Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

212: After Clause 124, insert the following new Clause—
“Short custodial sentences
(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In section 230 (threshold for imposing discretionary custodial sentence), after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) If the court finds that the offence is so serious that neither a fine alone or a community sentence can be justified for the offence, it must state its reasons for being satisfied that the offence is so serious (having regard to the considerations in subsection (2B)), and, in particular, why a community order with appropriate requirements could not be justified. (2B) In this determination, the court must take account of the following principles—(a) passing the custody threshold does not mean that a custodial sentence should be deemed inevitable; (b) custody should not be imposed where a community order could provide sufficient restriction on an offender’s liberty (by way of punishment) while addressing the rehabilitation of the offender to prevent future crime; (c) sentences should not necessarily escalate from one community order range to the next at each sentencing occasion;(d) the decision as to the appropriate range of community order should be based upon the seriousness of the new offence(s);(e) section 65 (a relevant previous conviction to be treated as an aggravating factor) should not be interpreted so as to meet the custody threshold in respect of the sentence for one or more offences that would not themselves justify custody; and(f) where the offender being sentenced is a primary carer for a child, imprisonment should not be imposed where there would be an impact on dependants which would make a custodial sentence disproportionate to achieving the aims of sentencing.”(3) After section 230, insert—“230A Impact of custodial sentence on child or unborn child(1) This section applies where a court is considering imposing a custodial sentence on—(a) a primary carer for a child, or(b) a pregnant woman.(2) The sentencing court must—(a) consider the impact of a custodial sentence on the child or unborn child, and(b) presume (subject to victim impact and any other sentencing considerations) that a non-custodial sentence is in the best interests of the child or unborn child.(3) In this section—(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.””

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the purpose of Amendment 212 is to encourage sentencers to used community-based sentences rather than short prison sentences. It proposes strengthening the custody threshold as a principled starting point for reducing the current use of custody for lower-level sentences.

I favour this amendment over the potentially bolder Amendment 213 in the name of my noble friends, which seeks a presumption against a ban on short prison sentences. The danger of Amendment 213 is that if it restricts access to short prison sentences, in the current climate it could result in up-tariffing, which would not be a desirable result for the length of prison sentences.

As the law is currently drafted, imprisonment is reserved for serious offences. It is already established in statutory terms that an imprisonable sentence should be given only if there is no alternative. However, despite that, in practice people routinely continue to be imprisoned for low-level lawbreaking, fuelling an expensive merry-go-round of multiple short prison sentences.

The amendment proposed builds on principles already accepted in the sentencing guidelines. It enshrines these into legislation to better clarify the current statutory custodial threshold. Specifically, it intends to better ensure that custodial sentences are appropriately reserved for serious offences by better clarifying the assessments that are required to be made. The impact of imprisonment on dependent children should be considered in the sentencing of primary carers. This would limit the relevance of previous convictions in determining custodial sentences.

Persistence is a key driver of the current use of short-term custody and needs to be tackled head on. This amendment emphasises that short periods in custody should not be seen as an inevitable response to a person with a history of relatively minor offending.

The intention of this amendment is to shape the approach of judges and magistrates when considering a custodial sentence in a substantial proportion of cases which currently result in short prison sentences. However, it is important to emphasise that nothing in the proposed provisions would prevent a court from imposing custodial sentences of any length, including short custodial sentences.

In conclusion, I sit as a magistrate in central London. I put short custodial sentences in place, the vast majority of which are for people who have previously tried community orders and have either reoffended or have breached them on multiple occasions. It is very rare for a magistrate to give a short custodial sentence to somebody who has not previously been on a community order. Nevertheless, I think there is a genuine issue here—primarily the strength of the community orders which are available to courts. When the Minister responds to this debate, perhaps he will say something about the strengths and current revamping of the probation service. When sentencing judges or magistrates make short custodial sentences, the confidence that they have in community orders is an important consideration. I beg to move.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 213. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby was somewhat critical of it. I agree with what he is seeking to achieve in Amendment 212. Amendment 213 goes a little further and is a little more precise. If I may say so, I think it is a better amendment.

To clarify, this is not a blanket ban on short sentences; it is a presumption against short sentences. Previous Governments have supported this idea. The evidence is that short sentences do not lessen offending. They are mainly concerned with non-violent offences. They do not provide meaningful rehabilitation. They can have a disruptive effect on family life and relationships.

The statistics are quite awesome. According to data from the Ministry of Justice, between January 2020 and March 2021, 20,000 people went to prison to serve a sentence of six months or less—44% of the prison population. This was even more so for women during the same period. Prior to the pandemic, the figures were even starker.

As I have said, the majority of people serving sentences of six months or less are in prison for non-violent offences, such a theft and drug offences. These offences are often linked to underlying issues such as poverty, addiction, homelessness and poor mental health. We know that these people really should not be in prison at all. Prison does not help them. We also know that short sentences have proven to be less effective than community sentences in reducing offending. Community sentences include interventions such as drug, alcohol and mental health treatment. They do more to address the root causes of offending.

Short sentences disrupt family life and ties; they damage housing, employment and treatment programmes. They do not provide any meaningful rehabilitation. These sentences contribute to volatility shown in prison.

Short prison sentences have a harmful effect on women in particular, hampering relationships with their families and children. Over half of women in prison report being victims of domestic violence, which often contributes to the offence that led to the prison sentence. I have had some help from a great organisation called Revolving Doors, and I have a quotation from one of its members:

“Although I was in prison for a short time I felt traumatised by the whole experience. In fact, sending me to prison was just a waste of time and money. I was released with no explanation and no support. I found myself back in the violent relationship which exacerbated my addiction which led to further arrests and trauma.”


Another argument for a presumption against short sentences is the cost. Of course, that should not be the main thing; the main thing should be protecting society, penalising people who should be penalised and helping to reduce reoffending. However, cost does come into it. The annual cost per prison place in 2020 was £44,640, compared with £4,305 for a community order. It is quite a dramatic difference.

The public, according to surveys, understand why there should be a presumption against short prison sentences. Probably, there are people who say, “Send them in and keep them in longer—six months is too short”, but the public are quite sensible and understand what is going on. I can only refer to previous Ministers, David Gauke and Rory Stewart, who both said it was necessary to introduce the presumption against short sentences. I think we can manage to do that.

The amendment of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, as I said, goes in the right direction, but it is not quite strong enough. This is such a simple measure—so simple that it is hardly worth spending time debating it. I am sure the Minister will accept it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for summing up his response to the two amendments in this group. I feel I have been around this track a number of times over the years and we hear the same arguments again and again. The central point is surely that made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith: the current state of affairs is not satisfactory. We have the merry-go-round of short sentences so that sentencers, including myself, feel that we have to make short sentences because we have repeat breaches of community orders and some sentencers do not have confidence in them. So the merry-go-round carries on, with all the disruptive and damaging consequences which we have heard about from many noble Lords in this debate.

I am not saying that my amendment is significantly better than that of my noble friend Lord Dubs. I am saying, however, that there needs to be a holistic response of shorter sentences and better community sentences which people have confidence in, and which the offenders stick to and benefit from.

I will just come to the question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about giving reasons. Magistrates’ courts are not a court of record. However, we give reasons and write them down—particularly if we think that we are going to be appealed. So, yes, we do give reasons. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 212 withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to add my name to Amendment 214A, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, because we care about protecting vulnerable victims of crime from harm and repeat victimisation.

Home detention curfew, or HDC, is a valuable scheme allowing certain offenders to be released early from their custodial sentence if they have a suitable address to go to. We all recognise the value that this brings in providing a managed way of releasing offenders back into the community. However, there are, rightly, a number of exclusions to eligibility for the scheme based upon the offender’s history of compliance as well as the offences for which they have been convicted. For example, sex offenders required to register, those sentenced for breach of curfew and those serving sentences for cruelty to children or racially aggravated offences are ineligible for HDC. These are just some of the criteria that currently can preclude someone. I believe, as do some colleagues around the Chamber with whom I speak, that the safety of the victim and the risk presented to them by the offender are of the utmost importance when considering suitability for release under HDC.

Amendment 214A seeks to add two new criteria to the framework governing home detention curfews: first, that offenders who have previously breached protective orders such as restraining orders are deemed ineligible; secondly, that those with a history of offences related to stalking, harassment, coercive control and domestic abuse are also deemed ineligible. Victims of these crimes are at high risk of repeat victimisation and are in desperate need of respite from their abuse to help them recover. Under HDC, that respite can be as little as 28 days, allowing no time to address the behaviours that characterise these offences.

Fifty-five per cent of stalking perpetrators go on to reoffend because of the fixated and obsessive nature that defines stalking, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has just said. Therefore, granting HDC in stalking cases is highly inappropriate and of grave concern, as these offenders regularly breach orders and bail conditions. Home detention curfew for these offenders poses a significant risk, catching victims as they let down their guard. To see an offender released so quickly can be highly distressing, retraumatising and risky; and it impacts trust and confidence in our justice system.

HDC can allow offenders to leave prison so quickly that the victim is entirely unaware. I am aware of multiple cases where a victim has been harassed by an offender following release on HDC, including the victim of a brutal assault, whose father told me what happened: “My daughter was convinced she saw the perpetrator within yards of her new flat. She had to walk around him on the pavement. I assured her that this couldn’t be possible, even with only serving half his sentence. Nevertheless, I checked with the prosecuting officer. He knew nothing of any early release, nor had the police been consulted. In fact, we discovered to our horror that my daughter’s assailant had been released barely three months into his sentence.”

This woman saw the man who assaulted her just yards from her new address—an address she moved to for safety, which was secret for a reason. Her father told me of the enormous distress and anxiety this caused as she relived her assault and felt constantly in fear. In this instance, she had signed up for the victim contact scheme, but a HDC decision had been made before she had been allocated a victim liaison officer contact. As such, the decision was made without any opportunity to input licence conditions and set an exclusion zone for her offender, or for her to contribute in any way by raising highly relevant issues. The relevant issues included the fact that the offender had been given a 10-year restraining order—an unusual intervention signalling the judge’s belief that he posed an ongoing risk. Relevant issues such as that he had previously contacted the victim on bail, showing that he had a history of not complying with orders, should have raised red flags and, under this amendment, would have precluded him from HDC.

The use of home detention curfews in these contexts presents an ongoing problem. If the nature of the offence relates to ongoing harm or risk to a particular individual, as detailed in this amendment, HDC should not be considered a suitable intervention. Those are the words of a father who is so worried for his daughter.

I know it is drawing late, but I would like to thank the London Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman, and her office for bringing these concerning cases to my attention. We need to protect our vulnerable victims of crime.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, my name is on this amendment as well. I have the same briefing as the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Newlove, so I do not have anything additional to say, other than that obsessional behaviour is a problem that one sees throughout the court system. While of course I support home detention curfews, it needs to be recognised that obsessional, fixated behaviour is a source of very serious risk—mainly to women, but not exclusively to women. I have seen, relatively recently, obsessional people in breach of a restraining order, a non-molestation order, bail conditions and licence conditions all at the same time. So I support the amendment in my name.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, twice over. First, I thank her for tabling this amendment, which has enabled us to have this short but interesting debate. Secondly, I have to say mea culpa, because I failed to thank her for her contribution in the last group. I should have done so and I apologise for that. I hope that she will be able to hear what I am saying now, via the screen.

The home detention curfew—HDC—scheme has operated since 1999. It provides a managed transition from custody to the community for lower-risk offenders who serve sentences of less than four years. They may be released a maximum of four and a half months earlier than the date on which they must be released in any event, but on average they are released on HDC within three months of their automatic release date.

