birmingham Yardley tabled amendments seeking to strengthen the protection afforded by a DAPO against workplace abuse, and my honourable friend the Minister for Safeguarding undertook to consider those amendments. She has done so, and government Amendment 75, which comes from that, would make it explicit that a DAPO can include a requirement prohibiting the perpetrator coming within a specified distance of any other specified premises, or premises of a specified description, such as the victim’s place of work.

Much of the debate today has revolved around whether it is right to put the workplace, and the definition that we have chosen, specifically on the face of the Bill. The government amendment is deliberately broad so that it covers not only the victim’s place of work—in response to my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, I want to be very clear that the amendment does include a person’s place of work—but other places where the victim might regularly be found, such as their place of worship or their children’s school. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, mentioned the importance of training colleges in enabling victims to re-establish some independence, to get out of the house and to find support, whether that involves going back to work, going into training or finding support through religious institutions. Those are all hugely important to people as they rebuild their lives.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right that we need to look more broadly and not just at places of work. Of course, people’s patterns of work are very variable. Some people have one static work location but many are peripatetic—perhaps supply teachers, cleaners or carers visiting people in their own home. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, gave an example of someone who works in multiple locations. My noble friend Lord Cormack said that he wants the Bill to be unambiguous, and that is what we are trying to achieve in the breadth of the government amendment—to give the power to specify whatever that location might be. To answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, we will also make it clear in the guidance that places of work should certainly be considered.

As a consequence of the amendment to Clause 33, Amendment 78 to Clause 34 makes it clear that any requirements imposed on a person which prohibit the person from coming within a specified distance of any specific premises should not, as far as practicable, interfere with the person’s work or their attendance at an educational establishment. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, agrees that these government amendments achieve the same outcome that he seeks with his Amendments 74, 76, 77 and 79.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, asked about the duties of employers. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, noted, we will debate that more fully when we come to Amendment 174. My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering asked about the pilot of the DAPO scheme. We are developing plans for a pilot of the DAPO, which will start as soon as practicable. We will address the training and guidance points before it begins, and of course the pilot scheme will inform the wider implementation of the policy.

With regard to the domestic abuse protection notice—the subject of Amendments 57 to 60—Clause 20 sets out that a notice automatically prohibits the perpetrator from being abusive towards the person to be protected by the notice. Additionally, Clause 21 provides that a notice may prevent the perpetrator contacting the victim. Both those provisions can include the victim’s workplace, or any other non-residential property or location. We believe that these provisions in the Bill are sufficient to protect victims at their place of work and are appropriate for a police-issued notice, pending the making of a substantive court order.

I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this important issue today. I trust that the two government amendments, along with my explanation of them and of domestic abuse protection notices, will provide the clarity they are seeking and that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 63 which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, would ensure that a risk assessment is carried out. That would consider any risk to the victim which was likely to occur due to the perpetrator being given notice that a DAPO is likely to be given to the perpetrator.

I presume that the amendments in this group are probing amendments—mine certainly is—going into the detail of how the DAPOs and notices are to be administered. It is right that these are only probing amendments because each case is different and, while there should be comprehensive guidelines on the way that the police operate these procedures, they need to be sufficiently flexible for police officers to make reasoned judgments. There is a very real point about risk assessments: it could be that the victim is put at greater risk through the perpetrator receiving a notice. Counter to that, it could also help the victim if an order is put on without her consent—but that is a matter for a separate amendment in a later group.

I support all the probing amendments in this group, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, for reasons of brevity and clarity, I will refer to person to whom a domestic abuse protection notice is given as the “perpetrator”, rather than the “alleged perpetrator” or “defendant”, and the person the notice seeks to protect as the “victim”, rather than the “complainant”, the “alleged victim” or “plaintiff”. Clearly it will be for the court to decide, ultimately, whether they are in fact perpetrator and victim.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee outlined, Amendment 61 proposes the common-sense change to ensure that the victim is consulted not only about whether a domestic abuse prevention notice should be given but about what restrictions it should contain. The person to be protected is likely to be in the best position to advise the senior police officer as to the circumstances in which she may be vulnerable.

Amendment 65 questions whether someone arrested for breach of a domestic abuse protection notice, which is discretionary, in that a constable “may” arrest the person, must be held in custody until they are brought before a court, which would be mandatory. My noble friend is right: we did not collude on what we were going to say on this, but we come to the same conclusion. Surely there may be circumstances where the arrest of the individual has a sufficiently salutary effect as to make further breach unlikely and, therefore, remand in custody unnecessary. I will return to that in a moment.

If the person breaches the domestic abuse prevention notice, if they are arrested and taken before a court, the court may impose conditions to ensure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice. But Amendment 66 asks whether these conditions are in addition to, or replace, those set out in the DAPN. I am assuming that they are additional, in that the DAPN is designed to protect the victim, not just protect the course of justice. In that case, does the court need to ensure that the conditions it imposes are compatible with those of the DAPN, and does that need to be stated on the face of the Bill? As my noble friend explained, for completeness, our Amendments 67 and 70 suggest that the perpetrator should not contact witnesses, either directly or indirectly.

Amendment 63 is also in this group. I recall research in the United States some time ago, which found that the involvement of the police in cases of domestic abuse generally had a salutary effect on professional classes, who felt shame at their actions being made public, but an unwelcome effect on lower socio-economic groups, who were enraged that the police had become involved in their private business. I am not sure whether the class divide aspects are useful, but the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, has a point, and this should be taken into account by the police. My noble friend and I did not collude, I promise. I would hope that most senior police officers would automatically take this into account, particularly as they need to seek the opinion of the victim as to whether a notice should be served—a conversation that should draw out such risk factors. I am not sure that it needs to be on the face of the Bill.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendment 68. This is really a very short point; it is a question of flexibility. There may be circumstances where a protection order has been issued, but by the time it comes to a senior officer, circumstances have changed and it would be far better not to have it go forward. It would be wise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said—I realise that this is a probing amendment—to have the flexibility in the Bill so that it is not the case that, if an order is issued by someone of junior rank, it is automatically supported by someone more senior.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, Clause 26(3) states that if a domestic abuse protection notice is given by the police under Clause 20, the chief police officer must apply for a domestic abuse protection order. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, just said, what if it transpires that the circumstances have changed or that the police officer who gave the notice, for example, made a mistake? What if further evidence becomes apparent that means a domestic abuse protection order should not have been given or is no longer required? Can the Minister explain why the issuing of a domestic abuse protection notice is discretionary, but the application for a domestic abuse protection order, once a notice has been served, is mandatory? Hence our Amendment 68. As my noble friend explained, Amendments 64 and 69 are consequential.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained, these probing amendments explore whether an application for a domestic abuse protection order should be an automatic consequence of the police issuing a domestic abuse protection notice. Although I fully understand the motivation behind this—namely, to build further flexibility into these provisions—these amendments would remove a key strength of the process as we envisage it. The domestic abuse protection notice is designed to give victims immediate protection and breathing space from the perpetrator following a crisis incident. If it has been judged necessary to issue a notice, it will be evident from the situation that the victim needs longer-term protection. Consequently, it is right that, once a notice has been issued, an application for an order should follow automatically within 48 hours.

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[Lord Cormack (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a privilege to take part briefly in a debate led by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Anderson, and by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I would sum up this debate by saying that we have heard some very wise words. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said that these amendments were logical, rational and humane. He also entered the Covid caveat, and obviously we need a degree of flexibility over timing, bearing in mind the extraordinary overburdening of the justice system at the moment. I cannot help but refer your Lordships to the Times today, which lists the extremely large number of people being drafted in to be judges without any previous experience. We have to bear that in mind—but I endorse the spirit behind the amendments, and I will say no more.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 71, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, would make the very sensible change from the vague requirement to allow the alleged perpetrator to make representations about the issue of a domestic abuse protection order from

“as soon as just and convenient”

in Clause 32(4)(a) to the more usual and precise “as soon as practicable”—or perhaps it should be “as soon as reasonably practicable”—to which Amendment 71 would add, “within five working days.” In addition to the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I would say that such orders can have profound, and not immediately obvious, unacceptable consequences for the perpetrator, alleged or otherwise—as my noble friend Lady Hamwee mentioned when she said that the process needed to be fair to both sides.

Amendments 72 and 73 limit conditions imposed by a domestic violence protection order granted without notice to only negative or prohibitive requirements, not positive ones. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, drew the comparison with TPIMs; I shall draw a different comparison. This legislation appears to be similar to that governing knife crime prevention orders made under the Offensive Weapons Act 2019. In the absence of the defendant, when an order is made without notice, only an interim knife crime prevention order can be granted, under Section 16(3)(a) of the 2019 Act, with proceedings on the knife crime prevention order itself being adjourned. The interim order can impose prohibitions that may be imposed under a full order, but none of the positive requirements. Why not here?

I ask the Minister, in support of this amendment, why such a distinction between, say, an interim domestic violence protection order and a full order is not part of this Bill. Consistency in legislation, particularly in the criminal law, where people must be able to understand clearly what is expected of them—an important part of the rule of law, to which this Government appear to be paying scant regard, judging by recent form—is important. It is not inconceivable that someone who is or has been subject to a knife crime prevention order may, at some stage, be subject to a domestic violence prevention order. Inconsistency such as that between this Bill and such recent legislation as the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is unhelpful and unwelcome.

As the amendments have the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, of an active magistrate, of a former Crown Court recorder and of a former Home Secretary, it would, at least in normal times, be difficult for the Minister to disagree. But I am sure he will.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, in response to that last comment, it is almost impossible for me not to rise to the occasion. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for setting out his case for the amendments. Of course I have listened carefully to everything in the debate, particularly because, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, the points have been put in a constructive spirit. I take on board, of course, the point made by a number of speakers, including in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that the amendments have the support of the Magistrates Association.

Clause 32 sets out when the court can make a domestic abuse protection order without prior notice of the proceedings having been given to the alleged perpetrator. Typically, as is also the case with existing protective orders, the courts will provide the alleged perpetrator with prior notice of an application for a domestic abuse protection order and of the hearing. However, like existing protective orders, a DAPO can be made without prior notification if there is an urgent need. Clause 32 sets out that a court may make such an order without prior notification

“where it is just and convenient to do so”.

That is in subsection (1).

Clause 32 also specifies, in subsection (3), that before making an order without prior notice,

“the court must have regard to all the circumstances”

of the case. Without limiting the breadth of that requirement, the clause then goes on to list a number of specific factors, three of which I will draw attention to. The first is

“any risk that, if the order is not made immediately,”

the alleged perpetrator will cause significant harm to the victim. The second is whether the victim is likely to be

“deterred or prevented from pursuing the application if an order is not made immediately”.

The third is

“whether there is reason to believe that”

the alleged perpetrator

“is aware of the proceedings but is deliberately evading service”.

Those provisions are crucial for ensuring that the victim can obtain the protection they need in all circumstances.

However, we agree, of course, that the alleged perpetrator should be able to exercise their right to make a representation to the court after such an order—an order without notice—has been made. That is a basic principle of justice: courts normally operate on what has traditionally been called audi alteram partem—it is a pleasure that one can still use Latin in the court of Parliament, even if you cannot use it in the courts of justice any more—which obviously means “both sides must be heard”. Where that has not been the case, for reasons of urgency or otherwise, a hearing where both or all parties are present is then convened. Therefore, Clause 32 already specifies that, when the court makes an order without prior notice, a return hearing must be scheduled

“as soon as just and convenient”.

I recognise that the noble Lord’s Amendment 71 sets a time limit of five working days; I understand his reasons for doing this, but there are a number of problems with this approach, and I shall set out three. First, the amendment would make our approach inconsistent with other protective orders, which require return hearings to take place as soon as is just and convenient. We do not see reason to take a different approach on that point for DAPOs.

Having said that, each sort of protective order must be looked at in its own circumstances, along with the mischief and harm that the order is seeking to address. Therefore, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—that there should be a direct read-across from knife crime prevention orders as to positive and negative factors or the phrase “as soon as practicable”—the problem with such analogies is that they are different. One must look at each sort of order on its own terms.

Secondly, the period of five days is somewhat arbitrary. As the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, pointed out, in the current circumstances five days might or might not be realistic. I will resist the opportunity to respond to his points about backlogs in the justice system in this short debate; I have done so elsewhere. I will also resist responding to my noble friend Lord Cormack’s point about the article in the Times, which I have only skimmed and have not had a chance to read in detail. I suggest that it is better to have a just and convenient timescale.

This leads me to my third point: we would not want a court to be, or to feel, forced to hold a hearing within the five-day period if a slightly longer period might be more suitable—for example, if the respondent’s preferred counsel were available on the sixth day but not the fifth. Another example might be the judge who granted the initial order being available on the sixth day but not the fifth, when it might well be in the interests of the parties and the justice system for the same judge to hear the matter on an all-parties basis. Therefore, for those reasons, while recognising the reasons behind the amendment, we are not persuaded that it is required.

I now turn to Amendments 72 and 73 to Clause 33. The existing provisions in Clause 33 enable the court to impose “any requirements … necessary” for the protection of the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of domestic abuse. This includes both prohibitions and positive requirements. Any order the court makes must be necessary and proportionate to protect the victim. Although I, of course, respect the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, while sitting as a recorder, that one would not normally make a positive order in the absence of a perpetrator, it may be important to do so in certain circumstances, and the courts should have the flexibility so to act.

I agree with the noble Lord’s view that, while it is important that the court can impose the necessary requirements by making a DAPO, we must ensure that the alleged perpetrator is not punished for breaching any requirements they were not aware of. This is especially the case as a breach of positive or restrictive requirements may be a criminal offence. In this context, it is important to take on board the point of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, that we must not, if I may adapt his phrase, be taken for a ride in this important area.

For this reason, Clause 37 sets out that, where an order is made in the alleged perpetrator’s absence, the person does not commit an offence as regards breach of any of the requirements imposed by the order, whether restrictive or positive, until that person is aware of the existence of the order. This approach is consistent with other orders in this area. I assure all noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who made this point, that these are serious amendments, as has been said. We have considered them extremely carefully.

In the light of the explanations I have given this afternoon, I hope that the noble Lord is now content to withdraw his amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his application, but I have to confess to being slightly confused or, at least, lacking some detail from his arguments. At one point, he said that the wording in the Bill is similar to other protective orders and that is why the Government do not support the amendments; yet, at others, he said that the reason why it is not consistent with other protective orders is that they are different.

I do not expect the noble Lord to be able to give me chapter and verse here and now as to why knife crime protection orders are different from domestic abuse protection orders, but I would be very grateful if he could write to me to explain why, on the one hand, the Government argue that the wording needs to be the same as other protective orders, while on the other, they argue that the amendments are faulty because they are different from other protective orders.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, there will be correlations and differences between various orders in this context. I can certainly undertake to write to the noble Lord on this point, but I hope I can go one better: if, in addition to a letter, a conversation would be helpful, I am very happy to offer that as well.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for the length of my speech; there are too many issues to reasonably consider in one group.

Amendments 80 and 81 add to the requirement to receive evidence about the suitability and enforceability of a requirement for the perpetrator to do something under the domestic abuse protection order from the person responsible for supervising compliance with that requirement. Amendment 80 suggests that probation or youth offending teams should give evidence as appropriate and Amendment 81 suggests, if the requirement is to attend substance misuse or mental health programmes, that these can be imposed only with the consent of the perpetrator.

On Amendment 80, it is a requirement under Sections 15(5) and 20(2) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 that the youth offending team—established under Section 39 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998—in whose area it appears to the prosecution that the defendant lives is consulted before making an application for a knife crime prevention order. Why not have that in this Bill and why not, as Amendment 80 suggests, consult the probation service in relation to adult offenders? Can the Minister yet again explain the inconsistency in approach between this Bill and the Offensive Weapons Act 2019? I hear what he says about protective orders being different, but both DAPOs and offensive weapon prevention orders are violence prevention orders, potentially aimed at similar offenders and more alike than perhaps he would want to admit.

