Assisted Dying

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 13th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the DPP has done a good job. His policy promotes the three main objectives which the Law Lords indicated, in the Purdy case, are vital in this sensitive area of law. First, the policy recognises the autonomy of the individual—a factor ignored by some speakers in this debate. The position is very simple: the able bodied may lawfully seek to end their life but the autonomy of the disabled person, vitally, depends on the assistance of others. The second objective advanced by the policy is to protect the sick and the vulnerable from being put under pressure to end their lives. The third objective is to introduce greater certainty into the law. I hope that the success of this policy—and it has been successful—will now encourage Parliament to show the necessary maturity to address these important issues as questions of legal rights and wrongs, not to continue to leave these matters to prosecutorial discretion, however compassionate its exercise.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment so persuasively moved by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. I do so for three reasons. The first reason concerns the vital importance of employment rights. Few areas of the law are of such day-to-day practical importance to the individual as their rights under employment law. This is surely at least as important as environmental pollution rights, which are within scope under paragraph 37. I do not understand why equality is included in paragraph 38 and so is within scope, covering as it does some employment rights, including the important right not to be discriminated against on prohibited grounds, but not other equally important employment rights such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed.

The second reason—the noble Lord, Lord Bach, mentioned this—is the inevitable inequality in advice and representation between the employer, who almost always has legal advice and representation in the employment tribunal, and the employee. This will undoubtedly result in inequity and in decisions being given that are contrary not only to justice but to the law.

The third reason is the absolute inevitability that the lack of legal advice and representation will result in people wrongly losing their jobs and becoming reliant on state benefits. I hope that the Minister will address this point because the very limited financial savings that we are talking about are completely illusory for this reason.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, the concept that employment tribunals are a cosy chat between an employee and his boss in front of a very receptive body of people is quite wrong these days. An impression of unfairness is created for the employee who is seeking his rights when he finds perhaps even a QC appearing on behalf of a wealthy employer. I have appeared many times for employers, sometimes for employees and sometimes on my own behalf.

The excuse, or the reasons, given by the Minister would be far more acceptable if he were to say, “Well, if a union is backing an employee, that is fair enough; they can pay for legal representation”. If he is there on his own, why not just have the boss—the person who did the sacking—in front of the tribunal, not lawyers who in many cases are overpaid when they are dealing with the individual appearing in front of them?

[Lord Pannick]

Before the Minister sits down completely, I have a question arising out of his emphasis on legal aid being available for equality claims. If I have understood this part correctly, paragraph 40 makes clear that legal aid will be available if your claim is in connection with a claim that is within scope. Is it right, therefore, that if I am a dismissed employee and I wish to be eligible for legal aid under the new regime, I should add a discrimination claim to my claim for unfair dismissal and then both of them would be within scope for legal aid? If that is correct, the consequence of excluding general employment claims from scope will simply be to encourage unmeritorious discrimination claims to be brought in order to ensure legal aid for unfair dismissal claims.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I too support the amendment. When my noble and learned friend responds to this debate, it would be helpful if he would explain the relationship between the types of issues covered in the amendment and Clause 9. If he and the Government believe that there is nothing in the amendment that is not in fact or in law covered by Clause 9, it would be helpful if he would say so. I respectfully suggest that it would be better for these very important decisions to be made by judges and that we should avoid a potentially unnecessary layer of satellite litigation through judicial review of decisions of the director of civil legal aid. I suggest to my noble and learned friend that it is better that judges rather than an official determine whether there should be legal aid.

I remind my noble and learned friend that the paradigm of the English claimant is the man on the Clapham omnibus, who may be coming to court with a very ordinary dispute. My noble and learned friend will recall, as a distinguished Scots lawyer, that one of the most important cases ever decided in the civil law in the United Kingdom related to a snail in a Scottish ginger beer bottle. Another of the most important cases in the common law arose from a carbolic smoke ball. One of the most important, if not the most important, cases in administrative law arose from the administrative arrangements for a cinema—a picture house—in Wednesbury in the Midlands. More recently, an extremely important case that led to a change in policy arose from a disabled person seeking guidance on her end-of-life care. That last one might have passed the test which I understand to be applied by Clause 9, but I believe that all four of those cases should in appropriate, means-tested circumstances be the recipients of legal aid and that the means test should be applied rather lightly if the outcome of the case has great importance in setting new precedent and our understanding of the law. In brief, I suggest to my noble and learned friend that the court is better placed than the director of civil legal aid to determine the importance of an issue in the panoply of precedent that the courts set.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment for all the reasons set out by the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Carlile of Berriew. I add one further factor. The criteria set out in this amendment are so tightly defined that it is highly probable that in any case falling within those criteria, where one party is not legally represented, the tribunal or the court—particularly the Appeal Court—would consider it wholly inappropriate to determine the issue before it without requesting the Attorney-General to appoint what used to be known as an amicus curiae, now friend of the court, at public expense. It is much more desirable, with that public expense, for the individual to be represented rather than to have his or her case presented through a friend of the court. Again, the saving is entirely illusory.

[Baroness Mallalieu]

I also support the amendment. Who do the Government propose should prepare and conduct appeals that fall into the category of either complexity or public importance in the absence of legal aid, but which will not make the cut under Clause 9 exceptional?

Unless damages are involved, conditional fee agreements will not begin to kick in. If there are qualified solicitors or barristers who have the time, the inclination and the financial ability to take on pro bono cases of complexity, I suspect that they are pretty thin on the ground and, following on from what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said in the previous debate, that they are likely to be even more scarce after the cuts kick in. I am afraid that the answer will be: either pay or do it yourself. Having been at the Bar for 40 years, I would not wish to prepare my own appeal, and certainly not if it was complex.

First, I would have to discover the relevant forms—whatever they are—which must be completed and filed with strict time limits. It may be necessary to obtain transcripts of the earlier proceedings, but from where, how and who will pay for them? Bundles of exhibits correctly paginated and in sufficient numbers would have to be prepared and lodged with the court and the other side. Written skeleton arguments would have to be prepared and exchanged, and a list of authorities—the reports of the earlier cases that will be relied on—will have to be compiled and given to the court and the other side as well.

How on earth is a lay man supposed to do all that without proper advice and legal assistance, let alone argue a legal case of complexity in court? An “exceptional case” must surely include consideration of the interests of justice. Proposed new sub-paragraph (1)(c) in the amendment, which permits legal services where the court or the tribunal certifies that there is some,

“compelling reason why the proper conduct of the appeal requires the provision of civil legal”,

aid, brings in just that factor that is currently missing.

