Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Rennard

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, we had quite a substantial discussion on fixed-term Parliaments in the debate on the gracious Speech in May of last year. That discussion, I recall, was particularly difficult in the aftermath of the election, as perceptions of the coalition agreement clouded the debate on the principles of fixed-term Parliaments. It is already clear from the tenor of today’s debate that some of those difficulties remain.

Fixed-term Parliaments are not a short-term political fix but a long-term and overdue democratic reform. The idea that Parliaments should last for a fixed term is one to which the Liberal Democrats have subscribed for a very long time. It is also one which Labour supported in its general election manifesto only last year and which the Conservative Party accepted in the coalition agreement.

The Government have improved their proposal since last year, not least by dispensing with their original plan to set a threshold of only 55 per cent for the Dissolution of Parliament, which would have worked perhaps for this Parliament but not for most Parliaments. The Bill now provides for greater clarity to distinguish between votes of confidence and votes for Dissolution.

In order to have a fixed-term Parliament, there must be some form of mechanism to hold it in place. A substantial threshold for early Dissolution is clearly required. Without it, the legislation would be simply a statement of aspiration and a reiteration of the status quo whereby a Parliament lasts for five years unless a Prime Minister decides otherwise. The proposed threshold for Dissolution of the Westminster Parliament, a two-thirds majority, now closely reflects the arrangements set up by the Scotland Act 1998, introduced by the last Labour Government. Those arrangements have been shown to work very well since their introduction. Sadly, it was not a reform that the Labour Government extended to Westminster in their 13 recent years in office. However, Labour sought to rectify that in its last manifesto, in which it promised to legislate to “ensure” that there would be fixed-term Parliaments, although it did not say of what duration. I look forward to hearing from noble Lords opposite exactly how they intended to legislate to ensure that there were fixed-term Parliaments.

Labour’s pledge to legislate for fixed-term Parliaments was first made in 1992 by the noble Lord, Lord Kinnock, whom I am very pleased to see in his place today. In its manifesto of that year, the Labour Party criticised,

“months of on-again, off-again dithering which damaged our economy and weakened our democracy”,

after John Major delayed a much anticipated 1991 election. The Labour Party said then:

“No government with a majority should be allowed to put the interests of party above country, as the Conservatives have done”.

Labour promised fixed-term Parliaments in 1992 and again in 2010.

A fixed-term Parliament is accepted without controversy in most developed democracies—indeed, I believe that it exists in about two-thirds of democracies. It also exists for every single local authority and devolved Government here in Britain. It was introduced for all those devolved Governments during the 13 years of the Labour Government and each of them now operates a fixed-term Parliament principle. It is now the right time for the House of Commons to catch up with that principle.

I turn to the question of whether a fixed term should be of four or five years. The Government acknowledged that there is a genuine dilemma on this issue in their response to the report of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place. They recognised that there is no monopoly of merit in the cases for four or for five years; it is a question of judgment. However, on balance, I am persuaded that setting the term at five years is right, because a four-year fixed term would mean Governments having a non-election-fighting life—a period of governing without immediate electoral pressures—of three years at most, which would not be sufficient.

There are other practical reasons for considering why five years is the right period. The previous Labour Government legislated in the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 for a period covering party-political expenditure that works only in a five-year Parliament. Under the Act, the pre-election campaign period for regulating party-political expenditure starts 55 months into a Parliament—in other words after, and only after, four years and seven months—and it runs for up to 60 months after the previous general election, but for no longer. A few noble Lords may recall that I opposed those provisions at the time because they would work in practice only if there was a five-year fixed-term Parliament. That is now what is proposed and it would make those regulations on party-political controlled expenditure, introduced by the last Labour Government, actually work. The campaign expenses legislation that we approved only two years ago will now work in future.

I do not wish to repeat the debate that we had recently during the passage of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill—to do so would of course take a very long time—but I remind your Lordships that we approved legislation to review the constituency boundaries every five years. The first review of the constituency boundaries under the legislation that we so recently approved will be conducted by October 2013 and each subsequent review will be concluded on a five-year cycle from five years thereafter. To hold a general election in 2014, only four years after the previous one, would mean that the next general election would be fought only six months after the new constituency boundaries became known. If we have system of individual constituency representation, then that, I think, would be madness. Parties need time to find, select and promote candidates. Voters need to be able to assess them and their relative merits and to make informed choices. Even a period of 18 months between knowing the new boundaries and the general election may be too short to do this effectively, but anything less than a five-year Parliament will mean less than an 18-month period from knowing what the constituency boundaries will be to the Dissolution of Parliament and the commencement of the next general election.