On Amendment 81, I agree that enforced substance misuse programmes are less likely to be successful, although I am not sure about compulsory mental health programmes. In either case, surely any suitable person designated as being responsible for supervising compliance will have knowledge and expertise in these areas and will be able to advise the court as to whether they are likely to be suitable if the perpetrator does not agree to comply with them. As such, I am not sure it is necessary to include these amendments in the Bill.

Clause 42 allows for a domestic abuse protection order to be varied or discharged. If a magistrates’ court made the order, the change can made by a magistrates’ court in the same local justice area; otherwise, generally speaking, it must be made by the court that imposed it. Clause 36(1) and (2) state that a domestic abuse protection order takes effect on the day it is made unless there is already one in force, in which case it can take effect when the existing order ends. So, it can come into effect on a future date if required.

Amendment 82, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained, is probing to ask whether a DAPO with the same conditions would be dealt with under Clause 42—the variation—rather than Clause 36, to which the answer is presumably that it depends on whether it is being imposed by the same court or a different one. If it is the same court, it can be dealt with under Clause 42, but if it is a different court—for example, a family court or the High Court—which believes the order should continue after the date an order imposed by a magistrates’ court ends, it can do so under Clause 36. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s view.

Amendments 83 and 84 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, place a limit of two years on a domestic abuse protection order, instead of one that can be in place indefinitely, and the order may be reviewed at review hearings which the recipient can be required to attend. Times and circumstances change. For example, the victim may move away and any restriction preventing the perpetrator visiting her home may become redundant. It also allows for rehabilitation of the perpetrator who moves on with their life and no longer presents a danger to the victim. I accept that it is open to the court to discharge the order on application from an interested party, but this safeguard would ensure that domestic violence protection orders are not allowed to continue through neglect rather than because they are necessary.

The Offensive Weapons Act 2019, Section 23(3), states:

“A knife crime prevention order must specify the period for which it has effect, which must be a fixed period of at least 6 months, and not more than 2 years”.


Why do we not have the same for domestic abuse protection orders? We support these amendments.

Clause 37(2) rightly states that the perpetrator does not commit an offence of engaging in behaviour contrary to the requirements imposed by a domestic violence protection order unless he

“was aware of the existence of the order”.

The perpetrator may be aware that a DAPO is in existence but may not know the requirements in that order. Our Amendment 86 just as rightly suggests that the perpetrator needs to be aware of the restrictions before he can be found guilty of breaching them, not simply that an order is in existence, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained.

The crucial question for the Minister is this. An offence is committed by a person who is subject to a domestic abuse protection order if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with any requirement imposed by the order; so if our Amendment 86 is not necessary, because it would be a reasonable excuse if the perpetrator did not know what the requirements were, why is Clause 37(2) necessary? Surely, not knowing that a DAPO exists is also a reasonable excuse for not complying with it. The Minister might say that if the perpetrator knows that an order is in place but does not know the requirements, he is under an obligation to find out, but he may have heard of the existence of the order from someone who does not know the details.

In short, should it not simply be left to a court to decide whether a perpetrator has a reasonable excuse for breaching a DAPO, where not knowing of the order’s existence or not knowing its requirements are simply examples of what amounts to a reasonable excuse? Our Amendment 85 clarifies that the criminal offence of a breach of a DAPO needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

When we debated knife crime prevention orders, we discussed whether the breach of what is effectively a civil order, granted on the balance of probabilities, should result in a criminal offence rather than a fine or term of imprisonment for contempt of court, but without a criminal conviction being recorded against the perpetrator. As we discussed then, Parliament changed a similar regime introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, whereby breach of civil orders resulted in the criminalisation of many young people with no previous convictions. Parliament replaced ASBOs with anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices, by means of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Only breach of a criminal behaviour order, which can be made only after a person has been convicted of an offence, is in itself a criminal offence.

No doubt the Minister will quote from a High Court case in which the right to convict someone of a criminal offence for breach of a civil order, potentially based on hearsay evidence, was challenged but was not successful, on the basis that the validity of that hearsay evidence can be challenged when the criminal case is considered. But Parliament ignored that case and prohibited the criminal conviction of someone for breaching a civil order, in 2014, in relation to anti-social behaviour. The Minister might further say that contempt of court can have sanctions similar to those imposed following a criminal conviction, in that a fine or imprisonment could follow, but the difference is that there is no criminal record created as a result of breaching a civil order.

Based on hearsay evidence and potentially a malicious allegation, someone could be given a domestic abuse protection order, breach of which may result in a criminal conviction, an unlimited fine and a substantial prison sentence, as my noble friend pointed out. When the same point was debated in relation to knife crime prevention orders, the Government claimed that the police said that a criminal sanction was necessary, rather than a civil penalty. Again, the Government acted on the uncorroborated assertion of an operational partner, as we have recently seen in the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill. Can the Minister explain why it is necessary for a criminal record to be created when there is a breach of the civil domestic abuse protection order, when it is not necessary in relation to anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices?

Our Amendment 87 is on the separate issue of the degree of certainty that a person must have that the perpetrator has breached a domestic violence protection order before they can apply to the relevant judge for a warrant to arrest the perpetrator for failing to comply with the order, or is otherwise in contempt of court in relation to the order. Clause 38(3) states that the applicant “considers” that the perpetrator has breached the order, whereas we suggest an objective test of “reasonably believes” is more appropriate. The issue of the warrant is a matter for the relevant judge on the basis of “reasonable grounds for believing”.

I question whether arrest by warrant is necessary or desirable. It could take some time, and money if the victim is to be represented in court and is not in receipt of legal aid, and could be daunting if the victim is to represent herself. The purpose of a domestic violence protection order is to impose any requirement necessary to protect the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of abuse. Section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that a constable who

“has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed … may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of being guilty of”

that offence if, among other things, it is necessary

“to protect a child or other vulnerable person from the person in question”.

The subject of a DAPO is already considered by a court to be vulnerable—vulnerable to domestic abuse.

Another reason to arrest without warrant might be that it is necessary to allow the prompt investigation of the offence or the conduct of the person in question. Surely, if the victim under the protection of a DAPO, or anyone else with relevant information, believes that the perpetrator has breached the order, they should inform the police, who have ample powers to take immediate steps to arrest the perpetrator. Any delay, such as would occur if a warrant has to be applied for, could place the victim in danger. The very existence of this application for a warrant route could endanger victims. Can the Minister explain why this provision is included in the Bill?

Where a variation or discharge of an order is sought, Clause 42(4)(b) states that, where the victim protected by a DAPO

“is seeking to discharge the order, or to remove or make less onerous any requirement imposed by the order”,

the court must hear from her. Our Amendment 88 makes two points. First, can the Minister reassure the Committee that a victim or potential victim of domestic abuse is not going to be forced to appear in court? The clause says the court must hear from her. I understand that it is important that the court receive a reassurance that the victim is happy for the order to be weakened or removed, but surely her views can be represented by way of a statement read out in court.

Secondly, if the victim wishes to make representations, she must be heard whatever the variations are, including those that impose further restrictions or make them more onerous. Her testimony could make the difference between the stricter measures being agreed to or not. Conversely, it could be within her knowledge alone that the proposed stricter measures might tip the perpetrator over the edge in terms of non-compliance and, therefore, increase the danger she is in.

I apologise for the time I have taken, but as I said at the beginning, there are too many issues in this group to be debated together. I would welcome the Minister’s response in writing, as I think it may be unreasonable to expect him to respond now to every point on which I seek answers from the Government.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) (V)]

My Lords, I declare an interest in chairing the board of governors of Cardiff Metropolitan University, a major provider of speech and language therapy education with 130 students currently enrolled across the three-year course, 49 of whom started in 2020.

I support all the amendments because the links between domestic abuse and people with communication needs are clear but seriously underrecognised. In a cycle of abuse, communication needs in a child are ignored or overlooked as many do not realise how much can be done to improve a child’s life chances if they receive early—I stress early—supportive intervention. Public Health England’s Disability and Domestic Abuse: Risk, Impacts and Response paper reports:

“Disabled people experience disproportionately higher rates of domestic abuse. They also experience domestic abuse for longer periods of time, and more severe and frequent abuse.”


When those victims also have communication needs, they experience more barriers to accessing support such as health and social care services and domestic abuse services, and are at greater risk of ongoing gender-based sexual violence.

But the damage from abuse goes wider. The young child who experiences or witnesses abuse is more likely to have delayed speech and hearing development. This affects global cognitive development, especially in reading and writing, expressive language skills and social interaction skills. These children then fall further behind in many domains and may have flashbacks resulting in emotional shutdown and aberrant behaviours. Of course, they find it harder to express what has been happening, so these children often suddenly break down at school and the whole story unravels, but in a piecemeal and jerky fashion.

The cycle continues. Speech and language therapists working with children and young people in care or in custody report a very high incidence of these children having been abused or witnessed abuse. The key point is that recognition of abuse and subsequent remedial action must happen early, which is why speech and language therapists should be viewed as key members of statutory domestic abuse services.

[Lord Paddick (LD) (V)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, have highlighted the link between domestic abuse and communication needs—both in how abuse can lead to communication difficulties and how important communication ability is, so that victims can express the impact that domestic abuse has had on them. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, brings her wealth of professional experience to reinforce these points.

Disability discrimination includes when you are treated less well or put at a disadvantage for a reason that relates to your disability in one of the situations covered by the Equality Act 2010, such as when you use public services or have contact with public bodies. Those with communication needs would be included in that. I understand the particular concerns of those noble Lords who are promoting these amendments, but I wonder whether the protections of the Equality Act are sufficient. However, I hear the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, that these protections need to be embedded.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, first, I draw the attention of the Committee to my relevant registered interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. These Benches welcome and support all the amendments in this group.

Amendment 22, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, seeks to put a clear statement in the Bill that, in encouraging good practice as required by Clause 7, the domestic abuse commissioner must include identification of and response to any speech and communication needs that people have. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, using his extensive experience of work in the criminal justice system, as Chief Inspector of Prisons, gave us a clear example of why this is so important. My noble friend Lady Andrews made a point about how important it is to be able to use language to express and defend yourself. My noble friend also made the point that children witnessing abuse of a parent by another parent or partner is a horrific form of abuse. We have heard from other noble Lords that lifelong damage can be caused to a child who witnesses that form of abuse.

The noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, in an important and thoughtful contribution, explained to us the difficulties that he suffered 25 years ago and the effect that they had on his speech at the time. His contributions are always valued and respected in the House, and I am very sorry to learn that he feels that that is not the case.

I cannot see who would not agree with any of the amendments in this group. The first, Amendment 22, seeks to ensure that support is available and generally accessible to every victim. We may be told in a moment by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, that this amendment or these amendments are not needed, and that support is implied anyway. That may be so, and I am sure the noble Lord will set out his case shortly, but I think he needs to go further and that the Government have to provide every reassurance necessary. It may be that the noble Lord thinks that the provisions are adequately covered under Clause 7(2)(a) and (b), along with the powers set out in Clause 9. If that is the case, can the noble Lord make that expressly clear in his reply to this debate?

Amendment 92 seeks again to put a commitment in the Bill that a local authority will identify and respond to speech, language and communication needs when preparing its strategy for the support of domestic abuse victims—something that I and many other noble Lords fully support. Again, when responding to the debate, if the noble Lord thinks that this amendment is unnecessary and is going to rely on the powers set out in Clause 55(8) and (9)(b), and/or the powers contained under guidance in Clause 58, can he confirm than the Secretary of State will address the issue specifically through one of these routes?

Amendment 110 seeks to address the same issue as the previous amendments, this time in respect of providing proper support for victims during court proceedings. Again, if we are to be told by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, that this amendment is also not necessary, it would be helpful to have reassurances on the record that these important issues will be fully addressed by the rules of the court or other provisions.

Finally, Amendment 187 seeks to put points in the section related to guidance in the Bill that have been raised in previous amendments, along with the important issue of children witnessing domestic abuse and the effect that has on speech, language and communication needs, which many noble Lords raised in this short debate, including my noble friend Lady Andrews and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff. I look forward to the noble Lord’s response to this short debate.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, as a former police officer, I find being critical of the police difficult but sometimes necessary. Couple that with the fact that I am a survivor of domestic abuse and all I can say is: wish me luck with this one.

I will first speak to Amendment 62, which deals with a senior police officer having to take into account the previous criminal history of the person he is considering giving a domestic abuse prevention notice to. I find myself in a similar position to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, in that, regrettably, I was not provided with the briefings from the LSE. We need to be careful, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has highlighted. Clearly, police officers attending an incident of domestic abuse should routinely check on the antecedents of the parties involved, but the issuing of a domestic abuse prevention notice should be based on whether the police officer has reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to give the notice to protect the person from domestic abuse there and then.

The fact that someone has no criminal record does not mean that they do not present a danger to the complainant, and neither does someone having a criminal past mean that they present a danger to this particular victim. I draw a parallel with someone accused of a criminal offence, whose previous convictions are not normally revealed to a court until after their guilt has been established because the court must determine the facts of the case before it. Having said that, previous evidence of abuse of the current victim by the perpetrator in question is clearly an important factor.

Amendments 23 and 28 in this group require the domestic abuse commissioner to encourage good practice in the appropriate use of data and technology to aid in the prevention, reporting and detection of domestic abuse, including making recommendations to public authorities in these areas. The fact that we are debating these amendments has given a great opportunity for the LSE research to be brought to the attention of noble Lords.

As such, what the amendments are asking for is a subset of Clause 7(2)(b), on

“making recommendations to any public authority”.

While this is important, I am not sure it requires to be in the Bill. However, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, highlighted important research into how artificial intelligence—AI—and machine learning could be used to improve responses to domestic abuse. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, also highlighted the importance of silent reporting, especially during lockdown.

As my noble friend Lord Dholakia has said, Amendment 50, to which I have added my name, allows the commissioner to request information from public authorities. We have heard his concerns, reinforced by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, about the failure of the Greater Manchester Police to record crime that has been reported to it, particularly violent crime.

This has been a recurrent theme with the police service over the years, particularly with the police failing to take domestic violence seriously. From my own professional experience, I recall getting into trouble, many years ago, when I arrested a man who had broken a chair over his wife’s head—something that I should not have done, according to the prevailing culture at the time, because victims of domestic abuse often do not want action taken against the perpetrator. In this case, the victim had to be treated in hospital for her injuries, and, once treated, she did not want to take action against her husband, something I found difficult to understand until I became a victim of domestic violence myself.

From my own personal experience as a survivor, I know that perpetrators of domestic violence are very good at convincing you that there is no alternative to the abusive relationship you are in and that the pain they inflict is the price you have to pay for their affection. I must tell anyone in such an abusive relationship: you can, and you deserve to, have a loving relationship without the pain.

Although attitudes have changed in the police service, with prosecution of domestic abuse possible even without the consent of the victim—if there is physical evidence of assault, for example—we need to ensure that the police do not slip back into old practices, as Greater Manchester Police appears to have done in not recording crime, including violent crime and, no doubt, incidents of domestic abuse.

The Minister wrote to those who spoke at Second Reading and addressed this issue directly, including the issues in the Greater Manchester Police, following the publication on 10 December of the findings of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescues Services’ inspection of the service GMP provided to victims of crime. What the Minister says in that letter, for me, gives more cause for concern than reassurance. It says that the inspection is the first of HMICFRS’s new victim services assessment that assesses the end-to-end experience of victims, from the first report of a crime to its outcome. In this case, it included an inspection of the effectiveness of GMP’s crime recording processes. If this was the first inspection of this kind, what will future inspections of other forces unearth? GMP is unlikely to be alone.