If the amendment or at the very least something like it does not go into the ultimate legislation, I fear that the result will be: if you cannot afford to pay, you cannot appeal. That undermines one of our essential constitutional principles of equality before the law, which I cannot believe the noble and learned Lord or the Government wish.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I was a member of the Criminal Injury Compensation Board for seven or eight years and resigned when the noble Lord, Lord Howard, introduced his tariff scheme in 1993. Reverting to the Scottish theme, I recall sitting in Glasgow on one occasion with two very senior Scottish QCs next to me. I was the junior member. We had an applicant in front of us who addressed us in a language that I did not understand. At that time, I had been married to my late wife for some 30 years. She was from West Lothian, so I was pretty well attuned to the Scottish dialect of the central belt. However, I noticed that my learned friends on either side were nodding as though they understood, so I said to the chairman, “What’s he saying?”, and the chairman replied out of the side of his mouth, “I haven’t a clue”, so I said to the applicant, “Would you mind speaking more slowly please?”. He looked at me and said, “Eh?”. He could not understand me, so there was a certain confusion. I there realised the importance of having an advocate who could explain the case clearly to the tribunal. On the other hand, the members of the Criminal Injury Compensation Board were, I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will acknowledge, a pretty experienced bunch of people, and we handled most claims without representation and without any difficulty, so if there are priorities to be chosen here, this would not be one of mine.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, there are undoubtedly few examples of claims under the scheme that raise complex legal issues that require legal advice, but there are some, and it is unfortunate that the Bill should seek to exclude legal advice and representation in cases where such complex legal issues arise. It is particularly unfortunate that paragraph 16 of Part 2 should exclude claims under the criminal injuries compensation scheme because that conflicts with one of the most welcome and important developments in criminal law in recent decades: the recognition of the rights and interests of victims of serious crime. The criminal injuries compensation scheme is one of the earliest statutory—or non-statutory, in its case—recognitions of the rights and interests of victims. I can think of nothing more likely to undermine the real interests of victims where complex matters are raised than denying them any opportunity of legal aid and advice through the legal aid scheme.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I was rather impressed by the case that was put to the House by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and at the same time I heard what my noble friend Lord Thomas said from his direct experience of these types of tribunal. In summing up this debate, perhaps my noble friend might contemplate a compromise where legal advice would at least be available even if legal representation is not. That would significantly alleviate the sort of case that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, told us about, and would see justice done.

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[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a few words on Amendment 91. The defect in Clause 9(3) is that it defines the “exceptional case determination” exclusively by reference to breaches of convention rights and EU law rights. But those rights are designed as a floor and not a ceiling. It is most unfortunate that the Bill treats them as a ceiling. I hope that the Government, on reflection, agree that the interests of justice are criteria entirely appropriate for the responsible director to consider and to apply.

The wording of Clause 9(3) is very regrettable. If this amendment is not accepted, the consequence is that the director is compelled to deny legal aid even if he considers that the interests of justice require it in the circumstances of the case.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, my name is attached to Amendment 91. It is common ground across the Committee that the concern of those of us putting forward amendments is that, not just occasionally but frequently, the Government will inadvertently cause serious injustice by the exclusions from scope to legal aid. We have had a lot of debate on that broad proposition. The exceptional case provision in the Bill is therefore of huge importance, and if it were to be couched in sufficiently wide language, I believe that it would go a long way towards assuaging some of the great concern that is felt, as I have said, across the Committee about what this Bill will do in practice.

I want to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, that this amendment has been drafted by the Law Centres Federation. No other body of legal advice organisations in this land is as intimately knowledgeable of the on-the-ground reality of what, after this Bill has come into effect, will in practice be essential in order to avoid the greater injustices. Although my name is added to Amendment 91, I have to say that Amendment 91A is rather better and would also give the Government some solace. The arrangements that would result from it are defined in practical terms which the Government could accept. It may be that they would still be unhappy about the final subsection which talks generally about the “interests of justice”, and if that is the case, surely the way forward would be for the Government to accept the four paragraphs under the first subsection and add further ones as the price of excluding the general “interests of justice” exception. I hope that the Government will take this opportunity to put our minds at rest.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is important that we have moved on to Clause 9, covering exceptional funding, because this has been discussed in earlier amendments. Amendment 91, moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, would allow the director to fund excluded cases where he or she determines that it is generally in the interests of justice to do so. I am sure that Members of the Committee will readily acknowledge and appreciate that in this context, the phrase “interests of justice” is capable of wide interpretation. The amendment would create a power, which I am sure is its intention, that is considerably broader than the one currently being proposed in Clause 9 as it stands. It is right that there should be an exceptional funding scheme and that it should provide a potential safety net for the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights of access to justice, and we believe that Clause 9 achieves that important end. Exceptional funding determinations under Clause 9(3) will be made in accordance with the factors that the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have held to be relevant in determining whether publicly funded legal assistance must be provided in an individual case.

Following on from that and looking at the jurisprudence, in considering whether legal aid should be provided in an individual case, the kind of factors that the director will need to take into account include: the importance of the issues to the individual concerned and the nature of the rights at stake; the complexity of the case; the capacity of the individual to represent themselves effectively; and alternative means of securing access to justice. These factors are broadly similar to the considerations that the Legal Services Commission currently takes into account in criminal proceedings where it is in the interests of justice for legal representation to be provided. I would suggest that our exceptional funding provisions are likely to meet the concerns of noble Lords in civil cases where, for example, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged. Indeed, in moving his amendment, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford accepted that there is substantial case law from Strasbourg in relation to family law and he almost seemed to acknowledge himself that there was a potential for very many cases indeed to qualify under the exceptional funding provisions as set out in the Bill. However, we believe that the insertion of the general phrase “interests of justice” would be open to very broad interpretation and would risk undermining the approach, scope and rationale for making changes to the legal aid system.

It has been acknowledged that Amendment 91A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, covers similar territory in that it would allow the director to make exceptional case determinations when it was appropriate to do so against specified criteria. As with Amendment 91, the potential ambit of this is extremely broad, and certain elements would be open to very wide interpretation. Again, however, I believe it is worth noting that many of the factors listed in the amendment, such as,

“the client’s vulnerability … the client’s capacity to represent themself … and … the availability of alternative sources of”,

funding will form at least part of the test for exceptional funding where Article 6 is engaged.

Amendment 91A also specifically refers to clients under the age of 18. In considering whether an individual case meets ECHR exceptional funding criteria, the director would be obliged to consider the ability of the client to present their own case, having regard to the complexity and importance of the issues in terms of what is at stake. Where a child brings an action without a litigation friend, that would be a relevant factor in deciding whether or not they have the ability to present their own case. In the end, the factors I have indicated will be taken into account by the director in deciding whether the absence of legal aid would mean that it was practically impossible for the applicant to present their case or would lead to an obvious unfairness in the proceedings.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether legal aid would apply to advice and assistance. The answer is that in principle it could do so to the extent that it would avoid the breach of an individual’s rights under, for example, Article 6. Amendment 92 raises the issue of the chief coroner—

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, in relation to Amendment 91, does the noble and learned Lord accept that Clause 9(3) as currently drafted will require the director to spend much of his or her time making determinations as to the scope and application of convention rights rather than focusing on the easier question of whether or not the interests of justice require legal aid? I would suggest to the noble and learned Lord that there is a real danger of satellite litigation as to whether or not convention rights or EU rights are in fact breached. Would it not be much more sensible and efficient, and much less expensive, to leave the director to focus on what he or she will be good at, which is asking whether the interests of justice require legal aid?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As ever the noble Lord puts a seductive argument, but there is a certain advantage in the director being required to have regard to convention rights because, if the test was the wider one of the undefined interests of justice, I am not sure whether that would lead to any less satellite litigation; it is possible that it could lead to more. He says that it would be easier, but when faced with that test without any guidance—with the exception of a certain amount of specificity set out in the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach—there would not be any real steer for the director if that is all he is to be left with when making decisions.