Offenders who are released under the HDC scheme are released under strict licence conditions. An electronically monitored curfew of at least nine hours a day is mandatory. Location monitoring may be added in cases where practitioners advise that it is required. Importantly, research suggests that offenders released early on HDC are no more likely to commit further offences than if they were released at their automatic release date. Compliance with the curfew conditions is closely monitored and breaches are dealt with robustly, which can lead to a swift recall to prison where necessary.

As my noble friend Lady Newlove pointed out, certain offenders are excluded in law from HDC. They include registered sex offenders, terrorists and those imprisoned for specified violent offences. But, as I have said, most offenders serving sentences of less than four years are eligible for the scheme. I underline the word “eligible”. The fact that a particular offender is, in principle, eligible, does not mean that that offender is suitable for release under the scheme. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, has just said, offenders can, for example, exhibit obsessional behaviour. No offender can be approved for release on HDC without a robust risk-management plan in place. Where necessary, the governor can set additional licence conditions that can include exclusion zones or location monitoring. If the result of the assessment is that the offender cannot be safely managed at the proposed curfew address, HDC will simply not be granted.

We recognise that the release of offenders with a history of stalking, harassment, coercive control or domestic abuse can cause additional distress. We do not believe that adding those offences to the list of offences excluded by law and putting a blanket ban in place would be proportionate, or an effective means of safeguarding victims while maximising the benefits of the scheme. But we are currently reviewing the HDC policy framework to ensure that all the appropriate safeguards are in place to protect victims and the public and that unsuitable offenders are not released on HDC. With these reassurances and for these reasons, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, for so ably and comprehensively introducing her amendment. We return to an issue that we debated during the Domestic Abuse Bill, making misogyny a hate crime. From the Front Bench, we support Amendment 219 and oppose the alternative Amendment 219A.

When we debated the Domestic Abuse Bill, I talked about the appalling kidnap and murder of Sarah Everard by a serving police officer, and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, has said, many more women have died as a result of male violence since then. As the chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales said a few weeks ago, there is a problem with sexism and misogyny in the police service and in society as a whole. Urgent action is needed. Some changes will take a long time, such as changes to social attitudes and police culture, but some changes can happen now. We have an opportunity with this amendment to make one of those changes now.

I did not support the amendment to the Domestic Abuse Bill because I did not believe that that amendment made misogyny a hate crime. This amendment does. In the Domestic Abuse Bill debate, I suggested, as Amendment 219A does, that we should wait for the Law Commission report on hate crime laws. As the helpful briefing from the office of Stella Creasy MP says:

“Since 2010, more than half of Law Commission reviews have not been implemented at all, including the last review of hate crime legislation in 2014.”


I agree with the briefing’s assertion that this is an area where delay has tangible consequences. The evidence that there is a problem is overwhelming. In the wake of the tragic and horrific murders of Sarah Everard and Sabina Nessa, there is an opportunity to strike while the iron is hot, while public opinion is behind us, and where the issue is high in public consciousness. We need to seize that opportunity with Amendment 219.

I did not support the amendment to the Domestic Abuse Bill because I believed that it was the wrong Bill, where one third of domestic abuse victims are male. I believed that it was the wrong Bill because domestic abuse is one of the worst possible crimes, because if there is only one place where someone can feel safe, it should be in their own home—that domestic abuse could not and should be treated as any more serious than it already is.

I also said:

“If noble Lords or Members of the other place do not think we should wait for the Law Commission’s report, there is an imminent legislative opportunity to make sure that hatred of women is treated in every way as a hate crime. We could work cross-party to amend the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which is being debated in the Commons, to make misogyny a hate crime in every sense of the term. Even if the noble Baroness is not convinced by the Government’s concession, we do not need to rush this amendment through now when the ideal legislative opportunity is at our fingertips.”


The ideal legislative opportunity is at our fingertips—it is here and now, and we should do it.

I have to say that I found the arguments in the briefing that noble Lords have been provided with less convincing on the issue of sex and gender. I refer again to what I said on the Domestic Abuse Bill:

“If the Government only require police forces to record crimes where the victim perceives them to have been motivated by hostility based on the victim’s sex … it does not go far enough. Current hate crime offences are recorded when anyone perceives the offence to have been motivated by hatred, not just the victim. The amendment includes sex and gender, and this is important. If an offender believes the victim is a woman, and anybody perceives that the offence was motivated by hatred of women, it should be recorded as a crime motivated by hatred of women. It makes no difference … whether the victim is a transgender woman.”


There may of course be circumstances where an attack on a transgender woman might be more appropriately recorded as a transphobic hate crime, but:

“Where the victim or a witness believes that they were attacked because they were a woman because they perceive the offender believed the victim was a woman, it should be recorded as such. The use of the term “sex” on its own may exclude some offences”.—[Official Report, 17/3/21; col. 363-64.]


It has been argued that, legally, such offences would not be excluded, but we need to consider the practical implications of excluding gender, as Amendment 219A seeks to do.

There are some who believe that trans women are not women but men. Some of those people are very strident in asserting that view. I want to avoid that debate if possible, but the fact is that people are saying this, and that view may influence victims, witnesses and police officers. Some people may not accurately report crimes motivated by misogyny if they believe that this does not apply to trans women. If we are to protect women and record all crimes motivated by misogyny, gender must be included. A proposal such as Amendment 219A, which makes life more dangerous for some women, makes life more dangerous for all women. From the Front Bench, we support Amendment 219 and oppose Amendment 219A.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the Labour Party has been at the forefront of calls to make misogyny a hate crime. Former Nottingham police and crime commissioner Paddy Tipping ensured that it was recorded as a hate crime there, and we have heard from my noble friend Lady Warwick about his work with Chief Constable Sue Fish in that regard. During the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act, we secured the piloting of the recording of misogyny as a hate crime among crimes of violence against the person, including stalking, harassment and sexual offences. Police forces recording misogyny as a hate crime is an important step forward, but we want to go further by including sex and gender in the list of protected characteristics in hate crime laws for the first time.

I shall speak only very briefly because of the hour, but I want to conclude by saying that I thought that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti encapsulated the decision before us. We in the Labour Party support Amendment 219 and oppose Amendment 219A. As my noble friend said, first of all, this relates to where an offence has already taken place. Secondly, it is already the case that race and religion are aggravating factors, and they have been for many years. We believe that misogyny should be added as an aggravating factor when sentencing.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Newlove and Lady Noakes for tabling their amendments. Both have highlighted the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, as have other noble Lords. We rightly share this priority.

These amendments provide us with an opportunity to discuss the important issue of hate crime, and also to pay tribute to the work of the Law Commission. It performs an important service, considering complex matters of law and making recommendations for change and simplification. This very valuable function helps to bring coherence to complicated and technical areas of law.

The Government share the opinion that all hate crimes are a great injustice and should be dealt with by the full force of the law. I know that noble Lords are aware of the breadth of activity to combat the scourge of hate crime, but in the interests of the hour—I do not think I have ever started my first group of amendments at 10 past 12 at night, so this is a first—I shall consider the amendments before the Committee.

As I have stated in the House before, in 2018, as part of the updating of the Government’s hate crime action plan, we asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of current hate crime legislation. This specifically included concluding a review as to whether other protected characteristics, such as sex, gender and age, should be included. The review’s terms of reference were to review

“the existing range of protected characteristics, identifying gaps in the scope of the protection currently offered and making recommendations to promote a consistent approach.”

As noble Lords have said, the Law Commission’s final report is now imminent. It may be published as early as this month, and that of course is a matter for the Law Commission, which is fully independent of the Government. Noble Lords accepted this during the passage of the then Domestic Abuse Bill, and I think we should see it through in the way we agreed.

However, I do not think that we should commit to giving effect to all the Law Commission’s recommendations before anyone—including noble Lords—has even seen and studied them. It would be inappropriate for any Government to sign what is effectively a blank cheque.

In particular, I know many people hope that the Law Commission will recommend—if I can use the popular parlance—that misogyny should be made a hate crime. To those people, and indeed to any noble Lord, I would say, “Wait and see.” We do not know what it will recommend, and nor should we at this stage. As an independent body which considers and weighs up the evidence, the Law Commission will come to its own conclusions. We will only know what the commission’s advice is when the final report is published.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, pointed out, where the Law Commission suggested it was minded to consider adding sex and gender to hate crime legislation, it did so only in a consultation. But the purpose of a consultation is precisely to consult. The Law Commission will also want to consider what consultation responses have said and to shape its conclusions accordingly. Whatever the commission’s inclination might have been in 2020, we cannot assume the commission’s final position until it has been published.

It would be premature to accept Amendment 219 and negate the whole purpose of asking this distinguished, independent organisation to give full and proper consideration to the whole construct, purpose and design of hate crime legislation. What is the point of the Law Commission in the first place? I know that people have been critical of it, but I think it is a very useful tool to deal with certain complex issues.

It would also probably be premature at this stage to accept Amendment 219A. As I have said and my noble friend stated, we cannot pre-empt what the Law Commission will recommend. What I think we can say is that the law is complex and contentious, and that has been reflected in our debate tonight. It seems to me that there is every possibility that the Law Commission will make recommendations that will require primary legislation to implement and I do not think it would be appropriate to make what could be quite significant changes to our statute book through secondary legislation. I dare say that, were such a proposal ever to emanate from the Government, I would expect noble Lords to be critical.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, has relayed to the Committee clearly a very distressing case of mistaken identity and anti-social behaviour generally in that street, apparently to do with drug dealing. If the perpetrators of this terrible crime were found, I am not sure that they would be given a caution, and I thought this part of the Bill was about police cautions—but I accept the general point that victims need to be protected. Although a caution would not be applicable in this case of the break-in at the home and the damage to the car, there might be one in respect of the general anti-social behaviour in the street. It is absolutely essential that the needs of victims are taken into account by the police, including for the financial losses that victims have suffered.

As I said on a previous group, out-of-court settlements have a high victim approval rating already. These amendments, in so far as they apply to police cautions, would ensure that they remain high, and to that extent we support them.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just made. I also think that Mr McAra should be very grateful to my noble friend Lord Brooke for raising the points about the lack of a formal record of the cost of the incidents. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it seems very unlikely that anyone would get a caution for this sort of offence. Even if it got to court, there would be an obligation on the sentencing court to consider compensation, because one has to consider this whenever one sentences an individual. Nevertheless, my noble friend has raised an interesting question and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I hope I can be forgiven for intervening slightly out of order. I have been thinking as I listen to this debate about the very troubling case which the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, raised, but I am not sure that what he is looking for is germane to this clause. However, there is an issue of general principle about unrecovered, uninsured losses arising from a serious crime of violence which does not cause considerable personal injury.

If there is an injury that would attract damages of £1,000 or more, some ancillary costs are payable under the criminal injuries compensation scheme. This raises in my mind that perhaps the Government should look at something like the Pool Re reinsurance scheme, which applies to claims which are uninsured as a result of terrorism events. The underinsured or uninsured person can go to this entity, which has been set up jointly by the public and private sectors, and recover the cost of damages for what has occurred outside the insurance scheme. I suggest to the Minister, who is an extremely experienced lawyer, that perhaps the Government should look at the criminal injuries compensation scheme and the Pool Re scheme and try to produce something which would deal with quite a significant number of cases which probably do not involve a massive amount of money, but in which people who are not very well resourced suffer a great deal, and disproportionately, as a result of the kind of offence that the noble Lord described.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I will also speak to the other amendments in this group. The Committee has already considered these issues, so I can be brief. I apologise for not recognising that some of the amendments in a previous group covered similar issues.

In that previous group, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested that the maximum number of hours attached to the unpaid work condition and the attendance condition, and the maximum fine that could be attached to a caution, should be set in the case of the fine and varied in all cases by regulations and that those should be amended only by the affirmative resolution procedure. The noble and learned Lord previously said in Committee that this was not an ideal solution, as regulations could not be amended and that this House was reluctant to use the “nuclear option” of praying to annul regulations, which is the only option available if it disagrees with a statutory instrument. Even with the affirmative resolution procedure in place, in practice, if the House disagrees with an increase to the maximum number of hours of unpaid work—or any of the other conditions attached to police cautions—there is little that it can do about it, unless changes are made through primary legislation.

