National Security Strategy

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Leader of the House for repeating the Statement. It was important that the Prime Minister should, in advance of the NATO summit, signal the priority the Government attach to defence and national security. On these Benches we support that approach, as we do the analysis by the Government of the perceived major threats confronting the United Kingdom. There is much in the strategy with which these Benches can agree. I am aware of the continuity of advice to successive Prime Ministers on defence and security from No. 10 sources. I think that is very helpful, and I pay tribute to that expertise.

Protecting our country and our people from threat is the primary responsibility of the Government, and that was explicitly recognised by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the other place. But that analysis and that primary obligation of government bring onerous and challenging responsibilities. First, I join my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary in the other place in thanking our security and intelligence services, and all our defence personnel, for the extraordinary work they do to keep us all safe.

Secondly, I say to the Leader of the House that over the last few months a pattern has emerged from the Government of a series of important announcements concerning defence and security intentions but with two glaring omissions: no specific detail and no specific funding. These omissions seriously damage credibility, and I shall touch further on these aspects in my questions.

Let me deal first with security and intelligence. The Statement and the strategy refer to the three pillars: security at home, strength abroad and increasing sovereign and asymmetric capabilities. These Benches welcome actions that build on the measures that my party put in place when in government, including the National Security Act 2023, which gives us increased oversight of adversarial action. It also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme. At home, protecting critical national infrastructure is paramount and there has to be a lead body for that. Is that the Home Office or the MoD, or is it a tandem operation? Are strategic discussions taking place as to who is taking the lead? It may be that there is to be a new joint task force, but any further information the Leader of the House can provide on that would be very helpful.

Within the United Kingdom, our citizens and businesses face cyber threats on an unprecedented scale. Given the recent identification by the Government of threats posed by China, may I ask three questions? First, are the Government confident that they have appropriate vetting mechanisms in place to understand whether imported Chinese goods pose security threats, and by whom and how are these mechanisms applied? Secondly, specifically in relation to energy infrastructure, how do the Government monitor whether potential malign activity is taking place, and are they satisfied with the robustness of the monitoring process? Thirdly, I have a very simple question. Will China be placed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

On strength abroad, these Benches welcome the strategic defence review but express profound concern about the lack of detail on timing for many of the proposals and the vagueness surrounding money. In relation to the NATO summit, while the commitment to increase what the Government describe as national security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, with 3.5% of that to be spent on core defence, is in principle welcome, there is no funding plan. We have been unable to elicit how the Government will fund even 3%. That omission—that lack of material detail—undermines the credibility of the Government’s intention.

To their credit, the Government understand the urgency of the threat—but not, apparently, the urgency of the money. For example, while the strategy document is in many respects admirable, I had to get to page 27 before I found reference to any specific sum of money, which is £1 billion to establish

“a new network of National Biosecurity Centres”.

On the next page, there is reference to £520 million to be invested

“in UK-based Diagnostic, Therapeutic and Vaccine manufacturing facilities”.

That is what I mean when I say there is a threadbare character about the Government’s funding specification. Can the Leader of the House shed light on when the 3% is to come through, when the extra 0.5% is expected to materialise and what the remaining 1.5% is to cover? If she cannot answer these fundamental questions, the Government are proceeding on a wing and a prayer.

On Monday this House will have a welcome opportunity to debate the Chagos deal. In relation to the defence budget, we understand that the cost of the deal will come out of the defence funding pot, which makes answers on increased defence spending all the more pressing. Promising more on the one hand, while whisking money away with the other, is adding to the opaqueness. That is what is damaging the credibility of what I am sure are the Government’s good intentions on our defence and security.

On these Benches, we shall support the Government’s efforts to strengthen our defence capability, to improve our security and intelligence services and to make our critical national infrastructure more resilient. I commend the Prime Minister on demonstrating maturity and responsibility when dealing with acutely challenging and fast-moving global situations, but these Benches will ask questions and seek clarity when that is what our national security interests demand.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I also thank the Leader for repeating the Statement. Most people in our country take for granted the liberties and freedoms we enjoy. In a way, that is a good thing, as they do not need to concern themselves with the need for vigilance against the threats we face. We enjoy our way of life as a result of the tireless work of those who have dedicated their careers to making us safe, and I pay tribute to them. Many distinguished servants of commitment are represented in this House, and I thank them too.