[Lord Pannick]

It would be very difficult to challenge a director’s decision as to whether the interests of justice are met because it is a subjective test. If the test, as under Clause 9(3), is hard-edged—that is, whether there is a breach of the convention—it is much easier to bring a legal claim in that respect.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Having a definition which in these circumstances would be so broad—which I think the noble Lord is saying is a merit of it—opens up vast scope, as I said in response to my noble friend Lord Thomas.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I support the amendments. I was a member of the National Equality Panel, and one of the most shocking of our findings was the degree of educational disadvantage among Gypsy and Traveller communities. Reading the very helpful briefing that we have had from Community Law Partnership reminded me of the importance of this. A number of noble Lords have made the point about educational disadvantage and children’s need for education and security. Of course, access to justice is that much more important for a community which suffers high levels of illiteracy and educational disadvantage. As Community Law Partnership points out, we are talking about some very complex areas of law. I therefore hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on the amendments, which would protect one of the most vulnerable minority-ethnic groups in this country.

[Lord Pannick]

When the Minister comes to reply, will he clarify how these provisions will operate? Notwithstanding the provisions that are being debated today, is it the case that Gypsies and Travellers will remain entitled to seek legal aid to challenge acts or omissions of public authorities under paragraph 17 of the judicial review, and remain entitled to challenge under paragraph 20, which relates to convention rights, in the same way as other litigants? Is it the case that the provisions we are debating will not prevent Gypsies and Travellers claiming legal aid if they have proper grounds for contending that they are not trespassers? I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify those matters, because they have a considerable bearing on the fairness of the provisions that are under challenge through these amendments.

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, the Committee owes a debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and my noble friend Lady Whitaker for bringing forward these amendments for debate in Committee today.

Most of the cuts to social welfare legal aid appear at best naive and at worst socially and economically disastrous. However, the cuts with which these amendments deal—subject, of course, to the answers to the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just asked the Minister—unfortunately, appear maliciously, deliberately and uniquely to target a group which, as the Committee has heard, is one of the most marginalised in our country. It is ironic—more than ironic, it is distressing—that in a society where popular and governmental discrimination against groups of people is, thankfully, becoming rarer and rarer, the tolerance and acceptance which we think is the mark of a civilised society does not seem to apply to this group of people.

Gypsy and Traveller communities do not come in for an easy time, whether it is from the press, which seems to delight in portraying them as villains or an irredeemably alien culture, or from politicians, who have not done enough to help these communities preserve their way of life and certainly have not done enough to ensure sufficiency in the provision of housing.

Every victory for this community—as, for example, the acceptance in April last year that local authority sites should be subject to the Mobile Homes Act 1983 —has been very hard won. Legal aid has played a significant part in these victories and in establishing these rights and ensuring that they are rightfully and lawfully exerted.

Although the Government have claimed that the exemptions they have put in place are to deal with squatters—a subject to which we shall no doubt return in Part 3—everyone knows that at least a quarter of the Gypsy and Traveller population who live in caravans do not live on authorised sites. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, referred to that in opening his amendment. Many believe that this population, due to an acute crisis in the availability of sites, has little option but to trespass. If the Government’s intention is specifically to disfranchise a protected group which is already, as I have argued, much maligned, I suspect that it will end up causing much more trouble than it is worth, and that Gypsy and Traveller communities will continue to express their culture.

The Bill fails to give these communities a basic ability to stand up to oppressive behaviour by public authorities—and we have seen that kind of behaviour, I am afraid—and, frankly, it is unacceptable to mortgage the future of these communities for the purposes of the Bill. Legal aid has played an important part in gaining whatever benefits these communities have, and it would be a tragedy if they were taken away.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 14th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I will not take up your Lordships’ time by repeating the arguments for the sunset clause which noble Lords passed on two occasions before the Summer Recess, except to say to the Minister that it was a novelty to hear him accuse me of reintroducing politicking. I have rather been against politicking in my career. He referred to what was said by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee in its report on the Bill. I should like to remind the House of that. The committee said that,

“the balance of evidence we heard”—

the committee heard evidence from a number of very distinguished academics—

“does not convince most of us that a strong enough case has yet been made for overturning an established constitutional practice and moving to fixed-term Parliaments”.

The effect of the sunset clause passed by the House on two occasions was to give future Parliaments the power to decide whether they wish to make a permanent change.

Your Lordships will know that when this House has insisted on an amendment, the other place has to come back with some sort of modification to a Bill to prevent it from being lost. My noble friends and I had hoped that we might use the time during the Summer Recess to reach a reasonable agreement with the Government on a modification to the Bill. In August, my noble friend Lord Pannick had a meeting with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and Mr Harper, the Minister in the other place. My noble friend told the Ministers that, for our part, we would be happy to modify our amendment to meet criticisms that were made of it, including some of the criticisms made by the Minister tonight. Specifically, we said, first, that we would be content for a resolution to apply the legislation to be made only by the other place since it is the elected House. Secondly, we would be content for a time limit to be placed on the period within which such a resolution should be moved—within, say, three or six months of the meeting of a new Parliament. My noble friends and I were open to discussion on other aspects of the sunset provisions.

The Ministers made it clear that these modifications were not acceptable to them, but they put forward no proposals themselves. My noble friends and I then waited to see what modification the Government would propose. Last week, without any further consultation or notification, the Government put down in another place their modification to which the Minister has referred. That modification is now before us on the Marshalled List. It goes no way towards meeting the point made by noble Lords on two occasions. The key words of the modification are:

“The Prime Minister must make arrangements … for a committee to carry out a review of … this Act … Arrangements under subsection (4)(a) are to be made no earlier than 1 June 2020”.

As a former Cabinet Secretary, I have had experience of Governments fobbing people off by promising reviews that effectively kick issues into the long grass, but this is of a different order. Seriously, I have to say to the noble and learned Lord that if the Government’s amendment is intended to meet the point which your Lordships have legitimately made, it is an insult. It shows a contempt for your Lordships’ House and for the amendments we have passed.

There is still time to reach a reasonable agreement that will satisfy the point which this House has twice made, but I am afraid that this can happen only if noble Lords once more insist on the amendment and we can have sensible discussions. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. Your Lordships will not want to hear lengthy Second Reading speeches at this stage, but it needs to be understood that because this House and the other place have disagreed twice, the Government are obliged either to accept our amendments, lose the Bill, or produce a variation—what Erskine May describes as “alternative proposals”. The procedure is designed to ensure that the Government and the Commons cannot simply ignore what we have decided. Your Lordships have heard what the Government have produced by way of alternative proposals: that there should be a committee which will not begin its consideration for another nine years. That is not so much kicking the issue into the long grass, the phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, as burying it in a time capsule. The authors of “Yes Minister” would have regarded it as lacking in credibility to suggest, even in a work of fiction, that a Minister should solve a problem by setting up a committee which would begin its work in nine years’ time.