I grant that the value of money is eroded over time by inflation and periodically the maximum fine capable of being attached as a condition to a caution may need to increase accordingly, but surely not the amount of time to be spent in unpaid work or subject to the attendance condition. There is a question of principle. If an offence is so grave that greater punishment is required, that should be a matter for the courts and not for a police officer to decide. There is precedent in our legal system for this principle. If magistrates want to impose a harsher sentence, they must refer eligible cases to the Crown Court, where a more senior judge can make a decision with more serious consequences.

When I joined the police service in the 1970s, the police performed the role of both investigator and prosecutor. Parliament then decided that prosecution decisions should be made by an independent body, the Crown Prosecution Service, for very good reasons that I do not need to rehearse here, while punishment of the individual has primarily been a matter for the courts, supported by reports from experts on the medical, social and criminal antecedents of the accused, in many cases, and considered by highly trained and experienced judges who are obliged to follow sentencing guidelines. In the proposals contained in this part of the Bill, the police are investigators, prosecutors and sentencers. There must be limits on the extent to which they should be allowed to carry out all three functions in relation to a case and those limits should be set out in primary legislation, on the face of the Bill. That is the purpose of these amendments and I beg to move Amendment 174.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As he says, in this part of the Bill the police are investigators, prosecutors and sentencers. They also decide whether the matter should be sent to the CPS, with the people charged and sent into the court system. Of course, once the case gets into the court system, magistrates are judge, jury and sentencers. There are different roles at different stages of the system. The burden of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is in some way to codify, limit and guide the police when they are doing this pre-court intervention with the type of cautions set out in the Bill. I look forward with interest to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for putting forward this group of amendments. If I can put it this way, the noble Lord realistically recognised that we have covered some of this ground before—not this particular issue but the conceptual underpinning on which it is based. I hope, therefore, that the Committee and the noble Lord will not take it amiss if I reply relatively briefly, because we have covered some of the points before.

Amendments 174, 176, 182 and 185 relate to the delegated powers contained in Part 6. The amendments propose to remove the clauses that allow the maximum amount of the financial penalty and the maximum number of unpaid work and attendance hours to be specified in regulations and would replace that by putting the details in the Bill. Amendments 175, 183 and 184 set out that the maximum penalty attached to a caution would be fixed at £200 and would make it explicit that an offender’s ability to pay must be taken into account.

The Bill contains powers to set and amend the amount of the maximum financial penalty and to amend the maximum number of unpaid work or attendance hours by regulations via secondary legislation. As I explained on a previous occasion, it was drafted that way to ensure maximum flexibility when responding to the needs of operational practitioners. Any changes to these regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the normal way, but removing the delegated powers in their entirety, which is what Amendments 174, 176, 182 and 185 would do, would mean that there is no flexibility to amend either levels of financial penalty or the number of unpaid work hours. If we have the maximum financial penalty on the face of the Bill, to change it or update it, whether because of inflation or anything else, we would have to have to come back to primary legislation. I respectfully suggest that that is not a great use of parliamentary time.

Finally, as to the matter of whether the offender’s ability to pay should be explicitly set out in statute, of course it is a relevant factor, but we believe that this—alongside a range of other relevant factors around giving a financial penalty, the amount that it is set at and how quickly it is going to be paid—is better set out in detail in a statutory code of practice rather than in the Bill. With apologies for taking that a little shortly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support this amendment, but, as I have already said, we have our doubts about the whole regime. For the benefit of noble Lords who missed the midnight debate on Monday, I bring you the edited highlights, which are relevant to this group.

I quoted from the House of Commons briefing paper 9165. On the Government’s proposals on diversionary and community cautions, it says:

“the available evidence suggests the system: … may result in a further decline in … OOCDs; … is likely to cost more … is unlikely to have a major impact on the reoffending rates of offenders; and … may improve victim satisfaction but is unlikely to have a major impact.”

I have to say that the high point for me on Monday night—or was it Tuesday morning?—was the Minister’s answer to my question about how effective conditional cautions, which are the existing system of cautions with conditions attached, were, compared with simple cautions that do not have conditions attached. The noble Lord announced with glee, if I may say that in a very respectful way, that:

“As the Committee will know from previous exchanges, I am quite a fan of data.”—[Official Report, 8/11/10; col. 1577.]


The Minister then looked at his phone and a message from his WhatsApp group—it is good to see members of the WhatsApp group in the Box today—saying that, in effect, there was no data. The Government not only keep no record of how many conditional versus simple cautions are administered, just the total number of all cautions, but have no record of what kind of conditions are attached to conditional cautions. On the basis of that data void, they plan to implement a system where all police cautions will need to have conditions attached.

I also quoted from a 2018 paper by Dr Peter Neyroud, former chief constable of Thames Valley Police and now a distinguished academic, published by the University of Cambridge and commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, entitled Out of Court Disposals Managed by the Police: A Review of the Evidence. On the police attaching conditions to cautions, he said:

“The result … was a significant degree of inconsistency and a substantial number of inappropriate and un-evidenced conditions.”


The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham gave us an example of, presumably, a youth who was banned from public transport, which meant he could not get to school. I continue to quote from Dr Peter Neyroud:

“Whilst the provision of further training and more guidance improved the situation somewhat, the cost of such an investment within a more general implementation of OOCD’s with conditions”—


exactly what the Government are proposing—

“would be prohibitive and, in any case, did not completely resolve the problems.”

Never mind—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, came up with a better idea: the inspectorates of the constabulary and of the CPS could ensure consistency, so that somebody in a similar situation, committing a similar offence, would have the same conditions attached, no matter where they were in the country. I am afraid not, said the Minister:

“Those two inspectorates are not regulators; they do not have power to enforce compliance.”—[Official Report, 8/11/21; col. 1576.]


Inconsistent, inappropriate and unevidenced conditions will be attached to cautions all over the country, bringing no benefit to offenders, little benefit to victims and increased costs to the criminal justice system. That is what this part of the Bill does.

We support this amendment, which should also apply to diversionary cautions, but the omens are not good that the police will know what they are doing when it comes to applying conditions to support the offender to desist from offending. There is serious doubt that, even when they do, the conditions will have any effect on reducing reoffending.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging debate. When the right reverend Prelate introduced it, he made a general plea in favour of cautions and on why his amendment was appropriate. He spoke of the benefits of cautions and what they need to be effective, and of the revolving door of crisis and crime and of a holistic approach. He particularly gave the example of women offenders, for whom a holistic approach is appropriate to reduce reoffending. Then he went on to give examples of why quite a lot of cautions fail—by giving too many conditions. My experience, through following both cautions and sentences through court, is that the more conditions you put in place, even if they are in place for the best of reasons, the more likely you are to have a breach and to re-enter that cycle, coming back to court or to the police when conditions are breached.

My central point is that out-of-court disposals are a difficult area. The Government and previous Governments have a lot of experience in trying to come up with an appropriate regime for out-of-court disposals. As we have heard on the Bill—I agree with pretty much all the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—we have another cautions regime, which we hope will work in some way. I particularly noted the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, about the need to see draft regulations or a draft code of practice to ensure consistency across the country.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 187 in my name I will speak to the other amendments in this group. I ask the Committee to forgive the repetition.

I understand the Government’s desire to simplify out-of-court disposals and take the pressure off courts but, as I have said in several previous groups, research has shown that moving to the system suggested by the Bill, as piloted by some police forces, is likely to cost more, do nothing to reduce offending and have little or no impact on victim satisfaction.

I have also suggested that the complexity of having to impose conditions in every case when a police caution is given, whether a diversionary or community caution, is likely to have the unintended consequences of increasing the number of cases dealt with by no further action being taken and the number of cases sent to court—anything to avoid the complicated process of setting, arranging and monitoring compliance with the conditions that must be set whenever anyone is given a police caution. Research already shows a reduction in the number of out-of-court disposals in recent years, and these changes are likely to result in further reductions.

Clause 97 abolishes all other forms of out-of-court disposal. I will give some illustrations of what this means in practice. A young lawyer or medic who, completely out of character, has too much to drink, gets drunk and ends up making a nuisance of himself is arrested and, once sober, is given a simple caution. The salutary effect on such an individual’s future behaviour is dramatic, the impact on his career prospects negligible and the amount of time taken by the police to deal with the case minimal. If the impact of his being stopped and spoken to by a police officer has an immediate sobering effect, he might even be given a fixed penalty notice for disorder and sent on his way. Neither of these out-of-court disposals would be available under the Bill as drafted.

If someone drops litter, is seen by a police officer and refuses to put it in the bin, at the moment, that police officer can issue a fixed penalty notice for disorder. Under the Bill, the only course for the officer would be either not to take any action at all, undermining both the law and the authority of the police, or to arrest the person and take them to a police station so that they can be cautioned with conditions attached. I am at a bit of a loss as to what conditions might be attached to a caution for littering, but perhaps the Minister can enlighten the Committee.

Altogether, there are currently 27 minor offences that can be dealt with by a police officer issuing a fixed penalty notice on the spot, from cycling in a park where cycling is prohibited to possession of khat or cannabis. In all these cases, the only way to proceed, if this Bill passes unamended, would be to make an arrest, so that a community or diversionary caution with conditions attached could be administered.

This is a recipe for an increase in anti-social behaviour that goes unchallenged, because police officers faced with the bureaucracy of arrest and a community or diversionary caution with conditions attached will look the other way. What is unclear—the Committee needs to know this, and if the Minister cannot answer from the Dispatch Box, I ask him to write to me—is what happens to cannabis and khat warnings where people who have cannabis or khat found on them are seized by a police officer and a warning is given to them on the street. I would argue that that is a type of out-of-court disposal. Is this also to be outlawed by the Bill? If it is, it will have serious consequences for police resources.

What is proposed by this clause, with community and diversionary cautions being the only out-of-court disposals allowed, will result in fewer people having any action taken against them for anti-social behaviour and significant police resources being used to deal with minor offences. That is why Clause 97, which abolishes other forms of out-of-court disposals, such as fixed penalties for disorder, should not stand part of the Bill and the simple police caution should be retained. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is to retain simple cautions. The examples he gave illustrate the point I made earlier: that this is a very complex area, with a lot of history of government trying to manage out-of-court disposals in different ways. He gave the example of 27 minor offences which can be dealt with by fixed penalty notices and asked what happens with cannabis and khat warnings. I would be interested to hear the answer.

The noble Lord asked—I think rhetorically—what else a police officer can do other than give a conditional caution. The answer is that they can do nothing. They can give the person they are dealing with a talking to; in my experience, police officers are perfectly capable of doing that. Nevertheless, as I said in an earlier group, this is a very complex area. The Government have tried a number of different out-of-court disposal regimes in recent years; I am not aware that any approach was particularly better than previous ones. Indeed, the noble Lord gave examples of the not obvious success of the pilot schemes for this regime.

Nevertheless, I think that out-of-court disposals are appropriate. They need to be handled in a proportionate way and with the right amount of training for the police officers dealing with them. Clearly, an appropriate level of intervention would, one would hope, be for the benefit of the offenders, given that it is very likely that a large proportion of the offenders will be drug and alcohol users. Having said that, I will be interested to hear why the Minister thinks a simple caution is not appropriate to retain on the statute book.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, it is fair to say that this group of amendments goes to the heart of why reform to out of court disposals was needed and the aims of the new cautions framework. The background is that the public consultation on out of court disposals showed that more than half of respondents did not believe that they deterred offending. As such, it was felt that there should be a framework with more meaningful and proportionate consequences and a move away from “warnings” and “simple cautions” to a system with, on the one hand, repercussions for the offender but, on the other, an opportunity to reduce reoffending and address often complex needs.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated his intention to oppose Clause 97 standing part of the Bill. Removing that clause would allow existing cautions to remain in use. That would undermine the entire reform and change that we are trying to bring about and would continue the current inconsistent approach that we have across police forces. We do not want to stick with the status quo; we want to improve it.

