Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 31st January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of the justice committee, and I endorse everything that has been said by speakers in this debate. I do not need to repeat their reasons; I shall be expanding on them in the same vein when we debate Amendment 51.

We have to give teeth to this. There has to be cultural change and it has to be a change that affects those in the Crown Prosecution Service and police at ground level because those above them will know that, if they default, something not so nice—a failure to get promotion or something practical—may happen because they will have a black mark against them by having failed to implement the victims’ code. We need teeth.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with everyone who has spoken so far. I say to the Minister that, given the mentions earlier today about putting the victims’ code on a statutory footing, the brevity of this debate is in inverse proportion to the importance of the amendments. We appreciate that the Government have not come as far as us. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who helpfully set out the concerns of the committee that she quoted about this not being strong enough to get compliance.

I want to go back over a little bit of history. When I joined your Lordships’ House in 2011, a number of inquiries were going on relating to victims of crime. I became vice-chair of the all-party group on victims of crime. That group introduced the stalking inquiry report, which led to stalking law reform. Between 2011 and 2019, this House debated the role of a victim’s code and the victims of crime on many occasions. I had a Private Member’s Bill on the issue which had its Second Reading in July 2019. Not only did the Conservative manifesto of 2019 mention it but there was more detail about it in an addendum to it. I have no doubt that that was due to the work of the then Victims’ Commissioner, who is the Victims’ Commissioner again, sitting on the opposite Benches.

All that was because the current system does not work; it is quite simple. Until the services that have to provide the victims’ code are made to do so, there will be no incentive for them to deliver it if they have other pressures. It is the old thing: if you have to do something, then you will. You will have targets and you will be judged by your performance. Without that—if this is just a “thing too much—it will not happen.

As we come to the end of this Parliament, I want to say that it was a key tenet of the Conservative manifesto to make sure that a victims’ code was enshrined in law, but what we have seen is not what was spoken about during that general election campaign.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, this group is about giving teeth to the toothless tiger that is the victims’ code. To be clear, currently in law, and as proposed by the Government’s scheme in this Bill, the only indirect enforceability would be that if anybody has any other kind of proceedings against a relevant public authority, the victims’ code can be taken into account. That is it. That is not an enforceable right in any usual sense of the concept, because enforceable rights require duties that must be enforced.

Various options have been proffered by noble Lords in the Committee in the various amendments in this group. Mine is Amendment 31, on which I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and, once more, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I propose here that the teeth, to some extent, go to the Victims’ Commissioner. As I said in the debate on the previous group, the Government appoint the Victims’ Commissioner; this is not some dangerous person who will be litigating everywhere. This is an appropriate person who has been appointed by the Government of the day.

I am not suggesting that victims should be able to sue directly in the courts on the victims’ code. Frankly, there is no legal aid for them to do so anyway, and I do not want them to be traumatised by more litigation when they have been so traumatised by the principal proceedings in which they have had such a bad experience. But I do want them to have real rather than illusory rights, which can be enforced.

The thing about enforceable rights is that they become more real just because they exist, because the public authorities concerned will take note. I believe they will take greater note when they know that down the road, in extremis, there is a potential reckoning if they continue to ignore victims in the way that they have, to deprioritise them or to do whatever it is that has led to some of the stories we have heard in Committee this evening.

My proposed scheme is to replace the current Clause 5, the toothless tiger, with the following enforcement procedure. Incidentally, this is not about specific cases. It is not about the Victims’ Commissioner doing something that she does not do at the moment and getting involved in this criminal case or that; there would be obvious problems with that. This is about general practice. When, for example, it comes to the notice of the Victims’ Commissioner that women are being treated appallingly when they report rape and have their mobile phones taken or are not allowed to speak to counsellors—clearly things that would never happen in real life; I am just hypothesising for a moment—the Victims’ Commissioner in the first instance would do what she does already, which is to try to engage with the public authorities at length and persuade them that there is a problem in general that needs to be dealt with.

However, there are measures in the proposed new Clause 5(4) for when that is not being complied with. In the first instance, in Clause 5(4)(a), the Victims’ Commissioner would be able to issue a notice of general guidance. It would not be about a specific case but would be general guidance to the relevant public authority about its practice that, in her view, was not complying with the code. Whether it is about separate rooms in the Crown Court or the information being required, the victim is not being treated according to the code, so the commissioner issues the notice, initially in private.

If that is not complied with within a reasonable period of time, under Clause 5(4)(b), the next tool in the armoury—which is still pretty modest—is that the Victims’ Commissioner would be able to publish that notice. In my view, that public notice is another tool for accountability in relation to the intransigence of public authorities that are simply not complying with the code.

There is then a further step. One would hope that it would very rarely happen, but maybe sometimes it would need to. This is not about specific cases and would not involve individual victims having to go through legal proceedings, but in extremis the Victims’ Commissioner would be able to start proceedings in an appropriate court or tribunal, defined in rules by the Government, to seek enforcement of the code. That would be only the Victims’ Commissioner, not any litigant in the land who was being mischievous with their money, or lefty human rights lawyers and all that stuff. It would be the Victims’ Commissioner, who is trusted and was appointed by the Secretary of State in the first place.