If, as the letter says, since 2014, HMICFRS has carried out a discrete programme of police crime recording inspections, known as crime data integrity inspections, why have the problems at GMP only now been discovered? The Minister goes on to describe the process where HMICFRS makes recommendations to the chief officer of police for the force concerned, and says that “our expectation” is that the chief officer will take remedial action. Washing their hands of all responsibility, the Minister goes on to say that it is the responsibility of the local policing body, the mayor or police and crime commissioner to

“publish their comments and response to any recommendations for improvement made by HMICFRS.”

This is about the culture of the police service, which has in the past sought to reduce the pressure it is under by failing to record crime, including violent crime, and a culture that shies away from taking effective action against the perpetrators of domestic violence. This may be driven by the experience of reluctant victims, as I illustrated earlier, but perhaps it may also stem from a predominantly male police service that identifies with, or even empathises with, the perpetrator of domestic abuse. Yes, there have been improvements over the years, but what has been unearthed in Greater Manchester Police should set alarm bells ringing, not just at HMICFRS or among local policing bodies but at the Home Office and in the office of the Home Secretary.

In a private conversation with me, a former very senior police officer speculated that diversity goes out of the window when the police service comes under pressure, as it has done over the past decade, with the savage cuts to police budgets and corresponding reductions in police officers, police community support officers and support staff. The evidence from GMP is that victim care may also be a casualty. I also cite the evidence of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that the police are not responding quickly enough because they are wrongly assessing the risk and have a lack of resources. Cuts to budgets, support staff and the money available for IT systems inhibit the kind of data analysis that the LSE is recommending.

The potential consequences for the victims of domestic abuse of soft-pedalling on issues surrounding diversity, and on the failure to record crime, are alarming, and the Home Secretary needs to take responsibility. This is central, as all the potential positive outcomes from the Bill will be impaired if we do not know the nature and extent of the problem. That, in turn, relies on victims of domestic abuse having confidence in the police service and knowing that, when they report domestic abuse to the police, they will be believed and it will be recorded and acted upon.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, how we protect, store and use data affects almost every aspect of our lives. The use of data to protect victims and catch the perpetrators of domestic violence, with encouragement of best practice by the domestic abuse commissioner, is something that every noble Lord should support. Data can tell us much about what has gone on before and that can inform our thinking going forward.

Amendment 23, proposed by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, would, in proposed new paragraph (e), add to the list of things in which the domestic abuse commissioner must encourage good practice. My noble friend gave us examples based on the LSE research and said how important a proper risk assessment is in triggering the effective and proper use of resources to protect victims. I look forward to the response to this from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford. As I said on a previous group, if we are told that the amendment is not necessary, it is incumbent on the Government to set out very clearly how they believe the powers in the Bill are sufficient to deal with the concerns raised in the amendments in respect of the general duty under Clause 7(1) and (2) and any other proposed legislation. We would like to have that clarity from the noble Baroness.

Amendment 28, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, would add two things that the domestic abuse commissioner may do in pursuance of the general duty under Clause 7. Again, we need clarity from the Government on this. My fear is that the duty could be viewed as so wide and open that things could fall through the gaps. We need something to underpin that, with an indication from the Government of what this list of things should cover. I hope we all agree about the good intent behind the amendment. The risk is that we are being too vague to deliver what we all want to deliver.

Amendment 50, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Paddick, is very reasonable, but, again, if the Government view it as unnecessary, we need to hear very clearly whether they are relying on Clause 15(1) to ensure that the domestic abuse commissioner has the necessary power and that there is no doubt that co-operation includes the provision of data from the public authority in question. In the past, we have seen public authorities query the need to provide such data. I never want to hear them giving some spurious reason relating to GDPR or any other regulation, or saying that they cannot provide data due to custom and practice. We have all heard those infuriating and unacceptable reasons given in the past, so it is clear that we need to make sure that that cannot happen again.

Amendment 62, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seems to be a no-brainer. I have never been a police officer and am not a lawyer but, when I speak in this House, I try to apply plain common sense to things. That has served me reasonably well over the last few years. If a person who might be served a domestic abuse protection notice has a criminal record and the nature of the offences could be relevant, surely that is valid information for a police officer to have available when making a decision on whether to serve a notice. My noble friend highlighted past failures in the system, so that is a risk that we should avoid.

I listened very carefully to the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I agree that of course we have to be very careful about how people’s data is used, but if somebody has convictions for violence, such as violence against women and other serious offences, it is not unreasonable that a police officer should be aware of that when considering whether to serve a notice. Clause 22 lists four matters that a police officer needs to look at when considering whether a person, referred to as “P”, could be subject to a notice. They are all very reasonable and a police officer considering a person’s previous criminal history might be the most important.

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[Baroness Featherstone (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 39, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on the composition of the advisory board. This amendment is straightforward and brief, and is simply to ensure that men who are abused and those in same-sex relationships have a knowledgeable and expert advocate on that board.

As a Home Office Minister and Equalities Minister during the coalition, with responsibility for domestic violence in my portfolio, I met victims of all types and visited refuges of all types. The different issues that arise for men who are abused can be profound. As my noble friend Lord Dholakia said, they are less likely to report abuse and often feel ashamed if they are abused. They can feel that they are not proper men and more, so there is a need for specialist response and services. The same is true with the issues in same-sex relationships.

Of course, the majority of domestic abuse is against women by men and I know that among the many fantastic groups, charities and provision for women there is a wealth of experience. However, a substantial minority of men are victims too and their experience can often be less well understood. I noted the Minister’s earlier remarks about ensuring that the commissioner has freedom to appoint to her own requirements, and I know that it is the intention of this Bill that all people who suffer domestic abuse are covered by the legislation. However, I believe that it is important to ensure that this expertise is mandated in the board’s structure to enable it to succeed fully in its function, as the advisory board will be such an important underpinning for the commissioner. I am sure that there will still be, and should be, as other noble Lords have said, latitude for the commissioner to appoint above and beyond any statutory places.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, there appears to be no reasonable argument for limiting the number of members of the advisory board. Surely there should be as many as the commissioner believes to be reasonably necessary, as suggested by our Amendment 37. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, it should not be that at least one member of the board must represent the interests of victims of domestic abuse, but that they should have expertise and experience with regard to the victims of domestic abuse. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his support on this point.

It is quite clear that different victims will have different needs, in particular, those from minority groups, including black, Asian and other ethnic minorities, those with disabilities, male victims and those from sexually and gender-diverse groups. Were there to be a representative from each of these groups, it would be a very large advisory board indeed. Someone could have expertise in and experience of dealing with more than one minority group, hence Amendment 38.

Amendment 40 suggests that at least one member of the advisory board should have

“experience of or expertise in both”

policing and criminal justice, and not, as Clause 12(4)(e) suggests, that they

“represent the interests of … policing or criminal justice.”

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, it is essential that the police, the CPS, the courts and the prison and probation services all work together to tackle domestic abuse. Therefore, it should not be, as the Bill currently suggests, someone representing either the police or other parts of the criminal justice system.

Again, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said, having included children as victims in Clause 3, it seems necessary to have someone with expertise and experience in children’s health and well-being on the advisory board. The lifelong impact of adverse childhood experiences on the health, well-being and propensity of young people to engage in criminality is well documented. Witnessing domestic abuse is but one of these ACEs.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 25th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I refer to my interests as listed in the register. I listened with great interest to the noble Baroness’s explanation of this first amendment. I bring to the House a different situation that in my view is covered by the amendment, but which the noble Baroness has not put forward. Like many of the groups I am involved with, I am very opposed to marriage under the age of 18. There is no doubt that a number of teenage marriages involve domestic abuse. It is important to recognise that, in such marriages, those under 18 are as much at risk as anyone else. Later, I will deal through amendments of my own with a situation I am particularly concerned about: young people both under and over 18 who are forced by coercive control or physical abuse into an unwanted marriage that they—she, generally, but sometimes he—do not want to enter. That is why I want to raise this issue as perhaps another probing part of the amendment: to recognise this group of young people aged under 18.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I restate my interests in respect of this Bill. Noble Lords will recall the story of the farmyard animals that come up with the idea of rewarding the farmer with an egg and bacon breakfast, to which the pig responds to the chickens, “I’d be committed to this; you’d only be involved.” As a former police officer who dealt with countless cases of domestic abuse during my service, and as a survivor of domestic abuse myself, I very much feel like the pig when it comes to this Bill.

Amendment 1 questions why both perpetrator and victim have to be 16 or over. We understand that, if the victim is under 16, the offence would be child abuse rather than domestic abuse, but not if the perpetrator is under 16 and the victim over 16. For me, the acid test is whether someone is being placed in the intolerable position of not feeling safe in their own home as the result of the abuse. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has described, this might be the result of the actions of someone who is under 16—elder abuse of a grandmother by a grandchild, for example.

The Minister will acknowledge that increasingly younger children are becoming involved in county lines drug dealing. One of the many worrying aspects of county lines is how children are becoming violent towards their own family members at home as they become embroiled in the savage and ruthless culture of drug gangs, particularly when they are challenged about their behaviour by a parent or guardian. My noble friend described the amendment as probing. On reflection, I believe that it may become increasingly necessary. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the Bill currently defines domestic abuse as involving two people aged over 16. As has been said, the amendment would expand this definition to include a relationship where one person was under 16 and the other over 16. It appears that the definition would apply where the victim was over 16 but the perpetrator was not. We have doubts about the definition in the Bill being changed in this way, but I understand from what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has said that this is a probing amendment.

Teenage relationships, and the victims of teenage relationship abuse, have specific needs, which should be addressed through a separate strategy tailored to them and recognised as an issue separate from both child abuse and the abuse that takes place between adults. As I said, we recognise that this is a probing amendment, but our concern is that if the age of the perpetrator in the definition is lowered—as appears to be the effect of the amendment in the circumstances set out in it—we would end up prosecuting and treating some perpetrators under 16 as, in effect, adults, which is not a road we believe we should go down. However, the issue of younger person or teenage abuse raised by the amendment is an important one, which the Government should address through a specific strategy and guidance for this group of victims and perpetrators. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment, I had a very late request from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to have a word after the Minister. Can we please hear from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick?

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I want to make a general point: the point of speaking after the Minister is to challenge something that she has said. That may be in the very last sentence that she speaks. Therefore, there should be a pause to allow people who want to challenge the Minister to email before we go to the mover of the amendment.

The Minister says that the perpetrator age should not be less than 16 because the Government want to avoid criminalising children. How is that consistent with the approach that they are taking in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill? They want to increase penalties for children under that Bill, but apparently do not want to criminalise children in this.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I apologise to the noble Lord. Would the Minister like to come back on that particular point?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, it is never easy to make a truly original point at the end of such a full and interesting debate as the one on this group, so I will keep my remarks as brief as possible. In general, we have to be careful about diluting the definition of domestic abuse. We could be in danger of expanding it to the point where it begins to lose impact, duplicates laws already in place or worse still, as the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said, stores up significant legal problems for the future.

However, to argue against myself briefly, there is significant merit in considering Amendments 7, 11 and 12. Some of the most shocking and disturbing evidence heard by the joint scrutiny committee was from Ruth Bashall, the CEO of Stay Safe East. The noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, read out a quote from her, so I will not repeat it, but it was compelling and moving evidence. As a result, after much discussion and consideration, the committee recommended that the Bill should recognise that the abuse of disabled people by their carers often mirrors that seen in other relationships covered by the Bill. We concluded that abuse by any carer towards this particularly vulnerable group should be included in the statutory definition. We also recommended that the Government review the “personally connected” clause, with the intention of amending it to include a clause that covers all disabled people and their carers, paid or unpaid, in recognition of the fact that this type of abuse occurs in a domestic situation. I stand by this recommendation.

Worldwide systematic reviews have highlighted the greater risk of violence generally for disabled people, showing that they are substantially more likely to experience threats of violence, physical abuse and sexual assault. The noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, made an excellent and strong speech on this. Most people outside this House would be shocked to hear about the levels of abuse that disabled people have to put up with. SafeLives also produced a report showing that disabled people are far more likely—twice as likely, I think—than able-bodied women in particular to experience physical, sexual, emotional and financial abuse.

The other point that the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, made excellently is that the route out is so much harder and less clear. Domestic abuse suffered by disabled victims often goes unreported and unnoticed, and leaves these hidden victims without the support they need. We often have a chicken-and-egg situation, because the data and research on this group are limited, making it far more difficult to justify and advocate for the commissioning of services that respond to their specific needs.

The voice of people with disabilities is not heard often enough or loudly enough. I therefore hope that the Government will give due consideration to these amendments, which could have a significant impact on their ability to escape from what can so often be a prison in their own homes.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I think the general test for this group of amendments is whether the perpetrator of abuse has some power or hold over the victim and, through abuse, makes the victim feel unsafe in their own home. In that regard, the noble Baronesses, Lady Campbell of Surbiton and Lady Wilcox of Newport, both made the important point about the close connection there often is between a disabled person and their carers, raising similar risks to other vulnerable people in intimate relationships.

I will take these amendments in order. If the victim is 16 or over and subject to abuse by their guardian—someone who has power over them—it seems only right that guardians are included in the definition of “personally connected”, as Amendment 6 suggests.

Similarly, a carer for a disabled person—someone who, to a greater or lesser extent, the disabled person relies on—should also be included, particularly if the care is provided in the victim’s home. Amendment 7 is perhaps too wide, albeit that the intention is to provide a safeguard for disabled people, in that someone who provides care to an able-bodied person would be included in this amendment as currently drafted. The more narrowly drawn Amendment 11 appears more precise.

Amendment 12, to which we have our Amendment 13, is arguably unintentionally too narrow in applying only to cases where the care is provided to enable independent living, rather than, as our amendment suggests, where the care is provided to enable someone to live in their own home, whether independently or not. I accept what my noble friend Lady Hamwee said: this may not necessarily widen the definition but simply clarify what independent living means.

I understand that those involved in coercing someone into a forced marriage may not be parents or other family members. They may be the family of the other party to the marriage, for example, but parents and other family members involved in such practices, as indicated in the Member’s explanatory statement, are already included in the definition of “personally connected”, as they are relatives. The behaviour would also be covered by the definition of “abusive” under Clause 1(3)(c), “controlling or coercive behaviour”, although I accept what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, says: it could also be physical abuse. I wonder whether the Minister agrees.

Amendment 9 seeks to include victims of the offence under Section 1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I understand that such a person would also be a victim of domestic abuse, but I wonder whether they would need the protection of both this Bill and the Modern Slavery Act, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, alluded to.

Amendment 10 reinforces what I have previously said about someone who, as a result of abuse, does not feel safe in their own home. This might easily include someone who is part of the same household as the victim but not covered by any of the other definitions of “personally connected”, such as the victim’s sister’s live-in boyfriend. The sister and the boyfriend may be in an intimate relationship, but the victim is not otherwise “personally connected” to the boyfriend.

Amendment 14 concerns the separate issue of children as victims of domestic abuse who are traumatised as a result of seeing the effect on the victim and are related to the victim or the perpetrator. The example given is where a mother has several transitory relationships with men, who may live with her or visit her but are not otherwise connected with her children.

It is conceivable that such children might be traumatised by the actions of the perpetrator, rather than by experiencing the effects of abuse on the mother, making the amendment necessary. Bullying behaviour by the transitory lover could have a lasting and detrimental impact on the child, even if the mother’s reaction to it does not have any impact. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, this is the first opportunity I have had to speak on this Bill, so I hope that noble Lords will permit me to begin by agreeing with my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering and the wide range of noble Lords from all corners of your Lordships’ House who have paid tribute to my right honourable friend Theresa May for bringing forward this landmark legislation, as my noble friend called it. I mentioned in my maiden speech in your Lordships’ House more than a year ago that I hoped this Bill would see swift passage to the statute book. I hope this reassures noble Lords that I speak not just as a Government Whip but as an enthusiast for seeing this legislation on the statute book. I hope that we can conduct our scrutiny rigorously and swiftly, including of the nearly 200 amendments which have been tabled to it so far.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and others for introducing these amendments, and all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will begin with the amendments which seek to expand the definition of “personally connected” in Clause 2 of the Bill.