We therefore support a great deal in this strategy—its judgment on the threats we face and the changing security landscape, both in potential conflicts and in the emerging dangers through technological change, and the need to address them across all of government, the economy and society as a whole. There should be, of course, a high level of cross-party support. I hope the Government will bring regular updates with clear action plans of the many workstreams that fed into this strategy so that we can monitor and appraise for progress.

In many ways, the UK has a unique security need. But in many others, we can act as a global, open and interconnected country only if we secure the support and partnership of others. As an island nation, our shipping and data cables keep our economy alive. We were the first country to lay subsea communication cables, 175 years ago. Today we are almost exclusively reliant on them for communications. Shipping contributed to our growth in the Industrial Revolution, and today our consumers are reliant on shipped imports and key sectors on shipped exports.

This is why, for example, I was very happy to see Taiwan mentioned in paragraph 21. Taiwanese security and the openness of the South China Sea are critical to our technology industry and wider trade. I welcome the aircraft carrier task group currently in the region. It is a key shipping route, essential for our economy. I will refer to China a little later, but the Leader of the House may not agree with me on those aspects.

We agree that the way forward comes with the need for increased defence and lethal capability. We support the Government on increased defence expenditure, as the Leader knows. It would be helpful if she could indicate the breakdown of the sources of the 5%. What is the assumed level of growth of the size of the economy to meet the level of expenditure we expect to be necessary?

We do not depart from the level of funding, but we do say, with respect to the Government, that it should not have been transferred from the official development assistance budget. With respect, this is a strategic mistake, and we are seeing considerable reductions in programmes that have been part of the UK national security platform, and successfully so, for many years. It is no surprise to me that, in recent weeks, we have seen public statements from former defence and military leaders and chiefs, diplomats, and heads of the intelligence community of the UK, appealing to the Prime Minister not to cut the very programmes that have been national security focused in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and in supporting allies to build resilient civil society and institutions against malign interference.

The western Balkans is rightly raised in the strategy. Twice in the Chamber I have asked for clarity on the continuation of the western Balkans freedom and resilience programme, funded by ODA. I hope that it is not under threat. If the Leader can provide reassurance on our posture within the western Balkans, that would be appreciated.

The FCDO network and our excellent diplomats were raised, and rightly so. I welcome what was said, but we have to recall that, in the spending review, there are year-on-year cuts to the operational budget of the FCDO going forward.

On other threats, such as biosecurity, I agree that we are less of an island than many might hope. Last night, I looked back at the UK’s first biological security strategy in 2018. DfID and ODA were mentioned on almost every single page—a recognition that biosecurity in the UK is weakened if it is also weak in countries where we have a large diaspora community or travel relationship. There was a reason why, 10 years ago, Ebola did not become Covid: it was because of the UK, through DfID and ODA. But this document makes no mention of it at all. In fact, with regards to official development assistance, there is only the most passing reference in paragraph 30.

We welcome the elements on research and development and the reconnection with Europe to regain the ground that we lost considerably under the previous Government. Page 11 says that we will go

“further than the agreements we have already struck”

with the EU. That is good news. In what areas will new agreements be sought?

We will consider the China audit next week, but the Leader may know that we on these Benches are concerned about the Government’s approach. In January, the Chancellor hailed £600 million of growth to our economy from extra trade with China over the next five years. In June, the Government announced £600 million for security agencies to tackle the threat from China. This is literally a zero-sum relationship this year. We would like to see legislative action on transnational repression suffered by people living here in the UK. The director-general of MI5 has made public warnings that China exploits education agreements and sovereign funds for espionage on an industrial scale. Although we welcome the first scheme, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, has heard me say that we regret both that China is not on the enhanced tier and that education and sovereign funds are exempted.

Finally, I want to look further to the future. The convulsive violence in the Middle East, Sudan and elsewhere will have a lingering effect here in the UK. Community cohesion and reducing tensions will now have to be a critical part of our national security strategy, because we know from previous conflicts that there is a lag, whereby young people affected by it now may well be radicalised in the years to come. Activities such as the Chamberlain Highbury Trust that bring communities together are examples of good work that we are doing in the UK, but, regrettably, as a result of the heightened conflicts that this strategy rightly seeks to address, we may well see further radicalisation within our shores in the future. Investment now is necessary so that we do not pay the price later.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their comments. I will do my best to respond to as many as possible in the time available.

Both were right to recognise the work of our security services but also of those in our embassies and diplomats overseas. The noble Lord rightly raised soft power. The soft power embedded in our embassies and the work that they do can never be underestimated; it is an absolutely vital part of keeping the country safe and improving relations across the world.

