Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Rooker]

6: Clause 3, page 2, line 28, after “threats,” insert “including the threats posed to the biosecurity of the United Kingdom by illegal meat imports,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Border Security Commander, to have regard to the threats posed to UK biosecurity by illegal meat imports.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, the explanation of the amendment makes its intention clear, and so I will not take very long.

I do not say that this amendment is a leftover—far from it—but, back in May, the NFU operated a very successful campaign on the need for greater biosecurity in the country, and there was an attempt to put this issue when the Bill was in the Commons. I think it simply was not selected and so there was no opportunity for it to be debated. I offered to do the necessary to get it raised here.

For an island nation like us, biosecurity is national security—it is as simple as that. We are in the same position as New Zealand, if one is looking for a comparable need for biosecurity. Our exports at the moment amount to about £9 billion of animal and plant products, and that very much relies on our reputation. We have had a few problems in the past, but our reputation is very good. The recent foot and mouth outbreak in Germany, Hungary and Slovakia is a stark reminder that it has not gone away. The consequences of failure at the border would be catastrophic for UK food producers, not just the 44,000 farmers.

Using the Bill to clarify that biosecurity is an element of border security—which is what I am asking my noble friend to do—is quite important. We look to strengthen the deterrence against and penalties for those engaged in border criminality, and to ensure, importantly, that all the agencies—the Border Force and the port health authorities—have the resources, legal powers, intelligence and political backing that they need. This is not a trivial issue, but it is not high in the political importance of colleagues in both Houses, particularly in the Government. We need to get it raised. We need to evaluate whether the current customs and inspection functions are fit for purpose. This is much needed.

I want to give a couple of examples. Since October 2022, more than 240 tonnes of illegal meat products have been seized at the Port of Dover alone. During the week commencing 6 January this year, 10 tonnes of illegal meat were intercepted and removed from the food chain. These volumes are not trivial. This will be meat that has probably not gone through official controls and has not had the hygiene care that is required. It is an ongoing threat.

Of particular concern is African swine fever—a disease with no cure or vaccine—which would cost the UK economy between £10 million and £100 million. The pig sector alone is worth £8 billion and would be severely impacted, with exports currently valued at £600 million facing greater restrictions. I have already mentioned the foot and mouth disease outbreak—the big outbreak in 2001, as opposed to the 2006 self-inflicted outbreak from the laboratory. The 2001 outbreak cost to the public sector was more than £3 billion and more than £5 billion to the private sector, including the culling of over 6 million animals. An outbreak today would devastate UK agriculture. In 2025, both African swine fever and foot and mouth disease have been detected in multiple countries across Europe.

Illegal meat is big money. The meat industry is a huge industry. It has been some years since I did any individual checking on it. Then, it was worth £6 billion—it is huge. In my experience in MAFF, Defra and the Food Standards Agency, it was one part of the food industry where there was always a willingness among certain sectors to cut corners. I had no problem with colleagues tightening up official controls. I know people complain about it, but there are plenty of people looking to make extra money with illegal meat.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Before my noble friend Lord Rooker responds, I again refer the noble Baroness to Clause 3(2). It says very clearly, and this is why it is generic, that:

“The Commander must from time to time issue a document (a ‘strategic priority document’) which sets out what, in the Commander’s view, are—


(a) the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and


(b) the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions”.


That is a long-term proposal for a Border Security Commander to determine in the priority document that they are going to produce under this clause the strategic threats to border security. That would include, potentially, at any one time, biosecurity, cybersecurity, economic security and the issues of illegal immigration security that we are facing as a high priority at this moment.

I hope that Clause 3(2)(a) and (b) give the potential for that document to be produced. That document is going to be shared and discussed with the Home Secretary of the day. It will be produced later in an annual plan showing what is happening. That gives an opportunity for Members of both Houses to question, debate and discuss it at any time. If there was, for example, a glaring gap in biosecurity in that strategic document, it would be for Members of this House and the House of Commons to press Ministers on that. I am saying to Members today that it is a priority for the Government. It will be in the work of the Border Security Commander. The generic role set out in Clause 3(2) includes setting a strategic priority document.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed. As far as I am concerned, my noble friend has given a positive, clear, on-the-record response for which he can be held to account. That is what it is about. He has been quite clear, and he has not tried to shove it aside.

The amendment is about border security. In my remarks, I missed the opportunity, which I always try to take, to say that the unsung heroes of food safety in this country are environmental health officers. There is no question that they are unsung, and there are fewer of them than there used to be.

I want to close with one example of joined-up government, because it covers my noble friend’s position. My first role in this House was as a Home Office Minister. I had one year. Doing immigration, asylum and nationality was my day job, and the rest of the Home Office was the other bit. During that year, I spent one complete day at Gatwick and one complete day at Heathrow watching the transfer of particular flights that were coming in—they were the bushmeat flights. This was the Home Office in 2001, so we were joined up to that extent. They were both Saturdays. I am not going to mention the country the flights came from, but the result was that we slapped visas on them. The Home Office was aware of the situation because of what was being discovered, and it was thought appropriate that the Minister should have a Saturday there and a Saturday at the other place. I still occasionally read about people with bushmeat. I do not accept the cultural argument, by the way; it is out of bounds, as far as I am concerned. It is about food safety, it is illegal, and it is crucial that it is dealt with. The Home Office in 2001 proved that safety goes across government.

I understand that my noble friend is not even paid for the job he is doing at the moment, so I will not try to force him to spend a Saturday down at the airport, away from his family. He gave a first-class answer. I congratulate the NFU as well; I know that it pushed this issue, having started a campaign back in May to improve biosecurity. The more that we talk about it, the more likely we are to succeed in protecting the country. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.