The Minister suggested that there is some constitutional novelty in the provision approved by noble Lords, but many legislative provisions have attracted such a procedure: there is the need to consider each year whether to maintain the late and unlamented control order system; and Parliament requires that the Armed Forces Act be reconsidered every five years. The Minister suggested that the House should accept the views of the House of Commons and that we should go quietly into the night on this issue. He emphasised that we are a revising Chamber and that we cannot challenge the will of the elected House. But the relationship between this House and the other place depends on the other place and, indeed, the Government taking seriously the concerns we have expressed.

The response of the Government and the other place to our amendments is simply derisory, and it is intended to be so. The Commons and the Government are not listening to or engaging with your Lordships’ House, and I regret that. Just as the Government introduced this legislation without bothering to consult anyone or to adopt any pre-legislative scrutiny, they are now rejecting the views of this House without bothering to listen to and engage with us. We should ask the House of Commons to think again on this matter.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

While I appreciate the constructive response that the Minister gave to the proposals by this House to redraw Clause 2, I have to say that the Government’s response to the Motion spoken to so well today by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, is not only inadequate, it is indeed contemptuous. Whether we talk of long grass, time capsules or the deep freeze, it simply will not do. The seriously considered advice of your Lordships’ House ought equally seriously to be considered by Ministers and by the other place. It should not be dismissed with reflex reactions. That is a matter of constitutional principle.

It is also a matter of constitutional principle that legislation that proposes constitutional change should be subjected to ample and early consultation, through a Green Paper, through full preliminary debate—debate outside this House across the country, as well as within Parliament—and then to a White Paper before legislation is introduced to Parliament, let alone being voted on in a whipped vote. I add that in my view it is questionable whether it is suitable for constitutional legislation to be subject to the Whip.

The Government actually agree, or say they agree, that pre-legislative scrutiny is a good thing. In its report on the process of constitutional change, the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House—the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, who chairs it, is in her place—described the process that is appropriate for the consideration of proposals for constitutional legislation, and explained the importance of that process being followed. Indeed, in its report it actually quoted its own report on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, in which it had said:

“Process is critical in terms of upholding, and being seen to uphold, constitutional values: particularly those of democratic involvement and transparency in the policy-making process. Moreover, we believe that a proper process is the foundation upon which successful policy is built: the lack of a proper process makes an ineffective outcome more likely”.

There was no good reason why a proper process was not adopted by the Government for this legislation. There was no genuine hurry to get this legislation on to the statute book. It did not need to be done in the first Session. But the Government neglected to follow due procedures. During our proceedings a very good case has been made by noble Lords on all sides of the House that legislating to introduce fixed-term Parliaments, and particularly Parliaments fixed for a term of five years—which means that general elections will occur less frequently in the future than they have in the past—contrary to the Government’s professed intentions, would reduce the accountability of the Executive to Parliament, not increase it. It would impair our democracy, not enhance it.

We should, therefore, insist on the amendment that we have already sent to the other place twice. This would be the third time. That is relatively unusual, but the Constitution Committee, again in that same report on the process of constitutional change, observed that,

“constitutional legislation is qualitatively different from other legislation”—

and I believe there is a very good case for this. As the committee also pointed out, there is a lack of checks and balances to prevent a Government armed with a majority in the House of Commons from changing the constitution of this country more or less at whim. This House should seek to act as a check and a balance, as well as we can, on issues of such importance as this.

An appropriate process was not followed by the Government. This constitutional legislation is highly contentious; it would introduce a major innovation into our constitution. It is the responsibility of your Lordships’ House to be vigilant to safeguard the constitution. It is entirely right, therefore, that we should adjure the House of Commons to think again.

The amendment that we have already twice sent to the other place provides a convenient and practical means whereby subsequent Parliaments should have the opportunity to judge whether indeed they wish each new Parliament to be fixed for five years, or whether they judge it preferable to revert to the historic arrangements that we have had in this country, of flexibility in terms of the date of the election within five years, which has enabled government and Parliament to be responsive to political reality in all its unpredictability, and to be more accountable to the people.

Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 15th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

I do not agree with that. I think that the point is fully covered by the declaratory provision that the Government have put forward and the possible amendment of it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. It removes the obscurity and the uncertainty in Clause 18. My answer to the question that has been posed twice now by the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, is that the amendment is clear. It is “by virtue” of the 1972 Act and therefore by virtue of nothing else that EU law is recognised and available in law in the United Kingdom. It cannot mean anything other than that. The clarity is provided, in my opinion, by the amendment. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, explained that the answer given by the Minister in Committee about why the clause refers generally to an Act of Parliament rather than to the 1972 Act was because there are other uses of primary legislation, such as the Equality Act, that give effect to aspects of EU law.

I will add to the noble and learned Lord’s explanation about why it is not appropriate for Clause 18 to be drafted in this general manner. First, the constitutional concern that Clause 18 seeks to address and to which he referred does not arise out of the fact that Parliament has on occasions chosen to refer to EU law obligations. The constitutional concern—and I do not share this concern—is that the 1972 Act generally imports EU law rights, powers, remedies and so forth into United Kingdom law without the need for specific enactment. If Clause 18 has any purpose at all it is to emphasise that just as Parliament created this status for EU law by the 1972 Act—and it was only by the 1972 Act—so Parliament may take it away.

The other reason why it is appropriate in Clause 18 to focus on the 1972 Act and not generally is that the 1972 Act did not just give legal effect to EU law rights by Section 2(1). Section 3 provides for recognition by English courts of EU treaties and instruments, and for such matters to be questions of law to be determined in a court in accordance with the decisions of the European Court of Justice.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, the key point has been made, but not yet by me. I want to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. Many of the measures being brought before us are premised on the assumption that our political system is broken. Like the noble Lord, I do not accept that it is and there is empirical evidence for showing that the people do not accept it. I accept that there is a crisis of confidence, but it is a crisis of confidence not in institutions but in politicians. There is a danger of displacement taking place here, of saying, “Well, it is not us, it’s the system. We’ll change the system”. There are problems in that, so I accept the premise on which the noble Lord is proceeding.

My fear is that we may get ourselves into a situation where people do think that the system is broken if we keep messing about with it and making disparate changes without any clear rationale for them, rather than individual changes. If the Government start having a referendum on one issue which they feel for whatever reason there should be a referendum on, but then deny it on another issue which people think is important and there should be a referendum on, they will create problems in terms of how people view the system and how it is being operated.