Amendment 6 seeks to expand the definition to include guardians. The Government have understood this to mean legal guardians of children under the age of 18, but we believe that the existing drafting already covers guardians to the extent that it is appropriate to do so. Clause 2(1) defines the term “personally connected” for the purposes of the definition of domestic abuse in Clause 1. Among those groups of people who are taken to be personally connected are two people who each have, or have at one time had, parental responsibility in relation to the same child. Subsection (2) goes on to define a parental relationship as being one where the person “is a parent of”, or has “parental responsibility for the child”. Subsection (3) then provides that parental responsibility,

“has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989 … section 3”,

which defines parental responsibility to include legal guardians of children. So, if the two individuals within an abusive relationship are, say, the birth mother of a child and a legal guardian or former legal guardian of the same child, then those two individuals would come within the definition of “personally connected”.

Amendment 8, in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, seeks to expand the definition of “personally connected” to include victims of forced marriage or those in a situation where one person is forcing the other into a marriage with another person. As the noble and learned Baroness said, this affects a large number of people from a wide range of parts of the community. She mentioned, for instance, gay men and women who are forced into marriage by their families and others, and that, sadly, it is often accompanied by violence or so-called honour killings. We are confident that victims of forced marriage are already captured under the existing definition of “personally connected” in Clause 2. Among other things, this provides that a personal connection exists if persons A and B are, or have been, married to each other, or if they are, or have been, in an intimate personal relationship.

We are also confident that victims who are being forced into a marriage with another person by a family member will also be captured under the existing definition at Clause 2(1)(g), which provides that a personal connection exists when person A and person B are related. Moreover, the draft statutory guidance clearly signals that forced marriage is one manifestation of domestic abuse.

That leaves one potential situation arising from Amendment 8, in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, namely where a victim is being forced into a forced marriage by somebody to whom he or she is not related. In this situation, the victim would not be considered “personally connected” to the perpetrator, and it would not be considered domestic abuse in the context of the Bill. Similarly, with reference to Amendment 9, victims of domestic servitude who are suffering abuse would not be considered victims of domestic abuse unless they were personally connected to the perpetrator as defined in Clause 2. That is because the definition of “personal connection” is key to the approach we are taking in this Bill.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is absolutely right to bring forward her amendment to the Motion. I might want to criticise the details, which I do not intend to do, but she is right to do so. In fact, it would have been inconsistent with her rigid approach to the Bill for her not to do so. So, to that extent, I support her right to table the amendment; there is no question whatever about that. It gives me an opportunity to further vote for the Bill because I will not support the amendment to the Motion.

The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, just made a point about the open society. This is a problem and there is a disquiet here. As an open society, we need to protect our openness. However, when that openness is the very thing used to undermine and smash our open society, we have to say no. We have to have a process that defends our open society and is consistent with the rule of law. The Bill is perfect for that. I have no doubt that in future the Bill will be amended, but the language that has been used about it is extravagant and misleading.

I see that on Twitter it is described as the “Spy Cops Bill”. It has nothing to do with spy cops. It is completely different and that can be misleading. If I was a CHIS in Scotland, I would be a bit concerned at the moment about becoming a whistleblower because I am not sure whether the Scottish Government are fully behind the process.

Perhaps I may briefly also express thanks. I have not been involved in the detail but I took up the Minister’s opportunity for a discussion with the Bill team and some of the advisers, which I found useful. Indeed, as a result, they published more information. The case studies, which I used extensively on Report, should have been deployed even more. There has been a communication issue regarding the Bill, which I find a fault because the Government have not defended and promoted some of its practical aspects as much as they could have.

The Bill protects covert human intelligence sources. It makes sure that they are not put at risk by being tested by the criminal gangs they may have been sucked into involuntarily, as mentioned in some of the examples used in the case studies. It is not the case that all people knowingly go down that route; they get sucked in by their employers. As a non-expert in this area, I found the newly published guidance incredibly helpful.

My final point is on the pejorative language used, such as when quangos are dismissed as not important. Most of the quangos listed in the Bill are non-ministerial government departments and should not be dismissed by saying, “Oh, it doesn’t matter”. I find that kind of language unacceptable among parliamentarians because it deliberately seeks to mislead the public regarding what the Bill is about. It should stop.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have a lot of respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and we support the spirit of her amendment to the Motion to the extent that we oppose the granting of legal immunity. We believe that the Bill undermines the rule of law—that is, the principle whereby all members of a society are considered equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. As a result of the Bill, that is called into question, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, have said.

Where a police officer or member of the security services tasks a covert human intelligence source to commit an act defined in law as a crime, the person tasked will no longer be subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. An existing system that has worked effectively for decades, whereby informants and agents are tasked to commit crime and the decision, almost without exception, not to prosecute is taken by the relevant prosecuting authority, after considering all the facts, will be swept aside.

It is to be replaced with what we consider an unsafe and undesirable power, vested in the hands of the police, the security services and numerous other public authorities, to grant legal immunity with no prior judicial authority. The main issue is not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, says in her amendment to the Motion, that there are insufficient safeguards or oversight, although this is arguably true. It is the fact that immunity can be granted at all, making the illegal legal. That is the fundamental issue for us on these Benches. I expect the legality of this aspect of the Bill to be challenged in the courts. That said, the House fully debated this aspect of the Bill, and without the support of the Labour Party leadership, we on these Benches were unable to remove it.

Contrary to the amendment to the Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, this House has clarified the existing position and improved the Bill, to ensure that innocent victims of crimes committed by those instructed to do so by state agents can seek compensation. Contrary to her amendment to the Motion, undercover policing is not being expanded by the Bill, although the Bill has shone more light on this aspect of policing. The number of public authorities that can deploy covert human intelligence sources has been reduced by the Bill. The directed criminal activity of those informants and agents has been placed on a statutory footing, rather than the Bill enabling it to increase.

From the start, we recognised the need to place the tasking of covert human intelligence sources to commit crime on a statutory basis, which this Bill does. We have improved the Bill in some important respects—the safeguards for children and vulnerable adults, for example, despite our fundamental misgivings over immunity. Therefore, with regret, we cannot support the noble Baroness’s amendment to the Motion.

I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their work on the Bill; our Labour colleagues and their staff for their assistance and co-operation on those aspects that we were able to agree on; and those on the Cross Benches who have liaised with us. I also thank my staff and colleagues for their help with what has been a very difficult Bill for me, personally, because of my previous professional experience of this difficult area of policing and because of my knowledge of the very real opportunities that the Bill presents for corruption and malpractice. The amendments that this House has introduced are the very minimum required and we will resist any attempt to remove any of them.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we do not support the amendment to the Motion. This unelected House does not vote down Bills. Our role is that of a revising Chamber. Through making amendments to Bills, we invite the House of Commons to reconsider its position on specific aspects of legislation. That is what we have done with this Bill.

We have debated amendments to the Bill. Some have been agreed by this House, and some have not had its support. From our point of view, we have not won the support of this House for everything we wanted, but important amendments have been agreed and we want the Bill with those amendments to go back to the House of Commons for consideration. This amendment to the Motion, if carried, would thwart that objective and accordingly we shall vote against it.

Police National Computer

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 19th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I thank the noble Baroness the Minister for being here—unlike the Home Secretary yesterday in the Commons—as the senior government Minister in the Lords covering the Home Office, to be accountable to this House for the worrying events detailed in the Statement.

The Statement says that it is estimated that up to some 400,000 offence, arrest and person records have, due to human error, inadvertently been deleted from the police national computer. There will be an internal investigation. Something described as human error can hide a multitude of failures covering, for example, inadequate training or supervision, previous warnings of the likelihood of an incident occurring being ignored, people working under pressure, out-of-date or unreliable equipment and lack of provision of readily available safeguards to override the consequences of human error—all factors for which responsibility should ultimately lie at the highest level within the department. Yet the Commons Minister yesterday stated:

“Sadly, human error introduced into the code has led to this particular situation”.


The Government appear to have already determined the outcome of the internal investigation. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, who speaks for the Government: why is this investigation not going to be independent and, secondly, will the full report of the investigation be placed before Parliament? Can the Government also say whether Statements would have even been made to Parliament if reports of this serious loss of data had not appeared in the media?

The police national computer and the police national database are due to be replaced by the national law enforcement data programme. However, the assessment by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority is that successful delivery of the project is in doubt. The Policing Minister admitted in the Commons yesterday that the replacement of the PNC

“has had its fair share of problems, it is fair to say we have undergone a reset. There is now a renewed sense of partnership working between the Home Office and the police, to make sure we get that much needed upgrade in technology correct.”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/1/20; col. 624.]

When a Minister uses those kind of words, one knows that there have been big problems with the replacement of the outdated PNC, from which up to 400,000 records have been deleted, not because it is no longer fit for purpose but apparently due solely to human error. How could up to 400,000 records be deleted without apparently there being a proper back-up system in place? Was that lack of a proper back-up system also due to “human error”?

Is it true, as was asked in the Commons yesterday, but without a reply being given, that Ministers were warned many months ago that their approach to the police national computer and database posed a significant risk to policing’s ability to protect the public, and that the databases were “creaking” and operating on

“end of life, unsupported hardware and software”?—[Official Report, Commons, 18/1/20; col. 627.]

If so, what did the Government do about that?

In the Commons, the Government sought to say that, first, the data deleted might be available on other systems or databases and, secondly—because the data related to people arrested and in respect of whom, for the specific matter for which they were arrested, no further action was taken—it really is not that serious that this data has been deleted. The National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for the police national computer has said that the deleted DNA contains records marked for

“indefinite retention following conviction of serious offences.”

Is it still the Government’s view that this deleted data is not important? If so, could the Government explain why this data is retained at all, and may be on other systems, if it has no real value in preventing crime in the first place, in the fight against crime and in bringing criminals to justice? In the absence of a credible answer to that question, clearly the data deleted is of significance. In responding, could the Government set out the potential damage that could be done, or has perhaps already been done, as a result of these inadvertent deletions?

We need greater openness and frankness from the Government, now and in promised further updates, about what has happened—merely

“technical issues … with the police national computer”

according to the Statement—and why. We do not need an attempt to brush it all off as down to a “human error” with consequences of little significance.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, let me try to bring some clarity to what has happened. The records that have apparently been deleted are those of people arrested but not charged, or charged but not convicted. These are sometimes, but not always, deleted. If someone is arrested but not charged or not convicted for one of more than 200 serious offences, their fingerprints and DNA can be retained for up to five years. If they have previous convictions for a serious offence, their fingerprints and DNA can be retained indefinitely. It may be that there are no fingerprint or DNA records for any of these people, other than those taken when there was no conviction. These are the records that have apparently been deleted. Meanwhile, some that should have been deleted have not been.

Although the people whose records have been deleted may not have been charged or convicted on this occasion, their DNA or fingerprints may be found at crime scenes in the future. If their fingerprints and DNA have been deleted, there is no way of proving forensically that they were at these crime scenes.

Some 213,000 offence records, 175,000 arrest records and 15,000 person records have potentially been deleted. Some 26,000 DNA records, 30,000 fingerprint records and 600 subject records may also have been deleted. This mistake could result in criminals who would otherwise be convicted of serious criminal offences not being identified, arrested, charged or convicted.

The Statement says that other databases such as the police national database can be checked, but my understanding is that the script run on the PNC deleted records on linked databases. Can the Minister confirm that?

Because of the variety of records that have been deleted—offence records, arrest records, person records and DNA and fingerprint records—it will be very difficult to put the jigsaw puzzle back together by collecting the pieces from different databases where the data may still be recorded. Is that the Minister’s understanding?

The first question, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked, must be: why was there no back-up? In October, senior police officers wrote to the Home Office to say they had “lost confidence” in its ability to complete big IT projects. What evidence is there to support this view?

Work on the national law enforcement data programme is in serious trouble, as the noble Lord said. This replacement for the police national computer and the police national database began in 2016 but is not expected to be completed until 2023, significantly delayed and overbudget. That is despite the existing systems running on obsolete hardware, using obsolete software.

To take another example, the new emergency services network was due to replace the system of radios and other mobile communications used by the police, the Motorola Airwave network, by 2019. That Home Office IT project has been delayed, meaning the existing Airwave system has had to be maintained for at least three years beyond its planned end of life, which is costing an additional £1.7 million a day. The final total is expected to reach close to £2 billion.

The facts are that the Government not only cut police officer numbers by over 20,000 between 2010 and 2020 but failed to invest in the systems that the police rely on to be effective. They have committed to recruiting 20,000 new police officers—dressing the window—meanwhile allowing what is unseen but vital to fall apart.

Following the end of the transition period on 1 January, the police lost real-time access to the European Union Schengen Information System, SIS II, meaning that front-line officers no longer have real-time access to data on 40,000 fugitives and dangerous criminals. It is now clear that these officers, who put their lives on the line for us every day, cannot rely on UK systems either. What are the Government going to do, not just to retrieve the lost data, but to ensure that the Home Office IT systems that the police rely on are fit for purpose? At the moment, it is absolutely clear that they are not.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I will start with that assertion by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick: this does not relate to SIS II. This issue was a human error. Both noble Lords talked about IT systems; again, this was a human error, but it would be churlish of me not to discuss what the Home Office is doing about IT systems. We are delivering a number of new national IT systems to replace ageing critical national infrastructure and provide modern digital services that extend and enhance police capability. They have already delivered some valuable new capabilities to front-line policing: for example, to do fingerprint checks in the field and to extend ANPR coverage significantly.

Noble Lords are right that there have been some delivery challenges. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about the ESMCP, where I share his frustration. I have been focusing on it closely, and a new programme director was appointed in August last year, with the support of an interim SRO. The focus has been on greater transparency to the emergency services. On that note, the emergency services need confidence that the programme will deliver, for which testing has to be done.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was right in his breakdown of the numbers. On the point that this is not serious, it is. I do not think that my right honourable friend the Policing Minister tried to downplay that yesterday, in any way. It is serious. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who asked whether the deletion is not that important—no, it is important. It is important to show how the process that my right honourable friend outlined yesterday is going to work. The first stage is to bring back the data, not to try to restore that which has been deleted, as that could cause worse problems. We will do a close analysis by the close of play tomorrow. We will recover the relevant data and, fourthly and importantly, we will ensure legal compliance in all the moves that we make.

Back-ups are, of course, held for all systems but due to the scale, the complexity and the dynamic nature of how the affected systems interact, restoring from back-ups needs to be undertaken in a very controlled manner. Our technical teams are now working at pace to identify how to do this safely. As I said, we should complete this analysis very shortly, and it will give us the full picture of what needs to be done.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about deleted records on police systems, I understand that the engineers managed to stop some of the activity before it could proceed any further. That is certainly a part of the analysis that is being done today, and the extent of that will be further understood.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why we do not have an external review. The reason it is an internal review is because it is an issue of human error and the Home Office engineers are having to work at pace to identify the full list of affected records. The analysis is due to be completed, as I say, very shortly. There will be a lessons-learned exercise. Of course there will be a full lessons-learned review. As for who will carry out that, it may be an external person. I can certainly find that out for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

Extradition Arrangements: European Union Member States

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the additional cost of trials of those wanted in the UK having to take place in the accused’s home country, and to what extent will that be a consideration in deciding whether to pursue a prosecution?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

As I said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, it is probably quite early to say what those additional costs would be, but the decision on whether to pursue a trial would be based not on costs but on the likelihood of that trial being successful, either for the accused or indeed for the victim.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for the leading role he has played in achieving consensus around Amendment 24. I start by reminding the House of the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, in his summary of a similar group of amendments in Committee. He used the analogy of torture, where the ends do not justify the means, in the same way that using children as informants or agents is difficult to justify under any circumstances. Regrettably, banning the use of children as covert human intelligence sources is outside the scope of the Bill. He went on to recall the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who suggested as an alternative to using children using people over 18 who look younger, as the acting profession often does, particularly when dealing with adult themes.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out that there is a very fine line between grooming and persuading children to act as covert human intelligence sources. My noble friend Lady Doocey quite rightly pointed out that these children are already vulnerable and exploited, particularly in the case of county lines, without the need for them to be further exploited by the police. We do not send children into war, so why do we send them into potentially more dangerous situations as CHIS, as a number of noble Lords have asked this afternoon? A very experienced police handler of informants told me that, in his experience, even adult CHIS are open to manipulation, let alone children. If you are a child, a non-documented migrant or a victim of human trafficking caught by the police committing crime, you are likely to look for any available way out. You do not need to be blackmailed in such a situation; you are likely to grab at any opportunity, including being tasked to commit crime as a participating informant, a point made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Young of Hornsey, in Committee. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, we are talking about the power imbalance between the police and these vulnerable people, including children.