I think that is a pretty modest and balanced scheme for giving the toothless tiger not great big scary teeth but just some milk teeth so they can nudge these public authorities, which have had all this time and all these years with the current code and the current scheme, which is going to be replicated in the Bill proposed by the Government. It would get the Victims’ Commissioner a little bit more by way of a power to deliver for the victims that she serves.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I can do this in the time allotted, as they say.

I shall speak to Amendment 51 on training in relation to support for victims. Very simply, Clause 6 directs that criminal justice bodies must take reasonable steps to promote awareness of the victims’ code to victims and other members of the public, but the Bill does not mandate that professionals within these bodies receive any training in the code. There is no point in this provision in Clause 6 if those who are to carry it out—those who are acting on the ground within the agencies, under the chief constable or within the prosecution service—are not aware of their duties or trained properly to deliver them. This part of the Bill risks being a fig leaf. To make it effective, those responsible for it must be trained in delivery. Is this not just common sense?

The evidence base is that there is a need to provide training and that it is clear that there is a widespread lack of awareness of victims’ rights. I take you back to two surveys. In 2019, the London victims’ commissioner conducted a review into compliance with the victims’ code of practice. She heard from over 2,000 victims of crime. The review revealed examples of unacceptable service. It showed that a proportion of those who work in the criminal justice service lack the skills or training to understand and respond to victims’ needs effectively. Victims suffer the consequences of those problems time and again; they simply were not informed of their rights. In short, the code was not delivering.

Let me give some examples. Fewer than a third of the victims reported being told about the code of practice. Of course, some of them may have forgotten, but certainly a large proportion were not told. As a result, they did not know what their rights were—they did not know they had any rights. It is no use giving the victims rights if they do not know about them. Largely, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service are not trained to do this. It is not because they are wicked people; they just do not know about it. There are many other deficiencies. Read the review if you want to know more.

More recently, in June 2022 the office of the Victims’ Commissioner launched the Victim Survey, an online survey of victims of crime in England and Wales that asked them about their experiences as a victim of crime. I will give a few examples. Fewer than a third, only 29% of respondents, were aware of the victims’ code. The same percentage said that they were offered the opportunity to make a victim personal statement. In other words, if that is right, 71% were not offered that opportunity. Again, allowing for some people not being very capable or bright, it shows a large proportion, on any basis, were not informed of really basic information.

Data from the user satisfaction survey in London shows that only 25% of victims were made aware of the victims’ code. In the same period, the answers showed that 50% were offered victim support services—in other words, half were not; and 59% were given the opportunity to make a victim personal statement, so around 40% were not. It is the “nots” we are interested in here. Only 12% were offered information on compensation. Again, making allowances for the fact that it may not have been appropriate or necessary and that some people are forgetful, a large proportion were not told about possible compensation and how to claim it, and that is important. Even a small amount of compensation can make an individual who has been the victim of crime feel a bit less disgruntled. I speak as someone who sat as a recorder in the Crown Court for 20 years.

Those are all rights in the victims’ code. They are all failures; just read the survey for more. It is plain that there is no training. We need it and it should made part of the statute. So, I commend this amendment to the Committee.

Debate on Amendment 30 adjourned.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I look forward to hearing the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, whom I am sure will bring much to this House. I also congratulate my noble friend Lord Moylan on his powerful speech on IPP prisoners, a subject which I shall not be addressing. My focus today is simply on Part 1, on victims. I am particularly grateful for the briefing which I received from Claire Waxman OBE, who is London’s Victims’ Commissioner.

I welcome this Bill, but I believe it could, and should, be strengthened in significant ways to assist the victims of crime. Bills like this do not come along every year. We have waited a long time for it and we really must take the opportunity we have; it may be another 20 years before we get another one. As other noble Lords have said, it can and should be strengthened to make it clear that agencies are under a statutory obligation to deliver certain core rights for victims. A bland entitlement that victims should receive certain rights, with no adequate machinery for enforcement, is not enough. The Bill must make it clear that victims’ rights must be identified. These must be unequivocal and must be enforceable in the event that agencies default—so the drafting of the code will be very important.

It must be premised on the basis that victims are entitled to, and must have, the benefit of certain treatment, and that there must be an enforceable obligation on the agencies so to provide. That will require measures to ensure positive compliance. Such measures will require minimum threshold levels and sanctions or, at the very least, inspections of agencies that do not meet those requirements. There must, of course, in addition be obligations on the agencies to collect and publish data on compliance, and those must be enforced. I say that because, as Claire Waxman has helpfully explained in her briefing, Clause 5 of the Bill replicates the non-compliance provisions of the Domestic Violence, Crimes and Victims Act 2004. Her coalface experience is that these have proved insufficient in practice, and we should learn from that.