I have always argued against referendums because I have an objection on principle to them; the Government’s problem is that they do not. When they start holding them, they need to have a clear rationale for those occasions when they are clearly appropriate and those when they are not. Otherwise, we create a problem of delegitimising issues, with people thinking, “Well, this is really important, but we’re not going to accept it unless it’s subject to a referendum. Why can the Government have a referendum on A, when we attach real importance to B and we’ve not been given a say on the issue?”. To cope with that, as the noble Lord, Lord Reid, indicated, you need a very clear framework which is transparent and explained to people, so that they know the basis on which the Government are proceeding. You cannot do it on an ad hoc basis. You need clearly to adumbrate the overarching framework or, if necessary, come up with those issues which clearly fall within the framework of necessitating a referendum.

The Constitution Committee of which I am member, as is the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, produced its report on referendums and tried to identify those areas so that we could at least get agreement on them. The Government need to think about what framework they are using for promoting referendums. They cannot do it on simply an ad hoc basis, saying that it is up to Parliament, because Government bring the Bill before Parliament. We need to know why they are doing that, and that they are doing it on the basis of principle rather than political desirability. The more politicians do the latter, the more we run the danger of people starting to worry about what the Government are doing and their trust being lost. It is essential that we maintain that trust. If the crisis of confidence is in politicians, it is up to us to get it right.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has served a very valuable purpose, because he has identified with precision one of the main defects in this Bill and so many of the proposals for constitutional change that have been brought forward by this Government and are still to be brought forward.

The essential point surely about constitutional principles is that they are intended to be neutral; they are intended to be objective criteria by which we and the people judge the propriety of the conduct of government. They do so by convention, by practice and, if change is proposed, they do so by public consultation, by pre-legislative scrutiny and by an attempt to achieve consensus. The Government’s inability to identify when a referendum is appropriate—the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, asked the Minister to explain the Government’s position on this in Committee and the Minister was unable to do so—is a manifestation of constitutional reform and change that is being proposed on an ad hoc basis; it is being proposed if and in so far as it is politically convenient for the coalition to do so.

Constitutional change cannot command public respect when the public perceive politicians as using constitutional means such as a referendum—means which are designed to control politicians—as a way of holding a coalition together. One has to do better than that. One has to identify a principled basis for using or not using a referendum. To bring forward constitutional change in this way—without public consultation and without any attempt to identify and then to apply objective, coherent principles on matters such as referendums—leads inevitably not only to poorly drafted, inadequate legislation but guarantees that the legislation, when enacted, will not command public understanding, far less public respect, and ensures that the legislation will remain on the statute book only in the short term.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, having rashly intervened on the spur of the moment earlier I decided that I had better stay until the end of debate in line with the conventions. I am very glad that I did because, in an old-fashioned phrase, it has been worth a guinea a minute. I shall associate myself later with some of the latter speeches but, first, I should say to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—who thought that I was trying to embarrass him—that I was congratulating him on his sheer effrontery. I am not sure that the same is not true about the latter part of his remarks about Governments tampering with the constitution with no overall aim because, frankly, this is not the first Government that this charge could be levelled at—and he was a member of the last. However, on the latter point I am in complete agreement with him.

I wish to pick up on the comments of my noble friend Lord Norton, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and, not least, the noble Lord, Lord Reid—who made one of the most excellent speeches we have heard in these proceedings—on House of Lords reform. I agree with every word they said. As a coalition loyalist—well, mostly—I hope my colleagues will stop this messing about with the constitution. They have not got an architect drawing up what they want to get out of it, a great deal of it looks as though it has not been thought through and it does not reflect the basic fact that we have a constitution which, by and large, has served the country well and continues to do so, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and which was implicit in other speeches.

Having made those troublesome remarks—I saw my Whip looking at me and wondering whether I really had told him that I would be docile and loyalist this week—I assure my noble friend on the Front Bench that I will be good on this Bill. However, I am not promising that if we go on getting this kind of stuff.

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

25: Clause 7, page 4, line 6, at end insert—
“(4) Sections 2, 3 and 6(3) shall have effect only until the first meeting of the new Parliament after the next parliamentary general election, but that Parliament or any subsequent Parliament may bring those sections back into force for the Parliament’s own duration and until the first meeting of the following Parliament if a resolution to that effect is approved by each House of the Parliament in question.”

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 12, 14 and 16 in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Tyler and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. Amendments 12 and 14 reflect the position that I set out in Committee, when I made plain that I could not see any justification for a provision to bring forward polling day in a general election by two months, in the way that the Bill originally suggested. In all my consideration of the debates here and in another place, I have yet to hear advanced any argument for why it might be sensible to say that a Prime Minister might be able to foresee circumstances in which he needed to bring forward the election by two months.

As the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said, no Prime Minister could be so prescient as to foresee such events and decide to bring forward the election in anticipation of them. I simply do not see the justification for the provision. However, there will remain in the Bill and in the detail now in Amendment 20, which we will come to later, a power for Parliament to have elections early if MPs vote for it by a two-thirds majority and this House endorses that proposal. I have no doubt that if there is reasonable political consensus on the need to bring forward polling day and have an early election, that will happen.

Amendment 16 deals with a power for which, I accept, there is a rather stronger case. That is the power for delay by two months. The commonly cited example of how a general election planned for one day might be postponed for a short while is our experience in 2001, when the foot and mouth epidemic broke out. Everyone knew that we would probably have an election in May. We had planned to have local elections in May. Those local elections were postponed and the general election, expected to coincide with them in May, was also postponed. I am therefore content that some power remains in the Bill for a delay and am now fairly convinced that there is at least some provision in the Bill to safeguard against abuse. That safeguard is this House, which would be asked to approve such a delay.

I was seeking through Amendment 16 to have a further safeguard built in for that—also a two-thirds majority in the House of Commons—but I now look at the changes that the Government have made by accepting Amendment 20. That dispenses with the role of the Speaker’s certificate. On that basis, I am prepared to accept that Amendment 16 is no longer appropriate, and I will not press that case; but the case for Amendments 12 and 14 remains strong. They simply retain the principle that if polling day is to be brought forward, it is Parliament by reasonable consensus and not the Prime Minister who should decide to bring forward the election.

The whole purpose of the legislation is to fix parliamentary terms at five years, notwithstanding the amendment which this House narrowly approved some hours ago. We need to remove from the Prime Minister the privilege of being able to hold the starting pistol in a race where he is also one of the runners. Amendments in the same form as Amendments 12 and 14 received substantial support from across the House when they were tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Rooker, in Committee. I therefore hope that the Minister will have had time since Committee to reflect on those amendments and to consider them favourably.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, both the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Rennard, proceed on the basis that the power to bring forward or postpone a general election would be exercised only in circumstances of crisis. It is very difficult—or impossible—to foresee such a crisis. I give noble Lords a possible example of when one would need to use such provisions where there is no crisis. Suppose that this country is awarded the Olympics or the World Cup. Each of those events will occupy a period of two weeks, for the Olympics, or four weeks, for the World Cup. One would know of such events years in advance, so there would be no crisis, but it would be entirely appropriate for a general election not to take place by consent of all concerned during such events.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I had thought before hearing the debate that I would tend to support the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, but I found what the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said powerful. Everyone appears to agree that the election is unlikely to be called early anyway; if there is sufficient consensus for it to be called early, that can be dealt with by the two-thirds provision. If it is to be up to two months late, that is a moderately massive exception and if it is to be done, there needs to be consensus. If there is that degree of consensus, it is extremely likely that emergency legislation can be got through in order to achieve it. We are much better off being certain. Having not intended to take this view, I am afraid that I found what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, said, rather powerful. I invite the Government to reflect on what the noble Lord said and perhaps bring the issue back at Third Reading. If the Minister brings back the issue at Third Reading in a way that reflects the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, or alternatively says, either now or at Third Reading, why the noble Lord is wrong, I would not support the noble Lord. However, if he does not, my inclination is to support the noble Lord, Lord Norton, either now or, as seems more sensible, after the Government have had an opportunity to reflect and come back at Third Reading.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