The Minister’s response in Committee was to cite a High Court judge, Mr Justice Supperstone, who was convinced by the police that it was okay to use children in this way. They appear to have been less successful in convincing the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham. When I was seeking promotion to the most senior ranks in the police service, on a six-month course at the national Police Staff College, we were told that we were moving from superintending ranks, where we had to operate within the existing paradigm, to ACPO ranks, where our responsibility was to change the paradigm. Despite the High Court’s decision, we need to change the paradigm. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, says, the court did not consider the active involvement of children as CHIS in crime.

The Government, in response to our deliberations in Committee, have come up with their own alternative. I am as unimpressed as the noble Lord, Lord Young, with this attempt. First, in relation to authorising the use of children, it amends secondary not primary legislation—much easier for the Government to subsequently change and impossible for us to amend. The only change to primary legislation is on post-event reporting. The government amendments, particularly Amendment 26, prohibit the use of children under 16 to commit crimes against their parent or guardian, but not 17 and 18 year-olds: this is already the case, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said. It creates the position of a “relevant person” who is responsible for the risk assessment and for ensuring that an “appropriate adult” is present if the child is under 16. This risk assessment and the presence of an appropriate adult are already required in legislation. In the case of 17 and 18 year-olds, the appropriate person has only to consider,

“whether an appropriate adult should be present”.

Again, that consideration is already required.

Saying that a child criminal conduct authorisation should be limited to four months instead of 12 is also not a real change. Child CHIS can only be authorised for a maximum of four months and a CCA cannot be granted unless the child has been authorised to be a CHIS, so a review after four months is already inevitable. Overall, I would summarise the proposed alternatives the Government are putting forward as too little, too late.

Amendment 24, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has been a long time in the planning. I join with the noble Baroness in thanking Stella Creasy MP and Just for Kids Law. It covers vulnerable adults as well as children—the case for which was made strongly by my noble friend Lady Hamwee this afternoon—which the government amendment goes nowhere near. The presence of an appropriate adult would be mandatory for all children and vulnerable adults under this amendment, instead of being compulsory only for under-16s, as in the Government’s alternative. It sets out the very limited circumstances when a child could be used, where the best interests of the child must be paramount. The child or vulnerable adult is not to be put at risk of physical or psychological harm, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed. The Minister may say that these restrictions are so limiting that it may result in children and vulnerable adults not being used at all. That is a risk we should be willing to take.

In the absence of Amendments 12 and 13, we support Amendment 24 as the best of the available options, though I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, that it does not involve the independent prior authorisation contained in her Amendment 14. However, as I have just said, it does include informing the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as possible. If anyone thinks that 16 might be an appropriate age for drawing the line, I would urge them to watch the film “County Lines”, directed by Henry Blake. It brings out the horror of the impact of county lines drug dealing on teenagers, including older teenagers, and powerfully makes the case for immediately removing children from these circumstances. Important points were made by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, about the lifelong impact of adverse childhood experiences such as involvement in county lines. Regrettably, contrary to the assertion of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, Amendment 12 does not prevent using a child as a CHIS; it only prohibits tasking them to commit crime. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out, some adults are at least as vulnerable as some children.

Amendment 24 is a compromise, but it is comprehensive in that covers both vulnerable adults and children, and we support it strongly for the reasons so clearly expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his kind words about my right honourable friend James Brokenshire. I inform the House that he read all the lovely comments from Monday’s debate and was very touched by them.

Also, in response to my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, I apologise for the late arrival of the letter. I hope he has had a chance in the course of this debate to look at it.

This has been a very thoughtful debate on an incredibly important issue. I have listened very carefully to the points made by all noble Lords throughout the preceding debates on the safeguards that should apply to children. At this stage, I must say to my noble friend Lord Cormack, who bemoaned the advent of certain behaviours over the last 20 or 30 years, that I am afraid to tell him that they go back far longer than that. I also thank all noble Lords who have engaged with me on this issue directly, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Rosser, who gave up their Saturday afternoon, together with Stella Creasy, to speak to me and my right honourable friend James Brokenshire. I must say that I think we all found that conversation very helpful.

I hope that all noble Lords will recognise the substantial amendments that the Government have put forward to ensure that robust safeguards are in place in legislation for the very rare circumstances in which a juvenile CHIS may be tasked to participate in criminal conduct. Noble Lords have been told that the courts have found these safeguards to be inadequate. That is not the case at all. The High Court considered the safeguards for juvenile CHIS in 2019 and expressly found them to be lawful. In fact, Mr Justice Supperstone explicitly rejected the contention that the scheme is inadequate in its safeguarding of the interests and welfare of juvenile CHIS. He also set out his view that it was clear that the principal focus of the framework for juvenile CHIS is to ensure that appropriate weight is given to a child’s best interests and that the practical effect of the enhanced risk assessment is that juveniles are

“only utilised in extreme circumstances and when other potential sources of information have been exhausted.”

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked whether a child impact assessment has been conducted, and the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, suggested an independent review of authorisations of juveniles. This has happened. The independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner conducted a review of all public authorisations of juveniles and the conclusions of that review were reported in March 2019 to the JCHR. The IPC was satisfied that those who grant such authorisations do so only after very careful consideration of the inherent risks and concerns around the safeguarding of children. The public authority’s duty of care to the child is a key consideration in the authorisation process. The IPC also highlighted that juvenile CHIS are not tasked to participate in criminality that they are not already involved in and that becoming a CHIS can potentially offer a way to extricate themselves from such harm. The decisions to authorise are made only where this is the best option for breaking the cycle of crime and the danger for the individual.

In moving the government amendments today, I will not move Amendments 35, 38 and 49, which relate to devolved activity in Scotland. This is because, as I hope noble Lords have seen in the letter I issued earlier today, the Scottish Government are unable to support the Bill. Respecting the Sewel convention, the Government will not legislate without the consent of the Scottish Government. Therefore, at Third Reading I will bring forward amendments to remove from the Bill the ability to authorise participation in criminal conduct for devolved purposes in Scotland. Authorisations necessary for the purpose of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom relate to reserved matters and the relevant public authorities will still be able to grant authorisations for these purposes for activity in Scotland through the powers contained within this legislation. An authorisation necessary for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime or preventing disorder is not in itself reserved. An authorisation granted for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime or preventing disorder may therefore relate to devolved matters, and it will be these matters to which the Bill will not apply.

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[Viscount Brookeborough (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene—[Inaudible]—discussed in the context of CHIS operating in non-terrorist criminal organisations and rather less of those in terrorist groups. Because the Bill covers both at once, I feel there is a danger—[Inaudible]—extent that it might seriously inhibit the latter, which is the fight against terrorism. I therefore cannot fully support the amendment as a whole, but I would support proposed new subsection (c) on sexual offences on its own if I could do so.

The major difference between non-terrorist crime and terrorism is that the former—[Inaudible]—of death. Terrorism always has death and destruction as its aim. I know little about the former apart from what I have read in the press and heard in the very excellent debates on the Bill. However, I have some knowledge of—[Inaudible]—we remember the serious nature of the criminality that terrorist groups seek to carry out. The intelligence that CHIS gather prevents large numbers of deaths and serious harm to the public.

There have been, I believe, some misconceptions in these debates about the terrorist world. There has been mention of informer—[Inaudible.] All agents are informers, but not all informers are agents. The single-use informer is a person who is short term only and would probably be paid off or given another life after the operation, such as the dismantling of a drug-dealing gang. This is because he will have been exposed by the arrest—[Inaudible]—operator in a large organisation that provides ongoing information that can go on for years or even decades. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested that a CHIS operating under one of these authorisations is called a participating informer. Perhaps that was so in the areas of his experience, but it was not so in mine, when—[Inaudible]—these types of agents, strategic agents in a terrorist group or short-term criminal informers.

In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, said:

“Let us suppose that in becoming a member of a terrorist organisation, a CHIS is required to fill out a membership form … The handlers may therefore assist”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 151.]


in filling the form out. I hesitate to disagree with such an eminent noble and learned Lord, and while I do not doubt that this might be the case for other groups, I am not aware of any terrorist organisation that produces a membership application—although the IRA had a green book that was given to people once they were inducted.

[Inaudible]—in Northern Ireland for 23 years of the Troubles. More recently, I am well aware of the agent-handling protocols from the Troubles era and that they have been adapted and improved for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. For centuries, perhaps for all time, there have been spies and intelligence gatherers at state level, where it is basically strategic intelligence within a pyramid of government structure. This is, if you like, the Le Carré world. Spies rarely have to commit crimes, such as planning and carrying out a bombing—[Inaudible]—in the last 60 years is worldwide terrorism and the need to have long-term deep plants or active terrorists who have been turned.

[Inaudible]—that states have. Terrorist organisations are very flat in structure and every person from the top to the bottom is—[Inaudible]—for want of a better word. They are active terrorists. It is also important to realise that it is very difficult to—[Inaudible.] In 40 years of the Troubles, there were only, I believe—[Inaudible]—figures of such people. We saw what happened when Robert Nairac thought he could become a member of a family. As a result, most CHIS are turned terrorists or at the very least members of the same communities. They will have committed and will almost certainly continue to commit crime—[Inaudible]—a big part of the induction process in the first place. There are no convenient forms to sign, and any reluctance to take part, from initiation onwards, is suicidal.

Imposing these legal limits, as laid down in the amendment, could put CHIS in the terrorist world at substantial risk. After being inducted into a terrorist organisation, every part of that individual’s life from then on contributes, one way or another, to the terrorist aims, death and destruction—criminality of the highest order. Becoming a CHIS cannot change that much. However, the outcomes of their provision of intelligence saved many lives.

I shall give a true example of a small event. An agent turned up at a meeting of his IRA ASU—active service unit—in the county where I live. He was told to deliver a car bomb immediately. He could not refuse. He delivered the car and, luckily, the TPU—the timer power unit—gave him time to call his handler from a call box before the bomb was to blow up, thereby avoiding loss of life. If I may say so, that is not the most extreme case.

Of course it is right that CHIS activity should be regulated and the Bill does just that. There are protections in place such as the Human Rights Act. However, there may be times when participation in serious crime is necessary and at short notice. Any refusal to be involved would result in the loss of an agent, and no further information from that source. It may have taken years for him to become so deeply involved. This is real life in that terrifying world. The running of the protection of such people is vital and complex. There has to be a way in which to manage them. Inserting increasingly tight legal limits on what they can and cannot do is not the way forward, as those limits may be largely unenforceable in those circumstances.

I will not go into examples of the protection. However, there is an analogy which shows the value of sources. The Enigma was a provider of intelligence, albeit a machine, rather than a person. When the code was broken, the first signal referred to an immediate attack on a convoy by U-boats. It struck me that that was a similar situation to those of some agents. Turing’s colleagues said quickly, “We must warn the convoy.” He said, “No. We cannot risk such a valuable source for the future, or that will be the end of it.” That is one of the problems for the CHIS.

Terrorism is—[Inaudible]—operations alone. The use of many long-term, deep-intelligence CHIS creates a cancer within the terrorist organisations that does so much damage to them that, although they do not admit defeat, they begin to realise that they cannot win. That turning point is sought after by Governments worldwide, and very much due to CHIS.

In the months prior to the ceasefire in Northern Ireland, over 90% of planned terrorist operations failed or did not take place, largely as a result of long-term deep CHIS. I and my family were among the beneficiaries of such intelligence. I believe that this and some of the other amendments will inhibit the fight against the worldwide terrorist threat.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen. I have added my name to it.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seems to have blown the Government’s reliance on the European Convention on Human Rights out of the water. Even if he was wrong, which I very much doubt, I fail to understand the difference between a list of offences that can be deduced from the convention and an offence listed in the Bill. The Government’s argument seems to be solely based on the danger of the CHIS being tested by asking them to perform prohibited acts. Yet as the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Cormack, have said—the amendment being based on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1985—the Canadians seem to have had no such qualms or difficulties.

In any event, is the cat not out of the bag already? Do criminals read Hansard? That is about as likely as they are to read primary legislation, in my experience. We have the list of prohibited offences published as a proposed amendment. The Minister is saying that those offences would be prohibited anyway under the ECHR, so what is to be lost? I understand the reservations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, about the wording of the amendment, but if the Government do not give an undertaking to bring this matter back at Third Reading, it can be approved on ping-pong, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

17: Clause 1, page 3, line 2, at end insert—
“(8A) Where a criminal conduct authorisation has been granted, the covert human intelligence source so authorised cannot be deployed unless the conditions under subsection (8B) have been fulfilled.(8B) The conditions are that—(a) notification has been given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner of—(i) the purpose and extent of the deployment, and(ii) the type of criminal activity it is anticipated the covert human intelligence source would participate in, and(b) the Commissioner has considered the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects, including the potential for collateral damage or injury, and has approved the deployment.(8C) In the event of urgency, prior approval is not required but notification must be given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event not later than seven days after the deployment.(8D) A notification under subsection (8B) or (8C) must be given in writing or transmitted by electronic means.”

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

I beg to move and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick [V]]

36: Schedule 1, page 7, line 9, after “is” insert “reasonably”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would insert a requirement that belief in the necessity and proportionality of a criminal conduct authorisation, and in the existence of satisfactory arrangements, be reasonably held.

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[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

The noble Lord, Lord Mann, has scratched. Accordingly, I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her kind remarks about my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I can assure her that my noble friend will be watching and listening intently as we come to the end of this Report stage.

We support Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Clark of Kilwinning. The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, ably and comprehensively explained the amendment, which means that I can be brief.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Finally, Amendment 32 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would make it explicit in RIPA that a person harmed by conduct under an authorisation—I believe the word used in RIPA is “aggrieved”—would have the right to seek redress from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. We first raised the issue of victims having redress through the tribunal in the House of Commons and we will support the amendment if it is taken to a vote. I await with interest the Minister’s response, not least to the assurances that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, seeks.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and to hear him speak in positive terms about his noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Before I address the main issues raised by Amendments 1 and 2, let me will clear the decks. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 32 in this group, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned, and my noble friend will deal that amendment later in the group. I have put my name to Amendments 1, 2, 21, and 22.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, proposes Amendments 21 and 22, which seek to clarify the legal extent of immunity that the Bill confers, because, despite debates in Second Reading and Committee, and numerous meetings and email exchanges between Members of your Lordships’ House, the Minister and the Bill team, it is still not clear to me and to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, exactly what the Bill seeks to achieve in terms of immunity. At the very least it shows how complex the Government’s proposals are. We support the noble Lord’s amendments.

Amendments 3 and 4 seek to limit the legal immunity provided by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, seeks to limit it to criminal liability. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, wants to ensure that criminals do not profit from the crimes they are asked to commit. We will support these amendments if the House divides on them, but they are both about damage limitation and will, I hope, be pre-empted by Amendments 1 and 2.