My next point is to turn to Jade’s law, which of course we all applaud and are pleased that it is introduced. I heard with interest what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, had to say, and he has great experience, having sat as a family judge for many years. We appeared against each other in the family courts many years ago, so I bow to his experience, but I think we can and should do something, at the very least on an optional basis, to protect children who have been abused by their parents.

So, while I welcome the provisions that will ensure that parents who kill a partner, or former partner, by whom they have had children, will upon sentencing have their parental responsibility automatically suspended, I favour also giving the Crown Court an optional power: in other words, to expand Clause 16 to go further, to include among those whose parental rights may be suspended by the Crown Court parents convicted of committing serious sexual offences, such as rape, against their children or other children in the household, and other serious offences such as grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act.

This should be only for really serious cases. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, about the issues that can arise in complicated family situations, but there will be clear cases where to make a decision on sentencing at the end of the trial will be of enormous benefit to the family, so the court should have discretion. I am persuaded of this by the story of Sammy Woodhouse, a victim of the Rotherham child sexual abuse scandal. According to a report in the Times, the man, Hussain, was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment for offences including rape, abduction and indecent assault—but not murder. He was then allowed to participate in family court proceedings when the child, the progeny of the rape, became the subject of voluntary care proceedings. By definition, he was the rapist of the mother. That should have been the end of that. It must be possible to extend the scope of Clause 16 to protect children and mothers who are the actual victims of such sexual offences, but I agree that it must be discretionary and not on a mandatory basis.

Finally, continuing with victims, I draw attention to the witness preparation programme developed over the last 35 years in the province of Quebec in Canada. It uses crime victims assistance centres and carefully trained workers to prepare adult victims who will give evidence at a trial in ways that ensure that the specifics of the case are not discussed and that there is no adverse impact on the evidence presented by a victim at trial—no coaching, in other words. This is important because, very often, in practice a vulnerable witness does not meet Crown counsel until the morning of the trial and knows little of the reality of what lies ahead in the Crown Court.

As John Riley of the Criminal Bar Association told the Commons Justice Committee inquiry into sexual offences evidence, defence counsel may have had one or more conferences with the defendant and discussed the evidence in detail with them. The defendant knows what is coming, as is right and proper, but too many victims have no practical grasp of either the process or what they may be confronted with. Time does not permit me to go into the detail of the Quebec process, but Ms Waxman has produced a short report of her visit this May and I will provide a copy to the Minister.

In short, I commend this Bill but it could do even more.

Lord Chancellor and Law Officers (Constitution Committee Report)

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Thursday 20th July 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, it is a true pleasure to follow my friend the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, who, like me, is a Bencher of Middle Temple. I declare my interest in the register, as chair of research for the Society of Conservative Lawyers, and I welcome this committee’s thoughtful report.

Historically, as we have heard, the Lord Chancellor and law officers have had special responsibilities. Lord Chancellors have had a special role in ensuring that their Cabinet colleagues adhere to the role of law. They sit in Cabinet; the Attorney-General, on the other hand, is not a member but attends Cabinet. The Government website describes the Attorney-General as the “chief legal adviser to the Crown”. That carries a heavy responsibility.

We are fortunate that the current Lord Chancellor has been a serious practitioner. He will properly understand the judges’ role in our unwritten constitution and the need to defend them against ill-considered abuse and commentary. As we know, sadly that entirely passed the notice of one of his non-legal predecessors. But we cannot undo the past. Today, there are many fewer serious lawyer politicians in either House, so there is a practical reason why it may be hard to appoint a lawyer as Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. The committee and the outgoing Lord Chief Justice have suggested that prisons might be removed from the portfolio. I do not suggest that is a bad idea, but I am not convinced it will necessarily help with the problems with which we are truly concerned. It is not only because what would be left would be a small department. Put simply, it will not restore the authority of old. We need to look elsewhere for a parliamentarian to protect the rule of law, and we must do so.

We do not have a written constitution. We rely on the Crown in Parliament as the Executive, together with Parliament itself and the judiciary, each knowing where each stands and its respective role and, importantly, that each must not overstep the lines. Each of these three actors must observe their invisible boundaries. Recent events have stretched that understanding to their limit. I need only refer to the decision to advise the late Queen to prorogue Parliament. It is not the point whether the Supreme Court was right in strict constitutional theory to hold the prorogation unlawful. What is plain is that the Executive, the Crown, sought by fiat to render Parliament impotent. I ask noble Lords to think of this: if throughout the Supreme Court judgment, one substituted for the words “Prime Minister” the words “King James I” or “King Charles I”, would the court’s critics still find the decision questionable? This constitutional gambling was followed by the internal markets Bill. That led to the resignation of a distinguished Lord Advocate, my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, who was here a moment ago.

It is clear that the Executive must be constrained from overstepping important boundaries. These things matter; politicians must understand that. Our constitution and Parliament are not playthings for Prime Ministers. I do not have a complete answer, but it will not lie just in future Lord Chancellors, notwithstanding their statutory duty. If they do not properly understand our constitution, in the way that decent lawyers do, as some have not in the past, how can they attempt effectively to uphold the relevant law? So, it is with the law officers that our protections must rest. Here, I interject a personal note. James Mansfield, my four-times-great-grandfather, was like my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, Solicitor General and later Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. He was also one of those who represented Somerset, the slave, and achieved his freedom—so he knew something about the rule of law and proper principles.