The noble Baroness was uncharacteristically a little uncharitable to describe this as “a wing and a prayer”. This is a serious strategy document, and it brings together numerous other documents that the Government have been working on—some of which have already been presented to this House. The industrial strategy is part of that, but there are a number of them. This is not a wing and a prayer; it is a serious commitment. Both noble Lords talked about the 5%. The noble Lord’s point at the end of his comments was important. In looking at our national security, what happens here at home—community cohesion but also the resilience of our infrastructure—is equally as important as what we do overseas. This is not a wing and a prayer; it is an absolute commitment to these figures.

The NATO pledge commits to hitting a headline ambition of 5%, and we are talking about the Parliament after next, in 2035-36. Some 1.5% of that is around security and resilience spending and homeland security and resilience, which is an important part of national security, and 3.5% is core defence spending. We estimate that we will get to over 4%—about 4.1%—the year after next, and that information will become clearer. What is important in all this is that it is a collective national enterprise, as I have said, across industry, business, our embassies and the work here. This is an overarching strategy, at home and abroad.

The noble Baroness asked whether the Government are confident and a number of questions about the China audit. That is the reason why we are having the China audit: those are questions that must be addressed. Whether we are talking about energy infrastructure or anything else—I am sure we will have further questions on this—our relationship with China is one of the most complex bilateral relationships we have in the entire world. There have been various ways of looking at this in the past. There was the golden era, where we said, “Yes, we’re going to work very closely with China”, and then, moving back from that, there was a lack of engagement. Neither of those approaches serves the national interest in the way that we wish. That is why we have the China audit. We have to manage the security implications and our concerns about that but also the economic relationship that we have.

I thank the noble Lord for referring to Taiwan. That relationship is a commitment in the document. I admire his ingenuity—each time he speaks about ODA, he picks a different region that he wants a commitment on. He will understand that, as we travel around the world, if he adds all those up he will get to a point where we are committed to completely the same level of ODA. I know that would be his objective, but I cannot satisfy him on that point and I cannot give him some of the details, as they are still being worked out. The noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, is engaged on work on the global health fund as we speak.

I say to the noble Lord that how we work with other countries, improve their resilience and support them is not just about ODA. My noble friend Lord Collins has spoken about this before; he was telling me earlier about meetings that he has with African leaders. What do they want from us? They want our support for economic diversification. They want our support for levering in private funding for business, so that they can grow their economies. They want us to facilitate and enable. All that work continues, and it is vital that it does. Our relationship with the City of London and supporting them on that also makes a real difference. I assure the noble Lord that those things will continue.

The issue of the Middle East was raised. This has been of enormous concern to Members across the House, and we have had a number of debates on the issue. It is clear that Iran cannot be producing nuclear weapons that put the world at risk, and we are absolutely committed to that. But the noble Lord is right that this plays out in what happens in this country: we see conflict abroad playing out on the streets of London and major cities and towns across the UK. That brings a responsibility to government and the whole nation as well, which is why that 1.5% of the 5% funding is so important. I do not think the noble Baroness touched on this point, but resilience happens in a number of ways: it is our food resilience, energy resilience, telecoms resilience and business resilience. Marks & Spencer had a cyberattack—I am sure there are more noble Lords than me who have not been able to use their Sparks card. The most important thing is the damage that that has done to the economy and to that business. The damage to people’s confidence in dealing with the business is considerable. In all these areas, resilience is crucial.

The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, emphasised that we need to know exactly where the money is coming from—what is happening on this pound and that pound. More of this will become available as the spending review information is fed out, but this is a commitment and she should not doubt it in any way. I hope that all noble Lords will recognise that if we want to keep the country safe and secure, the first duty of any Government is the safety and security of their citizens, at home and abroad. I am sorry that she thinks this is, to use her words, on a wing and a prayer; I fail to accept that.

The noble Baroness mentioned the money to be spent on Chagos. Governments do not spend this kind of money lightly. They will do so only if they are absolutely confident that it is in the national interest to do so. We have taken the view, and the evidence supports this, that it is absolutely in our security interests as a nation that we have this deal around the Diego Garcia base. That is why we have done the deal. Some of the figures given out are wildly inaccurate. We will have a longer debate on this on Monday, but we are committed to this for absolutely the right reasons, which are national security and national safety.