That is the point. The Government could have said that they had decided that they wanted the term to last for five years, that they would do that by making a commitment now for it to last for five years, unless there are unforeseen circumstances, and that they would legislate for future fixed-term Parliaments of a different level. It was not at all a question of the committee recognising that five years, as a legislative fixed-term as opposed to as a result of the exercise of prerogative, was right for this Parliament.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I, too, support these amendments. If we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, a change to the constitutional practice over the past 100 years advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, then four years is manifestly preferable to five. The Constitution Committee, of which I, too, am a member, heard evidence from a vast number of witnesses who advocated four years. Almost all of them did so on one simple, fundamental ground: you do not enhance the accountability of Parliament to the people, which is the aim stated in the coalition agreement, by reducing in practice the length of time between general elections.

There was a further piece of evidence, which I add to that cited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, which came from the Deputy Prime Minister himself. At paragraph 57 of our report, we quote the extraordinary evidence given to us by the Deputy Prime Minister last October, when we considered the Government’s programme for constitutional reform. Mr Clegg told us that he did not accept that,

“people are straining at the bit to vote in elections more frequently”.

He added that he had never met anyone who had said to him,

“‘Well, I kind of like voting every four years.’”

I can introduce the Deputy Prime Minister to many people in the Dog and Duck referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, who are very keen to exercise a right to vote in general elections at least every four years to determine who represents them in Parliament and what the policies of their Government should be.

It is quite bizarre that the Government's response to the diminution in public respect for Parliament and the search for methods of making Members of Parliament more accountable to their constituents should be to propose to insulate Members of Parliament so that there will be a longer period, in practice, before they are answerable at the ballot box. When the Minister responds to this debate, will he please tell the House how a five-year term promotes accountability?

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

4: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, at beginning insert “If, but only if, a resolution to this effect is approved by each House of the Parliament in question,”

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the amendments are in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Armstrong of Ilminster. The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, regrets that he is unable to be in his place because he is chairing a Joint Committee.

The purpose of the amendments is to address the deep unease on all sides of the House, as expressed at Second Reading and in Committee, as to whether it is appropriate to confine the circumstances in which a general election may be called within a five-year term. The amendments would ensure that the coalition Government will have their way as to the criteria governing this Parliament, but would leave future Parliaments to decide for themselves whether to apply the provisions in the Bill. That sunrise provision would thereby limit what many noble Lords regard as the constitutional damage which would be caused by this unhappy Bill. The amendments do not touch on the distinct question of the length of any fixed-term Parliament, which we have just debated.

I want to make four points. First, the Bill would not in fact introduce fixed-term Parliaments. There is general agreement on all sides, and it is embodied in the Bill, that it is essential to allow for early general elections in some circumstances. The dispute concerns in what circumstances and by what means. Many noble Lords believe that it is impossible satisfactorily to define in legislation the circumstances in which an early election is appropriate. Such matters are far better left to convention and practical politics than to legalistic constraints. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee heard compelling evidence to that effect, in particular from Professor Vernon Bogdanor. It is easy to envisage circumstances in which an early general election may well be appropriate, whether or not the criteria in Clause 2 are satisfied—for example, a change of Prime Minister; a change of coalition partner; or a new policy, such as Asquith’s in 1910 to gain popular approval for Lloyd George's Budget and then popular approval for limiting the powers of this House.

Clauses 2 and 3 are worthy but necessarily cumbersome attempts to allow for early general elections in some circumstances. Such is the splendid unpredictability of politics that no one can foresee all the circumstances that justifiably lead to an early general election. That is the first point.

Secondly, many noble Lords on all sides of the House have doubted the premise of the Bill, which is that the power of the Prime Minister to call an early general election is a political advantage for him or her. The evidence is very weak that this power has assisted Prime Ministers who would otherwise have lost subsequent general elections. Many noble Lords have spoken from experience of the agonies of decision-making caused to Prime Ministers with whom they have worked closely. Our political system has worked well; people can and should be trusted to decide whether to penalise a Prime Minister who calls what the people regard as an unnecessary or inappropriate early general election.

Thirdly, it is of special importance—we heard discussion of this earlier—that a constitutional measure of this sort should be grounded in public consultation and in pre-legislative scrutiny. There was none. The Government should recognise that one reason why the referendum campaign on AV—I say nothing of the result—was so unsatisfactory was that there was no process of prior analysis of the options for change and of the merits and demerits of different voting systems. The absence of public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny in this Bill is even more troubling, because there will be no opportunity for the public to express a view by way of a referendum. Unless and until there is proper public consultation on the issue, in a referendum if appropriate, we should do no more than legislate for this Parliament.

Fourthly and finally, we should identify why this Bill is before Parliament. No one could seriously dispute the conclusion of your Lordships' Constitution Committee, which stated in paragraph 20 that,

“the origins and content of this Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand”.

I recognise that the Liberal Democrats have been arguing for fixed-term Parliaments for some time. However, they could not dispute seriously that the inclusion of this measure in the coalition agreement is due solely to the desire of the two parts of the coalition to ensure that their union lasts for five years and does not end in tears before then. That is a short-term political need. I do not deprecate it, but it does not justify a long-term alteration to the constitution of this country.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I stand to be corrected, but as far as I am aware it is a novel approach. Not only could it lapse and be put in suspension; it could be revived, lapse again and be revived again. We are not switching on and off light bulbs. There are quite important issues here and I am not sure that these procedures are designed to give them proper weight. That is why we argue that primary legislation should be the way of dealing with the issue, if it is felt that the provisions for a fixed-term Parliament are not working and should not be the basis for the future.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting debate and for the support that has been expressed on all sides of the House. My answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is that we are dealing with an exceptional Bill which is being brought forward by the coalition Government to deal with a particular short-term political problem. In the light of that, we should think very carefully before we embody on the statute book, as a permanent measure introducing permanent constitutional change, a measure which has at best a short-term political purpose.

I respect the views expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Marks, and by the Minister. I respect their views because they and the Liberal Democrats strongly believe in fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. However, their difficulty is that large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches do not agree with fixed-term Parliaments as a matter of principle. They are rightly concerned about the constitutional implications of such a measure, as so eloquently expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton and Lord Cormack, in this debate. They are particularly concerned about this matter in the absence of any public consultation on this issue, in the absence of any pre-legislative scrutiny and given the lack of any evidential basis for the new constitutional principles we are about to enact.