As I understand it, Amendments 187 and 188 are consequential to the removal of Clause 97. Amendment 189 seeks to retain the option to use the simple caution as well as the new diversionary and community cautions. It also means that, if any existing cautions were retained, the giving of these disposals to offenders would then be taken into account in any repeat offending. Clause 96 deals with the provisions of restrictions on multiple use of cautions, so I will not expand further on that point at this stage.

Following the joint government and police review of out of court disposals between 2013 and 2014, it was established that the existing disposals framework needed reform. The National Police Chiefs’ Council developed its own two-tier out of court disposal strategy in 2017, which removed the need for the simple caution, penalty notice for disorder and cannabis and khat warnings. I will come back to the specific point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about. Since then, one-third of forces have moved to the two-tier framework, using conditional cautions along with the non-statutory community resolution. We believe that attaching conditions to the caution means that the recipient must engage in some way with the outcome as well as accepting responsibility. That is a more proactive and robust approach than the simple caution, which requires no further engagement by the offender and is often nothing more than a warning.

Removal of the simple caution does not mean that there is no provision for offenders where conditions requiring higher levels of engagement are considered unsuitable. As I said in response to an earlier group, we want to ensure a wide range of conditions is available, including those that require a low level of engagement on the part of the offender; indeed, it goes down at the bottom end to an expectation not to reoffend, so that such conditions can be selected where appropriate. The critical point is that there should be flexibility in the conditions that may be set in terms of the level of engagement that is required from the offender, so that the authorised person has discretion in this regard when choosing the conditions.

On the specific point of cannabis and khat warnings, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, also echoed, the community resolution already replaces cannabis and khat warnings. This is NPCC policy. The community resolution will be retained by the police as the only non-statutory option. Police are well practised in using the community resolution for this type of drug possession, and it does not require a formal admission of guilt either.

The final point I make is that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, implied—I think; I may have got this wrong—that removing the simple caution meant that a low-level offence could be dealt with only by means of a diversionary or community caution. Fixed penalty notices do not fall under the reform to out of court disposals and will still be available for use where relevant. The example of littering given by the noble Lord may be dealt with by those means or indeed by community resolution, which is an alternative and non-statutory disposal that police forces will retain. I hope that answers his question on the khat point and also his point on littering.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will make a very brief point in support of what has just been said by the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Baroness. There are a number of professions where you have to establish that you are a fit and proper person. I act as a legal assessor to the Nursing and Midwifery Council, and I am aware of the registration process: you have to assert that you are a fit and proper person. I can see that a caution of the kind that we have been discussing might stand in the way of a registration being effective, and that would be a great tragedy.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling his amendment. As we have seen through this debate, it has inspired many contributions on a wide range of points about whether and when a caution should be spent: after three months or immediately when the caution is given.

I remember sitting on the Michael Sieff Foundation report, and our discussions about whether all youths should effectively have their criminal records expunged unless there were particularly serious matters in there. I also remember debating that point very well, because I was sceptical about it at the time. The argument that I found most convincing was from the lady who was an academic helping us. It was based on the inadequacy of the record-keeping system for having any sort of differentiated approach for expunging a criminal record. It is really much better and more reliable to expunge the lot unless there are extreme reasons not to. That way gave young people the best chance of getting a good job and starting their career.

All noble Lords who spoke in this debate made interesting points. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti made one particular point about the record-keeping of the internet. This is a huge issue; the internet does not forget. Of course, employers make their own checks through the internet, whether or not they have been given permission to. In my experience, young people are conscious of this and spend a certain amount of time editing their internet history to make sure they get any job they are offered. That is a flippant point. Nevertheless, this was an interesting debate and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s reason for why a caution should not be spent at the time it is given, rather than after three months or whatever period it was. I too had the briefing from Transform Justice, which made a good case, so I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, first, I will pick up one point from the last group to make it very clear: if I have made any errors, I am happy to correct them. As far as I am aware, there is no doctrine of ministerial infallibility; I say that with all due respect to my colleagues. Because the Cabinet table is still terra incognita to me, I hope I am on the right side of good behaviour even speaking from this seat.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that we are not introducing any changes to the current regime for rehabilitating offenders who receive a caution. The proposed diversionary caution replicates the current system for the conditional caution, with the same spending period. I also point out that the lower-tier community caution being introduced has no spending period, and therefore mirrors the current adult simple caution. In effect, we are maintaining the position that pertains with a spending period for the lower-tier and higher-tier cautions. We think that is a sensible position to take.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act was, to use her phrase, a wonderful thing. It is an important piece of legislation and the principle underpinning it is important. It seeks to strike a balance between protecting the public and rehabilitating offenders, and it does that by requiring that in most cases a criminal record must be disclosed for a period of time but—this is the important “but”—after that period, the offender no longer needs to disclose it for most types of employment. I hear the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham that cautions sometimes have to be disclosed, but it depends for what purposes and when. There is an important spending period.

The real question at the heart of this debate is whether diversionary and community cautions should have the same spending periods. It is at that point that I respectfully diverge from the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, because, if a diversionary caution were to be treated as spent at the time a caution is given, it would suggest that there is nothing in favour of public protection that requires the disclosure of that caution, and the offending it relates to, for even a limited time—up to three months—after it has been given. That position is simply not tenable, once we recall what the diversionary caution is all about. Let us remember that the diversionary caution requires the authorised person to be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of offending to charge the offender, and the offender themselves must both admit to that offending and consent to the giving of the caution. Public protection therefore continues to be engaged after it is given as, unlike a community caution, criminal proceedings may be instituted if the offender does not comply with the conditions.

Over and above that, again unlike the community caution, the diversionary caution can be given for indictable offences, admittedly in exceptional circumstances and with permission of the Director of Public Prosecutions. That again highlights the importance of placing a time-limited spending period on cautions that relate to more serious offences. Removing, therefore, the spending period for diversionary cautions blurs the important distinction between the two sorts of caution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend Lady Massey for introducing these amendments. She did so comprehensively, and I shall speak very briefly in support of them.

When most young people go into custody, they will serve half their sentence in custody and the other half out on licence or on a training order. The gist of the Bill is to increase the custody element to two-thirds, while the amendments would put that back to half the period. As I have said on other amendments, I have an aversion to sentence inflation, and this is an example of it. There is no evidence that I am aware of that it would reduce reoffending. Rehabilitation is available within both the youth estate and the adult estate, but it is so much better if it can be engaged while outside prison.

On principle, I am against sentence inflation. My noble friend has set out with her normal expertise why, when looking at a wider context of international law, this example of sentence inflation is not appropriate. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments, which I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, for putting down, all relate to custodial sentences for children. There were one or two points that she made that I shall perhaps respond to when we get to group 9, because there is a little bit of an overlap with some of the points there. I hope that she will forgive me if I respond to some of the points then, but I shall seek to respond to the majority now.

As the Committee will be aware, there is a separate and distinct sentencing framework for children. When sentencing children, the courts have to take into account two statutory considerations: the principal aim of the youth justice system, which is to prevent offending by children and young people, and the welfare of the child. I hope that overlaps with some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord German, emanating from the Sentencing Council.

Although, therefore, custody should always be a last resort for children, there will be some cases where it is necessary, and we believe that the court is best placed to determine the appropriate sentence. But those who commit the most serious offences, and who pose a risk to the public, should serve an amount of time in custody which reflects the seriousness of their offending.

Against that background, let me go through the relevant clauses and amendments. Clause 101 relates to—and I underline this point—minimum sentences. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, on a few occasions referred to “mandatory” sentences. The clause is not headed “mandatory sentences”; the words “mandatory sentence” do not appear in this Bill, except in one place, Clause 101(8), which refers back—it is a pity that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is not in his place, because we have a nice piece of parliamentary drafting here—to Section 399(c) of the Sentencing Code “(mandatory sentence requirements)”, but that refers to a minimum sentence where the conditions set out in the clause do not apply.

I have two points to make in this regard. First, minimum sentences are not mandatory in the sense that they must be imposed. They are a mandatory consideration that the court must make before passing a sentence unless the provision in the sentence is met. Secondly, the Bill does not introduce minimum sentences for under-18s for the first time. Offenders aged 16 or 17 are already subject to minimum sentencing provisions if convicted of threatening with a weapon or bladed article, or a repeat offence involving a weapon or bladed article.

The threshold for courts to depart from imposing a minimum sentence is open to them, the question being whether the test is met. This amendment aims to ensure that the change in the threshold will not apply to offenders aged 16 and 17 who are convicted of these two offences. In Clause 101 we seek to ensure that courts depart from the minimum sentence only in exceptional circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, in the light of what my predecessor as Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said, I can be very brief.

First, I wholeheartedly agree with him. Secondly, I do not think that we should beat about the bush at all about the change to the word “exceptional”. Any lawyer knows that the intention is to raise the bar significantly. You use that word only when you want to try to minimise the discretion or ambit of when it is to happen. I hope that the Minister will accept the clear intention of the change and answer the question posed in the earlier debate by the noble Lord, Lord German, about the difference. There is a clear and obvious difference.

Thirdly, having had a little less time as a judge and coming to the job a bit later, I can see an argument, which one has to accept, for saying that, by setting a minimum term, Parliament is giving an indication of what it thinks is appropriate. Perhaps that was not the right road to go down, but we have gone down it. But where this Government are wholly wrong—I do not think that we should mince our words about that—is in saying that a judge should impose a sentence that is not just. In refusing this amendment, the Government are saying, “We don’t care if injustice results: you must look at the circumstances, and if they are not exceptional” —a high bar—“you must impose an unjust sentence”. Have we really sunk so low as to require our judges not to do justice?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has made, but I want to give a different perspective that partly undermines the argument put by him and all the other noble, and noble and learned, Lords who have spoken. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that, ultimately, it is for judges to pass a sentence that is just. He pinned his argument on that single point.

We talked about youths in the previous group. For youth justice, the overarching purpose when sentencing is to reduce reoffending. That purpose supersedes the overall position of needing to be just in the sentence. That is why there is a minimum sentence in youth courts of four months. The reason is that, when you go to youth offender institutions or things like that, you are invariably told by the prison offers and teachers dealing with the young people that they need to be there for a duration of time to get their education. That is the justification for having a minimum sentence of four months in youth cases.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has made a very strong point about an issue which applies only in a specific part of the country. Most of us do not have experience of this issue. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, said, there is a more general trend in the use of bikes as cargo bikes—and, indeed, my own son also used to take his young children around in a little cart behind his bike. It used to worry me greatly. The girls no longer like to be reminded of it, but they seemed to think it was great fun at the time. Of course, the issue of insurance is important. It seems to me that the point the noble Baroness has made is that there is a long-overdue need for a review of hire services—vehicles for hire—and since the use of bikes is much more common these days, we really should include them in that review.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I too agree that the noble Baroness made a compelling speech, with which a lot of people who live in London will have a lot of sympathy. I also agree with my noble friend Lord Berkeley, who raised the issues of cycles for freight, insurance and how the very rapid development of small electric vehicles and bicycles expanding their remit in London is a wider problem that needs to be addressed. The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, also made that point.