[Lord Rooker]

I am interested in what the noble Lord has just said. He has made a specific and direct link between the five years in this Bill and the legislation that the House has just passed. He has done it in such a way as to suggest that basically you could outlaw any amendments for four years on the basis that the House has passed previous legislation for five years. The fact that he has made a direct connection between the two almost amounts to blackmail. If he had not said that towards the end of his remarks, I would tend to agree with most of what he said, but that direct link will be used to attack anybody who wants to move from five years to four years or four and a half years, if that is the desire. It cannot be a fair argument to use the kind of legislative trick that he has just played on us. My question to the noble Lord is this: during our Committee stage, will he be prepared to accept the good faith of those who want to promote four years or four and a half years and not suggest that they are seeking to go back and debate the previous Bill? If he will not spend time accusing people of that, I will withdraw the imputations that I have just made about his speech.

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, early in my remarks I said that there is merit in the case for four years or for five years. The noble Lord should accept that and withdraw his remark that my suggestion that there are strong reasons why we should have five years rather than four years amounts to blackmail. Also, comments from a sedentary position that this sounds like blackmail are rather offensive and over the top in the circumstances of a genuine debate on this issue.

[Lord Rooker]

I apologise.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Rennard

Monday 6th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, I wish to oppose the inclusion of Amendment 16 in the Bill and to do so as a strong supporter of electoral reform. I actually joined the Electoral Reform Society some 35 years ago at the age of 15. Unlike some supporters of the alternative vote, I remain strongly committed to the principles of proportional representation, and to the merits of the single transferable vote system in particular. However, I share the opposition to closed lists of noble Lords who propose this amendment, whether they be lists of 10 people or just one, as in the current first past the post system. Above all, I am committed to making progress that will allow the voters themselves to have a say in how their representatives are chosen.

I am sure we wish the noble Lord, Lord Owen, well in his recovery. I note from his recent correspondence with the Electoral Reform Society that he has been referring to the alliance commission in the early 1980s, which, on behalf of the Liberal Party and the SDP, looked at electoral systems. He notes that that commission found in favour of STV rather than the alternative vote system, but I ask him when he looks at his Hansard to consider that report again in some detail because it also said that in parts of the country where perhaps it was appropriate to have only a single member—such as in the far-flung rural parts of the country—it was appropriate to use the alternative vote system.

I also draw his attention, and that of some of his noble friends, to the system that operated for choosing single candidates within the SDP—of which he was a member between 1981 and 1988—and in the party that he led between 1988 and 1990. The system chosen for choosing a single person, be it a leader, a president or a candidate, was in fact the alternative vote system.

[Lord Rooker]

Which one?

[Lord Rennard]

It was the system that is proposed in this Bill and which was proposed by the then Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill put forward earlier this year and voted for overwhelmingly by Members in another place. I ask those in your Lordships’ House who are members of the major parties, and who are considering tonight and on many other days the merits or otherwise of the alternative vote system, to consider how it is that within their own parties—the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives, and for that matter the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru or the Greens—when it comes to electing a single person, be it a leader, a president or a candidate, it is the alternative vote system, as generally known, that is always used.

In 1996-97, I was the joint secretary of the committee between the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats that looked at proposals for constitutional reform in the event that the Conservative Party lost the 1997 general election. I served under the late Robin Cook and my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart. We had very high hopes then because it was agreed between the then main opposition parties that as and when there was a general election in 1997, and if the Conservative Party was defeated, there would be a referendum on an alternative proportional voting system. Over the 13 years in which that Government lasted, no such referendum was ever held.

Shortly after the general election of 1997, the late Lord Jenkins chaired the commission that looked at the alternatives; the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, was a member of it. I have noted how some of those in support of this amendment are quoting the fact that the Jenkins commission, as it became known in 1998, did not find in favour of AV but in favour of a system known as AV+. As the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has confirmed in earlier debates, when it came to actually looking at this issue, the great—and I think very wise—Lord Jenkins, actually decided that the best system, in his opinion, was for AV for single-member constituencies in rural areas and for STV in the bigger city areas with multi-Member constituencies.

I note the words of my noble—he called me a little while ago his erstwhile—friend Lord Alton of Liverpool. He said that Lord Jenkins had in the end rejected the AV system. To all those who hold the memory of the late Lord Jenkins in some esteem—I hope there are many in this House—I would say that I know that it was to his great, great regret, in a very long and very distinguished career, that at that period in the late 1990s, when there was the opportunity to implement the AV system, he did not help to seize that opportunity. I believe that we must not let the opportunity of some form of electoral reform go away again.

The Electoral Reform Society, which was formerly known as the Proportional Representation Society, campaigned for PR for more than 100 years. It is urging rejection of these amendments in order to get some progress and to give voters some say on the issue as opposed to none at all. The alternative vote system may not be perfect, but it gives more power to the voter. It would mean, for example, that MPs who considered themselves unfairly deselected by their party could stand again without fear of splitting their party vote, thus giving more power to the voter. It would have meant, for example, that supporters of the noble Lord, Lord Owen, could have stood against the party that became the Liberal Democrats and avoided the split in votes that damaged his cause and split the vote of what had been the alliance in the 1980s. For these reasons, I would say that AV is at least a much more attractive proposition than first past the post, to say nothing of the greater power that it gives to the voter.