First, I agree with the committee that the concept of a “respectable legal argument” needs firming up. It is one thing for the Government to litigate a case in the English courts, having been advised that the prospects are weak—that is not improper—but how low should Government be free to go? They are not an amoral, commercial client. Nor are they necessarily wrong to act when the advice given by an Attorney General is that a proposed step might breach a treaty—and I emphasise “might”. While legal advice should ordinarily remain confidential and privileged, in matters of international law the Attorney General’s determination on the lawfulness of government action in relation to a treaty can provide an important legal constraint—or not, as the case may be.

Importantly, because advice on such an issue will not be tested in the courts—at least not till long after the event; it is not like advice which leads to one going into litigation. So the Attorney-General must be particularly mindful of the solemn and constitutional duty to advise on such questions objectively and impartially and, in my view, free to explain that decision to Parliament, which has a legitimate interest if a treaty is, or may have been, broken. Indeed, I suggest that the Attorney-General should be obliged to confirm to Parliament that the advice was given that this was not a deliberate knowing breach of treaty. Furthermore, and perhaps even more seriously, when it comes to going to war, government should act only if it is confident that this is the right course. Our Armed Forces, and in particular their commanders, must be confident that, in case of armed conflict, they are not in the wrong.

To conclude, I will make some points in summary form. As my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier just explained, law officers must be Members of one or other House of Parliament and answerable to it. They should be well-established practitioners. We can look at provisions such as seven years’ or 10 years’ practice; I will not go into the detail now.

To strengthen their role, the statutory duty currently imposed on the Lord Chancellor to defend the rule of law should be extended to the law officers, and the oath taken on appointment updated to reflect this situation. The law officers should also have to appear once a year before the Justice Committee of the House of Commons. The current powers given to a departmental Select Committee to send for persons should in this respect be put on a statutory footing of compulsion.

Next, an Attorney-General, while of course continuing to attend Cabinet, should not be a member of the Cabinet—there must be that element of detachment—nor should they be a member of a Cabinet committee that is not clearly related to legal or criminal justice issues. They should not be a pure politician.

Finally, law officers should not engage in media briefings on a range of government issues. Given the short time available, I leave things there.

Nuptial Agreements

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Tuesday 25th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, it is hard for me to add to my previous answer. The Government feel that we must look at the whole landscape and get the law on financial provision sorted out, and that gives us the context in which we can decide what to do about prenups.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, as others have said today, such a Bill can stand completely independently of the planned reform. The whole point is that those who embark on this do not want to litigate, in the unhappy event of a divorce, and do not want to expose themselves to all the uncertainties of the court’s discretion. Why on earth can the Government not do something about it now?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, it is not a straight- forward issue; even the Law Commission’s report of 2014 made it clear that there had to be quite a number of exceptions in relation to financial need before one could legislate. As I say, the Government prefer to proceed on a broad front rather than deal with this issue specifically.

European Court of Human Rights

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I entirely understand the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the Strasbourg court in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom made a fundamental and damaging error and acted inconsistently with the Vienna convention in holding that the procedural duty under Article 2 of the convention has extraterritorial effect? Has that not damaged the court’s standing in this country and abroad?

Human Rights Act 1998

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the chance to engage in this important debate on this important statute. I begin by declaring my interest as chair of research at the Society of Conservative Lawyers.

Experience of the Human Rights Act has revealed structural flaws that the Bill of Rights would go some way to remedying. Our time today is short, so I will focus on just three matters. The first is Section 2, which directs a court determining a question in connection with a convention right to “take into account” any judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. That has led to unfortunate results, with our courts sometimes doing more than just take account. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said in a lecture in 2013, Section 2 should be amended to make it plain that in this jurisdiction, the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court is, at the very least, a court of equal standing. Thankfully, Clause 1 of the Bill of Rights addresses this.

Next, I turn to Section 3. Under this, our legislation must be interpreted as far as possible in a manner compatible with the convention. This displaced conventional approaches to statutory interpretation. The House of Lords in the case of Ghaidan made that worse. It held that this meant the court should adopt any possible interpretation of a statute to give effect in a way compatible with convention rights, even if “the interpretation is unreasonable”. That is extraordinary.

This has led to strained interpretation, unintended by Parliament. Then, because the provision in question has not been ruled incompatible, as it could have been under Section 4, it is not sent back to Parliament to address. This has taken away from Parliament decisions that are rightly for it. Such decisions often involve balancing exercises. Our parliamentarians, for better or worse, represent society. They are likely to have access to information—and better information than people arguing it in the courts—about the issues involved to balance what matters.