As I have said to the Committee before, I sit as a magistrate in London, very often in Westminster. I remember dealing with pedicabs a number of years ago. Those offences were brought to our attention by Westminster City Council. From memory—this is a number of years ago—it was usually to do with pedicabs being parked on pavements, with the police bringing people to court through the council and impounding some vehicles. I have not seen those offences for several years now. I do not quite know what has changed—perhaps Westminster City Council does not feel it has the power to do that anymore, I do not know; it is a moving target. Nevertheless, I think the central point of the noble Baroness’s amendment is powerful.

I do not know whether there are any practical problems with harmonising the regulations with the rest of England and Wales, so I look forward to what the Minister says on that point.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Stowell for comprehensively setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the regulation of pedicabs. As she pointed out, Clause 66 relates to motor vehicles which are defined as “mechanically propelled”. They are the most dangerous and cause the most harm, so it is logical that they are the focus of this clause.

The noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, mentioned other types of similar vehicle that might be caught by this, so it is perhaps worth mentioning what the Government are doing on cycling offences. In 2018, we held a consultation to consider cycling offences causing serious injury or death, as well as reviewing existing cycling offences. The Government feel that any new offences applicable to cyclists, with or without a trailer, are best legislated for as a package, rather than piecemeal. Moreover, we believe that there should be a separate framework of cycling offences, as compared with motoring offences, as it may not be proportionate to apply to cyclists offences intended for drivers of motor vehicles and their corresponding penalties. The response to the consultation will be published in due course—I hope before the end of this year, but early next year at the latest.

The wider question of the regulation of pedicabs, including that of noise nuisance caused by sound systems located on pedicabs—which I agree from experience can be ear-splitting—is not a straightforward issue. In England, pedicabs generally fall under the taxi and private hire vehicle licensing regime, as various noble Lords have mentioned, in that they can be regulated as a hackney carriage—a taxi. The exception to this is London, where, as my noble friend Lady Stowell explained, they fall outside the existing taxi legislation. It should also be noted that taxi and private hire vehicle legislation is a devolved matter in Scotland and Wales, although the legislation that applies in Wales is the same as that which applies in England.

The Government are aware of the long-standing concerns that pedicabs contribute to safety and traffic-related issues in central London. The current situation in London means that there are few existing powers to control pedicab operations effectively. This has meant that pedicab operators, drivers and their vehicles are not licensed, there are no requirements for drivers to undergo criminal record or right-to-work checks, as there are in other industries, and there is no fare control. And there may very well be insurance issues, as the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, mentioned.

The Government agree that it is in the interest of safety and fairness to passengers to fix this legal anomaly and, as my noble friend Lady Stowell noted, a Private Member’s Bill that would enable Transport for London to regulate pedicabs in London is currently being taken forward by Nickie Aiken MP—the Pedicabs (London) Bill. I am pleased to confirm that the Government intend to join the very long list pointed out by my noble friend and support this Bill. I am therefore happy to offer her a meeting with the Minister, my noble friend Lady Vere, to discuss this further, if she would like. I commend my noble friend for raising this issue. We agree that it needs to be addressed, and I hope she is reassured that the Department for Transport is on the case. For now, I hope my noble friend feels free to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I wonder whether I should say that I am not going to make a second speech polishing up my first. I apologise to my noble and learned friend Lord Hope that I got my words in before he did.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have to say that I find myself in the somewhat invidious situation of supporting the Government. The Labour Party supported this clause in the other place; we agree that it fills a gap in the law and allows the high level of harm caused by these incidents to be recognised.

The debate has focused essentially on the possibility of imprisonment for careless driving, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, made it clear in his speech that that was the burden of his objection and the reason he was moving his amendment proposing that the clause do not stand part of the Bill.

The burden of the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, was that the mental element in the case of careless driving is no more than negligence and the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said that that would be a momentary lapse, which would have a serious consequence. But when one looks at health and safety legislation, you can indeed have momentary lapses which have very serious consequences. Magistrates occasionally deal with health and safety legislation as well. In addition to that, as part of health and safety legislation that I have seen, it is about a more systemic approach to health and safety within the environment of the factory or whatever you are talking about. Nevertheless, there can be momentary lapses that lead to serious consequences and there is the possibility—although it may be unlikely—of a prison sentence for the director of a company who is responsible for health and safety matters.

As I introduce this, I acknowledge that I find myself in an unusual situation of supporting this element of the Government’s proposals. Nevertheless, I would hope that it would be a very exceptional case, where there is such egregious negligence, that resulted in a prison sentence, when the vast majority of cases are momentary lapses, possibly with tragic results. I would have thought that those types of cases would not result in a prison sentence.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, the good thing is that the party opposite is being consistent, because it introduced the offence of causing death by careless driving.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I am. Sorry, ignore that. Strike that from the record. I will come back to that.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I was interested in the explanation of this amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As he rightly said, there are all sorts of potential issues—one can think of electric cars—and reasons this may not be workable as it has been drafted. Nevertheless, the noble Lord made the point about the vulnerability of police officers when they are in this situation, and of course the vast majority of cars do use conventional engines at the moment.

The other point made by the noble Lord is that a driver is under no obligation to get out of the vehicle. I have to say that, in the current circumstances, if there was a lone woman in the vehicle and a lone police officer asked her to step outside, that may be problematic. Nevertheless, that is not the burden of the noble Lord’s amendment. He has raised an interesting point; we want to protect police officers in vulnerable situations, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, if I understand the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, correctly, this amendment is aimed at improving the safety of police officers at the roadside. I share his concerns and want to reassure him that the safety of police officers is vitally important to this Government, as is demonstrated by our programme of work on the police covenant. I will not echo the arguments made to the noble Lord by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, on the defects of his amendment, but I want to say that we are committed to ensuring that the police have the powers that they need to protect people.

The British model of policing is based on consent, and the exercise of police powers, including the Section 163 power, needs to be transparent, fair and legitimate to ensure that the public can remain confident in policing. I am supportive of the intention behind the extension of this power, but more evidence and consultation are needed to demonstrate that it would provide benefits to officers’ safety and build support for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the proposal to extend the power. I can say to the noble Lord that we will work closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and the Police Federation to explore these issues further and consider what more can be done to improve officer safety at the roadside. On that basis, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment. One of the most telling statistics is that there were 28,000 hit-and-run collisions in 2017, all involving failure to stop and report collisions that involved actual or potential serious or fatal injury. This number had increased by 43% since 2013—in only four years. That is a very significant increase and, as other noble Lords have said, the current maximum penalty for a hit-and-run collision is six months in prison which, as the noble Baroness said, might be all right in some circumstances, but not in others.

The other issue is that, now that most people have mobile phones in their cars, there should be a general duty to report collisions while at the collision scene. Yes, there are a few places in this country where there is not any signal, but very few compared to where there is; and if it is not possible, the driver or rider may subsequently report the collision and produce their insurance certificates, if appropriate, at a police station or to a constable. This should all be done within two hours of the collision, because 24 hours means that, if there were any risk of alcohol or drugs having an effect, that could be lost in that time. This is a really important amendment, and I would be interested if we could find some more up-to-date statistics on what has happened since 2017, because it is a very serious issue.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, my right honourable friend Ben Bradshaw spoke to his amendment, which was along similar lines, in the other place, to increase the sentences for this type of offence from six months to a possible 14 years. I agree with most of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and particularly her opening point: in general terms, I do not like sentence inflation. This is a very large potential inflation in sentences. Nevertheless, I take the point that she and other noble Lords have made, that a maximum of six months in custody for failing to report a serious or fatal injury during a road traffic accident seems like an unduly light sentence for the most extreme cases.

We have heard reference to the petition; I understand that it will be debated in the House of Commons later this month. I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I would be interested to know how this would interact with existing sentences. For example, if a person has committed an offence causing serious injury or death by dangerous driving, would the expectation be that they would also be sentenced to a number of years for not reporting the accident? How would the two charges work in combination with each other? I have an open mind on these amendments, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as noble Lords have explained, Amendments 161 and 166 relate to the offence of drivers failing to stop. We know that in a small number of cases, the failure to stop might be related to an event that leads to the death of, or serious injury to, another person, but in the vast majority of cases, convictions involve low-level traffic incidents. In an extremely small number of cases, there may not be any other evidence to connect the death or serious harm with the driver who fails to stop, meaning the only offence they have committed is that failure to stop. I understand the concerns raised, but these amendments potentially risk providing for a maximum custodial sentence of 14 years for failure-to-stop offences resulting in serious or fatal injuries in circumstances where there would not have had to be evidence of a causal link between the failure to stop and the death or serious injury.

What is more, these amendments cut across the basis for the current offence. I must stress that the offence of failure to stop and report is designed to deal with the behaviour relating to the failure to stop. The offence is not to provide an alternative route to punish an offender for a more serious but unproven offence.

Where there is evidence that the driver caused harm, there are a range of other offences, including causing death or serious injury by dangerous or careless driving, with which the driver can be charged. In these cases, the courts can treat the failure to stop as an aggravating factor that adds to the overall seriousness of the offending. Where there is evidence that the driver knew about the incident and took steps to avoid detection, they may be charged with perverting the course of justice, a common law offence that already carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

Linking death or serious injury with a failure to stop as the cause would risk creating an unnecessary and unfairly severe offence. To take an example, where there was evidence of causing death by careless driving and failure to stop, the offender would face a maximum penalty almost three times higher for failure to stop than they would for causing death by careless driving—14 years compared to five years— even though the causing death offence requires proof of a fault in the standard of driving.

The law already imposes severe penalties for vehicle offences that lead to death or serious injury, but when doing so, a clear causal link must be proved between the driver’s behaviour and the outcome. The proposed amendment would essentially be equating, or in some cases exceeding, the seriousness of failure to stop with actual culpability for causing death or injury. That, as I have said but want to repeat, causes serious anomalies with other offences that could result in potential injustices, and it is why the Government cannot accept the amendment.

In relation to Amendment 166, which also seeks to amend the current offence, we are concerned by the potential impacts on what is a complex area of law. For example, it is unclear what impact replacing the word “accident” with “collision” would have; it might exclude incidents that are currently and rightly within scope of the existing version of this section. We also reiterate our objections set out above to the creation of the offence of failing to report where the collision caused foreseeable serious or fatal injury.

We are of course aware of the traumatic effects of such incidents, however rare. From what I have already said, it should be clear that this is a complex area, and any change to the law has to fit within the current driving offence framework. However, let me assure noble Lords that my ministerial colleagues at the Department for Transport understand the concerns that have been raised. I can assure the Committee that the Department for Transport is exploring options that could be pursued in this area, including but not limited to the available penalties and how the offence operates as part of long-term and wider work on road safety. I hope that, with those assurances, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

It is clear that, if it is known that there is to be a review for compliance and consistency by the inspectorates, this will help bring that about, quite apart from providing public confidence that compliance with the code and consistency are being achieved in practice. We support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment. Noble Lords may be bored, and I am exhausted, but I beg to move Amendment 170.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to say something from the Back Benches about my experience of sitting on scrutiny committees, which the noble Lord has just spoken about. I have sat on scrutiny committees for reviewing out of court disposals for both the British Transport Police and the Metropolitan Police. In my experience, they are good committees because they bring together a range of interested parties on whether out of court disposals are appropriate—magistrates, probation, CPS, police, YOTs and sometimes, in addition, there may be housing, education and health people from local government to review the appropriateness of out of court disposals.