All these amendments, and those in the following groups, simply highlight the can of worms that the Government are opening by going way beyond the status quo by giving public authorities the power to grant legal immunity. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, Amendments 1 and 2 would remove the ability of public authorities to grant legal immunity to covert human intelligence sources prior to the criminal activity they are being asked to participate in. This would maintain the status quo, where the actions of agents or informants who are properly tasked by public authorities to commit crime are referred to the relevant prosecuting authority, which invariably rules that it is not in the public interest to prosecute them.

We on these Benches accept that that it is undesirable but necessary to use covert human intelligence sources and that, on occasion, these agents or informants need to be tasked to commit crime. We accept that, because of a legal challenge, it is necessary to put the tasking of covert human intelligence sources to commit crime on a statutory footing.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, set out the dangers of the changes the Government propose. I will take a slightly different angle. A reason often used by Governments for not accepting attempts to change existing law is that they are not necessary. We suggest that the Government have been unable to provide any evidence that a change in the law to provide covert human intelligence sources with legal immunity prior to their being tasked to commit crime is necessary.

In Committee, the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland said that

“noble Lords have accepted—and they have not needed to be persuaded—our position is that it is grossly unfair and unreasonable for the state to ask an individual to engage in difficult and dangerous work to frustrate serious crimes while leaving open the possibility of the state prosecuting them for that very same conduct”.

Will the Minister today admit from the Dispatch Box that her noble and learned friend was wrong to say what he did? I, along with many other noble Lords, have said explicitly and openly before the Minister made those remarks that we do not accept the Government’s position that this it is “grossly unfair and unreasonable” to leave open the possibility of prosecuting covert human intelligence sources in such circumstances.

The noble and learned Lord went on to say that covert human intelligence sources operate “in the public interest”. Many police informants act out of self-interest and for financial gain. I have, as a senior police officer, reluctantly handed brown envelopes stuffed full of £20 notes to criminals to pay them for acting as covert human intelligence sources. They were paid an amount agreed in advance for acting on police instructions. What these informants did undoubtedly was in the public interest, but that was not their primary motivation, as the Minister has suggested.

The noble and learned Lord went on to say that

“we must accept that we have lost intelligence and failed to recruit undercover operatives because we have not been able hitherto to give them confidence that the state will not prosecute them for the things that the state has asked them to do.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 171.]

Why must we accept this? Because the Minister said so? Because he has been told by operational partners who have a vested interested that this is the case? Parliament set a very useful precedent on 9 November 2005 when operational partners, backed by the then Labour Government, said that they needed to detain terrorist suspects for up to 90 days without charge. Large numbers of Labour MPs rebelled and joined a united opposition to reject what operational partners, backed by the Labour Government, were asking for. We should do the same today.

We have asked the Government for evidence of how much intelligence has been lost, as the Minister claims; we are told that they cannot produce any evidence. We have asked how many times operational partners have failed to recruit undercover operatives as a result of the status quo; we are told that the Government cannot produce any evidence. We have asked how many times a properly authorised agent or informant has been prosecuted for doing exactly what they were asked to do; we are told they cannot produce such evidence. We have said, “Okay then, just give us one example of where a properly authorised CHIS has been prosecuted for doing exactly what they were asked to do. If it is sensitive, redact the sensitive detail and show us in private if necessary.” They cannot even do that.

I suggest that, if we are to make such a monumental legal change, we should have evidence to support that decision. So, what evidence is there to support the Government’s case for so dramatically changing the law, so that a police officer can tell an informant to commit a crime, and for that criminal activity to no longer even be a crime—for that informant not to have legally done anything wrong at all, even if innocent people are hurt in the process? The Government’s case is simply their assertion, “It’s not fair.” Seriously? Do the Government think we should so radically change the law because it’s “not fair”?

I will quote the Minister again, who said that

“my respectful conclusion is to say that the continuation of the status quo is not desirable.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 173.]

Not desirable? Police officers have to secure the prior authority of both an Investigatory Powers Commissioner and a Secretary of State before they can listen to someone’s telephone conversation—and then only if the target is suspected of the most serious criminality. This Bill allows police officers to give an informant total legal immunity to commit any type of crime, with no prior independent authority or oversight, to combat even minor offences. That is the definition of “undesirable”.

Parliament rejected the unsubstantiated claims of operational partners in November 2005 and we should reject them now. We support Amendments 1 and 2.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

What a pleasure it is to follow the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who has demolished the Government’s case for handing out immunity like sweeties to criminals. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not call these people covert human intelligence sources; they are police spies, and we have to be clear about that when we use this language, so that people outside your Lordships’ Chamber can understand what we are talking about.

I shall speak in support of Amendments 1 and 2, which I have signed, but quite honestly, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said, all the amendments here are simply damage limitation. I am staggered that the government lawyers have actually allowed this legislation to be presented to your Lordships’ House. It is appalling. I liked the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Her stance on this is not factionalism; it is a principled stance by a lawyer who understands civil liberties and human rights, and we could all learn from that.

I will focus specifically on my Amendment 4. It might seem a little less powerful or important than the other amendments that we are coming to today and on Wednesday, but I think it is quite important. We will be authorising criminals—or officers, or police spies, or whoever they are—to make money by criminal activities and then keep that money. I would like those profits to be recoverable through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I would like a proper, clear answer from the Minister on this. I have asked multiple times since Second Reading but have not yet had an answer on how the Government will recover the profits made by a police spy under a criminal conduct authorisation, or CCA.

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The amendments we are supporting provide for effective pre-judicial and post-judicial scrutiny of criminal conduct authorisations while still enabling such authorisations to be given when the degree of urgency precludes prior judicial authorisation. In so doing, the amendments provide the balance between the need for flexibility over the procedure for giving authorisations and the importance of prior judicial authorisation to minimise the prospect—in what is otherwise self-authorisation by an agency or other body—of a potentially ill-judged or incorrect authorisation of criminal conduct by a covert human intelligence source, with all the consequences that might have.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is again a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. We agree with the arguments he put forward for the need for additional safeguards, beyond what is contained in the Bill. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 17 and 43 in this group.

Amendment 43 provides for a senior judge to undertake a review of the use of informants and agents and their participation in crime; in other words, to get answers to the questions, “Why do we need this Bill?” and “How far should it go?”, questions the Government have been unable to provide any evidence for. Contrary to what the Minister claimed in Committee, this review would not duplicate the oversight that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner provides in his annual review of the current use of the powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Instead, it would answer the questions we have been asking at every stage of this Bill that the Government have been unable to answer.

How widespread is the practice of using agents or informants who have been tasked to participate in crime? Who has been involved? Have they been brave men and women whose sole motivation is the public interest, or have they been people who lack civil responsibility, who do it for money and who have been engaged in very questionable activity—or is it both? The evidence we have heard on this point, arguably from equally reliable sources, has apparently been contradictory. To what extent has immunity from prosecution been a factor in the loss of intelligence and in potential covert human intelligence sources being deterred from helping public authorities? The Government have been unable to tell us, but this review would be able to answer the question—fundamental to the provisions of this Bill—of whether they are all needed. It would also answer the other crucial question: are the safeguards adequate?

That brings me to our Amendment 17. We have heard from Members of your Lordships’ House who have had hands-on, practical, operational experience of the issues covered by the Bill, of whom I am only one. I hesitate to use the word “expert” after I was once described as an expert on drugs—a rather dubious accolade—so I shall use the term “practitioners”. What we have heard from practitioners are the operational difficulties of prior judicial or ministerial authorisation. Practitioners have highlighted the differences between the existing provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act—which relate to the interception of communications—and the new provisions, which relate to the use of covert human intelligence sources tasked to commit crime; I will refer to them as “participating informants”.

The former usually involve the use of technology, such as the planting of a listening device or corrupting the software of a mobile telephone or a computer. The stream of information can be turned on and off remotely, without the target even knowing. The latter involves placing someone in an uncontrolled, unpredictable, often volatile situation, where the participating informant often interacts with dangerous criminals and often must use their own initiative to deal with rapidly changing and unpredicted scenarios with no real-time contact with their handlers or authorising officers. The former is passive and controllable intrusion. The latter is interactive and often uncontrollable.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, told us in Committee that he had been

“converted to the idea of prior judicial approval”

in the case of communications interception—as he has just restated—but that, again, tasking a CHIS

“requires decisions of a quite different nature based on immersion in the human complexities of fast-changing situations. Those decisions depend on close personal knowledge of a person’s character, which will often be unreliable and volatile, and on assessments of the underworld group in which that person is embedded. The authorisation of criminality is simply one part of that complex human relationship.”

The noble Lord also said that judges were good at assessing

“the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects”.—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 198.]

Our Amendment 17 is the result of listening to practitioners—and to those like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who has experience of being an Investigatory Powers Commissioner—and coming up with a compromise. The amendment allows the practitioners to do what they are good at: use the close personal knowledge of the participating informant’s character, assess the underworld group in which that person is to be embedded and define the crimes that the participating informant is to be authorised to commit.

However, once the informant has been granted a criminal conduct authority by the authorising officer, that now participating informant cannot be used or deployed unless the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has authorised use or deployment. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must consider the purpose and extent of the deployment and the type of criminality, in general terms, that it is anticipated the informant will be participating in. If the informant is not to be used to commit crime, IPC authority is not required. It is only once the informant is authorised to commit crime that IPC authority is needed.

If I may use this analogy, if you want to deploy a missile, you need one level of authority—in this case, the authorising officer. If you want to arm the missile with a warhead, you need another level of authority—in this case, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If the purpose or extent of the deployment changes, or the type of criminal activity in general terms changes, the IPC has to re-authorise the use of the participating informant. Contrary to what some critics have said, it would not be the case that, once given, IPC authority would give the authorising public authority carte blanche to use the participating informant at will.

The amendment allows judges, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his judicial commissioners, who must hold or have held high judicial office, to do what they are good at: consider the likely operational dividend against the likely intrusive effects, including the potential for collateral damage or injury. If it is necessary to deploy the participating informant urgently, prior approval is not required but notification must be given as soon as reasonably practicable and, in any event, not less than seven days after deployment.

Our amendment attempts to square the circle. How can you have prior judicial authorisation without getting the Investigatory Powers Commissioner involved in the sordid details of participating informants but at the same time safeguarding against the kind of malpractice we have seen in the past, such as that described by the noble Lord, Lord Hain: infiltrating anti-apartheid groups, the Lawrence family support group, legitimate environmental groups and trade unions?

I believe that Amendment 17 provides prior authority by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in a way that would be more practical in an operational setting. Amendments 22 and 33 lack the power to stop a CCA without Amendment 34; in any event, they do not amount to prior judicial authorisation, which is what many noble Lords have been calling for. As Amendment 17 authorises the deployment once the CCA has been granted, and not the criminal conduct authority itself, I believe that it is consistent with Amendments 5 and 16—that these amendments, if passed, would not pre-empt Amendment 17, which would also not pre-empt any other amendments in this group.

In Committee, the Minister said:

“We have been consistently clear that we want this important legislation to command the confidence of Parliament and the public and are thus willing to consider proposals which provide greater reassurance on oversight but do not impact operational effectiveness.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 651.]


As a former police officer, I can say that this amendment fits the Bill. I intend to test the opinion of the House when we get to Amendment 17.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

7: Clause 1, page 2, line 27, after “detecting” insert “serious”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment will limit the crime whose prevention or detection is the basis of a criminal conduct authorisation to serious crime.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 7, I will speak also to Amendments 8, 9 and 10 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

The primary force of this Bill comes from inserting a new clause into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 deals with the interception of communication warrants that have to be issued by a Secretary of State. It states that the Secretary of State shall not issue an interception warrant unless she believes it is necessary, and it goes on to define “necessary” in subsection (3):

“Subject to the following provisions of this section, a warrant is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is necessary—(a) in the interests of national security; (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; (c) for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.


There is a paragraph (d), but it is not relevant today. This definition of “necessary” appears at other places in the 2000 Act, including Section 32, on the “Authorisation of intrusive surveillance”.

Section 81 deals with general interpretations and subsection (3) sets out the tests, either of which need to be satisfied if a crime is to be considered a “serious” crime, and they are:

“(a) that the offence or one of the offences that is or would be constituted by the conduct is an offence for which a person who has attained the age of twenty-one and has no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more; (b) that the conduct involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose.”


In previous groups, we have set out why we believe covert human intelligence sources committing crimes is more serious than other forms of intrusive surveillance. Agents or informants are difficult to pull out of a situation if it suddenly changes, whereas listening devices can be switched off. Agents or informants are often placed at continuing personal risk in a way that technicians deploying listening devices are not. Listening devices are deployed against serious criminals, but innocent bystanders are more likely to be caught up in the criminal activity of agents or informants.

The list goes on, and yet this Bill allows criminal conduct authorisations to be granted in order to tackle any sort of crime and any level of disorder. Of course, CCAs have to be necessary and proportionate, but so does the deployment of listening devices, the interception of communication and the interference of equipment as set out in the other parts of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. But in those cases, in addition to being necessary and proportionate, they also have to target “serious” crime.

The Government make great play of the fact that these new provisions should be consistent with existing provisions in this area. In that case, they should agree to our Amendments 7 and 10, which limit the granting of criminal conduct authorisations to serious crime as defined by the 2000 Act. Preventing disorder is not mentioned in any of the existing provisions of the 2000 Act. We believe that a clear distinction needs to be made between, say, lawful protests, marches and demonstrations, and serious disorder. Our Amendment 8 seeks to achieve this.

Amendment 9 takes a slightly different approach, as things have moved on from when the 2000 Act was drafted. The issue of the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom has been considered by this House more recently. In the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, in various places—including subsection (2)(c) of Section 20, which deals with the grounds on which targeted interception warrants are granted—the necessary grounds include it being

“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security”.

The same definition applies to obtaining communications data, bulk interception warrants, bulk equipment interference warrants and, in fact, every provision for the granting of authorisations in the 2016 Act.

This House considered the same issue in relation to the powers granted to border security officers to stop, question and detain under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Under part 1 of Schedule 3, an “act” is defined in paragraph 1(6) as hostile if, among other things, it

“threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in a way relevant to the interests of national security”.

The same definition, including the additional phrase

“in a way relevant to the interests of national security”,

appears in relation to the power to make and retain copies of articles.

We had exactly the same discussions when it came to those Bills, which post-date the 2000 Act, as we are having now: that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom needs to be qualified to include where that is relevant to the interests of national security. In relation to the 2016 and 2019 Acts, the Government accepted those arguments and changed the legislation. In case the Minister raises it, the definition of “serious” crime in the 2016 and 2019 Acts is almost identical to that in the 2000 Act.

The Minister will have to come up with a convincing argument as to why this Bill is different from both the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Quite clearly, consistency with the 2000 Act was not accepted as a good enough reason when it came to the 2016 and 2019 Acts. If the Minister fails to produce a compelling reason not to accept our Amendment 9, I intend to test the opinion of the House.

On Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I simply repeat what I said in Committee. For as long as I can remember, the use of an agent provocateur was explicitly prohibited in police guidance on participating informants, and yet it appears nowhere in this Bill, nor in the draft statutory codes of practice.

The only argument that the Minister came up with against this amendment in Committee was that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to a fair trial, an existing principle of English and Scottish law, and that the use of agents provocateurs could affect a fair trial. He also pointed out that Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows a court to consider and exclude such evidence. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, convincingly responded to the Minister in Committee, agents provocateurs may be used in circumstances where there is no trial. For example, agents provocateurs may provoke a legitimate organisation to do or say something that undermines its credibility in the eyes of the public, short of a criminal offence, or they may provoke criminal offences that would otherwise not have been committed where no one is arrested or charged. The Government’s argument appears to be that agents provocateurs are acceptable provided that no one faces trial.

Amendment 11 is necessary, and we will support it if the noble Baroness divides the House. I beg to move Amendment 7.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for putting the argument for my Amendment 11, which is supported by him and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I intend to press that amendment.