Let me explain. Policy is essentially for those who make the law. Policy choices have to be made between compensating individuals and protecting the budgets of public services. Of its nature, a balancing exercise presupposes a situation in which the factors are not all one way. A stark example is the case of Quila, decided in 2011. In 2008, the Home Secretary changed the Immigration Rules to deter forced marriages. The change raised from 18 to 21 the minimum age of the person entitled to be granted the right to settle by reason of marriage.

The worthy aim was to deter forced marriages, but the Supreme Court found a violation of Article 8, the right to family life. It ruled that the interference with family life was not proportionate. One might feel, and I suggest, that there was scope for more than one view on this sensitive matter. The Home Secretary’s policy was supported by 50% of the respondents to a government consultation and by the largest NGO concerned with the evil of forced marriages. That was a matter for Parliament, not for second guessing.

Finally, Section 12 has given insufficient weight to freedom of expression. Incorporation into domestic law of the two qualified rights, Articles 8 and 10, gave direct domestic effect to Article 8, creating a right to privacy. That has protected the rich and powerful with insufficient weight given to the public interest in free speech.

Fortunately, under the Bill of Rights and the forthcoming Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill, free speech will be given greater weight, but I should add as a footnote that the Online Safety Bill will wrongly create a serious threat to free speech. What we can legally say or write, we shall be stopped from putting online—a strange concept of “legal and harmful”.

Without leaving the convention, there is plenty to be done to improve its incorporation in domestic law.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 31st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I am in the happy position of having somebody agree with me on every point—but not everybody agrees. The Minister is a remarkable advocate. If he came to my home and we had a family cat, after he had spoken for about two minutes the cat would be convinced that if it wanted a fish, it should dive deep down into the sea, find one at the bottom and bring it out.

The Bill provides a new, additional remedy, and it is a very wise step. Can we please consider situations in which judicial review is involved? A massive judicial review proceeds against—it does not matter who—the Government, a ministry, a local authority, and at the end of the hearing the judge finds there is no unlawfulness about this, that and the other, but yes, there was a moment when the decision-making process was flawed because a small procedural step was not taken. It should be open to the court, having listened to arguments on both sides, to say that that procedural irregularity, although demonstrated, has not affected anybody and therefore the order will not be quashed so all the matters that were in argument can proceed. I see no difficulty about that.

My real problem is that I am very troubled about the way in which the new remedy is circumscribed with the presumption. It gives the opportunity for inaction to the wrongdoer. The Minister said that there is not a very heavy presumption, not much to make a fuss about, besides which there is the development of new jurisprudence—I love the idea of the Government wanting judges to develop new jurisprudence in the field of judicial review and I am very grateful to the Minister for that offer—but the only thing expressly required of a judge considering judicial review is to apply the presumption. Why is there not a presumption or a consideration that says that the judge must look at how determined the wrongdoer was to persist in his unlawful action? That would a consideration too, would it not? There is none of that in the Bill—it is just simply this presumption. I respectfully suggest that it is a heavy presumption, because it is the only one which appears in the Bill or which directs the court to a particular starting point.

As for the specialist judges—and they are specialist judges—the idea that they will not know about this new remedy and consider it is simply barking. Even if the judge had a bad moment and forgot about it, can you imagine any advocate acting for the wrongdoer who wished to have the order stand not drawing his or her attention to the presumption and saying, “This is the starting point, my Lord”? The judge will wake up and think about it. To enact legislation to encourage judges to develop jurisprudence is, if I may say so, one of the least good arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has offered in his whole forensic career.

Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. The judge, having considered whether unlawfulness has been established —that is the first question and let us not overlook it—finds that it has. He then examines the nature of the unlawfulness. Is it fundamental? Is it procedural? Is it important procedural? Is it minimal procedural? Then he or she reflects on all the considerations that have come to bear—in other words, all the facts of the case—and makes a decision. Judges really do not need to have more than the broad discretion that judicial review has always offered, and which has made it one of the most fantastic developments in our administrative law in my professional career.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose these amendments. The power to make a prospective quashing order brings clear benefits. Such an order has more teeth than a mere declaration that a Secretary of State has acted unlawfully. It would be able to indicate that regulations will be quashed within a certain time from the date of judgment unless the Secretary of State in the meantime has properly performed his statutory duties and considered in the light of that exercise whether the regulations need to be revised and, if so, in what form. It is hard to see why that is not beneficial.

Further, the ability to make such orders will be especially useful in high-profile constitutional cases where it would be desirable for the court explicitly to acknowledge the supremacy of Parliament, and in cases where it is possible for a public body, given time, to cure a defect that has rendered its initial exercise of public power unlawful. I note that in his powerful piece in the Times last week, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, wrote that he strongly supported giving the court these powers. As he explained, these powers are not quite so radical as some suggest and, as we have heard, judicial review has always been a discretionary remedy.

The noble and learned Lord pointed out that

“high-profile cases well illustrate how discretion may properly be exercised against giving relief that would have disproportionate consequences for past events”.