In my experience, this system is extremely erratic and not systemised in any particular way. My experience is that the results of reviewing out of court disposals are not fed up through the Home Office, so when I have asked questions of both the MoJ and the Home Office, there is no way of reviewing whether out of court disposals have been appropriately used or of collating the numbers, because the use of scrutiny committees varies so much across the country—that is my understanding. I was interested to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talk about the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and whether he is trying to introduce a code of practice to try to regularise these out of court disposal scrutiny committees. They are a good idea, but they need to be standardised across the country.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am very much obliged to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede for that intervention, which goes to an incredibly important point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which is that there needs to be proper scrutiny of the police being given a power to, in effect, punish people and impose conditions. There are two aspects to that, which the noble and learned Lord identified in his speech, so beautifully read by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, even though it is so late: first, that the code of practice is complied with and, secondly, that there is consistency throughout the country in relation to the application of out of court disposals. I would be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say on how that point will be dealt with. We support the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

I also agree with Amendments 170, 171 and 190, which seek to ensure that a person may be authorised to give a discretionary or community caution only if they have been authorised by a prosecuting authority for those purposes and a prosecuting authority must be satisfied that that person has received adequate training and is suitable to carry out those functions. Amendment 190 is a consequential amendment on that. I support these amendments and am very interested to hear what the Ministry of Justice has to say about them. I cannot think that it would not agree with this; some level of quality must be required for somebody who is going to give that caution.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made points to the effect that this will be more expensive. He did not mention, because he is too kind—or he may have done, but I missed it—the additional £13 million that the Commons paper identifies for the cost of introduction, in addition to the £105 million and £15 million. We are going to spend all this money to achieve no greater victim satisfaction and without any evidence that it reduces reoffending. Why?

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, I pick up a point made from the Back Benches, for a change, by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that there is too much variation or a lack or a consistency in the use of out of court disposals across police forces. The noble Lord is, with respect, right that there are differences in the way cautions are given across forces. That is why, as I said earlier, we want to simplify the framework to reduce the inconsistency. We have to recognise, however, that there is ultimately an operational policing point here. Necessarily, therefore, because we have different police forces we will have different operational decisions, and different emphases in the way out of court disposals—

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

If the noble Lord will give way, the point I was making is that there is an inconsistency in the scrutiny of out of court disposals, not just the out of court disposals themselves.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Absolutely. Let me deal with the out of court disposals themselves. I hope I have answered that point. There will, we hope, be a greater consistency of approach, but there will be differences. As for the scrutiny, as I said earlier, the code of practice will, we hope, provide a level of consistency of scrutiny that we also want to make sure is part of this structure. As I said earlier, that will be subject to an affirmative SI.

I am conscious of the time. I think we have drifted into Tuesday, so perhaps I should just conclude by thanking the Committee for contributions and invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment, although I am sure the discussions will continue. I also beg to move that the clauses stand part of the Bill.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 276, to which I have added my name. Suspicionless stop and search is a significant problem for community relations in this country. It is a significant problem for trust in the police. In recent days, we have rightly given a great deal of time and attention on all sides of your Lordships’ House, including in this Committee, to trust and confidence on the part of women, and young women in particular, but we must not forget other aspects of broader trust and confidence, including the issue of young black men and policing.

Decades after the Lawrence inquiry, we still need to keep returning to this issue. No power or set of powers has probably done more to weigh against the strides made by the late Sir William Macpherson and by everyone across politics, including former Prime Minister, Theresa May, to try to address problems with stop and search. No power has been more problematic than that of suspicionless stop and search in general and Section 60 in particular.

This is really not a partisan issue. Your Lordships know that, long before I came to this House, I was a civil liberties campaigner and not popular with Governments of either stripe in relation to powers such as these. In my view, there has been an authoritarian arms race about law and order in this country for too long. No Government are perfect. No Opposition are perfect. This is a good moment to look at stop and search. There is no better parliamentarian to be leading us in this conversation than the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

The problem with suspicionless stop and search is this. No human is perfect; therefore, no police officer is perfect. Stop and search, conducted by humans of other humans, even with reasonable suspicion, is problematic, but there is no choice if we want to combat crime and investigate offences that have happened or that might yet take place. We have to have powers to stop and search. They are problematic, even when based on reasonable suspicion because what is reasonable suspicion? Who do we think is going equipped? Who do we think meets the profile of somebody who committed an offence a few hours ago? Of course, it is hard for any citizen, including constables, to rid themselves of all the baggage that comes with being in this—or any—society. Those problems are so compounded when reasonable suspicion is taken out of the equation.

Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act gives the power—which is triggered by a senior police officer, but a police officer none the less—effectively to change the criminal law in an area for the period in which that power is triggered. In that particular part of town, there is effectively a suspicionless stop and search zone. We are often talking about urban areas, and areas with a very high density of people from certain communities. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, can correct me if I am wrong. Within that area, young black men in particular know that that is a stop and search zone. Their first encounters with the police service are often very negative.

Because of the rise of the internet, mobile phone use and videos of incidents, this material is now there to be viewed. I have seen some very disturbing scenes of quite young boys being stopped and searched, without suspicion, on streets not many miles from here. These young boys and men do not have the protections that they have post-arrest in the police station. Arrest is based on reasonable suspicion. Officers usually stop a young man. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave the statistics. If you are a young black man you are many more times likely to be stopped and searched than if you are a young white woman, let alone a middle-aged woman like me.

Sometimes officers will be situated in a particular place. I understand their reasons. They are worried about knife use, for example. Some young men are being stopped on a routine basis. Sometimes big, burly officers make a human wall around a boy of perhaps 13 or 14 years-old. I have seen the pictures. People in that community—bystanders, if it happens in the daytime—will be trying to remonstrate with the officers. They will be held back. This young man—13, 14 or 15 years-old —is having his first encounter with the authorities. He is frightened. He is behind this human wall of big, burly officers. There is not even reasonable suspicion that he has done something wrong.

It seems to me that this is very dangerous—and it is not an occasion where I can even blame the police. It is an occasion when I have to look to the statute book itself, because this is about legislators, not police officers. I have been critical in other debates, and I am afraid that I will have to be critical about some decisions that the police have made. But this is a legislative problem, because legislators from both major parties have allowed this regime to be triggered for suspicionless stop and search, and it has created problems over many years. It really is time to address this.

This seems like a radical probing amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but if Section 60 were removed from the statute book, what would be the consequence? There would still be ordinary, democratic, rule of law-based powers to stop and search with reasonable suspicion. That is a fairly low threshold in any event, I would argue, but this ability and power to designate particular areas—everybody knows where those areas are and who is affected in them—would go. I cannot think of a more positive signal and progressive step for any Government, any party and any legislator who cares about race relations in this country, and cares about rebuilding trust in policing and the rule of law.

So once more I find myself thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I feel that I will do so again a few more times in this Committee.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have some questions for the Government on Amendment 129, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

Drugs policy and the drugs trade have come up in our debates on this Bill as part of the debate on the serious violence reduction duty, particularly regarding child exploitation and county lines. It will come up again shortly when we look at the groups of amendments on road safety and dangerous driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol. There is a complexity of links in multiple areas of policy, be they poverty, health or criminal justice. On the serious violence reduction duty, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce serious violence through a public health approach. So my question to the Minister is: what work is being done alongside those plans to look at a coherent public health approach to drugs policy? As with serious violence, there needs to be a focus on what reduces harm, not just what deals with the symptoms.

Amendment 129 is specifically about removing the power of the police to search people for drugs for personal use only. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave a very informative history lesson, if you like, on his part in the “no arrest” policy in Brixton. I thought I might update what he was saying with my perception as a magistrate who sits in criminal and youth courts in London. I can say with reasonable confidence that I very rarely see in front of me, for the possession of class B drugs alone, either a youth or an adult who is of good character. I really cannot remember the last time I saw that in a court in which I was sitting. In my experience, when that is charged, other matters are charged as well, or the amount of drugs found on the person is at a much higher level but, nevertheless, the CPS chooses to charge that person only with possession rather than possession with intent to supply. Nevertheless, it is an interesting amendment, and the noble Lord raised a number of interesting points about the appropriateness of that power of the police under Amendment 129.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, made a very interesting speech. For about the first 40 years of my life, I lived in north-west London and—on this discrimination point—I have never been stopped and searched by the police. I have had my vehicle stopped a few times, but I can perfectly well understand why the police did it. So it is quite an interesting point on discrimination.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My noble friend asked me a very interesting question, but I am not sure that I can answer it. I suppose that the short answer is that I am very conscious that this is a divisive issue and one that the police themselves have strong views on. They do not agree with each other—I have certainly heard a range of views within the police about its effectiveness or its blanket use being ineffective. I think that the answer is that the Government need to look at this issue very sensitively and be very aware of the distrust that it breeds within communities, particularly ethnic minority communities.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendments, which relate to stop and search powers. We can always rely on him to share his experience on the ground. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his very thoughtful contribution at the end.

Amendment 129 seems to be a step in the direction of decriminalising drug possession, but I do not think that the noble Lord has ever disguised his wish to see that happen—ditto, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. As the noble Lord will know, this Government have no intention of decriminalising drug possession. Our approach on drugs remains clear: we must prevent drug use in our communities, support people through treatment and recovery, and tackle the supply of illegal drugs.

The noble Lord gave the statistic from Matt Parr saying that 63% of searches were for drugs. He is absolutely right on that. We make no secret of our intention to disrupt drug markets, because that is often part of the police’s strategy for tackling serious violence, and possession searches may come in response from reports from CCTV or the public or from factors that officers more obviously encounter on patrol, such as drug transactions. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seemed to reflect that in talking about the types of issues that he sees in the magistrates’ courts.

There is a substantial body of scientific and medical evidence to show that controlled drugs are harmful and can damage people’s mental and physical health, and our wider communities. The decriminalisation of drugs in the UK would not eliminate the crime committed by the illicit trade, nor would it address the harms associated with drug dependence and the misery that this can cause to families and communities. I bet that everyone in your Lordships’ House can think of someone who has been affected. The police therefore have a wide range of powers at their disposal to deal with drug-related offences, including the powers to search and obtain evidence under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. How the police choose to pursue investigations is an operational decision for chief constables, but we are clear that we expect them to enforce the law.

I return to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about what we are doing to assist young people away from drugs. He will know that we invested tens of millions of pounds in the National County Lines Coordination Centre; he will also know that we do not wish to criminalise young people—our prime aim is to move them away from a life of drugs and some of the criminal activity that can sit alongside it.

On Amendment 276, the police should have the powers they need to keep the public safe and combat serious violence while ensuring that these powers are used fairly and within the law. The Government fully support the police in the fair use of stop and search to crack down on violent crime and protect communities. It is only right that these powers are used to stand firm against criminals who break the law.

Every knife taken off our streets is a potential life saved. While I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his statistics, I will give some of my own. In 2019-20, stop and search removed over 11,000 weapons and firearms from our streets and resulted in over 74,000 arrests. Crime statistics have previously shown that increasing proactive policing such as stop and search is helping the police find more knives and arrest more criminals.

That said, the noble Lord is right to highlight the vital importance of ensuring that officers are using their powers based on intelligence and legitimacy, to ensure that the rights of the individual are upheld. Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 gives police the powers to stop and search individuals or vehicles, in anticipation of or after an incident of serious violence, to find offensive weapons or dangerous instruments. They do not need grounds to suspect that the person or vehicle is carrying these items.

Because of its suspicionless nature, the use of Section 60 must be limited in geographical scope and duration, and must be authorised by an officer of at least the rank of inspector. That is to ensure that these powers are used proportionately and only where necessary. PACE Code A sets out that use of Section 60 should be authorised only where there is a reasonable belief that serious violence may occur, and that this should be based on objective factors and led by intelligence. The authorising officer should communicate this intelligence to officers on the ground. When carrying out searches under a Section 60 authorisation, officers should search only individuals likely to be involved, having regard to the intelligence that led to the Section 60 being authorised.

Section 60 searches make up a tiny proportion of the stops and searches carried out by police officers: in the last year they were just 3% of all searches carried out. Despite its low level of use, the police tell us it is a vital tool to tackle serious violence. These powers can also act as a deterrent to prevent offenders carrying weapons, by increasing the perceived risk of detection.