Forgive me, but I am not being rhetorical here: I do not think this amendment should be controversial in substance. I think the only difference between the Minister and me on this issue will be on whether the amendment is necessary to deliver my intention or whether the protection already exists in the legislation.

I shall briefly make the argument to the Minister. One of the grounds for authorising criminal conduct in what will become Section 29B is

“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

We have just said that that belief must now be reasonable. Let us say that I work for one of the security agencies or indeed a police force, and I take the view that a particular environmental movement proposes the most extreme measures in the fight against climate change and that the agenda promoted by this organisation—perhaps not today but in five years’ time—is so extreme a green position that it will severely damage the economic interests of the United Kingdom. I also perhaps believe that, while that movement is yet to become extreme in its direct action, that may well happen in future, and I believe that it is in the economic and possibly even the national security interests of the United Kingdom to head this movement off at the pass and discredit it in the public eye before the damage is done.

Therefore I authorise an agent—a CHIS—to commit crime, not because it is necessary to keep their cover but to discredit the organisation, which to date has not been involved in violence or anything that is actually criminal. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, put it, I then authorise a crime. The agent commits a crime, and the undercover agent is the only person in that group who has committed a crime, but the crime has such consequences that it discredits that peaceful protest movement in the eyes of the media, the public and the Government. It possibly justifies if not a criminal prosecution then perhaps the banning of that organisation. Article 6, and criminal court rules against entrapment and so on, will not help because there is no trial.

It seems to me that currently in the Bill there is nothing to prevent an agent provocateur who is used to incriminate peaceful protest. This is not an academic issue; it is an issue of grave concern to trade unions, the environmental movement, the Black Lives Matter movement and others involved in peaceful dissent. This has been a problem in our country and elsewhere in the world throughout the history of peaceful protest, so I urge the Minister to consider accepting the amendment. It would do no violence to the stated intentions of her policy or the legislative scheme that she is intending to pass.

Finally, I echo the kind words of my noble friend Lord Rosser towards James Brokenshire, who may be in the other House but whom I have experience of being in very heated debates with for the media. He is a kind and gentle man worthy of this House who could teach a lot of us a few things about tone and civility. I am sure that I join the whole House, remote and present, in sending thoughts and prayers and every possible good wish for his speedy and complete recovery.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

Does the Minister wish to reply? No? Okay—I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions, but, first, I send my best wishes to the right honourable James Brokenshire. James and I have known each other for a very long time—since my policing days—and he is such a lovely guy. I really hope that he recovers completely from the terrible situation that he is in.

I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Beith and the noble Lord, Lord Judd, for their support. The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, gave no reason why the ISC did not want these powers limited to serious crime, when so many other aspects of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act are limited to serious crime, and arguably this is more serious than those powers.

I was a little confused by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who gave two examples of very serious criminal offences, which are of course covered by those aspects of the power that refer to the prevention and detection of crime. We are talking here about something that has an impact on the economic well-being of the UK that is not a crime, because if it was a crime it would be covered by that other aspect. I am sure that they were very important cases, but they were cases of crime, not simply impacting the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.

It sounded as though the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, was talking about the deployment of covert human intelligence sources, rather than authorising those CHIS to commit crime. I do not understand this from what anyone has said, including the Minister: if something threatens the economic well-being of the UK but is not a crime—if it was it would be covered by one of the criteria of preventing or detecting crime—how can it be necessary and proportionate, unless it also involves an issue of national security, to authorise somebody to commit a crime to deal with something that is not a crime?

On that basis, because there has not been a satisfactory response, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 9. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 7.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

9: Clause 1, page 2, line 30, at end insert “so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would allow a criminal conduct authorisation to be granted on economic grounds only if it is also relevant to the interests of national security, reflecting equivalent provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 5th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we live in a patriarchal, male-dominated society where, on average, men are physically stronger and have higher incomes. On average, men are more able to physically abuse and economically dominate a relationship, but that does not mean that domestic abuse is exclusively or overwhelmingly perpetrated by men on women. Some women are physically stronger than some men. Some women are the main income earners, both in same-sex and in opposite-sex relationships. There is little evidence that men are psychologically stronger than women, stronger willed or more emotionally resilient, for example.

According to ONS data, although domestic abuse is prevalent, it is often hidden and therefore difficult to quantify. Although there is a reluctance to report all types of domestic abuse, half of male victims fail to tell anyone that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and male victims are almost three times less likely to tell anyone than female victims. Domestic abuse against men is likely to be even less visible than domestic abuse against women.

There also appears to be a reluctance on the part of victims to report same-sex domestic abuse. Male victims of domestic violence are more likely to report that the perpetrator was female than male: 61% compared with only 1%. Female victims are more likely to report that the perpetrator was male rather than female: 56% compared with 2%. But these figures need to be treated with caution. One third of male victims and 40% of female victims in these surveys stated that they did not know the sex of the perpetrator or did not wish to answer the question.

To use a personal example, I was earning eight times more than my abusive partner, but he was physically and psychologically stronger than me, enabling his coercive and controlling behaviour. I was a senior police officer at the time, but I did not tell anyone about the abuse for years, until it became physically dangerous. Even then, I did not report it to the police, despite being beaten up in the street. When I finally managed to leave, he threatened to kill me and said that he would get his revenge. Eighteen months later, he collaborated with a Sunday tabloid newspaper, making false criminal allegations and describing intimate details of our relationship in a kiss and tell story, which the newspaper eventually admitted was libellous. The threat of revenge and abuse after separation can continue for years.

Domestic abuse in all its forms can be perpetrated by both men and women on both men and women. The true picture of the levels of abuse is unclear, in part because of the pressure to conform to the traditional, socially accepted norm of male-dominated heterosexual relationships. According to ONS figures, one third of victims of domestic abuse are men, but only 4% of victims being supported by local domestic violence services are men. We must make it absolutely clear throughout this Bill, and throughout the statutory guidance, that the provisions apply equally to all victims of domestic abuse, and the services provided should be proportional to the needs of all victims, whatever their gender or sexuality. Domestic abuse is domestic abuse, whoever the perpetrator is and whoever the survivor is. Not feeling safe in your own home is one of the worst positions anyone can find themselves in. We have an opportunity here to help.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]]

My Lords, unlike, I think, every other speaker to these amendments so far, I do not support them. I see in them, once again, attempts to impose yet more conditions that may affect the effectiveness of the operation of undercover support and sources doing what I thought was generally agreed to be vital work in the interests of enforcement and the life of people in our country. I say at the start that a number of these things, and the worry about how these powers may be exercised, do not pay respect to the fact of the code of practice, which many have said should be required reading for everybody taking part in these debates. The importance of that code of practice is that it is going to have to be approved by both Houses of Parliament. That will be a very important protection, because it is under that code of practice that authorising officers issuing CCAs, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, will obviously be required to act.

I make no apology for repeating what I said on an earlier amendment in quoting James Brokenshire, the Minister for Security, when he gave the astonishing figures for a single year in London alone. The use of undercover sources resulted in 3,500 arrests, the recovery of more than 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, the seizure of more than 400 kilograms of class A drugs and the recovery of more than £2.5 million in cash. It also enabled, which I did not mention, the National Crime Agency to safeguard several hundred victims of crime, including from child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those figures alone, just from London in one year, surely leave nobody in any doubt of the importance of this vital source of support for preserving an orderly and law-abiding society. I make this point because, under the code of practice, which includes this question, others are seeking to add the word “serious” to “crime”. How does an authorising officer react when an informant comes and says, “There is a group of people who are starting to get together, I am not quite sure what they are up to, but I think there is a real risk that it could turn, later on, into something much nastier”?

When one looks at those figures I quoted from James Brokenshire, how many lives have been saved; how many people’s lives have not been disrupted; how much misery and poverty that might otherwise have entailed has been prevented? For these reasons, I am not persuaded of the need to add “serious” to crime; I think it might inhibit the operation of a properly authorised issuer of a CCA, who obviously has to use his judgment, and has to persuade the IPC as well that his judgment is correct and is in line with the code of practice.

I should also say a word about preventing disorder. We are living in extremely difficult and dangerous times at the moment. We know that the power of social media now makes it possible, in an instant, practically, to organise major demonstrations which may, in fact, be based on that new and horrid ingredient “fake news”. These may disrupt many people’s lives and may cost people’s lives. Although there are many very worthy causes—whether it is Black Lives Matter or Extinction Rebellion—pursuing very understandable and admirable objectives, none the less we also know that around the fringes of those organisations, or in the confusion that some of their demonstrations cause, other sources of crime can easily emerge and it often makes opportunities for gangs to commit many more crimes as well. So I would not delete “preventing disorder”, provided it is properly covered within the code of practice.

The other thing I would just add is about economic well-being. I totally support trade unions—I always have done and, as Secretary of State for Employment, I was obviously closely involved—and legitimate trade union activity. However, we all know that, within our lifetime, we have had one or two instances where that has not been the case. One instance was the miners’ strike, when Mr Arthur Scargill said that one of his objectives was to bring down the Government, and he was not averse, in the process, to accepting money from the Soviet Union in pursuit of that objective. It is to the credit of Neil Kinnock, now the noble Lord, Lord Kinnock, if I may say so, that he would not support him at that time, because Mr Scargill had not put the issue to a vote of the whole trade union movement.

I think we have seen here, and I understood at the beginning of this, that virtually all noble Lords recognise the vital importance of undercover source information and for there to be a proper system, a statutory system, under which they would operate. That is what I wish to see. I wish to see a thoroughly effective code of practice, thoroughly trained issuing officers and rapid and close contact with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as they carry out their work.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I accept that it is difficult to separate these issues, but I will leave discussion of economic well-being and the activities of trade unions and trade unionists until the relevant groups.

As drafted, the Bill defines very broadly when a criminal conduct authorisation is necessary, and this group of amendments focuses on the new Section 29B(5)(b) inserted into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by Clause 1(5) of this Bill. It states:

“A criminal conduct authorisation is necessary … if it is necessary … for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder”.


Crime and disorder have very wide definitions, as noble Lords have set out in this debate.

As we have already debated, tasking a CHIS to participate in crime is a very serious step for any authority to take, with all the implications for the rule of law and the potential for abuse that we have already debated, and because of the potential danger it places the CHIS in, about which we will discuss more in a later group. In many situations it could have far more negative consequences for innocent people than the interception of communications, and we should not forget that we are amending legislation that was originally intended to cover, when drafted, only the interception of communications.

The legislation covering such interception limits the use of its powers to cases of serious crime. Even in my limited seven years in this House, I have lost count of the definitions of serious crime in different pieces of legislation. It could be argued that, if we wanted to limit the power to grant a CCA to cases of serious criminality, we could choose whatever definition of serious crime we liked.

The noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Hain, have decided in their Amendment 22 to define serious crime as indictable offences only, but I am glad to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, is attracted to our definition rather than the one in his own amendment.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has clearly articulated, we have gone with the definition already used in RIPA—for the sake of consistency, at least within the Act itself. The principle, however, is the same: that this power to grant a criminal conduct authorisation should be limited to serious crime.

The Government may say that, in addition to being necessary, the granting of a CCA must also be proportionate, and it would not be proportionate to deploy CHIS if the criminal activity was minor. The same argument applies, however, to the interception of communications in RIPA, where “necessity” is already limited to serious crime, as defined in our Amendment 31.

The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, talked about the code of practice. There is, however, a definition of serious crime in RIPA despite the existence of the code of practice for the interception of communications. The noble Lord also talked about the impressive array of offences that had been detected as a result of the deployment of CHIS, including those relating to firearms, drug-dealing and child sexual exploitation. All those examples would fall within our definition of serious crime.

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, even though geese and ganders are different in some important respects. RIPA limits the interception of communications to serious crime, so this Bill should limit the issuing of criminal conduct authorisations to serious crime using the same definition.

The second issue is more difficult and more controversial, starting with the fact that the prevention of disorder is not one of the necessary grounds for the interception of communications. The Government are already on the back foot here, in that large-scale disruptive disorder can have very serious consequences for society yet there is no power to intercept the communications of organisers of disorder in order to prevent it. None the less, there is an argument for both the interception of such communications and the deployment of CHIS into groups that are planning to cause widespread disruption that could seriously affect public order, cause damage to property and the economy, prevent people going about their day-to-day business, and create fear among innocent bystanders.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I have received a request to speak from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for what the Minister has said and appreciate that she has to stick to her script, but it gives the impression on occasion that there is no point in making contributions to debate because what I have said appears, from what she has said, to have been completely ignored. I will repeat exactly what I said. I said that of course the Government may say that in addition to being necessary the granting of a CCA must be proportionate—the issue that she mentioned—and it would not be proportionate to deploy a CHIS if the criminal activity was minor. That is almost word for word what she said. However, I went on to say that the same argument applies to the interception of communications in RIPA, where necessity is limited to serious crime, as defined in our Amendment 31. That second point seems to have been completely ignored by the Minister. I accept that that is probably because she has, understandably, just stuck to her script. It comes back to the point that I made, which is: what is the point of making speeches in debates if what noble Lords say is ignored by the Minister?

The Minister said that these amendments would limit how CHIS could lawfully be deployed and seek to restrict their deployment, and authorities would be less able to investigate crime. This Bill is about criminal conduct by CHIS, not their deployment. It is about giving authority to agents and informants to commit crime, and grant complete legal immunity to CHIS in those circumstances. There is a world of difference between deploying a CHIS and authorising them to commit crime, and then granting them immunity from prosecution. Yet the whole basis of her argument, from what I understood her to say, is that there is no difference between the two. In which case, what is the purpose of the Bill?

I say again: why is the interception of communications limited to serious crime if there is no need to limit the deployment of CHIS, who are going to be authorised to commit crime? Why should they not be limited to serious crime? That is a question that the Minister has failed to answer.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord, with whom I am actually good friends, makes a valid point: what is the point in making speeches if points are ignored? I often find that I make the same points over and again, and they are completely ignored because such is the will of people to make their opposite points. However, on this occasion, he is absolutely right. I did not address his point about RIPA and it being confined to serious crime. In the interception of communications, we are dealing with machines. In the deployment of humans, we are dealing with something else. I apologise to him for not answering his point.

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Many in this House are here only because of their involvement in politics, which is a fundamental right in a free society. The legislation before us is an inadequate framework that includes few safeguards. The backdrop is a history of recent police abuse and failure to respect human rights. Legislation is required to create a framework and this Bill is an opportunity to do that. However, as currently framed, it is inadequate and provides few safeguards. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Government could outline the circumstances in which they believe it is acceptable to undertake surveillance of those involved in political activities.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start by making it absolutely clear that I do not blame the Minister or those who have written her brief. All I am saying to the House is that Members of this House involved in this debate have hands-on experience of these issues. I include the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, in that. I ask the Government to listen very carefully to those with that experience; that is all. I can confirm that the Minister and I are friends.

The amendments in this group seek to prevent the use of criminal conduct authorisations in connection with the activities of trade unions or legitimate political activity, or to compile lists to exclude people from employment because of their involvement with trade unions or their activities. Others seek to ensure that they are not used disproportionately against minorities and to find out how the Government intend to respond to the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

There are difficulties with Amendments 28 and 29. What happens if a trade union, or its members, is involved in criminal or seditious activity, such as, as was suggested earlier, the activities of Arthur Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers? Who defines what political activity is legitimate? If members of a trade union have been involved in criminal activity, are there not circumstances where they could legitimately be discriminated against by employers?

We have sought to take a more general approach. In an earlier group, I mentioned our Amendment 56A in this group. It might have been better in the group where we discussed prior judicial authorisation, but the amendment did not come to me until midway through that debate. That is why it is in this group. However, it addresses exactly the issues that the noble Baroness just spoke about. Therefore, it is legitimate for it to be in this group.