He pointed to two examples:

“In Hurley and Moore … in 2012 the Divisional Court declined to quash the ministerial order permitting universities to increase student fees to £9,000. Quashing, the court said, ‘would cause administrative chaos’”.


He also explained that as long ago as 2005 in the House of Lords, in the case of Re Spectrum, seven of the court

“recognised that prospective overruling of erroneous decisions could be necessary”—

I stress that word—

“in the interests of justice where the decision would otherwise be ‘gravely unfair and (have) disruptive consequences for past transactions or happenings’. Although it was not exercised in that case, the power was recognised by five”

members of the court. It will ensure sensible, good administration. It will not bring injustice. These are real benefits.

As for the presumption, I have listened carefully and with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but on this occasion I must differ from him. It is only a presumption; it means merely that the court must start from there. It is, as my noble friend Lord Faulks explained, a flag; it points it out; it reminds the court. It does not impose a destination. If there is good reason not to make such an order, the court will be obliged to follow its conscience and depart from the principle—but, if there is not good reason, why should there be a problem? In short, the court is simply prompted to do what good reason dictates.

This clause does not damage the rule of law. It is reasonable and just.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, it was a pleasure to hear the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and his tour d’horizon of the giants and giantesses of old. I shall speak only in respect of the proposals relating to judicial review. My focus will be on the suspended quashing orders.

The elegant report from the independent review chaired by my noble friend Lord Faulks had these concluding observations. I point to two in particular. First, it said:

“It is inevitable that the relationship between the judiciary, the executive and Parliament will from time to time give rise to tensions … On one view, a degree of conflict shows that the checks and balances in our constitution are working well.”


Well, they are working well at the moment. Secondly, it said that

“the government and Parliament can be confident that the courts will respect institutional boundaries in exercising their inherent powers to review the legality of government action. Politicians should, in turn, afford the judiciary the respect which it is undoubtedly due when it exercises these powers.”

The Bill gives judges sensible new powers to address errors in legislation and administration.

The panel concluded that suspended quashing orders would bring benefits. It explained why. It identified concerns that, in certain cases, the courts have overstepped constitutional boundaries in ruling against legislation. The report said that such concerns

“would have been substantially allayed had the remedy in those cases consisted of a suspended quashing order.”

That is because such an order could have indicated that the impugned exercise of public power would be automatically quashed at a fixed point in the near future unless Parliament legislated in the meantime to ratify the exercise of that power. It is giving Parliament a choice.

As the panel explained, such a suspended order would have made it clear that the court acknowledged the supremacy of Parliament in resolving conflicts between the Executive and the courts as to how public power should be employed. Such orders will go further than issuing a mere declaration that a Secretary of State has acted unlawfully. That approach has been used where to quash regulations would cause undue and unmerited disruption, but some people feel that it is a bit of cop-out. A suspended quashing order will have more teeth than a declaration. It could indicate that regulations will be quashed within a certain time from the date of the judgment unless the Secretary of State has in the meantime properly performed his or her statutory duties and considered, in the light of that exercise, whether the regulations need to be revised.

I suggest that the criteria under new Section 29A(8) give the court ample scope to avoid injustice. The courts will be free to decide whether or not to treat an unlawful exercise of public power as having been null and void from the outset. In reality, its discretion will not, I suggest, be unduly fettered. The ability to make such orders will be especially useful: first, in high-profile constitutional cases where it would be desirable for the courts explicitly to acknowledge the supremacy of Parliament; and, secondly, in cases where it is possible for a public body, given time, to cure a defect that has rendered its initial exercise of public power unlawful. Finally, I note with a little gratification that the Bar Council, which I once chaired, has said that it has no significant concerns about these provisions in the Bill as drafted.

I commend this provision. I also support the provision to overturn the decision in the case of Cart. As the panel—and other noble Lords—explained, the continued expenditure of judicial resources on considering applications for a Cart judicial review cannot be defended. The practice of making and considering such applications again and again must be discontinued. The ouster clause is carefully crafted and does not set a dangerous precedent for the future.

Social Welfare Law Cases: Legal Aid

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I note that when it is Justice Questions we always seem to have longer questions. We are starting a pilot in both Manchester and Middlesbrough to focus on the point that the noble Lord makes: to what extent can we divert people away and solve their problems at an earlier stage? I am aware of the report the noble Lord mentioned, and of others, but we are starting a pilot, so that we have evidence of what actually works on the ground.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister very much for his first Answer. I remind him that the Conservative Lord Rushcliffe’s 1945 report urged that:

“Legal aid should be available in all Courts and in such manner as will enable persons in need to have access to the professional help they require”.


At the last pre-Covid count, in more than half the local authorities in England and Wales, with some 22 million people, there was no provider in the field of housing legal aid. Would it not be a simple first step in the process of levelling up to take immediate steps to fund at least one such provider in each local authority in England and Wales?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am aware of the issue with legal aid for housing. I should make two points. First, we keep this under review and are making special efforts to ensure that we find providers in areas where there are currently no providers. Secondly, as my noble friend will also be aware, wherever you are in England and Wales you can always get legal advice through the CLA telephone service. Legal advice is always available.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Sandhurst Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the noble Baroness who moved the lead amendment in this group is concerned primarily with Amendment 78B, but perhaps I might be forgiven if I focus exclusively on Amendment 78A. This relates to the new clause, which would apply a minimum mandatory sentence of seven years to the offence of rape.