That is why the Government announced, as part of the beating crime plan in July this year, the relaxation of the five voluntary restrictions on the use of Section 60. This follows a two-year pilot during which we gathered and analysed data from forces and community scrutiny leads on their perception of the changes, which told us that officers felt more confident using Section 60 during the pilot, and that the relaxations better reflected the operational reality of policing and the pressures and conditions officers face on the ground. It also showed that many forces had implemented their own best practices to reassure themselves internally that this power was being used legitimately and with accountability.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pressed me on this and I will say that there are a number of legal safeguards, including statutory codes of practice and the use of body-worn video, to ensure that officers are accountable during a search, including any conducted under the powers in the Misuse of Drugs Act. We publish extensive data on these powers, which allow police and crime commissioners and others to hold forces to account. HMICFRS also inspects force level disparities and the use of stop and search as part of its regular inspection programme. I assure the Committee that no one should be subject to the use of stop and search powers based on their race or ethnicity, and that safeguards exist to prevent this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am not sure that this requires a change in the law; I think the problem lies elsewhere. Section 176 should have been an improvement; low-value shoplifting offences should have been dealt with much more quickly and efficiently.

The Home Office guidance for implementing Section 176 is very clear. It sets out, for example, that repeat offenders, organised criminals and people going equipped should all be referred to the CPS for prosecution, rather than using the simplified procedures. I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.

Something has gone wrong. I am going to guess that it is a consequence of 11 years of austerity inflicted on police forces. Rather than being a legal problem, it is a simple operational matter of the police not having the resources to deal with the problem—they cannot respond, investigate or prosecute. I think the solution lies in policing and not the law.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too want to protect shopkeepers. I endorse the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, backed up by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, made an interesting point when she said it was not necessarily a mistake of law but in the application of the law that this problem has emerged.

I too received the briefing from the British Independent Retailers Association; its figures are stark. I also have the previous statements by Kit Malthouse, the relevant Minister. He has said that he is happy to look at the data to see what it tells us about the operation of the policy, now that we are four or five years in. I do not think there is any problem with us reviewing the data internally, deciding whether the policy is working and then promulgating some kind of best practice. However, in January 2021, in response to a Written Question on when the Government was planning to review the operation of Section 176, the Minister said that it would be part of a wider, post-legislative review of the Act but that no date had yet been set.

The point I want to make to the Minister is that there is some urgency on this. The system does not seem to be working very well. From my own experience as a magistrate sitting in London, I cannot remember the last time I saw a youth come to court for shoplifting—they never come to court for shoplifting; we see them for much more serious offences. I am not saying that they should be brought to court for shoplifting but that they are being dealt with in another way and it is questionable whether that alternative is appropriate. We do see low-level shoplifting in adult magistrates’ courts, but it tends to be by multiple, repeat offenders, who are part of a gang. We see that element of shoplifting, but we do not see occasional, low-level shoplifters in court very much. They are being dealt with in other ways, and this may be part of the problem.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, for tabling his amendment and for explaining it in considerable detail.

I start by expressing my support and respect for all those who work in the retail sector. Shops are the lifeblood of our communities and neighbourhoods. As the noble Lord pointed out, that fact was perhaps amplified by the pandemic. It is important that businesses should be free to trade without fear of crime or disorder. I recognise the significant impact that shoplifting can have, not only on businesses but on the wider community and consumers. It is vital that perpetrators are brought to justice. As the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, pointed out, it is not a victimless crime.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I too support these amendments, for all the reasons given by the noble Lords who tabled them. Of course, the principal amendment seeks regulations and lacks specificity. It does not seek to define all the circumstances for retaining, recording, using or disclosing personal data relating to hate crimes or non-criminal hate incidents or otherwise. That is sensible, and it is now for the Government to accept the principles that underly this amendment and come forward with proposals. Of course, I accept the caution which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, brings to the question of regulations that are unamendable; nevertheless, this is a complex area that needs a complex response.

The principles engaged are important. As the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, pointed out, this amendment is not concerned with established hate crime or in any sense with defending hate crime. It starts from the principle that personal data deserves protection from the arbitrary retention, use and disclosure by the police, enforcement agencies and authorities generally, and the converse principle that disclosure should be subject to the rule of law and to principles of accountability—points made by many in this debate, and briefly but eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, a few moments ago.

The conduct with which these amendments are concerned is not provably, still less proved, criminal—a point made by many. They seek to control the arbitrary retention, use and disclosure of personal information, based on a subjective perception of a citizen’s motivation, in the absence of solid evidence or proof. It is subjective, one notes, because it is often based on the subjective view of another citizen—no better informed, necessarily, than the citizen about whom the information is then held.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, spoke on the basis that subsection (7) was in a different category from the rest of the clause. I prefer the way that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put it, when he set out the principles that underlay the whole of this amendment. It is not often that I find myself agreeing with almost everybody in the House, including, at one and the same time, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—but I do. Even on this occasion, although I understand the hesitations voiced by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, she and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, accepted the need for regulation in this area.

The amendment is directed at achieving sensible limitations on the retention, use and disclosure of data to others. This is an area where the Government ought to act and that has become controversial, with the emergence of guidelines that are, frankly, offensive to justice and parliamentary democracy. I therefore invite the Minister—I believe that I speak for the House in doing so—to return to the House with proposals that accept the principles that we have enunciated and will give rise to amendment of the Bill, to its vast improvement.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, it is unusual to have such unanimity across the House in Committee on something that is superficially a very complex matter. I agree with two noble Lords in particular. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was very succinct: he said that the information that the police retain should be subject to parliamentary or government control and not to police guidance. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in being cautious about regulation and having a full role for Parliament in any rules that are introduced.

I am sure that this is a very complex matter. I have just been wondering whether, in my role as a sitting magistrate in London, I would see this information. I obviously routinely see the police national computer—PNC—list, which includes convictions, cautions and bail conditions. If we go ahead and have a “bad character” application for a trial, additional information may be disclosed to us—to do with allegations of, say, a domestic abuse nature.

I was also thinking about my role sitting as a magistrate in family court, where I routinely see allegations that have not been substantiated in any court but have been recorded over many years in social services reports. I think that it is right that I see those allegations when we as a court are making decisions about the way that children should be treated in the context of a family court.

I give those two examples, which are different to what noble Lords have spoken about, to acknowledge the complexity of the situation with which we are dealing. I am sympathetic to the points that have been made by noble Lords, but I am also sympathetic to the Government addressing this with an open mind. I will listen with great interest to what the noble Baroness says about whether they propose bringing back any amendments at a later stage of the Bill.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, which has been very constructive. I thank my noble friend Lord Moylan for tabling the amendments. I applaud the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, for promoting the need for balance, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his concluding words.

I say at the outset that the Government do not disagree with my noble friend’s view that people should not be inhibited from saying what they think, provided that it does not transgress the legal framework that this Parliament has put in place. Noble Lords would all be concerned if the activities of the police were—even if inadvertently and quite possibly for the best of motives—having an adverse effect on particular individuals who had committed no crime. If that possibility were having a chilling effect, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, or causing people to temper their quite lawful remarks, that would be a most unsatisfactory state of affairs.

That is my starting point. I will try to set out some of the background to the issues raised by the amendments that are before noble Lords. My noble friend Lady Noakes asked: how have we got here? It is a key legacy of the Macpherson inquiry, set up to consider the issues surrounding the murder of Stephen Lawrence, and is intended to give the police the means to understand tensions within communities before they escalate to serious harm.

As the name implies, the data pertains to incidents that are not crimes. It can include location data to know where repeat incidents of apparent tension and hostility might occur—for example, outside a place of worship. In this respect, the data is vital for helping the police build intelligence to understand where they must target resources to prevent serious crimes that may later occur. The importance of such intelligence has been illustrated where its use could have prevented real harm. The tragic case of Fiona Pilkington and her daughter, subjected to persistent hate and abuse and where the police failed to draw the links to repeated incidents of harassment, is a prime example.

Of course, non-crime hate incidents may also include the collection of personal data. Some of these records will include an accusation of hate crime that has been made against a person but was not proven. I know there has been concern that such data might appear in enhanced criminal record checks, which are required for jobs such as working with children and vulnerable adults, and that a person could be inappropriately disadvantaged for expressing a sentiment that is in no way criminal.

Precisely to guard against that possibility, the disclosure of non-conviction data in such checks is covered by statutory guidance issued by the Home Office to chief officers of police. This makes it clear that the police should disclose such information only after careful consideration and when it is proportionate and relevant to the job in question. Data of this kind can be disclosed only on the say-so of a senior officer, who should also consider whether the individual concerned should be given the opportunity to make the case that the information is not shared. Individuals also have the right to request an independent monitor to carry out a review of whether information is relevant to the role for which they are applying.

In practice, it is rare for the police to disclose non-conviction information of any kind: only 0.1% of enhanced certificates included such information in 2019-20. However, I fully understand that the public are concerned with how the collection of non-crime hate incident data might infringe fundamental liberties, particularly free expression, and may harm a person’s future prospects. However, I do not think that it is as simple as saying that the issue could be resolved through the introduction of more stringent regulations governing the processing and disclosure of data. We need to avoid unintended consequences through any reform of this practice. First, we need to ensure that we do not tie the hands of police in collecting the non-personal location data that I describe, and which can be vital in building an understanding of hotspots where serious harm might occur; this takes us back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, about balance.

Secondly, it is important to remember that the process of determining whether a crime has occurred is not always linear or simple. While the law on hate crime is clear, the process of determining whether an offence was committed may not be. The use of non-crime incident recording can exist in the grey space between the police making initial inquiries and making records such as this, and a decision to take no further action due to lack of evidence, or where a suspect cannot be identified. Non-crime hate incident records often form part of the normal record-keeping of early criminal investigations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Harris of Richmond (LD) [V]]

My Lords, my Amendment 110A is grouped with my noble friend’s amendments, as we have just heard, and is about bail principles. I bring it forward at the suggestion of the Police Superintendents’ Association and thank it for its help in doing so. In particular, I thank its president Paul Griffiths, with whom I have worked over a number of years, including on this issue in a previous police Bill; sadly, nothing has changed.

At the heart of every investigation is the requirement on police to collate, review and examine the evidence that is gathered. This should be without prejudice and the police are expected to pursue lines of inquiry that gather the facts, whether the facts support the victim’s account or that given by any suspect. For those investigations that require CPS authority, the information presented must allow the full-code test to be applied so that a decision can be made by the CPS as to whether or not the case progresses through the criminal justice system.

To ensure that the investigation is effective and efficient, it should be free from interference from factors that would seek to pervert the course of justice or cause a victim, witness or suspect to provide false evidence to the police, whether under duress or otherwise. The imposition of proportionate, appropriate, legal and necessary pre-charge police bail allows for the protection of the victim, suspect, witnesses and the general public, Correctly applied and checked, police bail is vital in ensuring that the investigation can progress fairly and comprehensively. It should be used only to protect and never to punish. Its imposition should be subject to appropriate review and audit procedures to ensure that the system is fair and maintains public confidence.

Currently, as we have heard, the breach of pre-charge police bail does not constitute a separate offence for the purposes of the PACE custody clock. If a person is arrested for breach of bail, the police will have to use the remaining time on the custody clock which relates to the substantive events for which they were bailed.

The current proposal in the Bill is that the custody clock will pause if a suspect is arrested for breaching police bail. In the majority of cases, the police will not be in a position to make a decision about whether that person on bail is charged for the offence for which they are on bail. The outcome is often release from custody with the same conditions, simply with a reiteration that the bail conditions should not be breached. Currently the police have less time to investigate the offence, and the risks to the investigation remain. The police would ask that any breach be regarded as a separate offence that can be charged on its own merit, if appropriate, using the established rules of evidence for offences.

