Employment Rights Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 23rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, first, I declare an interest as a barrister who occasionally practices in employment law. Secondly, in Committee on 18 June, Hansard recalls that I described the Bill as

“a complete Horlicks … truly bizarre”

and

“absolutely beyond belief”.—[Official Report, 18/6/25; col. 2048.]

I am amazed at my moderation. Nothing I have heard since addresses my concerns. As ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, whose amendment I entirely agree with, this clause allows the Secretary of State to bring a complaint to an employment tribunal without the consent of the complainant. Have these people ever been to an employment tribunal? This is absurd.

Is it proposed, in the event that the claimant has the temerity to disagree with the Secretary of State’s assessment that they have a valid claim, to witness summons the claimant, on pain of arrest, if they do not come and give evidence in support of their claim? If, when there, they have the temerity to give evidence against the claim brought by the Secretary of State on their unwilling behalf, will the Secretary of State apply to the judge to treat their witness as hostile, thus permitting the former to cross-examine the latter on the basis that they really were badly treated by their employer? This is palpable nonsense. This clause cannot stand part of the Bill.

I also draw the House’s attention to the fact that, as raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, the wording of the clause is an exercise in discretion and is therefore subject to judicial review. There can therefore be a judicial review of both the decision to bring proceedings on the part of the unwilling claimant and of the decision not to bring proceedings. This is going to be marvellous for those of us who are both at the employment Bar and the public law Bar. There will be endless litigation, all at public expense on every side. This is absurd. I invite the House to remove this clause from the Bill as swiftly as possible.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I cannot match the peculiar tones of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, but I do agree with the thrust of his remarks. Noble Lords often oppose clauses in government Bills; sometimes noble Lords are alarmed by such clauses, but, very occasionally, it is appropriate to say that a clause in a government Bill is simply bonkers—a technical term, but appropriate in this context. That is the appropriate term in respect of a proposal that the Secretary of State should be given power to

“bring proceedings … in an employment tribunal”,

in place of the worker who has the employment right, where

“it appears to the Secretary of State that the worker is not going to bring proceedings”.

This is a quite astonishing provision, for all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, in particular because the Bill does not require the Secretary of State even to consult the worker whose rights they are going to pursue, far less to obtain the worker’s consent.

Of course, the worker may have good reason not to want to bring proceedings. Not everyone wishes to spend more time with their lawyers. Not everyone wishes to have the finer details of their conduct picked over in public by lawyers for the employer and to be the subject of a public judgment. I declare my interest as a practising barrister, occasionally in employment law cases. I spend much of my time advising clients in all areas of the law that litigation is not necessarily the answer to their problem. The idea that the Secretary of State should decide whether to bring proceedings, and not the worker themselves, could appeal only to those who believe in a state that is ever expanding to take more and more responsibility for areas of life.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Is it really appropriate for a Secretary of State to insist that the circumstances relating to an individual are publicly exposed—subject to cross-examination, subject to a public judgment—when the individual whose private rights are the subject of those proceedings wishes, no doubt for good reason, that they not be so exposed? Is it really appropriate?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I venture to suggest that in some circumstances it might be, but I add an important point, which is that my party has been involved in discussions with the Government about the protection of such a worker.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

There is nothing secret about any such discussions. They relate to anonymity for such a worker and the restrictions on publicity that might protect such a worker from exactly the dangers and difficulties that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggests and envisages. But the Secretary of State might, in a given case, take the view that an issue of law or principle was involved, with wider ramifications going beyond that particular case, and that the public interest required the issue to be determined. With respect to all the arguments that have been put by those who have spoken before me, I am not sure that any of those arguments met that possibility, certainly not in the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Murray, expressed it. Even the moderate tones of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, a colleague of mine, failed to deal comprehensively with that suggestion.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is a very important matter. Surely the answer to his concern that the individual case may raise wider, broader issues is that it is absolutely inevitable in those circumstances that there will be other affected workers, one of whom no doubt will bring proceedings. We do not need the Secretary of State to bring proceedings in those circumstances. It is inconceivable.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

There might be others. Then again, there might not. I quite accept that a Secretary of State would have to weigh up very carefully the competing considerations in favour of the public interest in having a point determined against the private interest of the worker concerned in not being involved in any way in litigation. Of course, the worker concerned does not have to be involved; proceedings are brought—this is a point I will come on to in a moment—as if he were involved, but the point may need determination in any case.

I think I have covered the point about the public interest, which I suspect is the argument that we will hear from the Government. Nevertheless, and on a point that the noble Lord, Lord Carter, made, in a case where Section 113 is invoked, I suggest that it would be utterly wrong for such a worker to be exposed to risk by the Secretary of State proceeding with such a case. I have dealt with the point about anonymity and circumscribing publicity, and I suggest that this must be addressed before this clause becomes law.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Such protections as would be afforded would depend on the individual case and on such measures as the tribunal thought appropriate; they might indeed include anonymity or witness protection in an extreme case. I do not believe that that is likely, but I do believe that the right of the worker to some sort of privacy, in a case in which he positively did not want to be identified, would have to be protected.

Going on to my point about the risk in costs, I suggest that it would be simply unconscionable if the decision of the Secretary of the State to take proceedings could expose the worker to a risk in costs. There is no protection in the Bill for a worker on this point; indeed, in subsections (3) and (6) in particular, there is the clear suggestion that there would be a risk in costs for an unwilling worker claimant. Specifically, subsection (3) would provide that, if the Secretary of State brings such proceedings, they are

“to be proceeded with as if they had been brought by the worker”,

and that needs to be addressed. As the noble Lord, Lord Carter, pointed out, subsection (6) will provide that:

“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge or purported discharge of the Secretary of State’s functions by virtue of this section”.


That, in my submission, renders the worker vulnerable to an order in costs and there ought to be an indemnity against any such order. I accept that there is not one; the question is therefore whether that can be addressed by the Government. It is not a question that leads to a stand part decision that the clause should be left out of the Bill altogether.

We would of course hope that no employment tribunal would make a costs order against a worker in such circumstances, but this House should not proceed on the basis of hope alone; the possibility remains, particularly if the tribunal were to take a dim view of the worker’s conduct. That, we should remember, may be exactly the conduct that sensibly dissuaded the worker from launching proceedings in the first place.

I invite the Government to bring forward an amendment, hopefully by agreement at Third Reading, whereby protection from this risk in costs could be given to a worker, either by way of indemnity by the Secretary of State or by a prohibition on a costs order. I also urge the Government to look at the other protections that the worker might have. Alternatively, the Government might consider giving solid assurances to meet this point. I give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can I ask for the noble Lord’s assistance? He mentioned that, according to subsection (3),

“the proceedings are to be proceeded with as if they had been brought by the worker”.

Does he think that that means that if the worker decides to withdraw the proceedings, they are to be treated as withdrawn?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

The noble Lord has plainly given the Government solid pause for thought on that point, because of course any proceedings before a tribunal of first instance can be withdrawn by the litigants. The litigants in this case would be the Secretary of State and the other party—presumably the employer. If subsection (3) is given the interpretation that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggests might be given to it, the worker would be treated as the litigant. That is a difficult point for the courts to resolve. It is a point that at Third Reading the Government really must resolve, and that I entirely accept.