The inescapable reality is that the Government and large numbers of noble Lords on the government Benches are supporting the Bill not because they believe in the constitutional principle but because it is part of the coalition agreement, and it is part of the coalition agreement because of the political needs of this coalition Government to remain together for five years. I repeat: I do not deprecate that; it is a perfectly proper political position to adopt as a basis for legislation which applies to this Parliament. However, it is not an acceptable basis for general constitutional change, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has pointed out.

The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, asked whether under the amendments a future Parliament could approve a resolution at any time during that Parliament. The answer is yes, and the reason the amendment is so drafted is that it would be inappropriate to limit the events and the circumstances that may occur during a future Parliament. It is quite possible that a coalition Government might be formed part of the way through a future Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the Minister were concerned about the Parliament Act, but of course a future Parliament could at any time enact primary legislation on this subject.

The Minister asked a fair question—all his questions were fair, of course, but he asked me to address this one in my reply—about how this will work in the future. My belief, my expectation, is that no future Government will want to apply the provisions in this Bill as they are unless there is another coalition Government with similar political demands to this one. I hope and expect that after the next general election, if there is a desire in principle for fixed-term Parliaments, the relevant responsible Government will bring forward new primary legislation that will be based upon proper consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny and in the light of experience.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but what is his answer to my point and to that of the Minister that there should be proper, full parliamentary consideration of primary legislation to amend or appeal this Bill rather than the odd mechanism proposed in his amendments.

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[Lord Pannick]

If this amendment were to be approved by this House and if it were to be approved by the other place, that would be the parliamentary consent to the provisions of this Bill. That is no different in principle from any other circumstance where both Houses approve a particular procedure.

The issue before the House is very simple. Accepting, as these amendments do, that the coalition Government can have their way for this Parliament, should we as a House enact constitutional change for the future on a permanent basis when, to put it at its very lowest, the case for permanent constitutional change has not been made out? I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

5: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “each” and insert “a”

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I do not recognise that at all. It is tempting to mention Mr Asquith, if only to encourage the noble Lord to make further enjoyable interventions.

There are two issues here. We are changing our system and we believe that the change from four to five years will be damaging to our constitutional arrangements. Extending the elections by, in practice, around one year will distance people from the politicians. The debate before the dinner break on the issue of the devolved Administrations was very interesting because it highlighted the principle of unintended consequences of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. It is likely that, as a result of this legislation, the term of office in Scotland and Wales, and possibly Northern Ireland, will be extended to five years. That must be the clear implication of what the noble Lord said. I am glad to see that the noble Lord is in his place. He argued that we should not have a referendum on this Bill because, although under the Bill the term of the Parliament will be fixed at five years, that will not be outwith the limit in the current legislation. However, in relation to the devolved Administrations, moving to five years will go outwith the current primary legislation. I hope that there will be a referendum on that proposal if it comes before Parliament.

My noble friend has raised the very interesting and ingenious proposition that four years should be the norm while respecting the principle of a five-year limit. He deserves a comprehensive response from the Minister.

[Lord Pannick]

Before the Minister responds, I should like to add my response to these amendments and, indeed, to so many of the thoughtful amendments to Clause 1 that have been tabled. They tinker with a fundamentally misconceived concept of a fixed-term Parliament, as was explained by so many of your Lordships at Second Reading. As we have already debated this afternoon, Clause 1 is driven by the short-term political considerations of the coalition and will reduce the effective power of the electorate to have their say about those who govern them. I am coming to the view that the correct approach is for this House to agree that this Parliament should last for five years—that will deal perfectly adequately with the short-term political needs of this Government—but refuse to accept that we should legislate for any future Parliament. After this Parliament, the normal, traditional procedures, which have worked very well, should continue. I very much hope that on Report we can decide that that should be the case.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, I anticipated that it would not be long before the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, found an opportunity to digress from the issue of participation in elections at weekends and encouraging people to participate. It is a source of regret to me, if not to many others, that the debate the noble Lord proposed to have about the relative turnout resulting from different electoral systems was not held in this House. Of course, he tends to compare declining turnout in European elections with declining turnout in general elections. The truth is that turnout is declining in many levels of elections, particularly in European elections. People may see the European Parliament as even more remote and they make a protest by spoiling their ballot paper. We have to recognise that. But if the noble Lord wishes to study the evidence on this properly and looks at the preference vote using the 1,2,3 system, he will see that in the Scottish local elections in 2007, notwithstanding the fact that there were other elections for the Scottish Parliament on the same day which used a different proportional system, there were very few spoilt ballot papers.

The principle of weekend voting deserves serious and considered debate. It is most unfortunate that the Bill as it stands enshrines Thursday as the day on which general elections should be held, even though that is an accidental precedent. It is not widely known that there is no statutory basis at present for polling day to be on a Thursday; indeed, many council by-elections are held on a Wednesday or a Tuesday when, for some good reason, they cannot be held on a Thursday.

We should think about voting on a Saturday or a Sunday or a Saturday and a Sunday. Our amendments provide the Government with what some noble Lords will now understand as being a Lord Rooker-type famous lifeboat. They do not actually say that things should change; they merely invite the Government to consider the possibility of a change on the assumption that there could be proper consultation, perhaps piloting and serious debate, and then the decision can be made at a later point. We can look at the arguments and consider them properly but because, as I said earlier, the issue has simply been allowed to drift so often, our amendments set a deadline for determination of the issue. That deadline is, sensibly, 1 October 2013, which coincides with the deadline for the publication of reports by the Boundary Commissions.

I hope very much, therefore, that the Government will keep an open mind on weekend voting. If there is a clear promise that we will consider this issue properly in due course and that Parliament will be allowed to decide whether voting should in some form be taking place at weekends rather than on a Thursday, I will not seek to press my amendments. But if there is no such indication, I would, at the very least, not want to see the Bill pass with people thinking that Thursday 7 May 2015 is already fixed in stone as polling day for the next general election.

[Lord Pannick]

Before the noble Lord sits down, does he accept that to mandate Saturday as the exclusive day for voting would effectively disfranchise Orthodox Jews? There may also be difficulties about observant members of the Christian community who would not wish to vote on a Sunday. Therefore, does the noble Lord accept that if there is to be weekend voting, it would have to be over the whole of the weekend?

[Lord Rennard]

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, makes a very good point, which I made when we discussed the issue in general without being able to decide the precise terms. I have always thought that weekends are probably better for voting than weekdays. I accept that it would be a problem in principle if some people felt that either Saturday or Sunday was an objectionable day when it came to them going out to vote. It would be rather good to say that a Saturday or a Sunday could be polling day—that is, two days. However, the hours could be more limited, as I do not think that polling would need to last from 7 am until 10 pm. I think that this should be the subject of proper debate and scrutiny. It may be that polling hours of 9 am to 6 pm will be very suitable on a Saturday and Sunday. The only objection to this that has been raised in the past is rather absurd and it has come from the electoral administrators. They said that there would be problems with security at the ballot boxes over a Saturday night into a Sunday. However, in the European elections we vote on a Thursday. The ballot boxes are sealed on the Thursday night and counted on the Sunday evening. Therefore, I do not believe that that is a significant problem. Indeed, I believe that many people who work in the electoral administration process would welcome the opportunity to work on a Saturday or a Sunday.