I am against this proposed new clause and think it profoundly wrong. I am against it for essentially two reasons. First, as one who has practised in the criminal courts for many years, I know that the offence of rape carries within it a very broad spectrum of culpability, from the most serious kinds of offence to ones significantly less serious. That should be reflected in the ability of the judge to impose the appropriate sentences.

Already a life sentence is the maximum that can be imposed. This takes me to my second point—that I really think the amendment is unnecessary. Anybody who goes to have a careful look at the guidelines published by the Sentencing Council as to how courts should approach sentencing for rape will come to the conclusion that public protection is already appropriately safeguarded. In fact, the spectrum of custodial sentences set out in the Sentencing Council guidelines is between four and 19 years. There is a whole host of considerations set out to assist the judge in determining what level of sentence should be imposed.

That takes me to the last point that I want to make. If you go to the Sentencing Council’s guidelines, as I am sure many of your Lordships have done, you will see a whole range of mitigating circumstances—as well, of course, as aggravating circumstances. Those mitigating circumstances are circumstances that a trial judge could take into account when imposing a determinate sentence of less than seven years. In the new clause proposed in Amendment 78A, nothing is said, for example, about what the consequences would be of remorse or contrition, nor about the making of an early plea, although that of course now attracts a mandatory reduction as a general proposition. Nothing is said about what happens if the defendant has been assisting the prosecution, nor about the time spent on bail. All those things are built into the sentencing guidelines of the council, but they do not appear in the proposed new clause.

If the amendment was to be accepted by your Lordships’ House, very considerable injustice would be done. I also happen to think that it is wholly unnecessary.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 78B, on the maximum sentence for disclosing the identity of sexual offences complainants. I understand the motivation for this amendment and agree with the sentiment underlying it. The current level is obviously inaccurate and inappropriate, but it should not be addressed in isolation. It is correct that the present provisions for dealing with disclosure need revision, as they were passed in 1992 and plainly directed at conventional print, radio and TV media, antedating the internet. For newspapers and TV stations, a fine is generally appropriate. Since 2015, a level 5 fine has meant an unlimited one, which could run to hundreds of thousands of pounds for a newspaper that does this either deliberately or inadvertently. But we all know that today a malicious individual can cause similar damage with a post on the internet, and imprisonment may well be appropriate.

These are serious sexual offences—I do not deny that at all—but there are other matters of great sensitivity that will not be covered by this; it could well cause offence and upset if they are not dealt with at the same time, and they should all be looked at as a whole. The ones that I pull out in particular are, for example, to be found in Section 71 of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. There is still only a fine if you disclose identity, when really it is a very sensitive matter—but, for historical reasons, it remains just a fine. So too if you disclose the name of someone involved in slavery—it is also only a fine—and so too with witnesses in the context of youth justice, which also results in only a fine. All those cases are dealt with in a magistrates’ court. Those things, which are all sensitive and difficult, would be better dealt with in the round. It might be that, for one category of offences, it was thought that the maximum sentence ought to be more than two years, and for others two years, but you want to look at them as a package and reach a considered decision.

This is a worthy amendment, in one sense, but it should not be pursued. Instead, I urge the Government to bring on the review with the Attorney-General that has been promised, really get cracking on it, and look at all offences of the unlawful disclosure of witnesses’ names. I am sure that, if the Government’s officials have time after Christmas, they could draw up a list of all those categories pretty swiftly and get on with it, so they are all dealt with as a whole. I call on the Minister to give appropriate assurances in that respect.

--- Later in debate ---

My amendment selects 10 years rather than two in order to make the point that sexual penetration of a corpse is a much more serious offence than a two-year term implies. I claim no expertise in criminal law or sentencing, and wiser heads than mine will know how best to calibrate this offence. The purpose of tabling my amendment is to hear from the Government what they intend to do about the offence, and when they will do it. I am aware that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care informed the other place that the Government would review the offence, but he did not put a timetable on it. It is a fairly simple issue, and I hope my noble friend the Minister can be clear with the House about what the Government will do. I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. I am conscious that the Bill is on Report. This is a probing amendment, but it raises an important and pressing point. I hope I shall be short. I make four points.

If this offence is taken on its own, I think we would all agree that two years is plainly an insufficient maximum. Let us assume for these purposes that an offender comes before the court, is not a murderer and has not been a party to the death of any victim, but has had access to the bodies and has done what Mr Fuller did. It appears that he committed many offences of sexual penetration of corpses to which he had access by virtue of his employment. It may not be common, but we simply do not know what someone may do in the future. It is an appalling prospect, but we simply cannot exclude the possibility that a non-murderous necrophiliac might offend in a similar way. I suggest that we must do all we can both to deter and to punish in that event. If there is no murder but a large number of offences, is 10 years really too long a maximum sentence for someone such as Mr Fuller?