Imposing pre-charge police bail can be significant in its impact on the human rights and liberty of a suspect and, as such, there must be a process that allows challenge and review. The primary decision-maker should always be the custody sergeant, as they are independent from the investigation. They are also responsible for the welfare and treatment of detainees, and they work on systems that allow for a clear and auditable rationale to be recorded and scrutinised.

The suspect and/or their legal adviser should always have the right to object to conditions, as they do with PACE reviews or extensions, and to have these objections noted on the record with the rationale clearly communicated. They should also have the conditions altered or amended if circumstances change, and that can be done in writing to a custody inspector. The suspect should always have the right to ask the courts to review bail conditions that they feel are inappropriate.

We have previously discussed appropriate authority levels for the time that a suspect remains on police bail. That should reflect the requirements of modern-day investigations such as forensic and e-forensic evidence.

I reiterate that pre-charge police bail should be imposed only where it is necessary and proportionate and protects individuals, the public and the investigation. Police should ensure that it is for the minimum time necessary to complete the investigation, that the rationale is clearly communicated to parties as appropriate and that an appeals process is in place—in addition, with a review process to ensure that the investigation is being carried out diligently.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the two noble Lords who have spoken have fully introduced their amendments. Amendment 110ZC, from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would provide that a bail period could be extended only for a period of six months at a time, and not nine, so it would reduce the potential extension period before referral to a magistrates’ court.

I remind the Committee that I sit as a magistrate, and I occasionally do those hearings where I am asked to extend pre-charge bail. It is an interesting process for a magistrate because you see far more serious cases than you would in the normal course of events; it is the extremely serious cases where the police are looking for an extra period. They are often computer-based cases, in connection with child pornography-type offences. One common scenario that I see as a magistrate is that the police have made no progress in their investigations. That may be through a lack of resources or through them having other priorities, but, either way, there are often requests to extend the pre-charge bail period, sometimes for a matter of years, where the court or the magistrates making this decision are not given a particularly good reason. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that amendment because it would inevitably put further pressure on the police to make progress on any individual case before it was brought to the magistrates’ court.

The noble Lord’s Amendments 110ZA and 110ZB would require custody officers to record case-specific reasons why bail and bail conditions were necessary and proportionate. I recognise the scenario that the noble Lord gave, of a cut-and-paste approach, and I would be interested in the Minister’s response to the points that he made. The final amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is Amendment 110B, requiring the police to publish annual statistics on the number of people released under pre-charge bail and the number released under investigation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Harris, spoke to her Amendment 110A, which would create an offence of breaking the conditions of pre-charge bail. It would supplement the powers of arrest available where conditions were broken, and the offence would be a summary offence. The noble Baroness went into some detail, which I thought was persuasive. She quoted the Police Superintendents’ Association, which said in evidence to the Commons Committee that

“bail conditions are imposed and then suspects continue to breach those bails. Of course, those bail conditions would be there to protect victims or even the wider public. It could be extremely useful to us for that to be an offence in its own right.”—[Official Report, Commons, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Committee, 18/5/21; col. 31.]

This matter was raised in the House of Commons, where it was spoken to by my honourable friend Sarah Jones in the context of Kay’s law, a well-known domestic abuse case where an abusive partner killed Kay while he was on pre-charge bail. I will not rehearse the speech that Sarah Jones made but it was very powerful.

The Minister’s response to the request, which we see here in Amendment 110A by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, was that she wanted to look at a wider review of civil orders that could potentially be put in place as well as greater data collection, rather than specifically making an additional criminal offence. It is interesting to note that the Centre for Women’s Justice came out with a specific proposal whereby a breach of a bail condition triggers the presumption that the police will impose a domestic abuse prevention notice and apply to court for a domestic abuse prevention order. Of course the breach of a DAPO would be a criminal offence, so it would effectively create a “two strikes and you’re out” process.

The Minister, Victoria Atkins, whom I have always found very helpful when I have spoken to her about these and related matters, spoke about reviewing a greater array of civil orders, such as a stalking protection order or sexual risk order. It would be helpful if the Minister could say how long that review is likely to take and whether we are going to get any proposals at later stages of the Bill. I acknowledge that there are a number of potential ways of closing this loophole and that the amendment put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, is a particular proposal and there is a wider context. However, there is an urgency to this issue. There is an opportunity in the Bill to address that lacuna, if I can put it like that, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support my noble friend Lord Beith. He has clearly explained his amendment: persons other than those mentioned in the Bill are in positions of trust. Although there is no evidence of widespread concern about instructors in dance, drama or music abusing their positions of trust, there are examples and fairly recent high-profile cases. My noble friend explains that either we should leave it to the courts to decide whether someone is in a position of trust or a more comprehensive list is required that is not limited, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, to the examples in the amendments.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to some extent, although one could imagine that children are more vulnerable in certain scenarios and one-to-one situations than in others. But we support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Beith.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too support these amendments, and I too found the introduction from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to be comprehensive. The brief in front of me asks why some youth activities are included and others are not, which is the point the Minister will have to address when he winds up this brief debate. I will not repeat those points about why certain activities might be included and others might not, and I am sure that everyone who has spoken in this debate wants to achieve the same end, but there are different mechanisms to do that.

I agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who, as she said, somewhat unusually found herself in agreement with potentially using Henry VIII powers to amend legislation. While listening to this debate, I remembered the biography of a very famous English composer that I read recently, just a few months ago. He would fall foul of these regulations and would very likely go to jail on the basis of that biography.

I hope this problem is not widespread, but it is something that people are far more alert to these days than they were in the past. It is right that the Government should ensure that the appropriate structures are in place in each of the activities for which young people get support, so that, if things go wrong, the coaches or whoever is involved can be held to account in an appropriate way.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 22nd October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Davidson, on her maiden speech; it was spectacular, and I look forward to many further speeches. I also congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, on bringing forward the Bill and securing today’s Second Reading. It is a privilege to respond briefly on behalf of the Opposition.

The Opposition believe that any change in the law in this emotive area is an issue of individual conscience. In our view, it is a matter for Parliament to decide, rather than any Government. However, it is still the responsibility of the Government to ensure that any legislation is fit for purpose, and for the Opposition to assist the Government towards that end.

It reflects the importance of the subject matter that so many Members of the House have attended today and contributed to what has been an extraordinary debate. When a similar Bill was put forward by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, in 2014, there were 133 speakers, and today there were about 138. If nothing else, that is a testament to the enduring profundity of the issue with which we are dealing.

The Bill would, if enacted, legalise assisted suicide for mentally competent, terminally ill adults. It follows my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer’s Bill of the same name and introduces provisions to allow a person who is terminally ill to request and be given assistance to end their own life via the use of self-administered prescribed drugs. Wherever one stands on the desirability of legislative change, there can be no doubt that this would be a significant step. Most noble Lords have recognised the significance of this step, while some have argued that the Bill has modest provisions. I would say that it is possible to have modest provisions that are none the less very significant.

Yesterday I read Gordon Brown’s piece in the Times newspaper, where he argued against the Bill. He wrote about the development of the hospice movement and the work of Dame Cicely Saunders—referred to by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and my noble friend Lady Goudie. He feared a slippery slope, and wrote of his wife and him volunteering at a local hospice and the achievability of a good death.

This reminded me of a recent conversation I had with my local Church of England minister, Gordon Jeanes, who has recently retired. Forty years ago, he was a male nurse working in hospices. He explained to me that 40 years ago, the arguments around assisted death revolved around pain alleviation leading up to a death, whereas today the arguments revolve around a person’s dignity and self-determination. I think that change in emphasis has been seen in today’s debate, and it is fair to say that he would share the traditional view, as expressed by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury today.

Today’s debate has been characterised by a series of questions and, in a sense, challenges to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. To summarise those, I would say that they concern the adequacy of any safeguards the Bill may contain; whether the slippery slope argument is an excuse for doing nothing; the difficulty of predicting life expectancy in the face of a diagnosis of serious illness; and the difficulty of assessing mental capacity. I was particularly interested in the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, who spoke about his amendment to the previous Bill, on reducing the availability of doctors to repeatedly sign these sorts of certificates. He said that he may bring that amendment forward at a later stage.

In conclusion, I believe there is a consensus across the House that the Bill should proceed to Committee, and I look forward to the Minister’s acknowledgement of that fact.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard part one
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

More broadly in society, and this has been hinted at, there is a crisis of authority. We have to ask a much deeper question about why people might want to punch a policeman and why people in the emergency services are treated with disrespect. To be honest, just adding on prison sentences or making that kind of point will not achieve what the Government want, even though I am sympathetic to their aims.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will open by discussing first some of noble Lords’ contributions on their amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, spoke to his Amendment 10. The amendment is about preparing sentencing guidelines for assaulting an emergency worker, or along those lines. My experience as a sitting magistrate is that those guidelines are not available at the moment so we use the old guidelines for assaulting a police officer as the guidance. However, I reassure him that whenever I sentence people I invariably make it explicit that part of the sentence, or maybe part of the uplift, is due to the role played by the person who was assaulted. So although it may not have been expressly set out in legislation about emergency workers, if it concerns a teacher or something like that, I will say that it is a very serious matter and I have taken that into account in the sentence. Nevertheless, I understand the points that the noble Lord made.

The amendment by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who spoke on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, seeks to expand the definition of “emergency worker” to include all prison staff, and he gave some very moving examples of chaplains, educators, instructors and healthcare workers. I think he has seen some of the same briefing that I have, which says essentially that many of those people are saying that they have never seen it so bad in terms of assaults on those people working in prisons.

As is often the case in Committee on Bills in this House, the debate went wider. I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said about being cautious about having a hierarchy of people who work in public service in one way or another. Nevertheless, I also took into account what my noble friend Lord Bach said: there is a role for sending a message about the Government responding in some way, although that does not necessarily mean increasing sentences themselves; there are other ways of responding that may be more effective.

I turn to Amendment 9, which I have put my name to, and I thank the noble Earl for tabling it. As well as sitting as a magistrate in London, I am also co-chair of the Justice Unions Parliamentary Group here in Parliament and I have had a lot of lobbying on this matter, as I know other noble Lords have too.

The noble Earl explained the practice of “potting” in prisons. It can be done by prisoners who are mentally ill or, as he explained, by other prisoners as part of a tactic to punish officers who are targeted by particular groups of prisoners. He explained the circumstances where it may have a relatively minimal effect on the offender if they are towards the end of their sentence.

There is a widespread perception among prison officers that they have been neglected by the Government and that the CPS and the existing discipline structures within the prisons, and indeed visiting judges, do not take the practice of potting sufficiently seriously. In fact, on various TV programmes about working in prisons, we can all see, as I have, prison officers being potted. In fact, I have a magisterial colleague whose niece is a serving prison officer and, only a few months ago, she was potted herself. Of course, this is a completely disgusting and disturbing thing to happen. I hope that it will not reduce her commitment to the job of being a prison officer, but I have to say that I do not know; it might be one of the reasons that some officers choose to resign from the service.

There are many issues facing the Prison Service, which we have debated many times: high turnover of staff, pay and conditions, inexperienced managers, a change in the retirement age—the list goes on. I suspect that the noble Earl is right to anticipate that, in his answer, the Minister will say that the practice of potting could be charged in any number of ways and may well argue that it is covered by existing legislation. But the point that the noble Earl was making is that it simply is not taken seriously enough. The addition of a separate, specifically defined piece of legislation outlining this practice, making it more difficult for the authorities to minimise, would show that the Government value prison officers. This is an opportunity, I would say, for the Government to demonstrate that they value prison officers.

I do not know what the noble Earl plans to do at further stages of this Bill. This is such an egregiously disgusting practice and it is a tactic used in prisons; this is a specific way of responding to that tactic, which is within the Government’s hands in this Bill.