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[Baroness Golding]

My Lords, I was an election agent for some 15 years, so I do not think that there is very much that I have not seen. I have dealt with four elections—parish, county, district and general elections—all on the same day and all over a big area, and have learnt much through practice. Does the amendment refer just to a general election? Will all other elections follow suit? If we have a general election at a weekend, is it being proposed that county and parish elections take place then as well? Or will they be on a different day?

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, in answer to my intervention, accepted that if there is to be weekend voting it would need to be over the whole two days of the weekend, albeit during shorter periods on each day. There are difficulties about that, not just the loss of drama to which the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, referred. The difficulties arise from the fact that one day of voting involves all the electorate, with the exception of those who are postal voters, voting on the same factual premise. It is a snapshot of opinion at a particular time. Broadcasters are prevented from broadcasting any material during that day which would be politically partisan. That is entirely acceptable and workable. All that becomes much more difficult if the period of voting extends over two days. What happens if an event of considerable political significance—it may be a foreign policy issue or a terrorist attack—occurs during the first day of polling? The danger is that one can envisage circumstances in which the electorate who vote on the second day would be voting on a set of facts that would be materially different from those on which the electorate voted on the first day.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

The noble Lord refers to certain instances, including a terrorist attack. Such an event could occur in the middle of polling day, in which case there would be a completely different mood among those who had voted early and the very large number of people who vote going home from work. I do not think that even a single day of voting avoids that risk.

[Lord Pannick]

The noble Lord is of course correct, but it is much less likely that the electorate who vote during a single day will be aware of or affected by a major news event during that day than if the event occurs during that day and there is second day of voting. This seems to be at the very least a factor that should be taken into account if consideration is being given to two days of voting.

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[The Earl of Onslow]

My Lords, I crave your Lordships’ indulgence and apologise for not being able to speak at Second Reading. There was a slight horlicks done by our Whips’ Office, for which I apologise.

This Government, who I support extraordinarily strongly, have the opportunity to produce some of the greatest social reforms and improvements for the benefit of this country since 1911. If Iain Duncan Smith gets his welfare reforms right, that will be a major contribution to the well-being of this country. If George Osborne gets the economy right, it will be of major benefit. If education reforms and medical reforms are as good as I personally think they are going to be, these will be the successes of a very great Government. But why have they gone completely doolally over constitutional change?

The trouble with this country is that constitutional change is extraordinarily easy. Every other country has complicated locking mechanisms in it. The Bill reduces the power of the House of Commons, reduces the power of the electorate and increases the chances of chaos. In 1870 or 1871, the French Government resigned. Either the President or the Prime Minister refused a dissolution—I cannot remember which. As there was no possibility of a dissolution, they played the game of pass the parcel and wrecked French government from 1870 until 1945. That is bad constitutional form. We would do the minimum amount of harm by adopting something along the lines of what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, says. In my 30 or so years in this House, I have regarded myself as a disloyal Conservative, and I will go on being a disloyal Conservative. If they are doing something that I believe is as fundamentally wrong as this, I will say so. That does not mean that I will come and join you over there.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I, too, support the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, as to the need for careful consideration of constitutional reform. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, accurately pointed out that the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, did not suggest that a referendum is required in relation to the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments. As the Committee well knows, the Constitution Committee expressed grave concern in paragraph 20 of our report that this Bill owes,

“more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles”.

I suggest that the Government’s position in relation to whether a referendum on constitutional reform is appropriate is precisely a matter that appears to be determined by short-term considerations—alternative vote, yes; reform of this House and fixed-term Parliaments, apparently no.

It is very difficult to deny that the Bill that we are currently considering will introduce major constitutional reform. In paragraph 40 of our report, we refer to the evidence that we heard from Professor Vernon Bogdanor in which he pointed out that the Bill, if enacted, will prevent,

“a newly chosen Prime Minister between Parliaments from going to the country”,

it will prevent,

“a Prime Minister who has a new policy for which he may seek a mandate from going to the country”,

and:

“Most importantly of all, because we could be moving into that situation with our hung Parliaments, it means that coalitions can change in the middle of a Parliament without the people being allowed to pronounce on that”.

This is a major constitutional reform. I am no fan of referendums, but I would welcome guidance from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, on behalf of the Government, as to what their policy is as to when a referendum is appropriate for constitutional reform and when it is not, and I would welcome an assurance that that issue is not determined by short-term political considerations.

[Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville]

My Lords, I realise that I regard the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, as an agreeable ally on constitutional matters, but I was sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, felt it necessary to precede her in this short debate. Of course I understand the protocol that he was pursuing, but we always know that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, will have spoken before the Minister rises—he is indeed a pillar of the constitution. However, I think that chivalry has a role. At Second Reading, I alluded to the French Revolution. In Burke’s memorable sentences:

“It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France … the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever”.

I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, spoke but a little variety in our experience might bring the government Benches back into the Chamber on constitutional matters, as he was wishing earlier, just as everyone who speaks in these debates has their own personal and individual subjective view on how we could increase voter turnout.

An aspect of variety in this speech is that, most unusually, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, whose constitutional views I respect just this side of idolatry. However, I have a reservation on this occasion. He prayed in aid the statistical fact that there would have been four fewer elections since the war under this Bill than factual history produced. I have profound admiration for the maturity of the British electorate. On only one occasion among those 17 post-war elections did they possibly make a mistake, as they themselves may have conceded, by giving more votes to one party and more seats to the other, but that does not mean that we may want more opportunities as an electorate to exercise our maturity or indeed our wisdom.

The reductio ad absurdum to which the argument from the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, could be made subject is that we should hold a referendum on whether the electorate wanted more elections or fewer. There is some polling evidence that they would vote for fewer but that would accelerate the number of referendums we felt it necessary to think that we need.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, we have once again had a spirited and interesting debate with a number of important points made. It is also obvious that some of the issues raised went beyond the question of a referendum and into some of the detail of the different constitutional reforms that have either been debated and passed or are about to come down the track.

Perhaps I might start by taking issue with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on a couple of the points which he made at the outset. He said that he hoped that never again would he hear that the Prime Minister was surrendering power or determining the date of the election. While it is the case that the Prime Minister and the Government are, in this Bill, putting forward a date for an election as being the first Thursday in May 2015, and while I hope that the Bill will be passed with that in it, that in itself means that the Prime Minister has surrendered a power because it is not possible—

[Lord Pannick]

He has chosen it.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

He has actually put it to Parliament for it to support. Parliament will have had to vote that through, as is quite clear because we have other amendments coming down to change that date. Unless circumstances arise that would trigger the mechanisms in Clause 2, the Prime Minister of the day will not have the opportunity to seek Dissolution when it might seem opportune other than to have the election on the date set down in the Bill. He will have surrendered that power.