I talk about punishment because it is impossible to contemplate the horror of a relative who learns that their deceased loved one was defiled in this way. We as society owe it to such a relative, who is truly a victim, to show that we respect the dead and will mark such behaviour in a way that demonstrates that respect.

When I was approached by the noble Baroness to help her on this matter, I asked the Library to do some research. It very helpfully uncovered materials relating to the debate that took place in 2003. There was the Home Office’s consultation paper of July 2000, and section 8.6 addressed this issue. It disclosed that at that time, somewhat to the authors’ surprise, there was no offence that made necrophilia illegal. The consultation disclosed that there was

“no firm evidence of the nature or the extent of the problem”,

but agreed that

“human remains should be shown respect”

and noted that

“relatives and friends would be deeply distressed”.

In section 9.2, that consultation addressed sentences for a range of offences. From my reading of the Government’s response in November 2002—I do not criticise anyone for this—it appears that the authors at that point may have proceeded on the assumption that the offence would follow and be additional to a charge of murder or manslaughter. In other words, it was not looked at on the basis of a stand-alone sexual deviant.

If we are looking for a comparator, brief research has disclosed what happens in Canada, where the offence carries a maximum sentence of five years. I question whether even that is sufficient in the worst case, but I leave it to others to consider.

To conclude, this is a most unpleasant criminal offence. It must be reconsidered as a matter of priority. The current sentence for the stand-alone offence is simply too low. I urge the Government to address this with dispatch and not to delay once the immediate clamour over the Fuller case has died down. It is not difficult. It simply needs a suitably steep maximum sentence to mark its gravity.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 78DA, moved by my noble friend Lady Noakes, is in regard to the maximum penalty for the sexual penetration of a corpse. I first place on record my shock and horror at David Fuller’s horrifying offending; my thoughts are with the victims and their families. I assure the House that the Government are committed to looking in detail at what happened in this appalling circumstance to ensure that it simply never happens again.

As we have heard, just this afternoon Mr Fuller has been sentenced to a whole-life term of imprisonment. An investigation into other aspects of his offending is ongoing. The House will understand why I will not comment on the sentence passed in this case, but I thank all those in the police, the CPS and the wider criminal justice system for bringing him to justice.

The Government have announced an inquiry into the events that occurred in hospitals in Tunbridge Wells. This will help us understand how the offences took place without detection in the trust, identify any areas where early action by the trust was necessary and consider wider national issues, including for the NHS as a whole. The Government have already made good progress in establishing the independent inquiry. I understand from colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care that the inquiry’s chair, Sir Jonathan Michael, has developed draft terms of reference already and will engage with the families on them in the new year before they are published.

As well as that inquiry, I assure the House that the Ministry of Justice is reviewing the existing penalties available for the offence of sexual penetration of a corpse. The statutory maximum penalty for that offence is, as my noble friend indicated, two years’ imprisonment.

I reassure your Lordships, however, that that is the statutory maximum penalty for one offence. Where the offence is sentenced alongside other offences, each offence will be sentenced individually. The overall sentence passed will therefore reflect the totality of the offending behaviour.

I also pay tribute to my noble friend’s work in supporting the inclusion of this offence when it was debated during the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It was created primarily to deal with a different circumstance—different circumstances were in mind at the time. The focus was on the situation where a murderer abuses the corpse of their victim after death, and it was therefore perhaps thought likely that those sentenced for this offence would, for the most part, be sentenced at the same time for another offence, such as murder—which of course carries a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. As we have seen in the Fuller case, that is sometimes the case but may not always be so.

It is therefore right that, in view of this depraved—which is not a word I use often, but I think is appropriate in this context—and horrifying offending where we have seen an individual commit this offence independently of other offending in relation to that victim, we review the current statutory maximum penalty for the Section 70 offence. It may also be that this review, and the public inquiry into the offending in hospitals in Kent, will highlight other issues that need to be considered relating to the existing offences that deal with sexual abuse of corpses.

To be clear, I am not saying—I cannot this afternoon —that the Government will adopt the specific approach taken in this amendment, but neither do I rule out future changes to the maximum penalty. Rather, we are reviewing the maximum penalty in its context, and speaking with DHSC officials to ensure that learning from the inquiry into events in hospitals can be taken into account into our review of the penalty. That is the best way to reach a considered conclusion about how to amend Section 70 appropriately.

As to timing, the inquiry into the events at hospitals in Kent is due to publish interim findings in the new year, with the full report at a later stage. I will write to my noble friend, and place a copy in the Library, with any further information on the inquiry’s timescales as soon as that is available. Our review of the available maximum penalties is likely to follow a similar timescale, to ensure that findings from the inquiry can be taken into account in our conclusions. It is therefore important that we await the findings of the inquiry before amending the current legislation. I listened carefully to how my noble friend opened this short debate, and I therefore ask her formally to withdraw this amendment.