I believe there is consensus around the House that agents of the state, in particular the police, should not be able to authorise covert human intelligence sources—an informant or agent—to participate in crime, granting everyone involved legal immunity in the process, without more rigorous and independent oversight. Otherwise, the sort of activity that the amendments in this group seek to prevent could take place.

As we have already debated, the problem with the prior judicial authorisation of a criminal conduct authorisation, which has to define very precisely what exactly the CHIS is or is not allowed to do, is that the agent or informant is often being sent into an uncertain, rapidly changing scenario in an uncontrolled environment, often involving chaotic individuals. Straitjacketing the agent into an exact set of actions, stepping outside of which would remove his legal immunity, is not practical, not least if the CCA has to be referred back to a judge, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or even a Secretary of State before the criminal conduct authorisation can be changed. These are often fast-moving situations, involving complex human interactions that cannot be paused while a decision is made.

It is essential that covert human intelligence sources are not tasked to commit crime in a way that is not legitimate, whether by mistake or corruptly. The draft revised code of practice is not reassuring on this point. For clarity, I will set out what could happen in practice: a handler, who is in in contact with the informant and wants him to participate in crime, makes an application to an authorising officer—in urgent cases, a police inspector or equivalent and, otherwise, a superintendent. Paragraph 5.8 of the draft code of practice says:

“authorising officers should, where possible, be independent of the investigation. However, it is recognised that this is not always possible”.

There could be a situation where a drugs squad sergeant investigating a drugs gang gets urgent authority from his own drugs squad inspector to authorise an undercover drugs squad officer to engage in a drug deal in which the sergeant, the undercover officer and, arguably, the authorising officer are all immune from legal action. It is not difficult to see the potential for abuse in such situations. Noble Lords will be able to imagine a similar scenario, where the target of the operation is a legitimate peaceful protest or the proper activities of a trade union.

Amendment 56A in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee seeks to resolve this conundrum. It seeks to ensure that, if it is intended that an agent or informant is to participate in crime, the

“nature and extent of the deployment have been approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner”

in advance, not the precise details of the criminal conduct authorisation. It is pre-approval, if you will: a CCA cannot be granted unless and until the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has agreed to the mission, in general terms, on which the CHIS is about to embark.

The amendment does not require the prior approval of the exact and precise terms of the criminal conduct authorisation. Instead,

“the purpose and extent of the deployment, and … the type of criminal activity”

likely to be involved must be explained, in general terms, to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who must approve the use of the agent or informant in the intended way. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner could, for example, approve the deployment of an agent into a terrorist organisation, but would, in all likelihood, refuse the use of a CHIS to spy on the legitimate activities of a trade union.

We suggest that this would provide the reassurance that many noble Lords seek by ensuring that a covert human intelligence source should not participate in crime without prior judicial approval, but without the Investigatory Powers Commissioner becoming involved in trying to understand the personality of the CHIS and those he will interact with, or becoming involved in the exact detail of the criminal conduct authorisation prior to the event. It would give the handler the flexibility he needs, but ensure that the CHIS is deployed only for a legitimate purpose. Such prior approval of deployment would apply only where it is intended that the agent or informant will be authorised to commit crime.

Clearly, there needs to be provision for urgent cases, which the amendment attempts to give, but what constitutes an urgent case also needs to be defined—although there is guidance in the draft code of practice about this. The question of legal immunity needs to be dealt with separately, but I urge the Government to seriously consider this compromise, and I hope that the Minister will undertake to discuss this amendment with me before Report.

As with all activity by the state and its actors, the impact on minorities should be monitored, and we support Amendment 78. However, we feel that it is too early to expect the Government to set out how they will respond to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, as this will depend on its findings.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave a very graceful explanation of his previous intervention. Perhaps I should do the same and at the same time apologise to civil servants. If we accept what the Minister has said —that such actions as sleeping with campaigners to infiltrate those campaigns was illegal then and is illegal now—that still means that four Met commissioners sat in front of the body holding them to account and refused to commit to that. What does that say about our senior officers? We always have to bear this in mind, and I have been involved in this struggle for the past 20 years.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I have just one question. She said that the scenario I suggested could not happen because police forces had dedicated source units. Can she point to where in the Bill or in the codes of practice it says that that has to be the case? If not, the Bill or the code of practice is defective.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord will appreciate that not every Bill contains every minute detail of issues such as this, but I hope that, with my having made the statement on the Floor of the House, the noble Lord is satisfied that there cannot be conflict. However, I would be very happy to speak to him about this before Report.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about seeking clarity as to who is covered not just because a criminal conduct authorisation authorises somebody to commit a crime, but because they have, as a consequence, both civil and criminal legal immunity. As we and other noble Lords have argued, immunity from prosecution should be decided after the event by the independent prosecuting authority—disagreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. However, these amendments raise important questions, not least about legal immunity.

The first person covered, without doubt, is the agent or informant—the covert human intelligence source. If the CHIS is asked or ordered to participate in crime then if anyone is to be given legal immunity, it should be him. The question then becomes: is a handler who asks or orders a CHIS to commit crime, whether or not the request or order is legitimate, also covered by legal immunity? This arises from the fact that he can request or order a CHIS to commit crime only if he, in turn, has been given authority to issue such a request or order by the authorising officer. If the authorising officer has told the handler that he is permitted to request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the handler also have legal immunity, in that it is then the authorising officer’s decision, not that of the handler? Then, if the authorising officer has agreed that the handler can request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the authorising officer too not be covered by legal immunity?

What the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was aiming at with his amendment came as something of a surprise. I do not understand how, under the terms of the Bill, a corporation can be authorised to carry out crime. Surely, it has to be an individual—the covert human intelligence source himself or herself—who is authorised, not a corporation. While I accept that some work of the police service, for example, or the security services may be outsourced, surely that corporation would have to be listed as an authorising authority in the Bill if that were the case.

There would be unintended consequences of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, if the only person who can be authorised to commit a crime is an undercover police officer or a James Bond-type character in the security services, and not a criminal who is helping the police or, indeed, somebody in a foreign country who is simply an employee of an organisation that interests the security services and who passes information back, not an employee of the security services. That would surely leave a big hole in what the Bill attempts to achieve. We cannot support Amendment 53. However, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response to my question, and that of other noble Lords: who is covered by the CCA? Is it the CHIS who commits the crime, the handler who tells him to commit the crime, the officer who authorises the handler to tell the CHIS to commit the crime, or all three?

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in the names of my noble friends Lady Massey of Darwen and Lord Dubs removes from the definition in the Bill of authorised criminal conduct the words

“by or in relation to”

the specified covert human intelligence source. It replaces those words with a more detailed definition; namely, that it is conduct by

“the covert human intelligence source”

or by a person who holds a rank, office, or position in the public authority that is granting the authorisation and is assisting in the behaviour of the covert human intelligence source. As my noble friend Lord Dubs said, this amendment was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Under the terms of the Bill, authorised conduct is not limited to the conduct of the covert human intelligence source. The code of practice says that a criminal conduct authorisation may also authorise conduct by someone else in relation to a covert human intelligence source, with that someone else being those within a public authority involved in or affected by the authorisation.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 39, they need to set out in their response the reasons why they consider it necessary to provide for the authorisation of criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source; the parameters of that criminal conduct by someone other than the CHIS that can be so authorised; and the safeguards in the Bill to ensure that the person authorised to commit criminal conduct—who is someone other than the covert human intelligence source—is not also involved in any way in the authorisation process to which that criminal conduct relates.

I shall listen with interest to the Government’s response to Amendment 39 and to the pertinent questions raised by my noble friend Lord Sikka in speaking to his amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister, and hand signals suggest it may be the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation. I am not sure I explained myself well enough to her in terms of who is covered by legal immunity. It is not if the CHIS goes beyond the CCA, but if the CHIS remains within the CCA. So, if the CHIS operates exactly in the way the handler has told them to, and the handler tells them only what the authorising officer has authorised them to, but it is not necessary or proportionate, it is corrupt or a mistake, who is covered by the CCA? Who is covered by the immunity, even though the CHIS has not gone beyond what they were asked to do?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I say again that each situation will be different, but I understand the noble Lord’s point that if the CHIS is acting as instructed, but the handler has gone beyond where they should have gone, it would be the handler’s authorising officer who would be liable for that activity. There would be an investigation, but at that point, we are talking about a theoretical case. If it was the handler who had acted beyond their purview, the handler would be liable for that handling activity, or the authorising officer. It is late, I am tired, and I have suddenly forgotten my thread.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, is not participating in this debate, so I call the next speaker, who is the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too signed the amendment, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has very adequately introduced. When I think back to my experience in the Metropolitan Police Service and the instructions that we had, acting as an agent provocateur was clearly and explicitly prohibited as that relates to covert human intelligence sources committing crime. However, unless I have missed it, I cannot find in the Bill or in the draft code of practice any explicit reference to “agent provocateur”.

To repeat what the noble Baroness said in different terms, an agent provocateur is someone who commits a crime or encourages others to commit a crime that would not have been committed had it not been for the actions of the CHIS, or it relates to a situation in which the CHIS commits a crime and then blames the organisation for that crime, which members of the organisation had no intention of committing. In other words, the crime would never have taken place had it not been for the presence of the CHIS.

I look forward to hearing from the Minister where I have missed that explicit instruction, either in the Bill or in the codes of practice. I stress to her that, although I understand that this scenario could not happen under existing guidelines in the police service, we in this House want reassurance either in the Bill or in the codes of practice that it is prohibited.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, my contribution on this amendment will be fairly short. I hear the point that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti makes and I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this issue is not mentioned in the Bill. Therefore, I am not quite clear whether the amendment is necessary. It would help us if, when the Minister responds, she could say something about the detail of the authorisations in a CCA.

Behind all the amendments today are concerns and worries about what may or may not have happened in the past. People want reassurance going forward, but they are not seeing it. I see that theme across all our discussions today. At some point, the Government will probably have to go a bit further to provide that reassurance, although I do not know how they will do that.

All these issues have been raised because of concerns that people have had in the past. As my noble friend said, we do not know whether we can stop this in the future, but I hope that the Minister can go a bit further. I cannot see any particular issue but, if I am right, the reason behind an authorisation would have to be recorded and shared with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That is the issue on which we need reassurance, as we move forward and give people new powers.

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[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank unreservedly the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, for the way in which he introduced this amendment. It was a challenge to us all. In protecting the values of our society, of which we like to speak so often, and in protecting the young and the vulnerable, there have to be some absolutes. I am glad that some of the other amendments have drawn attention to other vulnerable people who have been through nightmare experiences, and to whom the damage from being used in this way can be quite incredible.

We have to take seriously—again—the point that I have made several times this afternoon. I am afraid that we could be giving those who seek to undermine our society a victory, because they have provoked us into a situation in which we have acted against what we know to be essential. Nobody can calculate the damage to young people of being used in this way. Very few can really understand or analyse the damage done to other vulnerable people by being used in this way.

So, if we are going to stand firm for the society in which we believe, we must not allow ourselves to give in on these things; we must have absolutes. I therefore counsel those who have moved important amendments raising very serious points about “exceptional circumstances” to consider that probably, in this situation, there are no exceptions. We have to make our stand absolute and, in that way, we can win the battle for humanity that we are determined to win. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Young, for having challenged us so clearly.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee will not welcome me trying to summarise what has been said, and I could not do justice to the excellent contributions that we have heard, not least from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who completely summed up the position with a very compelling argument, using the analogy with torture that the ends do not justify the means—in the case of this Bill, using children as CHISs and authorising them to commit crimes.

A number of noble Lords said—and the Minister may be about to tell us—that it is a very small number of children who are actually involved in this sort of activity. But the whole reason for using child CHISs that the Government use to try to justify it is that the growth in child sexual exploitation, the growth in county lines drug dealing and the growth in human trafficking mean that they need to use more children as CHISs. These are not going to be small numbers for very long—that is the point I am trying to make.

The noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, in her excellent speech, asked us to consider placing one of our own 15 year-old or 16 year-old sons or daughters into such a situation. But I ask the Minister to imagine being put herself—let alone a child—into a criminal gang and being asked to try to carry off an act where she was pretending to be part of a gang and at the same time passing information to the police, or being asked to commit a criminal offence.

Many of these children, as other noble Lords have said, are vulnerable, either because they have substance misuse problems, because they are looked-after children or simply because their decision-making is immature because of the physiology of the brain, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, said. This is a horrifying situation in which to place anybody, let alone a child. As my noble friends Lady Doocey and Lady Hamwee said, this should not apply just to children who are vulnerable; there are many vulnerable adults who, arguably, are more vulnerable than some streetwise teenagers. We are, again, very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, in that respect.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

49: Clause 1, page 3, line 2, at end insert—
“( ) A criminal conduct authorisation must be reviewed monthly by the person by whom it is granted.( ) A criminal conduct authorisation ceases to have effect on the date it provides, which must be no later than four calendar months after the date it is granted.”Member’s explanatory statement
Under this amendment a criminal conduct authorisation would be reviewed monthly and expire after four months.

[Lord Paddick (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have debated at length, authorising a CHIS to commit crime and granting immunity to that CHIS and maybe others involved is a far more serious thing to do than simply deploying a CHIS. We felt that to expect such an authorisation to last for 12 months—and, in the code of practice, with no mandatory review within that 12-month period but purely at the discretion of the authorising officer—was too much; it is far too long for a criminal conduct authorisation to be in place and not be reviewed.

We cast around for what a reasonable period might be and went back to what I referred to before: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000, amended by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) (Amendment) Order 2018. The initial order changed the period for authorising a juvenile CHIS from one year to one month. The 2018 order amended that to four months with a monthly review, recognising how much more serious it is to deploy a juvenile CHIS than an adult CHIS. Therefore, bearing in mind how serious a CCA is compared with the deployment of a CHIS in other circumstances, we felt that a four-month cut-off for a CCA with monthly reviews was the appropriate limitation to be placed on a CCA in line with the authorisation for juvenile CHISs. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

I will speak briefly in full-blooded support of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and an amendment that seems to me like a no-brainer. The worst abuses of undercover policing, as are emerging in the inquiry, have related to people who have been embedded for a long time without adequate review, and obviously the risk of abuse is greater the longer a person builds their legend and is embedded without proper review.

Given that all time limits are arbitrary, it is right that we look for something relatively short, given the gravity of the line that is being crossed with this legislation for criminal conduct. The noble Lord has come to a very decent compromise with the monthly review and the four-month maximum on licensing people to commit crime.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I hope to provide the clarity that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, seeks and persuade the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this is not necessary in the Bill. The current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities listed in the Bill.

In the updated CHIS code of practice that accompanies the Bill, it is clear that a criminal conduct authorisation should be relied upon for as short a duration as possible. There is also a requirement on authorising officers to undertake regular reviews to assess whether the authorisation remains necessary and proportionate, and is justified. An authorisation must be cancelled when that is no longer the case.

Authorisations will be specifically and narrowly drafted and, in many cases, the specificity of the authorisation will mean that the criminal conduct authorised is in effect narrowly time-limited. However, there will be occasions when this conduct necessarily extends longer than a four-month period; CHIS who are members of proscribed organisations is a good example of this.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for what she just said and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support. I do not quite understand the position of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. If 12 months is specified as the length of a CCA in the Bill then why, if we want to change it to four months, should it not be in the Bill? The Minister is saying it is consistent with the period for authorising CHIS, but not the period for authorising juvenile CHIS. It is a much more serious issue than simply authorising CHIS, as we have discussed. Authorising someone to commit a crime and giving them immunity from prosecution is far more serious than simply deploying CHIS.

To say that it makes it easier if the length of time is the same for one as it is for the other is to ignore the seriousness of this deployment—authorising CHIS to commit crime. If you were to follow the noble Baroness’s argument to its logical conclusion, you would not need the Bill to authorise CHIS to commit crime, as it would be just the same as deploying CHIS. No doubt we will return to this on Report but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.